]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
c99935e3 | 60 | #include <ctype.h> |
d02b48c6 | 61 | #include "cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
62 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
63 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
64 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
e947f396 | 65 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
d02b48c6 | 66 | |
ccd86b68 | 67 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
68 | { |
69 | int i; | |
70 | X509_CINF *ai, *bi; | |
71 | ||
72 | ai = a->cert_info; | |
73 | bi = b->cert_info; | |
f422a514 | 74 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); |
0f113f3e MC |
75 | if (i) |
76 | return (i); | |
77 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); | |
78 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 79 | |
cf1b7d96 | 80 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
6b691a5c | 81 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
82 | { |
83 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
84 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
85 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
86 | char *f; | |
87 | ||
88 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
89 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); | |
90 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) | |
91 | goto err; | |
92 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) | |
93 | goto err; | |
94 | OPENSSL_free(f); | |
95 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate | |
96 | (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, | |
97 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) | |
98 | goto err; | |
99 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) | |
100 | goto err; | |
101 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
102 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
103 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
104 | err: | |
105 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
106 | return (ret); | |
107 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 108 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 109 | |
ccd86b68 | 110 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
111 | { |
112 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); | |
113 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 114 | |
ccd86b68 | 115 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
116 | { |
117 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); | |
118 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 119 | |
ccd86b68 | 120 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
121 | { |
122 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); | |
123 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 124 | |
edc54021 | 125 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
126 | { |
127 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | |
128 | } | |
edc54021 | 129 | |
6b691a5c | 130 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
131 | { |
132 | return (a->cert_info->issuer); | |
133 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 134 | |
6b691a5c | 135 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
136 | { |
137 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); | |
138 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 139 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
140 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
141 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
142 | { |
143 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); | |
144 | } | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
145 | #endif |
146 | ||
6b691a5c | 147 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
148 | { |
149 | return (a->cert_info->subject); | |
150 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 151 | |
6b691a5c | 152 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
153 | { |
154 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); | |
155 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 156 | |
6b691a5c | 157 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
158 | { |
159 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); | |
160 | } | |
731d9c5f | 161 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
162 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
163 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
164 | { |
165 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); | |
166 | } | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
167 | #endif |
168 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
169 | /* |
170 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
171 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
172 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
173 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
174 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
175 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
e947f396 | 176 | */ |
ccd86b68 | 177 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
e947f396 | 178 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
179 | int rv; |
180 | /* ensure hash is valid */ | |
181 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); | |
182 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); | |
183 | ||
184 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
185 | if (rv) | |
186 | return rv; | |
187 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ | |
188 | if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { | |
189 | rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); | |
190 | if (rv) | |
191 | return rv; | |
192 | return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, | |
193 | a->cert_info->enc.len); | |
194 | } | |
195 | return rv; | |
e947f396 | 196 | } |
d02b48c6 | 197 | |
450ea834 | 198 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
199 | { |
200 | int ret; | |
c81a1509 | 201 | |
0f113f3e | 202 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
c81a1509 | 203 | |
0f113f3e MC |
204 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
205 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
206 | if (ret < 0) | |
207 | return -2; | |
208 | } | |
1862dae8 | 209 | |
0f113f3e MC |
210 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
211 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
212 | if (ret < 0) | |
213 | return -2; | |
214 | } | |
1862dae8 | 215 | |
0f113f3e | 216 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
d02b48c6 | 217 | |
0f113f3e MC |
218 | if (ret) |
219 | return ret; | |
1862dae8 | 220 | |
0f113f3e | 221 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
d02b48c6 | 222 | |
0f113f3e | 223 | } |
d02b48c6 | 224 | |
c2c99e28 | 225 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
226 | { |
227 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
228 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
229 | ||
230 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
231 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
232 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | |
233 | NULL)) | |
234 | return 0; | |
235 | ||
236 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
237 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
238 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
239 | return (ret); | |
240 | } | |
450ea834 | 241 | |
cf1b7d96 | 242 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
0f113f3e MC |
243 | /* |
244 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
245 | * this is reasonably efficient. | |
246 | */ | |
c2c99e28 DSH |
247 | |
248 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
249 | { |
250 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
251 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
252 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
253 | ||
254 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
255 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
256 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
257 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); | |
258 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) | |
259 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) | |
260 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) | |
261 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
262 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
263 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
264 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
265 | ||
266 | return (ret); | |
267 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
268 | #endif |
269 | ||
270 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | |
6b691a5c | 271 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
0f113f3e MC |
272 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
273 | { | |
274 | int i; | |
275 | X509_CINF cinf; | |
276 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; | |
277 | ||
278 | if (!sk) | |
279 | return NULL; | |
280 | ||
281 | x.cert_info = &cinf; | |
282 | cinf.serialNumber = serial; | |
283 | cinf.issuer = name; | |
284 | ||
285 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
286 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
287 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | |
288 | return (x509); | |
289 | } | |
290 | return (NULL); | |
291 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 292 | |
6b691a5c | 293 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
294 | { |
295 | X509 *x509; | |
296 | int i; | |
297 | ||
298 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
299 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
300 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | |
301 | return (x509); | |
302 | } | |
303 | return (NULL); | |
304 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 305 | |
6b691a5c | 306 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
307 | { |
308 | if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) | |
309 | return (NULL); | |
310 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); | |
311 | } | |
dfeab068 | 312 | |
88ce56f8 | 313 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
314 | { |
315 | if (!x) | |
316 | return NULL; | |
317 | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; | |
318 | } | |
3b0648eb | 319 | |
6b691a5c | 320 | int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) |
0f113f3e MC |
321 | { |
322 | EVP_PKEY *xk; | |
323 | int ret; | |
324 | ||
325 | xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
326 | ||
327 | if (xk) | |
328 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
329 | else | |
330 | ret = -2; | |
331 | ||
332 | switch (ret) { | |
333 | case 1: | |
334 | break; | |
335 | case 0: | |
336 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
337 | break; | |
338 | case -1: | |
339 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
340 | break; | |
341 | case -2: | |
342 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
343 | } | |
344 | if (xk) | |
345 | EVP_PKEY_free(xk); | |
346 | if (ret > 0) | |
347 | return 1; | |
348 | return 0; | |
349 | } | |
350 | ||
351 | /* | |
352 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID | |
353 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a | |
354 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. | |
3ad344a5 DSH |
355 | */ |
356 | ||
14536c8c DSH |
357 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
358 | ||
3ad344a5 | 359 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
0f113f3e MC |
360 | { |
361 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; | |
362 | int curve_nid; | |
363 | if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) | |
364 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); | |
365 | if (!grp) | |
366 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; | |
367 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
368 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ | |
369 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ | |
370 | /* | |
371 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. | |
372 | */ | |
373 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) | |
374 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
375 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) | |
376 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
377 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ | |
378 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
379 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ | |
380 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
381 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
382 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) | |
383 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
384 | } else | |
385 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; | |
386 | ||
387 | return X509_V_OK; | |
388 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 389 | |
3b0648eb | 390 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
0f113f3e MC |
391 | unsigned long flags) |
392 | { | |
393 | int rv, i, sign_nid; | |
394 | EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; | |
395 | unsigned long tflags; | |
396 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
397 | return X509_V_OK; | |
398 | tflags = flags; | |
399 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ | |
400 | if (x == NULL) { | |
401 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
402 | i = 1; | |
403 | } else | |
404 | i = 0; | |
405 | ||
406 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
407 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
408 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
409 | i = 0; | |
410 | goto end; | |
411 | } | |
412 | ||
413 | pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
414 | /* Check EE key only */ | |
415 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
416 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
417 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
418 | i = 0; | |
419 | goto end; | |
420 | } | |
421 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
422 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
423 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
424 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
425 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
426 | goto end; | |
427 | } | |
428 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
429 | pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
430 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); | |
431 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
432 | goto end; | |
433 | } | |
434 | ||
435 | /* Final check: root CA signature */ | |
436 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); | |
437 | end: | |
438 | if (pk) | |
439 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
440 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
441 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ | |
442 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM | |
443 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) | |
444 | i--; | |
445 | /* | |
446 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 | |
447 | * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. | |
448 | */ | |
449 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) | |
450 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; | |
451 | if (perror_depth) | |
452 | *perror_depth = i; | |
453 | } | |
454 | return rv; | |
455 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 456 | |
3b0648eb | 457 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
458 | { |
459 | int sign_nid; | |
460 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
461 | return X509_V_OK; | |
462 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); | |
463 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); | |
464 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
465 | |
466 | #else | |
467 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
0f113f3e MC |
468 | unsigned long flags) |
469 | { | |
470 | return 0; | |
471 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
472 | |
473 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
0f113f3e MC |
474 | { |
475 | return 0; | |
476 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
477 | |
478 | #endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
479 | /* |
480 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
481 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
482 | * each X509 structure. | |
3b0648eb DSH |
483 | */ |
484 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
0f113f3e MC |
485 | { |
486 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | |
487 | int i; | |
488 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
489 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { | |
490 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); | |
491 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
492 | } | |
493 | return ret; | |
494 | } |