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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 RE |
62 | |
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
6c21b860 | 72 | #include "x509_lcl.h" |
d02b48c6 | 73 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
74 | /* CRL score values */ |
75 | ||
76 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
77 | ||
0f113f3e | 78 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
79 | |
80 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
81 | ||
0f113f3e | 82 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
83 | |
84 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
85 | ||
0f113f3e | 86 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
87 | |
88 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
89 | ||
0f113f3e | 90 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
91 | |
92 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
93 | ||
94 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
95 | ||
96 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
97 | ||
0f113f3e | 98 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
99 | |
100 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
101 | ||
0f113f3e | 102 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
103 | |
104 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
105 | ||
0f113f3e | 106 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
107 | |
108 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
109 | ||
0f113f3e | 110 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 111 | |
0f113f3e | 112 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
113 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
114 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 115 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 116 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 117 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 118 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
119 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
120 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 121 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 122 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
4b96839f DSH |
123 | |
124 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 125 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 126 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
127 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
128 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
129 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
130 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
131 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
132 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 133 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 134 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
135 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
136 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
137 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
138 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 139 | |
d02b48c6 | 140 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 141 | const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
d02b48c6 | 142 | |
6b691a5c | 143 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
144 | { |
145 | return ok; | |
146 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
147 | |
148 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 149 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
0f113f3e MC |
150 | { |
151 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); | |
152 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 153 | #endif |
2da2ff50 DSH |
154 | /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ |
155 | static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
156 | { |
157 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); | |
158 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) | |
159 | return 1; | |
160 | else | |
161 | return 0; | |
162 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 163 | |
2dabd822 DSH |
164 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
165 | ||
166 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
167 | { |
168 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
169 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
170 | int i; | |
171 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
172 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
173 | if (certs == NULL) | |
174 | return NULL; | |
175 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
176 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
177 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
178 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
179 | break; | |
180 | } | |
181 | if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
182 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
183 | else | |
184 | xtmp = NULL; | |
185 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
186 | return xtmp; | |
187 | } | |
2dabd822 | 188 | |
6b691a5c | 189 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
190 | { |
191 | X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL; | |
192 | int bad_chain = 0; | |
193 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
194 | int depth, i, ok = 0; | |
195 | int num; | |
196 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
197 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
198 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { | |
199 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
200 | return -1; | |
201 | } | |
202 | ||
203 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
204 | ||
205 | /* | |
206 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
207 | * the first entry is in place | |
208 | */ | |
209 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) { | |
210 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || | |
211 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
212 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
213 | goto end; | |
214 | } | |
215 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
216 | ctx->last_untrusted = 1; | |
217 | } | |
218 | ||
219 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | |
220 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | |
221 | && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
222 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
223 | goto end; | |
224 | } | |
225 | ||
226 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
227 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
228 | depth = param->depth; | |
229 | ||
230 | for (;;) { | |
231 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
232 | if (depth < num) | |
233 | break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | |
234 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | |
235 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code | |
236 | * later. */ | |
237 | ||
238 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
239 | if (cert_self_signed(x)) | |
240 | break; | |
241 | /* | |
242 | * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first | |
243 | */ | |
244 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { | |
245 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
246 | if (ok < 0) | |
247 | return ok; | |
248 | /* | |
249 | * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up | |
250 | * again later. | |
251 | */ | |
252 | if (ok > 0) { | |
253 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
254 | break; | |
255 | } | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
259 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { | |
260 | xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
261 | if (xtmp != NULL) { | |
262 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
263 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
264 | goto end; | |
265 | } | |
266 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
267 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); | |
268 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | |
269 | x = xtmp; | |
270 | num++; | |
271 | /* | |
272 | * reparse the full chain for the next one | |
273 | */ | |
274 | continue; | |
275 | } | |
276 | } | |
277 | break; | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
280 | /* | |
281 | * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. | |
282 | * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we | |
283 | * complain. | |
284 | */ | |
285 | ||
286 | /* | |
287 | * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. | |
288 | */ | |
289 | ||
290 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
291 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); | |
292 | if (cert_self_signed(x)) { | |
293 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
294 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { | |
295 | /* | |
296 | * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find | |
297 | * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible | |
298 | * impersonation. | |
299 | */ | |
300 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
301 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { | |
302 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
303 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
304 | ctx->error_depth = i - 1; | |
305 | if (ok == 1) | |
306 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
307 | bad_chain = 1; | |
308 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
309 | if (!ok) | |
310 | goto end; | |
311 | } else { | |
312 | /* | |
313 | * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so | |
314 | * we get any trust settings. | |
315 | */ | |
316 | X509_free(x); | |
317 | x = xtmp; | |
318 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | |
319 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
320 | } | |
321 | } else { | |
322 | /* | |
323 | * extract and save self signed certificate for later use | |
324 | */ | |
325 | chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
326 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | |
327 | num--; | |
328 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
329 | } | |
330 | } | |
331 | ||
332 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
333 | for (;;) { | |
334 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
335 | if (depth < num) | |
336 | break; | |
337 | ||
338 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
339 | if (cert_self_signed(x)) | |
340 | break; | |
341 | ||
342 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
343 | ||
344 | if (ok < 0) | |
345 | return ok; | |
346 | if (ok == 0) | |
347 | break; | |
348 | ||
349 | x = xtmp; | |
350 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { | |
351 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
352 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
353 | return 0; | |
354 | } | |
355 | num++; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
359 | ||
360 | i = check_trust(ctx); | |
361 | ||
362 | /* If explicitly rejected error */ | |
363 | if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
364 | goto end; | |
365 | /* | |
366 | * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single | |
367 | * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already | |
368 | * and set bad_chain == 1 | |
369 | */ | |
370 | if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { | |
371 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { | |
372 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
373 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
374 | else | |
375 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
376 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
377 | } else { | |
378 | ||
379 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); | |
380 | num++; | |
381 | ctx->last_untrusted = num; | |
382 | ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; | |
383 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
384 | chain_ss = NULL; | |
385 | } | |
386 | ||
387 | ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
388 | bad_chain = 1; | |
389 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
390 | if (!ok) | |
391 | goto end; | |
392 | } | |
393 | ||
394 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | |
395 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); | |
396 | ||
397 | if (!ok) | |
398 | goto end; | |
399 | ||
400 | /* Check name constraints */ | |
401 | ||
402 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
403 | ||
404 | if (!ok) | |
405 | goto end; | |
406 | ||
407 | ok = check_id(ctx); | |
408 | ||
409 | if (!ok) | |
410 | goto end; | |
411 | ||
412 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | |
413 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
414 | ||
415 | /* | |
416 | * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because | |
417 | * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
418 | */ | |
419 | ||
420 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
421 | if (!ok) | |
422 | goto end; | |
423 | ||
424 | i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
425 | ctx->param->flags); | |
426 | if (i != X509_V_OK) { | |
427 | ctx->error = i; | |
428 | ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); | |
429 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
430 | if (!ok) | |
431 | goto end; | |
432 | } | |
433 | ||
434 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ | |
435 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
436 | ok = ctx->verify(ctx); | |
437 | else | |
438 | ok = internal_verify(ctx); | |
439 | if (!ok) | |
440 | goto end; | |
5d7c222d | 441 | |
10ca15f3 | 442 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
0f113f3e MC |
443 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
444 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
445 | if (!ok) | |
446 | goto end; | |
447 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
448 | if (!ok) | |
449 | goto end; | |
96ea4ae9 BL |
450 | #endif |
451 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
452 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
453 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
454 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
455 | if (!ok) | |
456 | goto end; | |
457 | if (0) { | |
458 | end: | |
459 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
460 | } | |
461 | if (sktmp != NULL) | |
462 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
463 | if (chain_ss != NULL) | |
464 | X509_free(chain_ss); | |
465 | return ok; | |
466 | } | |
467 | ||
468 | /* | |
469 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 DSH |
470 | */ |
471 | ||
472 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
473 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
474 | int i; |
475 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;; | |
476 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
477 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
478 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { | |
479 | rv = issuer; | |
480 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1)) | |
481 | break; | |
482 | } | |
483 | } | |
484 | return rv; | |
2f043896 DSH |
485 | } |
486 | ||
487 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
488 | ||
489 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
490 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
491 | int ret; |
492 | if (x == issuer) | |
493 | return cert_self_signed(x); | |
494 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
495 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) { | |
496 | int i; | |
497 | X509 *ch; | |
498 | /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ | |
499 | if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
500 | return 1; | |
501 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
502 | ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
503 | if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { | |
504 | ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; | |
505 | break; | |
506 | } | |
507 | } | |
508 | } | |
509 | ||
510 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
511 | return 1; | |
512 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
513 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
514 | return 0; | |
515 | ||
516 | ctx->error = ret; | |
517 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
518 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
519 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
520 | } |
521 | ||
522 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
523 | ||
524 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
525 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
526 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
527 | if (*issuer) { | |
528 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
529 | return 1; | |
530 | } else | |
531 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 532 | } |
2f043896 | 533 | |
0f113f3e MC |
534 | /* |
535 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
536 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
537 | */ |
538 | ||
30b415b0 | 539 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 540 | { |
cf1b7d96 | 541 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
0f113f3e | 542 | return 1; |
11262391 | 543 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
544 | int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
545 | X509 *x; | |
546 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
547 | int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
548 | int purpose; | |
549 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
550 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
551 | ||
552 | /*- | |
553 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
554 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
555 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
556 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
557 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
558 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
559 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
560 | */ | |
561 | must_be_ca = -1; | |
562 | ||
563 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
564 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
565 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
566 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
567 | } else { | |
568 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
569 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
570 | /* | |
571 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
572 | * happy | |
573 | */ | |
574 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
575 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
576 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
577 | } | |
578 | ||
579 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
580 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { | |
581 | int ret; | |
582 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
583 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
584 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
585 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
586 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
587 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
588 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
589 | if (!ok) | |
590 | goto end; | |
591 | } | |
592 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
593 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
594 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
595 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
596 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
597 | if (!ok) | |
598 | goto end; | |
599 | } | |
600 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
601 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
602 | case -1: | |
603 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
604 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
605 | ret = 0; | |
606 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
607 | } else | |
608 | ret = 1; | |
609 | break; | |
610 | case 0: | |
611 | if (ret != 0) { | |
612 | ret = 0; | |
613 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
614 | } else | |
615 | ret = 1; | |
616 | break; | |
617 | default: | |
618 | if ((ret == 0) | |
619 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
620 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
621 | ret = 0; | |
622 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
623 | } else | |
624 | ret = 1; | |
625 | break; | |
626 | } | |
627 | if (ret == 0) { | |
628 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
629 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
630 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
631 | if (!ok) | |
632 | goto end; | |
633 | } | |
634 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { | |
635 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); | |
636 | if ((ret == 0) | |
637 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
638 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
639 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
640 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
641 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
642 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
643 | if (!ok) | |
644 | goto end; | |
645 | } | |
646 | } | |
647 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
648 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
649 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
650 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
651 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
652 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
653 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
654 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
655 | if (!ok) | |
656 | goto end; | |
657 | } | |
658 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
659 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
660 | plen++; | |
661 | /* | |
662 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
663 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
664 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
665 | */ | |
666 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
667 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
668 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
669 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
670 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
671 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
672 | if (!ok) | |
673 | goto end; | |
674 | } | |
675 | proxy_path_length++; | |
676 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
677 | } else | |
678 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
679 | } | |
680 | ok = 1; | |
82aec1cc | 681 | end: |
0f113f3e | 682 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
683 | #endif |
684 | } | |
685 | ||
e9746e03 | 686 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
687 | { |
688 | X509 *x; | |
689 | int i, j, rv; | |
690 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
691 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
692 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
693 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
694 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
695 | continue; | |
696 | /* | |
697 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
698 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
699 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
700 | * to be obeyed. | |
701 | */ | |
702 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
703 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
704 | if (nc) { | |
705 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
706 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
707 | ctx->error = rv; | |
708 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
709 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
710 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
711 | return 0; | |
712 | } | |
713 | } | |
714 | } | |
715 | } | |
716 | return 1; | |
717 | } | |
e9746e03 | 718 | |
3bf15e29 | 719 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e MC |
720 | { |
721 | ctx->error = errcode; | |
722 | ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; | |
723 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
724 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
725 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 726 | |
8abffa4a | 727 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) |
0f113f3e MC |
728 | { |
729 | int i; | |
730 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); | |
731 | char *name; | |
732 | ||
733 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { | |
734 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); | |
735 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0) | |
736 | return 1; | |
737 | } | |
738 | return n == 0; | |
739 | } | |
8abffa4a | 740 | |
3bf15e29 | 741 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
742 | { |
743 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
744 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; | |
745 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; | |
746 | if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { | |
747 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) | |
748 | return 0; | |
749 | } | |
750 | if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { | |
751 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) | |
752 | return 0; | |
753 | } | |
754 | if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { | |
755 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) | |
756 | return 0; | |
757 | } | |
758 | return 1; | |
759 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 760 | |
51630a37 DSH |
761 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
762 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
763 | int i, ok; |
764 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
765 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
766 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
767 | /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ | |
768 | for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
769 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
770 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
771 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ | |
772 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | |
773 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
774 | /* | |
775 | * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not | |
776 | * overridden. | |
777 | */ | |
778 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
779 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
780 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
781 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
782 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
783 | if (!ok) | |
784 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
785 | } | |
786 | } | |
787 | /* | |
788 | * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate | |
789 | * return success. | |
790 | */ | |
791 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
792 | X509 *mx; | |
793 | if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) | |
794 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
795 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); | |
796 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); | |
797 | if (mx) { | |
798 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
799 | X509_free(x); | |
800 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
801 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
802 | } | |
803 | } | |
804 | ||
805 | /* | |
806 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
807 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
808 | */ | |
809 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
810 | } |
811 | ||
b545dc67 | 812 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
813 | { |
814 | int i, last, ok; | |
815 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | |
816 | return 1; | |
817 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
818 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
819 | else { | |
820 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
821 | if (ctx->parent) | |
822 | return 1; | |
823 | last = 0; | |
824 | } | |
825 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
826 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
827 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
828 | if (!ok) | |
829 | return ok; | |
830 | } | |
831 | return 1; | |
832 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
833 | |
834 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
835 | { |
836 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
837 | X509 *x; | |
838 | int ok, cnum; | |
839 | unsigned int last_reasons; | |
840 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
841 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
842 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
843 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
844 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
845 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
846 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
847 | last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
848 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
849 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
850 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
851 | else | |
852 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
853 | /* | |
854 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
855 | */ | |
856 | if (!ok) { | |
857 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
858 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
859 | goto err; | |
860 | } | |
861 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
862 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
863 | if (!ok) | |
864 | goto err; | |
865 | ||
866 | if (dcrl) { | |
867 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
868 | if (!ok) | |
869 | goto err; | |
870 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
871 | if (!ok) | |
872 | goto err; | |
873 | } else | |
874 | ok = 1; | |
875 | ||
876 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
877 | if (ok != 2) { | |
878 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
879 | if (!ok) | |
880 | goto err; | |
881 | } | |
882 | ||
883 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
884 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
885 | crl = NULL; | |
886 | dcrl = NULL; | |
887 | /* | |
888 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
889 | * so exit loop. | |
890 | */ | |
891 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
892 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
893 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
894 | goto err; | |
895 | } | |
896 | } | |
897 | err: | |
898 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
899 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
900 | ||
901 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
902 | return ok; | |
903 | ||
904 | } | |
b545dc67 | 905 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
906 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
907 | ||
908 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
0f113f3e MC |
909 | { |
910 | time_t *ptime; | |
911 | int i; | |
912 | if (notify) | |
913 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
914 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
915 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
916 | else | |
917 | ptime = NULL; | |
918 | ||
919 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
920 | if (i == 0) { | |
921 | if (!notify) | |
922 | return 0; | |
923 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
924 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
925 | return 0; | |
926 | } | |
927 | ||
928 | if (i > 0) { | |
929 | if (!notify) | |
930 | return 0; | |
931 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
932 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
933 | return 0; | |
934 | } | |
935 | ||
936 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
937 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
938 | ||
939 | if (i == 0) { | |
940 | if (!notify) | |
941 | return 0; | |
942 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
943 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
944 | return 0; | |
945 | } | |
946 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
947 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
948 | if (!notify) | |
949 | return 0; | |
950 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
951 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
952 | return 0; | |
953 | } | |
954 | } | |
955 | ||
956 | if (notify) | |
957 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
958 | ||
959 | return 1; | |
960 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 961 | |
d43c4497 | 962 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
963 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
964 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
965 | { | |
966 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
967 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
968 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
969 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
970 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
971 | ||
972 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
973 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
974 | reasons = *preasons; | |
975 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
976 | ||
977 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
978 | best_crl = crl; | |
979 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
980 | best_score = crl_score; | |
981 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
982 | } | |
983 | } | |
984 | ||
985 | if (best_crl) { | |
986 | if (*pcrl) | |
987 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
988 | *pcrl = best_crl; | |
989 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
990 | *pscore = best_score; | |
991 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
992 | CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
993 | if (*pdcrl) { | |
994 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); | |
995 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
996 | } | |
997 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); | |
998 | } | |
999 | ||
1000 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
1001 | return 1; | |
1002 | ||
1003 | return 0; | |
1004 | } | |
1005 | ||
1006 | /* | |
1007 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1008 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
1009 | */ | |
1010 | ||
1011 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1012 | { |
1013 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
1014 | int i; | |
1015 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
1016 | if (i >= 0) { | |
1017 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1018 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1019 | return 0; | |
1020 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
1021 | } else | |
1022 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1023 | |
0f113f3e | 1024 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 1025 | |
0f113f3e | 1026 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 1027 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1028 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1029 | return 0; | |
1030 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
1031 | } else | |
1032 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1033 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1034 | if (!exta && !extb) |
1035 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 1036 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1037 | if (!exta || !extb) |
1038 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1039 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1040 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
1041 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1042 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1043 | return 1; |
1044 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1045 | |
1046 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
1047 | ||
1048 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1049 | { |
1050 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
1051 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
1052 | return 0; | |
1053 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
1054 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
1055 | return 0; | |
1056 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1057 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
1058 | return 0; | |
1059 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1060 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1061 | return 0; | |
1062 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1063 | return 0; | |
1064 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1065 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1066 | return 0; | |
1067 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1068 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1069 | return 1; | |
1070 | return 0; | |
1071 | } | |
1072 | ||
1073 | /* | |
1074 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1075 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1076 | */ |
1077 | ||
1078 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1079 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1080 | { | |
1081 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1082 | int i; | |
1083 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
1084 | return; | |
1085 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
1086 | return; | |
1087 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1088 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1089 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1090 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1091 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
1092 | CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
1093 | *dcrl = delta; | |
1094 | return; | |
1095 | } | |
1096 | } | |
1097 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1098 | } | |
1099 | ||
1100 | /* | |
1101 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1102 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1103 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1104 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1105 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
1106 | */ |
1107 | ||
1108 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1109 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1110 | { | |
1111 | ||
1112 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1113 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1114 | ||
1115 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1116 | ||
1117 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
1118 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1119 | return 0; | |
1120 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
1121 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
1122 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
1123 | return 0; | |
1124 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
1125 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1126 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1127 | return 0; | |
1128 | } | |
1129 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1130 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1131 | return 0; | |
1132 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1133 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
1134 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1135 | return 0; | |
1136 | } else | |
1137 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1138 | ||
1139 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1140 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1141 | ||
1142 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1143 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1144 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1145 | ||
1146 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1147 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1148 | ||
1149 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1150 | ||
1151 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1152 | return 0; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1155 | ||
1156 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1157 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1158 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1159 | return 0; | |
1160 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1161 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1162 | } | |
1163 | ||
1164 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1165 | ||
1166 | return crl_score; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1169 | |
1170 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1171 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1172 | { | |
1173 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1174 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1175 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1176 | int i; | |
1177 | ||
1178 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1179 | cidx++; | |
1180 | ||
1181 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1182 | ||
1183 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1184 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1185 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1186 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1187 | return; | |
1188 | } | |
1189 | } | |
1190 | ||
1191 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1192 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1193 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1194 | continue; | |
1195 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1196 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1197 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1198 | return; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | } | |
1201 | ||
1202 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1203 | ||
1204 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1205 | return; | |
1206 | ||
1207 | /* | |
1208 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1209 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1210 | */ | |
1211 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1212 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1213 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1214 | continue; | |
1215 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1216 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1217 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1218 | return; | |
1219 | } | |
1220 | } | |
1221 | } | |
1222 | ||
1223 | /* | |
1224 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1225 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1226 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1227 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1228 | */ |
1229 | ||
1230 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1231 | { |
1232 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1233 | int ret; | |
1234 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1235 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1236 | return 0; | |
1237 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1238 | return -1; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1241 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1242 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1243 | ||
1244 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1245 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1246 | ||
1247 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1248 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1249 | ||
1250 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1251 | goto err; | |
1252 | ||
1253 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1254 | ||
1255 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1256 | err: | |
1257 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1258 | return ret; | |
1259 | } | |
1260 | ||
1261 | /* | |
1262 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1263 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1264 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1265 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1266 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1267 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1268 | */ |
1269 | ||
1270 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1271 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1272 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1273 | { | |
1274 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1275 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1276 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1277 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1278 | return 1; | |
1279 | return 0; | |
1280 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1281 | |
3a83462d MC |
1282 | /*- |
1283 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1284 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1285 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1286 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1287 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1288 | */ |
1289 | ||
3e727a3b | 1290 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1291 | { |
1292 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1293 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1294 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1295 | int i, j; | |
1296 | if (!a || !b) | |
1297 | return 1; | |
1298 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1299 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1300 | return 0; | |
1301 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1302 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1303 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1304 | return 0; | |
1305 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1306 | return 1; | |
1307 | else | |
1308 | return 0; | |
1309 | } | |
1310 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1311 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1312 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1313 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1314 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1315 | return 0; | |
1316 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1317 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1318 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1319 | } | |
1320 | ||
1321 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1322 | if (nm) { | |
1323 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1324 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1325 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1326 | continue; | |
1327 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1328 | return 1; | |
1329 | } | |
1330 | return 0; | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | ||
1333 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1334 | ||
1335 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1336 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1337 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1338 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1339 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1340 | return 1; | |
1341 | } | |
1342 | } | |
1343 | ||
1344 | return 0; | |
1345 | ||
1346 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1347 | |
4b96839f | 1348 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1349 | { |
1350 | int i; | |
1351 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1352 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1353 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1354 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1355 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1356 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1357 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1358 | continue; | |
1359 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1360 | return 1; | |
1361 | } | |
1362 | return 0; | |
1363 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1364 | |
4b96839f | 1365 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1366 | |
4b96839f | 1367 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1368 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1369 | { | |
1370 | int i; | |
1371 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1372 | return 0; | |
1373 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1374 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1375 | return 0; | |
1376 | } else { | |
1377 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1378 | return 0; | |
1379 | } | |
1380 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1381 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1382 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1383 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1384 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1385 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1386 | return 1; | |
1387 | } | |
1388 | } | |
1389 | } | |
1390 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1391 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1392 | return 1; | |
1393 | return 0; | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | ||
1396 | /* | |
1397 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1398 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1399 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1400 | |
d43c4497 | 1401 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1402 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1403 | { | |
1404 | int ok; | |
1405 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1406 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1407 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1408 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1409 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1410 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1411 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1412 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1413 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1414 | ||
1415 | if (ok) | |
1416 | goto done; | |
1417 | ||
1418 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1419 | ||
1420 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1421 | ||
1422 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1423 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1424 | goto done; | |
1425 | ||
1426 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1427 | ||
1428 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1429 | ||
1430 | done: | |
1431 | ||
1432 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1433 | if (crl) { | |
1434 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1435 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1436 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1437 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1438 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1439 | return 1; | |
1440 | } | |
1441 | ||
1442 | return 0; | |
1443 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1444 | |
1445 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1446 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1447 | { |
1448 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1449 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1450 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1451 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1452 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1453 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1454 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1455 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1456 | ||
1457 | /* | |
1458 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1459 | * certificate in chain. | |
1460 | */ | |
1461 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1462 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1463 | else { | |
1464 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1465 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1466 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
1467 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1468 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1469 | if (!ok) | |
1470 | goto err; | |
1471 | } | |
1472 | } | |
1473 | ||
1474 | if (issuer) { | |
1475 | /* | |
1476 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1477 | */ | |
1478 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1479 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1480 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1481 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
1482 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1483 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1484 | if (!ok) | |
1485 | goto err; | |
1486 | } | |
1487 | ||
1488 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
1489 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1490 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1491 | if (!ok) | |
1492 | goto err; | |
1493 | } | |
1494 | ||
1495 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
1496 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
1497 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1498 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1499 | if (!ok) | |
1500 | goto err; | |
1501 | } | |
1502 | } | |
1503 | ||
1504 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
1505 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1506 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1507 | if (!ok) | |
1508 | goto err; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
1511 | } | |
1512 | ||
1513 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
1514 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1515 | if (!ok) | |
1516 | goto err; | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | ||
1519 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
1520 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1521 | ||
1522 | if (!ikey) { | |
1523 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1524 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1525 | if (!ok) | |
1526 | goto err; | |
1527 | } else { | |
1528 | int rv; | |
1529 | rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
1530 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
1531 | ctx->error = rv; | |
1532 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1533 | if (!ok) | |
1534 | goto err; | |
1535 | } | |
1536 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1537 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
1538 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1539 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1540 | if (!ok) | |
1541 | goto err; | |
1542 | } | |
1543 | } | |
1544 | } | |
1545 | ||
1546 | ok = 1; | |
1547 | ||
1548 | err: | |
1549 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1550 | return ok; | |
1551 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1552 | |
1553 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1554 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1555 | { |
1556 | int ok; | |
1557 | X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1558 | /* | |
1559 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1560 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
1561 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
1562 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1563 | */ | |
1564 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1565 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
1566 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1567 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1568 | if (!ok) | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | /* | |
1572 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
1573 | * is not removeFromCRL. | |
1574 | */ | |
1575 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1576 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1577 | return 2; | |
1578 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1579 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1580 | if (!ok) | |
1581 | return 0; | |
1582 | } | |
1583 | ||
1584 | return 1; | |
1585 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1586 | |
5d7c222d | 1587 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1588 | { |
1589 | int ret; | |
1590 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1591 | return 1; | |
1592 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1593 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
1594 | if (ret == 0) { | |
1595 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1596 | return 0; | |
1597 | } | |
1598 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1599 | if (ret == -1) { | |
1600 | /* | |
1601 | * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
1602 | */ | |
1603 | X509 *x; | |
1604 | int i; | |
1605 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
1606 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1607 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1608 | continue; | |
1609 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1610 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1611 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1612 | return 0; | |
1613 | } | |
1614 | return 1; | |
1615 | } | |
1616 | if (ret == -2) { | |
1617 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1618 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1619 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1620 | } | |
1621 | ||
1622 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1623 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1624 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1625 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1626 | return 0; | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | ||
1629 | return 1; | |
1630 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1631 | |
0930251d | 1632 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet) |
0f113f3e MC |
1633 | { |
1634 | time_t *ptime; | |
1635 | int i; | |
1636 | ||
1637 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1638 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
1639 | else | |
1640 | ptime = NULL; | |
1641 | ||
1642 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1643 | if (i == 0) { | |
1644 | if (quiet) | |
1645 | return 0; | |
1646 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1647 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1648 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1649 | return 0; | |
1650 | } | |
1651 | ||
1652 | if (i > 0) { | |
1653 | if (quiet) | |
1654 | return 0; | |
1655 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1656 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1657 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1658 | return 0; | |
1659 | } | |
1660 | ||
1661 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1662 | if (i == 0) { | |
1663 | if (quiet) | |
1664 | return 0; | |
1665 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1666 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1667 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1668 | return 0; | |
1669 | } | |
1670 | ||
1671 | if (i < 0) { | |
1672 | if (quiet) | |
1673 | return 0; | |
1674 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1675 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1676 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1677 | return 0; | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | ||
1680 | return 1; | |
1681 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1682 | |
6b691a5c | 1683 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1684 | { |
1685 | int ok = 0, n; | |
1686 | X509 *xs, *xi; | |
1687 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1688 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
1689 | ||
1690 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1691 | ||
1692 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
1693 | ctx->error_depth = n - 1; | |
1694 | n--; | |
1695 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1696 | ||
1697 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
1698 | xs = xi; | |
1699 | else { | |
1700 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
1701 | xs = xi; | |
1702 | goto check_cert; | |
1703 | } | |
1704 | if (n <= 0) { | |
1705 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1706 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1707 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
1708 | goto end; | |
1709 | } else { | |
1710 | n--; | |
1711 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1712 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1713 | } | |
1714 | } | |
1715 | ||
1716 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1717 | while (n >= 0) { | |
1718 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1719 | ||
1720 | /* | |
1721 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1722 | * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
1723 | * time. | |
1724 | */ | |
1725 | if (!xs->valid | |
1726 | && (xs != xi | |
1727 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { | |
1728 | if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { | |
1729 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1730 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1731 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1732 | if (!ok) | |
1733 | goto end; | |
1734 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
1735 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1736 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1737 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1738 | if (!ok) { | |
1739 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1740 | goto end; | |
1741 | } | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1744 | pkey = NULL; | |
1745 | } | |
1746 | ||
1747 | xs->valid = 1; | |
1748 | ||
1749 | check_cert: | |
1750 | ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0); | |
1751 | if (!ok) | |
1752 | goto end; | |
1753 | ||
1754 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1755 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
1756 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1757 | ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); | |
1758 | if (!ok) | |
1759 | goto end; | |
1760 | ||
1761 | n--; | |
1762 | if (n >= 0) { | |
1763 | xi = xs; | |
1764 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1765 | } | |
1766 | } | |
1767 | ok = 1; | |
1768 | end: | |
1769 | return ok; | |
1770 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1771 | |
91b73acb | 1772 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1773 | { |
0f113f3e | 1774 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1775 | } |
1776 | ||
91b73acb | 1777 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e MC |
1778 | { |
1779 | char *str; | |
1780 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1781 | long offset; | |
1782 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
1783 | int i, j; | |
1784 | ||
1785 | p = buff1; | |
1786 | i = ctm->length; | |
1787 | str = (char *)ctm->data; | |
1788 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1789 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) | |
1790 | return 0; | |
1791 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1792 | p += 10; | |
1793 | str += 10; | |
1794 | } else { | |
1795 | if (i < 13) | |
1796 | return 0; | |
1797 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1798 | p += 12; | |
1799 | str += 12; | |
1800 | } | |
1801 | ||
1802 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1803 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1804 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1805 | } else { | |
1806 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
1807 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
1808 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | |
1809 | if (*str == '.') { | |
1810 | str++; | |
1811 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) | |
1812 | str++; | |
1813 | } | |
1814 | ||
1815 | } | |
1816 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1817 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1818 | ||
1819 | if (*str == 'Z') | |
1820 | offset = 0; | |
1821 | else { | |
1822 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) | |
1823 | return 0; | |
1824 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; | |
1825 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1826 | if (*str == '-') | |
1827 | offset = -offset; | |
1828 | } | |
1829 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1830 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1831 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1832 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1833 | ||
1834 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1835 | return 0; | |
1836 | ||
1837 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1838 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1839 | if (i < 50) | |
1840 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1841 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1842 | if (j < 50) | |
1843 | j += 100; | |
1844 | ||
1845 | if (i < j) | |
1846 | return -1; | |
1847 | if (i > j) | |
1848 | return 1; | |
1849 | } | |
1850 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1851 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1852 | return -1; | |
1853 | else | |
1854 | return i; | |
1855 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1856 | |
284ef5f3 | 1857 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1858 | { |
0f113f3e | 1859 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1860 | } |
1861 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1862 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1863 | { |
1864 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1865 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1866 | |
1867 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1868 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1869 | { | |
1870 | time_t t; | |
1871 | ||
1872 | if (in_tm) | |
1873 | t = *in_tm; | |
1874 | else | |
1875 | time(&t); | |
1876 | ||
1877 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1878 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1879 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1880 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1881 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1882 | } | |
1883 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1884 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1885 | |
7e258a56 | 1886 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1887 | { |
1888 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1889 | int i, j; | |
1890 | ||
1891 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1892 | return 1; | |
1893 | ||
1894 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
1895 | ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); | |
1896 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1897 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1898 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1899 | return 0; | |
1900 | } | |
1901 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1902 | break; | |
1903 | else { | |
1904 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1905 | ktmp = NULL; | |
1906 | } | |
1907 | } | |
1908 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1909 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1910 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1911 | return 0; | |
1912 | } | |
1913 | ||
1914 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1915 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
1916 | ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); | |
1917 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); | |
1918 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | |
1919 | } | |
1920 | ||
1921 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1922 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
1923 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1924 | return 1; | |
1925 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1926 | |
2e8cb108 DSH |
1927 | /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
1928 | ||
1929 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1930 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
1931 | { | |
1932 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
1933 | int i; | |
1934 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
1935 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
1936 | if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
1937 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
1938 | return NULL; | |
1939 | } | |
1940 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
1941 | if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
1942 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
1943 | return NULL; | |
1944 | } | |
1945 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1946 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
1947 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
1948 | return NULL; | |
1949 | } | |
1950 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1951 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
1952 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
1953 | return NULL; | |
1954 | } | |
1955 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
1956 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
1957 | return NULL; | |
1958 | } | |
1959 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1960 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
1961 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
1962 | return NULL; | |
1963 | } | |
1964 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
1965 | if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
1966 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
1967 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
1968 | return NULL; | |
1969 | } | |
1970 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
1971 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
1972 | if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) | |
1973 | goto memerr; | |
1974 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
1975 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
1976 | goto memerr; | |
1977 | ||
1978 | if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) | |
1979 | goto memerr; | |
1980 | if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) | |
1981 | goto memerr; | |
1982 | ||
1983 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
1984 | ||
1985 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
1986 | goto memerr; | |
1987 | ||
1988 | /* | |
1989 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
1990 | * number to correct value too. | |
1991 | */ | |
1992 | ||
1993 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
1994 | X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
1995 | ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
1996 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
1997 | goto memerr; | |
1998 | } | |
1999 | ||
2000 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
2001 | ||
2002 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
2003 | ||
2004 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
2005 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
2006 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); | |
2007 | /* | |
2008 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
2009 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
2010 | */ | |
2011 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { | |
2012 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); | |
2013 | if (!rvtmp) | |
2014 | goto memerr; | |
2015 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
2016 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
2017 | goto memerr; | |
2018 | } | |
2019 | } | |
2020 | } | |
2021 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
2022 | ||
2023 | if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
2024 | goto memerr; | |
2025 | ||
2026 | return crl; | |
2027 | ||
2028 | memerr: | |
2029 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2030 | if (crl) | |
2031 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
2032 | return NULL; | |
2033 | } | |
2034 | ||
2035 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, | |
2036 | CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | |
2037 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, | |
2038 | CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
2039 | { | |
2040 | /* | |
2041 | * This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
2042 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). | |
2043 | */ | |
2044 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
2045 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
2046 | } | |
58964a49 | 2047 | |
6b691a5c | 2048 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2049 | { |
2050 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2051 | } | |
58964a49 | 2052 | |
6b691a5c | 2053 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2054 | { |
2055 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2056 | } | |
58964a49 | 2057 | |
6b691a5c | 2058 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2059 | { |
2060 | return ctx->error; | |
2061 | } | |
58964a49 | 2062 | |
6b691a5c | 2063 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2064 | { |
2065 | ctx->error = err; | |
2066 | } | |
58964a49 | 2067 | |
6b691a5c | 2068 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2069 | { |
2070 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2071 | } | |
58964a49 | 2072 | |
6b691a5c | 2073 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2074 | { |
2075 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2076 | } | |
58964a49 | 2077 | |
7e258a56 | 2078 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2079 | { |
2080 | return ctx->chain; | |
2081 | } | |
58964a49 | 2082 | |
c7cb16a8 | 2083 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2084 | { |
2085 | if (!ctx->chain) | |
2086 | return NULL; | |
2087 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2088 | } | |
25f923dd | 2089 | |
2008e714 | 2090 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2091 | { |
2092 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2093 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2094 | |
2095 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2096 | { |
2097 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2098 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2099 | |
2100 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2101 | { |
2102 | return ctx->parent; | |
2103 | } | |
2008e714 | 2104 | |
6b691a5c | 2105 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2106 | { |
2107 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2108 | } | |
58964a49 | 2109 | |
6b691a5c | 2110 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2111 | { |
2112 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2113 | } | |
58964a49 | 2114 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2115 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2116 | { |
2117 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2118 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2119 | |
13938ace | 2120 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e MC |
2121 | { |
2122 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
2123 | } | |
11262391 | 2124 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2125 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e MC |
2126 | { |
2127 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
2128 | } | |
2129 | ||
2130 | /* | |
2131 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2132 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2133 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2134 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2135 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2136 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2137 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2138 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
2139 | */ |
2140 | ||
2141 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2142 | int purpose, int trust) |
2143 | { | |
2144 | int idx; | |
2145 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
2146 | if (!purpose) | |
2147 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
2148 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
2149 | if (purpose) { | |
2150 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
2151 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
2152 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2153 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2154 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2155 | return 0; | |
2156 | } | |
2157 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2158 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2159 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
2160 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2161 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2162 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2163 | return 0; | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2166 | } | |
2167 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
2168 | if (!trust) | |
2169 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
2170 | } | |
2171 | if (trust) { | |
2172 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
2173 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2174 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2175 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
2176 | return 0; | |
2177 | } | |
2178 | } | |
2179 | ||
2180 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
2181 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
2182 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
2183 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
2184 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2185 | } |
2186 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2187 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2188 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2189 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; |
2190 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
2191 | if (!ctx) { | |
2192 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2193 | return NULL; | |
2194 | } | |
2195 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
2196 | return ctx; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2197 | } |
2198 | ||
2199 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2200 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2201 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2202 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
2203 | } |
2204 | ||
79aa04ef | 2205 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2206 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2207 | { | |
2208 | int ret = 1; | |
2209 | ctx->ctx = store; | |
2210 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
2211 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
2212 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2213 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
2214 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
2215 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; | |
2216 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2217 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2218 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2219 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2220 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2221 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2222 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2223 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2224 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2225 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2226 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2227 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
2228 | ||
2229 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
2230 | ||
2231 | if (!ctx->param) { | |
2232 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2233 | return 0; | |
2234 | } | |
2235 | ||
2236 | /* | |
2237 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2238 | */ | |
2239 | ||
2240 | if (store) | |
2241 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2242 | else | |
2243 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2244 | ||
2245 | if (store) { | |
2246 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2247 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | |
2248 | } else | |
2249 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
2250 | ||
2251 | if (ret) | |
2252 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2253 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2254 | ||
2255 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2256 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2257 | return 0; | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | ||
2260 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
2261 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2262 | else | |
2263 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2264 | ||
2265 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2266 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2267 | else | |
2268 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2269 | ||
2270 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2271 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2272 | else | |
2273 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2274 | ||
2275 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2276 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2277 | else | |
2278 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2279 | ||
2280 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2281 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2282 | else | |
2283 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2284 | ||
2285 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2286 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
2287 | else | |
2288 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
2289 | ||
2290 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2291 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2292 | else | |
2293 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2294 | ||
2295 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2296 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2297 | else | |
2298 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2299 | ||
2300 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2301 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2302 | else | |
2303 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2304 | ||
2305 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2306 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2307 | else | |
2308 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2309 | ||
2310 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2311 | ||
2312 | /* | |
2313 | * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As | |
2314 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
2315 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. | |
2316 | */ | |
2317 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
2318 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
2319 | &(ctx->ex_data))) { | |
2320 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2321 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2322 | return 0; | |
2323 | } | |
2324 | return 1; | |
2325 | } | |
2326 | ||
2327 | /* | |
2328 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2329 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 DSH |
2330 | */ |
2331 | ||
2332 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2333 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2334 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2335 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2336 | } |
2337 | ||
2338 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2339 | { |
2340 | if (ctx->cleanup) | |
2341 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); | |
2342 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { | |
2343 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2344 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2345 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2346 | } | |
2347 | if (ctx->tree != NULL) { | |
2348 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); | |
2349 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2350 | } | |
2351 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { | |
2352 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2353 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2354 | } | |
2355 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); | |
2356 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | |
2357 | } | |
13938ace | 2358 | |
5d7c222d | 2359 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2360 | { |
2361 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2362 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2363 | |
5d7c222d | 2364 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2365 | { |
2366 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2367 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2368 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2369 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2370 | time_t t) | |
2371 | { | |
2372 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2373 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2374 | |
db089ad6 | 2375 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
2376 | int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
2377 | { | |
2378 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2379 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2380 | |
5d7c222d | 2381 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2382 | { |
2383 | return ctx->tree; | |
2384 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2385 | |
2386 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2387 | { |
2388 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2389 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2390 | |
2391 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2392 | { |
2393 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2394 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2395 | if (!param) | |
2396 | return 0; | |
2397 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2398 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2399 | |
2400 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2401 | { |
2402 | return ctx->param; | |
2403 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2404 | |
2405 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2406 | { |
2407 | if (ctx->param) | |
2408 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2409 | ctx->param = param; | |
2410 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2411 | |
f73e07cf | 2412 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
0f113f3e | 2413 | |
f73e07cf | 2414 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) |
d500de16 | 2415 | |
f73e07cf | 2416 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
d500de16 | 2417 | |
f5fedc04 | 2418 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
0f113f3e | 2419 | |
d500de16 | 2420 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |