[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / cmp / cmp_protect.c

/*
 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include "cmp_local.h"

/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>

DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)

/*
 * This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
 *
 * Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
 * and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
 *
 * secret or pkey must be set. Attempts doing PBMAC in case 'secret' is set
 * and else signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
 * do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
 *
 * returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
                                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
                                          EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
    ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
    OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
    const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
    int len;
    size_t prot_part_der_len;
    unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
    size_t sig_len;
    unsigned char *protection = NULL;
    const void *ppval = NULL;
    int pptype = 0;
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
    ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
    const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
    EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
    int md_NID;
    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;

    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
        return NULL;

    /* construct data to be signed */
    prot_part.header = msg->header;
    prot_part.body = msg->body;

    len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
    if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
        goto end;
    }
    prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;

    if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
        goto end;
    }
    X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);

    if (secret != NULL) {
        if (ppval == NULL) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
            goto end;
        }
        if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
            goto end;
        }
        pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
        pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
        pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
        if (pbm == NULL) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
            goto end;
        }

        if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
                               secret->data, secret->length,
                               &protection, &sig_len))
            goto end;
    } else if (pkey != NULL) {
        /* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
        /* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */

        if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
                || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
                || (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
            goto end;
        }
        if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
                || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
                                        prot_part_der_len) <= 0
                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
                || (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
            goto end;
        }
    } else {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
        goto end;
    }

    if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
        goto end;
    /* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
    prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
    prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
        prot = NULL;
    }

 end:
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
    OPENSSL_free(protection);
    OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
    return prot;
}

int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
        return 0;

    if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
            && (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
        return 0;

    if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
        /* make sure that our own cert is included in the first position */
        if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_cert(msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, 1, 1))
            return 0;
        /* if we have untrusted certs, try to add intermediate certs */
        if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
            STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
                ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->cert);
            int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
                                                  1 /* no self-issued */,
                                                  1 /* no duplicates */, 0);

            sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
            if (res == 0)
                return 0;
        }
    }

    /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
    if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
                                     1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
        return 0;

    /* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
    if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
        sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
        msg->extraCerts = NULL;
    }
    return 1;
}

/*
 * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
 * the pbm settings in the context
 * returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
 */
static X509_ALGOR *create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
    X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
    unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
    int pbm_der_len;
    ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;

    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
        return NULL;

    alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
    pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
                             ctx->pbm_mac);
    pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
    if (alg == NULL || pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
        goto err;

    if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
        goto err;

    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
        goto err;
    OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);

    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
                    V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
    return alg;

 err:
    ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
    X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
    OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
    return NULL;
}

int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
        return 0;

    /*
     * For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
     * TODO: Consider also removing any pre-existing extraCerts.
     */
    X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
    msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
    msg->protection = NULL;

    if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
        return 1;

    /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
    if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
        if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
            goto err;
        if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
                && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
                                                ctx->referenceValue))
            goto err;
    } else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
        /*
         * use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
         * private key is given
         */
        const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
        int algNID = 0;
        ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;

        /* make sure that key and certificate match */
        if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
            goto err;
        }

        if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
            goto err;
        if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
                                    EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
            goto err;
        }
        if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
            goto err;
        if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg, alg,
                             V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
            ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
            goto err;
        }

        /*
         * set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
         * to section 5.1.1
         */
        subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert);
        if (subjKeyIDStr == NULL)
            subjKeyIDStr = ctx->referenceValue; /* fallback */
        if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
                && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
            goto err;
    } else {
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
        goto err;
    }
    if ((msg->protection =
         ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
        goto err;

    /*
     * If present, add ctx->cert followed by its chain as far as possible.
     * Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
     * even if not needed to validate the protection
     * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
     */
    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
        goto err;

    /*
     * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
     * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
     * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
     */
    if (ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
            && msg->header->senderKID == NULL)
        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
    else
        return 1;

 err:
    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
    return 0;
}
Commit	Line	Data
3dbc5156	1	/*
33388b44	2	* Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3dbc5156 DDO	3	* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
	4	* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
	5	*
	6	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
	7	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
	8	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
	9	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
	10	*/
	11
	12	#include "cmp_local.h"
	13
	14	/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
	15	#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
	16	#include <openssl/cmp.h>
	17	#include <openssl/crmf.h>
	18	#include <openssl/err.h>
	19	#include <openssl/x509.h>
	20
852c2ed2 RS	21	DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
852c2ed2 RS	22
3dbc5156 DDO	23	/*
	24	* This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
	25	*
	26	* Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
	27	* and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
	28	*
ce0465ed DDO	29	* secret or pkey must be set. Attempts doing PBMAC in case 'secret' is set
ce0465ed DDO	30	* and else signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
3dbc5156 DDO	31	* do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
	32	*
	33	* returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
	34	*/
	35	ASN1_BIT_STRING ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG msg,
	36	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
	37	EVP_PKEY *pkey)
	38	{
	39	ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
642f60d8	40	OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
3dbc5156 DDO	41	const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
	42	int len;
	43	size_t prot_part_der_len;
	44	unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
	45	size_t sig_len;
	46	unsigned char *protection = NULL;
	47	const void *ppval = NULL;
	48	int pptype = 0;
	49	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
	50	ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
	51	const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
	52	EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
	53	int md_NID;
	54	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
	55
	56	if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
	57	return NULL;
	58
	59	/* construct data to be signed */
	60	prot_part.header = msg->header;
	61	prot_part.body = msg->body;
	62
642f60d8	63	len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
3dbc5156 DDO	64	if (len < 0 \|\| prot_part_der == NULL) {
	65	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
	66	goto end;
	67	}
	68	prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
	69
	70	if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
	71	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
	72	goto end;
	73	}
	74	X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
	75
ce0465ed	76	if (secret != NULL) {
3dbc5156 DDO	77	if (ppval == NULL) {
	78	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
	79	goto end;
	80	}
	81	if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
	82	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
	83	goto end;
	84	}
	85	pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
	86	pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
	87	pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
	88	if (pbm == NULL) {
	89	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
	90	goto end;
	91	}
	92
	93	if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
	94	secret->data, secret->length,
	95	&protection, &sig_len))
	96	goto end;
ce0465ed	97	} else if (pkey != NULL) {
3dbc5156 DDO	98	/* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
	99	/* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */
	100
	101	if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
	102	\|\| (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
	103	\|\| (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
	104	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
	105	goto end;
	106	}
	107	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
	108	\|\| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
	109	prot_part_der_len) <= 0
	110	\|\| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
	111	\|\| (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
	112	\|\| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
	113	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
	114	goto end;
	115	}
	116	} else {
	117	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
	118	goto end;
	119	}
	120
	121	if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
	122	goto end;
	123	/* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
	124	prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT \| 0x07);
	125	prot->flags \|= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
	126	if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
	127	ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
	128	prot = NULL;
	129	}
	130
	131	end:
	132	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
	133	EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
	134	OPENSSL_free(protection);
	135	OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
	136	return prot;
	137	}
	138
	139	int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
	140	{
	141	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
	142	return 0;
	143
	144	if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
	145	&& (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
	146	return 0;
	147
63f1883d	148	if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
143be474	149	/* make sure that our own cert is included in the first position */
63f1883d	150	if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_cert(msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, 1, 1))
3dbc5156	151	return 0;
143be474	152	/* if we have untrusted certs, try to add intermediate certs */
3dbc5156 DDO	153	if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
3dbc5156 DDO	154	STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
63f1883d	155	ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->cert);
3dbc5156	156	int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
235595c4	157	1 /* no self-issued */,
3dbc5156	158	1 /* no duplicates */, 0);
143be474	159
3dbc5156 DDO	160	sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
	161	if (res == 0)
	162	return 0;
	163	}
	164	}
	165
	166	/* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
	167	if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
	168	1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
	169	return 0;
	170
	171	/* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
	172	if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
	173	sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
	174	msg->extraCerts = NULL;
	175	}
	176	return 1;
	177	}
	178
	179	/*
	180	* Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
	181	* the pbm settings in the context
	182	* returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
	183	*/
	184	static X509_ALGOR create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx)
	185	{
	186	X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
	187	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
	188	unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
	189	int pbm_der_len;
	190	ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
	191
	192	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
	193	return NULL;
	194
	195	alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
	196	pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
	197	ctx->pbm_mac);
	198	pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
	199	if (alg == NULL \|\| pbm == NULL \|\| pbm_str == NULL)
	200	goto err;
	201
	202	if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
	203	goto err;
	204
	205	if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
	206	goto err;
	207	OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
	208
	209	X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
	210	V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
	211	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
	212	return alg;
	213
	214	err:
	215	ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
	216	X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
	217	OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
	218	OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
	219	return NULL;
	220	}
	221
	222	int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG msg)
	223	{
224	if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
225	return 0;
226
143be474 DDO	227	/*
	228	* For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
	229	* TODO: Consider also removing any pre-existing extraCerts.
	230	*/
	231	X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
	232	msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
	233	ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
	234	msg->protection = NULL;
	235
3dbc5156 DDO	236	if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
	237	return 1;
	238
	239	/* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
	240	if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
	241	if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
	242	goto err;
	243	if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
	244	&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
	245	ctx->referenceValue))
	246	goto err;
63f1883d	247	} else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
3dbc5156 DDO	248	/*
	249	* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
	250	* private key is given
	251	*/
143be474 DDO	252	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
	253	int algNID = 0;
	254	ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;
3dbc5156	255
143be474	256	/* make sure that key and certificate match */
63f1883d	257	if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
143be474 DDO	258	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
	259	goto err;
	260	}
3dbc5156	261
12bbcee2 DDO	262	if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
12bbcee2 DDO	263	goto err;
143be474 DDO	264	if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
	265	EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
	266	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
3dbc5156 DDO	267	goto err;
3dbc5156 DDO	268	}
143be474 DDO	269	if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
	270	goto err;
	271	if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg, alg,
	272	V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
	273	ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
	274	goto err;
	275	}
	276
	277	/*
	278	* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
	279	* to section 5.1.1
	280	*/
63f1883d	281	subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert);
143be474 DDO	282	if (subjKeyIDStr == NULL)
	283	subjKeyIDStr = ctx->referenceValue; /* fallback */
	284	if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
	285	&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
	286	goto err;
	287	} else {
	288	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
	289	goto err;
3dbc5156	290	}
143be474 DDO	291	if ((msg->protection =
	292	ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
	293	goto err;
	294
	295	/*
63f1883d	296	* If present, add ctx->cert followed by its chain as far as possible.
143be474 DDO	297	* Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
	298	* even if not needed to validate the protection
	299	* the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
	300	*/
	301	if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
	302	goto err;
3dbc5156	303
cfca56df DDO	304	/*
	305	* As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
	306	* to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
	307	* the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
	308	*/
cfca56df DDO	309	if (ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
	310	&& msg->header->senderKID == NULL)
	311	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
	312	else
	313	return 1;
	314
3dbc5156 DDO	315	err:
	316	CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
	317	return 0;
	318	}