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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
c99935e3 | 60 | #include <ctype.h> |
b39fc560 | 61 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 BM |
62 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
63 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
64 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
e947f396 | 65 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
2743e38c | 66 | #include "internal/x509_int.h" |
d02b48c6 | 67 | |
ccd86b68 | 68 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
69 | { |
70 | int i; | |
5cf6abd8 | 71 | const X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
0f113f3e | 72 | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
73 | ai = &a->cert_info; |
74 | bi = &b->cert_info; | |
81e49438 | 75 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber); |
0f113f3e MC |
76 | if (i) |
77 | return (i); | |
78 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); | |
79 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 80 | |
cf1b7d96 | 81 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
6b691a5c | 82 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e MC |
83 | { |
84 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
bfb0641f | 85 | EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
0f113f3e MC |
86 | unsigned char md[16]; |
87 | char *f; | |
88 | ||
6e59a892 RL |
89 | if (ctx == NULL) |
90 | goto err; | |
5cf6abd8 | 91 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); |
6e59a892 | 92 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) |
0f113f3e | 93 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 94 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) |
0f113f3e MC |
95 | goto err; |
96 | OPENSSL_free(f); | |
97 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate | |
6e59a892 | 98 | (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data, |
81e49438 | 99 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length)) |
0f113f3e | 100 | goto err; |
6e59a892 | 101 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) |
0f113f3e MC |
102 | goto err; |
103 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
104 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
105 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
106 | err: | |
bfb0641f | 107 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
108 | return (ret); |
109 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 110 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 111 | |
ccd86b68 | 112 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 113 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 114 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 115 | } |
d02b48c6 | 116 | |
ccd86b68 | 117 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
0f113f3e | 118 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 119 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject)); |
0f113f3e | 120 | } |
d02b48c6 | 121 | |
ccd86b68 | 122 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e | 123 | { |
7aef39a7 | 124 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 125 | } |
d02b48c6 | 126 | |
edc54021 | 127 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
128 | { |
129 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | |
130 | } | |
edc54021 | 131 | |
6b691a5c | 132 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 133 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 134 | return (a->cert_info.issuer); |
0f113f3e | 135 | } |
d02b48c6 | 136 | |
6b691a5c | 137 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 138 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 139 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 140 | } |
d02b48c6 | 141 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
142 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
143 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 144 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 145 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer)); |
0f113f3e | 146 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
147 | #endif |
148 | ||
6b691a5c | 149 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 150 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 151 | return (a->cert_info.subject); |
0f113f3e | 152 | } |
d02b48c6 | 153 | |
6b691a5c | 154 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) |
0f113f3e | 155 | { |
81e49438 | 156 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber; |
0f113f3e | 157 | } |
d02b48c6 | 158 | |
6b691a5c | 159 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 160 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 161 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject)); |
0f113f3e | 162 | } |
731d9c5f | 163 | |
0e0c6821 DSH |
164 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
165 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 166 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 167 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject)); |
0f113f3e | 168 | } |
0e0c6821 DSH |
169 | #endif |
170 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
171 | /* |
172 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
173 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
174 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
175 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
176 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
177 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
e947f396 | 178 | */ |
ccd86b68 | 179 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
e947f396 | 180 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
181 | int rv; |
182 | /* ensure hash is valid */ | |
183 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); | |
184 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); | |
185 | ||
186 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
187 | if (rv) | |
188 | return rv; | |
189 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
190 | if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { |
191 | rv = (int)(a->cert_info.enc.len - b->cert_info.enc.len); | |
0f113f3e MC |
192 | if (rv) |
193 | return rv; | |
5cf6abd8 DSH |
194 | return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc, |
195 | a->cert_info.enc.len); | |
0f113f3e MC |
196 | } |
197 | return rv; | |
e947f396 | 198 | } |
d02b48c6 | 199 | |
450ea834 | 200 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
201 | { |
202 | int ret; | |
c81a1509 | 203 | |
0f113f3e | 204 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
c81a1509 | 205 | |
0f113f3e MC |
206 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
207 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
208 | if (ret < 0) | |
209 | return -2; | |
210 | } | |
1862dae8 | 211 | |
0f113f3e MC |
212 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
213 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
214 | if (ret < 0) | |
215 | return -2; | |
216 | } | |
1862dae8 | 217 | |
0f113f3e | 218 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
d02b48c6 | 219 | |
0f113f3e MC |
220 | if (ret) |
221 | return ret; | |
1862dae8 | 222 | |
0f113f3e | 223 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
d02b48c6 | 224 | |
0f113f3e | 225 | } |
d02b48c6 | 226 | |
c2c99e28 | 227 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
228 | { |
229 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
230 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
231 | ||
232 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
233 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
234 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | |
235 | NULL)) | |
236 | return 0; | |
237 | ||
238 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
239 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
240 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
241 | return (ret); | |
242 | } | |
450ea834 | 243 | |
cf1b7d96 | 244 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
0f113f3e MC |
245 | /* |
246 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
247 | * this is reasonably efficient. | |
248 | */ | |
c2c99e28 DSH |
249 | |
250 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | |
0f113f3e | 251 | { |
bfb0641f | 252 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
0f113f3e MC |
253 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
254 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
255 | ||
6e59a892 RL |
256 | if (md_ctx == NULL) |
257 | return ret; | |
258 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
259 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ |
260 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
6e59a892 RL |
261 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
262 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) | |
263 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) | |
264 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
265 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
266 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
267 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
bfb0641f | 268 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
269 | |
270 | return (ret); | |
271 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
272 | #endif |
273 | ||
274 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | |
6b691a5c | 275 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, |
0f113f3e MC |
276 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
277 | { | |
278 | int i; | |
0f113f3e MC |
279 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
280 | ||
281 | if (!sk) | |
282 | return NULL; | |
283 | ||
81e49438 | 284 | x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial; |
5cf6abd8 | 285 | x.cert_info.issuer = name; |
0f113f3e MC |
286 | |
287 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
288 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
289 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | |
290 | return (x509); | |
291 | } | |
292 | return (NULL); | |
293 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 294 | |
6b691a5c | 295 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
296 | { |
297 | X509 *x509; | |
298 | int i; | |
299 | ||
300 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
301 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
302 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | |
303 | return (x509); | |
304 | } | |
305 | return (NULL); | |
306 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 307 | |
c01ff880 DSH |
308 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(X509 *x) |
309 | { | |
310 | if (x == NULL) | |
311 | return NULL; | |
312 | return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key); | |
313 | } | |
314 | ||
6b691a5c | 315 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
0f113f3e | 316 | { |
5cf6abd8 | 317 | if (x == NULL) |
c01ff880 DSH |
318 | return NULL; |
319 | return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key); | |
0f113f3e | 320 | } |
dfeab068 | 321 | |
88ce56f8 | 322 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
323 | { |
324 | if (!x) | |
325 | return NULL; | |
5cf6abd8 | 326 | return x->cert_info.key->public_key; |
0f113f3e | 327 | } |
3b0648eb | 328 | |
6b691a5c | 329 | int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) |
0f113f3e MC |
330 | { |
331 | EVP_PKEY *xk; | |
332 | int ret; | |
333 | ||
c01ff880 | 334 | xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
335 | |
336 | if (xk) | |
337 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
338 | else | |
339 | ret = -2; | |
340 | ||
341 | switch (ret) { | |
342 | case 1: | |
343 | break; | |
344 | case 0: | |
345 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
346 | break; | |
347 | case -1: | |
348 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
349 | break; | |
350 | case -2: | |
351 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
352 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
353 | if (ret > 0) |
354 | return 1; | |
355 | return 0; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | /* | |
359 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID | |
360 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a | |
361 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. | |
3ad344a5 DSH |
362 | */ |
363 | ||
14536c8c DSH |
364 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
365 | ||
3ad344a5 | 366 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
0f113f3e MC |
367 | { |
368 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; | |
369 | int curve_nid; | |
3aeb9348 DSH |
370 | if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
371 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
372 | if (!grp) |
373 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; | |
374 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
375 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ | |
376 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ | |
377 | /* | |
378 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. | |
379 | */ | |
380 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) | |
381 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
382 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) | |
383 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
384 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ | |
385 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
386 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ | |
387 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
388 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
389 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) | |
390 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
391 | } else | |
392 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; | |
393 | ||
394 | return X509_V_OK; | |
395 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 396 | |
3b0648eb | 397 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, |
0f113f3e MC |
398 | unsigned long flags) |
399 | { | |
400 | int rv, i, sign_nid; | |
401 | EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; | |
402 | unsigned long tflags; | |
403 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
404 | return X509_V_OK; | |
405 | tflags = flags; | |
406 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ | |
407 | if (x == NULL) { | |
408 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
409 | i = 1; | |
410 | } else | |
411 | i = 0; | |
412 | ||
413 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
414 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
415 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
416 | i = 0; | |
417 | goto end; | |
418 | } | |
419 | ||
c01ff880 | 420 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
421 | /* Check EE key only */ |
422 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
423 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
424 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
425 | i = 0; | |
426 | goto end; | |
427 | } | |
428 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
429 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
430 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
431 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
432 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
433 | goto end; | |
434 | } | |
8382fd3a | 435 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
436 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); |
437 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
438 | goto end; | |
439 | } | |
440 | ||
441 | /* Final check: root CA signature */ | |
442 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); | |
443 | end: | |
0f113f3e MC |
444 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
445 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ | |
446 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM | |
447 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) | |
448 | i--; | |
449 | /* | |
450 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 | |
451 | * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. | |
452 | */ | |
453 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) | |
454 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; | |
455 | if (perror_depth) | |
456 | *perror_depth = i; | |
457 | } | |
458 | return rv; | |
459 | } | |
3ad344a5 | 460 | |
3b0648eb | 461 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
462 | { |
463 | int sign_nid; | |
464 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
465 | return X509_V_OK; | |
6e63c142 | 466 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm); |
0f113f3e MC |
467 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
468 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
469 | |
470 | #else | |
471 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
0f113f3e MC |
472 | unsigned long flags) |
473 | { | |
474 | return 0; | |
475 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
476 | |
477 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
0f113f3e MC |
478 | { |
479 | return 0; | |
480 | } | |
14536c8c DSH |
481 | |
482 | #endif | |
0f113f3e MC |
483 | /* |
484 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
485 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
486 | * each X509 structure. | |
3b0648eb DSH |
487 | */ |
488 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
0f113f3e MC |
489 | { |
490 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | |
491 | int i; | |
492 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
493 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { | |
494 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); | |
05f0fb9f | 495 | X509_up_ref(x); |
0f113f3e MC |
496 | } |
497 | return ret; | |
498 | } |