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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
c99935e3 | 60 | #include <ctype.h> |
b39fc560 | 61 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
62 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
63 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
64 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
e947f396 | 65 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
2743e38c | 66 | #include "internal/x509_int.h" |
d02b48c6 | 67 | |
ccd86b68 | 68 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
69 | { |
70 | int i; | |
5cf6abd8 | 71 | const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
0f113f3e | 72 | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
73 | ai = &a->cert_info; |
74 | bi = &b->cert_info; | |
f422a514 | 75 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); |
0f113f3e MC |
76 | if (i) |
77 | return (i); | |
78 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); | |
79 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 80 | |
cf1b7d96 | 81 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
6b691a5c | 82 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
83 | { |
84 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
85 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
86 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
87 | char *f; | |
88 | ||
89 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
5cf6abd8 | 90 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); |
0f113f3e MC |
91 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) |
92 | goto err; | |
93 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) | |
94 | goto err; | |
95 | OPENSSL_free(f); | |
96 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
97 | (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber->data, |
98 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber->length)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
99 | goto err; |
100 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) | |
101 | goto err; | |
102 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
103 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
104 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
105 | err: | |
106 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
107 | return (ret); | |
108 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 109 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 110 | |
ccd86b68 | 111 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 112 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 113 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 114 | } |
d02b48c6 | 115 | |
ccd86b68 | 116 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 117 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 118 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject)); |
0f113f3e | 119 | } |
d02b48c6 | 120 | |
ccd86b68 | 121 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e | 122 | { |
7aef39a7 | 123 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 124 | } |
d02b48c6 | 125 | |
edc54021 | 126 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
127 | { |
128 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | |
129 | } | |
edc54021 | 130 | |
6b691a5c | 131 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 132 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 133 | return (a->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 134 | } |
d02b48c6 | 135 | |
6b691a5c | 136 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 137 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 138 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 139 | } |
d02b48c6 | 140 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
141 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
142 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 143 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 144 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 145 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
146 | #endif |
147 | ||
6b691a5c | 148 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 149 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 150 | return (a->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 151 | } |
d02b48c6 | 152 | |
6b691a5c | 153 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 154 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 155 | return (a->cert_info.serialNumber); |
0f113f3e | 156 | } |
d02b48c6 | 157 | |
6b691a5c | 158 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 159 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 160 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject)); |
0f113f3e | 161 | } |
731d9c5f | 162 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
163 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
164 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 165 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 166 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject)); |
0f113f3e | 167 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
168 | #endif |
169 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
170 | /* |
171 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
172 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
173 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
174 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
175 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
176 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
e947f396 | 177 | */ |
ccd86b68 | 178 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
e947f396 | 179 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
180 | int rv; |
181 | /* ensure hash is valid */ | |
182 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); | |
183 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); | |
184 | ||
185 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
186 | if (rv) | |
187 | return rv; | |
188 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
189 | if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { |
190 | rv = (int)(a->cert_info.enc.len - b->cert_info.enc.len); | |
0f113f3e MC |
191 | if (rv) |
192 | return rv; | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
193 | return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, |
194 | a->cert_info.enc.len); | |
0f113f3e MC |
195 | } |
196 | return rv; | |
e947f396 | 197 | } |
d02b48c6 | 198 | |
450ea834 | 199 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
200 | { |
201 | int ret; | |
c81a1509 | 202 | |
0f113f3e | 203 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
c81a1509 | 204 | |
0f113f3e MC |
205 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
206 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
207 | if (ret < 0) | |
208 | return -2; | |
209 | } | |
1862dae8 | 210 | |
0f113f3e MC |
211 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
212 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
213 | if (ret < 0) | |
214 | return -2; | |
215 | } | |
1862dae8 | 216 | |
0f113f3e | 217 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
d02b48c6 | 218 | |
0f113f3e MC |
219 | if (ret) |
220 | return ret; | |
1862dae8 | 221 | |
0f113f3e | 222 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
d02b48c6 | 223 | |
0f113f3e | 224 | } |
d02b48c6 | 225 | |
c2c99e28 | 226 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
227 | { |
228 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
229 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
230 | ||
231 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
232 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
233 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | |
234 | NULL)) | |
235 | return 0; | |
236 | ||
237 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
238 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
239 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
240 | return (ret); | |
241 | } | |
450ea834 | 242 | |
cf1b7d96 | 243 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
0f113f3e MC |
244 | /* |
245 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
246 | * this is reasonably efficient. | |
247 | */ | |
c2c99e28 DSH |
248 | |
249 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
250 | { |
251 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
252 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
253 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
254 | ||
255 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
256 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
257 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
258 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); | |
259 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) | |
260 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) | |
261 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) | |
262 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
263 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
264 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
265 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
266 | ||
267 | return (ret); | |
268 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
269 | #endif |
270 | ||
271 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | |
6b691a5c | 272 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
0f113f3e MC |
273 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
274 | { | |
275 | int i; | |
0f113f3e MC |
276 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
277 | ||
278 | if (!sk) | |
279 | return NULL; | |
280 | ||
5cf6abd8 DSH |
281 | x.cert_info.serialNumber = serial; |
282 | x.cert_info.issuer = name; | |
0f113f3e MC |
283 | |
284 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
285 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
286 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | |
287 | return (x509); | |
288 | } | |
289 | return (NULL); | |
290 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 291 | |
6b691a5c | 292 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
293 | { |
294 | X509 *x509; | |
295 | int i; | |
296 | ||
297 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
298 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
299 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | |
300 | return (x509); | |
301 | } | |
302 | return (NULL); | |
303 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 304 | |
6b691a5c | 305 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 306 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 307 | if (x == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 308 | return (NULL); |
5cf6abd8 | 309 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key)); |
0f113f3e | 310 | } |
dfeab068 | 311 | |
88ce56f8 | 312 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
313 | { |
314 | if (!x) | |
315 | return NULL; | |
5cf6abd8 | 316 | return x->cert_info.key->public_key; |
0f113f3e | 317 | } |
3b0648eb | 318 | |
6b691a5c | 319 | int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) |
0f113f3e MC |
320 | { |
321 | EVP_PKEY *xk; | |
322 | int ret; | |
323 | ||
324 | xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
325 | ||
326 | if (xk) | |
327 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
328 | else | |
329 | ret = -2; | |
330 | ||
331 | switch (ret) { | |
332 | case 1: | |
333 | break; | |
334 | case 0: | |
335 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
336 | break; | |
337 | case -1: | |
338 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
339 | break; | |
340 | case -2: | |
341 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
342 | } | |
c5ba2d99 | 343 | EVP_PKEY_free(xk); |
0f113f3e MC |
344 | if (ret > 0) |
345 | return 1; | |
346 | return 0; | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
349 | /* | |
350 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID | |
351 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a | |
352 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. | |
3ad344a5 DSH |
353 | */ |
354 | ||
14536c8c DSH |
355 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
356 | ||
3ad344a5 | 357 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
0f113f3e MC |
358 | { |
359 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; | |
360 | int curve_nid; | |
361 | if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) | |
362 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); | |
363 | if (!grp) | |
364 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; | |
365 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
366 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ | |
367 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ | |
368 | /* | |
369 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. | |
370 | */ | |
371 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) | |
372 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
373 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) | |
374 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
375 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ | |
376 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
377 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ | |
378 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
379 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
380 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) | |
381 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
382 | } else | |
383 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; | |
384 | ||
385 | return X509_V_OK; | |
386 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 387 | |
3b0648eb | 388 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
0f113f3e MC |
389 | unsigned long flags) |
390 | { | |
391 | int rv, i, sign_nid; | |
392 | EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; | |
393 | unsigned long tflags; | |
394 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
395 | return X509_V_OK; | |
396 | tflags = flags; | |
397 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ | |
398 | if (x == NULL) { | |
399 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
400 | i = 1; | |
401 | } else | |
402 | i = 0; | |
403 | ||
404 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
405 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
406 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
407 | i = 0; | |
408 | goto end; | |
409 | } | |
410 | ||
411 | pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
412 | /* Check EE key only */ | |
413 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
414 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
415 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
416 | i = 0; | |
417 | goto end; | |
418 | } | |
419 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
420 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
421 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
422 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
423 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
424 | goto end; | |
425 | } | |
426 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
427 | pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
428 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); | |
429 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
430 | goto end; | |
431 | } | |
432 | ||
433 | /* Final check: root CA signature */ | |
434 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); | |
435 | end: | |
c5ba2d99 | 436 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
0f113f3e MC |
437 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
438 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ | |
439 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM | |
440 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) | |
441 | i--; | |
442 | /* | |
443 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 | |
444 | * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. | |
445 | */ | |
446 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) | |
447 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; | |
448 | if (perror_depth) | |
449 | *perror_depth = i; | |
450 | } | |
451 | return rv; | |
452 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 453 | |
3b0648eb | 454 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
455 | { |
456 | int sign_nid; | |
457 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
458 | return X509_V_OK; | |
7aef39a7 | 459 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg->algorithm); |
0f113f3e MC |
460 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
461 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
462 | |
463 | #else | |
464 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
0f113f3e MC |
465 | unsigned long flags) |
466 | { | |
467 | return 0; | |
468 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
469 | |
470 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
0f113f3e MC |
471 | { |
472 | return 0; | |
473 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
474 | |
475 | #endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
476 | /* |
477 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
478 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
479 | * each X509 structure. | |
3b0648eb DSH |
480 | */ |
481 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
0f113f3e MC |
482 | { |
483 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | |
484 | int i; | |
485 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
486 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { | |
487 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); | |
05f0fb9f | 488 | X509_up_ref(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
489 | } |
490 | return ret; | |
491 | } |