]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
0f113f3e | 8 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
0f113f3e | 15 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
0f113f3e | 22 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
0f113f3e | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
d02b48c6 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
0f113f3e | 40 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
0f113f3e | 52 | * |
d02b48c6 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 62 | |
b39fc560 | 63 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
e3e57192 | 72 | #include "internal/x509_int.h" |
6c21b860 | 73 | #include "x509_lcl.h" |
d02b48c6 | 74 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
75 | /* CRL score values */ |
76 | ||
77 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
78 | ||
0f113f3e | 79 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 |
d43c4497 DSH |
80 | |
81 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
82 | ||
0f113f3e | 83 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 |
d43c4497 DSH |
84 | |
85 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
86 | ||
0f113f3e | 87 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 |
d43c4497 DSH |
88 | |
89 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
90 | ||
0f113f3e | 91 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 |
d43c4497 DSH |
92 | |
93 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
94 | ||
95 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
96 | ||
97 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
98 | ||
0f113f3e | 99 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 |
d43c4497 DSH |
100 | |
101 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
102 | ||
0f113f3e | 103 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 |
d43c4497 DSH |
104 | |
105 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
106 | ||
0f113f3e | 107 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 |
d43c4497 DSH |
108 | |
109 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
110 | ||
0f113f3e | 111 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 |
d43c4497 | 112 | |
0f113f3e | 113 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
114 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
115 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 116 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 117 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
3bf15e29 | 118 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 119 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
120 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
121 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 122 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
c9a81b30 | 123 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
4b96839f DSH |
124 | |
125 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e | 126 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); |
d43c4497 | 127 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
128 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); |
129 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
130 | int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
131 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
132 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
133 | int *pcrl_score); | |
4b96839f | 134 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e | 135 | unsigned int *preasons); |
9d84d4ed DSH |
136 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
137 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
138 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
139 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 140 | |
d02b48c6 | 141 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
d02b48c6 | 142 | |
6b691a5c | 143 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
0f113f3e MC |
144 | { |
145 | return ok; | |
146 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 147 | |
2da2ff50 DSH |
148 | /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ |
149 | static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
150 | { |
151 | X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); | |
152 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) | |
153 | return 1; | |
154 | else | |
155 | return 0; | |
156 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 157 | |
2dabd822 DSH |
158 | /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ |
159 | ||
160 | static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
161 | { |
162 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
163 | X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
164 | int i; | |
165 | /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
166 | certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
167 | if (certs == NULL) | |
168 | return NULL; | |
169 | /* Look for exact match */ | |
170 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
171 | xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
172 | if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
173 | break; | |
174 | } | |
175 | if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
05f0fb9f | 176 | X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
177 | else |
178 | xtmp = NULL; | |
179 | sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
180 | return xtmp; | |
181 | } | |
2dabd822 | 182 | |
6b691a5c | 183 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 184 | { |
da084a5e | 185 | X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; |
0f113f3e MC |
186 | int bad_chain = 0; |
187 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
188 | int depth, i, ok = 0; | |
da084a5e | 189 | int num, j, retry; |
0f113f3e MC |
190 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
191 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
192 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) { | |
193 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
194 | return -1; | |
195 | } | |
aae41f8c MC |
196 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) { |
197 | /* | |
198 | * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
199 | * cannot do another one. | |
200 | */ | |
201 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
202 | return -1; | |
203 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
204 | |
205 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
206 | ||
207 | /* | |
208 | * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
209 | * the first entry is in place | |
210 | */ | |
aae41f8c MC |
211 | if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
212 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { | |
213 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
214 | goto end; | |
0f113f3e | 215 | } |
05f0fb9f | 216 | X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); |
aae41f8c | 217 | ctx->last_untrusted = 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
218 | |
219 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | |
220 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | |
221 | && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
222 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
223 | goto end; | |
224 | } | |
225 | ||
226 | num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
227 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
228 | depth = param->depth; | |
229 | ||
230 | for (;;) { | |
231 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
232 | if (depth < num) | |
233 | break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | |
234 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | |
235 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code | |
236 | * later. */ | |
237 | ||
238 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
239 | if (cert_self_signed(x)) | |
240 | break; | |
241 | /* | |
242 | * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first | |
243 | */ | |
244 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { | |
245 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
246 | if (ok < 0) | |
55500ea7 | 247 | goto end; |
0f113f3e MC |
248 | /* |
249 | * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up | |
250 | * again later. | |
251 | */ | |
252 | if (ok > 0) { | |
253 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
254 | break; | |
255 | } | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
259 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { | |
260 | xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
261 | if (xtmp != NULL) { | |
262 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
263 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
264 | goto end; | |
265 | } | |
05f0fb9f | 266 | X509_up_ref(xtmp); |
0f113f3e MC |
267 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); |
268 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | |
269 | x = xtmp; | |
270 | num++; | |
271 | /* | |
272 | * reparse the full chain for the next one | |
273 | */ | |
274 | continue; | |
275 | } | |
276 | } | |
277 | break; | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
da084a5e MC |
280 | /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ |
281 | j = num; | |
0f113f3e MC |
282 | /* |
283 | * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. | |
284 | * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we | |
285 | * complain. | |
286 | */ | |
287 | ||
da084a5e MC |
288 | do { |
289 | /* | |
290 | * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. | |
291 | */ | |
292 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
293 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); | |
294 | if (cert_self_signed(x)) { | |
295 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
296 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { | |
297 | /* | |
298 | * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can | |
299 | * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
300 | * possible impersonation. | |
301 | */ | |
302 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
303 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { | |
304 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
305 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
306 | ctx->error_depth = i - 1; | |
307 | if (ok == 1) | |
308 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
309 | bad_chain = 1; | |
310 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
311 | if (!ok) | |
312 | goto end; | |
313 | } else { | |
314 | /* | |
315 | * We have a match: replace certificate with store | |
316 | * version so we get any trust settings. | |
317 | */ | |
318 | X509_free(x); | |
319 | x = xtmp; | |
320 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | |
321 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
322 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
323 | } else { |
324 | /* | |
da084a5e | 325 | * extract and save self signed certificate for later use |
0f113f3e | 326 | */ |
da084a5e MC |
327 | chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
328 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | |
329 | num--; | |
330 | j--; | |
331 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
0f113f3e | 332 | } |
0f113f3e | 333 | } |
da084a5e MC |
334 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ |
335 | for (;;) { | |
336 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
337 | if (depth < num) | |
338 | break; | |
339 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
340 | if (cert_self_signed(x)) | |
341 | break; | |
342 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
0f113f3e | 343 | |
da084a5e | 344 | if (ok < 0) |
55500ea7 | 345 | goto end; |
da084a5e MC |
346 | if (ok == 0) |
347 | break; | |
348 | x = xtmp; | |
349 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { | |
350 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
351 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
cc2829e6 IP |
352 | ok = 0; |
353 | goto done; | |
da084a5e MC |
354 | } |
355 | num++; | |
356 | } | |
0f113f3e | 357 | |
da084a5e MC |
358 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ |
359 | i = check_trust(ctx); | |
0f113f3e | 360 | |
da084a5e MC |
361 | /* If explicitly rejected error */ |
362 | if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
363 | goto end; | |
364 | /* | |
365 | * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative | |
366 | * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already | |
15dba5be MC |
367 | * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate |
368 | * chain checking | |
da084a5e MC |
369 | */ |
370 | retry = 0; | |
371 | if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED | |
15dba5be MC |
372 | && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) |
373 | && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { | |
da084a5e | 374 | while (j-- > 1) { |
e5991ec5 | 375 | STACK_OF(X509) *chtmp = ctx->chain; |
da084a5e | 376 | xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); |
e5991ec5 DSH |
377 | /* |
378 | * Temporarily set chain to NULL so we don't discount | |
379 | * duplicates: the same certificate could be an untrusted | |
380 | * CA found in the trusted store. | |
381 | */ | |
382 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
da084a5e | 383 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); |
e5991ec5 | 384 | ctx->chain = chtmp; |
da084a5e MC |
385 | if (ok < 0) |
386 | goto end; | |
387 | /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ | |
388 | if (ok > 0) { | |
389 | /* | |
390 | * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later | |
391 | */ | |
392 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
0f113f3e | 393 | |
da084a5e MC |
394 | /* |
395 | * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an | |
396 | * alternate chain | |
397 | */ | |
398 | while (num > j) { | |
399 | xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
400 | X509_free(xtmp); | |
401 | num--; | |
da084a5e | 402 | } |
2aacec8f | 403 | ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
da084a5e MC |
404 | retry = 1; |
405 | break; | |
406 | } | |
407 | } | |
0f113f3e | 408 | } |
da084a5e | 409 | } while (retry); |
0f113f3e | 410 | |
0f113f3e MC |
411 | /* |
412 | * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single | |
413 | * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already | |
414 | * and set bad_chain == 1 | |
415 | */ | |
416 | if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { | |
417 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { | |
418 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
419 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
420 | else | |
421 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
422 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
423 | } else { | |
424 | ||
425 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); | |
426 | num++; | |
427 | ctx->last_untrusted = num; | |
428 | ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; | |
429 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
430 | chain_ss = NULL; | |
431 | } | |
432 | ||
433 | ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
434 | bad_chain = 1; | |
435 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
436 | if (!ok) | |
437 | goto end; | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
440 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | |
441 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); | |
442 | ||
443 | if (!ok) | |
444 | goto end; | |
445 | ||
446 | /* Check name constraints */ | |
447 | ||
448 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
449 | ||
450 | if (!ok) | |
451 | goto end; | |
452 | ||
453 | ok = check_id(ctx); | |
454 | ||
455 | if (!ok) | |
456 | goto end; | |
457 | ||
458 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | |
459 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); | |
460 | ||
461 | /* | |
462 | * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because | |
463 | * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
464 | */ | |
465 | ||
466 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
467 | if (!ok) | |
468 | goto end; | |
469 | ||
470 | i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
471 | ctx->param->flags); | |
472 | if (i != X509_V_OK) { | |
473 | ctx->error = i; | |
474 | ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); | |
475 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
476 | if (!ok) | |
477 | goto end; | |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
480 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ | |
481 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
482 | ok = ctx->verify(ctx); | |
483 | else | |
484 | ok = internal_verify(ctx); | |
485 | if (!ok) | |
486 | goto end; | |
5d7c222d | 487 | |
47bbaa5b | 488 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
0f113f3e MC |
489 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
490 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
491 | if (!ok) | |
492 | goto end; | |
493 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
494 | if (!ok) | |
495 | goto end; | |
47bbaa5b | 496 | #endif |
96ea4ae9 | 497 | |
0f113f3e MC |
498 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
499 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
500 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
66696478 RS |
501 | if (ok) |
502 | goto done; | |
503 | ||
0f113f3e | 504 | end: |
66696478 RS |
505 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); |
506 | done: | |
222561fe RS |
507 | sk_X509_free(sktmp); |
508 | X509_free(chain_ss); | |
0f113f3e MC |
509 | return ok; |
510 | } | |
511 | ||
512 | /* | |
513 | * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
2f043896 DSH |
514 | */ |
515 | ||
516 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
517 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
518 | int i; |
519 | X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;; | |
520 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
521 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
522 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { | |
523 | rv = issuer; | |
524 | if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1)) | |
525 | break; | |
526 | } | |
527 | } | |
528 | return rv; | |
2f043896 DSH |
529 | } |
530 | ||
531 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
532 | ||
533 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
534 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
535 | int ret; |
536 | if (x == issuer) | |
537 | return cert_self_signed(x); | |
538 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
539 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) { | |
540 | int i; | |
541 | X509 *ch; | |
542 | /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ | |
543 | if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
544 | return 1; | |
545 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
546 | ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
547 | if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { | |
548 | ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; | |
549 | break; | |
550 | } | |
551 | } | |
552 | } | |
553 | ||
554 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
555 | return 1; | |
556 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
557 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
558 | return 0; | |
559 | ||
560 | ctx->error = ret; | |
561 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
562 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
563 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
564 | } |
565 | ||
566 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
567 | ||
568 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
569 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
570 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); |
571 | if (*issuer) { | |
05f0fb9f | 572 | X509_up_ref(*issuer); |
0f113f3e MC |
573 | return 1; |
574 | } else | |
575 | return 0; | |
2f043896 | 576 | } |
2f043896 | 577 | |
0f113f3e MC |
578 | /* |
579 | * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
580 | * purpose | |
11262391 DSH |
581 | */ |
582 | ||
30b415b0 | 583 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 584 | { |
0f113f3e MC |
585 | int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
586 | X509 *x; | |
587 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
588 | int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
589 | int purpose; | |
590 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
591 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
592 | ||
35a1cc90 MC |
593 | /*- |
594 | * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
595 | * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
596 | * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
597 | * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
598 | * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
599 | * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
600 | * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
601 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
602 | must_be_ca = -1; |
603 | ||
604 | /* CRL path validation */ | |
605 | if (ctx->parent) { | |
606 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
607 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
608 | } else { | |
609 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
610 | ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
611 | /* | |
612 | * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software | |
613 | * happy | |
614 | */ | |
615 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
616 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
617 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
618 | } | |
619 | ||
620 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
621 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { | |
622 | int ret; | |
623 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
624 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
625 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
626 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
627 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
628 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
629 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
630 | if (!ok) | |
631 | goto end; | |
632 | } | |
633 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
634 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
635 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
636 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
637 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
638 | if (!ok) | |
639 | goto end; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
642 | switch (must_be_ca) { | |
643 | case -1: | |
644 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
645 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { | |
646 | ret = 0; | |
647 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
648 | } else | |
649 | ret = 1; | |
650 | break; | |
651 | case 0: | |
652 | if (ret != 0) { | |
653 | ret = 0; | |
654 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
655 | } else | |
656 | ret = 1; | |
657 | break; | |
658 | default: | |
659 | if ((ret == 0) | |
660 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
661 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
662 | ret = 0; | |
663 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
664 | } else | |
665 | ret = 1; | |
666 | break; | |
667 | } | |
668 | if (ret == 0) { | |
669 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
670 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
671 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
672 | if (!ok) | |
673 | goto end; | |
674 | } | |
675 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { | |
676 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); | |
677 | if ((ret == 0) | |
678 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
679 | && (ret != 1))) { | |
680 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
681 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
682 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
683 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
684 | if (!ok) | |
685 | goto end; | |
686 | } | |
687 | } | |
688 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
689 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
690 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
691 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
692 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
693 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
694 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
695 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
696 | if (!ok) | |
697 | goto end; | |
698 | } | |
699 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
700 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
701 | plen++; | |
702 | /* | |
703 | * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
704 | * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
705 | * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
706 | */ | |
707 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
708 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
709 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
710 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
711 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
712 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
713 | if (!ok) | |
714 | goto end; | |
715 | } | |
716 | proxy_path_length++; | |
717 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
718 | } else | |
719 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
720 | } | |
721 | ok = 1; | |
82aec1cc | 722 | end: |
0f113f3e | 723 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
724 | } |
725 | ||
e9746e03 | 726 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
727 | { |
728 | X509 *x; | |
729 | int i, j, rv; | |
730 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
731 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
732 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
733 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
734 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
735 | continue; | |
736 | /* | |
737 | * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
738 | * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
739 | * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
740 | * to be obeyed. | |
741 | */ | |
742 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
743 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
744 | if (nc) { | |
745 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
746 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
747 | ctx->error = rv; | |
748 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
749 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
750 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
751 | return 0; | |
752 | } | |
753 | } | |
754 | } | |
755 | } | |
756 | return 1; | |
757 | } | |
e9746e03 | 758 | |
3bf15e29 | 759 | static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) |
0f113f3e MC |
760 | { |
761 | ctx->error = errcode; | |
762 | ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; | |
763 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
764 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
765 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 766 | |
8abffa4a | 767 | static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) |
0f113f3e MC |
768 | { |
769 | int i; | |
770 | int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); | |
771 | char *name; | |
772 | ||
a0724ef1 VD |
773 | if (id->peername != NULL) { |
774 | OPENSSL_free(id->peername); | |
775 | id->peername = NULL; | |
776 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
777 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { |
778 | name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); | |
779 | if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0) | |
780 | return 1; | |
781 | } | |
782 | return n == 0; | |
783 | } | |
8abffa4a | 784 | |
3bf15e29 | 785 | static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
786 | { |
787 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
788 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; | |
789 | X509 *x = ctx->cert; | |
790 | if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { | |
791 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) | |
792 | return 0; | |
793 | } | |
794 | if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { | |
795 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) | |
796 | return 0; | |
797 | } | |
798 | if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { | |
799 | if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) | |
800 | return 0; | |
801 | } | |
802 | return 1; | |
803 | } | |
3bf15e29 | 804 | |
51630a37 DSH |
805 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
806 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
807 | int i, ok; |
808 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
809 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
810 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
811 | /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ | |
812 | for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
813 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
814 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
815 | /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ | |
816 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | |
817 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
818 | /* | |
819 | * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not | |
820 | * overridden. | |
821 | */ | |
822 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
823 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
824 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
825 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
826 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
827 | if (!ok) | |
828 | return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
829 | } | |
830 | } | |
831 | /* | |
832 | * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate | |
833 | * return success. | |
834 | */ | |
835 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
836 | X509 *mx; | |
837 | if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) | |
838 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
839 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); | |
840 | mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); | |
841 | if (mx) { | |
842 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
843 | X509_free(x); | |
844 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
845 | return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
846 | } | |
847 | } | |
848 | ||
849 | /* | |
850 | * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
851 | * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
852 | */ | |
853 | return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 DSH |
854 | } |
855 | ||
b545dc67 | 856 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e | 857 | { |
4c9b0a03 | 858 | int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
859 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
860 | return 1; | |
861 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
862 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
863 | else { | |
864 | /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
865 | if (ctx->parent) | |
866 | return 1; | |
867 | last = 0; | |
868 | } | |
869 | for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
870 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
871 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
872 | if (!ok) | |
873 | return ok; | |
874 | } | |
875 | return 1; | |
876 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
877 | |
878 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
879 | { |
880 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
4c9b0a03 GK |
881 | X509 *x = NULL; |
882 | int ok = 0, cnum = 0; | |
883 | unsigned int last_reasons = 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
884 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
885 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
886 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
887 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
888 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
889 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
890 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
891 | last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
892 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
893 | if (ctx->get_crl) | |
894 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
895 | else | |
896 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
897 | /* | |
898 | * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
899 | */ | |
900 | if (!ok) { | |
901 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
902 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
903 | goto err; | |
904 | } | |
905 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
906 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
907 | if (!ok) | |
908 | goto err; | |
909 | ||
910 | if (dcrl) { | |
911 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
912 | if (!ok) | |
913 | goto err; | |
914 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
915 | if (!ok) | |
916 | goto err; | |
917 | } else | |
918 | ok = 1; | |
919 | ||
920 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
921 | if (ok != 2) { | |
922 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
923 | if (!ok) | |
924 | goto err; | |
925 | } | |
926 | ||
927 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
928 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
929 | crl = NULL; | |
930 | dcrl = NULL; | |
931 | /* | |
932 | * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
933 | * so exit loop. | |
934 | */ | |
935 | if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
936 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
937 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
938 | goto err; | |
939 | } | |
940 | } | |
941 | err: | |
942 | X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
943 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
944 | ||
945 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
946 | return ok; | |
947 | ||
948 | } | |
b545dc67 | 949 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
950 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
951 | ||
952 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
0f113f3e MC |
953 | { |
954 | time_t *ptime; | |
955 | int i; | |
956 | if (notify) | |
957 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
958 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
959 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
960 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
961 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
962 | else |
963 | ptime = NULL; | |
964 | ||
965 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
966 | if (i == 0) { | |
967 | if (!notify) | |
968 | return 0; | |
969 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
970 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
971 | return 0; | |
972 | } | |
973 | ||
974 | if (i > 0) { | |
975 | if (!notify) | |
976 | return 0; | |
977 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
978 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
979 | return 0; | |
980 | } | |
981 | ||
982 | if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
983 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
984 | ||
985 | if (i == 0) { | |
986 | if (!notify) | |
987 | return 0; | |
988 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
989 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
990 | return 0; | |
991 | } | |
992 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
993 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
994 | if (!notify) | |
995 | return 0; | |
996 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
997 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
998 | return 0; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | ||
1002 | if (notify) | |
1003 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
1004 | ||
1005 | return 1; | |
1006 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1007 | |
d43c4497 | 1008 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
0f113f3e MC |
1009 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, |
1010 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
1011 | { | |
1012 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
1013 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
1014 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
1015 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
1016 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1017 | ||
1018 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1019 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1020 | reasons = *preasons; | |
1021 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
1022 | ||
1023 | if (crl_score > best_score) { | |
1024 | best_crl = crl; | |
1025 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
1026 | best_score = crl_score; | |
1027 | best_reasons = reasons; | |
1028 | } | |
1029 | } | |
1030 | ||
1031 | if (best_crl) { | |
222561fe | 1032 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); |
0f113f3e MC |
1033 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
1034 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
1035 | *pscore = best_score; | |
1036 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
65cbf983 | 1037 | X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); |
25aaa98a RS |
1038 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); |
1039 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1040 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); |
1041 | } | |
1042 | ||
1043 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
1044 | return 1; | |
1045 | ||
1046 | return 0; | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | ||
1049 | /* | |
1050 | * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1051 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. |
1052 | */ | |
1053 | ||
1054 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1055 | { |
1056 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
1057 | int i; | |
1058 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
1059 | if (i >= 0) { | |
1060 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
1061 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
1062 | return 0; | |
1063 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
1064 | } else | |
1065 | exta = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1066 | |
0f113f3e | 1067 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); |
d43c4497 | 1068 | |
0f113f3e | 1069 | if (i >= 0) { |
d43c4497 | 1070 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1071 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) |
1072 | return 0; | |
1073 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
1074 | } else | |
1075 | extb = NULL; | |
d43c4497 | 1076 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1077 | if (!exta && !extb) |
1078 | return 1; | |
d43c4497 | 1079 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1080 | if (!exta || !extb) |
1081 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1082 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1083 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) |
1084 | return 0; | |
d43c4497 | 1085 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1086 | return 1; |
1087 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1088 | |
1089 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
1090 | ||
1091 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1092 | { |
1093 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
1094 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
1095 | return 0; | |
1096 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
1097 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
1098 | return 0; | |
1099 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
1100 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
1101 | return 0; | |
1102 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
1103 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
1104 | return 0; | |
1105 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
1106 | return 0; | |
1107 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
1108 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1109 | return 0; | |
1110 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
1111 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
1112 | return 1; | |
1113 | return 0; | |
1114 | } | |
1115 | ||
1116 | /* | |
1117 | * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
1118 | * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1119 | */ |
1120 | ||
1121 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1122 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
1123 | { | |
1124 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
1125 | int i; | |
1126 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
1127 | return; | |
1128 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
1129 | return; | |
1130 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
1131 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
1132 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
1133 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
1134 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
65cbf983 | 1135 | X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); |
0f113f3e MC |
1136 | *dcrl = delta; |
1137 | return; | |
1138 | } | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
1141 | } | |
1142 | ||
1143 | /* | |
1144 | * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
1145 | * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
1146 | * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
1147 | * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
1148 | * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
4b96839f DSH |
1149 | */ |
1150 | ||
1151 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1152 | unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) |
1153 | { | |
1154 | ||
1155 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1156 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
1157 | ||
1158 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
1159 | ||
1160 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
1161 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1162 | return 0; | |
1163 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
1164 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
1165 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
1166 | return 0; | |
1167 | } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
1168 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1169 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1170 | return 0; | |
1171 | } | |
1172 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1173 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1174 | return 0; | |
1175 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1176 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
1177 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1178 | return 0; | |
1179 | } else | |
1180 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1181 | ||
1182 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1183 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1184 | ||
1185 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1186 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1187 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1188 | ||
1189 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1190 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1191 | ||
1192 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1193 | ||
1194 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1195 | return 0; | |
1196 | ||
1197 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1198 | ||
1199 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
1200 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1201 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1202 | return 0; | |
1203 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1204 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1205 | } | |
1206 | ||
1207 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1208 | ||
1209 | return crl_score; | |
1210 | ||
1211 | } | |
4b96839f DSH |
1212 | |
1213 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1214 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) |
1215 | { | |
1216 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1217 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1218 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1219 | int i; | |
1220 | ||
1221 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1222 | cidx++; | |
1223 | ||
1224 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1225 | ||
1226 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1227 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
1228 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1229 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1230 | return; | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | } | |
1233 | ||
1234 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
1235 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1236 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1237 | continue; | |
1238 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1239 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1240 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1241 | return; | |
1242 | } | |
1243 | } | |
1244 | ||
1245 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1246 | ||
1247 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1248 | return; | |
1249 | ||
1250 | /* | |
1251 | * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
1252 | * untrusted certificates. | |
1253 | */ | |
1254 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
1255 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1256 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1257 | continue; | |
1258 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
1259 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1260 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1261 | return; | |
1262 | } | |
1263 | } | |
1264 | } | |
1265 | ||
1266 | /* | |
1267 | * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
9d84d4ed | 1268 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the |
0f113f3e MC |
1269 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will |
1270 | * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1271 | */ |
1272 | ||
1273 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1274 | { |
1275 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1276 | int ret; | |
1277 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1278 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1279 | return 0; | |
1280 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1281 | return -1; | |
1282 | ||
1283 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1284 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1285 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1286 | ||
1287 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1288 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1289 | ||
1290 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1291 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1292 | ||
1293 | if (ret <= 0) | |
1294 | goto err; | |
1295 | ||
1296 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1297 | ||
1298 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1299 | err: | |
1300 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1301 | return ret; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | /* | |
1305 | * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
1306 | * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
1307 | * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
1308 | * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
1309 | * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
1310 | * RFC5280 version | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1311 | */ |
1312 | ||
1313 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1314 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, |
1315 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1316 | { | |
1317 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1318 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1319 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1320 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1321 | return 1; | |
1322 | return 0; | |
1323 | } | |
9d84d4ed | 1324 | |
3a83462d MC |
1325 | /*- |
1326 | * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1327 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. |
1328 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1329 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1330 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1331 | */ |
1332 | ||
3e727a3b | 1333 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) |
0f113f3e MC |
1334 | { |
1335 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1336 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1337 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1338 | int i, j; | |
1339 | if (!a || !b) | |
1340 | return 1; | |
1341 | if (a->type == 1) { | |
1342 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1343 | return 0; | |
1344 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1345 | if (b->type == 1) { | |
1346 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1347 | return 0; | |
1348 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1349 | return 1; | |
1350 | else | |
1351 | return 0; | |
1352 | } | |
1353 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1354 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1355 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1356 | } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
1357 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1358 | return 0; | |
1359 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1360 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1361 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1362 | } | |
1363 | ||
1364 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1365 | if (nm) { | |
1366 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
1367 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1368 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1369 | continue; | |
1370 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1371 | return 1; | |
1372 | } | |
1373 | return 0; | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | ||
1376 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1377 | ||
1378 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
1379 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1380 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
1381 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1382 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1383 | return 1; | |
1384 | } | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | ||
1387 | return 0; | |
1388 | ||
1389 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1390 | |
4b96839f | 1391 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
0f113f3e MC |
1392 | { |
1393 | int i; | |
1394 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1395 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1396 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1397 | return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1398 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
1399 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1400 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1401 | continue; | |
1402 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1403 | return 1; | |
1404 | } | |
1405 | return 0; | |
1406 | } | |
d0fff69d | 1407 | |
4b96839f | 1408 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1409 | |
4b96839f | 1410 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
0f113f3e MC |
1411 | unsigned int *preasons) |
1412 | { | |
1413 | int i; | |
1414 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1415 | return 0; | |
1416 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
1417 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1418 | return 0; | |
1419 | } else { | |
1420 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1421 | return 0; | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1424 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
1425 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1426 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
1427 | if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
1428 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1429 | return 1; | |
1430 | } | |
1431 | } | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
1434 | && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
1435 | return 1; | |
1436 | return 0; | |
1437 | } | |
1438 | ||
1439 | /* | |
1440 | * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
1441 | * to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1442 | */ |
0f113f3e | 1443 | |
d43c4497 | 1444 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
1445 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) |
1446 | { | |
1447 | int ok; | |
1448 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1449 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1450 | unsigned int reasons; | |
1451 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1452 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1453 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1454 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1455 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1456 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1457 | ||
1458 | if (ok) | |
1459 | goto done; | |
1460 | ||
1461 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1462 | ||
1463 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1464 | ||
1465 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1466 | if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1467 | goto done; | |
1468 | ||
1469 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1470 | ||
1471 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1472 | ||
1473 | done: | |
1474 | ||
1475 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1476 | if (crl) { | |
1477 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1478 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1479 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1480 | *pcrl = crl; | |
1481 | *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1482 | return 1; | |
1483 | } | |
1484 | ||
1485 | return 0; | |
1486 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1487 | |
1488 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1489 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1490 | { |
1491 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1492 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1493 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1494 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1495 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1496 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1497 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1498 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1499 | ||
1500 | /* | |
1501 | * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
1502 | * certificate in chain. | |
1503 | */ | |
1504 | else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1505 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1506 | else { | |
1507 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1508 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1509 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
1510 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1511 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1512 | if (!ok) | |
1513 | goto err; | |
1514 | } | |
1515 | } | |
1516 | ||
1517 | if (issuer) { | |
1518 | /* | |
1519 | * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
1520 | */ | |
1521 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
1522 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1523 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1524 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
1525 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1526 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1527 | if (!ok) | |
1528 | goto err; | |
1529 | } | |
1530 | ||
1531 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
1532 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1533 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1534 | if (!ok) | |
1535 | goto err; | |
1536 | } | |
1537 | ||
1538 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
1539 | if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
1540 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1541 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1542 | if (!ok) | |
1543 | goto err; | |
1544 | } | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | ||
1547 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
1548 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1549 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1550 | if (!ok) | |
1551 | goto err; | |
1552 | } | |
1553 | ||
1554 | } | |
1555 | ||
1556 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
1557 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1558 | if (!ok) | |
1559 | goto err; | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | ||
1562 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
1563 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1564 | ||
1565 | if (!ikey) { | |
1566 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1567 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1568 | if (!ok) | |
1569 | goto err; | |
1570 | } else { | |
1571 | int rv; | |
1572 | rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
1573 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
1574 | ctx->error = rv; | |
1575 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1576 | if (!ok) | |
1577 | goto err; | |
1578 | } | |
1579 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1580 | if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
1581 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1582 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1583 | if (!ok) | |
1584 | goto err; | |
1585 | } | |
1586 | } | |
1587 | } | |
1588 | ||
1589 | ok = 1; | |
1590 | ||
1591 | err: | |
1592 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1593 | return ok; | |
1594 | } | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1595 | |
1596 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1597 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1598 | { |
1599 | int ok; | |
1600 | X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1601 | /* | |
1602 | * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
1603 | * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
1604 | * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
1605 | * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1606 | */ | |
1607 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1608 | && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
1609 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1610 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1611 | if (!ok) | |
1612 | return 0; | |
1613 | } | |
1614 | /* | |
1615 | * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
1616 | * is not removeFromCRL. | |
1617 | */ | |
1618 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
1619 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1620 | return 2; | |
1621 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1622 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1623 | if (!ok) | |
1624 | return 0; | |
1625 | } | |
1626 | ||
1627 | return 1; | |
1628 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1629 | |
5d7c222d | 1630 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1631 | { |
1632 | int ret; | |
1633 | if (ctx->parent) | |
1634 | return 1; | |
1635 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1636 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
1637 | if (ret == 0) { | |
1638 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1639 | return 0; | |
1640 | } | |
1641 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1642 | if (ret == -1) { | |
1643 | /* | |
1644 | * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
1645 | */ | |
1646 | X509 *x; | |
1647 | int i; | |
1648 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
1649 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1650 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1651 | continue; | |
1652 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1653 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1654 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1655 | return 0; | |
1656 | } | |
1657 | return 1; | |
1658 | } | |
1659 | if (ret == -2) { | |
1660 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1661 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1662 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1663 | } | |
1664 | ||
1665 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
1666 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1667 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1668 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1669 | return 0; | |
1670 | } | |
1671 | ||
1672 | return 1; | |
1673 | } | |
5d7c222d | 1674 | |
0930251d | 1675 | int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet) |
0f113f3e MC |
1676 | { |
1677 | time_t *ptime; | |
1678 | int i; | |
1679 | ||
1680 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1681 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
d35ff2c0 DW |
1682 | else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) |
1683 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1684 | else |
1685 | ptime = NULL; | |
1686 | ||
1687 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1688 | if (i == 0) { | |
1689 | if (quiet) | |
1690 | return 0; | |
1691 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1692 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1693 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1694 | return 0; | |
1695 | } | |
1696 | ||
1697 | if (i > 0) { | |
1698 | if (quiet) | |
1699 | return 0; | |
1700 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1701 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1702 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1703 | return 0; | |
1704 | } | |
1705 | ||
1706 | i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1707 | if (i == 0) { | |
1708 | if (quiet) | |
1709 | return 0; | |
1710 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1711 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1712 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1713 | return 0; | |
1714 | } | |
1715 | ||
1716 | if (i < 0) { | |
1717 | if (quiet) | |
1718 | return 0; | |
1719 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1720 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1721 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1722 | return 0; | |
1723 | } | |
1724 | ||
1725 | return 1; | |
1726 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 1727 | |
6b691a5c | 1728 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
1729 | { |
1730 | int ok = 0, n; | |
1731 | X509 *xs, *xi; | |
1732 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1733 | int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
1734 | ||
1735 | cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1736 | ||
1737 | n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
1738 | ctx->error_depth = n - 1; | |
1739 | n--; | |
1740 | xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1741 | ||
1742 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
1743 | xs = xi; | |
1744 | else { | |
1745 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
1746 | xs = xi; | |
1747 | goto check_cert; | |
1748 | } | |
1749 | if (n <= 0) { | |
1750 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1751 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1752 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
1753 | goto end; | |
1754 | } else { | |
1755 | n--; | |
1756 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1757 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1758 | } | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | ||
1761 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1762 | while (n >= 0) { | |
1763 | ctx->error_depth = n; | |
1764 | ||
1765 | /* | |
1766 | * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1767 | * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
1768 | * time. | |
1769 | */ | |
1770 | if (!xs->valid | |
1771 | && (xs != xi | |
1772 | || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { | |
1773 | if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { | |
1774 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1775 | ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
1776 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1777 | if (!ok) | |
1778 | goto end; | |
1779 | } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
1780 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1781 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1782 | ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
1783 | if (!ok) { | |
1784 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1785 | goto end; | |
1786 | } | |
1787 | } | |
1788 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1789 | pkey = NULL; | |
1790 | } | |
1791 | ||
1792 | xs->valid = 1; | |
1793 | ||
1794 | check_cert: | |
1795 | ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0); | |
1796 | if (!ok) | |
1797 | goto end; | |
1798 | ||
1799 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1800 | ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
1801 | ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
1802 | ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); | |
1803 | if (!ok) | |
1804 | goto end; | |
1805 | ||
1806 | n--; | |
1807 | if (n >= 0) { | |
1808 | xi = xs; | |
1809 | xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
1810 | } | |
1811 | } | |
1812 | ok = 1; | |
1813 | end: | |
1814 | return ok; | |
1815 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1816 | |
91b73acb | 1817 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 | 1818 | { |
0f113f3e | 1819 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1820 | } |
1821 | ||
91b73acb | 1822 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
0f113f3e MC |
1823 | { |
1824 | char *str; | |
1825 | ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1826 | long offset; | |
1827 | char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; | |
f48b83b4 | 1828 | int i, j, remaining; |
0f113f3e MC |
1829 | |
1830 | p = buff1; | |
f48b83b4 | 1831 | remaining = ctm->length; |
0f113f3e | 1832 | str = (char *)ctm->data; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1833 | /* |
1834 | * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the | |
1835 | * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
1836 | * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1837 | * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
1838 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1839 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1840 | /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ |
1841 | int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1842 | int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; | |
1843 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1844 | return 0; |
1845 | memcpy(p, str, 10); | |
1846 | p += 10; | |
1847 | str += 10; | |
f48b83b4 | 1848 | remaining -= 10; |
0f113f3e | 1849 | } else { |
f48b83b4 EK |
1850 | /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ |
1851 | int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; | |
1852 | int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; | |
1853 | if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1854 | return 0; |
1855 | memcpy(p, str, 12); | |
1856 | p += 12; | |
1857 | str += 12; | |
f48b83b4 | 1858 | remaining -= 12; |
0f113f3e MC |
1859 | } |
1860 | ||
1861 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { | |
1862 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1863 | *(p++) = '0'; | |
1864 | } else { | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1865 | /* SS (seconds) */ |
1866 | if (remaining < 2) | |
1867 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1868 | *(p++) = *(str++); |
1869 | *(p++) = *(str++); | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1870 | remaining -= 2; |
1871 | /* | |
1872 | * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... | |
1873 | * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. | |
1874 | * Can we just kill them altogether? | |
1875 | */ | |
1876 | if (remaining && *str == '.') { | |
0f113f3e | 1877 | str++; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1878 | remaining--; |
1879 | for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { | |
1880 | if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') | |
1881 | break; | |
1882 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1883 | } |
1884 | ||
1885 | } | |
1886 | *(p++) = 'Z'; | |
1887 | *(p++) = '\0'; | |
1888 | ||
f48b83b4 EK |
1889 | /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ |
1890 | if (!remaining) | |
1891 | return 0; | |
1892 | if (*str == 'Z') { | |
1893 | if (remaining != 1) | |
1894 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1895 | offset = 0; |
f48b83b4 EK |
1896 | } else { |
1897 | /* (+-)HHMM */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
1898 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
1899 | return 0; | |
f48b83b4 EK |
1900 | /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ |
1901 | if (remaining != 5) | |
1902 | return 0; | |
1903 | if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || | |
1904 | str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') | |
1905 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1906 | offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; |
1907 | offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); | |
1908 | if (*str == '-') | |
1909 | offset = -offset; | |
1910 | } | |
1911 | atm.type = ctm->type; | |
1912 | atm.flags = 0; | |
1913 | atm.length = sizeof(buff2); | |
1914 | atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1915 | ||
1916 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1917 | return 0; | |
1918 | ||
1919 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { | |
1920 | i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); | |
1921 | if (i < 50) | |
1922 | i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1923 | j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); | |
1924 | if (j < 50) | |
1925 | j += 100; | |
1926 | ||
1927 | if (i < j) | |
1928 | return -1; | |
1929 | if (i > j) | |
1930 | return 1; | |
1931 | } | |
1932 | i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); | |
1933 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1934 | return -1; | |
1935 | else | |
1936 | return i; | |
1937 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1938 | |
284ef5f3 | 1939 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 | 1940 | { |
0f113f3e | 1941 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); |
bbb72003 DSH |
1942 | } |
1943 | ||
87d3a0cd | 1944 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
0f113f3e MC |
1945 | { |
1946 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1947 | } | |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1948 | |
1949 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
0f113f3e MC |
1950 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1951 | { | |
1952 | time_t t; | |
1953 | ||
1954 | if (in_tm) | |
1955 | t = *in_tm; | |
1956 | else | |
1957 | time(&t); | |
1958 | ||
1959 | if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
1960 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1961 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1962 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1963 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1964 | } | |
1965 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1966 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1967 | |
7e258a56 | 1968 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
0f113f3e MC |
1969 | { |
1970 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; | |
1971 | int i, j; | |
1972 | ||
1973 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) | |
1974 | return 1; | |
1975 | ||
1976 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
1977 | ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); | |
1978 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1979 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1980 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1981 | return 0; | |
1982 | } | |
1983 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1984 | break; | |
c5ba2d99 RS |
1985 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
1986 | ktmp = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1987 | } |
1988 | if (ktmp == NULL) { | |
1989 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, | |
1990 | X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1991 | return 0; | |
1992 | } | |
1993 | ||
1994 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1995 | for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { | |
1996 | ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); | |
1997 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); | |
1998 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | ||
2001 | if (pkey != NULL) | |
2002 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); | |
2003 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
2004 | return 1; | |
2005 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2006 | |
2e8cb108 DSH |
2007 | /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ |
2008 | ||
2009 | X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2010 | EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) |
2011 | { | |
2012 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
2013 | int i; | |
2014 | STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
2015 | /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
2016 | if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
2017 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
2018 | return NULL; | |
2019 | } | |
2020 | /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
2021 | if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
2022 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
2023 | return NULL; | |
2024 | } | |
2025 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
2026 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
2027 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
2028 | return NULL; | |
2029 | } | |
2030 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
2031 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
2032 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
2033 | return NULL; | |
2034 | } | |
2035 | if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
2036 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
2037 | return NULL; | |
2038 | } | |
2039 | /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
2040 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
2041 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
2042 | return NULL; | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | /* CRLs must verify */ | |
2045 | if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
2046 | X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
2047 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
2048 | return NULL; | |
2049 | } | |
2050 | /* Create new CRL */ | |
2051 | crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
2052 | if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) | |
2053 | goto memerr; | |
2054 | /* Set issuer name */ | |
2055 | if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
2056 | goto memerr; | |
2057 | ||
2058 | if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) | |
2059 | goto memerr; | |
2060 | if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) | |
2061 | goto memerr; | |
2062 | ||
2063 | /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
2064 | ||
2065 | if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
2066 | goto memerr; | |
2067 | ||
2068 | /* | |
2069 | * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
2070 | * number to correct value too. | |
2071 | */ | |
2072 | ||
2073 | for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
2074 | X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
2075 | ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
2076 | if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
2077 | goto memerr; | |
2078 | } | |
2079 | ||
2080 | /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
2081 | ||
2082 | revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
2083 | ||
2084 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { | |
2085 | X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
2086 | rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); | |
2087 | /* | |
2088 | * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
2089 | * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
2090 | */ | |
2091 | if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { | |
2092 | rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); | |
2093 | if (!rvtmp) | |
2094 | goto memerr; | |
2095 | if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
2096 | X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
2097 | goto memerr; | |
2098 | } | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | } | |
2101 | /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
2102 | ||
2103 | if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
2104 | goto memerr; | |
2105 | ||
2106 | return crl; | |
2107 | ||
2108 | memerr: | |
2109 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
222561fe | 2110 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
0f113f3e MC |
2111 | return NULL; |
2112 | } | |
2113 | ||
2114 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, | |
2115 | CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | |
2116 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, | |
2117 | CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
2118 | { | |
2119 | /* | |
2120 | * This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
2121 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). | |
2122 | */ | |
2123 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
2124 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
2125 | } | |
58964a49 | 2126 | |
6b691a5c | 2127 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
0f113f3e MC |
2128 | { |
2129 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
2130 | } | |
58964a49 | 2131 | |
6b691a5c | 2132 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2133 | { |
2134 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
2135 | } | |
58964a49 | 2136 | |
6b691a5c | 2137 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2138 | { |
2139 | return ctx->error; | |
2140 | } | |
58964a49 | 2141 | |
6b691a5c | 2142 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
0f113f3e MC |
2143 | { |
2144 | ctx->error = err; | |
2145 | } | |
58964a49 | 2146 | |
6b691a5c | 2147 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2148 | { |
2149 | return ctx->error_depth; | |
2150 | } | |
58964a49 | 2151 | |
6b691a5c | 2152 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2153 | { |
2154 | return ctx->current_cert; | |
2155 | } | |
58964a49 | 2156 | |
7e258a56 | 2157 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2158 | { |
2159 | return ctx->chain; | |
2160 | } | |
58964a49 | 2161 | |
c7cb16a8 | 2162 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2163 | { |
2164 | if (!ctx->chain) | |
2165 | return NULL; | |
2166 | return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
2167 | } | |
25f923dd | 2168 | |
2008e714 | 2169 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2170 | { |
2171 | return ctx->current_issuer; | |
2172 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2173 | |
2174 | X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2175 | { |
2176 | return ctx->current_crl; | |
2177 | } | |
2008e714 DSH |
2178 | |
2179 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2180 | { |
2181 | return ctx->parent; | |
2182 | } | |
2008e714 | 2183 | |
6b691a5c | 2184 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
0f113f3e MC |
2185 | { |
2186 | ctx->cert = x; | |
2187 | } | |
58964a49 | 2188 | |
6b691a5c | 2189 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2190 | { |
2191 | ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
2192 | } | |
58964a49 | 2193 | |
e1a27eb3 | 2194 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
0f113f3e MC |
2195 | { |
2196 | ctx->crls = sk; | |
2197 | } | |
e1a27eb3 | 2198 | |
13938ace | 2199 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
0f113f3e MC |
2200 | { |
2201 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
2202 | } | |
11262391 | 2203 | |
bb7cd4e3 | 2204 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
0f113f3e MC |
2205 | { |
2206 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
2207 | } | |
2208 | ||
2209 | /* | |
2210 | * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
2211 | * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
2212 | * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
2213 | * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
2214 | * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
2215 | * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
2216 | * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
2217 | * client/server. | |
13938ace DSH |
2218 | */ |
2219 | ||
2220 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
0f113f3e MC |
2221 | int purpose, int trust) |
2222 | { | |
2223 | int idx; | |
2224 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
2225 | if (!purpose) | |
2226 | purpose = def_purpose; | |
2227 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
2228 | if (purpose) { | |
2229 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
2230 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
2231 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2232 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2233 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2234 | return 0; | |
2235 | } | |
2236 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2237 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
2238 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
2239 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2240 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2241 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
2242 | return 0; | |
2243 | } | |
2244 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
2245 | } | |
2246 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
2247 | if (!trust) | |
2248 | trust = ptmp->trust; | |
2249 | } | |
2250 | if (trust) { | |
2251 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
2252 | if (idx == -1) { | |
2253 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
2254 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
2255 | return 0; | |
2256 | } | |
2257 | } | |
2258 | ||
2259 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
2260 | ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
2261 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
2262 | ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
2263 | return 1; | |
51630a37 DSH |
2264 | } |
2265 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
2266 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
2267 | { | |
b51bce94 | 2268 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); |
b196e7d9 | 2269 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2270 | if (!ctx) { |
2271 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2272 | return NULL; | |
2273 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2274 | return ctx; |
2f043896 DSH |
2275 | } |
2276 | ||
2277 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2278 | { | |
222561fe RS |
2279 | if (!ctx) |
2280 | return; | |
0f113f3e MC |
2281 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); |
2282 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2f043896 DSH |
2283 | } |
2284 | ||
79aa04ef | 2285 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
0f113f3e MC |
2286 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
2287 | { | |
2288 | int ret = 1; | |
2289 | ctx->ctx = store; | |
2290 | ctx->current_method = 0; | |
2291 | ctx->cert = x509; | |
2292 | ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
2293 | ctx->crls = NULL; | |
2294 | ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
2295 | ctx->other_ctx = NULL; | |
2296 | ctx->valid = 0; | |
2297 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
2298 | ctx->error = 0; | |
2299 | ctx->explicit_policy = 0; | |
2300 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
2301 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
2302 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
2303 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
2304 | ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
2305 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
2306 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2307 | ctx->parent = NULL; | |
2308 | ||
2309 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
2310 | ||
2311 | if (!ctx->param) { | |
2312 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2313 | return 0; | |
2314 | } | |
2315 | ||
2316 | /* | |
2317 | * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
2318 | */ | |
2319 | ||
2320 | if (store) | |
2321 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2322 | else | |
2323 | ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2324 | ||
2325 | if (store) { | |
2326 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2327 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | |
2328 | } else | |
2329 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
2330 | ||
2331 | if (ret) | |
2332 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2333 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2334 | ||
2335 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2336 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2337 | return 0; | |
2338 | } | |
2339 | ||
2340 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
2341 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2342 | else | |
2343 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2344 | ||
2345 | if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2346 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2347 | else | |
2348 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2349 | ||
2350 | if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2351 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2352 | else | |
2353 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2354 | ||
2355 | if (store && store->verify) | |
2356 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2357 | else | |
2358 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2359 | ||
2360 | if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2361 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2362 | else | |
2363 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2364 | ||
2365 | if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2366 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
2367 | else | |
2368 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
2369 | ||
2370 | if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2371 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2372 | else | |
2373 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2374 | ||
2375 | if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2376 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2377 | else | |
2378 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2379 | ||
2380 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2381 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2382 | else | |
2383 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2384 | ||
2385 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2386 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2387 | else | |
2388 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2389 | ||
2390 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2391 | ||
2392 | /* | |
16f8d4eb RS |
2393 | * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we |
2394 | * put a corresponding "new" here. | |
0f113f3e | 2395 | */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2396 | if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, |
2397 | &(ctx->ex_data))) { | |
2398 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2399 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2400 | return 0; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | return 1; | |
2403 | } | |
2404 | ||
2405 | /* | |
2406 | * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
2407 | * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2f043896 DSH |
2408 | */ |
2409 | ||
2410 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2411 | { | |
0f113f3e MC |
2412 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; |
2413 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2414 | } |
2415 | ||
2416 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2417 | { |
2418 | if (ctx->cleanup) | |
2419 | ctx->cleanup(ctx); | |
2420 | if (ctx->param != NULL) { | |
2421 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2422 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2423 | ctx->param = NULL; | |
2424 | } | |
222561fe RS |
2425 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
2426 | ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2427 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
2428 | ctx->chain = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 2429 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
16f8d4eb | 2430 | memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); |
0f113f3e | 2431 | } |
13938ace | 2432 | |
5d7c222d | 2433 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
0f113f3e MC |
2434 | { |
2435 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2436 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2437 | |
5d7c222d | 2438 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
0f113f3e MC |
2439 | { |
2440 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2441 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2442 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2443 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, |
2444 | time_t t) | |
2445 | { | |
2446 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2447 | } | |
bbb72003 | 2448 | |
db089ad6 | 2449 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
0f113f3e MC |
2450 | int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) |
2451 | { | |
2452 | ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
2453 | } | |
db089ad6 | 2454 | |
5d7c222d | 2455 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
0f113f3e MC |
2456 | { |
2457 | return ctx->tree; | |
2458 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2459 | |
2460 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2461 | { |
2462 | return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2463 | } | |
5d7c222d | 2464 | |
7f3f41d8 MC |
2465 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2466 | { | |
2467 | return ctx->last_untrusted; | |
2468 | } | |
2469 | ||
5d7c222d | 2470 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) |
0f113f3e MC |
2471 | { |
2472 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2473 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2474 | if (!param) | |
2475 | return 0; | |
2476 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2477 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2478 | |
2479 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
0f113f3e MC |
2480 | { |
2481 | return ctx->param; | |
2482 | } | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2483 | |
2484 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
0f113f3e | 2485 | { |
222561fe | 2486 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |
0f113f3e MC |
2487 | ctx->param = param; |
2488 | } |