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58964a49 | 1 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
2 | * All rights reserved. |
3 | * | |
4 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
5 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
6 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 7 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
9 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
10 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
11 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
12 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
13 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 14 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
15 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
16 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
17 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
18 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
19 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
20 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 21 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
22 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
23 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
24 | * are met: | |
25 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
26 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
27 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
28 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
29 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
30 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
31 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
32 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
33 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
34 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
35 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 36 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
37 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
38 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 39 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
40 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
41 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
42 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
43 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
44 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
45 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
46 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
48 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
49 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
50 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 51 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
52 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
53 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
54 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
55 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
56 | */ | |
57 | ||
58 | #include <stdio.h> | |
59 | #include <time.h> | |
60 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 61 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 62 | |
b39fc560 | 63 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
919ba009 | 72 | #include <internal/dane.h> |
d9b8b89b | 73 | #include <internal/x509_int.h> |
6c21b860 | 74 | #include "x509_lcl.h" |
d02b48c6 | 75 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
76 | /* CRL score values */ |
77 | ||
78 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
79 | ||
0f113f3e | 80 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
81 | |
82 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
83 | ||
0f113f3e | 84 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
85 | |
86 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
87 | ||
0f113f3e | 88 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
89 | |
90 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
91 | ||
0f113f3e | 92 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
93 | |
94 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
95 | ||
96 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
97 | ||
98 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
99 | ||
0f113f3e | 100 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
101 | |
102 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
103 | ||
0f113f3e | 104 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
105 | |
106 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
107 | ||
0f113f3e | 108 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
109 | |
110 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
111 | ||
0f113f3e | 112 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 113 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
114 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
115 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
170b7358 | 116 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 117 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
118 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
119 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 120 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 121 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 122 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 123 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
124 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
125 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 126 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 127 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
170b7358 | 128 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); |
4b96839f DSH |
129 | |
130 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 131 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 132 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
133 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
134 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
135 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
136 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
137 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
138 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 139 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 140 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
141 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
142 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
143 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
144 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 145 | |
d02b48c6 | 146 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 147 | |
6b691a5c | 148 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
149 | { |
150 | return ok; | |
151 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 152 | |
2da2ff50 DSH |
153 | /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ |
154 | static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 155 | { |
d9b8b89b VD |
156 | /* |
157 | * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not | |
158 | * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are | |
159 | * parse errors, rather than memory pressure! | |
160 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
161 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
162 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) | |
163 | return 1; | |
164 | else | |
165 | return 0; | |
166 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 167 | |
2dabd822 DSH |
168 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
169 | ||
170 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
171 | { |
172 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
173 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
174 | int i; | |
175 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
176 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
177 | if (certs == NULL) | |
178 | return NULL; | |
179 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
180 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
181 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
182 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
183 | break; | |
184 | } | |
185 | if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
05f0fb9f | 186 | X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
187 | else |
188 | xtmp = NULL; | |
189 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
190 | return xtmp; | |
191 | } | |
2dabd822 | 192 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
193 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
194 | { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
195 | int err; |
196 | int ok; | |
197 | ||
198 | /* | |
199 | * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, | |
200 | * instantiate chain public key parameters. | |
201 | */ | |
202 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || | |
203 | (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || | |
204 | (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 || | |
205 | (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) | |
206 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
207 | if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) | |
208 | return ok; | |
209 | ||
210 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
211 | ctx->param->flags); | |
212 | if (err != X509_V_OK) { | |
213 | ctx->error = err; | |
214 | ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); | |
6e328256 | 215 | if ((ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
216 | return ok; |
217 | } | |
218 | ||
219 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
220 | ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); | |
221 | if (!ok) | |
222 | return ok; | |
223 | ||
224 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 | |
225 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
226 | if ((ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) | |
227 | return ok; | |
228 | if ((ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) | |
229 | return ok; | |
230 | #endif | |
231 | ||
232 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
233 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) | |
234 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
235 | return ok; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
6b691a5c | 238 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 239 | { |
170b7358 | 240 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b | 241 | |
0f113f3e MC |
242 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
243 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
244 | return -1; | |
245 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 246 | |
aae41f8c MC |
247 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
248 | /* | |
249 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
250 | * cannot do another one. | |
251 | */ | |
252 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
253 | return -1; | |
254 | } | |
0f113f3e | 255 | |
0f113f3e MC |
256 | /* |
257 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
258 | * the first entry is in place | |
259 | */ | |
aae41f8c MC |
260 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
261 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
262 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d9b8b89b | 263 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 264 | } |
05f0fb9f | 265 | X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); |
d9b8b89b | 266 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 267 | |
170b7358 VD |
268 | /* |
269 | * If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled | |
270 | * DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to | |
271 | * keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in | |
272 | * the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER. | |
273 | */ | |
274 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) | |
275 | return dane_verify(ctx); | |
d9b8b89b | 276 | return verify_chain(ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
277 | } |
278 | ||
279 | /* | |
280 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 DSH |
281 | */ |
282 | ||
283 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
284 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
285 | int i; |
286 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;; | |
287 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
288 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
289 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { | |
290 | rv = issuer; | |
291 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1)) | |
292 | break; | |
293 | } | |
294 | } | |
295 | return rv; | |
2f043896 DSH |
296 | } |
297 | ||
298 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
299 | ||
300 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
301 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
302 | int ret; |
303 | if (x == issuer) | |
304 | return cert_self_signed(x); | |
305 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
306 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) { | |
307 | int i; | |
308 | X509 *ch; | |
309 | /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ | |
310 | if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
311 | return 1; | |
312 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
313 | ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
314 | if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { | |
315 | ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; | |
316 | break; | |
317 | } | |
318 | } | |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
321 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
322 | return 1; | |
323 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
324 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
325 | return 0; | |
326 | ||
327 | ctx->error = ret; | |
328 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
329 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
330 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
331 | } |
332 | ||
333 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
334 | ||
335 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
336 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
337 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
338 | if (*issuer) { | |
05f0fb9f | 339 | X509_up_ref(*issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
340 | return 1; |
341 | } else | |
342 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 343 | } |
2f043896 | 344 | |
c864e761 DSH |
345 | static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) |
346 | { | |
347 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
348 | X509 *x; | |
349 | int i; | |
350 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { | |
351 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); | |
352 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { | |
353 | if (sk == NULL) | |
354 | sk = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
355 | if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) { | |
356 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
357 | return NULL; | |
358 | } | |
359 | X509_up_ref(x); | |
360 | } | |
361 | } | |
362 | return sk; | |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
365 | /* |
366 | * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local | |
367 | * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. | |
368 | */ | |
369 | static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, | |
370 | int must_be_ca) | |
371 | { | |
0daccd4d VD |
372 | int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
373 | ||
374 | /* | |
375 | * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust | |
33cc5dde | 376 | * settings trump the purpose constraints. |
0daccd4d VD |
377 | * |
378 | * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in | |
379 | * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in | |
380 | * ctx->param->purpose! | |
381 | * | |
382 | * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from | |
383 | * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets | |
384 | * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however | |
385 | * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value | |
386 | * via the X509_PURPOSE API. | |
387 | * | |
388 | * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're | |
389 | * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is | |
33cc5dde | 390 | * also set. |
0daccd4d VD |
391 | */ |
392 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) | |
393 | tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); | |
394 | ||
33cc5dde VD |
395 | switch (tr_ok) { |
396 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
0daccd4d | 397 | return 1; |
33cc5dde VD |
398 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: |
399 | break; | |
400 | default: | |
401 | switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { | |
402 | case 1: | |
403 | return 1; | |
404 | case 0: | |
405 | break; | |
406 | default: | |
407 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) | |
408 | return 1; | |
409 | } | |
410 | break; | |
411 | } | |
0daccd4d VD |
412 | |
413 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
414 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
415 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
416 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
417 | } | |
418 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
419 | /* |
420 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
421 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
422 | */ |
423 | ||
30b415b0 | 424 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 425 | { |
0daccd4d | 426 | int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 427 | X509 *x; |
0f113f3e MC |
428 | int proxy_path_length = 0; |
429 | int purpose; | |
430 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
0daccd4d | 431 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
0f113f3e | 432 | |
35a1cc90 MC |
433 | /*- |
434 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
435 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
436 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
437 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
438 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
439 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
440 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
441 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
442 | must_be_ca = -1; |
443 | ||
444 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
445 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
446 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
447 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
448 | } else { | |
449 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
450 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
451 | /* | |
452 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
453 | * happy | |
454 | */ | |
455 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
456 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
457 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
458 | } | |
459 | ||
0daccd4d | 460 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
0f113f3e MC |
461 | int ret; |
462 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
463 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
464 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
465 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
466 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
467 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
0daccd4d VD |
468 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
469 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
470 | } |
471 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
472 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
473 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
474 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
0daccd4d VD |
475 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
476 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
477 | } |
478 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
479 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
480 | case -1: | |
481 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
482 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
483 | ret = 0; | |
484 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
485 | } else | |
486 | ret = 1; | |
487 | break; | |
488 | case 0: | |
489 | if (ret != 0) { | |
490 | ret = 0; | |
491 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
492 | } else | |
493 | ret = 1; | |
494 | break; | |
495 | default: | |
496 | if ((ret == 0) | |
497 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
498 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
499 | ret = 0; | |
500 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
501 | } else | |
502 | ret = 1; | |
503 | break; | |
504 | } | |
505 | if (ret == 0) { | |
506 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
507 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
33cc5dde | 508 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
0daccd4d | 509 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 510 | } |
0daccd4d VD |
511 | if (purpose > 0) { |
512 | if (!check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) | |
513 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
514 | } |
515 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
516 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
517 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
518 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
519 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
520 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
521 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
0daccd4d VD |
522 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
523 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
524 | } |
525 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
526 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
527 | plen++; | |
528 | /* | |
529 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
530 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
531 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
532 | */ | |
533 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
534 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
535 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
536 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
537 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
0daccd4d VD |
538 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
539 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
540 | } |
541 | proxy_path_length++; | |
542 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
543 | } else | |
544 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
545 | } | |
0daccd4d | 546 | return 1; |
11262391 DSH |
547 | } |
548 | ||
e9746e03 | 549 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
550 | { |
551 | X509 *x; | |
552 | int i, j, rv; | |
553 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
554 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
555 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
556 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
557 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
558 | continue; | |
559 | /* | |
560 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
561 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
562 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
563 | * to be obeyed. | |
564 | */ | |
565 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
566 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
567 | if (nc) { | |
568 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
569 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
570 | ctx->error = rv; | |
571 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
572 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
573 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
574 | return 0; | |
575 | } | |
576 | } | |
577 | } | |
578 | } | |
579 | return 1; | |
580 | } | |
e9746e03 | 581 | |
3bf15e29 | 582 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e MC |
583 | { |
584 | ctx->error = errcode; | |
585 | ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; | |
586 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
587 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
588 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 589 | |
9689a6ae | 590 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
591 | { |
592 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 593 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
594 | char *name; |
595 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
596 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
597 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
598 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 599 | } |
0f113f3e | 600 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
601 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
602 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
603 | return 1; |
604 | } | |
605 | return n == 0; | |
606 | } | |
8abffa4a | 607 | |
3bf15e29 | 608 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
609 | { |
610 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 611 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
9689a6ae | 612 | if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
613 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
614 | return 0; | |
615 | } | |
9689a6ae | 616 | if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
617 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
618 | return 0; | |
619 | } | |
9689a6ae | 620 | if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
621 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
622 | return 0; | |
623 | } | |
624 | return 1; | |
625 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 626 | |
d9b8b89b | 627 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 628 | { |
d9b8b89b | 629 | int i, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e | 630 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 631 | X509 *mx; |
170b7358 | 632 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
633 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
634 | int trust; | |
635 | ||
bdcadca2 VD |
636 | /* |
637 | * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) | |
638 | * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. | |
639 | */ | |
640 | if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { | |
170b7358 VD |
641 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { |
642 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
643 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
644 | return trust; | |
645 | } | |
646 | } | |
647 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
648 | /* |
649 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
650 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
651 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
652 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
653 | */ | |
654 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 655 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 656 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
0f113f3e | 657 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
658 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
659 | goto trusted; | |
660 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
661 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 662 | } |
d9b8b89b | 663 | |
0f113f3e | 664 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
665 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
666 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 667 | */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
668 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
669 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) | |
670 | goto trusted; | |
671 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
497ecc0d | 674 | if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
d9b8b89b VD |
675 | /* |
676 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
677 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
678 | */ | |
bdcadca2 VD |
679 | i = 0; |
680 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
0f113f3e | 681 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
682 | if (!mx) |
683 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
684 | ||
685 | /* | |
686 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
687 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
688 | */ | |
689 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
690 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
691 | X509_free(mx); | |
692 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 693 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
694 | |
695 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
696 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
697 | X509_free(x); | |
698 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
699 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
700 | } |
701 | ||
702 | /* | |
703 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
704 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
705 | */ | |
706 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
707 | |
708 | rejected: | |
709 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
710 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
711 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
6e328256 | 712 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
d9b8b89b VD |
713 | if (!ok) |
714 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
715 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
716 | ||
717 | trusted: | |
170b7358 VD |
718 | if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
719 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
720 | if (dane->pdpth < 0) | |
721 | dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; | |
722 | /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ | |
723 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
724 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
725 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
726 | } |
727 | ||
b545dc67 | 728 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 729 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 730 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
731 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
732 | return 1; | |
733 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
734 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
735 | else { | |
736 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
737 | if (ctx->parent) | |
738 | return 1; | |
739 | last = 0; | |
740 | } | |
741 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
742 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
743 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
744 | if (!ok) | |
745 | return ok; | |
746 | } | |
747 | return 1; | |
748 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
749 | |
750 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
751 | { |
752 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
4c9b0a03 GK |
753 | X509 *x = NULL; |
754 | int ok = 0, cnum = 0; | |
755 | unsigned int last_reasons = 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
756 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
757 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
758 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
759 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
760 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
761 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
762 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
763 | last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
764 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
765 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
766 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
767 | else | |
768 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
769 | /* | |
770 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
771 | */ | |
772 | if (!ok) { | |
773 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
774 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
775 | goto err; | |
776 | } | |
777 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
778 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
779 | if (!ok) | |
780 | goto err; | |
781 | ||
782 | if (dcrl) { | |
783 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
784 | if (!ok) | |
785 | goto err; | |
786 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
787 | if (!ok) | |
788 | goto err; | |
789 | } else | |
790 | ok = 1; | |
791 | ||
792 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
793 | if (ok != 2) { | |
794 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
795 | if (!ok) | |
796 | goto err; | |
797 | } | |
798 | ||
799 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
800 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
801 | crl = NULL; | |
802 | dcrl = NULL; | |
803 | /* | |
804 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
805 | * so exit loop. | |
806 | */ | |
807 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
808 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
809 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
810 | goto err; | |
811 | } | |
812 | } | |
813 | err: | |
814 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
815 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
816 | ||
817 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
818 | return ok; | |
819 | ||
820 | } | |
b545dc67 | 821 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
822 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
823 | ||
824 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
0f113f3e MC |
825 | { |
826 | time_t *ptime; | |
827 | int i; | |
828 | if (notify) | |
829 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
830 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
831 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
832 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
833 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
834 | else |
835 | ptime = NULL; | |
836 | ||
837 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
838 | if (i == 0) { | |
839 | if (!notify) | |
840 | return 0; | |
841 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
842 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
843 | return 0; | |
844 | } | |
845 | ||
846 | if (i > 0) { | |
847 | if (!notify) | |
848 | return 0; | |
849 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
850 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
851 | return 0; | |
852 | } | |
853 | ||
854 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
855 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
856 | ||
857 | if (i == 0) { | |
858 | if (!notify) | |
859 | return 0; | |
860 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
861 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
862 | return 0; | |
863 | } | |
864 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
865 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
866 | if (!notify) | |
867 | return 0; | |
868 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
869 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
870 | return 0; | |
871 | } | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | if (notify) | |
875 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
876 | ||
877 | return 1; | |
878 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 879 | |
d43c4497 | 880 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
881 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
882 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
883 | { | |
884 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
885 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
886 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
887 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
888 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
889 | ||
890 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
891 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
892 | reasons = *preasons; | |
893 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
894 | ||
895 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
896 | best_crl = crl; | |
897 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
898 | best_score = crl_score; | |
899 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
900 | } | |
901 | } | |
902 | ||
903 | if (best_crl) { | |
222561fe | 904 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
905 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
906 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
907 | *pscore = best_score; | |
908 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 909 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
910 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
911 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
912 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
913 | } | |
914 | ||
915 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
916 | return 1; | |
917 | ||
918 | return 0; | |
919 | } | |
920 | ||
921 | /* | |
922 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
923 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
924 | */ | |
925 | ||
926 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
0f113f3e MC |
927 | { |
928 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
929 | int i; | |
930 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
931 | if (i >= 0) { | |
932 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
933 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
934 | return 0; | |
935 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
936 | } else | |
937 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 938 | |
0f113f3e | 939 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 940 | |
0f113f3e | 941 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 942 | |
0f113f3e MC |
943 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
944 | return 0; | |
945 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
946 | } else | |
947 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 948 | |
0f113f3e MC |
949 | if (!exta && !extb) |
950 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 951 | |
0f113f3e MC |
952 | if (!exta || !extb) |
953 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 954 | |
0f113f3e MC |
955 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
956 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 957 | |
0f113f3e MC |
958 | return 1; |
959 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
960 | |
961 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
962 | ||
963 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
0f113f3e MC |
964 | { |
965 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
966 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
967 | return 0; | |
968 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
969 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
970 | return 0; | |
971 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
972 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
973 | return 0; | |
974 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
975 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
976 | return 0; | |
977 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
978 | return 0; | |
979 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
980 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
981 | return 0; | |
982 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
983 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
984 | return 1; | |
985 | return 0; | |
986 | } | |
987 | ||
988 | /* | |
989 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
990 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
991 | */ |
992 | ||
993 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
0f113f3e MC |
994 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
995 | { | |
996 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
997 | int i; | |
998 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
999 | return; | |
1000 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
1001 | return; | |
1002 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1003 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1004 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1005 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1006 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1007 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1008 | *dcrl = delta; |
1009 | return; | |
1010 | } | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1013 | } | |
1014 | ||
1015 | /* | |
1016 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1017 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1018 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1019 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1020 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
1021 | */ |
1022 | ||
1023 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1024 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1025 | { | |
1026 | ||
1027 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1028 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1029 | ||
1030 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1031 | ||
1032 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
1033 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1034 | return 0; | |
1035 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
1036 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
1037 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
1038 | return 0; | |
1039 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
1040 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1041 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1042 | return 0; | |
1043 | } | |
1044 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1045 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1046 | return 0; | |
1047 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1048 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
1049 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1050 | return 0; | |
1051 | } else | |
1052 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1053 | ||
1054 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1055 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1056 | ||
1057 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1058 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1059 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1060 | ||
1061 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1062 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1063 | ||
1064 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1065 | ||
1066 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1067 | return 0; | |
1068 | ||
1069 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1070 | ||
1071 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1072 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1073 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1074 | return 0; | |
1075 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1076 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1077 | } | |
1078 | ||
1079 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1080 | ||
1081 | return crl_score; | |
1082 | ||
1083 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1084 | |
1085 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1086 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1087 | { | |
1088 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1089 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1090 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1091 | int i; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1094 | cidx++; | |
1095 | ||
1096 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1097 | ||
1098 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1099 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1100 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1101 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1102 | return; | |
1103 | } | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | ||
1106 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1107 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1108 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1109 | continue; | |
1110 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1111 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1112 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1113 | return; | |
1114 | } | |
1115 | } | |
1116 | ||
1117 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1118 | ||
1119 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1120 | return; | |
1121 | ||
1122 | /* | |
1123 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1124 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1125 | */ | |
1126 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1127 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1128 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1129 | continue; | |
1130 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1131 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1132 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1133 | return; | |
1134 | } | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | } | |
1137 | ||
1138 | /* | |
1139 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1140 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1141 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1142 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1143 | */ |
1144 | ||
1145 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1146 | { |
1147 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1148 | int ret; | |
1149 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1150 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1151 | return 0; | |
1152 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1153 | return -1; | |
1154 | ||
1155 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1156 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1157 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1158 | ||
1159 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1160 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1163 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1164 | ||
1165 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1166 | goto err; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1169 | ||
1170 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1171 | err: | |
1172 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1173 | return ret; | |
1174 | } | |
1175 | ||
1176 | /* | |
1177 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1178 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1179 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1180 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1181 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1182 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1183 | */ |
1184 | ||
1185 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1186 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1187 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1188 | { | |
1189 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1190 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1191 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1192 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1193 | return 1; | |
1194 | return 0; | |
1195 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1196 | |
3a83462d MC |
1197 | /*- |
1198 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1199 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1200 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1201 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1202 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1203 | */ |
1204 | ||
3e727a3b | 1205 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1206 | { |
1207 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1208 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1209 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1210 | int i, j; | |
1211 | if (!a || !b) | |
1212 | return 1; | |
1213 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1214 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1215 | return 0; | |
1216 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1217 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1218 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1219 | return 0; | |
1220 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1221 | return 1; | |
1222 | else | |
1223 | return 0; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1226 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1227 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1228 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1229 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1230 | return 0; | |
1231 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1232 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1233 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1234 | } | |
1235 | ||
1236 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1237 | if (nm) { | |
1238 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1239 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1240 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1241 | continue; | |
1242 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1243 | return 1; | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | return 0; | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | ||
1248 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1249 | ||
1250 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1251 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1252 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1253 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1254 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1255 | return 1; | |
1256 | } | |
1257 | } | |
1258 | ||
1259 | return 0; | |
1260 | ||
1261 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1262 | |
4b96839f | 1263 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1264 | { |
1265 | int i; | |
1266 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1267 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1268 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1269 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1270 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1271 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1272 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1273 | continue; | |
1274 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1275 | return 1; | |
1276 | } | |
1277 | return 0; | |
1278 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1279 | |
4b96839f | 1280 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1281 | |
4b96839f | 1282 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1283 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1284 | { | |
1285 | int i; | |
1286 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1287 | return 0; | |
1288 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1289 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1290 | return 0; | |
1291 | } else { | |
1292 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1293 | return 0; | |
1294 | } | |
1295 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1296 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1297 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1298 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1299 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1300 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1301 | return 1; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | } | |
1304 | } | |
1305 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1306 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1307 | return 1; | |
1308 | return 0; | |
1309 | } | |
1310 | ||
1311 | /* | |
1312 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1313 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1314 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1315 | |
d43c4497 | 1316 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1317 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1318 | { | |
1319 | int ok; | |
1320 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1321 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1322 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1323 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1324 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1325 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1326 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1327 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1328 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1329 | ||
1330 | if (ok) | |
1331 | goto done; | |
1332 | ||
1333 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1334 | ||
1335 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1336 | ||
1337 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1338 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1339 | goto done; | |
1340 | ||
1341 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1342 | ||
1343 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1344 | ||
1345 | done: | |
1346 | ||
1347 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1348 | if (crl) { | |
1349 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1350 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1351 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1352 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1353 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1354 | return 1; | |
1355 | } | |
1356 | ||
1357 | return 0; | |
1358 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1359 | |
1360 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1361 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1362 | { |
1363 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1364 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1365 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1366 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1367 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1368 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1369 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1370 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1371 | ||
1372 | /* | |
1373 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1374 | * certificate in chain. | |
1375 | */ | |
1376 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1377 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1378 | else { | |
1379 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1380 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1381 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
1382 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1383 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1384 | if (!ok) | |
1385 | goto err; | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | } | |
1388 | ||
1389 | if (issuer) { | |
1390 | /* | |
1391 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1392 | */ | |
1393 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1394 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1395 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1396 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
1397 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1398 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1399 | if (!ok) | |
1400 | goto err; | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | ||
1403 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
1404 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1405 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1406 | if (!ok) | |
1407 | goto err; | |
1408 | } | |
1409 | ||
1410 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
1411 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
1412 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1413 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1414 | if (!ok) | |
1415 | goto err; | |
1416 | } | |
1417 | } | |
1418 | ||
1419 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
1420 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1421 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1422 | if (!ok) | |
1423 | goto err; | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | ||
1426 | } | |
1427 | ||
1428 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
1429 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1430 | if (!ok) | |
1431 | goto err; | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | ||
1434 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
c01ff880 | 1435 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
1436 | |
1437 | if (!ikey) { | |
1438 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1439 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1440 | if (!ok) | |
1441 | goto err; | |
1442 | } else { | |
1443 | int rv; | |
1444 | rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
1445 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
1446 | ctx->error = rv; | |
1447 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1448 | if (!ok) | |
1449 | goto err; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1452 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
1453 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1454 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1455 | if (!ok) | |
1456 | goto err; | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | } | |
1459 | } | |
1460 | ||
1461 | ok = 1; | |
1462 | ||
1463 | err: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1464 | return ok; |
1465 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1466 | |
1467 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1468 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1469 | { |
1470 | int ok; | |
1471 | X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1472 | /* | |
1473 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1474 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
1475 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
1476 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1477 | */ | |
1478 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1479 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
1480 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1481 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1482 | if (!ok) | |
1483 | return 0; | |
1484 | } | |
1485 | /* | |
1486 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
1487 | * is not removeFromCRL. | |
1488 | */ | |
1489 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1490 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1491 | return 2; | |
1492 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1493 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1494 | if (!ok) | |
1495 | return 0; | |
1496 | } | |
1497 | ||
1498 | return 1; | |
1499 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1500 | |
5d7c222d | 1501 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1502 | { |
1503 | int ret; | |
1504 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1505 | return 1; | |
1506 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1507 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
895c2f84 | 1508 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1509 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1510 | return 0; | |
1511 | } | |
1512 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
895c2f84 | 1513 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1514 | /* |
1515 | * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
1516 | */ | |
1517 | X509 *x; | |
1518 | int i; | |
1519 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
1520 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1521 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1522 | continue; | |
1523 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1524 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1525 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1526 | return 0; | |
1527 | } | |
1528 | return 1; | |
1529 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1530 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1531 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
1532 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1533 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1534 | } | |
895c2f84 VD |
1535 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { |
1536 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1537 | return 0; | |
1538 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1539 | |
1540 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1541 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1542 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1543 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1544 | return 0; | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | ||
1547 | return 1; | |
1548 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1549 | |
0930251d | 1550 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet) |
0f113f3e MC |
1551 | { |
1552 | time_t *ptime; | |
1553 | int i; | |
1554 | ||
1555 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1556 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
1557 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
1558 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1559 | else |
1560 | ptime = NULL; | |
1561 | ||
1562 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1563 | if (i == 0) { | |
1564 | if (quiet) | |
1565 | return 0; | |
1566 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1567 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1568 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
1572 | if (i > 0) { | |
1573 | if (quiet) | |
1574 | return 0; | |
1575 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1576 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1577 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1578 | return 0; | |
1579 | } | |
1580 | ||
1581 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1582 | if (i == 0) { | |
1583 | if (quiet) | |
1584 | return 0; | |
1585 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1586 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1587 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1588 | return 0; | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | ||
1591 | if (i < 0) { | |
1592 | if (quiet) | |
1593 | return 0; | |
1594 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1595 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1596 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1597 | return 0; | |
1598 | } | |
1599 | ||
1600 | return 1; | |
1601 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1602 | |
6b691a5c | 1603 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1604 | { |
1605 | int ok = 0, n; | |
1606 | X509 *xs, *xi; | |
1607 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 1608 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
1609 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
1610 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1611 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); |
1612 | ||
170b7358 VD |
1613 | /* |
1614 | * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to | |
1615 | * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as | |
1616 | * NULL, since all we have is a bare key. | |
1617 | */ | |
1618 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { | |
1619 | xs = xi; | |
1620 | xi = NULL; | |
1621 | goto check_cert; | |
1622 | } | |
1623 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1624 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
1625 | xs = xi; | |
1626 | else { | |
1627 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
1628 | xs = xi; | |
1629 | goto check_cert; | |
1630 | } | |
1631 | if (n <= 0) { | |
1632 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1633 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
6e328256 | 1634 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
1635 | goto end; |
1636 | } else { | |
1637 | n--; | |
1638 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1639 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1640 | } | |
1641 | } | |
1642 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
1643 | /* |
1644 | * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback | |
1645 | * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). | |
1646 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1647 | while (n >= 0) { |
1648 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1649 | ||
1650 | /* | |
1651 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1652 | * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
1653 | * time. | |
1654 | */ | |
0e76014e | 1655 | if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { |
c01ff880 | 1656 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1657 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
1658 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
6e328256 | 1659 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
1660 | if (!ok) |
1661 | goto end; | |
1662 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
1663 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1664 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
6e328256 | 1665 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
c01ff880 | 1666 | if (!ok) |
0f113f3e | 1667 | goto end; |
0f113f3e | 1668 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1669 | } |
1670 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1671 | check_cert: |
1672 | ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0); | |
1673 | if (!ok) | |
1674 | goto end; | |
1675 | ||
1676 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1677 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
1678 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
6e328256 | 1679 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
0f113f3e MC |
1680 | if (!ok) |
1681 | goto end; | |
1682 | ||
1683 | n--; | |
1684 | if (n >= 0) { | |
1685 | xi = xs; | |
1686 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1687 | } | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | ok = 1; | |
1690 | end: | |
1691 | return ok; | |
1692 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1693 | |
91b73acb | 1694 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1695 | { |
0f113f3e | 1696 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1697 | } |
1698 | ||
91b73acb | 1699 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e MC |
1700 | { |
1701 | char *str; | |
1702 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1703 | long offset; | |
1704 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
f48b83b4 | 1705 | int i, j, remaining; |
0f113f3e MC |
1706 | |
1707 | p = buff1; | |
f48b83b4 | 1708 | remaining = ctm->length; |
0f113f3e | 1709 | str = (char *)ctm->data; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1710 | /* |
1711 | * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the | |
1712 | * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
1713 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1714 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1715 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1716 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1717 | /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ |
1718 | int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1719 | int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; | |
1720 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1721 | return 0; |
1722 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1723 | p += 10; | |
1724 | str += 10; | |
f48b83b4 | 1725 | remaining -= 10; |
0f113f3e | 1726 | } else { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1727 | /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ |
1728 | int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1729 | int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; | |
1730 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1731 | return 0; |
1732 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1733 | p += 12; | |
1734 | str += 12; | |
f48b83b4 | 1735 | remaining -= 12; |
0f113f3e MC |
1736 | } |
1737 | ||
1738 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1739 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1740 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1741 | } else { | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1742 | /* SS (seconds) */ |
1743 | if (remaining < 2) | |
1744 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1745 | *(p++) = *(str++); |
1746 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1747 | remaining -= 2; |
1748 | /* | |
1749 | * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... | |
1750 | * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. | |
1751 | * Can we just kill them altogether? | |
1752 | */ | |
1753 | if (remaining && *str == '.') { | |
0f113f3e | 1754 | str++; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1755 | remaining--; |
1756 | for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { | |
1757 | if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') | |
1758 | break; | |
1759 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1760 | } |
1761 | ||
1762 | } | |
1763 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1764 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1765 | ||
f48b83b4 EK |
1766 | /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ |
1767 | if (!remaining) | |
1768 | return 0; | |
1769 | if (*str == 'Z') { | |
1770 | if (remaining != 1) | |
1771 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1772 | offset = 0; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1773 | } else { |
1774 | /* (+-)HHMM */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1775 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
1776 | return 0; | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1777 | /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ |
1778 | if (remaining != 5) | |
1779 | return 0; | |
1780 | if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || | |
1781 | str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') | |
1782 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1783 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; |
1784 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1785 | if (*str == '-') | |
1786 | offset = -offset; | |
1787 | } | |
1788 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1789 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1790 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1791 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1792 | ||
1793 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1794 | return 0; | |
1795 | ||
1796 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1797 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1798 | if (i < 50) | |
1799 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1800 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1801 | if (j < 50) | |
1802 | j += 100; | |
1803 | ||
1804 | if (i < j) | |
1805 | return -1; | |
1806 | if (i > j) | |
1807 | return 1; | |
1808 | } | |
1809 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1810 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1811 | return -1; | |
1812 | else | |
1813 | return i; | |
1814 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1815 | |
284ef5f3 | 1816 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1817 | { |
0f113f3e | 1818 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1819 | } |
1820 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1821 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1822 | { |
1823 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1824 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1825 | |
1826 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1827 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1828 | { | |
1829 | time_t t; | |
1830 | ||
1831 | if (in_tm) | |
1832 | t = *in_tm; | |
1833 | else | |
1834 | time(&t); | |
1835 | ||
1836 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1837 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1838 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1839 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1840 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1841 | } | |
1842 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1843 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1844 | |
7e258a56 | 1845 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1846 | { |
1847 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1848 | int i, j; | |
1849 | ||
1850 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1851 | return 1; | |
1852 | ||
1853 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 1854 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e MC |
1855 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
1856 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1857 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1858 | return 0; | |
1859 | } | |
1860 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1861 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1862 | } |
1863 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1864 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1865 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1866 | return 0; | |
1867 | } | |
1868 | ||
1869 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1870 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 1871 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
0f113f3e | 1872 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
1873 | } |
1874 | ||
1875 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1876 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1877 | return 1; |
1878 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1879 | |
2e8cb108 DSH |
1880 | /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
1881 | ||
1882 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1883 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
1884 | { | |
1885 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
1886 | int i; | |
1887 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
1888 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
1889 | if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
1890 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
1891 | return NULL; | |
1892 | } | |
1893 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
1894 | if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
1895 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
1896 | return NULL; | |
1897 | } | |
1898 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1899 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
1900 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
1901 | return NULL; | |
1902 | } | |
1903 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1904 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
1905 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
1906 | return NULL; | |
1907 | } | |
1908 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
1909 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
1910 | return NULL; | |
1911 | } | |
1912 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1913 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
1914 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
1915 | return NULL; | |
1916 | } | |
1917 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
1918 | if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
1919 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
1920 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
1921 | return NULL; | |
1922 | } | |
1923 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
1924 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
90945fa3 | 1925 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1926 | goto memerr; |
1927 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
1928 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
1929 | goto memerr; | |
1930 | ||
1931 | if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) | |
1932 | goto memerr; | |
1933 | if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) | |
1934 | goto memerr; | |
1935 | ||
1936 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
1937 | ||
1938 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
1939 | goto memerr; | |
1940 | ||
1941 | /* | |
1942 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
1943 | * number to correct value too. | |
1944 | */ | |
1945 | ||
1946 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
1947 | X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
1948 | ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
1949 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
1950 | goto memerr; | |
1951 | } | |
1952 | ||
1953 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
1954 | ||
1955 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
1956 | ||
1957 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
1958 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
1959 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); | |
1960 | /* | |
1961 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
1962 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
1963 | */ | |
34a42e14 | 1964 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1965 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
1966 | if (!rvtmp) | |
1967 | goto memerr; | |
1968 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
1969 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
1970 | goto memerr; | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | } | |
1973 | } | |
1974 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
1975 | ||
1976 | if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
1977 | goto memerr; | |
1978 | ||
1979 | return crl; | |
1980 | ||
1981 | memerr: | |
1982 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
222561fe | 1983 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1984 | return NULL; |
1985 | } | |
1986 | ||
6b691a5c | 1987 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
1988 | { |
1989 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
1990 | } | |
58964a49 | 1991 | |
6b691a5c | 1992 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1993 | { |
1994 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
1995 | } | |
58964a49 | 1996 | |
6b691a5c | 1997 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1998 | { |
1999 | return ctx->error; | |
2000 | } | |
58964a49 | 2001 | |
6b691a5c | 2002 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2003 | { |
2004 | ctx->error = err; | |
2005 | } | |
58964a49 | 2006 | |
6b691a5c | 2007 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2008 | { |
2009 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2010 | } | |
58964a49 | 2011 | |
6b691a5c | 2012 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2013 | { |
2014 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2015 | } | |
58964a49 | 2016 | |
7e258a56 | 2017 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2018 | { |
2019 | return ctx->chain; | |
2020 | } | |
58964a49 | 2021 | |
c7cb16a8 | 2022 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2023 | { |
2024 | if (!ctx->chain) | |
2025 | return NULL; | |
2026 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2027 | } | |
25f923dd | 2028 | |
2008e714 | 2029 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2030 | { |
2031 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2032 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2033 | |
2034 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2035 | { |
2036 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2037 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2038 | |
2039 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2040 | { |
2041 | return ctx->parent; | |
2042 | } | |
2008e714 | 2043 | |
6b691a5c | 2044 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2045 | { |
2046 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2047 | } | |
58964a49 | 2048 | |
6b691a5c | 2049 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2050 | { |
2051 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2052 | } | |
58964a49 | 2053 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2054 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2055 | { |
2056 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2057 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2058 | |
13938ace | 2059 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e | 2060 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2061 | /* |
2062 | * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? | |
2063 | * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust | |
2064 | * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). | |
2065 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2066 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
2067 | } | |
11262391 | 2068 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2069 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e | 2070 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2071 | /* |
2072 | * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default | |
2073 | * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. | |
2074 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2075 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
2076 | } | |
2077 | ||
2078 | /* | |
2079 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2080 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2081 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2082 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2083 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2084 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2085 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2086 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
2087 | */ |
2088 | ||
2089 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2090 | int purpose, int trust) |
2091 | { | |
2092 | int idx; | |
2093 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
2094 | if (!purpose) | |
2095 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
2096 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
2097 | if (purpose) { | |
2098 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
2099 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
2100 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2101 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2102 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2103 | return 0; | |
2104 | } | |
2105 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2106 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2107 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
0daccd4d VD |
2108 | /* |
2109 | * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is | |
2110 | * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the | |
2111 | * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? | |
2112 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2113 | if (idx == -1) { |
2114 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2115 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2116 | return 0; | |
2117 | } | |
2118 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2119 | } | |
2120 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
2121 | if (!trust) | |
2122 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
2123 | } | |
2124 | if (trust) { | |
2125 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
2126 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2127 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2128 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
2129 | return 0; | |
2130 | } | |
2131 | } | |
2132 | ||
2133 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
2134 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
2135 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
2136 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
2137 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2138 | } |
2139 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2140 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2141 | { | |
b51bce94 | 2142 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2143 | |
90945fa3 | 2144 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2145 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2146 | return NULL; | |
2147 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2148 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2149 | } |
2150 | ||
2151 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2152 | { | |
222561fe RS |
2153 | if (!ctx) |
2154 | return; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2155 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2156 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
2157 | } |
2158 | ||
79aa04ef | 2159 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2160 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2161 | { | |
2162 | int ret = 1; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2163 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2164 | ctx->ctx = store; |
2165 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
2166 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
2167 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2168 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2169 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2170 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2171 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2172 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2173 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2174 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2175 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2176 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2177 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2178 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2179 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2180 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2181 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2182 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2183 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
170b7358 | 2184 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2185 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2186 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2187 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2188 | if (store) { |
2189 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
e29c73c9 | 2190 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2191 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
2192 | } else | |
2193 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
2194 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2195 | if (store && store->check_issued) |
2196 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2197 | else | |
2198 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2199 | ||
2200 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2201 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2202 | else | |
2203 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2204 | ||
2205 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2206 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2207 | else | |
2208 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2209 | ||
2210 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2211 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2212 | else | |
2213 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2214 | ||
2215 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2216 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2217 | else | |
2218 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2219 | ||
2220 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2221 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
311f2785 VD |
2222 | else |
2223 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2224 | |
2225 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2226 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2227 | else | |
2228 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2229 | ||
2230 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2231 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2232 | else | |
2233 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2234 | ||
2235 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2236 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2237 | else | |
2238 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2239 | ||
2240 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2241 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2242 | else | |
2243 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2244 | ||
2245 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2246 | ||
ecdaa1ae | 2247 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2248 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
2249 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2250 | goto err; | |
2251 | } | |
2252 | ||
2253 | /* | |
2254 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2255 | */ | |
2256 | if (store) | |
2257 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2258 | else | |
2259 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2260 | ||
2261 | if (ret) | |
2262 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2263 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2264 | ||
2265 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2266 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2267 | goto err; | |
2268 | } | |
2269 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
2270 | /* |
2271 | * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the | |
2272 | * purpose if this still yields the default value. | |
2273 | */ | |
2274 | if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2275 | int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); | |
2276 | X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2277 | ||
2278 | if (xp != NULL) | |
2279 | ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); | |
2280 | } | |
2281 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2282 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2283 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2284 | return 1; | |
2285 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
ecdaa1ae | 2286 | |
d9b8b89b | 2287 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2288 | /* |
2289 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2290 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2291 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2292 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2293 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2294 | } |
2295 | ||
2296 | /* | |
2297 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2298 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 DSH |
2299 | */ |
2300 | ||
2301 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2302 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2303 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2304 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
c864e761 | 2305 | ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; |
2f043896 DSH |
2306 | } |
2307 | ||
2308 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2309 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2310 | /* |
2311 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2312 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2313 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2314 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2315 | */ | |
2316 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ | |
2317 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { | |
0f113f3e | 2318 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2319 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2320 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2321 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2322 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2323 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2324 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2325 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2326 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2327 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2328 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2329 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2330 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2331 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2332 | } |
13938ace | 2333 | |
5d7c222d | 2334 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2335 | { |
2336 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2337 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2338 | |
5d7c222d | 2339 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2340 | { |
2341 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2342 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2343 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2344 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2345 | time_t t) | |
2346 | { | |
2347 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2348 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2349 | |
db089ad6 | 2350 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
2351 | int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
2352 | { | |
2353 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2354 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2355 | |
5d7c222d | 2356 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2357 | { |
2358 | return ctx->tree; | |
2359 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2360 | |
2361 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2362 | { |
2363 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2364 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2365 | |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2366 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2367 | { | |
d9b8b89b | 2368 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2369 | } |
2370 | ||
5d7c222d | 2371 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2372 | { |
2373 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2374 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2375 | if (!param) | |
2376 | return 0; | |
2377 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2378 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2379 | |
2380 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2381 | { |
2382 | return ctx->param; | |
2383 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2384 | |
2385 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2386 | { |
222561fe | 2387 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2388 | ctx->param = param; |
2389 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2390 | |
919ba009 VD |
2391 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct dane_st *dane) |
2392 | { | |
2393 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2394 | } | |
2395 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2396 | static unsigned char *dane_i2d( |
2397 | X509 *cert, | |
2398 | uint8_t selector, | |
2399 | unsigned int *i2dlen) | |
2400 | { | |
2401 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
2402 | int len; | |
2403 | ||
2404 | /* | |
2405 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
2406 | */ | |
2407 | switch (selector) { | |
2408 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
2409 | len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); | |
2410 | break; | |
2411 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
2412 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); | |
2413 | break; | |
2414 | default: | |
2415 | X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
2416 | return NULL; | |
2417 | } | |
2418 | ||
2419 | if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { | |
2420 | X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2421 | return NULL; | |
2422 | } | |
2423 | ||
2424 | *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
2425 | return buf; | |
2426 | } | |
2427 | ||
2428 | #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ | |
2429 | ||
2430 | static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
2431 | { | |
2432 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; | |
2433 | unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2434 | unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2435 | unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2436 | unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2437 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
2438 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
2439 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2440 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; | |
2441 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
2442 | int i; | |
2443 | int recnum; | |
2444 | int matched = 0; | |
2445 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
2446 | uint32_t mask; | |
2447 | ||
2448 | mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; | |
2449 | ||
2450 | /* | |
2451 | * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) | |
2452 | */ | |
2453 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
2454 | mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2455 | ||
2456 | /* | |
2457 | * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any | |
2458 | * furher PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. | |
2459 | * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. | |
2460 | */ | |
2461 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
2462 | mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2463 | ||
2464 | /*- | |
2465 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 | |
2466 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 | |
2467 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 | |
2468 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 | |
2469 | * | |
2470 | * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building | |
2471 | * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with | |
2472 | * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which | |
2473 | * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). | |
2474 | * | |
2475 | * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX | |
2476 | * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest | |
2477 | * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. | |
2478 | * | |
2479 | * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we | |
2480 | * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers | |
2481 | * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch | |
2482 | * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", | |
2483 | * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public | |
2484 | * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" | |
2485 | * or multiple "3 0 1" records. | |
2486 | * | |
2487 | * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either | |
2488 | * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after | |
2489 | * exhausing all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is | |
2490 | * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. | |
2491 | */ | |
2492 | recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; | |
2493 | for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2494 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2495 | if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) | |
2496 | continue; | |
2497 | if (t->usage != usage) { | |
2498 | usage = t->usage; | |
2499 | ||
2500 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2501 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2502 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2503 | } | |
2504 | if (t->selector != selector) { | |
2505 | selector = t->selector; | |
2506 | ||
2507 | /* Update per-selector state */ | |
2508 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2509 | i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); | |
2510 | if (i2dbuf == NULL) | |
2511 | return -1; | |
2512 | ||
2513 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2514 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2515 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2516 | } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
2517 | /*- | |
2518 | * Digest agility: | |
2519 | * | |
2520 | * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9> | |
2521 | * | |
2522 | * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the | |
2523 | * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals | |
2524 | * other than "Full". | |
2525 | */ | |
2526 | if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) | |
2527 | continue; | |
2528 | } | |
2529 | ||
2530 | /* | |
2531 | * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant | |
2532 | * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. | |
2533 | */ | |
2534 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
2535 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
2536 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; | |
2537 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
2538 | ||
2539 | if (md != NULL) { | |
2540 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; | |
2541 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
2542 | matched = -1; | |
2543 | break; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | } | |
2546 | } | |
2547 | ||
2548 | /* | |
2549 | * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any | |
2550 | * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a | |
2551 | * full chain. | |
2552 | */ | |
2553 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && | |
2554 | memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
2555 | if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) | |
2556 | matched = 1; | |
2557 | if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { | |
2558 | dane->mdpth = depth; | |
2559 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2560 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); | |
2561 | dane->mcert = cert; | |
2562 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
2563 | } | |
2564 | break; | |
2565 | } | |
2566 | } | |
2567 | ||
2568 | /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ | |
2569 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2570 | return matched; | |
2571 | } | |
2572 | ||
2573 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
2574 | { | |
2575 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; | |
2576 | int matched = 0; | |
2577 | X509 *cert; | |
2578 | ||
2579 | if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) | |
2580 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2581 | ||
2582 | /* | |
2583 | * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if | |
2584 | * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking | |
2585 | * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). | |
2586 | */ | |
2587 | cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
2588 | if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) | |
2589 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2590 | if (matched > 0) { | |
2591 | ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; | |
2592 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2593 | } | |
2594 | ||
2595 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2596 | } | |
2597 | ||
2598 | static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2599 | { | |
2600 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; | |
2601 | danetls_record *t; | |
2602 | int num = ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2603 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2604 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
2605 | int i; | |
2606 | ||
2607 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2608 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2609 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || | |
2610 | t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || | |
2611 | t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || | |
2612 | X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) | |
2613 | continue; | |
2614 | ||
2615 | /* Clear PKIX-?? matches that failed to panned out to a full chain */ | |
2616 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
2617 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2618 | ||
2619 | /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ | |
2620 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; | |
2621 | dane->mdpth = num - 1; | |
2622 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2623 | ||
2624 | /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ | |
2625 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2626 | for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) | |
2627 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2628 | ||
2629 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2630 | } | |
2631 | ||
2632 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2633 | } | |
2634 | ||
2635 | static void dane_reset(struct dane_st *dane) | |
2636 | { | |
2637 | /* | |
2638 | * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. | |
2639 | */ | |
2640 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
2641 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2642 | dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
2643 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2644 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
2645 | } | |
2646 | ||
6e328256 VD |
2647 | static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
2648 | { | |
2649 | int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); | |
2650 | ||
2651 | if (err == X509_V_OK) | |
2652 | return 1; | |
2653 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
2654 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2655 | ctx->error = err; | |
2656 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
2657 | } | |
2658 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2659 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2660 | { | |
2661 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; | |
170b7358 VD |
2662 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; |
2663 | int matched; | |
2664 | int done; | |
2665 | ||
2666 | dane_reset(dane); | |
2667 | ||
2668 | matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); | |
2669 | done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); | |
2670 | ||
2671 | if (done) | |
2672 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
2673 | ||
2674 | if (matched > 0) { | |
6e328256 VD |
2675 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2676 | return 0; | |
170b7358 VD |
2677 | ctx->error_depth = 0; |
2678 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
6e328256 | 2679 | return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
2680 | } |
2681 | ||
2682 | if (matched < 0) { | |
2683 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2684 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
2685 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
2686 | return -1; | |
2687 | } | |
2688 | ||
2689 | if (done) { | |
2690 | /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ | |
6e328256 VD |
2691 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2692 | return 0; | |
170b7358 VD |
2693 | ctx->current_cert = cert; |
2694 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2695 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
6e328256 | 2696 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
2697 | } |
2698 | ||
2699 | /* | |
2700 | * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 | |
2701 | * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. | |
2702 | */ | |
2703 | return verify_chain(ctx); | |
2704 | } | |
2705 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2706 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2707 | { | |
170b7358 | 2708 | struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2709 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
2710 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2711 | int ss = cert_self_signed(cert); | |
2712 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
2713 | unsigned int search; | |
170b7358 | 2714 | int may_trusted = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2715 | int may_alternate = 0; |
2716 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2717 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
2718 | int depth; | |
2719 | int ok = 0; | |
2720 | int i; | |
2721 | ||
2722 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
2723 | OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num); | |
2724 | ||
2725 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ | |
2726 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
2727 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
2728 | /* | |
2729 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. | |
170b7358 VD |
2730 | * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the |
2731 | * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, | |
2732 | * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain | |
2733 | * if no luck with untrusted first. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2734 | */ |
2735 | search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; | |
170b7358 VD |
2736 | if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { |
2737 | if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) | |
2738 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
2739 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
2740 | may_alternate = 1; | |
2741 | may_trusted = 1; | |
2742 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2743 | |
2744 | /* | |
2745 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
2746 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make | |
2747 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
2748 | */ | |
2749 | if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
2750 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2751 | return 0; | |
2752 | } | |
2753 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2754 | /* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */ |
2755 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) { | |
2756 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) { | |
2757 | if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) { | |
2758 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
2759 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2760 | return 0; | |
2761 | } | |
2762 | } | |
2763 | } | |
2764 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2765 | /* |
2766 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
2767 | * might be reasonable. | |
2768 | */ | |
2769 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) | |
2770 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; | |
2771 | ||
2772 | /* | |
2773 | * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. | |
2774 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, | |
2775 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
2776 | */ | |
2777 | depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; | |
2778 | ||
2779 | while (search != 0) { | |
2780 | X509 *x; | |
2781 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
2782 | ||
2783 | /* | |
2784 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
2785 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When | |
2786 | * we exceed the depth limit, we simulate absence of a match. | |
2787 | */ | |
2788 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
2789 | STACK_OF(X509) *hide = ctx->chain; | |
2790 | ||
2791 | i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2792 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
2793 | /* | |
2794 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
2795 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
2796 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
2797 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
2798 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
2799 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
2800 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
2801 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
2802 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
2803 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
2804 | * | |
2805 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
2806 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
2807 | */ | |
2808 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
2809 | } | |
2810 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); | |
2811 | ||
2812 | /* Suppress duplicate suppression */ | |
2813 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2814 | ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
2815 | ctx->chain = hide; | |
2816 | ||
2817 | if (ok < 0) { | |
2818 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2819 | search = 0; | |
2820 | continue; | |
2821 | } | |
2822 | ||
2823 | if (ok > 0) { | |
2824 | /* | |
2825 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
2826 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
2827 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
2828 | * that despite the current trust-store match we might still | |
2829 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which | |
2830 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try | |
2831 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
2832 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
170b7358 VD |
2833 | * |
2834 | * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust | |
2835 | * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted | |
2836 | * certificate among the ones from the trust store. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2837 | */ |
2838 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
2839 | OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0); | |
2840 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; | |
2841 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
2842 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2843 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
170b7358 VD |
2844 | |
2845 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
2846 | dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
2847 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2848 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
2849 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2850 | } | |
2851 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
2852 | dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
2853 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2854 | } |
2855 | ||
2856 | /* | |
2857 | * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their | |
2858 | * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. | |
2859 | */ | |
2860 | if (ss == 0) { | |
2861 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { | |
2862 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
2863 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2864 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2865 | search = 0; | |
2866 | continue; | |
2867 | } | |
2868 | ss = cert_self_signed(x); | |
2869 | } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
2870 | /* | |
2871 | * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same | |
2872 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as | |
2873 | * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
2874 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. | |
2875 | */ | |
2876 | if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { | |
2877 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ | |
2878 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
2879 | ok = 0; | |
2880 | } else { | |
2881 | X509_free(x); | |
2882 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; | |
2883 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); | |
2884 | } | |
2885 | } | |
2886 | ||
2887 | /* | |
2888 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck | |
2889 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. | |
2890 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
2891 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
170b7358 VD |
2892 | * |
2893 | * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the | |
2894 | * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE | |
2895 | * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from | |
2896 | * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the | |
2897 | * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted | |
2898 | * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2899 | */ |
2900 | if (ok) { | |
2901 | OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num); | |
2902 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
2903 | switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { | |
2904 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
2905 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
2906 | search = 0; | |
2907 | continue; | |
2908 | } | |
2909 | if (ss == 0) | |
2910 | continue; | |
2911 | } | |
2912 | } | |
2913 | ||
2914 | /* | |
2915 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
2916 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
2917 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
2918 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
2919 | */ | |
2920 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
2921 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
2922 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
2923 | continue; | |
2924 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
2925 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
2926 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
2927 | break; | |
2928 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
2929 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
2930 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
2931 | ss = 0; | |
2932 | } | |
2933 | } | |
2934 | ||
2935 | /* | |
2936 | * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates | |
2937 | */ | |
2938 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
2939 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2940 | OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted); | |
2941 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); | |
2942 | xtmp = (depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
2943 | ||
2944 | /* | |
2945 | * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more | |
2946 | * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
2947 | */ | |
2948 | if (xtmp == NULL) { | |
2949 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
2950 | if (may_trusted) | |
2951 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
2952 | continue; | |
2953 | } | |
2954 | ||
2955 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { | |
2956 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2957 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2958 | search = 0; | |
2959 | continue; | |
2960 | } | |
2961 | X509_up_ref(x); | |
2962 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2963 | ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); | |
2964 | ||
2965 | /* | |
2966 | * Not strictly necessary, but saves cycles looking at the same | |
2967 | * certificates over and over. | |
2968 | */ | |
2969 | (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, x); | |
170b7358 VD |
2970 | |
2971 | /* | |
2972 | * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. | |
2973 | */ | |
2974 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) { | |
2975 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
2976 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
2977 | search = 0; | |
2978 | continue; | |
2979 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2980 | } |
2981 | } | |
2982 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
2983 | ||
2984 | /* | |
170b7358 VD |
2985 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key |
2986 | * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
d9b8b89b | 2987 | */ |
497ecc0d VD |
2988 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
2989 | if (num <= depth) { | |
170b7358 VD |
2990 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) |
2991 | trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); | |
497ecc0d VD |
2992 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) |
2993 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2994 | } |
2995 | ||
2996 | switch (trust) { | |
2997 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
2998 | return 1; | |
2999 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
3000 | return 0; | |
3001 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
3002 | default: | |
3003 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
3004 | ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
3005 | ctx->error_depth = num-1; | |
3006 | if (num > depth) | |
3007 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; | |
170b7358 VD |
3008 | else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && |
3009 | (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0)) | |
3010 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3011 | else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
3012 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
3013 | else if (ss) | |
3014 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
3015 | else if (ctx->num_untrusted == num) | |
3016 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
3017 | else | |
3018 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
170b7358 VD |
3019 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
3020 | dane_reset(dane); | |
6e328256 | 3021 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3022 | } |
3023 | } |