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d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 RE |
62 | |
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
d02b48c6 | 72 | |
d02b48c6 | 73 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
74 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
75 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 76 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 77 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 78 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
79 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
80 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 81 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
5cbd2033 | 82 | static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer); |
d0fff69d | 83 | static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int *pimatch); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
84 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
85 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
86 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
87 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
d02b48c6 | 88 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
560b79cb | 89 | const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
b4cadc6e | 90 | |
d02b48c6 | 91 | |
6b691a5c | 92 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
d02b48c6 | 93 | { |
f684090c | 94 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
95 | } |
96 | ||
97 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 98 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
d02b48c6 | 99 | { |
f684090c | 100 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); |
d02b48c6 RE |
101 | } |
102 | #endif | |
103 | ||
6b691a5c | 104 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
d02b48c6 RE |
105 | { |
106 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | |
107 | X509_NAME *xn; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
108 | int bad_chain = 0; |
109 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
110 | int depth,i,ok=0; |
111 | int num; | |
2c45bf2b | 112 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
f73e07cf | 113 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; |
d02b48c6 RE |
114 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) |
115 | { | |
116 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
f684090c | 117 | return -1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
118 | } |
119 | ||
2f043896 | 120 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
d02b48c6 RE |
121 | |
122 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | |
123 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | |
124 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | |
125 | { | |
7e258a56 BL |
126 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
127 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
128 | { |
129 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
130 | goto end; | |
131 | } | |
132 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
133 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | |
134 | } | |
135 | ||
f76d8c47 | 136 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ |
f73e07cf BL |
137 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL |
138 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
139 | { |
140 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
141 | goto end; | |
142 | } | |
143 | ||
7e258a56 BL |
144 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
145 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | |
5d7c222d | 146 | depth=param->depth; |
d02b48c6 RE |
147 | |
148 | ||
149 | for (;;) | |
150 | { | |
151 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
d797727b | 152 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take |
a9642be6 BM |
153 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the |
154 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | |
155 | * code later. | |
156 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
157 | |
158 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
159 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 | 160 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; |
d02b48c6 RE |
161 | |
162 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
163 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | |
164 | { | |
2f043896 | 165 | xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); |
d02b48c6 RE |
166 | if (xtmp != NULL) |
167 | { | |
7e258a56 | 168 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
169 | { |
170 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
171 | goto end; | |
172 | } | |
173 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
a6fbcb42 | 174 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); |
d02b48c6 RE |
175 | ctx->last_untrusted++; |
176 | x=xtmp; | |
177 | num++; | |
178 | /* reparse the full chain for | |
179 | * the next one */ | |
180 | continue; | |
181 | } | |
182 | } | |
183 | break; | |
184 | } | |
185 | ||
186 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | |
187 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | |
188 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | |
189 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
190 | /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it |
191 | * is self signed. | |
192 | */ | |
193 | ||
7e258a56 BL |
194 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
195 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | |
f76d8c47 | 196 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
2f043896 | 197 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
198 | { |
199 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
7e258a56 | 200 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
d02b48c6 | 201 | { |
f76d8c47 DSH |
202 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if |
203 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | |
204 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. | |
205 | */ | |
2f043896 DSH |
206 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
207 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | |
f76d8c47 DSH |
208 | { |
209 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
210 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
211 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | |
b7c190d9 | 212 | if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); |
5d7c222d | 213 | bad_chain = 1; |
f76d8c47 DSH |
214 | ok=cb(0,ctx); |
215 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
216 | } | |
217 | else | |
218 | { | |
219 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | |
220 | * so we get any trust settings. | |
221 | */ | |
222 | X509_free(x); | |
2f043896 | 223 | x = xtmp; |
56c7754c | 224 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); |
f76d8c47 DSH |
225 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; |
226 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
227 | } |
228 | else | |
229 | { | |
2f043896 | 230 | /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ |
7e258a56 | 231 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
d02b48c6 RE |
232 | ctx->last_untrusted--; |
233 | num--; | |
7e258a56 | 234 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); |
d02b48c6 RE |
235 | } |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
238 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
239 | for (;;) | |
240 | { | |
241 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
7f89714e | 242 | if (depth < num) break; |
d02b48c6 RE |
243 | |
244 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
245 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 | 246 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; |
d02b48c6 | 247 | |
2f043896 DSH |
248 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
249 | ||
250 | if (ok < 0) return ok; | |
b7c190d9 | 251 | if (ok == 0) break; |
2f043896 DSH |
252 | |
253 | x = xtmp; | |
254 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) | |
d02b48c6 | 255 | { |
2f043896 | 256 | X509_free(xtmp); |
d02b48c6 | 257 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f684090c | 258 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
259 | } |
260 | num++; | |
261 | } | |
262 | ||
263 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
264 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 DSH |
265 | |
266 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | |
267 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | |
d02b48c6 | 268 | { |
2f043896 | 269 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
270 | { |
271 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
272 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
273 | else | |
274 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
275 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
276 | } | |
277 | else | |
278 | { | |
279 | ||
7e258a56 | 280 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); |
d02b48c6 RE |
281 | num++; |
282 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | |
283 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | |
284 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
285 | chain_ss=NULL; | |
286 | } | |
287 | ||
288 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | |
5d7c222d | 289 | bad_chain = 1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
290 | ok=cb(0,ctx); |
291 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
292 | } | |
293 | ||
11262391 | 294 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ |
30b415b0 | 295 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); |
11262391 | 296 | |
b7c190d9 | 297 | if (!ok) goto end; |
11262391 | 298 | |
e9746e03 DSH |
299 | /* Check name constraints */ |
300 | ||
301 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
302 | ||
303 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
304 | ||
51630a37 DSH |
305 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ |
306 | ||
5d7c222d | 307 | if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); |
51630a37 | 308 | |
b7c190d9 | 309 | if (!ok) goto end; |
51630a37 | 310 | |
d02b48c6 RE |
311 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ |
312 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | |
313 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
314 | /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters |
315 | * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
316 | */ | |
317 | ||
318 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
319 | if(!ok) goto end; | |
320 | ||
5d7c222d | 321 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ |
2f043896 DSH |
322 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) |
323 | ok=ctx->verify(ctx); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
324 | else |
325 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | |
5d7c222d DSH |
326 | if(!ok) goto end; |
327 | ||
10ca15f3 | 328 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
96ea4ae9 BL |
329 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
330 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
331 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
332 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
333 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
334 | #endif | |
335 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
336 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
337 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
338 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
339 | if(!ok) goto end; | |
dfeab068 RE |
340 | if (0) |
341 | { | |
d02b48c6 | 342 | end: |
dfeab068 RE |
343 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); |
344 | } | |
f73e07cf | 345 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); |
d02b48c6 | 346 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); |
f684090c | 347 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
348 | } |
349 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
350 | |
351 | /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
352 | */ | |
353 | ||
354 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
355 | { | |
356 | int i; | |
357 | X509 *issuer; | |
b7c190d9 | 358 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) |
82aec1cc | 359 | { |
2f043896 | 360 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
b7c190d9 | 361 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) |
82aec1cc BM |
362 | return issuer; |
363 | } | |
2f043896 DSH |
364 | return NULL; |
365 | } | |
366 | ||
367 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
368 | ||
369 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
370 | { | |
371 | int ret; | |
372 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
82aec1cc BM |
373 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) |
374 | return 1; | |
dbba890c | 375 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ |
5d7c222d | 376 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) |
dbba890c DSH |
377 | return 0; |
378 | ||
379 | ctx->error = ret; | |
380 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
381 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
bdee69f7 | 382 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
383 | return 0; |
384 | } | |
385 | ||
386 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
387 | ||
388 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
389 | { | |
390 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | |
82aec1cc BM |
391 | if (*issuer) |
392 | { | |
2f043896 DSH |
393 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
394 | return 1; | |
82aec1cc BM |
395 | } |
396 | else | |
397 | return 0; | |
2f043896 DSH |
398 | } |
399 | ||
400 | ||
11262391 DSH |
401 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency |
402 | * with the supplied purpose | |
403 | */ | |
404 | ||
30b415b0 | 405 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 406 | { |
cf1b7d96 | 407 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
11262391 DSH |
408 | return 1; |
409 | #else | |
db50661f | 410 | int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
11262391 | 411 | X509 *x; |
2c45bf2b | 412 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
6951c23a | 413 | int proxy_path_length = 0; |
9d84d4ed DSH |
414 | int purpose; |
415 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
b392e520 | 416 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
30b415b0 RL |
417 | |
418 | /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
419 | -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
420 | use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
421 | 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
422 | used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
423 | 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
424 | all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
425 | */ | |
426 | must_be_ca = -1; | |
d9bfe4f9 | 427 | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
428 | /* CRL path validation */ |
429 | if (ctx->parent) | |
430 | { | |
431 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
432 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
433 | } | |
434 | else | |
435 | { | |
436 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
437 | !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
438 | /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their | |
439 | software happy */ | |
440 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
441 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
442 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
443 | } | |
d9bfe4f9 | 444 | |
11262391 | 445 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ |
b7c190d9 | 446 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) |
82aec1cc | 447 | { |
bc501570 | 448 | int ret; |
11262391 | 449 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
5d7c222d | 450 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
f1558bb4 DSH |
451 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) |
452 | { | |
453 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
454 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
455 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
456 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
457 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
458 | } | |
d9bfe4f9 RL |
459 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) |
460 | { | |
461 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
462 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
463 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
464 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
465 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
466 | } | |
30b415b0 RL |
467 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
468 | switch(must_be_ca) | |
82aec1cc | 469 | { |
30b415b0 RL |
470 | case -1: |
471 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
472 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) | |
473 | { | |
474 | ret = 0; | |
82aec1cc | 475 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
30b415b0 | 476 | } |
82aec1cc | 477 | else |
30b415b0 RL |
478 | ret = 1; |
479 | break; | |
480 | case 0: | |
481 | if (ret != 0) | |
482 | { | |
483 | ret = 0; | |
484 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
485 | } | |
486 | else | |
487 | ret = 1; | |
488 | break; | |
489 | default: | |
490 | if ((ret == 0) | |
491 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
492 | && (ret != 1))) | |
493 | { | |
494 | ret = 0; | |
495 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
496 | } | |
497 | else | |
498 | ret = 1; | |
499 | break; | |
500 | } | |
501 | if (ret == 0) | |
502 | { | |
11262391 DSH |
503 | ctx->error_depth = i; |
504 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
505 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
82aec1cc BM |
506 | if (!ok) goto end; |
507 | } | |
30b415b0 RL |
508 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) |
509 | { | |
9d84d4ed | 510 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); |
30b415b0 RL |
511 | if ((ret == 0) |
512 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
513 | && (ret != 1))) | |
514 | { | |
515 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
516 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
517 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
518 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
519 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
520 | } | |
521 | } | |
db50661f DSH |
522 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ |
523 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
524 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
525 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) | |
82aec1cc | 526 | { |
11262391 DSH |
527 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
528 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
529 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
530 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
82aec1cc BM |
531 | if (!ok) goto end; |
532 | } | |
db50661f DSH |
533 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ |
534 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
535 | plen++; | |
6951c23a RL |
536 | /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next |
537 | certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE | |
538 | certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a | |
539 | CA certificate. */ | |
540 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) | |
541 | { | |
542 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) | |
543 | { | |
544 | ctx->error = | |
545 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
546 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
547 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
548 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
549 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
550 | } | |
551 | proxy_path_length++; | |
552 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
553 | } | |
554 | else | |
555 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
11262391 | 556 | } |
11262391 | 557 | ok = 1; |
82aec1cc | 558 | end: |
f684090c | 559 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
560 | #endif |
561 | } | |
562 | ||
e9746e03 DSH |
563 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
564 | { | |
565 | X509 *x; | |
566 | int i, j, rv; | |
567 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
568 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) | |
569 | { | |
570 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
571 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
572 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
573 | continue; | |
574 | /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in | |
575 | * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly | |
576 | * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be | |
577 | * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. | |
578 | */ | |
579 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) | |
580 | { | |
581 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
582 | if (nc) | |
583 | { | |
584 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
585 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
586 | { | |
587 | ctx->error = rv; | |
588 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
589 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
590 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) | |
591 | return 0; | |
592 | } | |
593 | } | |
594 | } | |
595 | } | |
596 | return 1; | |
597 | } | |
598 | ||
51630a37 DSH |
599 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
600 | { | |
cf1b7d96 | 601 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
51630a37 DSH |
602 | return 1; |
603 | #else | |
604 | int i, ok; | |
605 | X509 *x; | |
2c45bf2b | 606 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
2f043896 | 607 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
51630a37 DSH |
608 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ |
609 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
610 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
5d7c222d | 611 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
82aec1cc BM |
612 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
613 | return 1; | |
b545dc67 | 614 | ctx->error_depth = i; |
51630a37 | 615 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
82aec1cc BM |
616 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) |
617 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
618 | else | |
619 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 | 620 | ok = cb(0, ctx); |
f684090c | 621 | return ok; |
51630a37 DSH |
622 | #endif |
623 | } | |
624 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
625 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
626 | { | |
627 | int i, last, ok; | |
5d7c222d | 628 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
b545dc67 | 629 | return 1; |
5d7c222d | 630 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) |
b545dc67 | 631 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
50078051 DSH |
632 | else |
633 | last = 0; | |
b545dc67 DSH |
634 | for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) |
635 | { | |
636 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
637 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
638 | if (!ok) return ok; | |
639 | } | |
640 | return 1; | |
641 | } | |
642 | ||
643 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
644 | { | |
645 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
646 | X509 *x; | |
647 | int ok, cnum; | |
648 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
649 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
650 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
5cbd2033 | 651 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; |
b545dc67 DSH |
652 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
653 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
654 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except | |
655 | * notify callback | |
656 | */ | |
657 | if(!ok) | |
658 | { | |
659 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
bdee69f7 | 660 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
661 | goto err; |
662 | } | |
663 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
664 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
665 | if (!ok) goto err; | |
666 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
667 | err: | |
668 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
669 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
670 | return ok; | |
671 | ||
672 | } | |
673 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
674 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
675 | ||
676 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
677 | { | |
678 | time_t *ptime; | |
679 | int i; | |
680 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
681 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
682 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
683 | else |
684 | ptime = NULL; | |
685 | ||
686 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
687 | if (i == 0) | |
688 | { | |
689 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
690 | if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
691 | return 0; | |
692 | } | |
693 | ||
694 | if (i > 0) | |
695 | { | |
696 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
697 | if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
698 | return 0; | |
699 | } | |
700 | ||
701 | if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) | |
702 | { | |
703 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
704 | ||
705 | if (i == 0) | |
706 | { | |
707 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
708 | if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
709 | return 0; | |
710 | } | |
711 | ||
712 | if (i < 0) | |
713 | { | |
714 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
715 | if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
716 | return 0; | |
717 | } | |
718 | } | |
719 | ||
720 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
721 | ||
722 | return 1; | |
723 | } | |
724 | ||
bc7535bc DSH |
725 | /* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited |
726 | * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number | |
727 | * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then | |
728 | * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are | |
729 | * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then | |
730 | * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information. | |
731 | * | |
732 | * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL. | |
733 | * If IDP is present: | |
734 | * a. it must be consistent. | |
735 | * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked. | |
736 | * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE. | |
737 | * d. onlysomereason must be absent. | |
738 | * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match. | |
739 | * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID. | |
740 | * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate. | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
741 | */ |
742 | ||
bc7535bc DSH |
743 | /* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */ |
744 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4 | |
745 | /* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */ | |
746 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2 | |
747 | /* times OK */ | |
748 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1 | |
749 | ||
750 | #define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7 | |
751 | ||
752 | /* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */ | |
753 | ||
d0fff69d | 754 | #define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_REASONS) |
bc7535bc | 755 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
756 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, |
757 | X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
758 | { | |
bc7535bc | 759 | int i, crl_score, best_score = -1; |
e1a27eb3 | 760 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; |
5cbd2033 | 761 | X509 *crl_issuer, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
762 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) |
763 | { | |
d0fff69d | 764 | int imatch = 1; |
bc7535bc | 765 | crl_score = 0; |
5cbd2033 | 766 | crl_issuer = NULL; |
e1a27eb3 | 767 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); |
016bc5ce | 768 | if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) |
d0fff69d DSH |
769 | { |
770 | /* Issuer name does not match: could be indirect */ | |
771 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
772 | continue; | |
773 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
774 | continue; | |
775 | imatch = 0; | |
776 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 777 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) |
bc7535bc DSH |
778 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; |
779 | ||
780 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT) | |
781 | { | |
782 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT) | |
783 | continue; | |
d0fff69d | 784 | if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl, &imatch)) |
bc7535bc DSH |
785 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; |
786 | } | |
787 | else | |
788 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
789 | ||
d0fff69d DSH |
790 | /* If no issuer match at this point try next CRL */ |
791 | if (!imatch) | |
792 | continue; | |
793 | ||
5cbd2033 | 794 | if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, &crl_issuer)) |
bc7535bc | 795 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; |
5cbd2033 DSH |
796 | /* If CRL matches criteria and issuer is not different use it */ |
797 | if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL && !crl_issuer) | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
798 | { |
799 | *pcrl = crl; | |
4d50a2b4 | 800 | CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
801 | return 1; |
802 | } | |
bc7535bc DSH |
803 | |
804 | if (crl_score > best_score) | |
805 | { | |
806 | best_crl = crl; | |
5cbd2033 | 807 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; |
bc7535bc DSH |
808 | best_score = crl_score; |
809 | } | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
810 | } |
811 | if (best_crl) | |
812 | { | |
813 | *pcrl = best_crl; | |
5cbd2033 | 814 | ctx->current_issuer = best_crl_issuer; |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
815 | CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
816 | } | |
5cbd2033 | 817 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
818 | return 0; |
819 | } | |
820 | ||
5cbd2033 | 821 | static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer) |
bc7535bc | 822 | { |
5cbd2033 | 823 | X509 *crl_issuer; |
d0fff69d | 824 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
bc7535bc | 825 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
2e0c7db9 | 826 | int i; |
5cbd2033 DSH |
827 | if (!crl->akid) |
828 | return 1; | |
bc7535bc DSH |
829 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) |
830 | cidx++; | |
5cbd2033 DSH |
831 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
832 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
bc7535bc | 833 | return 1; |
d0fff69d | 834 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) |
5cbd2033 | 835 | { |
d0fff69d DSH |
836 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
837 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
838 | continue; | |
839 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
5cbd2033 | 840 | { |
d0fff69d DSH |
841 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
842 | return 1; | |
5cbd2033 DSH |
843 | } |
844 | } | |
2e0c7db9 | 845 | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
846 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ |
847 | ||
848 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
849 | return 0; | |
850 | ||
2e0c7db9 DSH |
851 | /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the |
852 | * set of untrusted certificates. | |
853 | */ | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
854 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) |
855 | { | |
856 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
857 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), | |
858 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) | |
859 | continue; | |
860 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
861 | { | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
862 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, crl_issuer)) |
863 | { | |
864 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
865 | return 1; | |
866 | } | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
867 | } |
868 | } | |
2e0c7db9 | 869 | |
bc7535bc DSH |
870 | return 0; |
871 | } | |
872 | ||
9d84d4ed DSH |
873 | /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new |
874 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the | |
875 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking | |
876 | * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in | |
877 | * practice. | |
878 | */ | |
879 | ||
880 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
881 | { | |
882 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
883 | int ret; | |
884 | if (ctx->parent) | |
885 | return 0; | |
886 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
887 | return -1; | |
888 | ||
889 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
890 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
891 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
892 | ||
893 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
894 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
895 | ||
896 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
897 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
898 | ||
899 | /* Maybe send path check result back to parent? */ | |
900 | if (!ret) | |
901 | goto err; | |
902 | ||
903 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
904 | ||
905 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
906 | ||
907 | err: | |
908 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
909 | return ret; | |
910 | } | |
911 | ||
912 | /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path | |
913 | * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a | |
914 | * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised | |
915 | * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must | |
916 | * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... | |
917 | * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version | |
918 | */ | |
919 | ||
920 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
921 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
922 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
923 | { | |
924 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
925 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
926 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
927 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
928 | return 1; | |
929 | return 0; | |
930 | } | |
931 | ||
3e727a3b DSH |
932 | /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. |
933 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. | |
934 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
935 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 936 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
937 | */ |
938 | ||
939 | ||
940 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) | |
941 | { | |
942 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
943 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
944 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
945 | int i, j; | |
d0fff69d DSH |
946 | if (!a || !b) |
947 | return 1; | |
3e727a3b DSH |
948 | if (a->type == 1) |
949 | { | |
950 | if (!a->dpname) | |
951 | return 0; | |
952 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
953 | if (b->type == 1) | |
954 | { | |
955 | if (!b->dpname) | |
956 | return 0; | |
957 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
958 | return 1; | |
959 | else | |
960 | return 0; | |
961 | } | |
962 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
963 | nm = a->dpname; | |
964 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
965 | } | |
966 | else if (b->type == 1) | |
967 | { | |
968 | if (!b->dpname) | |
969 | return 0; | |
970 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
971 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
972 | nm = b->dpname; | |
973 | } | |
974 | ||
975 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
976 | if (nm) | |
977 | { | |
978 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) | |
979 | { | |
980 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
981 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
982 | continue; | |
983 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
984 | return 1; | |
985 | } | |
986 | return 0; | |
987 | } | |
988 | ||
989 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
990 | ||
991 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) | |
992 | { | |
993 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
994 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) | |
995 | { | |
996 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
997 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
998 | return 1; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | ||
1002 | return 0; | |
1003 | ||
1004 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1005 | |
d0fff69d DSH |
1006 | static int idp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int *pimatch) |
1007 | { | |
1008 | int i; | |
1009 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1010 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1011 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1012 | return *pimatch; | |
1013 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) | |
1014 | { | |
1015 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1016 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1017 | continue; | |
1018 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1019 | { | |
1020 | *pimatch = 1; | |
1021 | return 1; | |
1022 | } | |
1023 | } | |
1024 | return 0; | |
1025 | } | |
1026 | ||
bc7535bc DSH |
1027 | /* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */ |
1028 | ||
d0fff69d | 1029 | static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int *pimatch) |
bc7535bc | 1030 | { |
3e727a3b | 1031 | int i; |
bc7535bc DSH |
1032 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) |
1033 | return 0; | |
1034 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) | |
1035 | { | |
1036 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1037 | return 0; | |
1038 | } | |
1039 | else | |
1040 | { | |
1041 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1042 | return 0; | |
1043 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1044 | if (!crl->idp->distpoint && *pimatch) |
bc7535bc | 1045 | return 1; |
3e727a3b | 1046 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
bc7535bc | 1047 | { |
3e727a3b DSH |
1048 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); |
1049 | /* We don't handle these at present */ | |
d0fff69d | 1050 | if (dp->reasons) |
3e727a3b DSH |
1051 | continue; |
1052 | if (idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) | |
d0fff69d DSH |
1053 | { |
1054 | if (idp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, pimatch)) | |
1055 | return 1; | |
1056 | } | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1057 | } |
1058 | return 0; | |
1059 | } | |
1060 | ||
1061 | /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only | |
1062 | * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle | |
1063 | * CRLs partitioned on reason code later. | |
b545dc67 | 1064 | */ |
bc7535bc | 1065 | |
e1a27eb3 | 1066 | static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) |
b545dc67 DSH |
1067 | { |
1068 | int ok; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1069 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; |
016bc5ce | 1070 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1071 | X509_NAME *nm; |
1072 | nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1073 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls); | |
1074 | if (ok) | |
1075 | { | |
1076 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1077 | return 1; | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | ||
016bc5ce | 1080 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ |
e1a27eb3 | 1081 | |
016bc5ce DSH |
1082 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
1083 | ||
1084 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1085 | if (!skcrl) | |
e1a27eb3 | 1086 | { |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1087 | if (crl) |
1088 | { | |
1089 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1090 | return 1; | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | return 0; | |
1093 | } | |
1094 | ||
016bc5ce DSH |
1095 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl); |
1096 | ||
1097 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1098 | ||
1099 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1100 | if (crl) | |
f6e7d014 | 1101 | { |
016bc5ce DSH |
1102 | *pcrl = crl; |
1103 | return 1; | |
f6e7d014 | 1104 | } |
016bc5ce DSH |
1105 | |
1106 | return 0; | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1107 | } |
1108 | ||
1109 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1110 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
1111 | { | |
1112 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1113 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1114 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1115 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1116 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
5cbd2033 DSH |
1117 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
1118 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1119 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1120 | /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1121 | * is next certificate in chain. |
1122 | */ | |
5cbd2033 | 1123 | else if (cnum < chnum) |
b545dc67 DSH |
1124 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
1125 | else | |
1126 | { | |
1127 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1128 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1129 | if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) | |
1130 | { | |
1131 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
bdee69f7 | 1132 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1133 | if(!ok) goto err; |
1134 | } | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | ||
1137 | if(issuer) | |
1138 | { | |
bc501570 DSH |
1139 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
1140 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1141 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) | |
1142 | { | |
1143 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1144 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1145 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1146 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1147 | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1148 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT) |
1149 | { | |
d0fff69d | 1150 | int dmy = 1; |
bc7535bc DSH |
1151 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) |
1152 | { | |
1153 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1154 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1155 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1156 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1157 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) |
bc7535bc DSH |
1158 | { |
1159 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE; | |
1160 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1161 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1162 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1163 | if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl, &dmy)) |
bc7535bc DSH |
1164 | { |
1165 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1166 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1167 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1168 | } | |
1169 | } | |
1170 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
1171 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1172 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1173 | ||
1174 | if(!ikey) | |
1175 | { | |
1176 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
bdee69f7 | 1177 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1178 | if (!ok) goto err; |
1179 | } | |
1180 | else | |
1181 | { | |
1182 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1183 | if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) | |
1184 | { | |
1185 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
bdee69f7 | 1186 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1187 | if (!ok) goto err; |
1188 | } | |
1189 | } | |
1190 | } | |
1191 | ||
3f791ca8 DSH |
1192 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); |
1193 | if (!ok) | |
e1a27eb3 | 1194 | goto err; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1195 | |
1196 | ok = 1; | |
1197 | ||
1198 | err: | |
1199 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1200 | return ok; | |
1201 | } | |
1202 | ||
1203 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1204 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
1205 | { | |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1206 | int ok; |
1207 | /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL | |
1208 | * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1209 | * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. |
1210 | */ | |
d0fff69d | 1211 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, NULL, x) > 0) |
bc501570 DSH |
1212 | { |
1213 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1214 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1215 | if (!ok) |
1216 | return 0; | |
bc501570 DSH |
1217 | } |
1218 | ||
010fa0b3 | 1219 | if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) |
bc501570 | 1220 | { |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1221 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
1222 | return 1; | |
1223 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1224 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1225 | if(!ok) | |
1226 | return 0; | |
bc501570 | 1227 | } |
010fa0b3 | 1228 | |
bc501570 | 1229 | return 1; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1230 | } |
1231 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1232 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1233 | { | |
1234 | int ret; | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1235 | if (ctx->parent) |
1236 | return 1; | |
175ac681 | 1237 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
5d7c222d DSH |
1238 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); |
1239 | if (ret == 0) | |
1240 | { | |
8afca8d9 | 1241 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5d7c222d DSH |
1242 | return 0; |
1243 | } | |
1244 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1245 | if (ret == -1) | |
1246 | { | |
1247 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify | |
1248 | * callback. | |
1249 | */ | |
1250 | X509 *x; | |
1251 | int i; | |
1252 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) | |
1253 | { | |
1254 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1255 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1256 | continue; | |
1257 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1258 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
002e66c0 DSH |
1259 | if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
1260 | return 0; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1261 | } |
1262 | return 1; | |
1263 | } | |
1264 | if (ret == -2) | |
1265 | { | |
1266 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1267 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1268 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1269 | } | |
1270 | ||
1271 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) | |
1272 | { | |
1273 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1274 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1275 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1276 | return 0; | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | ||
1279 | return 1; | |
1280 | } | |
1281 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1282 | static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
1283 | { | |
1284 | time_t *ptime; | |
1285 | int i; | |
1286 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1287 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
1288 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1289 | else |
1290 | ptime = NULL; | |
1291 | ||
1292 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1293 | if (i == 0) | |
1294 | { | |
1295 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1296 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1297 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1298 | return 0; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | ||
1301 | if (i > 0) | |
1302 | { | |
1303 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1304 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1305 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1306 | return 0; | |
1307 | } | |
1308 | ||
1309 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1310 | if (i == 0) | |
1311 | { | |
1312 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1313 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1314 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1315 | return 0; | |
1316 | } | |
1317 | ||
1318 | if (i < 0) | |
1319 | { | |
1320 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1321 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1322 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1323 | return 0; | |
1324 | } | |
1325 | ||
1326 | return 1; | |
1327 | } | |
1328 | ||
6b691a5c | 1329 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
d02b48c6 | 1330 | { |
e1a27eb3 | 1331 | int ok=0,n; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1332 | X509 *xs,*xi; |
1333 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | |
2c45bf2b | 1334 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
d02b48c6 | 1335 | |
2f043896 | 1336 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
d02b48c6 | 1337 | |
7e258a56 | 1338 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1339 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; |
1340 | n--; | |
7e258a56 | 1341 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
e1a27eb3 | 1342 | |
bbb72003 | 1343 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1344 | xs=xi; |
1345 | else | |
1346 | { | |
1347 | if (n <= 0) | |
1348 | { | |
1349 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1350 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1351 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
1352 | goto end; | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | else | |
1355 | { | |
1356 | n--; | |
1357 | ctx->error_depth=n; | |
7e258a56 | 1358 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1359 | } |
1360 | } | |
1361 | ||
1362 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1363 | while (n >= 0) | |
1364 | { | |
1365 | ctx->error_depth=n; | |
1366 | if (!xs->valid) | |
1367 | { | |
1368 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | |
1369 | { | |
1370 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1371 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1372 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
1373 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
1374 | } | |
29902449 | 1375 | else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) |
78f3a2aa BM |
1376 | /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, |
1377 | * this is a waste of time. That check should | |
1378 | * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be | |
1379 | * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but | |
1380 | * we don't verify again and again in SSL | |
1381 | * handshakes and the like once the cert has | |
1382 | * been declared trusted. */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1383 | { |
1384 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1385 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | |
1386 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
582e5929 DSH |
1387 | if (!ok) |
1388 | { | |
1389 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1390 | goto end; | |
1391 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1392 | } |
cfcf6453 | 1393 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
d02b48c6 | 1394 | pkey=NULL; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1395 | } |
1396 | ||
e1a27eb3 | 1397 | xs->valid = 1; |
d02b48c6 | 1398 | |
3f791ca8 DSH |
1399 | ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); |
1400 | if (!ok) | |
e1a27eb3 | 1401 | goto end; |
d02b48c6 | 1402 | |
d02b48c6 | 1403 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ |
a7201e9a | 1404 | ctx->current_issuer=xi; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1405 | ctx->current_cert=xs; |
1406 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | |
1407 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
1408 | ||
1409 | n--; | |
1410 | if (n >= 0) | |
1411 | { | |
1412 | xi=xs; | |
7e258a56 | 1413 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1414 | } |
1415 | } | |
1416 | ok=1; | |
1417 | end: | |
f684090c | 1418 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1419 | } |
1420 | ||
91b73acb | 1421 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 DSH |
1422 | { |
1423 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | ||
91b73acb | 1426 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1427 | { |
1428 | char *str; | |
284ef5f3 | 1429 | ASN1_TIME atm; |
527497a7 | 1430 | long offset; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1431 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; |
1432 | int i,j; | |
1433 | ||
1434 | p=buff1; | |
1435 | i=ctm->length; | |
1436 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | |
82aec1cc BM |
1437 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
1438 | { | |
f684090c | 1439 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1440 | memcpy(p,str,10); |
1441 | p+=10; | |
1442 | str+=10; | |
82aec1cc BM |
1443 | } |
1444 | else | |
1445 | { | |
1446 | if (i < 13) return 0; | |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1447 | memcpy(p,str,12); |
1448 | p+=12; | |
1449 | str+=12; | |
82aec1cc | 1450 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
1451 | |
1452 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | |
1453 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1454 | else |
1455 | { | |
1456 | *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1457 | *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1458 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | |
82aec1cc | 1459 | if (*str == '.') |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1460 | { |
1461 | str++; | |
b7c190d9 | 1462 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; |
284ef5f3 | 1463 | } |
82aec1cc BM |
1464 | |
1465 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1466 | *(p++)='Z'; |
1467 | *(p++)='\0'; | |
1468 | ||
1469 | if (*str == 'Z') | |
1470 | offset=0; | |
1471 | else | |
1472 | { | |
0b0a60d8 | 1473 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
f684090c | 1474 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1475 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; |
1476 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | |
1477 | if (*str == '-') | |
dfeab068 | 1478 | offset= -offset; |
d02b48c6 | 1479 | } |
284ef5f3 | 1480 | atm.type=ctm->type; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1481 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); |
1482 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1483 | ||
a0e7c8ee DSH |
1484 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) |
1485 | return 0; | |
d02b48c6 | 1486 | |
b7c190d9 | 1487 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1488 | { |
1489 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | |
1490 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1491 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | |
1492 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | |
d02b48c6 | 1493 | |
f684090c BM |
1494 | if (i < j) return -1; |
1495 | if (i > j) return 1; | |
284ef5f3 | 1496 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
1497 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); |
1498 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
f684090c | 1499 | return -1; |
d02b48c6 | 1500 | else |
f684090c | 1501 | return i; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1502 | } |
1503 | ||
284ef5f3 | 1504 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 DSH |
1505 | { |
1506 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | |
1507 | } | |
1508 | ||
1509 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1510 | { |
1511 | time_t t; | |
ba8e2824 | 1512 | int type = -1; |
d02b48c6 | 1513 | |
b7c190d9 | 1514 | if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; |
bbb72003 DSH |
1515 | else time(&t); |
1516 | ||
d02b48c6 | 1517 | t+=adj; |
ba8e2824 DSH |
1518 | if (s) type = s->type; |
1519 | if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); | |
1520 | if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); | |
1521 | return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1522 | } |
1523 | ||
7e258a56 | 1524 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1525 | { |
1526 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | |
1527 | int i,j; | |
1528 | ||
f684090c | 1529 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; |
d02b48c6 | 1530 | |
7e258a56 | 1531 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) |
d02b48c6 | 1532 | { |
7e258a56 | 1533 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1534 | if (ktmp == NULL) |
1535 | { | |
1536 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
f684090c | 1537 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1538 | } |
1539 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1540 | break; | |
1541 | else | |
1542 | { | |
cfcf6453 | 1543 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1544 | ktmp=NULL; |
1545 | } | |
1546 | } | |
1547 | if (ktmp == NULL) | |
1548 | { | |
1549 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
f684090c | 1550 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1551 | } |
1552 | ||
1553 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1554 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | |
1555 | { | |
7e258a56 | 1556 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); |
d02b48c6 | 1557 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); |
cfcf6453 | 1558 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1559 | } |
1560 | ||
cfcf6453 DSH |
1561 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); |
1562 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
f684090c | 1563 | return 1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1564 | } |
1565 | ||
dd9d233e DSH |
1566 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
1567 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
3ac82faa BM |
1568 | { |
1569 | /* This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
79aa04ef GT |
1570 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ |
1571 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
1572 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
3ac82faa | 1573 | } |
58964a49 | 1574 | |
6b691a5c | 1575 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
58964a49 | 1576 | { |
f684090c | 1577 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); |
58964a49 RE |
1578 | } |
1579 | ||
6b691a5c | 1580 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
58964a49 | 1581 | { |
f684090c | 1582 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); |
58964a49 RE |
1583 | } |
1584 | ||
6b691a5c | 1585 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1586 | { |
f684090c | 1587 | return ctx->error; |
58964a49 RE |
1588 | } |
1589 | ||
6b691a5c | 1590 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
58964a49 RE |
1591 | { |
1592 | ctx->error=err; | |
1593 | } | |
1594 | ||
6b691a5c | 1595 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1596 | { |
f684090c | 1597 | return ctx->error_depth; |
58964a49 RE |
1598 | } |
1599 | ||
6b691a5c | 1600 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1601 | { |
f684090c | 1602 | return ctx->current_cert; |
58964a49 RE |
1603 | } |
1604 | ||
7e258a56 | 1605 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1606 | { |
f684090c | 1607 | return ctx->chain; |
58964a49 RE |
1608 | } |
1609 | ||
c7cb16a8 | 1610 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
25f923dd DSH |
1611 | { |
1612 | int i; | |
1613 | X509 *x; | |
1614 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
b7c190d9 BM |
1615 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; |
1616 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | |
82aec1cc | 1617 | { |
25f923dd DSH |
1618 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
1619 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
82aec1cc | 1620 | } |
f684090c | 1621 | return chain; |
25f923dd DSH |
1622 | } |
1623 | ||
6b691a5c | 1624 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
58964a49 RE |
1625 | { |
1626 | ctx->cert=x; | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | ||
6b691a5c | 1629 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
58964a49 RE |
1630 | { |
1631 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | |
1632 | } | |
1633 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1634 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
1635 | { | |
1636 | ctx->crls=sk; | |
1637 | } | |
1638 | ||
13938ace | 1639 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
11262391 | 1640 | { |
13938ace | 1641 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
11262391 DSH |
1642 | } |
1643 | ||
bb7cd4e3 | 1644 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
11262391 | 1645 | { |
bb7cd4e3 | 1646 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
11262391 DSH |
1647 | } |
1648 | ||
13938ace DSH |
1649 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust |
1650 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | |
1651 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | |
1652 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | |
1653 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | |
1654 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | |
1655 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | |
1656 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | |
1657 | */ | |
1658 | ||
1659 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
1660 | int purpose, int trust) | |
51630a37 | 1661 | { |
51630a37 | 1662 | int idx; |
13938ace | 1663 | /* If purpose not set use default */ |
82aec1cc | 1664 | if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; |
13938ace | 1665 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ |
82aec1cc BM |
1666 | if (purpose) |
1667 | { | |
068fdce8 | 1668 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
13938ace | 1669 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
b7c190d9 | 1670 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1671 | { |
13938ace DSH |
1672 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1673 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1674 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1675 | } |
068fdce8 | 1676 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
b7c190d9 | 1677 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) |
82aec1cc | 1678 | { |
068fdce8 | 1679 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); |
b7c190d9 | 1680 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1681 | { |
068fdce8 DSH |
1682 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1683 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1684 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1685 | } |
6d0d5431 | 1686 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
82aec1cc | 1687 | } |
068fdce8 | 1688 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ |
b7c190d9 | 1689 | if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; |
82aec1cc | 1690 | } |
b7c190d9 | 1691 | if (trust) |
82aec1cc | 1692 | { |
13938ace | 1693 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
b7c190d9 | 1694 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1695 | { |
13938ace DSH |
1696 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1697 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
1698 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1699 | } |
13938ace | 1700 | } |
13938ace | 1701 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1702 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
1703 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
51630a37 DSH |
1704 | return 1; |
1705 | } | |
1706 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
1707 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
1708 | { | |
1709 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
1710 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
79aa04ef GT |
1711 | if (!ctx) |
1712 | { | |
1713 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1714 | return NULL; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
2f043896 DSH |
1717 | return ctx; |
1718 | } | |
1719 | ||
1720 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1721 | { | |
1722 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
1723 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1724 | } | |
1725 | ||
79aa04ef | 1726 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
2f043896 DSH |
1727 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
1728 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1729 | int ret = 1; |
2f043896 DSH |
1730 | ctx->ctx=store; |
1731 | ctx->current_method=0; | |
1732 | ctx->cert=x509; | |
1733 | ctx->untrusted=chain; | |
5d7c222d | 1734 | ctx->crls = NULL; |
2f043896 | 1735 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; |
82aec1cc | 1736 | ctx->other_ctx=NULL; |
2f043896 DSH |
1737 | ctx->valid=0; |
1738 | ctx->chain=NULL; | |
2f043896 | 1739 | ctx->error=0; |
175ac681 | 1740 | ctx->explicit_policy=0; |
82aec1cc | 1741 | ctx->error_depth=0; |
2f043896 DSH |
1742 | ctx->current_cert=NULL; |
1743 | ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | |
5d7c222d | 1744 | ctx->tree = NULL; |
9d84d4ed | 1745 | ctx->parent = NULL; |
5d7c222d DSH |
1746 | |
1747 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
1748 | ||
1749 | if (!ctx->param) | |
1750 | { | |
1751 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1752 | return 0; | |
1753 | } | |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1754 | |
1755 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set | |
1756 | * use defaults. | |
1757 | */ | |
1758 | ||
bdee69f7 | 1759 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1760 | if (store) |
1761 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
1762 | else | |
1763 | ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
1764 | ||
a3829cb7 DSH |
1765 | if (store) |
1766 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1767 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
a3829cb7 DSH |
1768 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
1769 | } | |
1770 | else | |
a3829cb7 | 1771 | ctx->cleanup = 0; |
5d7c222d DSH |
1772 | |
1773 | if (ret) | |
1774 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
1775 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
1776 | ||
1777 | if (ret == 0) | |
1778 | { | |
1779 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1780 | return 0; | |
a3829cb7 DSH |
1781 | } |
1782 | ||
1783 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1784 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
1785 | else | |
1786 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
1787 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1788 | if (store && store->get_issuer) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1789 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
1790 | else | |
1791 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
1792 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1793 | if (store && store->verify_cb) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1794 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
1795 | else | |
1796 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
1797 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1798 | if (store && store->verify) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1799 | ctx->verify = store->verify; |
1800 | else | |
1801 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
1802 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1803 | if (store && store->check_revocation) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1804 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
1805 | else | |
1806 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
1807 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1808 | if (store && store->get_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1809 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
1810 | else | |
1811 | ctx->get_crl = get_crl; | |
1812 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1813 | if (store && store->check_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1814 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
1815 | else | |
1816 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
1817 | ||
a3829cb7 | 1818 | if (store && store->cert_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
1819 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
1820 | else | |
1821 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
1822 | ||
4d50a2b4 DSH |
1823 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) |
1824 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
1825 | else | |
016bc5ce | 1826 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; |
4d50a2b4 DSH |
1827 | |
1828 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
1829 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
1830 | else | |
016bc5ce | 1831 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; |
4d50a2b4 | 1832 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1833 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; |
1834 | ||
bdee69f7 | 1835 | |
79aa04ef GT |
1836 | /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As |
1837 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
1838 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ | |
1839 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
1840 | if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
1841 | &(ctx->ex_data))) | |
1842 | { | |
1843 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1844 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1845 | return 0; | |
1846 | } | |
1847 | return 1; | |
2f043896 DSH |
1848 | } |
1849 | ||
1850 | /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. | |
1851 | * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
1852 | */ | |
1853 | ||
1854 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
1855 | { | |
1856 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; | |
1857 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
1858 | } | |
1859 | ||
1860 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1861 | { | |
b7c190d9 | 1862 | if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
82bf227e RL |
1863 | if (ctx->param != NULL) |
1864 | { | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1865 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) |
1866 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
82bf227e RL |
1867 | ctx->param=NULL; |
1868 | } | |
1869 | if (ctx->tree != NULL) | |
1870 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1871 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
82bf227e RL |
1872 | ctx->tree=NULL; |
1873 | } | |
2f043896 DSH |
1874 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) |
1875 | { | |
1876 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | |
1877 | ctx->chain=NULL; | |
1878 | } | |
79aa04ef | 1879 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
c17810b0 | 1880 | memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); |
2f043896 | 1881 | } |
13938ace | 1882 | |
5d7c222d | 1883 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
bbb72003 | 1884 | { |
5d7c222d | 1885 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1886 | } |
1887 | ||
5d7c222d | 1888 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
bbb72003 | 1889 | { |
5d7c222d DSH |
1890 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); |
1891 | } | |
1892 | ||
1893 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) | |
1894 | { | |
1895 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
bbb72003 DSH |
1896 | } |
1897 | ||
db089ad6 LJ |
1898 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
1899 | int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | |
1900 | { | |
1901 | ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; | |
1902 | } | |
1903 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1904 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1905 | { | |
1906 | return ctx->tree; | |
1907 | } | |
1908 | ||
1909 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1910 | { | |
175ac681 | 1911 | return ctx->explicit_policy; |
5d7c222d DSH |
1912 | } |
1913 | ||
1914 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
1915 | { | |
1916 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
1917 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
1918 | if (!param) | |
1919 | return 0; | |
1920 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
1921 | } | |
1922 | ||
1923 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1924 | { | |
1925 | return ctx->param; | |
1926 | } | |
1927 | ||
1928 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
1929 | { | |
1930 | if (ctx->param) | |
1931 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
1932 | ctx->param = param; | |
1933 | } | |
1934 | ||
f73e07cf BL |
1935 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
1936 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | |
d500de16 | 1937 | |
f73e07cf | 1938 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
d500de16 | 1939 | |
f5fedc04 | 1940 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
d500de16 | 1941 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |