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b1322259 | 1 | /* |
4333b89f | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
3e4b43b9 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
b1322259 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
5b5eea4b SL |
10 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
11 | ||
d02b48c6 RE |
12 | #include <stdio.h> |
13 | #include <time.h> | |
14 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 15 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 16 | |
25f2138b | 17 | #include "crypto/ctype.h" |
b39fc560 | 18 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 19 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
20 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
21 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 24 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 25 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
176db6dc | 26 | #include "internal/dane.h" |
25f2138b | 27 | #include "crypto/x509.h" |
706457b7 | 28 | #include "x509_local.h" |
d02b48c6 | 29 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
30 | /* CRL score values */ |
31 | ||
88444854 DDO |
32 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ |
33 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
34 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */ | |
35 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
36 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \ | |
37 | (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
38 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
39 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
40 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
41 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
d43c4497 | 42 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
43 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
44 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
170b7358 | 45 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 46 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
47 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
48 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
67ecd65c | 49 | static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 50 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 51 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 52 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
53 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
54 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 55 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 56 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
170b7358 | 57 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); |
fbb82a60 VD |
58 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); |
59 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); | |
cccf532f | 60 | static int check_curve(X509 *cert); |
4b96839f DSH |
61 | |
62 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 63 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 64 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
65 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
66 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
67 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
68 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
69 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
70 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 71 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 72 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
73 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
74 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
75 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
76 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 77 | |
d02b48c6 | 78 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 79 | |
6b691a5c | 80 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
81 | { |
82 | return ok; | |
83 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 84 | |
0d8dbb52 | 85 | /*- |
ade08735 | 86 | * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error. |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
87 | * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested. |
88 | * It calls X509v3_cache_extensions() | |
89 | * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any | |
90 | * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc. | |
ade08735 | 91 | */ |
6725682d | 92 | int X509_self_signed(X509 *cert, int verify_signature) |
0f113f3e | 93 | { |
0d8dbb52 | 94 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0c56a648 | 95 | |
0d8dbb52 | 96 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL) { /* handles cert == NULL */ |
9311d0c4 | 97 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
98 | return -1; |
99 | } | |
6725682d | 100 | if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
101 | return -1; |
102 | if ((cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 103 | return 0; |
0d8dbb52 DDO |
104 | if (!verify_signature) |
105 | return 1; | |
6725682d | 106 | return X509_verify(cert, pkey); |
0d8dbb52 | 107 | } |
2dabd822 | 108 | |
0d8dbb52 | 109 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
2dabd822 | 110 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
111 | { |
112 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
113 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
114 | int i; | |
88444854 | 115 | |
0f113f3e | 116 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ |
bf973d06 | 117 | ERR_set_mark(); |
0f113f3e | 118 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); |
bf973d06 | 119 | ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
0f113f3e MC |
120 | if (certs == NULL) |
121 | return NULL; | |
122 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
123 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
124 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
125 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
126 | break; | |
e9e7b5df | 127 | xtmp = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 128 | } |
e9e7b5df | 129 | if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp)) |
0f113f3e MC |
130 | xtmp = NULL; |
131 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
132 | return xtmp; | |
133 | } | |
2dabd822 | 134 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
135 | /*- |
136 | * Inform the verify callback of an error. | |
e99505b4 DDO |
137 | * If 'x' is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at |
138 | * 'depth' | |
139 | * If 'err' is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave | |
70dd3c65 VD |
140 | * unchanged (presumably set by the caller). |
141 | * | |
142 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
143 | */ | |
144 | static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) | |
145 | { | |
146 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
147 | ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
148 | if (err != X509_V_OK) | |
149 | ctx->error = err; | |
150 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
151 | } | |
152 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
153 | #define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \ |
154 | if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \ | |
6e5e118c DO |
155 | return 0 |
156 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
157 | /*- |
158 | * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the | |
159 | * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error | |
160 | * number. | |
161 | * | |
162 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
163 | */ | |
164 | static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
165 | { | |
166 | ctx->error = err; | |
167 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
168 | } | |
169 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
170 | static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
171 | { | |
172 | int i; | |
173 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
174 | ||
175 | if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) | |
176 | return 1; | |
177 | ||
178 | for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
179 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
180 | ||
181 | /* | |
182 | * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only | |
183 | * check the security of issuer keys. | |
184 | */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
185 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert), |
186 | ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
fbb82a60 VD |
187 | /* |
188 | * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates | |
189 | * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. | |
190 | */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
191 | CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert), |
192 | ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
fbb82a60 VD |
193 | } |
194 | return 1; | |
195 | } | |
196 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
197 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
198 | { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
199 | int err; |
200 | int ok; | |
201 | ||
202 | /* | |
203 | * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, | |
204 | * instantiate chain public key parameters. | |
205 | */ | |
206 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || | |
67ecd65c | 207 | (ok = check_chain(ctx)) == 0 || |
fbb82a60 | 208 | (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 || |
d9b8b89b VD |
209 | (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) |
210 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
211 | if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) | |
88444854 | 212 | return 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
213 | |
214 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
215 | ctx->param->flags); | |
07b6068d | 216 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err); |
d9b8b89b VD |
217 | |
218 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
88444854 | 219 | ok = ctx->verify != NULL ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 220 | if (!ok) |
88444854 | 221 | return 0; |
d9b8b89b | 222 | |
8545051c | 223 | if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0) |
88444854 | 224 | return 0; |
8545051c | 225 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
226 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
227 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
9021a5df | 228 | if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) |
88444854 | 229 | return 0; |
9021a5df | 230 | if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) |
88444854 | 231 | return 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
232 | #endif |
233 | ||
234 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
235 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) | |
236 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
237 | return ok; | |
238 | } | |
239 | ||
11ddbf84 DDO |
240 | int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
241 | { | |
242 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
243 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
244 | return -1; | |
245 | } | |
246 | if (ctx->cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted) >= 1) | |
247 | ctx->cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, 0); | |
248 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
249 | } | |
250 | ||
6b691a5c | 251 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 252 | { |
f3e235ed | 253 | int ret; |
d9b8b89b | 254 | |
11ddbf84 DDO |
255 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
256 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
257 | return -1; | |
258 | } | |
0f113f3e | 259 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 260 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); |
f3e235ed | 261 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
0f113f3e MC |
262 | return -1; |
263 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 264 | |
aae41f8c MC |
265 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
266 | /* | |
267 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
268 | * cannot do another one. | |
269 | */ | |
9311d0c4 | 270 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); |
f3e235ed | 271 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
aae41f8c MC |
272 | return -1; |
273 | } | |
0f113f3e | 274 | |
eeccc237 | 275 | if (!X509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, ctx->cert, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { |
f3e235ed | 276 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b | 277 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 278 | } |
d9b8b89b | 279 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 280 | |
fbb82a60 | 281 | /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ |
07b6068d DDO |
282 | CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert), |
283 | ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
fbb82a60 | 284 | |
11ddbf84 | 285 | ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx); |
f3e235ed | 286 | |
170b7358 | 287 | /* |
f3e235ed VD |
288 | * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, |
289 | * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored | |
290 | * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). | |
170b7358 | 291 | */ |
f3e235ed VD |
292 | if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
293 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
294 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e MC |
295 | } |
296 | ||
3bed88a3 DDO |
297 | static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) |
298 | { | |
299 | int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); | |
300 | ||
301 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
302 | if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) | |
303 | return 1; | |
304 | return 0; | |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
0f113f3e | 307 | /* |
c476c06f DDO |
308 | * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|. |
309 | * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that | |
310 | * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element. | |
311 | * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one. | |
2f043896 | 312 | */ |
2f043896 DSH |
313 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
314 | { | |
0f113f3e | 315 | int i; |
c53f7355 | 316 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; |
fbb82a60 | 317 | |
0f113f3e | 318 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
c53f7355 | 319 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
4dd00918 | 320 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) |
3bed88a3 DDO |
321 | && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
322 | || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { | |
4dd00918 DDO |
323 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1)) |
324 | return issuer; | |
c476c06f DDO |
325 | if (rv == NULL || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer), |
326 | X509_get0_notAfter(rv)) > 0) | |
327 | rv = issuer; | |
c53f7355 | 328 | } |
0f113f3e | 329 | } |
c53f7355 | 330 | return rv; |
2f043896 DSH |
331 | } |
332 | ||
3bed88a3 DDO |
333 | /* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */ |
334 | static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
2f043896 | 335 | { |
3bed88a3 | 336 | return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK; |
2f043896 DSH |
337 | } |
338 | ||
339 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
2f043896 DSH |
340 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
341 | { | |
0f113f3e | 342 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
88444854 DDO |
343 | if (*issuer != NULL && X509_up_ref(*issuer)) |
344 | return 1; | |
e9e7b5df | 345 | |
e9e7b5df BE |
346 | *issuer = NULL; |
347 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 348 | } |
2f043896 | 349 | |
8cc86b81 DDO |
350 | static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
351 | const X509_NAME *nm) | |
c864e761 DSH |
352 | { |
353 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
354 | X509 *x; | |
355 | int i; | |
7fcdbd83 | 356 | |
c864e761 DSH |
357 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { |
358 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); | |
359 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { | |
eeccc237 | 360 | if (!X509_add_cert_new(&sk, x, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) { |
bbc3c22c | 361 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); |
7fcdbd83 | 362 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
c864e761 DSH |
363 | return NULL; |
364 | } | |
c864e761 DSH |
365 | } |
366 | } | |
367 | return sk; | |
368 | } | |
369 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
370 | /* |
371 | * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local | |
372 | * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. | |
373 | */ | |
374 | static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, | |
375 | int must_be_ca) | |
376 | { | |
0daccd4d VD |
377 | int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
378 | ||
379 | /* | |
380 | * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust | |
33cc5dde | 381 | * settings trump the purpose constraints. |
0daccd4d VD |
382 | * |
383 | * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in | |
384 | * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in | |
385 | * ctx->param->purpose! | |
386 | * | |
387 | * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from | |
388 | * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets | |
389 | * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however | |
390 | * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value | |
391 | * via the X509_PURPOSE API. | |
392 | * | |
393 | * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're | |
394 | * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is | |
33cc5dde | 395 | * also set. |
0daccd4d VD |
396 | */ |
397 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) | |
398 | tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); | |
399 | ||
33cc5dde VD |
400 | switch (tr_ok) { |
401 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
0daccd4d | 402 | return 1; |
33cc5dde VD |
403 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: |
404 | break; | |
405 | default: | |
406 | switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { | |
407 | case 1: | |
408 | return 1; | |
409 | case 0: | |
410 | break; | |
411 | default: | |
412 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) | |
413 | return 1; | |
414 | } | |
415 | break; | |
416 | } | |
0daccd4d | 417 | |
70dd3c65 | 418 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
0daccd4d VD |
419 | } |
420 | ||
07b6068d | 421 | /* Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose */ |
67ecd65c | 422 | static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 423 | { |
0daccd4d | 424 | int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 425 | X509 *x; |
88444854 DDO |
426 | int ret, proxy_path_length = 0; |
427 | int purpose, allow_proxy_certs, num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
0f113f3e | 428 | |
35a1cc90 MC |
429 | /*- |
430 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
431 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
432 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
433 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
434 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
435 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
436 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
437 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
438 | must_be_ca = -1; |
439 | ||
440 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
88444854 | 441 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
442 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; |
443 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
444 | } else { | |
445 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
88444854 | 446 | (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
447 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
0daccd4d | 450 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
0f113f3e | 451 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
07b6068d DDO |
452 | CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 |
453 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
454 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); | |
88444854 | 455 | CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0, |
07b6068d | 456 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED); |
0f113f3e MC |
457 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
458 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
459 | case -1: | |
07b6068d DDO |
460 | CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 |
461 | && ret != 1 && ret != 0, | |
462 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); | |
0f113f3e MC |
463 | break; |
464 | case 0: | |
07b6068d | 465 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA); |
0f113f3e MC |
466 | break; |
467 | default: | |
4d9e33ac | 468 | /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ |
07b6068d DDO |
469 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0 |
470 | || ((i + 1 < num | |
88444854 | 471 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0) |
07b6068d | 472 | && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); |
0f113f3e MC |
473 | break; |
474 | } | |
cccf532f TM |
475 | if (num > 1) { |
476 | /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ | |
477 | ret = check_curve(x); | |
07b6068d DDO |
478 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED); |
479 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS); | |
cccf532f | 480 | } |
d72c8b45 | 481 | /* |
e99505b4 | 482 | * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested |
d72c8b45 DDO |
483 | * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs |
484 | * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2. | |
485 | */ | |
486 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 | |
e41a2c4c DDO |
487 | && num > 1) { /* |
488 | * this should imply | |
489 | * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 | |
490 | * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0) | |
491 | */ | |
1e41dadf DDO |
492 | /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */ |
493 | if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) { | |
07b6068d DDO |
494 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0, |
495 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); | |
496 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx, | |
497 | x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN); | |
1e41dadf | 498 | } |
07b6068d DDO |
499 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 |
500 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0 | |
501 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0, | |
502 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL); | |
d72c8b45 | 503 | /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */ |
bb377c8d | 504 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { |
07b6068d DDO |
505 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0, |
506 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE); | |
bb377c8d | 507 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
508 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i, |
509 | X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); | |
bb377c8d | 510 | } |
1e41dadf | 511 | /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
512 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0, |
513 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY); | |
1e41dadf | 514 | /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
515 | CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 |
516 | || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0 | |
517 | || x->altname == NULL) | |
518 | && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0, | |
519 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY); | |
520 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0 | |
521 | && x->altname != NULL | |
522 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0, | |
523 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL); | |
1e41dadf | 524 | /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
525 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL |
526 | && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0, | |
527 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME); | |
1e41dadf DDO |
528 | /* TODO add more checks on SAN entries */ |
529 | /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
530 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0, |
531 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY); | |
532 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL | |
533 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
534 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); | |
535 | CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL | |
536 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0, | |
537 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); | |
1e41dadf DDO |
538 | if (X509_get_version(x) >= 2) { /* at least X.509v3 */ |
539 | /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */ | |
07b6068d DDO |
540 | CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /* |
541 | * this means not last cert in chain, | |
542 | * taken as "generated by conforming CAs" | |
543 | */ | |
544 | && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx, | |
545 | x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER); | |
1e41dadf | 546 | /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */ |
07b6068d DDO |
547 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL, |
548 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER); | |
82bdd641 | 549 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
550 | CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0, |
551 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3); | |
1e41dadf | 552 | } |
fa86e2ee | 553 | } |
6e5e118c | 554 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
555 | /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ |
556 | if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) | |
557 | return 0; | |
e99505b4 | 558 | /* Check path length */ |
07b6068d DDO |
559 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1 |
560 | && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length, | |
561 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); | |
ade08735 | 562 | /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */ |
dc5831da | 563 | if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
564 | plen++; |
565 | /* | |
566 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
567 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
568 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
569 | */ | |
570 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
ed17c7c1 RL |
571 | /* |
572 | * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint | |
573 | * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to | |
574 | * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length | |
575 | * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. | |
576 | * | |
577 | * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start | |
578 | * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, | |
579 | * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, | |
580 | * increment proxy_path_length. | |
581 | */ | |
582 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { | |
07b6068d DDO |
583 | CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen, |
584 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); | |
ed17c7c1 | 585 | proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; |
0f113f3e MC |
586 | } |
587 | proxy_path_length++; | |
588 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
88444854 | 589 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 590 | must_be_ca = 1; |
88444854 | 591 | } |
0f113f3e | 592 | } |
0daccd4d | 593 | return 1; |
11262391 DSH |
594 | } |
595 | ||
55a6250f VD |
596 | static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype) |
597 | { | |
598 | int i; | |
599 | int ret = 0; | |
600 | GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); | |
601 | ||
602 | if (gs == NULL) | |
603 | return 0; | |
604 | ||
605 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) { | |
606 | GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i); | |
607 | ||
608 | if (g->type == gtype) { | |
609 | ret = 1; | |
610 | break; | |
611 | } | |
612 | } | |
613 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs); | |
614 | return ret; | |
615 | } | |
616 | ||
e9746e03 | 617 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 618 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
619 | int i; |
620 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
621 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
622 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
623 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
624 | int j; | |
625 | ||
ade08735 | 626 | /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */ |
88444854 | 627 | if (i != 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 628 | continue; |
c8223538 RL |
629 | |
630 | /* | |
631 | * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the | |
632 | * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry | |
633 | * added. | |
634 | * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) | |
635 | */ | |
88444854 | 636 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) { |
c8223538 RL |
637 | X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
638 | X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
639 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; | |
88444854 | 640 | int last_nid = 0; |
c8223538 | 641 | int err = X509_V_OK; |
88444854 | 642 | int last_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; |
c8223538 RL |
643 | |
644 | /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ | |
88444854 | 645 | if (last_loc < 1) { |
c8223538 RL |
646 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
647 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | /* | |
651 | * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as | |
652 | * there is in issuer. | |
653 | */ | |
654 | if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) | |
655 | != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { | |
656 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
657 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
658 | } | |
659 | ||
660 | /* | |
661 | * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a | |
e99505b4 | 662 | * multi-valued RDN |
c8223538 | 663 | */ |
88444854 | 664 | if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc)) |
c8223538 | 665 | == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, |
88444854 | 666 | last_loc - 1))) { |
c8223538 RL |
667 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; |
668 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
669 | } | |
670 | ||
671 | /* | |
672 | * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that | |
673 | * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly | |
674 | */ | |
675 | tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); | |
676 | if (tmpsubject == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 677 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c8223538 RL |
678 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
679 | return 0; | |
680 | } | |
681 | ||
88444854 DDO |
682 | tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc); |
683 | last_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); | |
c8223538 | 684 | |
88444854 | 685 | if (last_nid != NID_commonName |
c8223538 RL |
686 | || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { |
687 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
688 | } | |
689 | ||
690 | X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); | |
691 | X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); | |
692 | ||
88444854 | 693 | proxy_name_done: |
07b6068d | 694 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err); |
c8223538 RL |
695 | } |
696 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
697 | /* |
698 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
699 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
700 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
701 | * to be obeyed. | |
702 | */ | |
703 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
704 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
70dd3c65 | 705 | |
0f113f3e | 706 | if (nc) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
707 | int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
708 | ||
5bd5dcd4 | 709 | /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ |
55a6250f VD |
710 | if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 |
711 | && (ctx->param->hostflags | |
712 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 | |
713 | && ((ctx->param->hostflags | |
714 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 | |
715 | || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS))) | |
5bd5dcd4 DSH |
716 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); |
717 | ||
f3e235ed VD |
718 | switch (rv) { |
719 | case X509_V_OK: | |
720 | break; | |
721 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
70dd3c65 | 722 | return 0; |
f3e235ed | 723 | default: |
07b6068d | 724 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, x, i, rv); |
f3e235ed VD |
725 | break; |
726 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
727 | } |
728 | } | |
729 | } | |
730 | return 1; | |
731 | } | |
e9746e03 | 732 | |
3bf15e29 | 733 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e | 734 | { |
70dd3c65 | 735 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); |
0f113f3e | 736 | } |
3bf15e29 | 737 | |
9689a6ae | 738 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
739 | { |
740 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 741 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
742 | char *name; |
743 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
744 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
745 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
746 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 747 | } |
0f113f3e | 748 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
749 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
750 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
751 | return 1; |
752 | } | |
753 | return n == 0; | |
754 | } | |
8abffa4a | 755 | |
3bf15e29 | 756 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
757 | { |
758 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 759 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
88444854 DDO |
760 | |
761 | if (vpm->hosts != NULL && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
762 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
763 | return 0; | |
764 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
765 | if (vpm->email != NULL |
766 | && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
767 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
768 | return 0; | |
769 | } | |
88444854 | 770 | if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
771 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
772 | return 0; | |
773 | } | |
774 | return 1; | |
775 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 776 | |
d9b8b89b | 777 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 778 | { |
70dd3c65 | 779 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 780 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 781 | X509 *mx; |
b9aec69a | 782 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
783 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
784 | int trust; | |
785 | ||
bdcadca2 VD |
786 | /* |
787 | * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) | |
788 | * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. | |
789 | */ | |
790 | if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { | |
170b7358 VD |
791 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { |
792 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
793 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
794 | return trust; | |
795 | } | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
798 | /* |
799 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
800 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
801 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
802 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
803 | */ | |
804 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 805 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 806 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
0f113f3e | 807 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
808 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
809 | goto trusted; | |
810 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
811 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 812 | } |
d9b8b89b | 813 | |
0f113f3e | 814 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
815 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
816 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 817 | */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
818 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
819 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) | |
820 | goto trusted; | |
821 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
822 | } | |
823 | ||
497ecc0d | 824 | if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
d9b8b89b VD |
825 | /* |
826 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
827 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
828 | */ | |
bdcadca2 VD |
829 | i = 0; |
830 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
0f113f3e | 831 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); |
88444854 | 832 | if (mx == NULL) |
d9b8b89b VD |
833 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
834 | ||
835 | /* | |
836 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
837 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
838 | */ | |
839 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
840 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
841 | X509_free(mx); | |
842 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 843 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
844 | |
845 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
88444854 | 846 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); |
d9b8b89b VD |
847 | X509_free(x); |
848 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
849 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
850 | } |
851 | ||
852 | /* | |
853 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
854 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
855 | */ | |
856 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
857 | |
858 | rejected: | |
6e5e118c DO |
859 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) == 0 |
860 | ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED : X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
861 | |
862 | trusted: | |
170b7358 VD |
863 | if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
864 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
865 | if (dane->pdpth < 0) | |
866 | dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; | |
867 | /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ | |
868 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
869 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
870 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
871 | } |
872 | ||
b545dc67 | 873 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 874 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 875 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
88444854 DDO |
876 | |
877 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 878 | return 1; |
88444854 | 879 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 880 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
88444854 | 881 | } else { |
0f113f3e MC |
882 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ |
883 | if (ctx->parent) | |
884 | return 1; | |
885 | last = 0; | |
886 | } | |
887 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
888 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
889 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
890 | if (!ok) | |
891 | return ok; | |
892 | } | |
893 | return 1; | |
894 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
895 | |
896 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
897 | { |
898 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
899 | int ok = 0; |
900 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
901 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
902 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
903 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
904 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
905 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
906 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 907 | |
88444854 | 908 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) |
790555d6 RL |
909 | return 1; |
910 | ||
0f113f3e | 911 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
912 | unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
913 | ||
0f113f3e | 914 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
88444854 | 915 | if (ctx->get_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
916 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); |
917 | else | |
918 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
07b6068d | 919 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ |
0f113f3e | 920 | if (!ok) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
921 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
922 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
923 | } |
924 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
925 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
926 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 927 | goto done; |
0f113f3e | 928 | |
88444854 | 929 | if (dcrl != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
930 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); |
931 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 932 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
933 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
934 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 935 | goto done; |
88444854 | 936 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 937 | ok = 1; |
88444854 | 938 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
939 | |
940 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
941 | if (ok != 2) { | |
942 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
943 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 944 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
945 | } |
946 | ||
947 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
948 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
949 | crl = NULL; | |
950 | dcrl = NULL; | |
951 | /* | |
60250017 | 952 | * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, |
0f113f3e MC |
953 | * so exit loop. |
954 | */ | |
955 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
956 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
957 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
958 | } |
959 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 960 | done: |
0f113f3e MC |
961 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
962 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
963 | ||
964 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
965 | return ok; | |
0f113f3e | 966 | } |
b545dc67 | 967 | |
e1a27eb3 | 968 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
e1a27eb3 | 969 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) |
0f113f3e MC |
970 | { |
971 | time_t *ptime; | |
972 | int i; | |
70dd3c65 | 973 | |
0f113f3e MC |
974 | if (notify) |
975 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
88444854 | 976 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 977 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
88444854 | 978 | else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
d35ff2c0 | 979 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
980 | else |
981 | ptime = NULL; | |
982 | ||
568ce3a5 | 983 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); |
0f113f3e MC |
984 | if (i == 0) { |
985 | if (!notify) | |
986 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 987 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
988 | return 0; |
989 | } | |
990 | ||
991 | if (i > 0) { | |
992 | if (!notify) | |
993 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 994 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) |
0f113f3e MC |
995 | return 0; |
996 | } | |
997 | ||
568ce3a5 DSH |
998 | if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { |
999 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1000 | |
1001 | if (i == 0) { | |
1002 | if (!notify) | |
1003 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 1004 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1005 | return 0; |
1006 | } | |
e99505b4 | 1007 | /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */ |
88444854 DDO |
1008 | if (i < 0 && (ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA) == 0) { |
1009 | if (!notify || !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1010 | return 0; |
1011 | } | |
1012 | } | |
1013 | ||
1014 | if (notify) | |
1015 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1016 | ||
1017 | return 1; | |
1018 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1019 | |
d43c4497 | 1020 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
1021 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
1022 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
1023 | { | |
1024 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
1025 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
1026 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
1027 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
1028 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1029 | ||
1030 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1031 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1032 | reasons = *preasons; | |
1033 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
8b7c51a0 | 1034 | if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) |
626aa248 DSH |
1035 | continue; |
1036 | /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ | |
8b7c51a0 | 1037 | if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { |
626aa248 | 1038 | int day, sec; |
88444854 | 1039 | |
568ce3a5 DSH |
1040 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), |
1041 | X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) | |
626aa248 | 1042 | continue; |
e032117d DSH |
1043 | /* |
1044 | * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| | |
1045 | * and |sec|. | |
1046 | */ | |
1047 | if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) | |
626aa248 | 1048 | continue; |
0f113f3e | 1049 | } |
626aa248 DSH |
1050 | best_crl = crl; |
1051 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
1052 | best_score = crl_score; | |
1053 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1054 | } |
1055 | ||
88444854 | 1056 | if (best_crl != NULL) { |
222561fe | 1057 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1058 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
1059 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
1060 | *pscore = best_score; | |
1061 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 1062 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
1063 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
1064 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1065 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
1066 | } | |
1067 | ||
1068 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
1069 | return 1; | |
1070 | ||
1071 | return 0; | |
1072 | } | |
1073 | ||
1074 | /* | |
1075 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1076 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
1077 | */ | |
d43c4497 | 1078 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) |
0f113f3e | 1079 | { |
88444854 DDO |
1080 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta = NULL, *extb = NULL; |
1081 | int i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
1082 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1083 | if (i >= 0) { |
1084 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1085 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1086 | return 0; | |
1087 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
88444854 | 1088 | } |
d43c4497 | 1089 | |
0f113f3e | 1090 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
0f113f3e | 1091 | if (i >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1092 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1093 | return 0; | |
1094 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
88444854 | 1095 | } |
d43c4497 | 1096 | |
88444854 | 1097 | if (exta == NULL && extb == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1098 | return 1; |
d43c4497 | 1099 | |
88444854 | 1100 | if (exta == NULL || extb == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1101 | return 0; |
d43c4497 | 1102 | |
88444854 | 1103 | return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb) == 0; |
0f113f3e | 1104 | } |
d43c4497 DSH |
1105 | |
1106 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
d43c4497 | 1107 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) |
0f113f3e MC |
1108 | { |
1109 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
88444854 | 1110 | if (delta->base_crl_number == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1111 | return 0; |
1112 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1113 | if (base->crl_number == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1114 | return 0; |
1115 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1116 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), |
1117 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1118 | return 0; |
1119 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1120 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1121 | return 0; | |
1122 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1123 | return 0; | |
1124 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1125 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1126 | return 0; | |
1127 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1128 | return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1129 | } |
1130 | ||
1131 | /* | |
1132 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1133 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 | 1134 | */ |
d43c4497 | 1135 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, |
0f113f3e MC |
1136 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1137 | { | |
1138 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1139 | int i; | |
88444854 DDO |
1140 | |
1141 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1142 | return; |
88444854 | 1143 | if (((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1144 | return; |
1145 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1146 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1147 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1148 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1149 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1150 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1151 | *dcrl = delta; |
1152 | return; | |
1153 | } | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
1158 | /* | |
1159 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1160 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1161 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1162 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1163 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f | 1164 | */ |
4b96839f | 1165 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, |
0f113f3e MC |
1166 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1167 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1168 | int crl_score = 0; |
1169 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1170 | ||
1171 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1172 | ||
1173 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
88444854 | 1174 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1175 | return 0; |
1176 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
88444854 | 1177 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1178 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) |
1179 | return 0; | |
88444854 | 1180 | } else if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1181 | /* If no new reasons reject */ |
88444854 | 1182 | if ((crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1183 | return 0; |
1184 | } | |
1185 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
88444854 | 1186 | else if (crl->base_crl_number != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1187 | return 0; |
1188 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1189 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) != 0) { |
1190 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT) == 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1191 | return 0; |
88444854 | 1192 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1193 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; |
88444854 | 1194 | } |
0f113f3e | 1195 | |
88444854 | 1196 | if ((crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1197 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; |
1198 | ||
e99505b4 | 1199 | /* Check expiration */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1200 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) |
1201 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1202 | ||
1203 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1204 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1205 | ||
1206 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
88444854 | 1207 | if ((crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1208 | return 0; |
1209 | ||
1210 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1211 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { |
1212 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
88444854 | 1213 | if ((crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1214 | return 0; |
1215 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1216 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | ||
1219 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1220 | ||
1221 | return crl_score; | |
1222 | ||
1223 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1224 | |
1225 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1226 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1227 | { | |
1228 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
8cc86b81 | 1229 | const X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1230 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
1231 | int i; | |
1232 | ||
1233 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1234 | cidx++; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1237 | ||
1238 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1239 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1240 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1241 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1242 | return; | |
1243 | } | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | ||
1246 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1247 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1248 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1249 | continue; | |
1250 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1251 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1252 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1253 | return; | |
1254 | } | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | ||
1257 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
88444854 | 1258 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1259 | return; |
1260 | ||
1261 | /* | |
1262 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1263 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1264 | */ | |
1265 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1266 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
88444854 | 1267 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1268 | continue; |
1269 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1270 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1271 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1272 | return; | |
1273 | } | |
1274 | } | |
1275 | } | |
1276 | ||
1277 | /* | |
1278 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1279 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1280 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1281 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed | 1282 | */ |
9d84d4ed | 1283 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
1284 | { |
1285 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1286 | int ret; | |
70dd3c65 | 1287 | |
0f113f3e | 1288 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
88444854 | 1289 | if (ctx->parent != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1290 | return 0; |
faa9dcd4 | 1291 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1292 | return -1; |
1293 | ||
1294 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1295 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1296 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1297 | ||
1298 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1299 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1300 | ||
1301 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1302 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1303 | if (ret <= 0) |
1304 | goto err; | |
1305 | ||
1306 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1307 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
1308 | err: | |
1309 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1310 | return ret; | |
1311 | } | |
1312 | ||
1313 | /* | |
1314 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1315 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
e99505b4 | 1316 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more |
0f113f3e MC |
1317 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, |
1318 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1319 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed | 1320 | */ |
9d84d4ed | 1321 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1322 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1323 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1324 | { | |
88444854 DDO |
1325 | X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); |
1326 | X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1327 | ||
1328 | return X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta) == 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1329 | } |
9d84d4ed | 1330 | |
3a83462d MC |
1331 | /*- |
1332 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1333 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1334 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1335 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1336 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b | 1337 | */ |
3e727a3b | 1338 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1339 | { |
1340 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1341 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1342 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1343 | int i, j; | |
88444854 DDO |
1344 | |
1345 | if (a == NULL || b == NULL) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1346 | return 1; |
1347 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1348 | if (a->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1349 | return 0; |
1350 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1351 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1352 | if (b->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e | 1353 | return 0; |
88444854 | 1354 | return X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname) == 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
1355 | } |
1356 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1357 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1358 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1359 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
88444854 | 1360 | if (b->dpname == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1361 | return 0; |
1362 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1363 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1364 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1365 | } | |
1366 | ||
1367 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
88444854 | 1368 | if (nm != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1369 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
1370 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1371 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1372 | continue; | |
88444854 | 1373 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1374 | return 1; |
1375 | } | |
1376 | return 0; | |
1377 | } | |
1378 | ||
1379 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1380 | ||
1381 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1382 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1383 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1384 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
88444854 | 1385 | if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1386 | return 1; |
1387 | } | |
1388 | } | |
1389 | ||
1390 | return 0; | |
1391 | ||
1392 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1393 | |
4b96839f | 1394 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1395 | { |
1396 | int i; | |
8cc86b81 | 1397 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
88444854 | 1398 | |
0f113f3e | 1399 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ |
88444854 DDO |
1400 | if (dp->CRLissuer == NULL) |
1401 | return (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1402 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
1403 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
88444854 | 1404 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1405 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) |
1406 | continue; | |
88444854 | 1407 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1408 | return 1; |
1409 | } | |
1410 | return 0; | |
1411 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1412 | |
4b96839f | 1413 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
4b96839f | 1414 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1415 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1416 | { | |
1417 | int i; | |
88444854 DDO |
1418 | |
1419 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) != 0) | |
0f113f3e | 1420 | return 0; |
88444854 DDO |
1421 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { |
1422 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) != 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1423 | return 0; |
1424 | } else { | |
88444854 | 1425 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1426 | return 0; |
1427 | } | |
1428 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1429 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1430 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
88444854 | 1431 | |
0f113f3e | 1432 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { |
88444854 DDO |
1433 | if (crl->idp == NULL |
1434 | || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1435 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; |
1436 | return 1; | |
1437 | } | |
1438 | } | |
1439 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
1440 | return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL) |
1441 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1442 | } |
1443 | ||
1444 | /* | |
1445 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1446 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1447 | */ |
d43c4497 | 1448 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1449 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1450 | { | |
1451 | int ok; | |
1452 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1453 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1454 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1455 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1456 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
8cc86b81 | 1457 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
70dd3c65 | 1458 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1459 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
1460 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1461 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1462 | if (ok) |
1463 | goto done; | |
1464 | ||
1465 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1466 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
1467 | ||
1468 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
88444854 | 1469 | if (skcrl == NULL && crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
1470 | goto done; |
1471 | ||
1472 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1473 | ||
1474 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1475 | ||
1476 | done: | |
0f113f3e | 1477 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
88444854 | 1478 | if (crl != NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1479 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
1480 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1481 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1482 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1483 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1484 | return 1; | |
1485 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1486 | return 0; |
1487 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1488 | |
1489 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1490 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1491 | { |
1492 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1493 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1494 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1495 | int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1496 | ||
ade08735 | 1497 | /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
88444854 | 1498 | if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 1499 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; |
0f113f3e MC |
1500 | /* |
1501 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1502 | * certificate in chain. | |
1503 | */ | |
88444854 | 1504 | } else if (cnum < chnum) { |
0f113f3e | 1505 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
88444854 | 1506 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1507 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); |
ade08735 | 1508 | /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */ |
70dd3c65 VD |
1509 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && |
1510 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) | |
1511 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1512 | } |
1513 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
1514 | if (issuer == NULL) |
1515 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1516 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1517 | /* |
1518 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1519 | */ | |
88444854 | 1520 | if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) { |
70dd3c65 | 1521 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
88444854 DDO |
1522 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && |
1523 | (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 && | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1524 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) |
1525 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1526 | |
88444854 | 1527 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1528 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) |
1529 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1530 | |
88444854 | 1531 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1532 | check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && |
1533 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) | |
1534 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1535 | |
88444854 | 1536 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1537 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) |
1538 | return 0; | |
1539 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1540 | |
88444854 | 1541 | if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1542 | !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) |
1543 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1544 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1545 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1546 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); | |
88444854 | 1547 | if (ikey == NULL && |
70dd3c65 VD |
1548 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) |
1549 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1550 | |
88444854 | 1551 | if (ikey != NULL) { |
70dd3c65 | 1552 | int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); |
0f113f3e | 1553 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1554 | if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) |
1555 | return 0; | |
1556 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1557 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && | |
1558 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1559 | return 0; | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1562 | } |
b545dc67 DSH |
1563 | |
1564 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1565 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 1566 | { |
0f113f3e | 1567 | X509_REVOKED *rev; |
70dd3c65 | 1568 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1569 | /* |
1570 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1571 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
70dd3c65 | 1572 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can |
0f113f3e MC |
1573 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. |
1574 | */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1575 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 |
1576 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 && | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1577 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) |
1578 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1579 | /* |
70dd3c65 VD |
1580 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure |
1581 | * reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
0f113f3e MC |
1582 | */ |
1583 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1584 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1585 | return 2; | |
70dd3c65 | 1586 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1587 | return 0; |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
1590 | return 1; | |
1591 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1592 | |
5d7c222d | 1593 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1594 | { |
1595 | int ret; | |
3921ded7 | 1596 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1597 | if (ctx->parent) |
1598 | return 1; | |
3921ded7 VD |
1599 | /* |
1600 | * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a | |
1601 | * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor | |
1602 | * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 | |
1603 | * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the | |
1604 | * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look | |
1605 | * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain | |
1606 | * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it | |
1607 | * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the | |
1608 | * X509_policy_check() call. | |
1609 | */ | |
1610 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 1611 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f3e235ed | 1612 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
3921ded7 VD |
1613 | return 0; |
1614 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1615 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
1616 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
3921ded7 | 1617 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) |
225c9660 | 1618 | (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
3921ded7 | 1619 | |
895c2f84 | 1620 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { |
9311d0c4 | 1621 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f3e235ed | 1622 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
0f113f3e MC |
1623 | return 0; |
1624 | } | |
1625 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
895c2f84 | 1626 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { |
0f113f3e | 1627 | int i; |
70dd3c65 VD |
1628 | |
1629 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ | |
0f113f3e | 1630 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1631 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
1632 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
1633 | CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, |
1634 | ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1635 | } |
1636 | return 1; | |
1637 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1638 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1639 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
1640 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1641 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1642 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1643 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { |
9311d0c4 | 1644 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
895c2f84 VD |
1645 | return 0; |
1646 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1647 | |
88444854 | 1648 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1649 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
f3e235ed VD |
1650 | /* |
1651 | * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed | |
1652 | * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then | |
1653 | * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier | |
1654 | * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. | |
1655 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1656 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
1657 | return 0; | |
1658 | } | |
1659 | ||
1660 | return 1; | |
1661 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1662 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1663 | /*- |
1664 | * Check certificate validity times. | |
1665 | * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return | |
1666 | * the validation status. | |
1667 | * | |
1668 | * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
1669 | */ | |
1670 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1671 | { |
1672 | time_t *ptime; | |
1673 | int i; | |
1674 | ||
88444854 | 1675 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
0f113f3e | 1676 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; |
88444854 | 1677 | else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) |
d35ff2c0 | 1678 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1679 | else |
1680 | ptime = NULL; | |
1681 | ||
568ce3a5 | 1682 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1683 | if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) |
1684 | return 0; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1685 | CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD); |
1686 | CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID); | |
0f113f3e | 1687 | |
568ce3a5 | 1688 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1689 | if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) |
1690 | return 0; | |
07b6068d DDO |
1691 | CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD); |
1692 | CB_FAIL_IF(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1693 | return 1; |
1694 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1695 | |
0b670a21 | 1696 | /* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */ |
6b691a5c | 1697 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 1698 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1699 | int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
1700 | X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
88444854 | 1701 | X509 *xs = xi; |
0f113f3e | 1702 | |
88444854 | 1703 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
170b7358 | 1704 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { |
88444854 DDO |
1705 | /* |
1706 | * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, | |
1707 | * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps. | |
1708 | * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key. | |
1709 | */ | |
170b7358 | 1710 | xi = NULL; |
88444854 DDO |
1711 | } else if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi) |
1712 | /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */ | |
1713 | && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) { | |
1714 | if (n > 0) { | |
1715 | n--; | |
1716 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1717 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1718 | } else { | |
1719 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0, | |
1720 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); | |
02a25671 | 1721 | } |
88444854 DDO |
1722 | /* |
1723 | * The below code will certainly not do a | |
1724 | * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued. | |
1725 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1726 | } |
1727 | ||
d9b8b89b | 1728 | /* |
88444854 DDO |
1729 | * Do not clear ctx->error = 0, it must be "sticky", |
1730 | * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). | |
d9b8b89b | 1731 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1732 | while (n >= 0) { |
07b6068d | 1733 | /*- |
0b670a21 DDO |
1734 | * For each iteration of this loop: |
1735 | * n is the subject depth | |
1736 | * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked | |
88444854 DDO |
1737 | * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures |
1738 | * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use | |
0b670a21 | 1739 | * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. |
88444854 DDO |
1740 | */ |
1741 | /* | |
1742 | * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly | |
ade08735 | 1743 | * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. |
0f113f3e | 1744 | */ |
88444854 DDO |
1745 | if (xi != NULL |
1746 | && (xs != xi | |
1747 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) | |
1748 | && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0))) { | |
02369787 | 1749 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0b670a21 DDO |
1750 | /* |
1751 | * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage | |
1752 | * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer | |
1753 | * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). | |
1754 | */ | |
1755 | int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); | |
1756 | /* | |
1757 | * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 | |
1758 | * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert | |
1759 | * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. | |
1760 | * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 | |
e99505b4 DDO |
1761 | * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of |
1762 | * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. | |
0b670a21 DDO |
1763 | * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is |
1764 | * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., | |
1765 | * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply | |
1766 | * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus | |
1767 | * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. | |
1768 | */ | |
1769 | int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 | |
1770 | ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); | |
02369787 | 1771 | |
07b6068d | 1772 | CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret); |
c01ff880 | 1773 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
07b6068d DDO |
1774 | CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, |
1775 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
6e5e118c | 1776 | } else { |
07b6068d DDO |
1777 | CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0, |
1778 | ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); | |
0f113f3e | 1779 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1780 | } |
1781 | ||
88444854 | 1782 | /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */ |
70dd3c65 VD |
1783 | /* Calls verify callback as needed */ |
1784 | if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) | |
1785 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1786 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1787 | /* |
1788 | * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) | |
1789 | * is retained. | |
1790 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1791 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
1792 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1793 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
1794 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) | |
1795 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1796 | |
70dd3c65 | 1797 | if (--n >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1798 | xi = xs; |
1799 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1800 | } | |
1801 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 1802 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1803 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1804 | |
91b73acb | 1805 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1806 | { |
0f113f3e | 1807 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1808 | } |
1809 | ||
91b73acb | 1810 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e | 1811 | { |
80770da3 EK |
1812 | static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; |
1813 | static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; | |
1814 | ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; | |
1815 | int i, day, sec, ret = 0; | |
48102247 | 1816 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
1817 | const char upper_z = 0x5A; | |
1818 | #else | |
1819 | const char upper_z = 'Z'; | |
1820 | #endif | |
88444854 | 1821 | |
07b6068d | 1822 | /*- |
80770da3 EK |
1823 | * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. |
1824 | * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1825 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
1826 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
80770da3 EK |
1827 | * |
1828 | * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: | |
1829 | * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate | |
1830 | * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity | |
1831 | * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." | |
f48b83b4 | 1832 | */ |
80770da3 EK |
1833 | switch (ctm->type) { |
1834 | case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: | |
1835 | if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1836 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1837 | break; |
1838 | case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: | |
1839 | if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1840 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1841 | break; |
1842 | default: | |
1843 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1844 | } |
1845 | ||
80770da3 EK |
1846 | /** |
1847 | * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more | |
1848 | * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. | |
1849 | * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. | |
1850 | */ | |
1851 | for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { | |
48102247 | 1852 | if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i])) |
f48b83b4 | 1853 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1854 | } |
48102247 | 1855 | if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z) |
f48b83b4 | 1856 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1857 | |
80770da3 EK |
1858 | /* |
1859 | * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no | |
1860 | * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, | |
1861 | * so we go through ASN.1 | |
1862 | */ | |
1863 | asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); | |
1864 | if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) | |
1865 | goto err; | |
88444854 | 1866 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time) == 0) |
80770da3 | 1867 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1868 | |
80770da3 EK |
1869 | /* |
1870 | * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. | |
1871 | * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. | |
1872 | */ | |
1873 | ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; | |
1874 | ||
1875 | err: | |
1876 | ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); | |
1877 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e | 1878 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1879 | |
25d7cd1d DDO |
1880 | /* |
1881 | * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range, | |
1882 | * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start | |
1883 | */ | |
1884 | int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, | |
1885 | const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end) | |
1886 | { | |
1887 | time_t ref_time; | |
1888 | time_t *time = NULL; | |
1889 | unsigned long flags = vpm == NULL ? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm); | |
1890 | ||
1891 | if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
1892 | ref_time = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm); | |
1893 | time = &ref_time; | |
1894 | } else if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
1895 | return 0; /* this means ok */ | |
1896 | } /* else reference time is the current time */ | |
1897 | ||
1898 | if (end != NULL && X509_cmp_time(end, time) < 0) | |
1899 | return 1; | |
1900 | if (start != NULL && X509_cmp_time(start, time) > 0) | |
1901 | return -1; | |
1902 | return 0; | |
1903 | } | |
1904 | ||
284ef5f3 | 1905 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1906 | { |
0f113f3e | 1907 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1908 | } |
1909 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1910 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1911 | { |
1912 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1913 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1914 | |
1915 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1916 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1917 | { | |
1918 | time_t t; | |
1919 | ||
1920 | if (in_tm) | |
1921 | t = *in_tm; | |
1922 | else | |
1923 | time(&t); | |
1924 | ||
88444854 | 1925 | if (s != NULL && (s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING) == 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1926 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
1927 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1928 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1929 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1932 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1933 | |
7e258a56 | 1934 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1935 | { |
1936 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1937 | int i, j; | |
1938 | ||
1939 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1940 | return 1; | |
1941 | ||
1942 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 1943 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e | 1944 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 1945 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); |
0f113f3e MC |
1946 | return 0; |
1947 | } | |
1948 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1949 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1950 | } |
1951 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 1952 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); |
0f113f3e MC |
1953 | return 0; |
1954 | } | |
1955 | ||
1956 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1957 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 1958 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
0f113f3e | 1959 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
1960 | } |
1961 | ||
1962 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1963 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1964 | return 1; |
1965 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1966 | |
e99505b4 | 1967 | /* Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs */ |
2e8cb108 | 1968 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, |
0f113f3e MC |
1969 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
1970 | { | |
1971 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
1972 | int i; | |
88444854 | 1973 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1974 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; |
1975 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
88444854 | 1976 | if (base->base_crl_number != NULL || newer->base_crl_number != NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 1977 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); |
0f113f3e MC |
1978 | return NULL; |
1979 | } | |
1980 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
88444854 | 1981 | if (base->crl_number == NULL || newer->crl_number == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 1982 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); |
0f113f3e MC |
1983 | return NULL; |
1984 | } | |
1985 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
88444854 DDO |
1986 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), |
1987 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 1988 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
1989 | return NULL; |
1990 | } | |
1991 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1992 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 1993 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
1994 | return NULL; |
1995 | } | |
1996 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 1997 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
1998 | return NULL; |
1999 | } | |
2000 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
2001 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2002 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); |
0f113f3e MC |
2003 | return NULL; |
2004 | } | |
2005 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
88444854 DDO |
2006 | if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || |
2007 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2008 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
2009 | return NULL; |
2010 | } | |
2011 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
2012 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
90945fa3 | 2013 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2014 | goto memerr; |
2015 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
2016 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
2017 | goto memerr; | |
2018 | ||
568ce3a5 | 2019 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) |
0f113f3e | 2020 | goto memerr; |
568ce3a5 | 2021 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) |
0f113f3e MC |
2022 | goto memerr; |
2023 | ||
2024 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2025 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) |
2026 | goto memerr; | |
2027 | ||
2028 | /* | |
2029 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
2030 | * number to correct value too. | |
2031 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2032 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { |
88444854 DDO |
2033 | X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); |
2034 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2035 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) |
2036 | goto memerr; | |
2037 | } | |
2038 | ||
2039 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2040 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); |
2041 | ||
2042 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
2043 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
88444854 | 2044 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2045 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); |
2046 | /* | |
2047 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
2048 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
2049 | */ | |
34a42e14 | 2050 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e | 2051 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
88444854 | 2052 | if (rvtmp == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2053 | goto memerr; |
2054 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
2055 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
2056 | goto memerr; | |
2057 | } | |
2058 | } | |
2059 | } | |
2060 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
2061 | ||
88444854 | 2062 | if (skey != NULL && md != NULL && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2063 | goto memerr; |
2064 | ||
2065 | return crl; | |
2066 | ||
2067 | memerr: | |
9311d0c4 | 2068 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
222561fe | 2069 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
2070 | return NULL; |
2071 | } | |
2072 | ||
6b691a5c | 2073 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2074 | { |
2075 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2076 | } | |
58964a49 | 2077 | |
8cc86b81 | 2078 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2079 | { |
2080 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2081 | } | |
58964a49 | 2082 | |
8cc86b81 | 2083 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2084 | { |
2085 | return ctx->error; | |
2086 | } | |
58964a49 | 2087 | |
6b691a5c | 2088 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2089 | { |
2090 | ctx->error = err; | |
2091 | } | |
58964a49 | 2092 | |
8cc86b81 | 2093 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2094 | { |
2095 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2096 | } | |
58964a49 | 2097 | |
51227177 VD |
2098 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2099 | { | |
2100 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
2101 | } | |
2102 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2103 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2104 | { |
2105 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2106 | } | |
58964a49 | 2107 | |
c9654873 VD |
2108 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
2109 | { | |
2110 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
2111 | } | |
2112 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2113 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2114 | { |
2115 | return ctx->chain; | |
2116 | } | |
58964a49 | 2117 | |
8cc86b81 | 2118 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 2119 | { |
88444854 | 2120 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2121 | return NULL; |
2122 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2123 | } | |
25f923dd | 2124 | |
8cc86b81 | 2125 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2126 | { |
2127 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2128 | } | |
2008e714 | 2129 | |
8cc86b81 | 2130 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2131 | { |
2132 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2133 | } | |
2008e714 | 2134 | |
8cc86b81 | 2135 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2136 | { |
2137 | return ctx->parent; | |
2138 | } | |
2008e714 | 2139 | |
6b691a5c | 2140 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2141 | { |
2142 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2143 | } | |
58964a49 | 2144 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2145 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2146 | { |
2147 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2148 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2149 | |
13938ace | 2150 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e | 2151 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2152 | /* |
2153 | * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? | |
2154 | * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust | |
2155 | * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). | |
2156 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2157 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
2158 | } | |
11262391 | 2159 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2160 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e | 2161 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2162 | /* |
2163 | * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default | |
2164 | * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. | |
2165 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2166 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
2167 | } | |
2168 | ||
2169 | /* | |
2170 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2171 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2172 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2173 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2174 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2175 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2176 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2177 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
2178 | */ |
2179 | ||
2180 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2181 | int purpose, int trust) |
2182 | { | |
2183 | int idx; | |
88444854 | 2184 | |
0f113f3e | 2185 | /* If purpose not set use default */ |
12a765a5 | 2186 | if (purpose == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2187 | purpose = def_purpose; |
2188 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
12a765a5 | 2189 | if (purpose != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 2190 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
88444854 | 2191 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2192 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
2193 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2194 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2195 | return 0; |
2196 | } | |
2197 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2198 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2199 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
0daccd4d VD |
2200 | /* |
2201 | * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is | |
2202 | * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the | |
2203 | * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? | |
2204 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2205 | if (idx == -1) { |
9311d0c4 | 2206 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2207 | return 0; |
2208 | } | |
2209 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2210 | } | |
2211 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
88444854 | 2212 | if (trust == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2213 | trust = ptmp->trust; |
2214 | } | |
88444854 | 2215 | if (trust != 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2216 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
2217 | if (idx == -1) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2218 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); |
0f113f3e MC |
2219 | return 0; |
2220 | } | |
2221 | } | |
2222 | ||
88444854 | 2223 | if (ctx->param->purpose == 0 && purpose != 0) |
0f113f3e | 2224 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
88444854 | 2225 | if (ctx->param->trust == 0 && trust != 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2226 | ctx->param->trust = trust; |
2227 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2228 | } |
2229 | ||
b4250010 | 2230 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) |
2f043896 | 2231 | { |
b51bce94 | 2232 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2233 | |
90945fa3 | 2234 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2235 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
2236 | return NULL; |
2237 | } | |
1143c27b MC |
2238 | |
2239 | ctx->libctx = libctx; | |
2240 | if (propq != NULL) { | |
2241 | ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq); | |
2242 | if (ctx->propq == NULL) { | |
2243 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
9311d0c4 | 2244 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
1143c27b MC |
2245 | return NULL; |
2246 | } | |
2247 | } | |
2248 | ||
0f113f3e | 2249 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2250 | } |
2251 | ||
1143c27b MC |
2252 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2253 | { | |
d8652be0 | 2254 | return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL); |
1143c27b MC |
2255 | } |
2256 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2257 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2258 | { | |
c001ce33 | 2259 | if (ctx == NULL) |
222561fe | 2260 | return; |
c001ce33 | 2261 | |
0f113f3e | 2262 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
1143c27b MC |
2263 | |
2264 | /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */ | |
2265 | OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); | |
0f113f3e | 2266 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
2267 | } |
2268 | ||
79aa04ef | 2269 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2270 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2271 | { | |
2272 | int ret = 1; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2273 | |
faa9dcd4 | 2274 | ctx->store = store; |
0f113f3e MC |
2275 | ctx->cert = x509; |
2276 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2277 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2278 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2279 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2280 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2281 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2282 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2283 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2284 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2285 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2286 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2287 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2288 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2289 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2290 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2291 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2292 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
170b7358 | 2293 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2294 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2295 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2296 | |
7b7eb472 | 2297 | /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ |
88444854 | 2298 | if (store != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2299 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
7b7eb472 | 2300 | else |
0f113f3e MC |
2301 | ctx->cleanup = 0; |
2302 | ||
88444854 | 2303 | if (store != NULL && store->check_issued != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2304 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
2305 | else | |
2306 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2307 | ||
88444854 | 2308 | if (store != NULL && store->get_issuer != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2309 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
2310 | else | |
2311 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2312 | ||
88444854 | 2313 | if (store != NULL && store->verify_cb != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2314 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
2315 | else | |
2316 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2317 | ||
88444854 | 2318 | if (store != NULL && store->verify != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2319 | ctx->verify = store->verify; |
2320 | else | |
2321 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2322 | ||
88444854 | 2323 | if (store != NULL && store->check_revocation != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2324 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
2325 | else | |
2326 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2327 | ||
88444854 | 2328 | if (store != NULL && store->get_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e | 2329 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
311f2785 VD |
2330 | else |
2331 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2332 | |
88444854 | 2333 | if (store != NULL && store->check_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2334 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
2335 | else | |
2336 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2337 | ||
88444854 | 2338 | if (store != NULL && store->cert_crl != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2339 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
2340 | else | |
2341 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2342 | ||
88444854 | 2343 | if (store != NULL && store->check_policy != NULL) |
0a5fe2eb RL |
2344 | ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; |
2345 | else | |
2346 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2347 | ||
88444854 | 2348 | if (store != NULL && store->lookup_certs != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2349 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; |
2350 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2351 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; |
0f113f3e | 2352 | |
88444854 | 2353 | if (store != NULL && store->lookup_crls != NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2354 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; |
2355 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2356 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; |
0f113f3e | 2357 | |
ecdaa1ae | 2358 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2359 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2360 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
ecdaa1ae | 2361 | goto err; |
2362 | } | |
2363 | ||
07b6068d | 2364 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ |
88444854 | 2365 | if (store != NULL) |
ecdaa1ae | 2366 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); |
2367 | else | |
2368 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2369 | ||
2370 | if (ret) | |
2371 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2372 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2373 | ||
2374 | if (ret == 0) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2375 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
ecdaa1ae | 2376 | goto err; |
2377 | } | |
2378 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
2379 | /* |
2380 | * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the | |
2381 | * purpose if this still yields the default value. | |
2382 | */ | |
2383 | if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2384 | int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); | |
2385 | X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2386 | ||
2387 | if (xp != NULL) | |
2388 | ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); | |
2389 | } | |
2390 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2391 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2392 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2393 | return 1; | |
9311d0c4 | 2394 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
ecdaa1ae | 2395 | |
d9b8b89b | 2396 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2397 | /* |
2398 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2399 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2400 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2401 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2402 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2403 | } |
2404 | ||
2405 | /* | |
2406 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2407 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 | 2408 | */ |
f0e0fd51 | 2409 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2f043896 | 2410 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
2411 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2412 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
c864e761 | 2413 | ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; |
2f043896 DSH |
2414 | } |
2415 | ||
2416 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2417 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2418 | /* |
2419 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2420 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2421 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2422 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2423 | */ | |
2424 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ | |
2425 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { | |
0f113f3e | 2426 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2427 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2428 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2429 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2430 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2431 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2432 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2433 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2434 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2435 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2436 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2437 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2438 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2439 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2440 | } |
13938ace | 2441 | |
5d7c222d | 2442 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2443 | { |
2444 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2445 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2446 | |
5d7c222d | 2447 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2448 | { |
2449 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2450 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2451 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2452 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2453 | time_t t) | |
2454 | { | |
2455 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2456 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2457 | |
8cc86b81 | 2458 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2459 | { |
2460 | return ctx->cert; | |
2461 | } | |
2462 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2463 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2464 | { |
2465 | return ctx->untrusted; | |
2466 | } | |
2467 | ||
2468 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2469 | { | |
2470 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2471 | } | |
2472 | ||
2473 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2474 | { | |
2475 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2476 | ctx->chain = sk; | |
2477 | } | |
2478 | ||
db089ad6 | 2479 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
f0e0fd51 | 2480 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) |
0f113f3e MC |
2481 | { |
2482 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2483 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2484 | |
8cc86b81 | 2485 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2486 | { |
2487 | return ctx->verify_cb; | |
2488 | } | |
2489 | ||
4a7b3a7b VD |
2490 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
2491 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) | |
2492 | { | |
2493 | ctx->verify = verify; | |
2494 | } | |
2495 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2496 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2497 | { |
1060a50b | 2498 | return ctx->verify; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2499 | } |
2500 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2501 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn |
2502 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2503 | { |
1060a50b | 2504 | return ctx->get_issuer; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2505 | } |
2506 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2507 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn |
88444854 | 2508 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
4dba585f | 2509 | { |
1060a50b | 2510 | return ctx->check_issued; |
4dba585f DSH |
2511 | } |
2512 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2513 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn |
88444854 | 2514 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2515 | { |
1060a50b | 2516 | return ctx->check_revocation; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2517 | } |
2518 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2519 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2520 | { |
1060a50b | 2521 | return ctx->get_crl; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2522 | } |
2523 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2524 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn |
2525 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2526 | { |
1060a50b RL |
2527 | return ctx->check_crl; |
2528 | } | |
2529 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2530 | X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn |
2531 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1060a50b RL |
2532 | { |
2533 | return ctx->cert_crl; | |
2534 | } | |
2535 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2536 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn |
88444854 | 2537 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2538 | { |
2539 | return ctx->check_policy; | |
2540 | } | |
2541 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2542 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn |
88444854 | 2543 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2544 | { |
2545 | return ctx->lookup_certs; | |
2546 | } | |
2547 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2548 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn |
88444854 | 2549 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2550 | { |
2551 | return ctx->lookup_crls; | |
2552 | } | |
2553 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2554 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2555 | { |
2556 | return ctx->cleanup; | |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2557 | } |
2558 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2559 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2560 | { |
2561 | return ctx->tree; | |
2562 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2563 | |
8cc86b81 | 2564 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2565 | { |
2566 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2567 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2568 | |
8cc86b81 | 2569 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
7f3f41d8 | 2570 | { |
d9b8b89b | 2571 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2572 | } |
2573 | ||
5d7c222d | 2574 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2575 | { |
2576 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
12a765a5 | 2577 | |
0f113f3e | 2578 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); |
12a765a5 | 2579 | if (param == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2580 | return 0; |
2581 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2582 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2583 | |
8cc86b81 | 2584 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2585 | { |
2586 | return ctx->param; | |
2587 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2588 | |
2589 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2590 | { |
222561fe | 2591 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2592 | ctx->param = param; |
2593 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2594 | |
b9aec69a | 2595 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) |
919ba009 VD |
2596 | { |
2597 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2598 | } | |
2599 | ||
88444854 DDO |
2600 | static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, |
2601 | unsigned int *i2dlen) | |
170b7358 VD |
2602 | { |
2603 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
2604 | int len; | |
2605 | ||
2606 | /* | |
2607 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
2608 | */ | |
2609 | switch (selector) { | |
2610 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
2611 | len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); | |
2612 | break; | |
2613 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
2614 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); | |
2615 | break; | |
2616 | default: | |
9311d0c4 | 2617 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); |
170b7358 VD |
2618 | return NULL; |
2619 | } | |
2620 | ||
2621 | if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { | |
9311d0c4 | 2622 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
170b7358 VD |
2623 | return NULL; |
2624 | } | |
2625 | ||
2626 | *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
2627 | return buf; | |
2628 | } | |
2629 | ||
88444854 | 2630 | #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ |
170b7358 VD |
2631 | |
2632 | static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
2633 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2634 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2635 | unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; |
2636 | unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2637 | unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2638 | unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2639 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
2640 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
2641 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2642 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; | |
2643 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
2644 | int i; | |
2645 | int recnum; | |
2646 | int matched = 0; | |
2647 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
2648 | uint32_t mask; | |
2649 | ||
2650 | mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; | |
2651 | ||
07b6068d | 2652 | /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */ |
170b7358 VD |
2653 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) |
2654 | mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2655 | ||
2656 | /* | |
2657 | * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any | |
02e112a8 | 2658 | * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. |
170b7358 VD |
2659 | * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. |
2660 | */ | |
2661 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
2662 | mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2663 | ||
2664 | /*- | |
2665 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 | |
2666 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 | |
2667 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 | |
2668 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 | |
2669 | * | |
2670 | * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building | |
2671 | * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with | |
2672 | * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which | |
2673 | * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). | |
2674 | * | |
2675 | * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX | |
2676 | * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest | |
2677 | * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. | |
2678 | * | |
2679 | * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we | |
2680 | * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers | |
2681 | * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch | |
2682 | * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", | |
2683 | * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public | |
2684 | * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" | |
2685 | * or multiple "3 0 1" records. | |
2686 | * | |
2687 | * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either | |
2688 | * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after | |
0d4fb843 | 2689 | * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is |
170b7358 VD |
2690 | * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. |
2691 | */ | |
88444854 | 2692 | recnum = (dane->umask & mask) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; |
170b7358 VD |
2693 | for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { |
2694 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2695 | if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) | |
2696 | continue; | |
2697 | if (t->usage != usage) { | |
2698 | usage = t->usage; | |
2699 | ||
2700 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2701 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2702 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2703 | } | |
2704 | if (t->selector != selector) { | |
2705 | selector = t->selector; | |
2706 | ||
2707 | /* Update per-selector state */ | |
2708 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2709 | i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); | |
2710 | if (i2dbuf == NULL) | |
2711 | return -1; | |
2712 | ||
2713 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2714 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2715 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2716 | } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
2717 | /*- | |
2718 | * Digest agility: | |
2719 | * | |
2720 | * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9> | |
2721 | * | |
2722 | * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the | |
2723 | * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals | |
2724 | * other than "Full". | |
2725 | */ | |
2726 | if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) | |
2727 | continue; | |
2728 | } | |
2729 | ||
2730 | /* | |
2731 | * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant | |
2732 | * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. | |
2733 | */ | |
2734 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
2735 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
88444854 | 2736 | |
170b7358 VD |
2737 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; |
2738 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
2739 | ||
2740 | if (md != NULL) { | |
dccd20d1 F |
2741 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; |
2742 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
2743 | matched = -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
2744 | break; |
2745 | } | |
2746 | } | |
2747 | } | |
2748 | ||
2749 | /* | |
2750 | * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any | |
2751 | * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a | |
2752 | * full chain. | |
2753 | */ | |
2754 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && | |
2755 | memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
2756 | if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) | |
2757 | matched = 1; | |
2758 | if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { | |
2759 | dane->mdpth = depth; | |
2760 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2761 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); | |
2762 | dane->mcert = cert; | |
2763 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
2764 | } | |
2765 | break; | |
2766 | } | |
2767 | } | |
2768 | ||
2769 | /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ | |
2770 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2771 | return matched; | |
2772 | } | |
2773 | ||
2774 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
2775 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2776 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2777 | int matched = 0; |
2778 | X509 *cert; | |
2779 | ||
2780 | if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) | |
88444854 | 2781 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2782 | |
2783 | /* | |
ade08735 | 2784 | * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if |
170b7358 VD |
2785 | * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking |
2786 | * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). | |
2787 | */ | |
2788 | cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
2789 | if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) | |
2790 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2791 | if (matched > 0) { | |
2792 | ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; | |
88444854 | 2793 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2794 | } |
2795 | ||
88444854 | 2796 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
170b7358 VD |
2797 | } |
2798 | ||
2799 | static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2800 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2801 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2802 | danetls_record *t; |
2803 | int num = ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2804 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2805 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
2806 | int i; | |
2807 | ||
2808 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2809 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2810 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || | |
2811 | t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || | |
2812 | t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || | |
6725682d | 2813 | X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) |
170b7358 VD |
2814 | continue; |
2815 | ||
c0a445a9 | 2816 | /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ |
170b7358 VD |
2817 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2818 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2819 | ||
2820 | /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ | |
2821 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; | |
2822 | dane->mdpth = num - 1; | |
2823 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2824 | ||
2825 | /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ | |
2826 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2827 | for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) | |
2828 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2829 | ||
2830 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2831 | } | |
2832 | ||
2833 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2834 | } | |
2835 | ||
b9aec69a | 2836 | static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) |
170b7358 | 2837 | { |
07b6068d | 2838 | /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */ |
170b7358 VD |
2839 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2840 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2841 | dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
2842 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2843 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
2844 | } | |
2845 | ||
6e328256 VD |
2846 | static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
2847 | { | |
2848 | int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); | |
2849 | ||
07b6068d | 2850 | CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err); |
6e5e118c | 2851 | return 1; |
6e328256 VD |
2852 | } |
2853 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2854 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2855 | { | |
2856 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; | |
b9aec69a | 2857 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2858 | int matched; |
2859 | int done; | |
2860 | ||
2861 | dane_reset(dane); | |
2862 | ||
89ff989d VD |
2863 | /*- |
2864 | * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, | |
2865 | * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) | |
2866 | * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the | |
ade08735 | 2867 | * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor. |
89ff989d VD |
2868 | * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done |
2869 | * if: | |
2870 | * + matched < 0, internal error. | |
2871 | * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record | |
2872 | * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no | |
2873 | * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. | |
2874 | */ | |
170b7358 VD |
2875 | matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); |
2876 | done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); | |
2877 | ||
2878 | if (done) | |
2879 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
2880 | ||
2881 | if (matched > 0) { | |
70dd3c65 | 2882 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
6e328256 VD |
2883 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2884 | return 0; | |
5ae4ceb9 VD |
2885 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
2886 | if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && | |
2887 | !check_id(ctx)) | |
2888 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2889 | /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ |
170b7358 VD |
2890 | ctx->error_depth = 0; |
2891 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
6e328256 | 2892 | return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
2893 | } |
2894 | ||
2895 | if (matched < 0) { | |
2896 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2897 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
2898 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
2899 | return -1; | |
2900 | } | |
2901 | ||
2902 | if (done) { | |
2903 | /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ | |
6e328256 VD |
2904 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2905 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2906 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
170b7358 VD |
2907 | } |
2908 | ||
2909 | /* | |
2910 | * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 | |
2911 | * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. | |
2912 | */ | |
2913 | return verify_chain(ctx); | |
2914 | } | |
2915 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
2916 | /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */ |
2917 | static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
2918 | { | |
2919 | STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; | |
2920 | int ok; | |
2921 | ||
2922 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2923 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); | |
2924 | ctx->chain = saved_chain; | |
2925 | ||
2926 | return ok; | |
2927 | } | |
2928 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2929 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2930 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2931 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b | 2932 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
88444854 DDO |
2933 | X509 *curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); /* current end of chain */ |
2934 | int self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0); /* always refers to curr */ | |
2935 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk_untrusted = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2936 | unsigned int search; |
170b7358 | 2937 | int may_trusted = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2938 | int may_alternate = 0; |
2939 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2940 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
2941 | int depth; | |
2942 | int ok = 0; | |
2943 | int i; | |
2944 | ||
2945 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
88444854 DDO |
2946 | if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) |
2947 | goto int_err; | |
2948 | if (self_signed < 0) | |
2949 | goto int_err; | |
2950 | ||
2951 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ | |
2952 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
2953 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2954 | /* |
2955 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. | |
170b7358 VD |
2956 | * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the |
2957 | * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, | |
2958 | * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain | |
2959 | * if no luck with untrusted first. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2960 | */ |
2961 | search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; | |
170b7358 | 2962 | if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { |
88444854 | 2963 | if (search == 0 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) != 0) |
170b7358 VD |
2964 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; |
2965 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
2966 | may_alternate = 1; | |
2967 | may_trusted = 1; | |
2968 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2969 | |
2970 | /* | |
2971 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
2972 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make | |
2973 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
2974 | */ | |
88444854 | 2975 | if ((sk_untrusted = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2976 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f3e235ed | 2977 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2978 | return 0; |
2979 | } | |
2980 | ||
69664d6a | 2981 | /* |
ade08735 | 2982 | * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, add |
69664d6a VD |
2983 | * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the |
2984 | * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with | |
2985 | * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create | |
2986 | * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE | |
2987 | * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack | |
2988 | * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for | |
2989 | * this to change. ] | |
2990 | */ | |
170b7358 | 2991 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) { |
88444854 | 2992 | if (sk_untrusted == NULL && (sk_untrusted = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
9311d0c4 | 2993 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f3e235ed | 2994 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
69664d6a VD |
2995 | return 0; |
2996 | } | |
88444854 DDO |
2997 | if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) { |
2998 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); | |
eeccc237 DDO |
2999 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
3000 | return 0; | |
170b7358 VD |
3001 | } |
3002 | } | |
3003 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
3004 | /* |
3005 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
3006 | * might be reasonable. | |
3007 | */ | |
88444854 DDO |
3008 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX / 2) |
3009 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX / 2; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3010 | |
3011 | /* | |
ade08735 | 3012 | * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. |
d9b8b89b VD |
3013 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, |
3014 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
3015 | */ | |
3016 | depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; | |
3017 | ||
3018 | while (search != 0) { | |
88444854 | 3019 | X509 *issuer = NULL; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3020 | |
3021 | /* | |
3022 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3023 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we |
3024 | * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point | |
ade08735 | 3025 | * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. |
fbb82a60 VD |
3026 | * |
3027 | * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the | |
3028 | * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last | |
3029 | * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, | |
3030 | * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer | |
3031 | * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be | |
3032 | * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain | |
3033 | * would be a-priori too long. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3034 | */ |
3035 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3036 | i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3037 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
3038 | /* | |
3039 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
3040 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
3041 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
3042 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
3043 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
3044 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
3045 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
3046 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
3047 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
3048 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
3049 | * | |
3050 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
3051 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
3052 | */ | |
3053 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
3054 | } | |
88444854 | 3055 | curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); |
d9b8b89b | 3056 | |
88444854 | 3057 | ok = depth < num ? 0 : get_issuer(&issuer, ctx, curr); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3058 | |
3059 | if (ok < 0) { | |
3060 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 3061 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
88444854 | 3062 | break; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3063 | } |
3064 | ||
3065 | if (ok > 0) { | |
3066 | /* | |
3067 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
3068 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
3069 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
ade08735 DDO |
3070 | * that despite the current trust store match we might still |
3071 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3072 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try |
3073 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
3074 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
170b7358 VD |
3075 | * |
3076 | * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust | |
3077 | * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted | |
3078 | * certificate among the ones from the trust store. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3079 | */ |
3080 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
02369787 | 3081 | if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && !self_signed)) { |
9311d0c4 | 3082 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
88444854 | 3083 | X509_free(issuer); |
24664a3b MC |
3084 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
3085 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
88444854 | 3086 | break; |
24664a3b | 3087 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
3088 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; |
3089 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
3090 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
3091 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
170b7358 VD |
3092 | |
3093 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3094 | dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
3095 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
3096 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
3097 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
3098 | } | |
3099 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3100 | dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
3101 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3102 | } |
3103 | ||
3104 | /* | |
3105 | * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their | |
3106 | * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. | |
3107 | */ | |
02369787 | 3108 | if (!self_signed) { |
88444854 DDO |
3109 | curr = issuer; |
3110 | if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0)) < 0) | |
3111 | goto int_err; | |
3112 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, curr)) { | |
3113 | X509_free(issuer); | |
9311d0c4 | 3114 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
d9b8b89b | 3115 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
f3e235ed | 3116 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
88444854 | 3117 | break; |
0c56a648 | 3118 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
3119 | } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { |
3120 | /* | |
3121 | * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same | |
3122 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as | |
ade08735 | 3123 | * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid |
d9b8b89b VD |
3124 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. |
3125 | */ | |
88444854 | 3126 | if (X509_cmp(curr, issuer) != 0) { |
d9b8b89b | 3127 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ |
88444854 | 3128 | X509_free(issuer); |
d9b8b89b | 3129 | ok = 0; |
88444854 DDO |
3130 | } else { /* curr "==" issuer */ |
3131 | X509_free(curr); | |
d9b8b89b | 3132 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; |
88444854 DDO |
3133 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, issuer); |
3134 | curr = issuer; | |
3135 | /* no need to update self_signed */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3136 | } |
3137 | } | |
3138 | ||
3139 | /* | |
e99505b4 | 3140 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check |
d9b8b89b VD |
3141 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. |
3142 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
3143 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
170b7358 VD |
3144 | * |
3145 | * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the | |
3146 | * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE | |
3147 | * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from | |
3148 | * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the | |
3149 | * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted | |
3150 | * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3151 | */ |
3152 | if (ok) { | |
88444854 DDO |
3153 | if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) |
3154 | goto int_err; | |
d9b8b89b | 3155 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
88444854 DDO |
3156 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); |
3157 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED | |
3158 | || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
3159 | break; | |
02369787 | 3160 | if (!self_signed) |
d9b8b89b VD |
3161 | continue; |
3162 | } | |
3163 | } | |
3164 | ||
3165 | /* | |
3166 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
3167 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
3168 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
3169 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
3170 | */ | |
3171 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
3172 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
3173 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
3174 | continue; | |
3175 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
3176 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
3177 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
3178 | break; | |
3179 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
3180 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
3181 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
02369787 | 3182 | self_signed = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3183 | } |
3184 | } | |
3185 | ||
3186 | /* | |
88444854 | 3187 | * Extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificates |
d9b8b89b VD |
3188 | */ |
3189 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
3190 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
88444854 DDO |
3191 | if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) |
3192 | goto int_err; | |
3193 | curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
3194 | issuer = (self_signed || depth < num) ? | |
3195 | NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr); | |
3196 | if (issuer == NULL) { | |
3197 | /* | |
3198 | * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num exceeds depth | |
3199 | * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking | |
3200 | * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
3201 | */ | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3202 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
3203 | if (may_trusted) | |
3204 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
3205 | continue; | |
3206 | } | |
3207 | ||
fbb82a60 | 3208 | /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ |
88444854 | 3209 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted, issuer); |
fbb82a60 | 3210 | |
88444854 DDO |
3211 | if (!X509_add_cert(ctx->chain, issuer, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) |
3212 | goto int_err; | |
fbb82a60 | 3213 | |
d9b8b89b | 3214 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; |
88444854 DDO |
3215 | curr = issuer; |
3216 | if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0)) < 0) | |
3217 | goto int_err; | |
d9b8b89b | 3218 | |
07b6068d | 3219 | /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */ |
88444854 DDO |
3220 | trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1); |
3221 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
3222 | break; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3223 | } |
3224 | } | |
88444854 | 3225 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3226 | |
3227 | /* | |
170b7358 VD |
3228 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key |
3229 | * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
d9b8b89b | 3230 | */ |
497ecc0d VD |
3231 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3232 | if (num <= depth) { | |
170b7358 VD |
3233 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) |
3234 | trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); | |
497ecc0d VD |
3235 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) |
3236 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3237 | } |
3238 | ||
3239 | switch (trust) { | |
3240 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3241 | return 1; | |
3242 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
70dd3c65 | 3243 | /* Callback already issued */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
3244 | return 0; |
3245 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
3246 | default: | |
3247 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
07b6068d | 3248 | CB_FAIL_IF(num > depth, |
88444854 | 3249 | ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); |
07b6068d DDO |
3250 | CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) |
3251 | && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0), | |
88444854 | 3252 | ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
02369787 | 3253 | if (self_signed) |
88444854 | 3254 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, |
6e5e118c DO |
3255 | sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1 |
3256 | ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT | |
3257 | : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); | |
88444854 | 3258 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, |
6e5e118c DO |
3259 | ctx->num_untrusted < num |
3260 | ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT | |
3261 | : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); | |
d9b8b89b | 3262 | } |
88444854 DDO |
3263 | |
3264 | int_err: | |
3265 | sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); | |
3266 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3267 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3268 | return 0; | |
d9b8b89b | 3269 | } |
fbb82a60 VD |
3270 | |
3271 | static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; | |
3272 | static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); | |
3273 | ||
07b6068d DDO |
3274 | /*- |
3275 | * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`. | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3276 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
3277 | */ | |
3278 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3279 | { | |
3280 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); | |
3281 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3282 | ||
baba1545 KG |
3283 | /* |
3284 | * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public | |
3285 | * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the | |
3286 | * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security | |
3287 | * floor. | |
3288 | */ | |
3289 | if (level <= 0) | |
3290 | return 1; | |
3291 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3292 | /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ |
3293 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3294 | return 0; | |
3295 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3296 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) |
3297 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3298 | ||
3299 | return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3300 | } | |
3301 | ||
07b6068d | 3302 | /*- |
cccf532f TM |
3303 | * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params |
3304 | * for an elliptic curve. | |
3305 | * | |
3306 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. | |
3307 | */ | |
3308 | static int check_curve(X509 *cert) | |
3309 | { | |
3310 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
3311 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); | |
3312 | ||
3313 | /* Unsupported or malformed key */ | |
3314 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3315 | return -1; | |
3316 | ||
3317 | if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
3318 | int ret; | |
3319 | ||
3320 | ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); | |
3321 | return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret; | |
3322 | } | |
3323 | #endif | |
3324 | ||
3325 | return 1; | |
3326 | } | |
3327 | ||
07b6068d | 3328 | /*- |
fbb82a60 VD |
3329 | * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security |
3330 | * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether | |
3331 | * self-signed or otherwise). | |
3332 | * | |
3333 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3334 | */ | |
3335 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3336 | { | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3337 | int secbits = -1; |
3338 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3339 | ||
3340 | if (level <= 0) | |
3341 | return 1; | |
3342 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) | |
3343 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3344 | ||
c3c8823c DSH |
3345 | if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) |
3346 | return 0; | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3347 | |
3348 | return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3349 | } |