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b1322259 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
d02b48c6 | 3 | * |
b1322259 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
d02b48c6 RE |
8 | */ |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
11 | #include <time.h> | |
12 | #include <errno.h> | |
d9b8b89b | 13 | #include <limits.h> |
d02b48c6 | 14 | |
b39fc560 | 15 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 16 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
17 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 22 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 23 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
919ba009 | 24 | #include <internal/dane.h> |
d9b8b89b | 25 | #include <internal/x509_int.h> |
6c21b860 | 26 | #include "x509_lcl.h" |
d02b48c6 | 27 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
28 | /* CRL score values */ |
29 | ||
30 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
31 | ||
0f113f3e | 32 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
33 | |
34 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
35 | ||
0f113f3e | 36 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
37 | |
38 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
39 | ||
0f113f3e | 40 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
41 | |
42 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
43 | ||
0f113f3e | 44 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
45 | |
46 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
47 | ||
48 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
49 | ||
50 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
51 | ||
0f113f3e | 52 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
53 | |
54 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
55 | ||
0f113f3e | 56 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
57 | |
58 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
59 | ||
0f113f3e | 60 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
61 | |
62 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
63 | ||
0f113f3e | 64 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 65 | |
d9b8b89b VD |
66 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
67 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
170b7358 | 68 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
0f113f3e | 69 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
70 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
71 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 72 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 73 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 74 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d9b8b89b | 75 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); |
b545dc67 DSH |
76 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
77 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 78 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 79 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
170b7358 | 80 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); |
fbb82a60 VD |
81 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); |
82 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); | |
4b96839f DSH |
83 | |
84 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 85 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 86 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
87 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
88 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
89 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
90 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
91 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
92 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 93 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 94 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
95 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
96 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
97 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
98 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 99 | |
d02b48c6 | 100 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 101 | |
6b691a5c | 102 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
103 | { |
104 | return ok; | |
105 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 106 | |
2da2ff50 DSH |
107 | /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ |
108 | static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 109 | { |
d9b8b89b VD |
110 | /* |
111 | * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not | |
112 | * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are | |
113 | * parse errors, rather than memory pressure! | |
114 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
115 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
116 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) | |
117 | return 1; | |
118 | else | |
119 | return 0; | |
120 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 121 | |
2dabd822 DSH |
122 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
123 | ||
124 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
125 | { |
126 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
127 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
128 | int i; | |
129 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
130 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
131 | if (certs == NULL) | |
132 | return NULL; | |
133 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
134 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
135 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
136 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
137 | break; | |
138 | } | |
139 | if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
05f0fb9f | 140 | X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
141 | else |
142 | xtmp = NULL; | |
143 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
144 | return xtmp; | |
145 | } | |
2dabd822 | 146 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
147 | /*- |
148 | * Inform the verify callback of an error. | |
149 | * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at | |
150 | * B<depth>. | |
151 | * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave | |
152 | * unchanged (presumably set by the caller). | |
153 | * | |
154 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
155 | */ | |
156 | static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) | |
157 | { | |
158 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
159 | ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
160 | if (err != X509_V_OK) | |
161 | ctx->error = err; | |
162 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
163 | } | |
164 | ||
165 | /*- | |
166 | * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the | |
167 | * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error | |
168 | * number. | |
169 | * | |
170 | * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. | |
171 | */ | |
172 | static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
173 | { | |
174 | ctx->error = err; | |
175 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
176 | } | |
177 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
178 | static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
179 | { | |
180 | int i; | |
181 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
182 | ||
183 | if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) | |
184 | return 1; | |
185 | ||
186 | for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
187 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
188 | ||
189 | /* | |
190 | * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only | |
191 | * check the security of issuer keys. | |
192 | */ | |
193 | if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) && | |
194 | verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0) | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | /* | |
197 | * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates | |
198 | * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. | |
199 | */ | |
200 | if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) && | |
201 | verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0) | |
202 | return 0; | |
203 | } | |
204 | return 1; | |
205 | } | |
206 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
207 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
208 | { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
209 | int err; |
210 | int ok; | |
211 | ||
212 | /* | |
213 | * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, | |
214 | * instantiate chain public key parameters. | |
215 | */ | |
216 | if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || | |
217 | (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || | |
fbb82a60 | 218 | (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 || |
d9b8b89b VD |
219 | (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 || |
220 | (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) | |
221 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
222 | if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) | |
223 | return ok; | |
224 | ||
225 | err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
226 | ctx->param->flags); | |
227 | if (err != X509_V_OK) { | |
70dd3c65 | 228 | if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
229 | return ok; |
230 | } | |
231 | ||
232 | /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ | |
233 | ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); | |
234 | if (!ok) | |
235 | return ok; | |
236 | ||
237 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 | |
238 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
9021a5df | 239 | if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b | 240 | return ok; |
9021a5df | 241 | if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) |
d9b8b89b VD |
242 | return ok; |
243 | #endif | |
244 | ||
245 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
246 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) | |
247 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
248 | return ok; | |
249 | } | |
250 | ||
6b691a5c | 251 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 252 | { |
b9aec69a | 253 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
f3e235ed | 254 | int ret; |
d9b8b89b | 255 | |
0f113f3e MC |
256 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { |
257 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
f3e235ed | 258 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
0f113f3e MC |
259 | return -1; |
260 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 261 | |
aae41f8c MC |
262 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
263 | /* | |
264 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
265 | * cannot do another one. | |
266 | */ | |
267 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
f3e235ed | 268 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; |
aae41f8c MC |
269 | return -1; |
270 | } | |
0f113f3e | 271 | |
0f113f3e MC |
272 | /* |
273 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
274 | * the first entry is in place | |
275 | */ | |
aae41f8c MC |
276 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
277 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
278 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 279 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b | 280 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 281 | } |
05f0fb9f | 282 | X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); |
d9b8b89b | 283 | ctx->num_untrusted = 1; |
5d7c222d | 284 | |
fbb82a60 VD |
285 | /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ |
286 | if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) && | |
287 | !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL)) | |
288 | return 0; | |
289 | ||
f3e235ed VD |
290 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
291 | ret = dane_verify(ctx); | |
292 | else | |
293 | ret = verify_chain(ctx); | |
294 | ||
170b7358 | 295 | /* |
f3e235ed VD |
296 | * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, |
297 | * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored | |
298 | * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). | |
170b7358 | 299 | */ |
f3e235ed VD |
300 | if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) |
301 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
302 | return ret; | |
0f113f3e MC |
303 | } |
304 | ||
305 | /* | |
306 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 | 307 | */ |
2f043896 DSH |
308 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) |
309 | { | |
0f113f3e | 310 | int i; |
fbb82a60 | 311 | |
0f113f3e | 312 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { |
fbb82a60 VD |
313 | X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
314 | ||
315 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | |
316 | continue; | |
317 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1)) | |
318 | return issuer; | |
0f113f3e | 319 | } |
fbb82a60 | 320 | return NULL; |
2f043896 DSH |
321 | } |
322 | ||
323 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
324 | ||
325 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
326 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
327 | int ret; |
328 | if (x == issuer) | |
329 | return cert_self_signed(x); | |
330 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
331 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) { | |
332 | int i; | |
333 | X509 *ch; | |
334 | /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ | |
335 | if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
336 | return 1; | |
337 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
338 | ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
339 | if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { | |
340 | ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; | |
341 | break; | |
342 | } | |
343 | } | |
344 | } | |
345 | ||
d33def66 | 346 | return (ret == X509_V_OK); |
2f043896 DSH |
347 | } |
348 | ||
349 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
350 | ||
351 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
352 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
353 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
354 | if (*issuer) { | |
05f0fb9f | 355 | X509_up_ref(*issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
356 | return 1; |
357 | } else | |
358 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 359 | } |
2f043896 | 360 | |
c864e761 DSH |
361 | static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) |
362 | { | |
363 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
364 | X509 *x; | |
365 | int i; | |
366 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { | |
367 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); | |
368 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { | |
369 | if (sk == NULL) | |
370 | sk = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
371 | if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) { | |
372 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
373 | return NULL; | |
374 | } | |
375 | X509_up_ref(x); | |
376 | } | |
377 | } | |
378 | return sk; | |
379 | } | |
380 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
381 | /* |
382 | * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local | |
383 | * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. | |
384 | */ | |
385 | static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, | |
386 | int must_be_ca) | |
387 | { | |
0daccd4d VD |
388 | int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
389 | ||
390 | /* | |
391 | * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust | |
33cc5dde | 392 | * settings trump the purpose constraints. |
0daccd4d VD |
393 | * |
394 | * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in | |
395 | * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in | |
396 | * ctx->param->purpose! | |
397 | * | |
398 | * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from | |
399 | * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets | |
400 | * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however | |
401 | * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value | |
402 | * via the X509_PURPOSE API. | |
403 | * | |
404 | * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're | |
405 | * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is | |
33cc5dde | 406 | * also set. |
0daccd4d VD |
407 | */ |
408 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) | |
409 | tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); | |
410 | ||
33cc5dde VD |
411 | switch (tr_ok) { |
412 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
0daccd4d | 413 | return 1; |
33cc5dde VD |
414 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: |
415 | break; | |
416 | default: | |
417 | switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { | |
418 | case 1: | |
419 | return 1; | |
420 | case 0: | |
421 | break; | |
422 | default: | |
423 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) | |
424 | return 1; | |
425 | } | |
426 | break; | |
427 | } | |
0daccd4d | 428 | |
70dd3c65 | 429 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
0daccd4d VD |
430 | } |
431 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
432 | /* |
433 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
434 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
435 | */ |
436 | ||
30b415b0 | 437 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 438 | { |
0daccd4d | 439 | int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 440 | X509 *x; |
0f113f3e MC |
441 | int proxy_path_length = 0; |
442 | int purpose; | |
443 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
0daccd4d | 444 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
0f113f3e | 445 | |
35a1cc90 MC |
446 | /*- |
447 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
448 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
449 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
450 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
451 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
452 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
453 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
454 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
455 | must_be_ca = -1; |
456 | ||
457 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
458 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
459 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
460 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
461 | } else { | |
462 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
463 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
464 | /* | |
465 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
466 | * happy | |
467 | */ | |
468 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
469 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
470 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
471 | } | |
472 | ||
0daccd4d | 473 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
0f113f3e MC |
474 | int ret; |
475 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
476 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
477 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
478 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
479 | X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)) | |
0daccd4d | 480 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
481 | } |
482 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
483 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
484 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED)) | |
0daccd4d | 485 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
486 | } |
487 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
488 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
489 | case -1: | |
490 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
491 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
492 | ret = 0; | |
493 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
494 | } else | |
495 | ret = 1; | |
496 | break; | |
497 | case 0: | |
498 | if (ret != 0) { | |
499 | ret = 0; | |
500 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
501 | } else | |
502 | ret = 1; | |
503 | break; | |
504 | default: | |
4d9e33ac | 505 | /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ |
0f113f3e | 506 | if ((ret == 0) |
4d9e33ac | 507 | || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) |
0f113f3e MC |
508 | && (ret != 1))) { |
509 | ret = 0; | |
510 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
511 | } else | |
512 | ret = 1; | |
513 | break; | |
514 | } | |
70dd3c65 VD |
515 | if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK)) |
516 | return 0; | |
517 | /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ | |
518 | if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) | |
519 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
520 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ |
521 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
522 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
523 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
70dd3c65 | 524 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) |
0daccd4d | 525 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
526 | } |
527 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
528 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
529 | plen++; | |
530 | /* | |
531 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
532 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
533 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
534 | */ | |
535 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
536 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
537 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
538 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) | |
0daccd4d | 539 | return 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
540 | } |
541 | proxy_path_length++; | |
542 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
543 | } else | |
544 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
545 | } | |
0daccd4d | 546 | return 1; |
11262391 DSH |
547 | } |
548 | ||
e9746e03 | 549 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 550 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
551 | int i; |
552 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
553 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ |
554 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
555 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
556 | int j; | |
557 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
558 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ |
559 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
560 | continue; | |
c8223538 RL |
561 | |
562 | /* | |
563 | * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the | |
564 | * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry | |
565 | * added. | |
566 | * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) | |
567 | */ | |
568 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
569 | X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); | |
570 | X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
571 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; | |
572 | int last_object_nid = 0; | |
573 | int err = X509_V_OK; | |
574 | int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; | |
575 | ||
576 | /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ | |
577 | if (last_object_loc < 1) { | |
578 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
579 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
580 | } | |
581 | ||
582 | /* | |
583 | * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as | |
584 | * there is in issuer. | |
585 | */ | |
586 | if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) | |
587 | != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { | |
588 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
589 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | /* | |
593 | * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a | |
594 | * multivalued RDN | |
595 | */ | |
596 | if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, | |
597 | last_object_loc)) | |
598 | == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, | |
599 | last_object_loc - 1))) { | |
600 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
601 | goto proxy_name_done; | |
602 | } | |
603 | ||
604 | /* | |
605 | * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that | |
606 | * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly | |
607 | */ | |
608 | tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); | |
609 | if (tmpsubject == NULL) { | |
610 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
611 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
612 | return 0; | |
613 | } | |
614 | ||
615 | tmpentry = | |
616 | X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); | |
617 | last_object_nid = | |
618 | OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); | |
619 | ||
620 | if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName | |
621 | || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { | |
622 | err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; | |
623 | } | |
624 | ||
625 | X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); | |
626 | X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); | |
627 | ||
628 | proxy_name_done: | |
629 | if (err != X509_V_OK | |
630 | && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err)) | |
631 | return 0; | |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
634 | /* |
635 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
636 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
637 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
638 | * to be obeyed. | |
639 | */ | |
640 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
641 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
70dd3c65 | 642 | |
0f113f3e | 643 | if (nc) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
644 | int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); |
645 | ||
f3e235ed VD |
646 | switch (rv) { |
647 | case X509_V_OK: | |
648 | break; | |
649 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
70dd3c65 | 650 | return 0; |
f3e235ed VD |
651 | default: |
652 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv)) | |
653 | return 0; | |
654 | break; | |
655 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
656 | } |
657 | } | |
658 | } | |
659 | return 1; | |
660 | } | |
e9746e03 | 661 | |
3bf15e29 | 662 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e | 663 | { |
70dd3c65 | 664 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); |
0f113f3e | 665 | } |
3bf15e29 | 666 | |
9689a6ae | 667 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) |
0f113f3e MC |
668 | { |
669 | int i; | |
9689a6ae | 670 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); |
0f113f3e MC |
671 | char *name; |
672 | ||
9689a6ae DSH |
673 | if (vpm->peername != NULL) { |
674 | OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); | |
675 | vpm->peername = NULL; | |
a0724ef1 | 676 | } |
0f113f3e | 677 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
9689a6ae DSH |
678 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); |
679 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) | |
0f113f3e MC |
680 | return 1; |
681 | } | |
682 | return n == 0; | |
683 | } | |
8abffa4a | 684 | |
3bf15e29 | 685 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
686 | { |
687 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
0f113f3e | 688 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; |
9689a6ae | 689 | if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
690 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) |
691 | return 0; | |
692 | } | |
9689a6ae | 693 | if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
694 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) |
695 | return 0; | |
696 | } | |
9689a6ae | 697 | if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
698 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) |
699 | return 0; | |
700 | } | |
701 | return 1; | |
702 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 703 | |
d9b8b89b | 704 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) |
51630a37 | 705 | { |
70dd3c65 | 706 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 707 | X509 *x = NULL; |
d9b8b89b | 708 | X509 *mx; |
b9aec69a | 709 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
710 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
711 | int trust; | |
712 | ||
bdcadca2 VD |
713 | /* |
714 | * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) | |
715 | * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. | |
716 | */ | |
717 | if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { | |
170b7358 VD |
718 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { |
719 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
720 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
721 | return trust; | |
722 | } | |
723 | } | |
724 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
725 | /* |
726 | * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. | |
727 | * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted | |
728 | * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, | |
729 | * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. | |
730 | */ | |
731 | for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { | |
0f113f3e | 732 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
d9b8b89b | 733 | trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
0f113f3e | 734 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
735 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
736 | goto trusted; | |
737 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
738 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 739 | } |
d9b8b89b | 740 | |
0f113f3e | 741 | /* |
d9b8b89b VD |
742 | * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, |
743 | * the chain is PKIX trusted. | |
0f113f3e | 744 | */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
745 | if (num_untrusted < num) { |
746 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) | |
747 | goto trusted; | |
748 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
497ecc0d | 751 | if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { |
d9b8b89b VD |
752 | /* |
753 | * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf | |
754 | * for a direct trust store match. | |
755 | */ | |
bdcadca2 VD |
756 | i = 0; |
757 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
0f113f3e | 758 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
759 | if (!mx) |
760 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
761 | ||
762 | /* | |
763 | * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, | |
764 | * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. | |
765 | */ | |
766 | trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
767 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
768 | X509_free(mx); | |
769 | goto rejected; | |
0f113f3e | 770 | } |
d9b8b89b VD |
771 | |
772 | /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ | |
773 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
774 | X509_free(x); | |
775 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; | |
776 | goto trusted; | |
0f113f3e MC |
777 | } |
778 | ||
779 | /* | |
780 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
781 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
782 | */ | |
783 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
784 | |
785 | rejected: | |
70dd3c65 | 786 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED)) |
d9b8b89b VD |
787 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
788 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
789 | ||
790 | trusted: | |
170b7358 VD |
791 | if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) |
792 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
793 | if (dane->pdpth < 0) | |
794 | dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; | |
795 | /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ | |
796 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
797 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
798 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
799 | } |
800 | ||
b545dc67 | 801 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 802 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 803 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
804 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
805 | return 1; | |
806 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
807 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
808 | else { | |
809 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
810 | if (ctx->parent) | |
811 | return 1; | |
812 | last = 0; | |
813 | } | |
814 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
815 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
816 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
817 | if (!ok) | |
818 | return ok; | |
819 | } | |
820 | return 1; | |
821 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
822 | |
823 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
824 | { |
825 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
826 | int ok = 0; |
827 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
828 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
829 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
830 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
831 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
832 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
833 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 834 | |
0f113f3e | 835 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
836 | unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
837 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
838 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
839 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
840 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
841 | else | |
842 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
843 | /* | |
844 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
845 | */ | |
846 | if (!ok) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
847 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
848 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
849 | } |
850 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
851 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
852 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 853 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
854 | |
855 | if (dcrl) { | |
856 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
857 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 858 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
859 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); |
860 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 861 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
862 | } else |
863 | ok = 1; | |
864 | ||
865 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
866 | if (ok != 2) { | |
867 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
868 | if (!ok) | |
70dd3c65 | 869 | goto done; |
0f113f3e MC |
870 | } |
871 | ||
872 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
873 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
874 | crl = NULL; | |
875 | dcrl = NULL; | |
876 | /* | |
877 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
878 | * so exit loop. | |
879 | */ | |
880 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
70dd3c65 VD |
881 | ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); |
882 | goto done; | |
0f113f3e MC |
883 | } |
884 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 885 | done: |
0f113f3e MC |
886 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
887 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
888 | ||
889 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
890 | return ok; | |
0f113f3e | 891 | } |
b545dc67 | 892 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
893 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
894 | ||
895 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
0f113f3e MC |
896 | { |
897 | time_t *ptime; | |
898 | int i; | |
70dd3c65 | 899 | |
0f113f3e MC |
900 | if (notify) |
901 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
902 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
903 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
904 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
905 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
906 | else |
907 | ptime = NULL; | |
908 | ||
909 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
910 | if (i == 0) { | |
911 | if (!notify) | |
912 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 913 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
914 | return 0; |
915 | } | |
916 | ||
917 | if (i > 0) { | |
918 | if (!notify) | |
919 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 920 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) |
0f113f3e MC |
921 | return 0; |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
925 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
926 | ||
927 | if (i == 0) { | |
928 | if (!notify) | |
929 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 930 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) |
0f113f3e MC |
931 | return 0; |
932 | } | |
933 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
934 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
935 | if (!notify) | |
936 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 937 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
938 | return 0; |
939 | } | |
940 | } | |
941 | ||
942 | if (notify) | |
943 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
944 | ||
945 | return 1; | |
946 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 947 | |
d43c4497 | 948 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
949 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
950 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
951 | { | |
952 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
953 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
954 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
955 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
956 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
957 | ||
958 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
959 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
960 | reasons = *preasons; | |
961 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
962 | ||
963 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
964 | best_crl = crl; | |
965 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
966 | best_score = crl_score; | |
967 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
968 | } | |
969 | } | |
970 | ||
971 | if (best_crl) { | |
222561fe | 972 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
973 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
974 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
975 | *pscore = best_score; | |
976 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 977 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
978 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
979 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
980 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
981 | } | |
982 | ||
983 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
984 | return 1; | |
985 | ||
986 | return 0; | |
987 | } | |
988 | ||
989 | /* | |
990 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
991 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
992 | */ | |
993 | ||
994 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
0f113f3e MC |
995 | { |
996 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
997 | int i; | |
998 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
999 | if (i >= 0) { | |
1000 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1001 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1002 | return 0; | |
1003 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
1004 | } else | |
1005 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1006 | |
0f113f3e | 1007 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 1008 | |
0f113f3e | 1009 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 1010 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1011 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1012 | return 0; | |
1013 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
1014 | } else | |
1015 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1016 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1017 | if (!exta && !extb) |
1018 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 1019 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1020 | if (!exta || !extb) |
1021 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1022 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1023 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
1024 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1025 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1026 | return 1; |
1027 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1028 | |
1029 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
1030 | ||
1031 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1032 | { |
1033 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
1034 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
1035 | return 0; | |
1036 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
1037 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
1038 | return 0; | |
1039 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1040 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
1041 | return 0; | |
1042 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1043 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1044 | return 0; | |
1045 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1046 | return 0; | |
1047 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1048 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1049 | return 0; | |
1050 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1051 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1052 | return 1; | |
1053 | return 0; | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | ||
1056 | /* | |
1057 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1058 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1059 | */ |
1060 | ||
1061 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1062 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1063 | { | |
1064 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1065 | int i; | |
1066 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
1067 | return; | |
1068 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
1069 | return; | |
1070 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1071 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1072 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1073 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1074 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1075 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1076 | *dcrl = delta; |
1077 | return; | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | /* | |
1084 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1085 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1086 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1087 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1088 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
1089 | */ |
1090 | ||
1091 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1092 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1093 | { | |
1094 | ||
1095 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1096 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1097 | ||
1098 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1099 | ||
1100 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
1101 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1102 | return 0; | |
1103 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
1104 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
1105 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
1106 | return 0; | |
1107 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
1108 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1109 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1110 | return 0; | |
1111 | } | |
1112 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1113 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1114 | return 0; | |
1115 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1116 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
1117 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1118 | return 0; | |
1119 | } else | |
1120 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1121 | ||
1122 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1123 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1126 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1127 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1128 | ||
1129 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1130 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1131 | ||
1132 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1133 | ||
1134 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1135 | return 0; | |
1136 | ||
1137 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1138 | ||
1139 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1140 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1141 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1142 | return 0; | |
1143 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1144 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1145 | } | |
1146 | ||
1147 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1148 | ||
1149 | return crl_score; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1152 | |
1153 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1154 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1155 | { | |
1156 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1157 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1158 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1159 | int i; | |
1160 | ||
1161 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1162 | cidx++; | |
1163 | ||
1164 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1165 | ||
1166 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1167 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1168 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1169 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1170 | return; | |
1171 | } | |
1172 | } | |
1173 | ||
1174 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1175 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1176 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1177 | continue; | |
1178 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1179 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1180 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1181 | return; | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | } | |
1184 | ||
1185 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1186 | ||
1187 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1188 | return; | |
1189 | ||
1190 | /* | |
1191 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1192 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1193 | */ | |
1194 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1195 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1196 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1197 | continue; | |
1198 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1199 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1200 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1201 | return; | |
1202 | } | |
1203 | } | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | ||
1206 | /* | |
1207 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1208 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1209 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1210 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1211 | */ |
1212 | ||
1213 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1214 | { |
1215 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1216 | int ret; | |
70dd3c65 | 1217 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1218 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
1219 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1220 | return 0; | |
1221 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1222 | return -1; | |
1223 | ||
1224 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1225 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1226 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1227 | ||
1228 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1229 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1230 | ||
1231 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1232 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1233 | if (ret <= 0) |
1234 | goto err; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1237 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); |
1238 | err: | |
1239 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1240 | return ret; | |
1241 | } | |
1242 | ||
1243 | /* | |
1244 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1245 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1246 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1247 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1248 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1249 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1250 | */ |
1251 | ||
1252 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1253 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1254 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1255 | { | |
1256 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1257 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1258 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1259 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1260 | return 1; | |
1261 | return 0; | |
1262 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1263 | |
3a83462d MC |
1264 | /*- |
1265 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1266 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1267 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1268 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1269 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1270 | */ |
1271 | ||
3e727a3b | 1272 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1273 | { |
1274 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1275 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1276 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1277 | int i, j; | |
1278 | if (!a || !b) | |
1279 | return 1; | |
1280 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1281 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1282 | return 0; | |
1283 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1284 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1285 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1286 | return 0; | |
1287 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1288 | return 1; | |
1289 | else | |
1290 | return 0; | |
1291 | } | |
1292 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1293 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1294 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1295 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1296 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1297 | return 0; | |
1298 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1299 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1300 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1301 | } | |
1302 | ||
1303 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1304 | if (nm) { | |
1305 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1306 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1307 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1308 | continue; | |
1309 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1310 | return 1; | |
1311 | } | |
1312 | return 0; | |
1313 | } | |
1314 | ||
1315 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1316 | ||
1317 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1318 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1319 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1320 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1321 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1322 | return 1; | |
1323 | } | |
1324 | } | |
1325 | ||
1326 | return 0; | |
1327 | ||
1328 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1329 | |
4b96839f | 1330 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1331 | { |
1332 | int i; | |
1333 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1334 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1335 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1336 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1337 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1338 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1339 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1340 | continue; | |
1341 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1342 | return 1; | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | return 0; | |
1345 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1346 | |
4b96839f | 1347 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1348 | |
4b96839f | 1349 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1350 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1351 | { | |
1352 | int i; | |
1353 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1354 | return 0; | |
1355 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1356 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1357 | return 0; | |
1358 | } else { | |
1359 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1360 | return 0; | |
1361 | } | |
1362 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1363 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1364 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1365 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1366 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1367 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1368 | return 1; | |
1369 | } | |
1370 | } | |
1371 | } | |
1372 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1373 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1374 | return 1; | |
1375 | return 0; | |
1376 | } | |
1377 | ||
1378 | /* | |
1379 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1380 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1381 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1382 | |
d43c4497 | 1383 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1384 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1385 | { | |
1386 | int ok; | |
1387 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1388 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1389 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1390 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1391 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1392 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
70dd3c65 | 1393 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1394 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; |
1395 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1396 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1397 | if (ok) |
1398 | goto done; | |
1399 | ||
1400 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1401 | ||
1402 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1403 | ||
1404 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1405 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1406 | goto done; | |
1407 | ||
1408 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1409 | ||
1410 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1411 | ||
1412 | done: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1413 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
1414 | if (crl) { | |
1415 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1416 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1417 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1418 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1419 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1420 | return 1; | |
1421 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1422 | return 0; |
1423 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1424 | |
1425 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1426 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1427 | { |
1428 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1429 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1430 | int cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1431 | int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1432 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1433 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
1434 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1435 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1436 | /* |
1437 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1438 | * certificate in chain. | |
1439 | */ | |
1440 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1441 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1442 | else { | |
1443 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1444 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1445 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && |
1446 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) | |
1447 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1448 | } |
1449 | ||
70dd3c65 VD |
1450 | if (issuer == NULL) |
1451 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1452 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1453 | /* |
1454 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1455 | */ | |
1456 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1457 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1458 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1459 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) && | |
1460 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) | |
1461 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1462 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1463 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) && |
1464 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) | |
1465 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1466 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1467 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) && |
1468 | check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && | |
1469 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) | |
1470 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1471 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1472 | if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) && |
1473 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) | |
1474 | return 0; | |
1475 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1476 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1477 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) && |
1478 | !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) | |
1479 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1480 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1481 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1482 | ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); | |
0f113f3e | 1483 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1484 | if (!ikey && |
1485 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) | |
1486 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1487 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1488 | if (ikey) { |
1489 | int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
0f113f3e | 1490 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1491 | if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) |
1492 | return 0; | |
1493 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1494 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && | |
1495 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1496 | return 0; | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 1499 | } |
b545dc67 DSH |
1500 | |
1501 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1502 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e | 1503 | { |
0f113f3e | 1504 | X509_REVOKED *rev; |
70dd3c65 | 1505 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1506 | /* |
1507 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1508 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
70dd3c65 | 1509 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can |
0f113f3e MC |
1510 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. |
1511 | */ | |
1512 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1513 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) && |
1514 | !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) | |
1515 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1516 | /* |
70dd3c65 VD |
1517 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure |
1518 | * reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
0f113f3e MC |
1519 | */ |
1520 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1521 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1522 | return 2; | |
70dd3c65 | 1523 | if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1524 | return 0; |
1525 | } | |
1526 | ||
1527 | return 1; | |
1528 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1529 | |
5d7c222d | 1530 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1531 | { |
1532 | int ret; | |
3921ded7 | 1533 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1534 | if (ctx->parent) |
1535 | return 1; | |
3921ded7 VD |
1536 | /* |
1537 | * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a | |
1538 | * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor | |
1539 | * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 | |
1540 | * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the | |
1541 | * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look | |
1542 | * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain | |
1543 | * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it | |
1544 | * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the | |
1545 | * X509_policy_check() call. | |
1546 | */ | |
1547 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { | |
1548 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 1549 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
3921ded7 VD |
1550 | return 0; |
1551 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1552 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
1553 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
3921ded7 VD |
1554 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) |
1555 | sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
1556 | ||
895c2f84 | 1557 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { |
0f113f3e | 1558 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f3e235ed | 1559 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
0f113f3e MC |
1560 | return 0; |
1561 | } | |
1562 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
895c2f84 | 1563 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { |
0f113f3e | 1564 | int i; |
70dd3c65 VD |
1565 | |
1566 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ | |
0f113f3e | 1567 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1568 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
1569 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1570 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) |
1571 | continue; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1572 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, |
1573 | X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1574 | return 0; |
1575 | } | |
1576 | return 1; | |
1577 | } | |
895c2f84 | 1578 | if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1579 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; |
1580 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1581 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1582 | } | |
895c2f84 VD |
1583 | if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { |
1584 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1585 | return 0; | |
1586 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1587 | |
1588 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1589 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
f3e235ed VD |
1590 | /* |
1591 | * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed | |
1592 | * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then | |
1593 | * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier | |
1594 | * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. | |
1595 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1596 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) |
1597 | return 0; | |
1598 | } | |
1599 | ||
1600 | return 1; | |
1601 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1602 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1603 | /*- |
1604 | * Check certificate validity times. | |
1605 | * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return | |
1606 | * the validation status. | |
1607 | * | |
1608 | * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
1609 | */ | |
1610 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1611 | { |
1612 | time_t *ptime; | |
1613 | int i; | |
1614 | ||
1615 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1616 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
1617 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
1618 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1619 | else |
1620 | ptime = NULL; | |
1621 | ||
1622 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1623 | if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) |
1624 | return 0; | |
1625 | if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, | |
1626 | X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD)) | |
1627 | return 0; | |
1628 | if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID)) | |
1629 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1630 | |
1631 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1632 | if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) |
1633 | return 0; | |
1634 | if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, | |
1635 | X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD)) | |
1636 | return 0; | |
1637 | if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)) | |
1638 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1639 | return 1; |
1640 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1641 | |
6b691a5c | 1642 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 1643 | { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1644 | int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
1645 | X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1646 | X509 *xs; | |
0f113f3e | 1647 | |
170b7358 VD |
1648 | /* |
1649 | * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to | |
1650 | * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as | |
1651 | * NULL, since all we have is a bare key. | |
1652 | */ | |
1653 | if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { | |
1654 | xs = xi; | |
1655 | xi = NULL; | |
1656 | goto check_cert; | |
1657 | } | |
1658 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1659 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
1660 | xs = xi; | |
1661 | else { | |
1662 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
1663 | xs = xi; | |
1664 | goto check_cert; | |
1665 | } | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1666 | if (n <= 0) |
1667 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, | |
1668 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); | |
1669 | n--; | |
1670 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1671 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1672 | } |
1673 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
1674 | /* |
1675 | * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback | |
1676 | * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). | |
1677 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1678 | while (n >= 0) { |
70dd3c65 | 1679 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
0f113f3e MC |
1680 | |
1681 | /* | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1682 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly |
1683 | * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If | |
1684 | * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate | |
1685 | * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject). | |
0f113f3e | 1686 | */ |
0e76014e | 1687 | if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { |
c01ff880 | 1688 | if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1689 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n, |
1690 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) | |
1691 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1692 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { |
70dd3c65 VD |
1693 | if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, |
1694 | X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) | |
1695 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1696 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
1697 | } |
1698 | ||
0f113f3e | 1699 | check_cert: |
70dd3c65 VD |
1700 | /* Calls verify callback as needed */ |
1701 | if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) | |
1702 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1703 | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1704 | /* |
1705 | * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) | |
1706 | * is retained. | |
1707 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1708 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; |
1709 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
70dd3c65 VD |
1710 | ctx->error_depth = n; |
1711 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) | |
1712 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1713 | |
70dd3c65 | 1714 | if (--n >= 0) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1715 | xi = xs; |
1716 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1717 | } | |
1718 | } | |
70dd3c65 | 1719 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1720 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1721 | |
91b73acb | 1722 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1723 | { |
0f113f3e | 1724 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1725 | } |
1726 | ||
91b73acb | 1727 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e MC |
1728 | { |
1729 | char *str; | |
1730 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1731 | long offset; | |
1732 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
f48b83b4 | 1733 | int i, j, remaining; |
0f113f3e MC |
1734 | |
1735 | p = buff1; | |
f48b83b4 | 1736 | remaining = ctm->length; |
0f113f3e | 1737 | str = (char *)ctm->data; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1738 | /* |
1739 | * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the | |
1740 | * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
1741 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1742 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1743 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1744 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1745 | /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ |
1746 | int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1747 | int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; | |
1748 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1749 | return 0; |
1750 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1751 | p += 10; | |
1752 | str += 10; | |
f48b83b4 | 1753 | remaining -= 10; |
0f113f3e | 1754 | } else { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1755 | /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ |
1756 | int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1757 | int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; | |
1758 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1759 | return 0; |
1760 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1761 | p += 12; | |
1762 | str += 12; | |
f48b83b4 | 1763 | remaining -= 12; |
0f113f3e MC |
1764 | } |
1765 | ||
1766 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1767 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1768 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1769 | } else { | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1770 | /* SS (seconds) */ |
1771 | if (remaining < 2) | |
1772 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1773 | *(p++) = *(str++); |
1774 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1775 | remaining -= 2; |
1776 | /* | |
1777 | * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... | |
1778 | * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. | |
1779 | * Can we just kill them altogether? | |
1780 | */ | |
1781 | if (remaining && *str == '.') { | |
0f113f3e | 1782 | str++; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1783 | remaining--; |
1784 | for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { | |
1785 | if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') | |
1786 | break; | |
1787 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1788 | } |
1789 | ||
1790 | } | |
1791 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1792 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1793 | ||
f48b83b4 EK |
1794 | /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ |
1795 | if (!remaining) | |
1796 | return 0; | |
1797 | if (*str == 'Z') { | |
1798 | if (remaining != 1) | |
1799 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1800 | offset = 0; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1801 | } else { |
1802 | /* (+-)HHMM */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1803 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
1804 | return 0; | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1805 | /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ |
1806 | if (remaining != 5) | |
1807 | return 0; | |
1808 | if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || | |
1809 | str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') | |
1810 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1811 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; |
1812 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1813 | if (*str == '-') | |
1814 | offset = -offset; | |
1815 | } | |
1816 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1817 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1818 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1819 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1820 | ||
1821 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1822 | return 0; | |
1823 | ||
1824 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1825 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1826 | if (i < 50) | |
1827 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1828 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1829 | if (j < 50) | |
1830 | j += 100; | |
1831 | ||
1832 | if (i < j) | |
1833 | return -1; | |
1834 | if (i > j) | |
1835 | return 1; | |
1836 | } | |
1837 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1838 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1839 | return -1; | |
1840 | else | |
1841 | return i; | |
1842 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1843 | |
284ef5f3 | 1844 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1845 | { |
0f113f3e | 1846 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1847 | } |
1848 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1849 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1850 | { |
1851 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1852 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1853 | |
1854 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1855 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1856 | { | |
1857 | time_t t; | |
1858 | ||
1859 | if (in_tm) | |
1860 | t = *in_tm; | |
1861 | else | |
1862 | time(&t); | |
1863 | ||
1864 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1865 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1866 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1867 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1868 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1869 | } | |
1870 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1871 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1872 | |
7e258a56 | 1873 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1874 | { |
1875 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1876 | int i, j; | |
1877 | ||
1878 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1879 | return 1; | |
1880 | ||
1881 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
c01ff880 | 1882 | ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); |
0f113f3e MC |
1883 | if (ktmp == NULL) { |
1884 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1885 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1886 | return 0; | |
1887 | } | |
1888 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1889 | break; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1890 | } |
1891 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1892 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1893 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1894 | return 0; | |
1895 | } | |
1896 | ||
1897 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1898 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
c01ff880 | 1899 | ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); |
0f113f3e | 1900 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
1901 | } |
1902 | ||
1903 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
1904 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1905 | return 1; |
1906 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1907 | |
2e8cb108 DSH |
1908 | /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
1909 | ||
1910 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1911 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
1912 | { | |
1913 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
1914 | int i; | |
1915 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
1916 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
1917 | if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
1918 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
1919 | return NULL; | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
1922 | if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
1923 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
1924 | return NULL; | |
1925 | } | |
1926 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1927 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
1928 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
1929 | return NULL; | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1932 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
1933 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
1934 | return NULL; | |
1935 | } | |
1936 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
1937 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
1938 | return NULL; | |
1939 | } | |
1940 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1941 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
1942 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
1943 | return NULL; | |
1944 | } | |
1945 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
1946 | if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
1947 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
1948 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
1949 | return NULL; | |
1950 | } | |
1951 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
1952 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
90945fa3 | 1953 | if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) |
0f113f3e MC |
1954 | goto memerr; |
1955 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
1956 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
1957 | goto memerr; | |
1958 | ||
1959 | if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) | |
1960 | goto memerr; | |
1961 | if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) | |
1962 | goto memerr; | |
1963 | ||
1964 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
1965 | ||
1966 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
1967 | goto memerr; | |
1968 | ||
1969 | /* | |
1970 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
1971 | * number to correct value too. | |
1972 | */ | |
1973 | ||
1974 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
1975 | X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
1976 | ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
1977 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
1978 | goto memerr; | |
1979 | } | |
1980 | ||
1981 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
1982 | ||
1983 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
1984 | ||
1985 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
1986 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
1987 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); | |
1988 | /* | |
1989 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
1990 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
1991 | */ | |
34a42e14 | 1992 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
1993 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); |
1994 | if (!rvtmp) | |
1995 | goto memerr; | |
1996 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
1997 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
1998 | goto memerr; | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | } | |
2001 | } | |
2002 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
2003 | ||
2004 | if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
2005 | goto memerr; | |
2006 | ||
2007 | return crl; | |
2008 | ||
2009 | memerr: | |
2010 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
222561fe | 2011 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
2012 | return NULL; |
2013 | } | |
2014 | ||
6b691a5c | 2015 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2016 | { |
2017 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2018 | } | |
58964a49 | 2019 | |
6b691a5c | 2020 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2021 | { |
2022 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2023 | } | |
58964a49 | 2024 | |
6b691a5c | 2025 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2026 | { |
2027 | return ctx->error; | |
2028 | } | |
58964a49 | 2029 | |
6b691a5c | 2030 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2031 | { |
2032 | ctx->error = err; | |
2033 | } | |
58964a49 | 2034 | |
6b691a5c | 2035 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2036 | { |
2037 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2038 | } | |
58964a49 | 2039 | |
51227177 VD |
2040 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
2041 | { | |
2042 | ctx->error_depth = depth; | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | ||
6b691a5c | 2045 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2046 | { |
2047 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2048 | } | |
58964a49 | 2049 | |
c9654873 VD |
2050 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
2051 | { | |
2052 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
2053 | } | |
2054 | ||
f0e0fd51 | 2055 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2056 | { |
2057 | return ctx->chain; | |
2058 | } | |
58964a49 | 2059 | |
c7cb16a8 | 2060 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2061 | { |
2062 | if (!ctx->chain) | |
2063 | return NULL; | |
2064 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2065 | } | |
25f923dd | 2066 | |
2008e714 | 2067 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2068 | { |
2069 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2070 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2071 | |
2072 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2073 | { |
2074 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2075 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2076 | |
2077 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2078 | { |
2079 | return ctx->parent; | |
2080 | } | |
2008e714 | 2081 | |
6b691a5c | 2082 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2083 | { |
2084 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2085 | } | |
58964a49 | 2086 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2087 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2088 | { |
2089 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2090 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2091 | |
13938ace | 2092 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e | 2093 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2094 | /* |
2095 | * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? | |
2096 | * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust | |
2097 | * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). | |
2098 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2099 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
2100 | } | |
11262391 | 2101 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2102 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e | 2103 | { |
0daccd4d VD |
2104 | /* |
2105 | * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default | |
2106 | * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. | |
2107 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2108 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
2109 | } | |
2110 | ||
2111 | /* | |
2112 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2113 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2114 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2115 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2116 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2117 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2118 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2119 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
2120 | */ |
2121 | ||
2122 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2123 | int purpose, int trust) |
2124 | { | |
2125 | int idx; | |
2126 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
2127 | if (!purpose) | |
2128 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
2129 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
2130 | if (purpose) { | |
2131 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
2132 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
2133 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2134 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2135 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2136 | return 0; | |
2137 | } | |
2138 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2139 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2140 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
0daccd4d VD |
2141 | /* |
2142 | * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is | |
2143 | * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the | |
2144 | * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? | |
2145 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
2146 | if (idx == -1) { |
2147 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2148 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2149 | return 0; | |
2150 | } | |
2151 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2152 | } | |
2153 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
2154 | if (!trust) | |
2155 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
2156 | } | |
2157 | if (trust) { | |
2158 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
2159 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2160 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2161 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
2162 | return 0; | |
2163 | } | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ||
2166 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
2167 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
2168 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
2169 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
2170 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2171 | } |
2172 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2173 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2174 | { | |
b51bce94 | 2175 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2176 | |
90945fa3 | 2177 | if (ctx == NULL) { |
0f113f3e MC |
2178 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
2179 | return NULL; | |
2180 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2181 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2182 | } |
2183 | ||
2184 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2185 | { | |
c001ce33 | 2186 | if (ctx == NULL) |
222561fe | 2187 | return; |
c001ce33 | 2188 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2189 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2190 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
2191 | } |
2192 | ||
79aa04ef | 2193 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2194 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2195 | { | |
2196 | int ret = 1; | |
ecdaa1ae | 2197 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2198 | ctx->ctx = store; |
2199 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
2200 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
2201 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2202 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
d9b8b89b | 2203 | ctx->num_untrusted = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
2204 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; |
2205 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2206 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2207 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2208 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2209 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2210 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2211 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2212 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2213 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2214 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2215 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2216 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
919ba009 | 2217 | ctx->dane = NULL; |
170b7358 | 2218 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; |
e29c73c9 VD |
2219 | /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ |
2220 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); | |
0f113f3e | 2221 | |
7b7eb472 VD |
2222 | /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ |
2223 | if (store) | |
0f113f3e | 2224 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
7b7eb472 | 2225 | else |
0f113f3e MC |
2226 | ctx->cleanup = 0; |
2227 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2228 | if (store && store->check_issued) |
2229 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2230 | else | |
2231 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2232 | ||
2233 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2234 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2235 | else | |
2236 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2237 | ||
2238 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2239 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2240 | else | |
2241 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2242 | ||
2243 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2244 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2245 | else | |
2246 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2247 | ||
2248 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2249 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2250 | else | |
2251 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2252 | ||
2253 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2254 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
311f2785 VD |
2255 | else |
2256 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2257 | |
2258 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2259 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2260 | else | |
2261 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2262 | ||
2263 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2264 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2265 | else | |
2266 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2267 | ||
2268 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2269 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2270 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2271 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; |
0f113f3e MC |
2272 | |
2273 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2274 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2275 | else | |
6ddbb4cd | 2276 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; |
0f113f3e MC |
2277 | |
2278 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2279 | ||
ecdaa1ae | 2280 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
2281 | if (ctx->param == NULL) { | |
2282 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2283 | goto err; | |
2284 | } | |
2285 | ||
2286 | /* | |
2287 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2288 | */ | |
2289 | if (store) | |
2290 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2291 | else | |
2292 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2293 | ||
2294 | if (ret) | |
2295 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2296 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2297 | ||
2298 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2299 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2300 | goto err; | |
2301 | } | |
2302 | ||
0daccd4d VD |
2303 | /* |
2304 | * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the | |
2305 | * purpose if this still yields the default value. | |
2306 | */ | |
2307 | if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2308 | int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); | |
2309 | X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2310 | ||
2311 | if (xp != NULL) | |
2312 | ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); | |
2313 | } | |
2314 | ||
e29c73c9 VD |
2315 | if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2316 | &ctx->ex_data)) | |
2317 | return 1; | |
2318 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
ecdaa1ae | 2319 | |
d9b8b89b | 2320 | err: |
e29c73c9 VD |
2321 | /* |
2322 | * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not | |
2323 | * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. | |
2324 | */ | |
ecdaa1ae | 2325 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2326 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2327 | } |
2328 | ||
2329 | /* | |
2330 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2331 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 | 2332 | */ |
f0e0fd51 | 2333 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2f043896 | 2334 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
2335 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2336 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
c864e761 | 2337 | ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; |
2f043896 DSH |
2338 | } |
2339 | ||
2340 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e | 2341 | { |
e29c73c9 VD |
2342 | /* |
2343 | * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls | |
2344 | * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() | |
2345 | * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the | |
2346 | * pointers below after they're freed! | |
2347 | */ | |
2348 | /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ | |
2349 | if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { | |
0f113f3e | 2350 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
e29c73c9 VD |
2351 | ctx->cleanup = NULL; |
2352 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2353 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { |
2354 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2355 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2356 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2357 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2358 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2359 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2360 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2361 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2362 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2363 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2364 | } |
13938ace | 2365 | |
5d7c222d | 2366 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2367 | { |
2368 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2369 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2370 | |
5d7c222d | 2371 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2372 | { |
2373 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2374 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2375 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2376 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2377 | time_t t) | |
2378 | { | |
2379 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2380 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2381 | |
db089ad6 | 2382 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
f0e0fd51 | 2383 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) |
0f113f3e MC |
2384 | { |
2385 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2386 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2387 | |
f0e0fd51 RS |
2388 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2389 | { | |
2390 | return ctx->verify_cb; | |
2391 | } | |
2392 | ||
2393 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2394 | { | |
2395 | return ctx->cert; | |
2396 | } | |
2397 | ||
2398 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2399 | { | |
2400 | return ctx->untrusted; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | ||
4dba585f DSH |
2403 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2404 | { | |
2405 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2406 | } | |
2407 | ||
f0e0fd51 RS |
2408 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
2409 | { | |
2410 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2411 | ctx->chain = sk; | |
2412 | } | |
2413 | ||
2414 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
2415 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify verify) | |
2416 | { | |
2417 | ctx->verify = verify; | |
2418 | } | |
2419 | ||
2420 | X509_STORE_CTX_verify X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2421 | { | |
2422 | return ctx->verify; | |
2423 | } | |
2424 | ||
5d7c222d | 2425 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2426 | { |
2427 | return ctx->tree; | |
2428 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2429 | |
2430 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2431 | { |
2432 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2433 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2434 | |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2435 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2436 | { | |
d9b8b89b | 2437 | return ctx->num_untrusted; |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2438 | } |
2439 | ||
5d7c222d | 2440 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2441 | { |
2442 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2443 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2444 | if (!param) | |
2445 | return 0; | |
2446 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2447 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2448 | |
2449 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2450 | { |
2451 | return ctx->param; | |
2452 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2453 | |
2454 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2455 | { |
222561fe | 2456 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2457 | ctx->param = param; |
2458 | } | |
d9b8b89b | 2459 | |
b9aec69a | 2460 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) |
919ba009 VD |
2461 | { |
2462 | ctx->dane = dane; | |
2463 | } | |
2464 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2465 | static unsigned char *dane_i2d( |
2466 | X509 *cert, | |
2467 | uint8_t selector, | |
2468 | unsigned int *i2dlen) | |
2469 | { | |
2470 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
2471 | int len; | |
2472 | ||
2473 | /* | |
2474 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
2475 | */ | |
2476 | switch (selector) { | |
2477 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
2478 | len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); | |
2479 | break; | |
2480 | case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
2481 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); | |
2482 | break; | |
2483 | default: | |
2484 | X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
2485 | return NULL; | |
2486 | } | |
2487 | ||
2488 | if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { | |
2489 | X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2490 | return NULL; | |
2491 | } | |
2492 | ||
2493 | *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; | |
2494 | return buf; | |
2495 | } | |
2496 | ||
2497 | #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ | |
2498 | ||
2499 | static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
2500 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2501 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2502 | unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; |
2503 | unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2504 | unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2505 | unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2506 | unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; | |
2507 | unsigned int i2dlen = 0; | |
2508 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2509 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; | |
2510 | unsigned int cmplen = 0; | |
2511 | int i; | |
2512 | int recnum; | |
2513 | int matched = 0; | |
2514 | danetls_record *t = NULL; | |
2515 | uint32_t mask; | |
2516 | ||
2517 | mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; | |
2518 | ||
2519 | /* | |
2520 | * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) | |
2521 | */ | |
2522 | if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
2523 | mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2524 | ||
2525 | /* | |
2526 | * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any | |
0d4fb843 | 2527 | * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. |
170b7358 VD |
2528 | * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. |
2529 | */ | |
2530 | if (dane->mdpth >= 0) | |
2531 | mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; | |
2532 | ||
2533 | /*- | |
2534 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 | |
2535 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 | |
2536 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 | |
2537 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 | |
2538 | * | |
2539 | * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building | |
2540 | * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with | |
2541 | * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which | |
2542 | * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). | |
2543 | * | |
2544 | * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX | |
2545 | * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest | |
2546 | * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. | |
2547 | * | |
2548 | * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we | |
2549 | * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers | |
2550 | * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch | |
2551 | * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", | |
2552 | * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public | |
2553 | * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" | |
2554 | * or multiple "3 0 1" records. | |
2555 | * | |
2556 | * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either | |
2557 | * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after | |
0d4fb843 | 2558 | * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is |
170b7358 VD |
2559 | * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. |
2560 | */ | |
2561 | recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; | |
2562 | for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2563 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2564 | if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) | |
2565 | continue; | |
2566 | if (t->usage != usage) { | |
2567 | usage = t->usage; | |
2568 | ||
2569 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2570 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2571 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2572 | } | |
2573 | if (t->selector != selector) { | |
2574 | selector = t->selector; | |
2575 | ||
2576 | /* Update per-selector state */ | |
2577 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2578 | i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); | |
2579 | if (i2dbuf == NULL) | |
2580 | return -1; | |
2581 | ||
2582 | /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ | |
2583 | mtype = DANETLS_NONE; | |
2584 | ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; | |
2585 | } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
2586 | /*- | |
2587 | * Digest agility: | |
2588 | * | |
2589 | * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9> | |
2590 | * | |
2591 | * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the | |
2592 | * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals | |
2593 | * other than "Full". | |
2594 | */ | |
2595 | if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) | |
2596 | continue; | |
2597 | } | |
2598 | ||
2599 | /* | |
2600 | * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant | |
2601 | * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. | |
2602 | */ | |
2603 | if (t->mtype != mtype) { | |
2604 | const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; | |
2605 | cmpbuf = i2dbuf; | |
2606 | cmplen = i2dlen; | |
2607 | ||
2608 | if (md != NULL) { | |
dccd20d1 F |
2609 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; |
2610 | if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { | |
2611 | matched = -1; | |
170b7358 VD |
2612 | break; |
2613 | } | |
2614 | } | |
2615 | } | |
2616 | ||
2617 | /* | |
2618 | * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any | |
2619 | * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a | |
2620 | * full chain. | |
2621 | */ | |
2622 | if (cmplen == t->dlen && | |
2623 | memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { | |
2624 | if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) | |
2625 | matched = 1; | |
2626 | if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { | |
2627 | dane->mdpth = depth; | |
2628 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2629 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); | |
2630 | dane->mcert = cert; | |
2631 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
2632 | } | |
2633 | break; | |
2634 | } | |
2635 | } | |
2636 | ||
2637 | /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ | |
2638 | OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); | |
2639 | return matched; | |
2640 | } | |
2641 | ||
2642 | static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
2643 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2644 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2645 | int matched = 0; |
2646 | X509 *cert; | |
2647 | ||
2648 | if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) | |
2649 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2650 | ||
2651 | /* | |
89ff989d | 2652 | * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if |
170b7358 VD |
2653 | * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking |
2654 | * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). | |
2655 | */ | |
2656 | cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); | |
2657 | if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) | |
2658 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
2659 | if (matched > 0) { | |
2660 | ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; | |
2661 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2662 | } | |
2663 | ||
2664 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2665 | } | |
2666 | ||
2667 | static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2668 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2669 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2670 | danetls_record *t; |
2671 | int num = ctx->num_untrusted; | |
2672 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2673 | int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
2674 | int i; | |
2675 | ||
2676 | for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { | |
2677 | t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
2678 | if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || | |
2679 | t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || | |
2680 | t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || | |
2681 | X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) | |
2682 | continue; | |
2683 | ||
c0a445a9 | 2684 | /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ |
170b7358 VD |
2685 | X509_free(dane->mcert); |
2686 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2687 | ||
2688 | /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ | |
2689 | ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; | |
2690 | dane->mdpth = num - 1; | |
2691 | dane->mtlsa = t; | |
2692 | ||
2693 | /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ | |
2694 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
2695 | for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) | |
2696 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2697 | ||
2698 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
2699 | } | |
2700 | ||
2701 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2702 | } | |
2703 | ||
b9aec69a | 2704 | static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) |
170b7358 VD |
2705 | { |
2706 | /* | |
2707 | * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. | |
2708 | */ | |
2709 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
2710 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2711 | dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
2712 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2713 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
2714 | } | |
2715 | ||
6e328256 VD |
2716 | static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) |
2717 | { | |
2718 | int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); | |
2719 | ||
2720 | if (err == X509_V_OK) | |
2721 | return 1; | |
70dd3c65 | 2722 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err); |
6e328256 VD |
2723 | } |
2724 | ||
170b7358 VD |
2725 | static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2726 | { | |
2727 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; | |
b9aec69a | 2728 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
170b7358 VD |
2729 | int matched; |
2730 | int done; | |
2731 | ||
2732 | dane_reset(dane); | |
2733 | ||
89ff989d VD |
2734 | /*- |
2735 | * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, | |
2736 | * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) | |
2737 | * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the | |
2738 | * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor. | |
2739 | * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done | |
2740 | * if: | |
2741 | * + matched < 0, internal error. | |
2742 | * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record | |
2743 | * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no | |
2744 | * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. | |
2745 | */ | |
170b7358 VD |
2746 | matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); |
2747 | done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); | |
2748 | ||
2749 | if (done) | |
2750 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
2751 | ||
2752 | if (matched > 0) { | |
70dd3c65 | 2753 | /* Callback invoked as needed */ |
6e328256 VD |
2754 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2755 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2756 | /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ |
170b7358 VD |
2757 | ctx->error_depth = 0; |
2758 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
6e328256 | 2759 | return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); |
170b7358 VD |
2760 | } |
2761 | ||
2762 | if (matched < 0) { | |
2763 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2764 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
2765 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
2766 | return -1; | |
2767 | } | |
2768 | ||
2769 | if (done) { | |
2770 | /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ | |
6e328256 VD |
2771 | if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) |
2772 | return 0; | |
70dd3c65 | 2773 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); |
170b7358 VD |
2774 | } |
2775 | ||
2776 | /* | |
2777 | * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 | |
2778 | * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. | |
2779 | */ | |
2780 | return verify_chain(ctx); | |
2781 | } | |
2782 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
2783 | /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */ |
2784 | static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
2785 | { | |
2786 | STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; | |
2787 | int ok; | |
2788 | ||
2789 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2790 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); | |
2791 | ctx->chain = saved_chain; | |
2792 | ||
2793 | return ok; | |
2794 | } | |
2795 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2796 | static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2797 | { | |
b9aec69a | 2798 | SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2799 | int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
2800 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
2801 | int ss = cert_self_signed(cert); | |
2802 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
2803 | unsigned int search; | |
170b7358 | 2804 | int may_trusted = 0; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2805 | int may_alternate = 0; |
2806 | int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
2807 | int alt_untrusted = 0; | |
2808 | int depth; | |
2809 | int ok = 0; | |
2810 | int i; | |
2811 | ||
2812 | /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ | |
2813 | OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num); | |
2814 | ||
2815 | #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ | |
2816 | #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ | |
2817 | #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ | |
2818 | /* | |
2819 | * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. | |
170b7358 VD |
2820 | * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the |
2821 | * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, | |
2822 | * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain | |
2823 | * if no luck with untrusted first. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2824 | */ |
2825 | search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; | |
170b7358 VD |
2826 | if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { |
2827 | if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) | |
2828 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
2829 | else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) | |
2830 | may_alternate = 1; | |
2831 | may_trusted = 1; | |
2832 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2833 | |
2834 | /* | |
2835 | * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is | |
2836 | * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make | |
2837 | * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. | |
2838 | */ | |
2839 | if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
2840 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 2841 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2842 | return 0; |
2843 | } | |
2844 | ||
69664d6a VD |
2845 | /* |
2846 | * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add | |
2847 | * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the | |
2848 | * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with | |
2849 | * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create | |
2850 | * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE | |
2851 | * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack | |
2852 | * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for | |
2853 | * this to change. ] | |
2854 | */ | |
170b7358 | 2855 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) { |
69664d6a VD |
2856 | if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { |
2857 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 2858 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
69664d6a VD |
2859 | return 0; |
2860 | } | |
170b7358 VD |
2861 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) { |
2862 | if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) { | |
2863 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
2864 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f3e235ed | 2865 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
170b7358 VD |
2866 | return 0; |
2867 | } | |
2868 | } | |
2869 | } | |
2870 | ||
d9b8b89b VD |
2871 | /* |
2872 | * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound | |
2873 | * might be reasonable. | |
2874 | */ | |
2875 | if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) | |
2876 | ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; | |
2877 | ||
2878 | /* | |
2879 | * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. | |
2880 | * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, | |
2881 | * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. | |
2882 | */ | |
2883 | depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; | |
2884 | ||
2885 | while (search != 0) { | |
2886 | X509 *x; | |
2887 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
2888 | ||
2889 | /* | |
2890 | * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run | |
fbb82a60 VD |
2891 | * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we |
2892 | * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point | |
2893 | * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. | |
2894 | * | |
2895 | * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the | |
2896 | * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last | |
2897 | * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, | |
2898 | * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer | |
2899 | * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be | |
2900 | * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain | |
2901 | * would be a-priori too long. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2902 | */ |
2903 | if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2904 | i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
2905 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
2906 | /* | |
2907 | * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative | |
2908 | * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently | |
2909 | * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable | |
2910 | * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It | |
2911 | * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain | |
2912 | * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of | |
2913 | * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a | |
2914 | * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor | |
2915 | * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or | |
2916 | * ctx->num_untrusted. | |
2917 | * | |
2918 | * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of | |
2919 | * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". | |
2920 | */ | |
2921 | i = alt_untrusted; | |
2922 | } | |
2923 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); | |
2924 | ||
fbb82a60 | 2925 | ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
2926 | |
2927 | if (ok < 0) { | |
2928 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 2929 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2930 | search = 0; |
2931 | continue; | |
2932 | } | |
2933 | ||
2934 | if (ok > 0) { | |
2935 | /* | |
2936 | * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? | |
2937 | * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now | |
2938 | * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note | |
2939 | * that despite the current trust-store match we might still | |
2940 | * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which | |
2941 | * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try | |
2942 | * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on | |
2943 | * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! | |
170b7358 VD |
2944 | * |
2945 | * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust | |
2946 | * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted | |
2947 | * certificate among the ones from the trust store. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2948 | */ |
2949 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { | |
2950 | OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0); | |
2951 | search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; | |
2952 | for (; num > i; --num) | |
2953 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
2954 | ctx->num_untrusted = num; | |
170b7358 VD |
2955 | |
2956 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
2957 | dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
2958 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
2959 | X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
2960 | dane->mcert = NULL; | |
2961 | } | |
2962 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
2963 | dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) | |
2964 | dane->pdpth = -1; | |
d9b8b89b VD |
2965 | } |
2966 | ||
2967 | /* | |
2968 | * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their | |
2969 | * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. | |
2970 | */ | |
2971 | if (ss == 0) { | |
2972 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { | |
2973 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
2974 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2975 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 2976 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
2977 | search = 0; |
2978 | continue; | |
2979 | } | |
2980 | ss = cert_self_signed(x); | |
2981 | } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { | |
2982 | /* | |
2983 | * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same | |
2984 | * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as | |
2985 | * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
2986 | * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. | |
2987 | */ | |
2988 | if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { | |
2989 | /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ | |
2990 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
2991 | ok = 0; | |
2992 | } else { | |
2993 | X509_free(x); | |
2994 | ctx->num_untrusted = --num; | |
2995 | (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); | |
2996 | } | |
2997 | } | |
2998 | ||
2999 | /* | |
3000 | * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck | |
3001 | * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. | |
3002 | * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer | |
3003 | * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. | |
170b7358 VD |
3004 | * |
3005 | * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the | |
3006 | * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE | |
3007 | * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from | |
3008 | * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the | |
3009 | * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted | |
3010 | * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3011 | */ |
3012 | if (ok) { | |
3013 | OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num); | |
3014 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
3015 | switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { | |
3016 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3017 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
3018 | search = 0; | |
3019 | continue; | |
3020 | } | |
3021 | if (ss == 0) | |
3022 | continue; | |
3023 | } | |
3024 | } | |
3025 | ||
3026 | /* | |
3027 | * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if | |
3028 | * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, | |
3029 | * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, | |
3030 | * and trying to extend the shorted chain. | |
3031 | */ | |
3032 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { | |
3033 | /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ | |
3034 | if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) | |
3035 | continue; | |
3036 | /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ | |
3037 | if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || | |
3038 | ctx->num_untrusted < 2) | |
3039 | break; | |
3040 | /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ | |
3041 | search |= S_DOALTERNATE; | |
3042 | alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; | |
3043 | ss = 0; | |
3044 | } | |
3045 | } | |
3046 | ||
3047 | /* | |
3048 | * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates | |
3049 | */ | |
3050 | if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { | |
3051 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
3052 | OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted); | |
3053 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3054 | |
3055 | /* | |
3056 | * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more | |
3057 | * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. | |
3058 | */ | |
fbb82a60 | 3059 | xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); |
d9b8b89b VD |
3060 | if (xtmp == NULL) { |
3061 | search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; | |
3062 | if (may_trusted) | |
3063 | search |= S_DOTRUSTED; | |
3064 | continue; | |
3065 | } | |
3066 | ||
fbb82a60 VD |
3067 | /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ |
3068 | (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); | |
3069 | ||
3070 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3071 | X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3072 | trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
f3e235ed | 3073 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; |
d9b8b89b VD |
3074 | search = 0; |
3075 | continue; | |
3076 | } | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3077 | |
3078 | X509_up_ref(x = xtmp); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3079 | ++ctx->num_untrusted; |
3080 | ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); | |
3081 | ||
170b7358 VD |
3082 | /* |
3083 | * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. | |
3084 | */ | |
3085 | switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) { | |
3086 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3087 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
3088 | search = 0; | |
3089 | continue; | |
3090 | } | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3091 | } |
3092 | } | |
3093 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
3094 | ||
3095 | /* | |
170b7358 VD |
3096 | * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key |
3097 | * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. | |
d9b8b89b | 3098 | */ |
497ecc0d VD |
3099 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
3100 | if (num <= depth) { | |
170b7358 VD |
3101 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) |
3102 | trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); | |
497ecc0d VD |
3103 | if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) |
3104 | trust = check_trust(ctx, num); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3105 | } |
3106 | ||
3107 | switch (trust) { | |
3108 | case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: | |
3109 | return 1; | |
3110 | case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: | |
70dd3c65 | 3111 | /* Callback already issued */ |
d9b8b89b VD |
3112 | return 0; |
3113 | case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: | |
3114 | default: | |
3115 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
d9b8b89b | 3116 | if (num > depth) |
70dd3c65 VD |
3117 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, |
3118 | X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); | |
3119 | if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && | |
3120 | (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0)) | |
3121 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); | |
3122 | if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
3123 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3124 | X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT); | |
3125 | if (ss) | |
3126 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3127 | X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); | |
3128 | if (ctx->num_untrusted < num) | |
3129 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3130 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT); | |
3131 | return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, | |
3132 | X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); | |
d9b8b89b VD |
3133 | } |
3134 | } | |
fbb82a60 VD |
3135 | |
3136 | static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; | |
3137 | static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); | |
3138 | ||
3139 | /* | |
3140 | * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of | |
3141 | * ``ctx``. | |
3142 | * | |
3143 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3144 | */ | |
3145 | static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3146 | { | |
3147 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); | |
3148 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3149 | ||
3150 | /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ | |
3151 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
3152 | return 0; | |
3153 | ||
3154 | if (level <= 0) | |
3155 | return 1; | |
3156 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) | |
3157 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3158 | ||
3159 | return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3160 | } | |
3161 | ||
3162 | /* | |
3163 | * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security | |
3164 | * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether | |
3165 | * self-signed or otherwise). | |
3166 | * | |
3167 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. | |
3168 | */ | |
3169 | static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) | |
3170 | { | |
3171 | int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert); | |
3172 | int mdnid = NID_undef; | |
3173 | int secbits = -1; | |
3174 | int level = ctx->param->auth_level; | |
3175 | ||
3176 | if (level <= 0) | |
3177 | return 1; | |
3178 | if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) | |
3179 | level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; | |
3180 | ||
3181 | /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ | |
3182 | if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) { | |
3183 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
3184 | ||
3185 | /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */ | |
3186 | if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL) | |
3187 | secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4; | |
3188 | } | |
3189 | ||
3190 | return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; | |
3191 | } |