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a6aa71ff | 1 | /* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
863fe2ec BM |
58 | /* ==================================================================== |
59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
60 | * | |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
67 | * | |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 111 | |
2ace287d | 112 | #ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG |
c1e744b9 BM |
113 | # ifndef NDEBUG |
114 | # define NDEBUG | |
115 | # endif | |
116 | #endif | |
117 | ||
118 | #include <assert.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 119 | #include <stdio.h> |
a224de3f | 120 | #include <string.h> |
17e3dd1c | 121 | |
7e701817 | 122 | #include "openssl/e_os.h" |
17e3dd1c | 123 | |
8ad7635e UM |
124 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
125 | #include "rand_lcl.h" | |
126 | ||
ec577822 | 127 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
eb952088 | 128 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
d02b48c6 | 129 | |
e64dceab UM |
130 | #ifdef BN_DEBUG |
131 | # define PREDICT | |
132 | #endif | |
133 | ||
dfeab068 | 134 | /* #define PREDICT 1 */ |
d02b48c6 RE |
135 | |
136 | #define STATE_SIZE 1023 | |
137 | static int state_num=0,state_index=0; | |
58964a49 | 138 | static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
d02b48c6 | 139 | static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
dfeab068 | 140 | static long md_count[2]={0,0}; |
853f757e | 141 | static double entropy=0; |
4ec2d4d2 | 142 | static int initialized=0; |
d02b48c6 | 143 | |
a4125514 RL |
144 | /* This should be set to 1 only when ssleay_rand_add() is called inside |
145 | an already locked state, so it doesn't try to lock and thereby cause | |
146 | a hang. And it should always be reset back to 0 before unlocking. */ | |
147 | static int add_do_not_lock=0; | |
148 | ||
e64dceab UM |
149 | #ifdef PREDICT |
150 | int rand_predictable=0; | |
151 | #endif | |
152 | ||
e778802f | 153 | const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
d02b48c6 | 154 | |
dfeab068 | 155 | static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); |
bf5dcd13 | 156 | static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); |
853f757e | 157 | static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); |
eb952088 | 158 | static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
373b575f | 159 | static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
5eb8ca4d | 160 | static int ssleay_rand_status(void); |
dfeab068 | 161 | |
651d0aff | 162 | RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ |
dfeab068 RE |
163 | ssleay_rand_seed, |
164 | ssleay_rand_bytes, | |
165 | ssleay_rand_cleanup, | |
eb952088 | 166 | ssleay_rand_add, |
373b575f | 167 | ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, |
5eb8ca4d | 168 | ssleay_rand_status |
dfeab068 RE |
169 | }; |
170 | ||
6b691a5c | 171 | RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) |
dfeab068 | 172 | { |
651d0aff | 173 | return(&rand_ssleay_meth); |
dfeab068 RE |
174 | } |
175 | ||
6b691a5c | 176 | static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) |
d02b48c6 | 177 | { |
58964a49 | 178 | memset(state,0,sizeof(state)); |
d02b48c6 RE |
179 | state_num=0; |
180 | state_index=0; | |
181 | memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
dfeab068 RE |
182 | md_count[0]=0; |
183 | md_count[1]=0; | |
eb952088 | 184 | entropy=0; |
d3093944 | 185 | initialized=0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
186 | } |
187 | ||
853f757e | 188 | static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) |
d02b48c6 | 189 | { |
c1e744b9 BM |
190 | int i,j,k,st_idx; |
191 | long md_c[2]; | |
192 | unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
193 | MD_CTX m; |
194 | ||
c1e744b9 | 195 | /* |
60b52453 | 196 | * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) |
c1e744b9 | 197 | * |
c88a900f | 198 | * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for |
60b52453 | 199 | * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash |
0b5cfe32 | 200 | * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function |
c1e744b9 BM |
201 | * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' |
202 | * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as | |
203 | * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' | |
204 | * (which is incremented after each use). | |
205 | * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the | |
60b52453 UM |
206 | * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the |
207 | * hash function. | |
c1e744b9 BM |
208 | */ |
209 | ||
a4125514 | 210 | if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
d02b48c6 | 211 | st_idx=state_index; |
d02b48c6 | 212 | |
c1e744b9 BM |
213 | /* use our own copies of the counters so that even |
214 | * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the | |
215 | * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_ | |
216 | * difference */ | |
217 | md_c[0] = md_count[0]; | |
218 | md_c[1] = md_count[1]; | |
219 | ||
220 | memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); | |
221 | ||
222 | /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ | |
223 | state_index += num; | |
58964a49 | 224 | if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) |
d02b48c6 RE |
225 | { |
226 | state_index%=STATE_SIZE; | |
227 | state_num=STATE_SIZE; | |
228 | } | |
229 | else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) | |
230 | { | |
231 | if (state_index > state_num) | |
232 | state_num=state_index; | |
233 | } | |
c1e744b9 BM |
234 | /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
235 | ||
236 | /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] | |
237 | * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them | |
238 | * as well */ | |
239 | ||
240 | md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); | |
241 | ||
a4125514 | 242 | if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
d02b48c6 RE |
243 | |
244 | for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) | |
245 | { | |
246 | j=(num-i); | |
247 | j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j; | |
248 | ||
249 | MD_Init(&m); | |
c1e744b9 | 250 | MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
d02b48c6 RE |
251 | k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE; |
252 | if (k > 0) | |
253 | { | |
254 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); | |
255 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); | |
256 | } | |
257 | else | |
258 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); | |
259 | ||
260 | MD_Update(&m,buf,j); | |
c1e744b9 BM |
261 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
262 | MD_Final(local_md,&m); | |
263 | md_c[1]++; | |
d02b48c6 | 264 | |
e778802f | 265 | buf=(const char *)buf + j; |
d02b48c6 RE |
266 | |
267 | for (k=0; k<j; k++) | |
268 | { | |
c1e744b9 BM |
269 | /* Parallel threads may interfere with this, |
270 | * but always each byte of the new state is | |
271 | * the XOR of some previous value of its | |
272 | * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost). | |
273 | * Alway using locking could hurt performance more | |
274 | * than necessary given that conflicts occur only | |
275 | * when the total seeding is longer than the random | |
276 | * state. */ | |
277 | state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k]; | |
d02b48c6 | 278 | if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) |
d02b48c6 | 279 | st_idx=0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
280 | } |
281 | } | |
282 | memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m)); | |
c1e744b9 | 283 | |
a4125514 | 284 | if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
c1e744b9 BM |
285 | /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that |
286 | * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for | |
287 | * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as | |
288 | * much entropy as fits into md. */ | |
289 | for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++) | |
290 | { | |
291 | md[k] ^= local_md[k]; | |
292 | } | |
c6709c6b BM |
293 | if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ |
294 | entropy += add; | |
a4125514 | 295 | if (!add_do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
c1e744b9 | 296 | |
bc36ee62 | 297 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) |
c1e744b9 BM |
298 | assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); |
299 | #endif | |
eb952088 UM |
300 | } |
301 | ||
302 | static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) | |
303 | { | |
304 | ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
305 | } |
306 | ||
eb952088 | 307 | static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
d02b48c6 | 308 | { |
361ee973 | 309 | static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 310 | int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; |
eb952088 | 311 | int ok; |
c1e744b9 BM |
312 | long md_c[2]; |
313 | unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
d02b48c6 | 314 | MD_CTX m; |
9a1e34e5 | 315 | #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
62ac2938 | 316 | pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); |
c1e744b9 | 317 | #endif |
361ee973 | 318 | int do_stir_pool = 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
319 | |
320 | #ifdef PREDICT | |
e64dceab UM |
321 | if (rand_predictable) |
322 | { | |
323 | static unsigned char val=0; | |
d02b48c6 | 324 | |
e64dceab UM |
325 | for (i=0; i<num; i++) |
326 | buf[i]=val++; | |
327 | return(1); | |
328 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
329 | #endif |
330 | ||
c1e744b9 | 331 | /* |
2c8aeddc | 332 | * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) |
c1e744b9 | 333 | * |
c88a900f | 334 | * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: |
c1e744b9 | 335 | * |
c88a900f BM |
336 | * Input into the hash function the top 10 bytes from the |
337 | * local 'md' (which is initialized from the global 'md' | |
338 | * before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are | |
339 | * to be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the | |
c1e744b9 | 340 | * 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output |
c88a900f BM |
341 | * (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are |
342 | * returned to the caller and the bottom (up to) 10 bytes are xored | |
c1e744b9 BM |
343 | * into the 'state'. |
344 | * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the | |
2c8aeddc BM |
345 | * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' |
346 | * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the | |
347 | * global 'md'. | |
c1e744b9 BM |
348 | */ |
349 | ||
4ec2d4d2 | 350 | if (!initialized) |
8ad7635e UM |
351 | RAND_poll(); |
352 | ||
353 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
a4125514 RL |
354 | add_do_not_lock = 1; /* Since we call ssleay_rand_add while in |
355 | this locked state. */ | |
d02b48c6 | 356 | |
8ad7635e | 357 | initialized = 1; |
361ee973 BM |
358 | if (!stirred_pool) |
359 | do_stir_pool = 1; | |
360 | ||
eb952088 | 361 | ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); |
c6709c6b BM |
362 | if (!ok) |
363 | { | |
364 | /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing | |
365 | * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new | |
366 | * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate. | |
367 | * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to | |
368 | * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious | |
369 | * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness. | |
361ee973 BM |
370 | * |
371 | * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before | |
372 | * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected | |
373 | * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the | |
374 | * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached. | |
c6709c6b BM |
375 | */ |
376 | entropy -= num; | |
377 | if (entropy < 0) | |
378 | entropy = 0; | |
379 | } | |
eb952088 | 380 | |
361ee973 BM |
381 | if (do_stir_pool) |
382 | { | |
383 | /* Our output function chains only half of 'md', so we better | |
384 | * make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly distributed' | |
385 | * through 'state', our randomness pool. The input function | |
386 | * (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more | |
387 | * suitable for this purpose. | |
388 | */ | |
389 | ||
390 | int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ | |
391 | while (n > 0) | |
392 | { | |
393 | #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 | |
394 | # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." | |
395 | #endif | |
396 | #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ | |
397 | /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that | |
398 | * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ | |
399 | ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); | |
400 | n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; | |
401 | } | |
402 | if (ok) | |
403 | stirred_pool = 1; | |
404 | } | |
405 | ||
d02b48c6 RE |
406 | st_idx=state_index; |
407 | st_num=state_num; | |
c1e744b9 BM |
408 | md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
409 | md_c[1] = md_count[1]; | |
410 | memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); | |
411 | ||
d02b48c6 RE |
412 | state_index+=num; |
413 | if (state_index > state_num) | |
c1e744b9 BM |
414 | state_index %= state_num; |
415 | ||
416 | /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num] | |
417 | * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */ | |
d02b48c6 | 418 | |
c1e744b9 | 419 | md_count[0] += 1; |
a4125514 RL |
420 | |
421 | add_do_not_lock = 0; /* If this would ever be forgotten, we can | |
422 | expect any evil god to eat our souls. */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
423 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
424 | ||
425 | while (num > 0) | |
426 | { | |
427 | j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num; | |
428 | num-=j; | |
429 | MD_Init(&m); | |
9a1e34e5 | 430 | #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
62ac2938 BM |
431 | if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ |
432 | { | |
433 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid); | |
434 | curr_pid = 0; | |
435 | } | |
436 | #endif | |
c1e744b9 BM |
437 | MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); |
438 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
439 | #ifndef PURIFY |
440 | MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */ | |
441 | #endif | |
442 | k=(st_idx+j)-st_num; | |
443 | if (k > 0) | |
444 | { | |
445 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); | |
446 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); | |
447 | } | |
448 | else | |
449 | MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); | |
c1e744b9 | 450 | MD_Final(local_md,&m); |
d02b48c6 RE |
451 | |
452 | for (i=0; i<j; i++) | |
453 | { | |
c1e744b9 BM |
454 | state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */ |
455 | *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
456 | if (st_idx >= st_num) |
457 | st_idx=0; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
458 | } |
459 | } | |
460 | ||
461 | MD_Init(&m); | |
c1e744b9 BM |
462 | MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
463 | MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
464 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
465 | MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
466 | MD_Final(md,&m); | |
c1e744b9 BM |
467 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
468 | ||
d02b48c6 | 469 | memset(&m,0,sizeof(m)); |
eb952088 UM |
470 | if (ok) |
471 | return(1); | |
472 | else | |
473 | { | |
474 | RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); | |
3b3bc455 RL |
475 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " |
476 | "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); | |
eb952088 UM |
477 | return(0); |
478 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
479 | } |
480 | ||
373b575f UM |
481 | /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not |
482 | unpredictable */ | |
483 | static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) | |
484 | { | |
485 | int ret, err; | |
486 | ||
487 | ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num); | |
488 | if (ret == 0) | |
489 | { | |
490 | err = ERR_peek_error(); | |
491 | if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND && | |
492 | ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED) | |
493 | (void)ERR_get_error(); | |
494 | } | |
495 | return (ret); | |
496 | } | |
497 | ||
5eb8ca4d | 498 | static int ssleay_rand_status(void) |
4ec2d4d2 | 499 | { |
b841e0ac BM |
500 | int ret; |
501 | ||
4ec2d4d2 | 502 | if (!initialized) |
8ad7635e | 503 | RAND_poll(); |
7ae634de | 504 | |
8ad7635e UM |
505 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
506 | initialized = 1; | |
507 | ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; | |
7ae634de RL |
508 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
509 | ||
b841e0ac | 510 | return ret; |
4ec2d4d2 | 511 | } |