]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
d02b48c6 | 1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ |
58964a49 | 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
d02b48c6 RE |
3 | * All rights reserved. |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 | * | |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <time.h> | |
61 | #include <errno.h> | |
d02b48c6 RE |
62 | |
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | |
17f389bb | 64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
ec577822 BM |
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> |
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11262391 | 70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
ec577822 | 71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
d02b48c6 | 72 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
73 | /* CRL score values */ |
74 | ||
75 | /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
76 | ||
77 | #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 | |
78 | ||
79 | /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
80 | ||
81 | #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 | |
82 | ||
83 | /* CRL times valid */ | |
84 | ||
85 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 | |
86 | ||
87 | /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
88 | ||
89 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 | |
90 | ||
91 | /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
92 | ||
93 | #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
94 | ||
95 | /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
96 | ||
97 | #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 | |
98 | ||
99 | /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
100 | ||
101 | #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 | |
102 | ||
103 | /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
104 | ||
105 | #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 | |
106 | ||
107 | /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
108 | ||
109 | #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 | |
110 | ||
d02b48c6 | 111 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); |
2f043896 DSH |
112 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); |
113 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
30b415b0 | 114 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
e9746e03 | 115 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
51630a37 | 116 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
117 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
118 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
5d7c222d | 119 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
4b96839f DSH |
120 | |
121 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
122 | unsigned int *preasons, | |
123 | X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); | |
d43c4497 DSH |
124 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
125 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); | |
126 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, | |
127 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
4b96839f DSH |
128 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, |
129 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); | |
130 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, | |
131 | unsigned int *preasons); | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
132 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); |
133 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
134 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
135 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
4b96839f | 136 | |
d02b48c6 | 137 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); |
560b79cb | 138 | const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
b4cadc6e | 139 | |
d02b48c6 | 140 | |
6b691a5c | 141 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) |
d02b48c6 | 142 | { |
f684090c | 143 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
144 | } |
145 | ||
146 | #if 0 | |
6b691a5c | 147 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) |
d02b48c6 | 148 | { |
f684090c | 149 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); |
d02b48c6 RE |
150 | } |
151 | #endif | |
152 | ||
6b691a5c | 153 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
d02b48c6 RE |
154 | { |
155 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | |
156 | X509_NAME *xn; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
157 | int bad_chain = 0; |
158 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
d02b48c6 RE |
159 | int depth,i,ok=0; |
160 | int num; | |
2c45bf2b | 161 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
f73e07cf | 162 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; |
d02b48c6 RE |
163 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) |
164 | { | |
165 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
f684090c | 166 | return -1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
167 | } |
168 | ||
2f043896 | 169 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
d02b48c6 RE |
170 | |
171 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | |
172 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | |
173 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | |
174 | { | |
7e258a56 BL |
175 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || |
176 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
177 | { |
178 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
179 | goto end; | |
180 | } | |
181 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
182 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | |
183 | } | |
184 | ||
f76d8c47 | 185 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ |
f73e07cf BL |
186 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL |
187 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
188 | { |
189 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
190 | goto end; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
7e258a56 BL |
193 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
194 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | |
5d7c222d | 195 | depth=param->depth; |
d02b48c6 RE |
196 | |
197 | ||
198 | for (;;) | |
199 | { | |
200 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
d797727b | 201 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take |
a9642be6 BM |
202 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the |
203 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | |
204 | * code later. | |
205 | */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
206 | |
207 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
208 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 | 209 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; |
d02b48c6 RE |
210 | |
211 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
212 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | |
213 | { | |
2f043896 | 214 | xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); |
d02b48c6 RE |
215 | if (xtmp != NULL) |
216 | { | |
7e258a56 | 217 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
218 | { |
219 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
220 | goto end; | |
221 | } | |
222 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
a6fbcb42 | 223 | (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); |
d02b48c6 RE |
224 | ctx->last_untrusted++; |
225 | x=xtmp; | |
226 | num++; | |
227 | /* reparse the full chain for | |
228 | * the next one */ | |
229 | continue; | |
230 | } | |
231 | } | |
232 | break; | |
233 | } | |
234 | ||
235 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | |
236 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | |
237 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | |
238 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
239 | /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it |
240 | * is self signed. | |
241 | */ | |
242 | ||
7e258a56 BL |
243 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
244 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | |
f76d8c47 | 245 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); |
2f043896 | 246 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
247 | { |
248 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
7e258a56 | 249 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) |
d02b48c6 | 250 | { |
f76d8c47 DSH |
251 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if |
252 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | |
253 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. | |
254 | */ | |
2f043896 DSH |
255 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
256 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | |
f76d8c47 DSH |
257 | { |
258 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
259 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
260 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | |
b7c190d9 | 261 | if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); |
5d7c222d | 262 | bad_chain = 1; |
f76d8c47 DSH |
263 | ok=cb(0,ctx); |
264 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
265 | } | |
266 | else | |
267 | { | |
268 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | |
269 | * so we get any trust settings. | |
270 | */ | |
271 | X509_free(x); | |
2f043896 | 272 | x = xtmp; |
56c7754c | 273 | (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); |
f76d8c47 DSH |
274 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; |
275 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
276 | } |
277 | else | |
278 | { | |
2f043896 | 279 | /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ |
7e258a56 | 280 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); |
d02b48c6 RE |
281 | ctx->last_untrusted--; |
282 | num--; | |
7e258a56 | 283 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); |
d02b48c6 RE |
284 | } |
285 | } | |
286 | ||
287 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
288 | for (;;) | |
289 | { | |
290 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
7f89714e | 291 | if (depth < num) break; |
d02b48c6 RE |
292 | |
293 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
294 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 | 295 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; |
d02b48c6 | 296 | |
2f043896 DSH |
297 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); |
298 | ||
299 | if (ok < 0) return ok; | |
b7c190d9 | 300 | if (ok == 0) break; |
2f043896 DSH |
301 | |
302 | x = xtmp; | |
303 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) | |
d02b48c6 | 304 | { |
2f043896 | 305 | X509_free(xtmp); |
d02b48c6 | 306 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
f684090c | 307 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
308 | } |
309 | num++; | |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
312 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
313 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2f043896 DSH |
314 | |
315 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | |
316 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | |
d02b48c6 | 317 | { |
2f043896 | 318 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
319 | { |
320 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
321 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
322 | else | |
323 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
324 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
325 | } | |
326 | else | |
327 | { | |
328 | ||
7e258a56 | 329 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); |
d02b48c6 RE |
330 | num++; |
331 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | |
332 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | |
333 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
334 | chain_ss=NULL; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | |
5d7c222d | 338 | bad_chain = 1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
339 | ok=cb(0,ctx); |
340 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
341 | } | |
342 | ||
11262391 | 343 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ |
30b415b0 | 344 | ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); |
11262391 | 345 | |
b7c190d9 | 346 | if (!ok) goto end; |
11262391 | 347 | |
e9746e03 DSH |
348 | /* Check name constraints */ |
349 | ||
350 | ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
351 | ||
352 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
353 | ||
51630a37 DSH |
354 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ |
355 | ||
5d7c222d | 356 | if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); |
51630a37 | 357 | |
b7c190d9 | 358 | if (!ok) goto end; |
51630a37 | 359 | |
d02b48c6 RE |
360 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ |
361 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | |
362 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
363 | /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters |
364 | * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
365 | */ | |
366 | ||
367 | ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
368 | if(!ok) goto end; | |
369 | ||
5d7c222d | 370 | /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ |
2f043896 DSH |
371 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) |
372 | ok=ctx->verify(ctx); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
373 | else |
374 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | |
5d7c222d DSH |
375 | if(!ok) goto end; |
376 | ||
10ca15f3 | 377 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
96ea4ae9 BL |
378 | /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ |
379 | ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
380 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
381 | ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
382 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
383 | #endif | |
384 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
385 | /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ |
386 | if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
387 | ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
388 | if(!ok) goto end; | |
dfeab068 RE |
389 | if (0) |
390 | { | |
d02b48c6 | 391 | end: |
dfeab068 RE |
392 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); |
393 | } | |
f73e07cf | 394 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); |
d02b48c6 | 395 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); |
f684090c | 396 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
397 | } |
398 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
399 | |
400 | /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
401 | */ | |
402 | ||
403 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
404 | { | |
405 | int i; | |
406 | X509 *issuer; | |
b7c190d9 | 407 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) |
82aec1cc | 408 | { |
2f043896 | 409 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); |
b7c190d9 | 410 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) |
82aec1cc BM |
411 | return issuer; |
412 | } | |
2f043896 DSH |
413 | return NULL; |
414 | } | |
415 | ||
416 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
417 | ||
418 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
419 | { | |
420 | int ret; | |
421 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
82aec1cc BM |
422 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) |
423 | return 1; | |
dbba890c | 424 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ |
5d7c222d | 425 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) |
dbba890c DSH |
426 | return 0; |
427 | ||
428 | ctx->error = ret; | |
429 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
430 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
bdee69f7 | 431 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
2f043896 DSH |
432 | return 0; |
433 | } | |
434 | ||
435 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
436 | ||
437 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
438 | { | |
439 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | |
82aec1cc BM |
440 | if (*issuer) |
441 | { | |
2f043896 DSH |
442 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
443 | return 1; | |
82aec1cc BM |
444 | } |
445 | else | |
446 | return 0; | |
2f043896 DSH |
447 | } |
448 | ||
449 | ||
11262391 DSH |
450 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency |
451 | * with the supplied purpose | |
452 | */ | |
453 | ||
30b415b0 | 454 | static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
11262391 | 455 | { |
cf1b7d96 | 456 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
11262391 DSH |
457 | return 1; |
458 | #else | |
db50661f | 459 | int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; |
11262391 | 460 | X509 *x; |
2c45bf2b | 461 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
6951c23a | 462 | int proxy_path_length = 0; |
9d84d4ed DSH |
463 | int purpose; |
464 | int allow_proxy_certs; | |
b392e520 | 465 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
30b415b0 RL |
466 | |
467 | /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
468 | -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
469 | use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
470 | 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
471 | used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
472 | 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
473 | all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
474 | */ | |
475 | must_be_ca = -1; | |
d9bfe4f9 | 476 | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
477 | /* CRL path validation */ |
478 | if (ctx->parent) | |
479 | { | |
480 | allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
481 | purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
482 | } | |
483 | else | |
484 | { | |
485 | allow_proxy_certs = | |
486 | !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
487 | /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their | |
488 | software happy */ | |
489 | if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
490 | allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
491 | purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
492 | } | |
d9bfe4f9 | 493 | |
11262391 | 494 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ |
b7c190d9 | 495 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) |
82aec1cc | 496 | { |
bc501570 | 497 | int ret; |
11262391 | 498 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); |
5d7c222d | 499 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
f1558bb4 DSH |
500 | && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) |
501 | { | |
502 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
503 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
504 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
505 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
506 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
507 | } | |
d9bfe4f9 RL |
508 | if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) |
509 | { | |
510 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
511 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
512 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
513 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
514 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
515 | } | |
30b415b0 RL |
516 | ret = X509_check_ca(x); |
517 | switch(must_be_ca) | |
82aec1cc | 518 | { |
30b415b0 RL |
519 | case -1: |
520 | if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
521 | && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) | |
522 | { | |
523 | ret = 0; | |
82aec1cc | 524 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; |
30b415b0 | 525 | } |
82aec1cc | 526 | else |
30b415b0 RL |
527 | ret = 1; |
528 | break; | |
529 | case 0: | |
530 | if (ret != 0) | |
531 | { | |
532 | ret = 0; | |
533 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
534 | } | |
535 | else | |
536 | ret = 1; | |
537 | break; | |
538 | default: | |
539 | if ((ret == 0) | |
540 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
541 | && (ret != 1))) | |
542 | { | |
543 | ret = 0; | |
544 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
545 | } | |
546 | else | |
547 | ret = 1; | |
548 | break; | |
549 | } | |
550 | if (ret == 0) | |
551 | { | |
11262391 DSH |
552 | ctx->error_depth = i; |
553 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
554 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
82aec1cc BM |
555 | if (!ok) goto end; |
556 | } | |
30b415b0 RL |
557 | if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) |
558 | { | |
9d84d4ed | 559 | ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); |
30b415b0 RL |
560 | if ((ret == 0) |
561 | || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
562 | && (ret != 1))) | |
563 | { | |
564 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
565 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
566 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
567 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
568 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
569 | } | |
570 | } | |
db50661f DSH |
571 | /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ |
572 | if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
573 | && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
574 | && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) | |
82aec1cc | 575 | { |
11262391 DSH |
576 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; |
577 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
578 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
579 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
82aec1cc BM |
580 | if (!ok) goto end; |
581 | } | |
db50661f DSH |
582 | /* Increment path length if not self issued */ |
583 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
584 | plen++; | |
6951c23a RL |
585 | /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next |
586 | certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE | |
587 | certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a | |
588 | CA certificate. */ | |
589 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) | |
590 | { | |
591 | if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) | |
592 | { | |
593 | ctx->error = | |
594 | X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
595 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
596 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
597 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
598 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
599 | } | |
600 | proxy_path_length++; | |
601 | must_be_ca = 0; | |
602 | } | |
603 | else | |
604 | must_be_ca = 1; | |
11262391 | 605 | } |
11262391 | 606 | ok = 1; |
82aec1cc | 607 | end: |
f684090c | 608 | return ok; |
11262391 DSH |
609 | #endif |
610 | } | |
611 | ||
e9746e03 DSH |
612 | static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
613 | { | |
614 | X509 *x; | |
615 | int i, j, rv; | |
616 | /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
617 | for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) | |
618 | { | |
619 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
620 | /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
621 | if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
622 | continue; | |
623 | /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in | |
624 | * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly | |
625 | * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be | |
626 | * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. | |
627 | */ | |
628 | for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) | |
629 | { | |
630 | NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
631 | if (nc) | |
632 | { | |
633 | rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
634 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
635 | { | |
636 | ctx->error = rv; | |
637 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
638 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
639 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) | |
640 | return 0; | |
641 | } | |
642 | } | |
643 | } | |
644 | } | |
645 | return 1; | |
646 | } | |
647 | ||
51630a37 DSH |
648 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
649 | { | |
cf1b7d96 | 650 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY |
51630a37 DSH |
651 | return 1; |
652 | #else | |
653 | int i, ok; | |
654 | X509 *x; | |
2c45bf2b | 655 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
2f043896 | 656 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
51630a37 DSH |
657 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ |
658 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
659 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
5d7c222d | 660 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); |
82aec1cc BM |
661 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) |
662 | return 1; | |
b545dc67 | 663 | ctx->error_depth = i; |
51630a37 | 664 | ctx->current_cert = x; |
82aec1cc BM |
665 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) |
666 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
667 | else | |
668 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
51630a37 | 669 | ok = cb(0, ctx); |
f684090c | 670 | return ok; |
51630a37 DSH |
671 | #endif |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
674 | static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
675 | { | |
676 | int i, last, ok; | |
5d7c222d | 677 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) |
b545dc67 | 678 | return 1; |
5d7c222d | 679 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) |
b545dc67 | 680 | last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; |
50078051 DSH |
681 | else |
682 | last = 0; | |
b545dc67 DSH |
683 | for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) |
684 | { | |
685 | ctx->error_depth = i; | |
686 | ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
687 | if (!ok) return ok; | |
688 | } | |
689 | return 1; | |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
692 | static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
693 | { | |
d43c4497 | 694 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; |
b545dc67 DSH |
695 | X509 *x; |
696 | int ok, cnum; | |
697 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
698 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
699 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
5cbd2033 | 700 | ctx->current_issuer = NULL; |
4b96839f DSH |
701 | ctx->current_reasons = 0; |
702 | while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) | |
b545dc67 | 703 | { |
4b96839f | 704 | /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ |
d43c4497 DSH |
705 | if (ctx->get_crl) |
706 | ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
707 | else | |
708 | ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
4b96839f DSH |
709 | /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except |
710 | * notify callback | |
711 | */ | |
712 | if(!ok) | |
713 | { | |
714 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
715 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
716 | goto err; | |
717 | } | |
718 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
719 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
720 | if (!ok) | |
721 | goto err; | |
d43c4497 DSH |
722 | |
723 | if (dcrl) | |
724 | { | |
725 | ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
726 | if (!ok) | |
727 | goto err; | |
728 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
729 | if (!ok) | |
730 | goto err; | |
731 | } | |
732 | else | |
733 | ok = 1; | |
734 | ||
735 | /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
736 | if (ok != 2) | |
737 | { | |
738 | ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
739 | if (!ok) | |
740 | goto err; | |
741 | } | |
742 | ||
4b96839f | 743 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
d43c4497 | 744 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); |
4b96839f | 745 | crl = NULL; |
d43c4497 | 746 | dcrl = NULL; |
b545dc67 | 747 | } |
b545dc67 | 748 | err: |
b545dc67 | 749 | X509_CRL_free(crl); |
d43c4497 DSH |
750 | X509_CRL_free(dcrl); |
751 | ||
4b96839f | 752 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; |
b545dc67 DSH |
753 | return ok; |
754 | ||
755 | } | |
756 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
757 | /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ |
758 | ||
759 | static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
760 | { | |
761 | time_t *ptime; | |
762 | int i; | |
4b96839f DSH |
763 | if (notify) |
764 | ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
765 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
766 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
767 | else |
768 | ptime = NULL; | |
769 | ||
770 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
771 | if (i == 0) | |
772 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
773 | if (!notify) |
774 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 775 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; |
4b96839f | 776 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
777 | return 0; |
778 | } | |
779 | ||
780 | if (i > 0) | |
781 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
782 | if (!notify) |
783 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 784 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; |
4b96839f | 785 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
786 | return 0; |
787 | } | |
788 | ||
789 | if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) | |
790 | { | |
791 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
792 | ||
793 | if (i == 0) | |
794 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
795 | if (!notify) |
796 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 797 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; |
4b96839f | 798 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
799 | return 0; |
800 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
801 | /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ |
802 | if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) | |
e1a27eb3 | 803 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
804 | if (!notify) |
805 | return 0; | |
e1a27eb3 | 806 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; |
4b96839f | 807 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
808 | return 0; |
809 | } | |
810 | } | |
811 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
812 | if (notify) |
813 | ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
814 | |
815 | return 1; | |
816 | } | |
817 | ||
d43c4497 DSH |
818 | static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, |
819 | X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, | |
4b96839f | 820 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) |
e1a27eb3 | 821 | { |
4b96839f | 822 | int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; |
43048d13 | 823 | unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; |
4b96839f | 824 | X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; |
e1a27eb3 | 825 | X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; |
fa0f834c | 826 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; |
43048d13 | 827 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
828 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) |
829 | { | |
830 | crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
4b96839f DSH |
831 | reasons = *preasons; |
832 | crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
bc7535bc DSH |
833 | |
834 | if (crl_score > best_score) | |
835 | { | |
836 | best_crl = crl; | |
5cbd2033 | 837 | best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; |
bc7535bc | 838 | best_score = crl_score; |
4b96839f | 839 | best_reasons = reasons; |
bc7535bc | 840 | } |
e1a27eb3 | 841 | } |
4b96839f | 842 | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
843 | if (best_crl) |
844 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
845 | if (*pcrl) |
846 | X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
e1a27eb3 | 847 | *pcrl = best_crl; |
4b96839f DSH |
848 | *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; |
849 | *pscore = best_score; | |
850 | *preasons = best_reasons; | |
d43c4497 DSH |
851 | CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); |
852 | if (*pdcrl) | |
853 | { | |
854 | X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); | |
855 | *pdcrl = NULL; | |
856 | } | |
857 | get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); | |
e1a27eb3 | 858 | } |
5cbd2033 | 859 | |
4b96839f DSH |
860 | if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) |
861 | return 1; | |
862 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
863 | return 0; |
864 | } | |
865 | ||
d43c4497 DSH |
866 | /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be |
867 | * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. | |
868 | */ | |
869 | ||
870 | static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
871 | { | |
872 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
873 | int i; | |
874 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0); | |
875 | if (i >= 0) | |
876 | { | |
877 | /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
878 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
879 | return 0; | |
880 | exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
881 | } | |
882 | else | |
883 | exta = NULL; | |
884 | ||
885 | i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0); | |
886 | ||
887 | if (i >= 0) | |
888 | { | |
889 | ||
890 | if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) | |
891 | return 0; | |
892 | extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
893 | } | |
894 | else | |
895 | extb = NULL; | |
896 | ||
897 | if (!exta && !extb) | |
898 | return 1; | |
899 | ||
900 | if (!exta || !extb) | |
901 | return 0; | |
902 | ||
903 | ||
904 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) | |
905 | return 0; | |
906 | ||
907 | return 1; | |
908 | } | |
909 | ||
910 | /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
911 | ||
912 | static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
913 | { | |
914 | /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
915 | if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
916 | return 0; | |
917 | /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
918 | if (!base->crl_number) | |
919 | return 0; | |
920 | /* Issuer names must match */ | |
921 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), | |
922 | X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
923 | return 0; | |
924 | /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
925 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
926 | return 0; | |
927 | if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
928 | return 0; | |
929 | /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
930 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
931 | return 0; | |
932 | /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
933 | if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
934 | return 1; | |
935 | return 0; | |
936 | } | |
937 | ||
938 | /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring | |
939 | * or retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
940 | */ | |
941 | ||
942 | static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
943 | X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
944 | { | |
945 | X509_CRL *delta; | |
946 | int i; | |
947 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
948 | return; | |
949 | if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
950 | return; | |
951 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) | |
952 | { | |
953 | delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
954 | if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) | |
955 | { | |
956 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
957 | *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
958 | CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
959 | *dcrl = delta; | |
960 | return; | |
961 | } | |
962 | } | |
963 | *dcrl = NULL; | |
964 | } | |
965 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
966 | /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. |
967 | * The return value is a mask of several criteria. | |
968 | * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. | |
969 | * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if | |
970 | * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
971 | */ | |
972 | ||
973 | static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
974 | unsigned int *preasons, | |
975 | X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
976 | { | |
977 | ||
978 | int crl_score = 0; | |
979 | unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
980 | ||
981 | /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
982 | ||
983 | /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
984 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
985 | return 0; | |
986 | /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
987 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
988 | { | |
989 | if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
990 | return 0; | |
991 | } | |
992 | else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) | |
993 | { | |
994 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
995 | if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
996 | return 0; | |
997 | } | |
d43c4497 DSH |
998 | /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ |
999 | else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1000 | return 0; | |
4b96839f DSH |
1001 | /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ |
1002 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) | |
1003 | { | |
1004 | if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1005 | return 0; | |
1006 | } | |
1007 | else | |
1008 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1009 | ||
1010 | if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1011 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1012 | ||
1013 | /* Check expiry */ | |
1014 | if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1015 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1016 | ||
1017 | /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1018 | crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1019 | ||
1020 | /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1021 | ||
1022 | if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1023 | return 0; | |
1024 | ||
1025 | /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1026 | ||
1027 | if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) | |
1028 | { | |
1029 | /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1030 | if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1031 | return 0; | |
1032 | tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1033 | crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1034 | } | |
1035 | ||
1036 | *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1037 | ||
1038 | return crl_score; | |
1039 | ||
1040 | } | |
1041 | ||
1042 | static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
1043 | X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) | |
bc7535bc | 1044 | { |
4b96839f | 1045 | X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; |
d0fff69d | 1046 | X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); |
bc7535bc | 1047 | int cidx = ctx->error_depth; |
2e0c7db9 | 1048 | int i; |
4b96839f | 1049 | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1050 | if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) |
1051 | cidx++; | |
4b96839f | 1052 | |
5cbd2033 | 1053 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
4b96839f | 1054 | |
5cbd2033 | 1055 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) |
4b96839f DSH |
1056 | { |
1057 | if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) | |
1058 | { | |
1059 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1060 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1061 | return; | |
1062 | } | |
1063 | } | |
1064 | ||
d0fff69d | 1065 | for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) |
5cbd2033 | 1066 | { |
d0fff69d DSH |
1067 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); |
1068 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1069 | continue; | |
1070 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
5cbd2033 | 1071 | { |
4b96839f | 1072 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; |
d0fff69d | 1073 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
4b96839f | 1074 | return; |
5cbd2033 DSH |
1075 | } |
1076 | } | |
2e0c7db9 | 1077 | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1078 | /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ |
1079 | ||
1080 | if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
4b96839f | 1081 | return; |
9d84d4ed | 1082 | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
1083 | /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the |
1084 | * set of untrusted certificates. | |
1085 | */ | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
1086 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) |
1087 | { | |
1088 | crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
4b96839f | 1089 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
1090 | continue; |
1091 | if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
1092 | { | |
4b96839f DSH |
1093 | *pissuer = crl_issuer; |
1094 | *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1095 | return; | |
2e0c7db9 DSH |
1096 | } |
1097 | } | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1098 | } |
1099 | ||
9d84d4ed DSH |
1100 | /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new |
1101 | * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the | |
1102 | * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking | |
1103 | * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in | |
1104 | * practice. | |
1105 | */ | |
1106 | ||
1107 | static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
1108 | { | |
1109 | X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1110 | int ret; | |
4b96839f | 1111 | /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1112 | if (ctx->parent) |
1113 | return 0; | |
1114 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1115 | return -1; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1118 | /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1119 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1120 | ||
1121 | crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1122 | crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1123 | ||
1124 | /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1125 | ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1126 | ||
e5fa864f | 1127 | if (ret <= 0) |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1128 | goto err; |
1129 | ||
1130 | /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1131 | ||
1132 | ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1133 | err: |
1134 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1135 | return ret; | |
1136 | } | |
1137 | ||
1138 | /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path | |
1139 | * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a | |
1140 | * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised | |
1141 | * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must | |
1142 | * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... | |
1143 | * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version | |
1144 | */ | |
1145 | ||
1146 | static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
1147 | STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
1148 | STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1149 | { | |
1150 | X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1151 | cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1152 | crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1153 | if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1154 | return 1; | |
1155 | return 0; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
3e727a3b DSH |
1158 | /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. |
1159 | * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. | |
1160 | * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1161 | * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
d0fff69d | 1162 | * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. |
3e727a3b DSH |
1163 | */ |
1164 | ||
1165 | ||
1166 | static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) | |
1167 | { | |
1168 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1169 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1170 | GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1171 | int i, j; | |
d0fff69d DSH |
1172 | if (!a || !b) |
1173 | return 1; | |
3e727a3b DSH |
1174 | if (a->type == 1) |
1175 | { | |
1176 | if (!a->dpname) | |
1177 | return 0; | |
1178 | /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1179 | if (b->type == 1) | |
1180 | { | |
1181 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1182 | return 0; | |
1183 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1184 | return 1; | |
1185 | else | |
1186 | return 0; | |
1187 | } | |
1188 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1189 | nm = a->dpname; | |
1190 | gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1191 | } | |
1192 | else if (b->type == 1) | |
1193 | { | |
1194 | if (!b->dpname) | |
1195 | return 0; | |
1196 | /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1197 | gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1198 | nm = b->dpname; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | ||
1201 | /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1202 | if (nm) | |
1203 | { | |
1204 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) | |
1205 | { | |
1206 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1207 | if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1208 | continue; | |
1209 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1210 | return 1; | |
1211 | } | |
1212 | return 0; | |
1213 | } | |
1214 | ||
1215 | /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1216 | ||
1217 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) | |
1218 | { | |
1219 | gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1220 | for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) | |
1221 | { | |
1222 | genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1223 | if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1224 | return 1; | |
1225 | } | |
1226 | } | |
1227 | ||
1228 | return 0; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | } | |
bc7535bc | 1231 | |
4b96839f | 1232 | static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) |
d0fff69d DSH |
1233 | { |
1234 | int i; | |
1235 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1236 | /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1237 | if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
4b96839f | 1238 | return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); |
d0fff69d DSH |
1239 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) |
1240 | { | |
1241 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1242 | if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1243 | continue; | |
1244 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
d0fff69d | 1245 | return 1; |
d0fff69d DSH |
1246 | } |
1247 | return 0; | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | ||
4b96839f | 1250 | /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ |
bc7535bc | 1251 | |
4b96839f DSH |
1252 | static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, |
1253 | unsigned int *preasons) | |
bc7535bc | 1254 | { |
3e727a3b | 1255 | int i; |
bc7535bc DSH |
1256 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) |
1257 | return 0; | |
1258 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) | |
1259 | { | |
1260 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1261 | return 0; | |
1262 | } | |
1263 | else | |
1264 | { | |
1265 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1266 | return 0; | |
1267 | } | |
4b96839f | 1268 | *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; |
3e727a3b | 1269 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) |
bc7535bc | 1270 | { |
3e727a3b | 1271 | DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); |
4b96839f | 1272 | if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) |
d0fff69d | 1273 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
1274 | if (!crl->idp || |
1275 | idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) | |
1276 | { | |
1277 | *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
d0fff69d | 1278 | return 1; |
4b96839f | 1279 | } |
d0fff69d | 1280 | } |
bc7535bc | 1281 | } |
4b96839f DSH |
1282 | if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) |
1283 | return 1; | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1284 | return 0; |
1285 | } | |
1286 | ||
d43c4497 DSH |
1287 | /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. |
1288 | * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too | |
b545dc67 | 1289 | */ |
bc7535bc | 1290 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1291 | static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
1292 | X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1293 | { |
1294 | int ok; | |
4b96839f DSH |
1295 | X509 *issuer = NULL; |
1296 | int crl_score = 0; | |
1297 | unsigned int reasons; | |
d43c4497 | 1298 | X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; |
016bc5ce | 1299 | STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; |
4b96839f DSH |
1300 | X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
1301 | reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1302 | ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, |
1303 | &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1304 | ||
e1a27eb3 | 1305 | if (ok) |
4b96839f | 1306 | goto done; |
e1a27eb3 | 1307 | |
016bc5ce | 1308 | /* Lookup CRLs from store */ |
e1a27eb3 | 1309 | |
016bc5ce DSH |
1310 | skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); |
1311 | ||
1312 | /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
4b96839f DSH |
1313 | if (!skcrl && crl) |
1314 | goto done; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1315 | |
d43c4497 | 1316 | get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); |
016bc5ce DSH |
1317 | |
1318 | sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1319 | ||
4b96839f DSH |
1320 | done: |
1321 | ||
016bc5ce DSH |
1322 | /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ |
1323 | if (crl) | |
f6e7d014 | 1324 | { |
4b96839f DSH |
1325 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; |
1326 | ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1327 | ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
016bc5ce | 1328 | *pcrl = crl; |
d43c4497 | 1329 | *pdcrl = dcrl; |
016bc5ce | 1330 | return 1; |
f6e7d014 | 1331 | } |
016bc5ce DSH |
1332 | |
1333 | return 0; | |
b545dc67 DSH |
1334 | } |
1335 | ||
1336 | /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1337 | static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
1338 | { | |
1339 | X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1340 | EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
e1a27eb3 | 1341 | int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1342 | cnum = ctx->error_depth; |
1343 | chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
5cbd2033 DSH |
1344 | /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ |
1345 | if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1346 | issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
d43c4497 | 1347 | |
5cbd2033 | 1348 | /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer |
b545dc67 DSH |
1349 | * is next certificate in chain. |
1350 | */ | |
5cbd2033 | 1351 | else if (cnum < chnum) |
b545dc67 DSH |
1352 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); |
1353 | else | |
1354 | { | |
1355 | issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1356 | /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1357 | if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) | |
1358 | { | |
1359 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
bdee69f7 | 1360 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1361 | if(!ok) goto err; |
1362 | } | |
1363 | } | |
1364 | ||
1365 | if(issuer) | |
1366 | { | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1367 | /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already |
1368 | * been done | |
1369 | */ | |
1370 | if (!crl->base_crl_number) | |
bc501570 | 1371 | { |
d43c4497 DSH |
1372 | /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ |
1373 | if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1374 | !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) | |
1375 | { | |
1376 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1377 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1378 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1379 | } | |
b545dc67 | 1380 | |
d43c4497 DSH |
1381 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) |
1382 | { | |
1383 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1384 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1385 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | ||
1388 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) | |
1389 | { | |
1390 | if (!check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer)) | |
1391 | { | |
1392 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
1393 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1394 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1395 | } | |
1396 | } | |
1397 | ||
1398 | if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1399 | { | |
1400 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1401 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1402 | if(!ok) goto err; | |
1403 | } | |
4b96839f | 1404 | |
4b96839f | 1405 | |
4b96839f | 1406 | } |
4b96839f | 1407 | |
d43c4497 | 1408 | if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) |
4b96839f | 1409 | { |
d43c4497 DSH |
1410 | ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); |
1411 | if (!ok) | |
1412 | goto err; | |
bc7535bc DSH |
1413 | } |
1414 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
1415 | /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ |
1416 | ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1417 | ||
1418 | if(!ikey) | |
1419 | { | |
1420 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
bdee69f7 | 1421 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1422 | if (!ok) goto err; |
1423 | } | |
1424 | else | |
1425 | { | |
1426 | /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1427 | if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) | |
1428 | { | |
1429 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
bdee69f7 | 1430 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); |
b545dc67 DSH |
1431 | if (!ok) goto err; |
1432 | } | |
1433 | } | |
1434 | } | |
1435 | ||
b545dc67 DSH |
1436 | ok = 1; |
1437 | ||
1438 | err: | |
1439 | EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1440 | return ok; | |
1441 | } | |
1442 | ||
1443 | /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1444 | static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
1445 | { | |
010fa0b3 | 1446 | int ok; |
d43c4497 DSH |
1447 | X509_REVOKED *rev; |
1448 | /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained | |
1449 | * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate | |
1450 | * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since | |
1451 | * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
b545dc67 | 1452 | */ |
010fa0b3 | 1453 | if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) |
bc501570 | 1454 | { |
010fa0b3 DSH |
1455 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) |
1456 | return 1; | |
1457 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1458 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1459 | if(!ok) | |
1460 | return 0; | |
bc501570 | 1461 | } |
d43c4497 DSH |
1462 | /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL |
1463 | * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
1464 | */ | |
1465 | if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) | |
1466 | { | |
1467 | if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1468 | return 2; | |
1469 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1470 | ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1471 | if (!ok) | |
1472 | return 0; | |
1473 | } | |
010fa0b3 | 1474 | |
bc501570 | 1475 | return 1; |
b545dc67 DSH |
1476 | } |
1477 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1478 | static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
1479 | { | |
1480 | int ret; | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
1481 | if (ctx->parent) |
1482 | return 1; | |
175ac681 | 1483 | ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, |
5d7c222d DSH |
1484 | ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); |
1485 | if (ret == 0) | |
1486 | { | |
8afca8d9 | 1487 | X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
5d7c222d DSH |
1488 | return 0; |
1489 | } | |
1490 | /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1491 | if (ret == -1) | |
1492 | { | |
1493 | /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify | |
1494 | * callback. | |
1495 | */ | |
1496 | X509 *x; | |
1497 | int i; | |
1498 | for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) | |
1499 | { | |
1500 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1501 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1502 | continue; | |
1503 | ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1504 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
002e66c0 DSH |
1505 | if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) |
1506 | return 0; | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1507 | } |
1508 | return 1; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | if (ret == -2) | |
1511 | { | |
1512 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1513 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1514 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1515 | } | |
1516 | ||
1517 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) | |
1518 | { | |
1519 | ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1520 | ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1521 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1522 | return 0; | |
1523 | } | |
1524 | ||
1525 | return 1; | |
1526 | } | |
1527 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1528 | static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
1529 | { | |
1530 | time_t *ptime; | |
1531 | int i; | |
1532 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
1533 | if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) |
1534 | ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1535 | else |
1536 | ptime = NULL; | |
1537 | ||
1538 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1539 | if (i == 0) | |
1540 | { | |
1541 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1542 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1543 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1544 | return 0; | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | ||
1547 | if (i > 0) | |
1548 | { | |
1549 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1550 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1551 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1552 | return 0; | |
1553 | } | |
1554 | ||
1555 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1556 | if (i == 0) | |
1557 | { | |
1558 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1559 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1560 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1561 | return 0; | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | ||
1564 | if (i < 0) | |
1565 | { | |
1566 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1567 | ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1568 | if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
1572 | return 1; | |
1573 | } | |
1574 | ||
6b691a5c | 1575 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
d02b48c6 | 1576 | { |
e1a27eb3 | 1577 | int ok=0,n; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1578 | X509 *xs,*xi; |
1579 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | |
2c45bf2b | 1580 | int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); |
d02b48c6 | 1581 | |
2f043896 | 1582 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; |
d02b48c6 | 1583 | |
7e258a56 | 1584 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1585 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; |
1586 | n--; | |
7e258a56 | 1587 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
e1a27eb3 | 1588 | |
bbb72003 | 1589 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1590 | xs=xi; |
1591 | else | |
1592 | { | |
1593 | if (n <= 0) | |
1594 | { | |
1595 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1596 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1597 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
1598 | goto end; | |
1599 | } | |
1600 | else | |
1601 | { | |
1602 | n--; | |
1603 | ctx->error_depth=n; | |
7e258a56 | 1604 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1605 | } |
1606 | } | |
1607 | ||
1608 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1609 | while (n >= 0) | |
1610 | { | |
1611 | ctx->error_depth=n; | |
1612 | if (!xs->valid) | |
1613 | { | |
1614 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | |
1615 | { | |
1616 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
1617 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1618 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
1619 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
1620 | } | |
29902449 | 1621 | else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) |
78f3a2aa BM |
1622 | /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, |
1623 | * this is a waste of time. That check should | |
1624 | * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be | |
1625 | * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but | |
1626 | * we don't verify again and again in SSL | |
1627 | * handshakes and the like once the cert has | |
1628 | * been declared trusted. */ | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1629 | { |
1630 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1631 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | |
1632 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
582e5929 DSH |
1633 | if (!ok) |
1634 | { | |
1635 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1636 | goto end; | |
1637 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1638 | } |
cfcf6453 | 1639 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
d02b48c6 | 1640 | pkey=NULL; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1641 | } |
1642 | ||
e1a27eb3 | 1643 | xs->valid = 1; |
d02b48c6 | 1644 | |
3f791ca8 DSH |
1645 | ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); |
1646 | if (!ok) | |
e1a27eb3 | 1647 | goto end; |
d02b48c6 | 1648 | |
d02b48c6 | 1649 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ |
a7201e9a | 1650 | ctx->current_issuer=xi; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1651 | ctx->current_cert=xs; |
1652 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | |
1653 | if (!ok) goto end; | |
1654 | ||
1655 | n--; | |
1656 | if (n >= 0) | |
1657 | { | |
1658 | xi=xs; | |
7e258a56 | 1659 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1660 | } |
1661 | } | |
1662 | ok=1; | |
1663 | end: | |
f684090c | 1664 | return ok; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1665 | } |
1666 | ||
91b73acb | 1667 | int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) |
bbb72003 DSH |
1668 | { |
1669 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | |
1670 | } | |
1671 | ||
91b73acb | 1672 | int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1673 | { |
1674 | char *str; | |
284ef5f3 | 1675 | ASN1_TIME atm; |
527497a7 | 1676 | long offset; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1677 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; |
1678 | int i,j; | |
1679 | ||
1680 | p=buff1; | |
1681 | i=ctm->length; | |
1682 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | |
82aec1cc BM |
1683 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
1684 | { | |
f684090c | 1685 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1686 | memcpy(p,str,10); |
1687 | p+=10; | |
1688 | str+=10; | |
82aec1cc BM |
1689 | } |
1690 | else | |
1691 | { | |
1692 | if (i < 13) return 0; | |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1693 | memcpy(p,str,12); |
1694 | p+=12; | |
1695 | str+=12; | |
82aec1cc | 1696 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
1697 | |
1698 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | |
1699 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1700 | else |
1701 | { | |
1702 | *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1703 | *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1704 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | |
82aec1cc | 1705 | if (*str == '.') |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1706 | { |
1707 | str++; | |
b7c190d9 | 1708 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; |
284ef5f3 | 1709 | } |
82aec1cc BM |
1710 | |
1711 | } | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1712 | *(p++)='Z'; |
1713 | *(p++)='\0'; | |
1714 | ||
1715 | if (*str == 'Z') | |
1716 | offset=0; | |
1717 | else | |
1718 | { | |
0b0a60d8 | 1719 | if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) |
f684090c | 1720 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1721 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; |
1722 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | |
1723 | if (*str == '-') | |
dfeab068 | 1724 | offset= -offset; |
d02b48c6 | 1725 | } |
284ef5f3 | 1726 | atm.type=ctm->type; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1727 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); |
1728 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1729 | ||
a0e7c8ee DSH |
1730 | if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) |
1731 | return 0; | |
d02b48c6 | 1732 | |
b7c190d9 | 1733 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
284ef5f3 DSH |
1734 | { |
1735 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | |
1736 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1737 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | |
1738 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | |
d02b48c6 | 1739 | |
f684090c BM |
1740 | if (i < j) return -1; |
1741 | if (i > j) return 1; | |
284ef5f3 | 1742 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
1743 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); |
1744 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
f684090c | 1745 | return -1; |
d02b48c6 | 1746 | else |
f684090c | 1747 | return i; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1748 | } |
1749 | ||
284ef5f3 | 1750 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) |
bbb72003 DSH |
1751 | { |
1752 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | |
1753 | } | |
1754 | ||
87d3a0cd DSH |
1755 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) |
1756 | { | |
1757 | return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1758 | } | |
1759 | ||
1760 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
1761 | int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1762 | { |
1763 | time_t t; | |
ba8e2824 | 1764 | int type = -1; |
d02b48c6 | 1765 | |
b7c190d9 | 1766 | if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; |
bbb72003 DSH |
1767 | else time(&t); |
1768 | ||
ba8e2824 | 1769 | if (s) type = s->type; |
87d3a0cd DSH |
1770 | if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) |
1771 | return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1772 | if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1773 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1774 | return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
d02b48c6 RE |
1775 | } |
1776 | ||
7e258a56 | 1777 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
d02b48c6 RE |
1778 | { |
1779 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | |
1780 | int i,j; | |
1781 | ||
f684090c | 1782 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; |
d02b48c6 | 1783 | |
7e258a56 | 1784 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) |
d02b48c6 | 1785 | { |
7e258a56 | 1786 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1787 | if (ktmp == NULL) |
1788 | { | |
1789 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
f684090c | 1790 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1791 | } |
1792 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1793 | break; | |
1794 | else | |
1795 | { | |
cfcf6453 | 1796 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1797 | ktmp=NULL; |
1798 | } | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | if (ktmp == NULL) | |
1801 | { | |
1802 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
f684090c | 1803 | return 0; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1804 | } |
1805 | ||
1806 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1807 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | |
1808 | { | |
7e258a56 | 1809 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); |
d02b48c6 | 1810 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); |
cfcf6453 | 1811 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); |
d02b48c6 RE |
1812 | } |
1813 | ||
cfcf6453 DSH |
1814 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); |
1815 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
f684090c | 1816 | return 1; |
d02b48c6 RE |
1817 | } |
1818 | ||
dd9d233e DSH |
1819 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, |
1820 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
3ac82faa BM |
1821 | { |
1822 | /* This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
79aa04ef GT |
1823 | * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ |
1824 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, | |
1825 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
3ac82faa | 1826 | } |
58964a49 | 1827 | |
6b691a5c | 1828 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) |
58964a49 | 1829 | { |
f684090c | 1830 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); |
58964a49 RE |
1831 | } |
1832 | ||
6b691a5c | 1833 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) |
58964a49 | 1834 | { |
f684090c | 1835 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); |
58964a49 RE |
1836 | } |
1837 | ||
6b691a5c | 1838 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1839 | { |
f684090c | 1840 | return ctx->error; |
58964a49 RE |
1841 | } |
1842 | ||
6b691a5c | 1843 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) |
58964a49 RE |
1844 | { |
1845 | ctx->error=err; | |
1846 | } | |
1847 | ||
6b691a5c | 1848 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1849 | { |
f684090c | 1850 | return ctx->error_depth; |
58964a49 RE |
1851 | } |
1852 | ||
6b691a5c | 1853 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1854 | { |
f684090c | 1855 | return ctx->current_cert; |
58964a49 RE |
1856 | } |
1857 | ||
7e258a56 | 1858 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
58964a49 | 1859 | { |
f684090c | 1860 | return ctx->chain; |
58964a49 RE |
1861 | } |
1862 | ||
c7cb16a8 | 1863 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
25f923dd DSH |
1864 | { |
1865 | int i; | |
1866 | X509 *x; | |
1867 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
b7c190d9 BM |
1868 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; |
1869 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | |
82aec1cc | 1870 | { |
25f923dd DSH |
1871 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); |
1872 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
82aec1cc | 1873 | } |
f684090c | 1874 | return chain; |
25f923dd DSH |
1875 | } |
1876 | ||
6b691a5c | 1877 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) |
58964a49 RE |
1878 | { |
1879 | ctx->cert=x; | |
1880 | } | |
1881 | ||
6b691a5c | 1882 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) |
58964a49 RE |
1883 | { |
1884 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | |
1885 | } | |
1886 | ||
e1a27eb3 DSH |
1887 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) |
1888 | { | |
1889 | ctx->crls=sk; | |
1890 | } | |
1891 | ||
13938ace | 1892 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) |
11262391 | 1893 | { |
13938ace | 1894 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); |
11262391 DSH |
1895 | } |
1896 | ||
bb7cd4e3 | 1897 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) |
11262391 | 1898 | { |
bb7cd4e3 | 1899 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); |
11262391 DSH |
1900 | } |
1901 | ||
13938ace DSH |
1902 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust |
1903 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | |
1904 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | |
1905 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | |
1906 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | |
1907 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | |
1908 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | |
1909 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | |
1910 | */ | |
1911 | ||
1912 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
1913 | int purpose, int trust) | |
51630a37 | 1914 | { |
51630a37 | 1915 | int idx; |
13938ace | 1916 | /* If purpose not set use default */ |
82aec1cc | 1917 | if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; |
13938ace | 1918 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ |
82aec1cc BM |
1919 | if (purpose) |
1920 | { | |
068fdce8 | 1921 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
13938ace | 1922 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); |
b7c190d9 | 1923 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1924 | { |
13938ace DSH |
1925 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1926 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1927 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1928 | } |
068fdce8 | 1929 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
b7c190d9 | 1930 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) |
82aec1cc | 1931 | { |
068fdce8 | 1932 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); |
b7c190d9 | 1933 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1934 | { |
068fdce8 DSH |
1935 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1936 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1937 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1938 | } |
6d0d5431 | 1939 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
82aec1cc | 1940 | } |
068fdce8 | 1941 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ |
b7c190d9 | 1942 | if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; |
82aec1cc | 1943 | } |
b7c190d9 | 1944 | if (trust) |
82aec1cc | 1945 | { |
13938ace | 1946 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); |
b7c190d9 | 1947 | if (idx == -1) |
82aec1cc | 1948 | { |
13938ace DSH |
1949 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, |
1950 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
1951 | return 0; | |
82aec1cc | 1952 | } |
13938ace | 1953 | } |
13938ace | 1954 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
1955 | if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; |
1956 | if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
51630a37 DSH |
1957 | return 1; |
1958 | } | |
1959 | ||
2f043896 DSH |
1960 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) |
1961 | { | |
1962 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
1963 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
79aa04ef GT |
1964 | if (!ctx) |
1965 | { | |
1966 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1967 | return NULL; | |
1968 | } | |
1969 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
2f043896 DSH |
1970 | return ctx; |
1971 | } | |
1972 | ||
1973 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1974 | { | |
1975 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
1976 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1977 | } | |
1978 | ||
79aa04ef | 1979 | int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, |
2f043896 DSH |
1980 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) |
1981 | { | |
5d7c222d | 1982 | int ret = 1; |
2f043896 DSH |
1983 | ctx->ctx=store; |
1984 | ctx->current_method=0; | |
1985 | ctx->cert=x509; | |
1986 | ctx->untrusted=chain; | |
5d7c222d | 1987 | ctx->crls = NULL; |
2f043896 | 1988 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; |
82aec1cc | 1989 | ctx->other_ctx=NULL; |
2f043896 DSH |
1990 | ctx->valid=0; |
1991 | ctx->chain=NULL; | |
2f043896 | 1992 | ctx->error=0; |
175ac681 | 1993 | ctx->explicit_policy=0; |
82aec1cc | 1994 | ctx->error_depth=0; |
2f043896 DSH |
1995 | ctx->current_cert=NULL; |
1996 | ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | |
5d7c222d | 1997 | ctx->tree = NULL; |
9d84d4ed | 1998 | ctx->parent = NULL; |
5d7c222d DSH |
1999 | |
2000 | ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
2001 | ||
2002 | if (!ctx->param) | |
2003 | { | |
2004 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2005 | return 0; | |
2006 | } | |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2007 | |
2008 | /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set | |
2009 | * use defaults. | |
2010 | */ | |
2011 | ||
bdee69f7 | 2012 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2013 | if (store) |
2014 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2015 | else | |
2016 | ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2017 | ||
a3829cb7 DSH |
2018 | if (store) |
2019 | { | |
5d7c222d | 2020 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
a3829cb7 DSH |
2021 | ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; |
2022 | } | |
2023 | else | |
a3829cb7 | 2024 | ctx->cleanup = 0; |
5d7c222d DSH |
2025 | |
2026 | if (ret) | |
2027 | ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2028 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2029 | ||
2030 | if (ret == 0) | |
2031 | { | |
2032 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2033 | return 0; | |
a3829cb7 DSH |
2034 | } |
2035 | ||
2036 | if (store && store->check_issued) | |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2037 | ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; |
2038 | else | |
2039 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2040 | ||
a3829cb7 | 2041 | if (store && store->get_issuer) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2042 | ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; |
2043 | else | |
2044 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2045 | ||
a3829cb7 | 2046 | if (store && store->verify_cb) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2047 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; |
2048 | else | |
2049 | ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2050 | ||
a3829cb7 | 2051 | if (store && store->verify) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2052 | ctx->verify = store->verify; |
2053 | else | |
2054 | ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2055 | ||
a3829cb7 | 2056 | if (store && store->check_revocation) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2057 | ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; |
2058 | else | |
2059 | ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2060 | ||
a3829cb7 | 2061 | if (store && store->get_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2062 | ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; |
2063 | else | |
d43c4497 | 2064 | ctx->get_crl = NULL; |
bdee69f7 | 2065 | |
a3829cb7 | 2066 | if (store && store->check_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2067 | ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; |
2068 | else | |
2069 | ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2070 | ||
a3829cb7 | 2071 | if (store && store->cert_crl) |
bdee69f7 DSH |
2072 | ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; |
2073 | else | |
2074 | ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2075 | ||
4d50a2b4 DSH |
2076 | if (store && store->lookup_certs) |
2077 | ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2078 | else | |
016bc5ce | 2079 | ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; |
4d50a2b4 DSH |
2080 | |
2081 | if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2082 | ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2083 | else | |
016bc5ce | 2084 | ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; |
4d50a2b4 | 2085 | |
5d7c222d DSH |
2086 | ctx->check_policy = check_policy; |
2087 | ||
bdee69f7 | 2088 | |
79aa04ef GT |
2089 | /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As |
2090 | * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
2091 | * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ | |
2092 | /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
2093 | if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
2094 | &(ctx->ex_data))) | |
2095 | { | |
2096 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2097 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2098 | return 0; | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | return 1; | |
2f043896 DSH |
2101 | } |
2102 | ||
2103 | /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. | |
2104 | * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2105 | */ | |
2106 | ||
2107 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2108 | { | |
2109 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; | |
2110 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2111 | } | |
2112 | ||
2113 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2114 | { | |
b7c190d9 | 2115 | if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); |
82bf227e RL |
2116 | if (ctx->param != NULL) |
2117 | { | |
9d84d4ed DSH |
2118 | if (ctx->parent == NULL) |
2119 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
82bf227e RL |
2120 | ctx->param=NULL; |
2121 | } | |
2122 | if (ctx->tree != NULL) | |
2123 | { | |
5d7c222d | 2124 | X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); |
82bf227e RL |
2125 | ctx->tree=NULL; |
2126 | } | |
2f043896 DSH |
2127 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) |
2128 | { | |
2129 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | |
2130 | ctx->chain=NULL; | |
2131 | } | |
79aa04ef | 2132 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); |
c17810b0 | 2133 | memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); |
2f043896 | 2134 | } |
13938ace | 2135 | |
5d7c222d | 2136 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) |
bbb72003 | 2137 | { |
5d7c222d | 2138 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); |
bbb72003 DSH |
2139 | } |
2140 | ||
5d7c222d | 2141 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) |
bbb72003 | 2142 | { |
5d7c222d DSH |
2143 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); |
2144 | } | |
2145 | ||
2146 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) | |
2147 | { | |
2148 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
bbb72003 DSH |
2149 | } |
2150 | ||
db089ad6 LJ |
2151 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, |
2152 | int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | |
2153 | { | |
2154 | ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; | |
2155 | } | |
2156 | ||
5d7c222d DSH |
2157 | X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
2158 | { | |
2159 | return ctx->tree; | |
2160 | } | |
2161 | ||
2162 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2163 | { | |
175ac681 | 2164 | return ctx->explicit_policy; |
5d7c222d DSH |
2165 | } |
2166 | ||
2167 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
2168 | { | |
2169 | const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2170 | param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2171 | if (!param) | |
2172 | return 0; | |
2173 | return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2174 | } | |
2175 | ||
2176 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2177 | { | |
2178 | return ctx->param; | |
2179 | } | |
2180 | ||
2181 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
2182 | { | |
2183 | if (ctx->param) | |
2184 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2185 | ctx->param = param; | |
2186 | } | |
2187 | ||
f73e07cf BL |
2188 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) |
2189 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | |
d500de16 | 2190 | |
f73e07cf | 2191 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) |
d500de16 | 2192 | |
f5fedc04 | 2193 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |
d500de16 | 2194 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |