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58964a49 RE |
1 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ |
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
3 | * All rights reserved. | |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
ec577822 BM |
61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
62 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | |
63 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
0b13e9f0 | 64 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
5270e702 | 65 | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
0b13e9f0 | 66 | #endif |
58964a49 | 67 | |
c1cd88a0 DSH |
68 | #ifndef RSA_NULL |
69 | ||
29c1f061 | 70 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
58964a49 | 71 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
29c1f061 | 72 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
58964a49 | 73 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
29c1f061 | 74 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
58964a49 | 75 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
29c1f061 | 76 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
58964a49 | 77 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
29c1f061 | 78 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa); |
58964a49 RE |
79 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); |
80 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); | |
58964a49 RE |
81 | static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ |
82 | "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", | |
83 | RSA_eay_public_encrypt, | |
24cff6ce BM |
84 | RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ |
85 | RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ | |
58964a49 RE |
86 | RSA_eay_private_decrypt, |
87 | RSA_eay_mod_exp, | |
123d24d6 | 88 | BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ |
58964a49 RE |
89 | RSA_eay_init, |
90 | RSA_eay_finish, | |
be6d7700 | 91 | 0, /* flags */ |
58964a49 | 92 | NULL, |
be6d7700 | 93 | 0, /* rsa_sign */ |
2814c629 GT |
94 | 0, /* rsa_verify */ |
95 | NULL /* rsa_keygen */ | |
58964a49 RE |
96 | }; |
97 | ||
7be7c2ed | 98 | const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) |
58964a49 RE |
99 | { |
100 | return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); | |
101 | } | |
102 | ||
79221bc2 GT |
103 | /* Static helper to reduce oodles of code duplication. As a slight |
104 | * optimisation, the "MONT_HELPER() macro must be used as front-end to this | |
105 | * function, to prevent unnecessary function calls - there is an initial test | |
106 | * that is performed by the macro-generated code. */ | |
107 | static int rsa_eay_mont_helper(BN_MONT_CTX **ptr, const BIGNUM *modulus, BN_CTX *ctx) | |
108 | { | |
109 | BN_MONT_CTX *bn_mont_ctx; | |
110 | if((bn_mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) | |
111 | return 0; | |
112 | if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx, modulus, ctx)) | |
113 | { | |
114 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
117 | if (*ptr == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ | |
118 | { | |
119 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | |
120 | if (*ptr == NULL) /* check again in the lock to stop races */ | |
121 | { | |
122 | *ptr = bn_mont_ctx; | |
123 | bn_mont_ctx = NULL; | |
124 | } | |
125 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | |
126 | } | |
127 | if (bn_mont_ctx) | |
128 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); | |
129 | return 1; | |
130 | } | |
131 | /* Usage example; | |
132 | * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); | |
133 | */ | |
134 | #define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \ | |
135 | if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \ | |
136 | !rsa_eay_mont_helper(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \ | |
137 | (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \ | |
138 | err_instr | |
139 | ||
29c1f061 | 140 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
6b691a5c | 141 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
58964a49 | 142 | { |
dfeab068 | 143 | BIGNUM f,ret; |
58964a49 RE |
144 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; |
145 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | |
146 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | |
147 | ||
dfeab068 RE |
148 | BN_init(&f); |
149 | BN_init(&ret); | |
58964a49 RE |
150 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
151 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | |
26a3a48d | 152 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
58964a49 RE |
153 | { |
154 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
155 | goto err; | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
158 | switch (padding) | |
159 | { | |
160 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
161 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); | |
162 | break; | |
cf1b7d96 | 163 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
a4949896 BL |
164 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
165 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); | |
166 | break; | |
79df9d62 | 167 | #endif |
58964a49 RE |
168 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
169 | i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); | |
170 | break; | |
171 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | |
172 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | |
173 | break; | |
174 | default: | |
175 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | |
176 | goto err; | |
177 | } | |
178 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | |
179 | ||
dfeab068 | 180 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; |
58964a49 | 181 | |
24cff6ce BM |
182 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) |
183 | { | |
184 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | |
185 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | |
186 | goto err; | |
187 | } | |
188 | ||
79221bc2 GT |
189 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
190 | ||
cb78486d | 191 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, |
03f8b042 | 192 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
58964a49 RE |
193 | |
194 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | |
195 | * length of the modulus */ | |
dfeab068 RE |
196 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); |
197 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | |
58964a49 RE |
198 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) |
199 | to[k]=0; | |
200 | ||
201 | r=num; | |
202 | err: | |
203 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | |
dfeab068 RE |
204 | BN_clear_free(&f); |
205 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | |
58964a49 RE |
206 | if (buf != NULL) |
207 | { | |
4579924b | 208 | OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
26a3a48d | 209 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
58964a49 RE |
210 | } |
211 | return(r); | |
212 | } | |
213 | ||
24cff6ce | 214 | /* signing */ |
29c1f061 | 215 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
6b691a5c | 216 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
58964a49 | 217 | { |
dfeab068 | 218 | BIGNUM f,ret; |
58964a49 RE |
219 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; |
220 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | |
221 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | |
222 | ||
dfeab068 RE |
223 | BN_init(&f); |
224 | BN_init(&ret); | |
225 | ||
58964a49 RE |
226 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
227 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | |
26a3a48d | 228 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
58964a49 RE |
229 | { |
230 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
231 | goto err; | |
232 | } | |
233 | ||
234 | switch (padding) | |
235 | { | |
236 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
237 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); | |
238 | break; | |
239 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | |
240 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | |
241 | break; | |
242 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | |
243 | default: | |
244 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | |
245 | goto err; | |
246 | } | |
247 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | |
248 | ||
dfeab068 | 249 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; |
24cff6ce BM |
250 | |
251 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | |
252 | { | |
253 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | |
254 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | |
255 | goto err; | |
256 | } | |
58964a49 RE |
257 | |
258 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | |
259 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | |
260 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | |
dfeab068 | 261 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; |
58964a49 | 262 | |
770d19b8 DSH |
263 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
264 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | |
58964a49 RE |
265 | (rsa->q != NULL) && |
266 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | |
267 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | |
770d19b8 | 268 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) |
cb78486d | 269 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } |
58964a49 RE |
270 | else |
271 | { | |
b12753df GT |
272 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
273 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx, | |
274 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | |
58964a49 RE |
275 | } |
276 | ||
277 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | |
dfeab068 | 278 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; |
58964a49 RE |
279 | |
280 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | |
281 | * length of the modulus */ | |
dfeab068 RE |
282 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); |
283 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | |
58964a49 RE |
284 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) |
285 | to[k]=0; | |
286 | ||
287 | r=num; | |
288 | err: | |
289 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | |
dfeab068 RE |
290 | BN_clear_free(&ret); |
291 | BN_clear_free(&f); | |
58964a49 RE |
292 | if (buf != NULL) |
293 | { | |
4579924b | 294 | OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
26a3a48d | 295 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
58964a49 RE |
296 | } |
297 | return(r); | |
298 | } | |
299 | ||
29c1f061 | 300 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
6b691a5c | 301 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
58964a49 | 302 | { |
dfeab068 | 303 | BIGNUM f,ret; |
58964a49 RE |
304 | int j,num=0,r= -1; |
305 | unsigned char *p; | |
306 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | |
307 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | |
308 | ||
dfeab068 RE |
309 | BN_init(&f); |
310 | BN_init(&ret); | |
58964a49 RE |
311 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); |
312 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | |
313 | ||
314 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | |
315 | ||
26a3a48d | 316 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
58964a49 RE |
317 | { |
318 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
319 | goto err; | |
320 | } | |
321 | ||
657e60fa | 322 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things |
58964a49 RE |
323 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ |
324 | if (flen > num) | |
325 | { | |
326 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | |
327 | goto err; | |
328 | } | |
329 | ||
330 | /* make data into a big number */ | |
dfeab068 | 331 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; |
58964a49 | 332 | |
24cff6ce BM |
333 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) |
334 | { | |
335 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | |
336 | goto err; | |
337 | } | |
338 | ||
58964a49 RE |
339 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) |
340 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | |
341 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | |
dfeab068 | 342 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; |
58964a49 RE |
343 | |
344 | /* do the decrypt */ | |
770d19b8 DSH |
345 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
346 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | |
58964a49 RE |
347 | (rsa->q != NULL) && |
348 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | |
349 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | |
770d19b8 | 350 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) |
cb78486d | 351 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } |
58964a49 RE |
352 | else |
353 | { | |
b12753df GT |
354 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
355 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx, | |
356 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) | |
58964a49 RE |
357 | goto err; |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
360 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | |
dfeab068 | 361 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; |
58964a49 RE |
362 | |
363 | p=buf; | |
dfeab068 | 364 | j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ |
58964a49 RE |
365 | |
366 | switch (padding) | |
367 | { | |
368 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
dfeab068 | 369 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); |
58964a49 | 370 | break; |
cf1b7d96 | 371 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
a4949896 BL |
372 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
373 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); | |
374 | break; | |
79df9d62 | 375 | #endif |
a4949896 | 376 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
dfeab068 | 377 | r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); |
58964a49 RE |
378 | break; |
379 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | |
dfeab068 | 380 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); |
58964a49 RE |
381 | break; |
382 | default: | |
383 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | |
384 | goto err; | |
385 | } | |
386 | if (r < 0) | |
387 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | |
388 | ||
389 | err: | |
390 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | |
dfeab068 RE |
391 | BN_clear_free(&f); |
392 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | |
58964a49 RE |
393 | if (buf != NULL) |
394 | { | |
4579924b | 395 | OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
26a3a48d | 396 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
58964a49 RE |
397 | } |
398 | return(r); | |
399 | } | |
400 | ||
24cff6ce | 401 | /* signature verification */ |
29c1f061 | 402 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
6b691a5c | 403 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
58964a49 | 404 | { |
dfeab068 | 405 | BIGNUM f,ret; |
58964a49 RE |
406 | int i,num=0,r= -1; |
407 | unsigned char *p; | |
408 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | |
409 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | |
410 | ||
dfeab068 RE |
411 | BN_init(&f); |
412 | BN_init(&ret); | |
58964a49 RE |
413 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); |
414 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | |
415 | ||
416 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | |
26a3a48d | 417 | buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
58964a49 RE |
418 | if (buf == NULL) |
419 | { | |
420 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
421 | goto err; | |
422 | } | |
423 | ||
657e60fa | 424 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things |
58964a49 RE |
425 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ |
426 | if (flen > num) | |
427 | { | |
428 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | |
429 | goto err; | |
430 | } | |
431 | ||
dfeab068 | 432 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; |
24cff6ce BM |
433 | |
434 | if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) | |
435 | { | |
436 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | |
437 | goto err; | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
79221bc2 GT |
440 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
441 | ||
cb78486d | 442 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, |
03f8b042 | 443 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
58964a49 RE |
444 | |
445 | p=buf; | |
dfeab068 | 446 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); |
58964a49 RE |
447 | |
448 | switch (padding) | |
449 | { | |
450 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | |
dfeab068 | 451 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); |
58964a49 RE |
452 | break; |
453 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | |
dfeab068 | 454 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); |
58964a49 RE |
455 | break; |
456 | default: | |
457 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | |
458 | goto err; | |
459 | } | |
460 | if (r < 0) | |
461 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | |
462 | ||
463 | err: | |
464 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | |
dfeab068 RE |
465 | BN_clear_free(&f); |
466 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | |
58964a49 RE |
467 | if (buf != NULL) |
468 | { | |
4579924b | 469 | OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
26a3a48d | 470 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
58964a49 RE |
471 | } |
472 | return(r); | |
473 | } | |
474 | ||
29c1f061 | 475 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) |
58964a49 | 476 | { |
6a5b52ef | 477 | BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy; |
58964a49 RE |
478 | int ret=0; |
479 | BN_CTX *ctx; | |
480 | ||
dfeab068 RE |
481 | BN_init(&m1); |
482 | BN_init(&r1); | |
6a5b52ef | 483 | BN_init(&vrfy); |
9cdf87f1 | 484 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
58964a49 | 485 | |
79221bc2 GT |
486 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); |
487 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); | |
b12753df | 488 | MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
126fe085 | 489 | |
dfeab068 | 490 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; |
cb78486d | 491 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, |
03f8b042 | 492 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; |
58964a49 | 493 | |
dfeab068 | 494 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; |
cb78486d | 495 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, |
03f8b042 | 496 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; |
58964a49 | 497 | |
dfeab068 RE |
498 | if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; |
499 | /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | |
500 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ | |
b53e44e5 | 501 | if (BN_get_sign(r0)) |
dfeab068 | 502 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; |
58964a49 | 503 | |
dfeab068 RE |
504 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; |
505 | if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | |
abd4c915 DSH |
506 | /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of |
507 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | |
508 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | |
509 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | |
510 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | |
511 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | |
512 | */ | |
b53e44e5 | 513 | if (BN_get_sign(r0)) |
abd4c915 | 514 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; |
dfeab068 RE |
515 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; |
516 | if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; | |
58964a49 | 517 | |
6a5b52ef UM |
518 | if (rsa->e && rsa->n) |
519 | { | |
79221bc2 | 520 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
81d1998e GT |
521 | /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation |
522 | * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of | |
523 | * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check | |
524 | * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ | |
525 | if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err; | |
526 | if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; | |
b53e44e5 | 527 | if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy)) |
81d1998e GT |
528 | if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; |
529 | if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy)) | |
530 | /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak | |
531 | * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) | |
532 | * mod_exp and return that instead. */ | |
b12753df GT |
533 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx, |
534 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | |
6a5b52ef | 535 | } |
58964a49 RE |
536 | ret=1; |
537 | err: | |
dfeab068 RE |
538 | BN_clear_free(&m1); |
539 | BN_clear_free(&r1); | |
6a5b52ef | 540 | BN_clear_free(&vrfy); |
e03ddfae | 541 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
58964a49 RE |
542 | return(ret); |
543 | } | |
544 | ||
6b691a5c | 545 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) |
58964a49 RE |
546 | { |
547 | rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; | |
548 | return(1); | |
549 | } | |
550 | ||
6b691a5c | 551 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) |
58964a49 | 552 | { |
03f8b042 BL |
553 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) |
554 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); | |
555 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) | |
556 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); | |
557 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) | |
558 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); | |
58964a49 RE |
559 | return(1); |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
c1cd88a0 | 562 | #endif |