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b1322259 | 1 | /* |
7e06a675 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
3e4b43b9 | 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
b1322259 RS |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
11 | #include <time.h> | |
12 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 13 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 14 | |
25f2138b | 15 | #include "crypto/ctype.h" |
b39fc560 | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 17 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 22 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 23 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
176db6dc | 24 | #include "internal/dane.h" |
25f2138b | 25 | #include "crypto/x509.h" |
706457b7 | 26 | #include "x509_local.h" |
d02b48c6 | 27 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
28 | /* CRL score values */ |
29 | ||
30 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
31 | ||
0f113f3e | 32 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
33 | |
34 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
35 | ||
0f113f3e | 36 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
37 | |
38 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
39 | ||
0f113f3e | 40 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
41 | |
42 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
43 | ||
0f113f3e | 44 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
45 | |
46 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
47 | ||
48 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
49 | ||
50 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
51 | ||
0f113f3e | 52 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
53 | |
54 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
55 | ||
0f113f3e | 56 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
57 | |
58 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
59 | ||
0f113f3e | 60 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
61 | |
62 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
63 | ||
0f113f3e | 64 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 65 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
66 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
67 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
170b7358 | 68 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 69 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
70 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
71 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 72 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 73 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 74 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 75 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
76 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
77 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 78 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 79 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
170b7358 | 80 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); |
fbb82a60 VD |
81 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); |
82 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); | |
4b96839f DSH |
83 | |
84 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 85 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 86 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
87 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
88 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
89 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
90 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
91 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
92 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 93 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 94 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
95 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
96 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
97 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
98 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 99 | |
d02b48c6 | 100 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 101 | |
6b691a5c | 102 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
103 | { |
104 | return ok; | |
105 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 106 | |
0c56a648 MC |
107 | /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error */ |
108 | static int cert_self_signed(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 109 | { |
0c56a648 MC |
110 | if (!X509v3_cache_extensions(x, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) |
111 | return -1; | |
112 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
113 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) |
114 | return 1; | |
115 | else | |
116 | return 0; | |
117 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 118 | |
2dabd822 DSH |
119 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
120 | ||
121 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
122 | { |
123 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
124 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
125 | int i; | |
126 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
127 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
128 | if (certs == NULL) | |
129 | return NULL; | |
130 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
131 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
132 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
133 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
134 | break; | |
135 | } | |
136 | if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
05f0fb9f | 137 | X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
138 | else |
139 | xtmp = NULL; | |
140 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
141 | return xtmp; | |
142 | } | |
2dabd822 | 143 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
144 | /*- |
145 | * Inform the verify callback of an error. | |
146 | * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at | |
147 | * B<depth>. | |
148 | * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave | |
149 | * unchanged (presumably set by the caller). | |
150 | * | |
151 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
152 | */ | |
153 | static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) | |
154 | { | |
155 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
156 | ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
157 | if (err != X509_V_OK) | |
158 | ctx->error = err; | |
159 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
160 | } | |
161 | ||
162 | /*- | |
163 | * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the | |
164 | * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error | |
165 | * number. | |
166 | * | |
167 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
168 | */ | |
169 | static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
170 | { | |
171 | ctx->error = err; | |
172 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
173 | } | |
174 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
175 | static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
176 | { | |
177 | int i; | |
178 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
179 | ||
180 | if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) | |
181 | return 1; | |
182 | ||
183 | for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
184 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
185 | ||
186 | /* | |
187 | * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only | |
188 | * check the security of issuer keys. | |
189 | */ | |
190 | if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) && | |
191 | verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0) | |
192 | return 0; | |
193 | /* | |
194 | * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates | |
195 | * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. | |
196 | */ | |
197 | if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) && | |
198 | verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0) | |
199 | return 0; | |
200 | } | |
201 | return 1; | |
202 | } | |
203 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
204 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
205 | { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
206 | int err; |
207 | int ok; | |
208 | ||
209 | /* | |
210 | * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, | |
211 | * instantiate chain public key parameters. | |
212 | */ | |
213 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || | |
214 | (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || | |
fbb82a60 | 215 | (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 || |
d9b8b89b VD |
216 | (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) |
217 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
218 | if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) | |
219 | return ok; | |
220 | ||
221 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
222 | ctx->param->flags); | |
223 | if (err != X509_V_OK) { | |
70dd3c65 | 224 | if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
225 | return ok; |
226 | } | |
227 | ||
228 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
229 | ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); | |
230 | if (!ok) | |
231 | return ok; | |
232 | ||
8545051c DB |
233 | if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0) |
234 | return ok; | |
235 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
236 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
237 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
9021a5df | 238 | if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b | 239 | return ok; |
9021a5df | 240 | if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
241 | return ok; |
242 | #endif | |
243 | ||
244 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
245 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) | |
246 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
247 | return ok; | |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
6b691a5c | 250 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 251 | { |
b9aec69a | 252 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
f3e235ed | 253 | int ret; |
d9b8b89b | 254 | |
0f113f3e MC |
255 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
256 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
f3e235ed | 257 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
0f113f3e MC |
258 | return -1; |
259 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 260 | |
aae41f8c MC |
261 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
262 | /* | |
263 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
264 | * cannot do another one. | |
265 | */ | |
266 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
f3e235ed | 267 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
aae41f8c MC |
268 | return -1; |
269 | } | |
0f113f3e | 270 | |
0f113f3e MC |
271 | /* |
272 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
273 | * the first entry is in place | |
274 | */ | |
aae41f8c MC |
275 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
276 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
277 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 278 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b | 279 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 280 | } |
05f0fb9f | 281 | X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); |
d9b8b89b | 282 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 283 | |
fbb82a60 VD |
284 | /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ |
285 | if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) && | |
286 | !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL)) | |
287 | return 0; | |
288 | ||
f3e235ed VD |
289 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
290 | ret = dane_verify(ctx); | |
291 | else | |
292 | ret = verify_chain(ctx); | |
293 | ||
170b7358 | 294 | /* |
f3e235ed VD |
295 | * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, |
296 | * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored | |
297 | * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). | |
170b7358 | 298 | */ |
f3e235ed VD |
299 | if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
300 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
301 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e MC |
302 | } |
303 | ||
304 | /* | |
305 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 | 306 | */ |
2f043896 DSH |
307 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
308 | { | |
0f113f3e | 309 | int i; |
c53f7355 | 310 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; |
fbb82a60 | 311 | |
0f113f3e | 312 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
c53f7355 VD |
313 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
314 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { | |
315 | rv = issuer; | |
316 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1)) | |
317 | break; | |
318 | } | |
0f113f3e | 319 | } |
c53f7355 | 320 | return rv; |
2f043896 DSH |
321 | } |
322 | ||
323 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
324 | ||
325 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
326 | { | |
0f113f3e | 327 | int ret; |
0c56a648 MC |
328 | int ss; |
329 | ||
330 | if (x == issuer) { | |
331 | ss = cert_self_signed(ctx, x); | |
332 | if (ss < 0) | |
333 | return 0; | |
334 | return ss; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
337 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); |
338 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) { | |
339 | int i; | |
340 | X509 *ch; | |
0c56a648 MC |
341 | |
342 | ss = cert_self_signed(ctx, x); | |
343 | if (ss < 0) | |
344 | return 0; | |
345 | ||
0f113f3e | 346 | /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ |
0c56a648 | 347 | if (ss > 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
0f113f3e MC |
348 | return 1; |
349 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
350 | ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
351 | if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { | |
352 | ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; | |
353 | break; | |
354 | } | |
355 | } | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
d33def66 | 358 | return (ret == X509_V_OK); |
2f043896 DSH |
359 | } |
360 | ||
361 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
362 | ||
363 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
364 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
365 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
366 | if (*issuer) { | |
05f0fb9f | 367 | X509_up_ref(*issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
368 | return 1; |
369 | } else | |
370 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 371 | } |
2f043896 | 372 | |
8cc86b81 DDO |
373 | static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
374 | const X509_NAME *nm) | |
c864e761 DSH |
375 | { |
376 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
377 | X509 *x; | |
378 | int i; | |
7fcdbd83 | 379 | |
c864e761 DSH |
380 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { |
381 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); | |
382 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { | |
383 | if (sk == NULL) | |
384 | sk = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
385 | if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) { | |
386 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
7fcdbd83 F |
387 | X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
388 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
c864e761 DSH |
389 | return NULL; |
390 | } | |
391 | X509_up_ref(x); | |
392 | } | |
393 | } | |
394 | return sk; | |
395 | } | |
396 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
397 | /* |
398 | * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local | |
399 | * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. | |
400 | */ | |
401 | static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, | |
402 | int must_be_ca) | |
403 | { | |
0daccd4d VD |
404 | int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
405 | ||
406 | /* | |
407 | * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust | |
33cc5dde | 408 | * settings trump the purpose constraints. |
0daccd4d VD |
409 | * |
410 | * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in | |
411 | * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in | |
412 | * ctx->param->purpose! | |
413 | * | |
414 | * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from | |
415 | * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets | |
416 | * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however | |
417 | * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value | |
418 | * via the X509_PURPOSE API. | |
419 | * | |
420 | * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're | |
421 | * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is | |
33cc5dde | 422 | * also set. |
0daccd4d VD |
423 | */ |
424 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) | |
425 | tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); | |
426 | ||
33cc5dde VD |
427 | switch (tr_ok) { |
428 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
0daccd4d | 429 | return 1; |
33cc5dde VD |
430 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: |
431 | break; | |
432 | default: | |
433 | switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { | |
434 | case 1: | |
435 | return 1; | |
436 | case 0: | |
437 | break; | |
438 | default: | |
439 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) | |
440 | return 1; | |
441 | } | |
442 | break; | |
443 | } | |
0daccd4d | 444 | |
70dd3c65 | 445 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
0daccd4d VD |
446 | } |
447 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
448 | /* |
449 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
450 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
451 | */ |
452 | ||
30b415b0 | 453 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 454 | { |
0daccd4d | 455 | int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 456 | X509 *x; |
0f113f3e MC |
457 | int proxy_path_length = 0; |
458 | int purpose; | |
459 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
0daccd4d | 460 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
0f113f3e | 461 | |
35a1cc90 MC |
462 | /*- |
463 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
464 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
465 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
466 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
467 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
468 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
469 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
470 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
471 | must_be_ca = -1; |
472 | ||
473 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
474 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
475 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
476 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
477 | } else { | |
478 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
479 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
0f113f3e MC |
480 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; |
481 | } | |
482 | ||
0daccd4d | 483 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
0f113f3e MC |
484 | int ret; |
485 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
486 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
487 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
488 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
489 | X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)) | |
0daccd4d | 490 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
491 | } |
492 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
493 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
494 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED)) | |
0daccd4d | 495 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
496 | } |
497 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
498 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
499 | case -1: | |
500 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
501 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
502 | ret = 0; | |
503 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
504 | } else | |
505 | ret = 1; | |
506 | break; | |
507 | case 0: | |
508 | if (ret != 0) { | |
509 | ret = 0; | |
510 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
511 | } else | |
512 | ret = 1; | |
513 | break; | |
514 | default: | |
4d9e33ac | 515 | /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ |
0f113f3e | 516 | if ((ret == 0) |
4d9e33ac | 517 | || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) |
0f113f3e MC |
518 | && (ret != 1))) { |
519 | ret = 0; | |
520 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
521 | } else | |
522 | ret = 1; | |
523 | break; | |
524 | } | |
fa86e2ee TM |
525 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 |
526 | && x->ex_pathlen != -1 | |
527 | && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) { | |
528 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
529 | ret = 0; | |
530 | } | |
70dd3c65 VD |
531 | if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK)) |
532 | return 0; | |
533 | /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ | |
534 | if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) | |
535 | return 0; | |
dc5831da VD |
536 | /* Check pathlen */ |
537 | if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
538 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) { | |
70dd3c65 | 539 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) |
0daccd4d | 540 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 541 | } |
ed422a2d | 542 | /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */ |
dc5831da | 543 | if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
544 | plen++; |
545 | /* | |
546 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
547 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
548 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
549 | */ | |
550 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
ed17c7c1 RL |
551 | /* |
552 | * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint | |
553 | * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to | |
554 | * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length | |
555 | * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. | |
556 | * | |
557 | * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start | |
558 | * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, | |
559 | * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, | |
560 | * increment proxy_path_length. | |
561 | */ | |
562 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { | |
563 | if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
564 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, | |
565 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) | |
566 | return 0; | |
567 | } | |
568 | proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; | |
0f113f3e MC |
569 | } |
570 | proxy_path_length++; | |
571 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
572 | } else | |
573 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
574 | } | |
0daccd4d | 575 | return 1; |
11262391 DSH |
576 | } |
577 | ||
55a6250f VD |
578 | static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype) |
579 | { | |
580 | int i; | |
581 | int ret = 0; | |
582 | GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); | |
583 | ||
584 | if (gs == NULL) | |
585 | return 0; | |
586 | ||
587 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) { | |
588 | GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i); | |
589 | ||
590 | if (g->type == gtype) { | |
591 | ret = 1; | |
592 | break; | |
593 | } | |
594 | } | |
595 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs); | |
596 | return ret; | |
597 | } | |
598 | ||
e9746e03 | 599 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 600 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
601 | int i; |
602 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
603 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
604 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
605 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
606 | int j; | |
607 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
608 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ |
609 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
610 | continue; | |
c8223538 RL |
611 | |
612 | /* | |
613 | * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the | |
614 | * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry | |
615 | * added. | |
616 | * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) | |
617 | */ | |
618 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
619 | X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); | |
620 | X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
621 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; | |
622 | int last_object_nid = 0; | |
623 | int err = X509_V_OK; | |
624 | int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; | |
625 | ||
626 | /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ | |
627 | if (last_object_loc < 1) { | |
628 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
629 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
630 | } | |
631 | ||
632 | /* | |
633 | * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as | |
634 | * there is in issuer. | |
635 | */ | |
636 | if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) | |
637 | != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { | |
638 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
639 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
642 | /* | |
643 | * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a | |
644 | * multivalued RDN | |
645 | */ | |
646 | if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, | |
647 | last_object_loc)) | |
648 | == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, | |
649 | last_object_loc - 1))) { | |
650 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
651 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
652 | } | |
653 | ||
654 | /* | |
655 | * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that | |
656 | * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly | |
657 | */ | |
658 | tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); | |
659 | if (tmpsubject == NULL) { | |
660 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
661 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
662 | return 0; | |
663 | } | |
664 | ||
665 | tmpentry = | |
666 | X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); | |
667 | last_object_nid = | |
668 | OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); | |
669 | ||
670 | if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName | |
671 | || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { | |
672 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
673 | } | |
674 | ||
675 | X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); | |
676 | X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); | |
677 | ||
678 | proxy_name_done: | |
679 | if (err != X509_V_OK | |
680 | && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err)) | |
681 | return 0; | |
682 | } | |
683 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
684 | /* |
685 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
686 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
687 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
688 | * to be obeyed. | |
689 | */ | |
690 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
691 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
70dd3c65 | 692 | |
0f113f3e | 693 | if (nc) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
694 | int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
695 | ||
5bd5dcd4 | 696 | /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ |
55a6250f VD |
697 | if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 |
698 | && (ctx->param->hostflags | |
699 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 | |
700 | && ((ctx->param->hostflags | |
701 | & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 | |
702 | || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS))) | |
5bd5dcd4 DSH |
703 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); |
704 | ||
f3e235ed VD |
705 | switch (rv) { |
706 | case X509_V_OK: | |
707 | break; | |
708 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
70dd3c65 | 709 | return 0; |
f3e235ed VD |
710 | default: |
711 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv)) | |
712 | return 0; | |
713 | break; | |
714 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
715 | } |
716 | } | |
717 | } | |
718 | return 1; | |
719 | } | |
e9746e03 | 720 | |
3bf15e29 | 721 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e | 722 | { |
70dd3c65 | 723 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); |
0f113f3e | 724 | } |
3bf15e29 | 725 | |
9689a6ae | 726 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
727 | { |
728 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 729 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
730 | char *name; |
731 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
732 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
733 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
734 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 735 | } |
0f113f3e | 736 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
737 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
738 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
739 | return 1; |
740 | } | |
741 | return n == 0; | |
742 | } | |
8abffa4a | 743 | |
3bf15e29 | 744 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
745 | { |
746 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 747 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
9689a6ae | 748 | if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
749 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
750 | return 0; | |
751 | } | |
9689a6ae | 752 | if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
753 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
754 | return 0; | |
755 | } | |
9689a6ae | 756 | if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
757 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
758 | return 0; | |
759 | } | |
760 | return 1; | |
761 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 762 | |
d9b8b89b | 763 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 764 | { |
70dd3c65 | 765 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 766 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 767 | X509 *mx; |
b9aec69a | 768 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
769 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
770 | int trust; | |
771 | ||
bdcadca2 VD |
772 | /* |
773 | * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) | |
774 | * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. | |
775 | */ | |
776 | if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { | |
170b7358 VD |
777 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { |
778 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
779 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
780 | return trust; | |
781 | } | |
782 | } | |
783 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
784 | /* |
785 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
786 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
787 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
788 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
789 | */ | |
790 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 791 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 792 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
0f113f3e | 793 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
794 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
795 | goto trusted; | |
796 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
797 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 798 | } |
d9b8b89b | 799 | |
0f113f3e | 800 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
801 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
802 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 803 | */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
804 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
805 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) | |
806 | goto trusted; | |
807 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
808 | } | |
809 | ||
497ecc0d | 810 | if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
d9b8b89b VD |
811 | /* |
812 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
813 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
814 | */ | |
bdcadca2 VD |
815 | i = 0; |
816 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
0f113f3e | 817 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
818 | if (!mx) |
819 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
820 | ||
821 | /* | |
822 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
823 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
824 | */ | |
825 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
826 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
827 | X509_free(mx); | |
828 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 829 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
830 | |
831 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
832 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
833 | X509_free(x); | |
834 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
835 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
836 | } |
837 | ||
838 | /* | |
839 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
840 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
841 | */ | |
842 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
843 | |
844 | rejected: | |
70dd3c65 | 845 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED)) |
d9b8b89b VD |
846 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
847 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
848 | ||
849 | trusted: | |
170b7358 VD |
850 | if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
851 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
852 | if (dane->pdpth < 0) | |
853 | dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; | |
854 | /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ | |
855 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
856 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
857 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
858 | } |
859 | ||
b545dc67 | 860 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 861 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 862 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
863 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
864 | return 1; | |
865 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
866 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
867 | else { | |
868 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
869 | if (ctx->parent) | |
870 | return 1; | |
871 | last = 0; | |
872 | } | |
873 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
874 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
875 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
876 | if (!ok) | |
877 | return ok; | |
878 | } | |
879 | return 1; | |
880 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
881 | |
882 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
883 | { |
884 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
885 | int ok = 0; |
886 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
887 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
888 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
889 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
890 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
891 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
892 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 893 | |
790555d6 RL |
894 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) |
895 | return 1; | |
896 | ||
0f113f3e | 897 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
898 | unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
899 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
900 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
901 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
902 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
903 | else | |
904 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
905 | /* | |
906 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
907 | */ | |
908 | if (!ok) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
909 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
910 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
911 | } |
912 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
913 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
914 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 915 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
916 | |
917 | if (dcrl) { | |
918 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
919 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 920 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
921 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
922 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 923 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
924 | } else |
925 | ok = 1; | |
926 | ||
927 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
928 | if (ok != 2) { | |
929 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
930 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 931 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
932 | } |
933 | ||
934 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
935 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
936 | crl = NULL; | |
937 | dcrl = NULL; | |
938 | /* | |
60250017 | 939 | * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, |
0f113f3e MC |
940 | * so exit loop. |
941 | */ | |
942 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
943 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
944 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
945 | } |
946 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 947 | done: |
0f113f3e MC |
948 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
949 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
950 | ||
951 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
952 | return ok; | |
0f113f3e | 953 | } |
b545dc67 | 954 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
955 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
956 | ||
957 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
0f113f3e MC |
958 | { |
959 | time_t *ptime; | |
960 | int i; | |
70dd3c65 | 961 | |
0f113f3e MC |
962 | if (notify) |
963 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
964 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
965 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
966 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
967 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
968 | else |
969 | ptime = NULL; | |
970 | ||
568ce3a5 | 971 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); |
0f113f3e MC |
972 | if (i == 0) { |
973 | if (!notify) | |
974 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 975 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
976 | return 0; |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
979 | if (i > 0) { | |
980 | if (!notify) | |
981 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 982 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) |
0f113f3e MC |
983 | return 0; |
984 | } | |
985 | ||
568ce3a5 DSH |
986 | if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { |
987 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
0f113f3e MC |
988 | |
989 | if (i == 0) { | |
990 | if (!notify) | |
991 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 992 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
993 | return 0; |
994 | } | |
995 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
996 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
997 | if (!notify) | |
998 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 999 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1000 | return 0; |
1001 | } | |
1002 | } | |
1003 | ||
1004 | if (notify) | |
1005 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1006 | ||
1007 | return 1; | |
1008 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1009 | |
d43c4497 | 1010 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
1011 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
1012 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
1013 | { | |
1014 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
1015 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
1016 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
1017 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
1018 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1019 | ||
1020 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1021 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1022 | reasons = *preasons; | |
1023 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
8b7c51a0 | 1024 | if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) |
626aa248 DSH |
1025 | continue; |
1026 | /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ | |
8b7c51a0 | 1027 | if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { |
626aa248 | 1028 | int day, sec; |
568ce3a5 DSH |
1029 | if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), |
1030 | X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) | |
626aa248 | 1031 | continue; |
e032117d DSH |
1032 | /* |
1033 | * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| | |
1034 | * and |sec|. | |
1035 | */ | |
1036 | if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) | |
626aa248 | 1037 | continue; |
0f113f3e | 1038 | } |
626aa248 DSH |
1039 | best_crl = crl; |
1040 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
1041 | best_score = crl_score; | |
1042 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1043 | } |
1044 | ||
1045 | if (best_crl) { | |
222561fe | 1046 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1047 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
1048 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
1049 | *pscore = best_score; | |
1050 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 1051 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
1052 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
1053 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1054 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
1055 | } | |
1056 | ||
1057 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
1058 | return 1; | |
1059 | ||
1060 | return 0; | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | ||
1063 | /* | |
1064 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1065 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
1066 | */ | |
1067 | ||
1068 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1069 | { |
1070 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
1071 | int i; | |
1072 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
1073 | if (i >= 0) { | |
1074 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1075 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1076 | return 0; | |
1077 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
1078 | } else | |
1079 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1080 | |
0f113f3e | 1081 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 1082 | |
0f113f3e | 1083 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 1084 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1085 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1086 | return 0; | |
1087 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
1088 | } else | |
1089 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1090 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1091 | if (!exta && !extb) |
1092 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 1093 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1094 | if (!exta || !extb) |
1095 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1096 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1097 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
1098 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1099 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1100 | return 1; |
1101 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1102 | |
1103 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
1104 | ||
1105 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1106 | { |
1107 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
1108 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
1109 | return 0; | |
1110 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
1111 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
1112 | return 0; | |
1113 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1114 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
1115 | return 0; | |
1116 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1117 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1118 | return 0; | |
1119 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1120 | return 0; | |
1121 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1122 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1123 | return 0; | |
1124 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1125 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1126 | return 1; | |
1127 | return 0; | |
1128 | } | |
1129 | ||
1130 | /* | |
1131 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1132 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1133 | */ |
1134 | ||
1135 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1136 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1137 | { | |
1138 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1139 | int i; | |
1140 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
1141 | return; | |
1142 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
1143 | return; | |
1144 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1145 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1146 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1147 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1148 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1149 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1150 | *dcrl = delta; |
1151 | return; | |
1152 | } | |
1153 | } | |
1154 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1155 | } | |
1156 | ||
1157 | /* | |
1158 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1159 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1160 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1161 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1162 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
1163 | */ |
1164 | ||
1165 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1166 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1167 | { | |
1168 | ||
1169 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1170 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1171 | ||
1172 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1173 | ||
1174 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
1175 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1176 | return 0; | |
1177 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
1178 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
1179 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
1180 | return 0; | |
1181 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
1182 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1183 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1184 | return 0; | |
1185 | } | |
1186 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1187 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1188 | return 0; | |
1189 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1190 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
1191 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1192 | return 0; | |
1193 | } else | |
1194 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1195 | ||
1196 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1197 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1198 | ||
1199 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1200 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1201 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1202 | ||
1203 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1204 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1205 | ||
1206 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1207 | ||
1208 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1209 | return 0; | |
1210 | ||
1211 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1212 | ||
1213 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1214 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1215 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1216 | return 0; | |
1217 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1218 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1219 | } | |
1220 | ||
1221 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1222 | ||
1223 | return crl_score; | |
1224 | ||
1225 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1226 | |
1227 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1228 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1229 | { | |
1230 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
8cc86b81 | 1231 | const X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1232 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
1233 | int i; | |
1234 | ||
1235 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1236 | cidx++; | |
1237 | ||
1238 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1239 | ||
1240 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1241 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1242 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1243 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1244 | return; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | ||
1248 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1249 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1250 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1251 | continue; | |
1252 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1253 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1254 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1255 | return; | |
1256 | } | |
1257 | } | |
1258 | ||
1259 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1260 | ||
1261 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1262 | return; | |
1263 | ||
1264 | /* | |
1265 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1266 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1267 | */ | |
1268 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1269 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1270 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1271 | continue; | |
1272 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1273 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1274 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1275 | return; | |
1276 | } | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
1280 | /* | |
1281 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1282 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1283 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1284 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1285 | */ |
1286 | ||
1287 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1288 | { |
1289 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1290 | int ret; | |
70dd3c65 | 1291 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1292 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
1293 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1294 | return 0; | |
faa9dcd4 | 1295 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1296 | return -1; |
1297 | ||
1298 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1299 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1300 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1301 | ||
1302 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1303 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1304 | ||
1305 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1306 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1307 | if (ret <= 0) |
1308 | goto err; | |
1309 | ||
1310 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1311 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
1312 | err: | |
1313 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1314 | return ret; | |
1315 | } | |
1316 | ||
1317 | /* | |
1318 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1319 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1320 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1321 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1322 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1323 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1324 | */ |
1325 | ||
1326 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1327 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1328 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1329 | { | |
1330 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1331 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1332 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1333 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1334 | return 1; | |
1335 | return 0; | |
1336 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1337 | |
3a83462d MC |
1338 | /*- |
1339 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1340 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1341 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1342 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1343 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1344 | */ |
1345 | ||
3e727a3b | 1346 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1347 | { |
1348 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1349 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1350 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1351 | int i, j; | |
1352 | if (!a || !b) | |
1353 | return 1; | |
1354 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1355 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1356 | return 0; | |
1357 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1358 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1359 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1360 | return 0; | |
1361 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1362 | return 1; | |
1363 | else | |
1364 | return 0; | |
1365 | } | |
1366 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1367 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1368 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1369 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1370 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1371 | return 0; | |
1372 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1373 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1374 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1375 | } | |
1376 | ||
1377 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1378 | if (nm) { | |
1379 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1380 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1381 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1382 | continue; | |
1383 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1384 | return 1; | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | return 0; | |
1387 | } | |
1388 | ||
1389 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1390 | ||
1391 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1392 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1393 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1394 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1395 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1396 | return 1; | |
1397 | } | |
1398 | } | |
1399 | ||
1400 | return 0; | |
1401 | ||
1402 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1403 | |
4b96839f | 1404 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1405 | { |
1406 | int i; | |
8cc86b81 | 1407 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1408 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ |
1409 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1410 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1411 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1412 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1413 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1414 | continue; | |
1415 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1416 | return 1; | |
1417 | } | |
1418 | return 0; | |
1419 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1420 | |
4b96839f | 1421 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1422 | |
4b96839f | 1423 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1424 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1425 | { | |
1426 | int i; | |
1427 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1428 | return 0; | |
1429 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1430 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1431 | return 0; | |
1432 | } else { | |
1433 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1434 | return 0; | |
1435 | } | |
1436 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1437 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1438 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1439 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1440 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1441 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1442 | return 1; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | } | |
1446 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1447 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1448 | return 1; | |
1449 | return 0; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | ||
1452 | /* | |
1453 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1454 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1455 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1456 | |
d43c4497 | 1457 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1458 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1459 | { | |
1460 | int ok; | |
1461 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1462 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1463 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1464 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1465 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
8cc86b81 | 1466 | const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
70dd3c65 | 1467 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1468 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
1469 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1470 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1471 | if (ok) |
1472 | goto done; | |
1473 | ||
1474 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1475 | ||
1476 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1477 | ||
1478 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1479 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1480 | goto done; | |
1481 | ||
1482 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1483 | ||
1484 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1485 | ||
1486 | done: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1487 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
1488 | if (crl) { | |
1489 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1490 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1491 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1492 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1493 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1494 | return 1; | |
1495 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1496 | return 0; |
1497 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1498 | |
1499 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1500 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1501 | { |
1502 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1503 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1504 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1505 | int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1506 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1507 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
1508 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1509 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1510 | /* |
1511 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1512 | * certificate in chain. | |
1513 | */ | |
1514 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1515 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1516 | else { | |
1517 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1518 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1519 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && |
1520 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) | |
1521 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1522 | } |
1523 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
1524 | if (issuer == NULL) |
1525 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1526 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1527 | /* |
1528 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1529 | */ | |
1530 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1531 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1532 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1533 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) && | |
1534 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) | |
1535 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1536 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1537 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) && |
1538 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) | |
1539 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1540 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1541 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) && |
1542 | check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && | |
1543 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) | |
1544 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1545 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1546 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) && |
1547 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) | |
1548 | return 0; | |
1549 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1550 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1551 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) && |
1552 | !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) | |
1553 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1554 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1555 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1556 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); | |
0f113f3e | 1557 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1558 | if (!ikey && |
1559 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) | |
1560 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1561 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1562 | if (ikey) { |
1563 | int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
0f113f3e | 1564 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1565 | if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) |
1566 | return 0; | |
1567 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1568 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && | |
1569 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1570 | return 0; | |
1571 | } | |
1572 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1573 | } |
b545dc67 DSH |
1574 | |
1575 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1576 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 1577 | { |
0f113f3e | 1578 | X509_REVOKED *rev; |
70dd3c65 | 1579 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1580 | /* |
1581 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1582 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
70dd3c65 | 1583 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can |
0f113f3e MC |
1584 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. |
1585 | */ | |
1586 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1587 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) && |
1588 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) | |
1589 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1590 | /* |
70dd3c65 VD |
1591 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure |
1592 | * reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
0f113f3e MC |
1593 | */ |
1594 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1595 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1596 | return 2; | |
70dd3c65 | 1597 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1598 | return 0; |
1599 | } | |
1600 | ||
1601 | return 1; | |
1602 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1603 | |
5d7c222d | 1604 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1605 | { |
1606 | int ret; | |
3921ded7 | 1607 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1608 | if (ctx->parent) |
1609 | return 1; | |
3921ded7 VD |
1610 | /* |
1611 | * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a | |
1612 | * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor | |
1613 | * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 | |
1614 | * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the | |
1615 | * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look | |
1616 | * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain | |
1617 | * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it | |
1618 | * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the | |
1619 | * X509_policy_check() call. | |
1620 | */ | |
1621 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { | |
1622 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 1623 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
3921ded7 VD |
1624 | return 0; |
1625 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1626 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
1627 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
3921ded7 VD |
1628 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) |
1629 | sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
1630 | ||
895c2f84 | 1631 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { |
0f113f3e | 1632 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f3e235ed | 1633 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
0f113f3e MC |
1634 | return 0; |
1635 | } | |
1636 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
895c2f84 | 1637 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { |
0f113f3e | 1638 | int i; |
70dd3c65 VD |
1639 | |
1640 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ | |
0f113f3e | 1641 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1642 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
1643 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1644 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) |
1645 | continue; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1646 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
1647 | X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1648 | return 0; |
1649 | } | |
1650 | return 1; | |
1651 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1652 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1653 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
1654 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1655 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1656 | } | |
895c2f84 VD |
1657 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { |
1658 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1659 | return 0; | |
1660 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1661 | |
1662 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1663 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
f3e235ed VD |
1664 | /* |
1665 | * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed | |
1666 | * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then | |
1667 | * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier | |
1668 | * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. | |
1669 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1670 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
1671 | return 0; | |
1672 | } | |
1673 | ||
1674 | return 1; | |
1675 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1676 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1677 | /*- |
1678 | * Check certificate validity times. | |
1679 | * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return | |
1680 | * the validation status. | |
1681 | * | |
1682 | * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
1683 | */ | |
1684 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1685 | { |
1686 | time_t *ptime; | |
1687 | int i; | |
1688 | ||
1689 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1690 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
1691 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
1692 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1693 | else |
1694 | ptime = NULL; | |
1695 | ||
568ce3a5 | 1696 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1697 | if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) |
1698 | return 0; | |
1699 | if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, | |
1700 | X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD)) | |
1701 | return 0; | |
1702 | if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID)) | |
1703 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1704 | |
568ce3a5 | 1705 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); |
70dd3c65 VD |
1706 | if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) |
1707 | return 0; | |
1708 | if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, | |
1709 | X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD)) | |
1710 | return 0; | |
1711 | if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)) | |
1712 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1713 | return 1; |
1714 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1715 | |
6b691a5c | 1716 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 1717 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1718 | int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
1719 | X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1720 | X509 *xs; | |
0f113f3e | 1721 | |
170b7358 VD |
1722 | /* |
1723 | * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to | |
1724 | * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as | |
1725 | * NULL, since all we have is a bare key. | |
1726 | */ | |
1727 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { | |
1728 | xs = xi; | |
1729 | xi = NULL; | |
1730 | goto check_cert; | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1733 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
1734 | xs = xi; | |
1735 | else { | |
1736 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
1737 | xs = xi; | |
1738 | goto check_cert; | |
1739 | } | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1740 | if (n <= 0) |
1741 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, | |
1742 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); | |
1743 | n--; | |
1744 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1745 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1746 | } |
1747 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
1748 | /* |
1749 | * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback | |
1750 | * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). | |
1751 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1752 | while (n >= 0) { |
70dd3c65 | 1753 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0f113f3e MC |
1754 | |
1755 | /* | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1756 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly |
1757 | * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If | |
1758 | * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate | |
1759 | * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject). | |
0f113f3e | 1760 | */ |
0e76014e | 1761 | if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { |
c01ff880 | 1762 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1763 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n, |
1764 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) | |
1765 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1766 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1767 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, |
1768 | X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1769 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1770 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1771 | } |
1772 | ||
0f113f3e | 1773 | check_cert: |
70dd3c65 VD |
1774 | /* Calls verify callback as needed */ |
1775 | if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) | |
1776 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1777 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1778 | /* |
1779 | * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) | |
1780 | * is retained. | |
1781 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1782 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
1783 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1784 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
1785 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) | |
1786 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1787 | |
70dd3c65 | 1788 | if (--n >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1789 | xi = xs; |
1790 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1791 | } | |
1792 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 1793 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1794 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1795 | |
91b73acb | 1796 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1797 | { |
0f113f3e | 1798 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1799 | } |
1800 | ||
91b73acb | 1801 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e | 1802 | { |
80770da3 EK |
1803 | static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; |
1804 | static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; | |
1805 | ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; | |
1806 | int i, day, sec, ret = 0; | |
48102247 | 1807 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
1808 | const char upper_z = 0x5A; | |
1809 | #else | |
1810 | const char upper_z = 'Z'; | |
1811 | #endif | |
f48b83b4 | 1812 | /* |
80770da3 EK |
1813 | * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. |
1814 | * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1815 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ |
1816 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
80770da3 EK |
1817 | * |
1818 | * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: | |
1819 | * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate | |
1820 | * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity | |
1821 | * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." | |
f48b83b4 | 1822 | */ |
80770da3 EK |
1823 | switch (ctm->type) { |
1824 | case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: | |
1825 | if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1826 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1827 | break; |
1828 | case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: | |
1829 | if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) | |
0f113f3e | 1830 | return 0; |
80770da3 EK |
1831 | break; |
1832 | default: | |
1833 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1834 | } |
1835 | ||
80770da3 EK |
1836 | /** |
1837 | * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more | |
1838 | * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. | |
1839 | * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. | |
1840 | */ | |
1841 | for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { | |
48102247 | 1842 | if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i])) |
f48b83b4 | 1843 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1844 | } |
48102247 | 1845 | if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z) |
f48b83b4 | 1846 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1847 | |
80770da3 EK |
1848 | /* |
1849 | * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no | |
1850 | * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, | |
1851 | * so we go through ASN.1 | |
1852 | */ | |
1853 | asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); | |
1854 | if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) | |
1855 | goto err; | |
1856 | if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) | |
1857 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1858 | |
80770da3 EK |
1859 | /* |
1860 | * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. | |
1861 | * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. | |
1862 | */ | |
1863 | ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; | |
1864 | ||
1865 | err: | |
1866 | ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); | |
1867 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e | 1868 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1869 | |
25d7cd1d DDO |
1870 | /* |
1871 | * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range, | |
1872 | * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start | |
1873 | */ | |
1874 | int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, | |
1875 | const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end) | |
1876 | { | |
1877 | time_t ref_time; | |
1878 | time_t *time = NULL; | |
1879 | unsigned long flags = vpm == NULL ? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm); | |
1880 | ||
1881 | if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
1882 | ref_time = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm); | |
1883 | time = &ref_time; | |
1884 | } else if ((flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0) { | |
1885 | return 0; /* this means ok */ | |
1886 | } /* else reference time is the current time */ | |
1887 | ||
1888 | if (end != NULL && X509_cmp_time(end, time) < 0) | |
1889 | return 1; | |
1890 | if (start != NULL && X509_cmp_time(start, time) > 0) | |
1891 | return -1; | |
1892 | return 0; | |
1893 | } | |
1894 | ||
284ef5f3 | 1895 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1896 | { |
0f113f3e | 1897 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1898 | } |
1899 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1900 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1901 | { |
1902 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1903 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1904 | |
1905 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1906 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1907 | { | |
1908 | time_t t; | |
1909 | ||
1910 | if (in_tm) | |
1911 | t = *in_tm; | |
1912 | else | |
1913 | time(&t); | |
1914 | ||
1915 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1916 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1917 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1918 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1919 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1922 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1923 | |
7e258a56 | 1924 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1925 | { |
1926 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1927 | int i, j; | |
1928 | ||
1929 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1930 | return 1; | |
1931 | ||
1932 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 1933 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e MC |
1934 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
1935 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1936 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1937 | return 0; | |
1938 | } | |
1939 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1940 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1941 | } |
1942 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1943 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1944 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1945 | return 0; | |
1946 | } | |
1947 | ||
1948 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1949 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 1950 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
0f113f3e | 1951 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
1952 | } |
1953 | ||
1954 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1955 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1956 | return 1; |
1957 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1958 | |
2e8cb108 DSH |
1959 | /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
1960 | ||
1961 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1962 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
1963 | { | |
1964 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
1965 | int i; | |
1966 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
1967 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
1968 | if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
1969 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
1970 | return NULL; | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
1973 | if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
1974 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
1975 | return NULL; | |
1976 | } | |
1977 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1978 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
1979 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
1980 | return NULL; | |
1981 | } | |
1982 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1983 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
1984 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
1985 | return NULL; | |
1986 | } | |
1987 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
1988 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
1989 | return NULL; | |
1990 | } | |
1991 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1992 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
1993 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
1994 | return NULL; | |
1995 | } | |
1996 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
1997 | if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
1998 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
1999 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
2000 | return NULL; | |
2001 | } | |
2002 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
2003 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
90945fa3 | 2004 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) |
0f113f3e MC |
2005 | goto memerr; |
2006 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
2007 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
2008 | goto memerr; | |
2009 | ||
568ce3a5 | 2010 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) |
0f113f3e | 2011 | goto memerr; |
568ce3a5 | 2012 | if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) |
0f113f3e MC |
2013 | goto memerr; |
2014 | ||
2015 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
2016 | ||
2017 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
2018 | goto memerr; | |
2019 | ||
2020 | /* | |
2021 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
2022 | * number to correct value too. | |
2023 | */ | |
2024 | ||
2025 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
2026 | X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
2027 | ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
2028 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
2029 | goto memerr; | |
2030 | } | |
2031 | ||
2032 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
2033 | ||
2034 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
2035 | ||
2036 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
2037 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
2038 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); | |
2039 | /* | |
2040 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
2041 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
2042 | */ | |
34a42e14 | 2043 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2044 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
2045 | if (!rvtmp) | |
2046 | goto memerr; | |
2047 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
2048 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
2049 | goto memerr; | |
2050 | } | |
2051 | } | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
2054 | ||
2055 | if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
2056 | goto memerr; | |
2057 | ||
2058 | return crl; | |
2059 | ||
2060 | memerr: | |
2061 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
222561fe | 2062 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
2063 | return NULL; |
2064 | } | |
2065 | ||
6b691a5c | 2066 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2067 | { |
2068 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2069 | } | |
58964a49 | 2070 | |
8cc86b81 | 2071 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2072 | { |
2073 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2074 | } | |
58964a49 | 2075 | |
8cc86b81 | 2076 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2077 | { |
2078 | return ctx->error; | |
2079 | } | |
58964a49 | 2080 | |
6b691a5c | 2081 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2082 | { |
2083 | ctx->error = err; | |
2084 | } | |
58964a49 | 2085 | |
8cc86b81 | 2086 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2087 | { |
2088 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2089 | } | |
58964a49 | 2090 | |
51227177 VD |
2091 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2092 | { | |
2093 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
2094 | } | |
2095 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2096 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2097 | { |
2098 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2099 | } | |
58964a49 | 2100 | |
c9654873 VD |
2101 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
2102 | { | |
2103 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
2104 | } | |
2105 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2106 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2107 | { |
2108 | return ctx->chain; | |
2109 | } | |
58964a49 | 2110 | |
8cc86b81 | 2111 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2112 | { |
2113 | if (!ctx->chain) | |
2114 | return NULL; | |
2115 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2116 | } | |
25f923dd | 2117 | |
8cc86b81 | 2118 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2119 | { |
2120 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2121 | } | |
2008e714 | 2122 | |
8cc86b81 | 2123 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2124 | { |
2125 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2126 | } | |
2008e714 | 2127 | |
8cc86b81 | 2128 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2129 | { |
2130 | return ctx->parent; | |
2131 | } | |
2008e714 | 2132 | |
6b691a5c | 2133 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2134 | { |
2135 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2136 | } | |
58964a49 | 2137 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2138 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2139 | { |
2140 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2141 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2142 | |
13938ace | 2143 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e | 2144 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2145 | /* |
2146 | * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? | |
2147 | * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust | |
2148 | * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). | |
2149 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2150 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
2151 | } | |
11262391 | 2152 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2153 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e | 2154 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2155 | /* |
2156 | * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default | |
2157 | * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. | |
2158 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2159 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
2160 | } | |
2161 | ||
2162 | /* | |
2163 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2164 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2165 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2166 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2167 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2168 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2169 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2170 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
2171 | */ |
2172 | ||
2173 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2174 | int purpose, int trust) |
2175 | { | |
2176 | int idx; | |
2177 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
12a765a5 | 2178 | if (purpose == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
2179 | purpose = def_purpose; |
2180 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
12a765a5 | 2181 | if (purpose != 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2182 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
2183 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
2184 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2185 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2186 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2187 | return 0; | |
2188 | } | |
2189 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2190 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2191 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
0daccd4d VD |
2192 | /* |
2193 | * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is | |
2194 | * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the | |
2195 | * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? | |
2196 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2197 | if (idx == -1) { |
2198 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2199 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2200 | return 0; | |
2201 | } | |
2202 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2203 | } | |
2204 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
2205 | if (!trust) | |
2206 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
2207 | } | |
2208 | if (trust) { | |
2209 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
2210 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2211 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2212 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
2213 | return 0; | |
2214 | } | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
2217 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
2218 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
2219 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
2220 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
2221 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2222 | } |
2223 | ||
1143c27b MC |
2224 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, |
2225 | const char *propq) | |
2f043896 | 2226 | { |
b51bce94 | 2227 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2228 | |
90945fa3 | 2229 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
1143c27b | 2230 | X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0f113f3e MC |
2231 | return NULL; |
2232 | } | |
1143c27b MC |
2233 | |
2234 | ctx->libctx = libctx; | |
2235 | if (propq != NULL) { | |
2236 | ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq); | |
2237 | if (ctx->propq == NULL) { | |
2238 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2239 | X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2240 | return NULL; | |
2241 | } | |
2242 | } | |
2243 | ||
0f113f3e | 2244 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2245 | } |
2246 | ||
1143c27b MC |
2247 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2248 | { | |
2249 | return X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(NULL, NULL); | |
2250 | } | |
2251 | ||
2252 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2253 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2254 | { | |
c001ce33 | 2255 | if (ctx == NULL) |
222561fe | 2256 | return; |
c001ce33 | 2257 | |
0f113f3e | 2258 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
1143c27b MC |
2259 | |
2260 | /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */ | |
2261 | OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); | |
2262 | ||
0f113f3e | 2263 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
2264 | } |
2265 | ||
79aa04ef | 2266 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2267 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2268 | { | |
2269 | int ret = 1; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2270 | |
faa9dcd4 | 2271 | ctx->store = store; |
0f113f3e MC |
2272 | ctx->cert = x509; |
2273 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2274 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2275 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2276 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2277 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2278 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2279 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2280 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2281 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2282 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2283 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2284 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2285 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2286 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2287 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2288 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2289 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
170b7358 | 2290 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2291 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2292 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2293 | |
7b7eb472 VD |
2294 | /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ |
2295 | if (store) | |
0f113f3e | 2296 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
7b7eb472 | 2297 | else |
0f113f3e MC |
2298 | ctx->cleanup = 0; |
2299 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2300 | if (store && store->check_issued) |
2301 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2302 | else | |
2303 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2304 | ||
2305 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2306 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2307 | else | |
2308 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2309 | ||
2310 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2311 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2312 | else | |
2313 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2314 | ||
2315 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2316 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2317 | else | |
2318 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2319 | ||
2320 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2321 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2322 | else | |
2323 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2324 | ||
2325 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2326 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
311f2785 VD |
2327 | else |
2328 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2329 | |
2330 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2331 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2332 | else | |
2333 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2334 | ||
2335 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2336 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2337 | else | |
2338 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2339 | ||
0a5fe2eb RL |
2340 | if (store && store->check_policy) |
2341 | ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; | |
2342 | else | |
2343 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2344 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2345 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) |
2346 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2347 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2348 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; |
0f113f3e MC |
2349 | |
2350 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2351 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2352 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2353 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; |
0f113f3e | 2354 | |
ecdaa1ae | 2355 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2356 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
2357 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2358 | goto err; | |
2359 | } | |
2360 | ||
2361 | /* | |
2362 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2363 | */ | |
2364 | if (store) | |
2365 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2366 | else | |
2367 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2368 | ||
2369 | if (ret) | |
2370 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2371 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2372 | ||
2373 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2374 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2375 | goto err; | |
2376 | } | |
2377 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
2378 | /* |
2379 | * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the | |
2380 | * purpose if this still yields the default value. | |
2381 | */ | |
2382 | if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2383 | int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); | |
2384 | X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2385 | ||
2386 | if (xp != NULL) | |
2387 | ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); | |
2388 | } | |
2389 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2390 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2391 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2392 | return 1; | |
2393 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
ecdaa1ae | 2394 | |
d9b8b89b | 2395 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2396 | /* |
2397 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2398 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2399 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2400 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2401 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2402 | } |
2403 | ||
2404 | /* | |
2405 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2406 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 | 2407 | */ |
f0e0fd51 | 2408 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2f043896 | 2409 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
2410 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2411 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
c864e761 | 2412 | ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; |
2f043896 DSH |
2413 | } |
2414 | ||
2415 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2416 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2417 | /* |
2418 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2419 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2420 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2421 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2422 | */ | |
2423 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ | |
2424 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { | |
0f113f3e | 2425 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2426 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2427 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2428 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2429 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2430 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2431 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2432 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2433 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2434 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2435 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2436 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2437 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2438 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2439 | } |
13938ace | 2440 | |
5d7c222d | 2441 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2442 | { |
2443 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2444 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2445 | |
5d7c222d | 2446 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2447 | { |
2448 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2449 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2450 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2451 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2452 | time_t t) | |
2453 | { | |
2454 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2455 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2456 | |
8cc86b81 | 2457 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2458 | { |
2459 | return ctx->cert; | |
2460 | } | |
2461 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2462 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2463 | { |
2464 | return ctx->untrusted; | |
2465 | } | |
2466 | ||
2467 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2468 | { | |
2469 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2470 | } | |
2471 | ||
2472 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2473 | { | |
2474 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2475 | ctx->chain = sk; | |
2476 | } | |
2477 | ||
db089ad6 | 2478 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
f0e0fd51 | 2479 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) |
0f113f3e MC |
2480 | { |
2481 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2482 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2483 | |
8cc86b81 | 2484 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2485 | { |
2486 | return ctx->verify_cb; | |
2487 | } | |
2488 | ||
4a7b3a7b VD |
2489 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
2490 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) | |
2491 | { | |
2492 | ctx->verify = verify; | |
2493 | } | |
2494 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2495 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2496 | { |
1060a50b | 2497 | return ctx->verify; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2498 | } |
2499 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2500 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2501 | { |
1060a50b | 2502 | return ctx->get_issuer; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2503 | } |
2504 | ||
8cc86b81 DDO |
2505 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn |
2506 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
4dba585f | 2507 | { |
1060a50b | 2508 | return ctx->check_issued; |
4dba585f DSH |
2509 | } |
2510 | ||
8cc86b81 DDO |
2511 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn |
2512 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
f0e0fd51 | 2513 | { |
1060a50b | 2514 | return ctx->check_revocation; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2515 | } |
2516 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2517 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2518 | { |
1060a50b | 2519 | return ctx->get_crl; |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2520 | } |
2521 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2522 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
f0e0fd51 | 2523 | { |
1060a50b RL |
2524 | return ctx->check_crl; |
2525 | } | |
2526 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2527 | X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2528 | { |
2529 | return ctx->cert_crl; | |
2530 | } | |
2531 | ||
8cc86b81 DDO |
2532 | X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn |
2533 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1060a50b RL |
2534 | { |
2535 | return ctx->check_policy; | |
2536 | } | |
2537 | ||
8cc86b81 DDO |
2538 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn |
2539 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1060a50b RL |
2540 | { |
2541 | return ctx->lookup_certs; | |
2542 | } | |
2543 | ||
8cc86b81 DDO |
2544 | X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn |
2545 | X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1060a50b RL |
2546 | { |
2547 | return ctx->lookup_crls; | |
2548 | } | |
2549 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2550 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1060a50b RL |
2551 | { |
2552 | return ctx->cleanup; | |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2553 | } |
2554 | ||
8cc86b81 | 2555 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2556 | { |
2557 | return ctx->tree; | |
2558 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2559 | |
8cc86b81 | 2560 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2561 | { |
2562 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2563 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2564 | |
8cc86b81 | 2565 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
7f3f41d8 | 2566 | { |
d9b8b89b | 2567 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2568 | } |
2569 | ||
5d7c222d | 2570 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2571 | { |
2572 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
12a765a5 | 2573 | |
0f113f3e | 2574 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); |
12a765a5 | 2575 | if (param == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
2576 | return 0; |
2577 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2578 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2579 | |
8cc86b81 | 2580 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2581 | { |
2582 | return ctx->param; | |
2583 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2584 | |
2585 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2586 | { |
222561fe | 2587 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2588 | ctx->param = param; |
2589 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2590 | |
b9aec69a | 2591 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) |
919ba009 VD |
2592 | { |
2593 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2594 | } | |
2595 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2596 | static unsigned char *dane_i2d( |
2597 | X509 *cert, | |
2598 | uint8_t selector, | |
2599 | unsigned int *i2dlen) | |
2600 | { | |
2601 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
2602 | int len; | |
2603 | ||
2604 | /* | |
2605 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
2606 | */ | |
2607 | switch (selector) { | |
2608 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
2609 | len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); | |
2610 | break; | |
2611 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
2612 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); | |
2613 | break; | |
2614 | default: | |
2615 | X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
2616 | return NULL; | |
2617 | } | |
2618 | ||
2619 | if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { | |
2620 | X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2621 | return NULL; | |
2622 | } | |
2623 | ||
2624 | *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
2625 | return buf; | |
2626 | } | |
2627 | ||
2628 | #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ | |
2629 | ||
2630 | static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
2631 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2632 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2633 | unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; |
2634 | unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2635 | unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2636 | unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2637 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
2638 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
2639 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2640 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; | |
2641 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
2642 | int i; | |
2643 | int recnum; | |
2644 | int matched = 0; | |
2645 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
2646 | uint32_t mask; | |
2647 | ||
2648 | mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; | |
2649 | ||
2650 | /* | |
2651 | * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) | |
2652 | */ | |
2653 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
2654 | mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2655 | ||
2656 | /* | |
2657 | * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any | |
02e112a8 | 2658 | * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. |
170b7358 VD |
2659 | * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. |
2660 | */ | |
2661 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
2662 | mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2663 | ||
2664 | /*- | |
2665 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 | |
2666 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 | |
2667 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 | |
2668 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 | |
2669 | * | |
2670 | * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building | |
2671 | * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with | |
2672 | * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which | |
2673 | * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). | |
2674 | * | |
2675 | * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX | |
2676 | * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest | |
2677 | * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. | |
2678 | * | |
2679 | * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we | |
2680 | * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers | |
2681 | * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch | |
2682 | * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", | |
2683 | * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public | |
2684 | * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" | |
2685 | * or multiple "3 0 1" records. | |
2686 | * | |
2687 | * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either | |
2688 | * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after | |
0d4fb843 | 2689 | * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is |
170b7358 VD |
2690 | * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. |
2691 | */ | |
2692 | recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; | |
2693 | for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2694 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2695 | if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) | |
2696 | continue; | |
2697 | if (t->usage != usage) { | |
2698 | usage = t->usage; | |
2699 | ||
2700 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2701 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2702 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2703 | } | |
2704 | if (t->selector != selector) { | |
2705 | selector = t->selector; | |
2706 | ||
2707 | /* Update per-selector state */ | |
2708 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2709 | i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); | |
2710 | if (i2dbuf == NULL) | |
2711 | return -1; | |
2712 | ||
2713 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2714 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2715 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2716 | } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
2717 | /*- | |
2718 | * Digest agility: | |
2719 | * | |
2720 | * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9> | |
2721 | * | |
2722 | * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the | |
2723 | * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals | |
2724 | * other than "Full". | |
2725 | */ | |
2726 | if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) | |
2727 | continue; | |
2728 | } | |
2729 | ||
2730 | /* | |
2731 | * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant | |
2732 | * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. | |
2733 | */ | |
2734 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
2735 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
2736 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; | |
2737 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
2738 | ||
2739 | if (md != NULL) { | |
dccd20d1 F |
2740 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; |
2741 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
2742 | matched = -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
2743 | break; |
2744 | } | |
2745 | } | |
2746 | } | |
2747 | ||
2748 | /* | |
2749 | * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any | |
2750 | * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a | |
2751 | * full chain. | |
2752 | */ | |
2753 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && | |
2754 | memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
2755 | if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) | |
2756 | matched = 1; | |
2757 | if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { | |
2758 | dane->mdpth = depth; | |
2759 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2760 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); | |
2761 | dane->mcert = cert; | |
2762 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
2763 | } | |
2764 | break; | |
2765 | } | |
2766 | } | |
2767 | ||
2768 | /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ | |
2769 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2770 | return matched; | |
2771 | } | |
2772 | ||
2773 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
2774 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2775 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2776 | int matched = 0; |
2777 | X509 *cert; | |
2778 | ||
2779 | if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) | |
2780 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2781 | ||
2782 | /* | |
89ff989d | 2783 | * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if |
170b7358 VD |
2784 | * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking |
2785 | * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). | |
2786 | */ | |
2787 | cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
2788 | if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) | |
2789 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2790 | if (matched > 0) { | |
2791 | ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; | |
2792 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2793 | } | |
2794 | ||
2795 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2796 | } | |
2797 | ||
2798 | static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2799 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2800 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2801 | danetls_record *t; |
2802 | int num = ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2803 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2804 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
2805 | int i; | |
2806 | ||
2807 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2808 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2809 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || | |
2810 | t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || | |
2811 | t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || | |
2812 | X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) | |
2813 | continue; | |
2814 | ||
c0a445a9 | 2815 | /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ |
170b7358 VD |
2816 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2817 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2818 | ||
2819 | /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ | |
2820 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; | |
2821 | dane->mdpth = num - 1; | |
2822 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2823 | ||
2824 | /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ | |
2825 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2826 | for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) | |
2827 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2828 | ||
2829 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2830 | } | |
2831 | ||
2832 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2833 | } | |
2834 | ||
b9aec69a | 2835 | static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) |
170b7358 VD |
2836 | { |
2837 | /* | |
2838 | * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. | |
2839 | */ | |
2840 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
2841 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2842 | dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
2843 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2844 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
2845 | } | |
2846 | ||
6e328256 VD |
2847 | static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
2848 | { | |
2849 | int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); | |
2850 | ||
2851 | if (err == X509_V_OK) | |
2852 | return 1; | |
70dd3c65 | 2853 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err); |
6e328256 VD |
2854 | } |
2855 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2856 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2857 | { | |
2858 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; | |
b9aec69a | 2859 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2860 | int matched; |
2861 | int done; | |
2862 | ||
2863 | dane_reset(dane); | |
2864 | ||
89ff989d VD |
2865 | /*- |
2866 | * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, | |
2867 | * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) | |
2868 | * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the | |
2869 | * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor. | |
2870 | * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done | |
2871 | * if: | |
2872 | * + matched < 0, internal error. | |
2873 | * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record | |
2874 | * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no | |
2875 | * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. | |
2876 | */ | |
170b7358 VD |
2877 | matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); |
2878 | done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); | |
2879 | ||
2880 | if (done) | |
2881 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
2882 | ||
2883 | if (matched > 0) { | |
70dd3c65 | 2884 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
6e328256 VD |
2885 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2886 | return 0; | |
5ae4ceb9 VD |
2887 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
2888 | if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && | |
2889 | !check_id(ctx)) | |
2890 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2891 | /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ |
170b7358 VD |
2892 | ctx->error_depth = 0; |
2893 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
6e328256 | 2894 | return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
2895 | } |
2896 | ||
2897 | if (matched < 0) { | |
2898 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2899 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
2900 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
2901 | return -1; | |
2902 | } | |
2903 | ||
2904 | if (done) { | |
2905 | /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ | |
6e328256 VD |
2906 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2907 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2908 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
170b7358 VD |
2909 | } |
2910 | ||
2911 | /* | |
2912 | * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 | |
2913 | * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. | |
2914 | */ | |
2915 | return verify_chain(ctx); | |
2916 | } | |
2917 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
2918 | /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */ |
2919 | static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
2920 | { | |
2921 | STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; | |
2922 | int ok; | |
2923 | ||
2924 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2925 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); | |
2926 | ctx->chain = saved_chain; | |
2927 | ||
2928 | return ok; | |
2929 | } | |
2930 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2931 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2932 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2933 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2934 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
2935 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
0c56a648 | 2936 | int ss; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2937 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; |
2938 | unsigned int search; | |
170b7358 | 2939 | int may_trusted = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2940 | int may_alternate = 0; |
2941 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2942 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
2943 | int depth; | |
2944 | int ok = 0; | |
2945 | int i; | |
2946 | ||
2947 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
24664a3b MC |
2948 | if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) { |
2949 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2950 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2951 | return 0; | |
2952 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2953 | |
0c56a648 MC |
2954 | ss = cert_self_signed(ctx, cert); |
2955 | if (ss < 0) { | |
2956 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2957 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
2958 | return 0; | |
2959 | } | |
2960 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2961 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ |
2962 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
2963 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
2964 | /* | |
2965 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. | |
170b7358 VD |
2966 | * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the |
2967 | * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, | |
2968 | * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain | |
2969 | * if no luck with untrusted first. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2970 | */ |
2971 | search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; | |
170b7358 VD |
2972 | if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { |
2973 | if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) | |
2974 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
2975 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
2976 | may_alternate = 1; | |
2977 | may_trusted = 1; | |
2978 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2979 | |
2980 | /* | |
2981 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
2982 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make | |
2983 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
2984 | */ | |
2985 | if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
2986 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 2987 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2988 | return 0; |
2989 | } | |
2990 | ||
69664d6a VD |
2991 | /* |
2992 | * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add | |
2993 | * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the | |
2994 | * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with | |
2995 | * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create | |
2996 | * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE | |
2997 | * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack | |
2998 | * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for | |
2999 | * this to change. ] | |
3000 | */ | |
170b7358 | 3001 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) { |
69664d6a VD |
3002 | if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
3003 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 3004 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
69664d6a VD |
3005 | return 0; |
3006 | } | |
170b7358 VD |
3007 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) { |
3008 | if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) { | |
3009 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
3010 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 3011 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
170b7358 VD |
3012 | return 0; |
3013 | } | |
3014 | } | |
3015 | } | |
3016 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
3017 | /* |
3018 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
3019 | * might be reasonable. | |
3020 | */ | |
3021 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) | |
3022 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; | |
3023 | ||
3024 | /* | |
3025 | * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. | |
3026 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, | |
3027 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
3028 | */ | |
3029 | depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; | |
3030 | ||
3031 | while (search != 0) { | |
3032 | X509 *x; | |
3033 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
3034 | ||
3035 | /* | |
3036 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3037 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we |
3038 | * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point | |
3039 | * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. | |
3040 | * | |
3041 | * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the | |
3042 | * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last | |
3043 | * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, | |
3044 | * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer | |
3045 | * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be | |
3046 | * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain | |
3047 | * would be a-priori too long. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3048 | */ |
3049 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3050 | i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3051 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
3052 | /* | |
3053 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
3054 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
3055 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
3056 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
3057 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
3058 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
3059 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
3060 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
3061 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
3062 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
3063 | * | |
3064 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
3065 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
3066 | */ | |
3067 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
3068 | } | |
3069 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); | |
3070 | ||
fbb82a60 | 3071 | ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3072 | |
3073 | if (ok < 0) { | |
3074 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 3075 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3076 | search = 0; |
3077 | continue; | |
3078 | } | |
3079 | ||
3080 | if (ok > 0) { | |
3081 | /* | |
3082 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
3083 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
3084 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
3085 | * that despite the current trust-store match we might still | |
3086 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which | |
3087 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try | |
3088 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
3089 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
170b7358 VD |
3090 | * |
3091 | * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust | |
3092 | * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted | |
3093 | * certificate among the ones from the trust store. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3094 | */ |
3095 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
24664a3b MC |
3096 | if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) { |
3097 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3098 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
3099 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
3100 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3101 | search = 0; | |
3102 | continue; | |
3103 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3104 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; |
3105 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
3106 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
3107 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
170b7358 VD |
3108 | |
3109 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3110 | dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
3111 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
3112 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
3113 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
3114 | } | |
3115 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3116 | dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
3117 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3118 | } |
3119 | ||
3120 | /* | |
3121 | * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their | |
3122 | * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. | |
3123 | */ | |
3124 | if (ss == 0) { | |
3125 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { | |
3126 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
3127 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3128 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 3129 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3130 | search = 0; |
3131 | continue; | |
3132 | } | |
0c56a648 MC |
3133 | ss = cert_self_signed(ctx, x); |
3134 | if (ss < 0) { | |
3135 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3136 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3137 | return 0; | |
3138 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3139 | } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { |
3140 | /* | |
3141 | * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same | |
3142 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as | |
3143 | * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
3144 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. | |
3145 | */ | |
3146 | if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { | |
3147 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ | |
3148 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
3149 | ok = 0; | |
3150 | } else { | |
3151 | X509_free(x); | |
3152 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; | |
3153 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); | |
3154 | } | |
3155 | } | |
3156 | ||
3157 | /* | |
3158 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck | |
3159 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. | |
3160 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
3161 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
170b7358 VD |
3162 | * |
3163 | * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the | |
3164 | * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE | |
3165 | * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from | |
3166 | * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the | |
3167 | * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted | |
3168 | * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3169 | */ |
3170 | if (ok) { | |
24664a3b MC |
3171 | if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) { |
3172 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3173 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
3174 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3175 | search = 0; | |
3176 | continue; | |
3177 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3178 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; |
3179 | switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { | |
3180 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3181 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
3182 | search = 0; | |
3183 | continue; | |
3184 | } | |
3185 | if (ss == 0) | |
3186 | continue; | |
3187 | } | |
3188 | } | |
3189 | ||
3190 | /* | |
3191 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
3192 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
3193 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
3194 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
3195 | */ | |
3196 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
3197 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
3198 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
3199 | continue; | |
3200 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
3201 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
3202 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
3203 | break; | |
3204 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
3205 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
3206 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
3207 | ss = 0; | |
3208 | } | |
3209 | } | |
3210 | ||
3211 | /* | |
3212 | * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates | |
3213 | */ | |
3214 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
3215 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
24664a3b MC |
3216 | if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) { |
3217 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3218 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
3219 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3220 | search = 0; | |
3221 | continue; | |
3222 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 3223 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3224 | |
3225 | /* | |
3226 | * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more | |
3227 | * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
3228 | */ | |
fbb82a60 | 3229 | xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3230 | if (xtmp == NULL) { |
3231 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
3232 | if (may_trusted) | |
3233 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
3234 | continue; | |
3235 | } | |
3236 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3237 | /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ |
3238 | (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); | |
3239 | ||
3240 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3241 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3242 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 3243 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3244 | search = 0; |
3245 | continue; | |
3246 | } | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3247 | |
3248 | X509_up_ref(x = xtmp); | |
d9b8b89b | 3249 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; |
0c56a648 MC |
3250 | ss = cert_self_signed(ctx, xtmp); |
3251 | if (ss < 0) { | |
3252 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3253 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
3254 | return 0; | |
3255 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 3256 | |
170b7358 VD |
3257 | /* |
3258 | * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. | |
3259 | */ | |
3260 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) { | |
3261 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3262 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
3263 | search = 0; | |
3264 | continue; | |
3265 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3266 | } |
3267 | } | |
3268 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
3269 | ||
3270 | /* | |
170b7358 VD |
3271 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key |
3272 | * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
d9b8b89b | 3273 | */ |
497ecc0d VD |
3274 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3275 | if (num <= depth) { | |
170b7358 VD |
3276 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) |
3277 | trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); | |
497ecc0d VD |
3278 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) |
3279 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3280 | } |
3281 | ||
3282 | switch (trust) { | |
3283 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3284 | return 1; | |
3285 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
70dd3c65 | 3286 | /* Callback already issued */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
3287 | return 0; |
3288 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
3289 | default: | |
3290 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
d9b8b89b | 3291 | if (num > depth) |
70dd3c65 VD |
3292 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, |
3293 | X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); | |
3294 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3295 | (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0)) | |
3296 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); | |
3297 | if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
3298 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3299 | X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT); | |
3300 | if (ss) | |
3301 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3302 | X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); | |
3303 | if (ctx->num_untrusted < num) | |
3304 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3305 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT); | |
3306 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3307 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3308 | } |
3309 | } | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3310 | |
3311 | static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; | |
3312 | static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); | |
3313 | ||
3314 | /* | |
3315 | * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of | |
3316 | * ``ctx``. | |
3317 | * | |
3318 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3319 | */ | |
3320 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3321 | { | |
3322 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); | |
3323 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3324 | ||
baba1545 KG |
3325 | /* |
3326 | * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public | |
3327 | * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the | |
3328 | * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security | |
3329 | * floor. | |
3330 | */ | |
3331 | if (level <= 0) | |
3332 | return 1; | |
3333 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3334 | /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ |
3335 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3336 | return 0; | |
3337 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3338 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) |
3339 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3340 | ||
3341 | return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3342 | } | |
3343 | ||
3344 | /* | |
3345 | * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security | |
3346 | * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether | |
3347 | * self-signed or otherwise). | |
3348 | * | |
3349 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3350 | */ | |
3351 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3352 | { | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3353 | int secbits = -1; |
3354 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3355 | ||
3356 | if (level <= 0) | |
3357 | return 1; | |
3358 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) | |
3359 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3360 | ||
c3c8823c DSH |
3361 | if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) |
3362 | return 0; | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3363 | |
3364 | return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3365 | } |