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Remove OPENSSL_assert() from crypto/threads_none.c
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
CommitLineData
b1322259
RS		 1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
d02b48c6 3 *
b1322259
RS		 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
d02b48c6
RE		 8 */
9
80770da3 10#include <ctype.h>
d02b48c6
RE		 11#include <stdio.h>
12#include <time.h>
13#include <errno.h>
d9b8b89b 14#include <limits.h>
d02b48c6 15
b39fc560 16#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17f389bb 17#include <openssl/crypto.h>
ec577822
BM		 18#include <openssl/lhash.h>
19#include <openssl/buffer.h>
20#include <openssl/evp.h>
21#include <openssl/asn1.h>
22#include <openssl/x509.h>
11262391 23#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
ec577822 24#include <openssl/objects.h>
919ba009 25#include <internal/dane.h>
d9b8b89b 26#include <internal/x509_int.h>
6c21b860 27#include "x509_lcl.h"
d02b48c6 28
d43c4497
DSH		 29/* CRL score values */
30
31/* No unhandled critical extensions */
32
0f113f3e 33#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
d43c4497
DSH		 34
35/* certificate is within CRL scope */
36
0f113f3e 37#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
d43c4497
DSH		 38
39/* CRL times valid */
40
0f113f3e 41#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
d43c4497
DSH		 42
43/* Issuer name matches certificate */
44
0f113f3e 45#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
d43c4497
DSH		 46
47/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48
49#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50
51/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52
0f113f3e 53#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
d43c4497
DSH		 54
55/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56
0f113f3e 57#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
d43c4497
DSH		 58
59/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60
0f113f3e 61#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
d43c4497
DSH		 62
63/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64
0f113f3e 65#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
d43c4497 66
d9b8b89b
VD		 67static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
170b7358 69static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
0f113f3e 70static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
2f043896
DSH		 71static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
72static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
30b415b0 73static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
e9746e03 74static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
3bf15e29 75static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
d9b8b89b 76static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
b545dc67
DSH		 77static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
5d7c222d 79static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
c9a81b30 80static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
170b7358 81static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
fbb82a60
VD		 82static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
83static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
4b96839f
DSH		 84
85static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
0f113f3e 86 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
d43c4497 87static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
0f113f3e
MC		 88 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
89static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
90 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
91 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
92static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
93 int *pcrl_score);
4b96839f 94static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
0f113f3e 95 unsigned int *preasons);
9d84d4ed
DSH		 96static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
97static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
0f113f3e
MC		 98 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
99 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
4b96839f 100
d02b48c6 101static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
d02b48c6 102
6b691a5c 103static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
0f113f3e
MC		 104{
105 return ok;
106}
d02b48c6 107
2da2ff50
DSH		 108/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
109static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
0f113f3e 110{
d9b8b89b
VD		 111 /*
112 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
113 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
114 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
115 */
0f113f3e
MC		 116 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
117 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
118 return 1;
119 else
120 return 0;
121}
d02b48c6 122
2dabd822
DSH		 123/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
124
125static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 126{
127 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
128 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
129 int i;
130 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
131 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
132 if (certs == NULL)
133 return NULL;
134 /* Look for exact match */
135 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
136 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
137 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
138 break;
139 }
140 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
05f0fb9f 141 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
0f113f3e
MC		 142 else
143 xtmp = NULL;
144 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
145 return xtmp;
146}
2dabd822 147
70dd3c65
VD		 148/*-
149 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
150 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * B<depth>.
152 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
153 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 *
155 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 */
157static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
158{
159 ctx->error_depth = depth;
160 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
161 if (err != X509_V_OK)
162 ctx->error = err;
163 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
164}
165
166/*-
167 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
168 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
169 * number.
170 *
171 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 */
173static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
174{
175 ctx->error = err;
176 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
177}
178
fbb82a60
VD		 179static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
180{
181 int i;
182 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
183
184 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
185 return 1;
186
187 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
188 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
189
190 /*
191 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
192 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 */
194 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
195 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
196 return 0;
197 /*
198 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
199 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 */
201 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
202 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
203 return 0;
204 }
205 return 1;
206}
207
d9b8b89b
VD		 208static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
209{
d9b8b89b
VD		 210 int err;
211 int ok;
212
213 /*
214 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
215 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 */
217 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
fbb82a60 219 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
d9b8b89b
VD		 220 (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
221 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
222 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
223 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
224 return ok;
225
226 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
227 ctx->param->flags);
228 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
70dd3c65 229 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
d9b8b89b
VD		 230 return ok;
231 }
232
233 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
234 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
235 if (!ok)
236 return ok;
237
238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
239 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
9021a5df 240 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
d9b8b89b 241 return ok;
9021a5df 242 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
d9b8b89b
VD		 243 return ok;
244#endif
245
246 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
247 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
248 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
249 return ok;
250}
251
6b691a5c 252int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e 253{
b9aec69a 254 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
f3e235ed 255 int ret;
d9b8b89b 256
0f113f3e
MC		 257 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
258 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
f3e235ed 259 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
0f113f3e
MC		 260 return -1;
261 }
d9b8b89b 262
aae41f8c
MC		 263 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
264 /*
265 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
266 * cannot do another one.
267 */
268 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
f3e235ed 269 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
aae41f8c
MC		 270 return -1;
271 }
0f113f3e 272
0f113f3e
MC		 273 /*
274 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
275 * the first entry is in place
276 */
aae41f8c
MC		 277 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
278 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
279 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
f3e235ed 280 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
d9b8b89b 281 return -1;
0f113f3e 282 }
05f0fb9f 283 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
d9b8b89b 284 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
5d7c222d 285
fbb82a60
VD		 286 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
287 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
288 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
289 return 0;
290
f3e235ed
VD		 291 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
292 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
293 else
294 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
295
170b7358 296 /*
f3e235ed
VD		 297 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
298 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
299 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
170b7358 300 */
f3e235ed
VD		 301 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
302 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
303 return ret;
0f113f3e
MC		 304}
305
306/*
307 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
2f043896 308 */
2f043896
DSH		 309static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
310{
0f113f3e 311 int i;
c53f7355 312 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
fbb82a60 313
0f113f3e 314 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
c53f7355
VD		 315 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
316 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
317 rv = issuer;
318 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
319 break;
320 }
0f113f3e 321 }
c53f7355 322 return rv;
2f043896
DSH		 323}
324
325/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
326
327static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
328{
0f113f3e
MC		 329 int ret;
330 if (x == issuer)
331 return cert_self_signed(x);
332 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
333 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
334 int i;
335 X509 *ch;
336 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
337 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
338 return 1;
339 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
340 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
341 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
342 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
343 break;
344 }
345 }
346 }
347
d33def66 348 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
2f043896
DSH		 349}
350
351/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
352
353static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
354{
0f113f3e
MC		 355 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
356 if (*issuer) {
05f0fb9f 357 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
0f113f3e
MC		 358 return 1;
359 } else
360 return 0;
2f043896 361}
2f043896 362
c864e761
DSH		 363static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
364{
365 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
366 X509 *x;
367 int i;
368 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
369 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
370 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
371 if (sk == NULL)
372 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
373 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
374 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
375 return NULL;
376 }
377 X509_up_ref(x);
378 }
379 }
380 return sk;
381}
382
0daccd4d
VD		 383/*
384 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
385 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
386 */
387static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
388 int must_be_ca)
389{
0daccd4d
VD		 390 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
391
392 /*
393 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
33cc5dde 394 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
0daccd4d
VD		 395 *
396 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
397 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
398 * ctx->param->purpose!
399 *
400 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
401 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
402 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
403 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
404 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
405 *
406 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
407 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
33cc5dde 408 * also set.
0daccd4d
VD		 409 */
410 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
411 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
412
33cc5dde
VD		 413 switch (tr_ok) {
414 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
0daccd4d 415 return 1;
33cc5dde
VD		 416 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
417 break;
418 default:
419 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
420 case 1:
421 return 1;
422 case 0:
423 break;
424 default:
425 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
426 return 1;
427 }
428 break;
429 }
0daccd4d 430
70dd3c65 431 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
0daccd4d
VD		 432}
433
0f113f3e
MC		 434/*
435 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
436 * purpose
11262391
DSH		 437 */
438
30b415b0 439static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
11262391 440{
0daccd4d 441 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
0f113f3e 442 X509 *x;
0f113f3e
MC		 443 int proxy_path_length = 0;
444 int purpose;
445 int allow_proxy_certs;
0daccd4d 446 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
0f113f3e 447
35a1cc90
MC		 448 /*-
449 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
450 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
451 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
452 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
453 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
454 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
455 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
456 */
0f113f3e
MC		 457 must_be_ca = -1;
458
459 /* CRL path validation */
460 if (ctx->parent) {
461 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
462 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
463 } else {
464 allow_proxy_certs =
465 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
0f113f3e
MC		 466 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
467 }
468
0daccd4d 469 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
0f113f3e
MC		 470 int ret;
471 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
472 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
473 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
70dd3c65
VD		 474 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
475 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
0daccd4d 476 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 477 }
478 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
70dd3c65
VD		 479 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
480 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
0daccd4d 481 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 482 }
483 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
484 switch (must_be_ca) {
485 case -1:
486 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
487 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
488 ret = 0;
489 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
490 } else
491 ret = 1;
492 break;
493 case 0:
494 if (ret != 0) {
495 ret = 0;
496 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
497 } else
498 ret = 1;
499 break;
500 default:
4d9e33ac 501 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
0f113f3e 502 if ((ret == 0)
4d9e33ac 503 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
0f113f3e
MC		 504 && (ret != 1))) {
505 ret = 0;
506 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
507 } else
508 ret = 1;
509 break;
510 }
70dd3c65
VD		 511 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
512 return 0;
513 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
514 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
515 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 516 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
517 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
518 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
519 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
70dd3c65 520 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
0daccd4d 521 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 522 }
523 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
524 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
525 plen++;
526 /*
527 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
528 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
529 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
530 */
531 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
ed17c7c1
RL		 532 /*
533 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
534 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
535 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
536 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
537 *
538 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
539 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
540 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
541 * increment proxy_path_length.
542 */
543 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
544 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
545 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
546 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
547 return 0;
548 }
549 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
0f113f3e
MC		 550 }
551 proxy_path_length++;
552 must_be_ca = 0;
553 } else
554 must_be_ca = 1;
555 }
0daccd4d 556 return 1;
11262391
DSH		 557}
558
e9746e03 559static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e 560{
70dd3c65
VD		 561 int i;
562
0f113f3e
MC		 563 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
564 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
70dd3c65
VD		 565 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
566 int j;
567
0f113f3e
MC		 568 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
569 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
570 continue;
c8223538
RL		 571
572 /*
573 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
574 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
575 * added.
576 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
577 */
578 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
579 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
580 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
581 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
582 int last_object_nid = 0;
583 int err = X509_V_OK;
584 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
585
586 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
587 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
588 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
589 goto proxy_name_done;
590 }
591
592 /*
593 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
594 * there is in issuer.
595 */
596 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
597 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
598 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
599 goto proxy_name_done;
600 }
601
602 /*
603 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
604 * multivalued RDN
605 */
606 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
607 last_object_loc))
608 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
609 last_object_loc - 1))) {
610 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
611 goto proxy_name_done;
612 }
613
614 /*
615 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
616 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
617 */
618 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
619 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
620 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
621 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
622 return 0;
623 }
624
625 tmpentry =
626 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
627 last_object_nid =
628 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
629
630 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
631 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
632 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
633 }
634
635 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
636 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
637
638 proxy_name_done:
639 if (err != X509_V_OK
640 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
641 return 0;
642 }
643
0f113f3e
MC		 644 /*
645 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
646 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
647 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
648 * to be obeyed.
649 */
650 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
651 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
70dd3c65 652
0f113f3e 653 if (nc) {
70dd3c65
VD		 654 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
655
5bd5dcd4
DSH		 656 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
657 if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0)
658 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
659
f3e235ed
VD		 660 switch (rv) {
661 case X509_V_OK:
662 break;
663 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
70dd3c65 664 return 0;
f3e235ed
VD		 665 default:
666 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
667 return 0;
668 break;
669 }
0f113f3e
MC		 670 }
671 }
672 }
673 return 1;
674}
e9746e03 675
3bf15e29 676static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
0f113f3e 677{
70dd3c65 678 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
0f113f3e 679}
3bf15e29 680
9689a6ae 681static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
0f113f3e
MC		 682{
683 int i;
9689a6ae 684 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
0f113f3e
MC		 685 char *name;
686
9689a6ae
DSH		 687 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
688 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
689 vpm->peername = NULL;
a0724ef1 690 }
0f113f3e 691 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
9689a6ae
DSH		 692 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
693 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
0f113f3e
MC		 694 return 1;
695 }
696 return n == 0;
697}
8abffa4a 698
3bf15e29 699static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 700{
701 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
0f113f3e 702 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
9689a6ae 703 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 704 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
705 return 0;
706 }
9689a6ae 707 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 708 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
709 return 0;
710 }
9689a6ae 711 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 712 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
713 return 0;
714 }
715 return 1;
716}
3bf15e29 717
d9b8b89b 718static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
51630a37 719{
70dd3c65 720 int i;
0f113f3e 721 X509 *x = NULL;
d9b8b89b 722 X509 *mx;
b9aec69a 723 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
d9b8b89b
VD		 724 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
725 int trust;
726
bdcadca2
VD		 727 /*
728 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
729 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
730 */
731 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
170b7358
VD		 732 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
733 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
734 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
735 return trust;
736 }
737 }
738
d9b8b89b
VD		 739 /*
740 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
741 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
742 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
743 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
744 */
745 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
0f113f3e 746 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
d9b8b89b 747 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
0f113f3e 748 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
d9b8b89b
VD		 749 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
750 goto trusted;
751 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
752 goto rejected;
0f113f3e 753 }
d9b8b89b 754
0f113f3e 755 /*
d9b8b89b
VD		 756 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
757 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
0f113f3e 758 */
d9b8b89b
VD		 759 if (num_untrusted < num) {
760 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
761 goto trusted;
762 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
763 }
764
497ecc0d 765 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
d9b8b89b
VD		 766 /*
767 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
768 * for a direct trust store match.
769 */
bdcadca2
VD		 770 i = 0;
771 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
0f113f3e 772 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
d9b8b89b
VD		 773 if (!mx)
774 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
775
776 /*
777 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
778 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
779 */
780 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
781 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
782 X509_free(mx);
783 goto rejected;
0f113f3e 784 }
d9b8b89b
VD		 785
786 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
787 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
788 X509_free(x);
789 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
790 goto trusted;
0f113f3e
MC		 791 }
792
793 /*
794 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
795 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
796 */
797 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
d9b8b89b
VD		 798
799 rejected:
70dd3c65 800 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
d9b8b89b
VD		 801 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
802 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
803
804 trusted:
170b7358
VD		 805 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
806 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
807 if (dane->pdpth < 0)
808 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
809 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
810 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
811 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
812 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
51630a37
DSH		 813}
814
b545dc67 815static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e 816{
4c9b0a03 817 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 818 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
819 return 1;
820 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
821 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
822 else {
823 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
824 if (ctx->parent)
825 return 1;
826 last = 0;
827 }
828 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
829 ctx->error_depth = i;
830 ok = check_cert(ctx);
831 if (!ok)
832 return ok;
833 }
834 return 1;
835}
b545dc67
DSH		 836
837static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 838{
839 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
70dd3c65
VD		 840 int ok = 0;
841 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
842 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
843
0f113f3e
MC		 844 ctx->current_cert = x;
845 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
846 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
847 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
70dd3c65 848
790555d6
RL		 849 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
850 return 1;
851
0f113f3e 852 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
70dd3c65
VD		 853 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
854
0f113f3e
MC		 855 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
856 if (ctx->get_crl)
857 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
858 else
859 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
860 /*
861 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
862 */
863 if (!ok) {
70dd3c65
VD		 864 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
865 goto done;
0f113f3e
MC		 866 }
867 ctx->current_crl = crl;
868 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
869 if (!ok)
70dd3c65 870 goto done;
0f113f3e
MC		 871
872 if (dcrl) {
873 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
874 if (!ok)
70dd3c65 875 goto done;
0f113f3e
MC		 876 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
877 if (!ok)
70dd3c65 878 goto done;
0f113f3e
MC		 879 } else
880 ok = 1;
881
882 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
883 if (ok != 2) {
884 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
885 if (!ok)
70dd3c65 886 goto done;
0f113f3e
MC		 887 }
888
889 X509_CRL_free(crl);
890 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
891 crl = NULL;
892 dcrl = NULL;
893 /*
60250017 894 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
0f113f3e
MC		 895 * so exit loop.
896 */
897 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
70dd3c65
VD		 898 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
899 goto done;
0f113f3e
MC		 900 }
901 }
70dd3c65 902 done:
0f113f3e
MC		 903 X509_CRL_free(crl);
904 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
905
906 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
907 return ok;
0f113f3e 908}
b545dc67 909
e1a27eb3
DSH		 910/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
911
912static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
0f113f3e
MC		 913{
914 time_t *ptime;
915 int i;
70dd3c65 916
0f113f3e
MC		 917 if (notify)
918 ctx->current_crl = crl;
919 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
920 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
d35ff2c0
DW		 921 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
922 return 1;
0f113f3e
MC		 923 else
924 ptime = NULL;
925
568ce3a5 926 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
0f113f3e
MC		 927 if (i == 0) {
928 if (!notify)
929 return 0;
70dd3c65 930 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
0f113f3e
MC		 931 return 0;
932 }
933
934 if (i > 0) {
935 if (!notify)
936 return 0;
70dd3c65 937 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
0f113f3e
MC		 938 return 0;
939 }
940
568ce3a5
DSH		 941 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
942 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
0f113f3e
MC		 943
944 if (i == 0) {
945 if (!notify)
946 return 0;
70dd3c65 947 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
0f113f3e
MC		 948 return 0;
949 }
950 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
951 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
952 if (!notify)
953 return 0;
70dd3c65 954 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
0f113f3e
MC		 955 return 0;
956 }
957 }
958
959 if (notify)
960 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
961
962 return 1;
963}
e1a27eb3 964
d43c4497 965static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
0f113f3e
MC		 966 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
967 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
968{
969 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
970 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
971 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
972 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
973 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
974
975 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
976 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
977 reasons = *preasons;
978 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
8b7c51a0 979 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
626aa248
DSH		 980 continue;
981 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
8b7c51a0 982 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
626aa248 983 int day, sec;
568ce3a5
DSH		 984 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
985 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
626aa248 986 continue;
e032117d
DSH		 987 /*
988 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
989 * and |sec|.
990 */
991 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
626aa248 992 continue;
0f113f3e 993 }
626aa248
DSH		 994 best_crl = crl;
995 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
996 best_score = crl_score;
997 best_reasons = reasons;
0f113f3e
MC		 998 }
999
1000 if (best_crl) {
222561fe 1001 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
0f113f3e
MC		 1002 *pcrl = best_crl;
1003 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1004 *pscore = best_score;
1005 *preasons = best_reasons;
65cbf983 1006 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
25aaa98a
RS		 1007 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1008 *pdcrl = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 1009 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1010 }
1011
1012 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1013 return 1;
1014
1015 return 0;
1016}
1017
1018/*
1019 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
d43c4497
DSH		 1020 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1021 */
1022
1023static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 1024{
1025 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1026 int i;
1027 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1028 if (i >= 0) {
1029 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1030 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1031 return 0;
1032 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1033 } else
1034 exta = NULL;
d43c4497 1035
0f113f3e 1036 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
d43c4497 1037
0f113f3e 1038 if (i >= 0) {
d43c4497 1039
0f113f3e
MC		 1040 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1041 return 0;
1042 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1043 } else
1044 extb = NULL;
d43c4497 1045
0f113f3e
MC		 1046 if (!exta && !extb)
1047 return 1;
d43c4497 1048
0f113f3e
MC		 1049 if (!exta || !extb)
1050 return 0;
d43c4497 1051
0f113f3e
MC		 1052 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1053 return 0;
d43c4497 1054
0f113f3e
MC		 1055 return 1;
1056}
d43c4497
DSH		 1057
1058/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1059
1060static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
0f113f3e
MC		 1061{
1062 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1063 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1064 return 0;
1065 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1066 if (!base->crl_number)
1067 return 0;
1068 /* Issuer names must match */
1069 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1070 return 0;
1071 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1072 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1073 return 0;
1074 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1075 return 0;
1076 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1077 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1078 return 0;
1079 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1080 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1081 return 1;
1082 return 0;
1083}
1084
1085/*
1086 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1087 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
d43c4497
DSH		 1088 */
1089
1090static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
0f113f3e
MC		 1091 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1092{
1093 X509_CRL *delta;
1094 int i;
1095 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1096 return;
1097 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1098 return;
1099 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1100 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1101 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1102 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1103 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
65cbf983 1104 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
0f113f3e
MC		 1105 *dcrl = delta;
1106 return;
1107 }
1108 }
1109 *dcrl = NULL;
1110}
1111
1112/*
1113 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1114 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1115 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1116 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1117 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
4b96839f
DSH		 1118 */
1119
1120static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
0f113f3e
MC		 1121 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1122{
1123
1124 int crl_score = 0;
1125 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1126
1127 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1128
1129 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1130 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1131 return 0;
1132 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1133 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1134 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1135 return 0;
1136 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1137 /* If no new reasons reject */
1138 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1139 return 0;
1140 }
1141 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1142 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1143 return 0;
1144 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1145 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1146 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1147 return 0;
1148 } else
1149 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1150
1151 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1152 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1153
1154 /* Check expiry */
1155 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1156 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1157
1158 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1159 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1160
1161 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1162
1163 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1164 return 0;
1165
1166 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1167
1168 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1169 /* If no new reasons reject */
1170 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1171 return 0;
1172 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1173 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1174 }
1175
1176 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1177
1178 return crl_score;
1179
1180}
4b96839f
DSH		 1181
1182static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
0f113f3e
MC		 1183 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1184{
1185 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1186 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1187 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1188 int i;
1189
1190 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1191 cidx++;
1192
1193 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1194
1195 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1196 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1197 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1198 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1199 return;
1200 }
1201 }
1202
1203 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1204 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1205 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1206 continue;
1207 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1208 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1209 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1210 return;
1211 }
1212 }
1213
1214 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1215
1216 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1217 return;
1218
1219 /*
1220 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1221 * untrusted certificates.
1222 */
1223 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1224 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1225 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1226 continue;
1227 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1228 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1229 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1230 return;
1231 }
1232 }
1233}
1234
1235/*
1236 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
9d84d4ed 1237 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
0f113f3e
MC		 1238 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1239 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
9d84d4ed
DSH		 1240 */
1241
1242static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 1243{
1244 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1245 int ret;
70dd3c65 1246
0f113f3e
MC		 1247 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1248 if (ctx->parent)
1249 return 0;
1250 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1251 return -1;
1252
1253 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1254 /* Copy verify params across */
1255 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1256
1257 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1258 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1259
1260 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1261 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
0f113f3e
MC		 1262 if (ret <= 0)
1263 goto err;
1264
1265 /* Check chain is acceptable */
0f113f3e
MC		 1266 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1267 err:
1268 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1269 return ret;
1270}
1271
1272/*
1273 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1274 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1275 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1276 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1277 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1278 * RFC5280 version
9d84d4ed
DSH		 1279 */
1280
1281static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
0f113f3e
MC		 1282 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1283 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1284{
1285 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1286 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1287 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1288 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1289 return 1;
1290 return 0;
1291}
9d84d4ed 1292
3a83462d
MC		 1293/*-
1294 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
3e727a3b
DSH		 1295 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1296 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1297 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
d0fff69d 1298 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
3e727a3b
DSH		 1299 */
1300
3e727a3b 1301static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
0f113f3e
MC		 1302{
1303 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1304 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1305 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1306 int i, j;
1307 if (!a || !b)
1308 return 1;
1309 if (a->type == 1) {
1310 if (!a->dpname)
1311 return 0;
1312 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1313 if (b->type == 1) {
1314 if (!b->dpname)
1315 return 0;
1316 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1317 return 1;
1318 else
1319 return 0;
1320 }
1321 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1322 nm = a->dpname;
1323 gens = b->name.fullname;
1324 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1325 if (!b->dpname)
1326 return 0;
1327 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1328 gens = a->name.fullname;
1329 nm = b->dpname;
1330 }
1331
1332 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1333 if (nm) {
1334 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1335 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1336 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1337 continue;
1338 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1339 return 1;
1340 }
1341 return 0;
1342 }
1343
1344 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1345
1346 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1347 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1348 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1349 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1350 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1351 return 1;
1352 }
1353 }
1354
1355 return 0;
1356
1357}
bc7535bc 1358
4b96839f 1359static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
0f113f3e
MC		 1360{
1361 int i;
1362 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1363 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1364 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1365 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1367 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1368 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1369 continue;
1370 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1371 return 1;
1372 }
1373 return 0;
1374}
d0fff69d 1375
4b96839f 1376/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
bc7535bc 1377
4b96839f 1378static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
0f113f3e
MC		 1379 unsigned int *preasons)
1380{
1381 int i;
1382 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1383 return 0;
1384 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1385 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1386 return 0;
1387 } else {
1388 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1389 return 0;
1390 }
1391 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1392 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1393 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1394 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1395 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1396 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1397 return 1;
1398 }
1399 }
1400 }
1401 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1402 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1403 return 1;
1404 return 0;
1405}
1406
1407/*
1408 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1409 * to find a delta CRL too
b545dc67 1410 */
0f113f3e 1411
d43c4497 1412static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
0f113f3e
MC		 1413 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1414{
1415 int ok;
1416 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1417 int crl_score = 0;
1418 unsigned int reasons;
1419 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1420 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1421 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
70dd3c65 1422
0f113f3e
MC		 1423 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1424 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1425 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
0f113f3e
MC		 1426 if (ok)
1427 goto done;
1428
1429 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1430
1431 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1432
1433 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1434 if (!skcrl && crl)
1435 goto done;
1436
1437 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1438
1439 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1440
1441 done:
0f113f3e
MC		 1442 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1443 if (crl) {
1444 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1445 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1446 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1447 *pcrl = crl;
1448 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1449 return 1;
1450 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1451 return 0;
1452}
b545dc67
DSH		 1453
1454/* Check CRL validity */
1455static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
0f113f3e
MC		 1456{
1457 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1458 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
70dd3c65
VD		 1459 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1460 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1461
0f113f3e
MC		 1462 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1463 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1464 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
0f113f3e
MC		 1465 /*
1466 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1467 * certificate in chain.
1468 */
1469 else if (cnum < chnum)
1470 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1471 else {
1472 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1473 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
70dd3c65
VD		 1474 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1475 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1476 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 1477 }
1478
70dd3c65
VD		 1479 if (issuer == NULL)
1480 return 1;
0f113f3e 1481
70dd3c65
VD		 1482 /*
1483 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1484 */
1485 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1486 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1487 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1488 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1489 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1490 return 0;
0f113f3e 1491
70dd3c65
VD		 1492 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1493 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1494 return 0;
0f113f3e 1495
70dd3c65
VD		 1496 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1497 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1498 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1499 return 0;
0f113f3e 1500
70dd3c65
VD		 1501 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1502 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1503 return 0;
1504 }
0f113f3e 1505
70dd3c65
VD		 1506 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1507 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1508 return 0;
0f113f3e 1509
70dd3c65
VD		 1510 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1511 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
0f113f3e 1512
70dd3c65
VD		 1513 if (!ikey &&
1514 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1515 return 0;
0f113f3e 1516
70dd3c65
VD		 1517 if (ikey) {
1518 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
0f113f3e 1519
70dd3c65
VD		 1520 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1521 return 0;
1522 /* Verify CRL signature */
1523 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1524 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1525 return 0;
1526 }
1527 return 1;
0f113f3e 1528}
b545dc67
DSH		 1529
1530/* Check certificate against CRL */
1531static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
0f113f3e 1532{
0f113f3e 1533 X509_REVOKED *rev;
70dd3c65 1534
0f113f3e
MC		 1535 /*
1536 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1537 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
70dd3c65 1538 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
0f113f3e
MC		 1539 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1540 */
1541 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
70dd3c65
VD		 1542 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1543 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1544 return 0;
0f113f3e 1545 /*
70dd3c65
VD		 1546 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1547 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
0f113f3e
MC		 1548 */
1549 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1550 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1551 return 2;
70dd3c65 1552 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
0f113f3e
MC		 1553 return 0;
1554 }
1555
1556 return 1;
1557}
b545dc67 1558
5d7c222d 1559static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 1560{
1561 int ret;
3921ded7 1562
0f113f3e
MC		 1563 if (ctx->parent)
1564 return 1;
3921ded7
VD		 1565 /*
1566 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1567 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1568 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1569 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1570 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1571 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1572 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1573 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1574 * X509_policy_check() call.
1575 */
1576 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1577 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
f3e235ed 1578 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3921ded7
VD		 1579 return 0;
1580 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1581 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1582 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
3921ded7
VD		 1583 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1584 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1585
895c2f84 1586 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
0f113f3e 1587 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
f3e235ed 1588 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
0f113f3e
MC		 1589 return 0;
1590 }
1591 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
895c2f84 1592 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
0f113f3e 1593 int i;
70dd3c65
VD		 1594
1595 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
0f113f3e 1596 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
70dd3c65
VD		 1597 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1598
0f113f3e
MC		 1599 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1600 continue;
70dd3c65
VD		 1601 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1602 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
0f113f3e
MC		 1603 return 0;
1604 }
1605 return 1;
1606 }
895c2f84 1607 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
0f113f3e
MC		 1608 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1609 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1610 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1611 }
895c2f84
VD		 1612 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1613 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 return 0;
1615 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1616
1617 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1618 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
f3e235ed
VD		 1619 /*
1620 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1621 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1622 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1623 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1624 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1625 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1626 return 0;
1627 }
1628
1629 return 1;
1630}
5d7c222d 1631
70dd3c65
VD		 1632/*-
1633 * Check certificate validity times.
1634 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1635 * the validation status.
1636 *
1637 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1638 */
1639int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
0f113f3e
MC		 1640{
1641 time_t *ptime;
1642 int i;
1643
1644 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1645 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
d35ff2c0
DW		 1646 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1647 return 1;
0f113f3e
MC		 1648 else
1649 ptime = NULL;
1650
568ce3a5 1651 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
70dd3c65
VD		 1652 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1653 return 0;
1654 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1655 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1656 return 0;
1657 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1658 return 0;
0f113f3e 1659
568ce3a5 1660 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
70dd3c65
VD		 1661 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1662 return 0;
1663 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1664 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1665 return 0;
1666 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1667 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 1668 return 1;
1669}
e1a27eb3 1670
6b691a5c 1671static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e 1672{
70dd3c65
VD		 1673 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1674 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1675 X509 *xs;
0f113f3e 1676
170b7358
VD		 1677 /*
1678 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1679 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1680 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1681 */
1682 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1683 xs = xi;
1684 xi = NULL;
1685 goto check_cert;
1686 }
1687
0f113f3e
MC		 1688 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1689 xs = xi;
1690 else {
1691 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1692 xs = xi;
1693 goto check_cert;
1694 }
70dd3c65
VD		 1695 if (n <= 0)
1696 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1697 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1698 n--;
1699 ctx->error_depth = n;
1700 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
0f113f3e
MC		 1701 }
1702
d9b8b89b
VD		 1703 /*
1704 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1705 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1706 */
0f113f3e 1707 while (n >= 0) {
70dd3c65 1708 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
0f113f3e
MC		 1709
1710 /*
70dd3c65
VD		 1711 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1712 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1713 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1714 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
0f113f3e 1715 */
0e76014e 1716 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
c01ff880 1717 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
70dd3c65
VD		 1718 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1719 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1720 return 0;
0f113f3e 1721 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
70dd3c65
VD		 1722 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1723 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1724 return 0;
0f113f3e 1725 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1726 }
1727
0f113f3e 1728 check_cert:
70dd3c65
VD		 1729 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1730 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1731 return 0;
0f113f3e 1732
70dd3c65
VD		 1733 /*
1734 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1735 * is retained.
1736 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1737 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1738 ctx->current_cert = xs;
70dd3c65
VD		 1739 ctx->error_depth = n;
1740 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1741 return 0;
0f113f3e 1742
70dd3c65 1743 if (--n >= 0) {
0f113f3e
MC		 1744 xi = xs;
1745 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1746 }
1747 }
70dd3c65 1748 return 1;
0f113f3e 1749}
d02b48c6 1750
91b73acb 1751int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
bbb72003 1752{
0f113f3e 1753 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
bbb72003
DSH		 1754}
1755
91b73acb 1756int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
0f113f3e 1757{
80770da3
EK		 1758 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1759 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1760 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1761 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1762
f48b83b4 1763 /*
80770da3
EK		 1764 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1765 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
f48b83b4
EK		 1766 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1767 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
80770da3
EK		 1768 *
1769 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1770 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1771 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1772 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
f48b83b4 1773 */
80770da3
EK		 1774 switch (ctm->type) {
1775 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1776 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
0f113f3e 1777 return 0;
80770da3
EK		 1778 break;
1779 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1780 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
0f113f3e 1781 return 0;
80770da3
EK		 1782 break;
1783 default:
1784 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 1785 }
1786
80770da3
EK		 1787 /**
1788 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1789 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1790 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1791 */
1792 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1793 if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
f48b83b4 1794 return 0;
0f113f3e 1795 }
80770da3 1796 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
f48b83b4 1797 return 0;
0f113f3e 1798
80770da3
EK		 1799 /*
1800 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1801 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1802 * so we go through ASN.1
1803 */
1804 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1805 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1806 goto err;
1807 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1808 goto err;
0f113f3e 1809
80770da3
EK		 1810 /*
1811 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1812 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1813 */
1814 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1815
1816 err:
1817 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
1818 return ret;
0f113f3e 1819}
d02b48c6 1820
284ef5f3 1821ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
bbb72003 1822{
0f113f3e 1823 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
bbb72003
DSH		 1824}
1825
87d3a0cd 1826ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
0f113f3e
MC		 1827{
1828 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1829}
87d3a0cd
DSH		 1830
1831ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 1832 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1833{
1834 time_t t;
1835
1836 if (in_tm)
1837 t = *in_tm;
1838 else
1839 time(&t);
1840
1841 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1842 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1843 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1844 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1845 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1846 }
1847 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1848}
d02b48c6 1849
7e258a56 1850int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
0f113f3e
MC		 1851{
1852 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1853 int i, j;
1854
1855 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1856 return 1;
1857
1858 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
c01ff880 1859 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
0f113f3e
MC		 1860 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1861 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1862 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1863 return 0;
1864 }
1865 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1866 break;
0f113f3e
MC		 1867 }
1868 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1869 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1870 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1871 return 0;
1872 }
1873
1874 /* first, populate the other certs */
1875 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
c01ff880 1876 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
0f113f3e 1877 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
0f113f3e
MC		 1878 }
1879
1880 if (pkey != NULL)
1881 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
0f113f3e
MC		 1882 return 1;
1883}
d02b48c6 1884
2e8cb108
DSH		 1885/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1886
1887X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
0f113f3e
MC		 1888 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1889{
1890 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1891 int i;
1892 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1893 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1894 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1895 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1896 return NULL;
1897 }
1898 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1899 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1900 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1901 return NULL;
1902 }
1903 /* Issuer names must match */
1904 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1905 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1906 return NULL;
1907 }
1908 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1909 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1910 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1911 return NULL;
1912 }
1913 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1914 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1915 return NULL;
1916 }
1917 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1918 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1919 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1920 return NULL;
1921 }
1922 /* CRLs must verify */
1923 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1924 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1925 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1926 return NULL;
1927 }
1928 /* Create new CRL */
1929 crl = X509_CRL_new();
90945fa3 1930 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
0f113f3e
MC		 1931 goto memerr;
1932 /* Set issuer name */
1933 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1934 goto memerr;
1935
568ce3a5 1936 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
0f113f3e 1937 goto memerr;
568ce3a5 1938 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
0f113f3e
MC		 1939 goto memerr;
1940
1941 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1942
1943 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1944 goto memerr;
1945
1946 /*
1947 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1948 * number to correct value too.
1949 */
1950
1951 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
1952 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
1953 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
1954 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
1955 goto memerr;
1956 }
1957
1958 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1959
1960 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
1961
1962 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
1963 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
1964 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
1965 /*
1966 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1967 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1968 */
34a42e14 1969 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
0f113f3e
MC		 1970 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
1971 if (!rvtmp)
1972 goto memerr;
1973 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
1974 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
1975 goto memerr;
1976 }
1977 }
1978 }
1979 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
1980
1981 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
1982 goto memerr;
1983
1984 return crl;
1985
1986 memerr:
1987 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
222561fe 1988 X509_CRL_free(crl);
0f113f3e
MC		 1989 return NULL;
1990}
1991
6b691a5c 1992int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
0f113f3e
MC		 1993{
1994 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
1995}
58964a49 1996
6b691a5c 1997void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
0f113f3e
MC		 1998{
1999 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2000}
58964a49 2001
6b691a5c 2002int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2003{
2004 return ctx->error;
2005}
58964a49 2006
6b691a5c 2007void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
0f113f3e
MC		 2008{
2009 ctx->error = err;
2010}
58964a49 2011
6b691a5c 2012int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2013{
2014 return ctx->error_depth;
2015}
58964a49 2016
51227177
VD		 2017void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2018{
2019 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2020}
2021
6b691a5c 2022X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2023{
2024 return ctx->current_cert;
2025}
58964a49 2026
c9654873
VD		 2027void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2028{
2029 ctx->current_cert = x;
2030}
2031
f0e0fd51 2032STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2033{
2034 return ctx->chain;
2035}
58964a49 2036
c7cb16a8 2037STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2038{
2039 if (!ctx->chain)
2040 return NULL;
2041 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2042}
25f923dd 2043
2008e714 2044X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2045{
2046 return ctx->current_issuer;
2047}
2008e714
DSH		 2048
2049X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2050{
2051 return ctx->current_crl;
2052}
2008e714
DSH		 2053
2054X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2055{
2056 return ctx->parent;
2057}
2008e714 2058
6b691a5c 2059void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 2060{
2061 ctx->cert = x;
2062}
58964a49 2063
e1a27eb3 2064void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
0f113f3e
MC		 2065{
2066 ctx->crls = sk;
2067}
e1a27eb3 2068
13938ace 2069int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
0f113f3e 2070{
0daccd4d
VD		 2071 /*
2072 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2073 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2074 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2075 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2076 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2077}
11262391 2078
bb7cd4e3 2079int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
0f113f3e 2080{
0daccd4d
VD		 2081 /*
2082 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2083 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2084 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2085 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2086}
2087
2088/*
2089 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2090 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2091 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2092 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2093 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2094 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2095 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2096 * client/server.
13938ace
DSH		 2097 */
2098
2099int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
0f113f3e
MC		 2100 int purpose, int trust)
2101{
2102 int idx;
2103 /* If purpose not set use default */
2104 if (!purpose)
2105 purpose = def_purpose;
2106 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2107 if (purpose) {
2108 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2109 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2110 if (idx == -1) {
2111 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2112 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2113 return 0;
2114 }
2115 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2116 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2117 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
0daccd4d
VD		 2118 /*
2119 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2120 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2121 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2122 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2123 if (idx == -1) {
2124 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2125 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2126 return 0;
2127 }
2128 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2129 }
2130 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2131 if (!trust)
2132 trust = ptmp->trust;
2133 }
2134 if (trust) {
2135 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2136 if (idx == -1) {
2137 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2138 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2139 return 0;
2140 }
2141 }
2142
2143 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2144 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2145 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2146 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2147 return 1;
51630a37
DSH		 2148}
2149
2f043896
DSH		 2150X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2151{
b51bce94 2152 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
b196e7d9 2153
90945fa3 2154 if (ctx == NULL) {
0f113f3e
MC		 2155 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2156 return NULL;
2157 }
0f113f3e 2158 return ctx;
2f043896
DSH		 2159}
2160
2161void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2162{
c001ce33 2163 if (ctx == NULL)
222561fe 2164 return;
c001ce33 2165
0f113f3e
MC		 2166 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2167 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2f043896
DSH		 2168}
2169
79aa04ef 2170int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
0f113f3e
MC		 2171 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2172{
2173 int ret = 1;
ecdaa1ae 2174
0f113f3e 2175 ctx->ctx = store;
0f113f3e
MC		 2176 ctx->cert = x509;
2177 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2178 ctx->crls = NULL;
d9b8b89b 2179 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2180 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2181 ctx->valid = 0;
2182 ctx->chain = NULL;
2183 ctx->error = 0;
2184 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2185 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2186 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2187 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2188 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2189 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2190 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2191 ctx->tree = NULL;
2192 ctx->parent = NULL;
919ba009 2193 ctx->dane = NULL;
170b7358 2194 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
e29c73c9
VD		 2195 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2196 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
0f113f3e 2197
7b7eb472
VD		 2198 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2199 if (store)
0f113f3e 2200 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
7b7eb472 2201 else
0f113f3e
MC		 2202 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2203
0f113f3e
MC		 2204 if (store && store->check_issued)
2205 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2206 else
2207 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2208
2209 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2210 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2211 else
2212 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2213
2214 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2215 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2216 else
2217 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2218
2219 if (store && store->verify)
2220 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2221 else
2222 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2223
2224 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2225 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2226 else
2227 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2228
2229 if (store && store->get_crl)
2230 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
311f2785
VD		 2231 else
2232 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
0f113f3e
MC		 2233
2234 if (store && store->check_crl)
2235 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2236 else
2237 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2238
2239 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2240 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2241 else
2242 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2243
0a5fe2eb
RL		 2244 if (store && store->check_policy)
2245 ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2246 else
2247 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2248
0f113f3e
MC		 2249 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2250 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2251 else
6ddbb4cd 2252 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
0f113f3e
MC		 2253
2254 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2255 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2256 else
6ddbb4cd 2257 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
0f113f3e 2258
ecdaa1ae 2259 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2260 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2261 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2262 goto err;
2263 }
2264
2265 /*
2266 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2267 */
2268 if (store)
2269 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2270 else
2271 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2272
2273 if (ret)
2274 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2275 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2276
2277 if (ret == 0) {
2278 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2279 goto err;
2280 }
2281
0daccd4d
VD		 2282 /*
2283 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2284 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2285 */
2286 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2287 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2288 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2289
2290 if (xp != NULL)
2291 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2292 }
2293
e29c73c9
VD		 2294 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2295 &ctx->ex_data))
2296 return 1;
2297 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ecdaa1ae 2298
d9b8b89b 2299 err:
e29c73c9
VD		 2300 /*
2301 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2302 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2303 */
ecdaa1ae 2304 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2305 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 2306}
2307
2308/*
2309 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2310 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2f043896 2311 */
f0e0fd51 2312void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2f043896 2313{
0f113f3e
MC		 2314 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2315 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
c864e761 2316 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2f043896
DSH		 2317}
2318
2319void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e 2320{
e29c73c9
VD		 2321 /*
2322 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2323 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2324 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2325 * pointers below after they're freed!
2326 */
2327 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2328 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
0f113f3e 2329 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
e29c73c9
VD		 2330 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2331 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2332 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2333 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2334 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2335 ctx->param = NULL;
2336 }
222561fe
RS		 2337 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2338 ctx->tree = NULL;
2339 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2340 ctx->chain = NULL;
0f113f3e 2341 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
16f8d4eb 2342 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
0f113f3e 2343}
13938ace 2344
5d7c222d 2345void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
0f113f3e
MC		 2346{
2347 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2348}
bbb72003 2349
5d7c222d 2350void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
0f113f3e
MC		 2351{
2352 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2353}
5d7c222d 2354
0f113f3e
MC		 2355void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2356 time_t t)
2357{
2358 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2359}
bbb72003 2360
1060a50b
RL		 2361X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2362{
2363 return ctx->cert;
2364}
2365
2366STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2367{
2368 return ctx->untrusted;
2369}
2370
2371void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2372{
2373 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2374}
2375
2376void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2377{
2378 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2379 ctx->chain = sk;
2380}
2381
db089ad6 2382void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
f0e0fd51 2383 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
0f113f3e
MC		 2384{
2385 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2386}
db089ad6 2387
f0e0fd51
RS		 2388X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2389{
2390 return ctx->verify_cb;
2391}
2392
4a7b3a7b
VD		 2393void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2394 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2395{
2396 ctx->verify = verify;
2397}
2398
1060a50b 2399X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
f0e0fd51 2400{
1060a50b 2401 return ctx->verify;
f0e0fd51
RS		 2402}
2403
1060a50b 2404X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
f0e0fd51 2405{
1060a50b 2406 return ctx->get_issuer;
f0e0fd51
RS		 2407}
2408
1060a50b 2409X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
4dba585f 2410{
1060a50b 2411 return ctx->check_issued;
4dba585f
DSH		 2412}
2413
1060a50b 2414X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
f0e0fd51 2415{
1060a50b 2416 return ctx->check_revocation;
f0e0fd51
RS		 2417}
2418
1060a50b 2419X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
f0e0fd51 2420{
1060a50b 2421 return ctx->get_crl;
f0e0fd51
RS		 2422}
2423
1060a50b 2424X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
f0e0fd51 2425{
1060a50b
RL		 2426 return ctx->check_crl;
2427}
2428
2429X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2430{
2431 return ctx->cert_crl;
2432}
2433
2434X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2435{
2436 return ctx->check_policy;
2437}
2438
2439X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440{
2441 return ctx->lookup_certs;
2442}
2443
2444X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2445{
2446 return ctx->lookup_crls;
2447}
2448
2449X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2450{
2451 return ctx->cleanup;
f0e0fd51
RS		 2452}
2453
5d7c222d 2454X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2455{
2456 return ctx->tree;
2457}
5d7c222d
DSH		 2458
2459int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2460{
2461 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2462}
5d7c222d 2463
7f3f41d8
MC		 2464int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2465{
d9b8b89b 2466 return ctx->num_untrusted;
7f3f41d8
MC		 2467}
2468
5d7c222d 2469int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
0f113f3e
MC		 2470{
2471 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2472 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2473 if (!param)
2474 return 0;
2475 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2476}
5d7c222d
DSH		 2477
2478X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
0f113f3e
MC		 2479{
2480 return ctx->param;
2481}
5d7c222d
DSH		 2482
2483void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
0f113f3e 2484{
222561fe 2485 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
0f113f3e
MC		 2486 ctx->param = param;
2487}
d9b8b89b 2488
b9aec69a 2489void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
919ba009
VD		 2490{
2491 ctx->dane = dane;
2492}
2493
170b7358
VD		 2494static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2495 X509 *cert,
2496 uint8_t selector,
2497 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2498{
2499 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2500 int len;
2501
2502 /*
2503 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2504 */
2505 switch (selector) {
2506 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2507 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2508 break;
2509 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2510 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2511 break;
2512 default:
2513 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2514 return NULL;
2515 }
2516
2517 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2518 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2519 return NULL;
2520 }
2521
2522 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2523 return buf;
2524}
2525
2526#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2527
2528static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2529{
b9aec69a 2530 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
170b7358
VD		 2531 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2532 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2533 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2534 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2535 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2536 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2537 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2538 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2539 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2540 int i;
2541 int recnum;
2542 int matched = 0;
2543 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2544 uint32_t mask;
2545
2546 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2547
2548 /*
2549 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2550 */
2551 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2552 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2553
2554 /*
2555 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
02e112a8 2556 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
170b7358
VD		 2557 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2558 */
2559 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2560 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2561
2562 /*-
2563 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2564 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2565 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2566 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2567 *
2568 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2569 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2570 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2571 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2572 *
2573 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2574 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2575 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2576 *
2577 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2578 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2579 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2580 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2581 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2582 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2583 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2584 *
2585 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2586 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
0d4fb843 2587 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
170b7358
VD		 2588 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2589 */
2590 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2591 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2592 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2593 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2594 continue;
2595 if (t->usage != usage) {
2596 usage = t->usage;
2597
2598 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2599 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2600 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2601 }
2602 if (t->selector != selector) {
2603 selector = t->selector;
2604
2605 /* Update per-selector state */
2606 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2607 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2608 if (i2dbuf == NULL)
2609 return -1;
2610
2611 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2612 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2613 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2614 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2615 /*-
2616 * Digest agility:
2617 *
2618 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2619 *
2620 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2621 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2622 * other than "Full".
2623 */
2624 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2625 continue;
2626 }
2627
2628 /*
2629 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2630 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2631 */
2632 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2633 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2634 cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
2635 cmplen = i2dlen;
2636
2637 if (md != NULL) {
dccd20d1
F		 2638 cmpbuf = mdbuf;
2639 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2640 matched = -1;
170b7358
VD		 2641 break;
2642 }
2643 }
2644 }
2645
2646 /*
2647 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2648 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2649 * full chain.
2650 */
2651 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2652 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2653 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2654 matched = 1;
2655 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2656 dane->mdpth = depth;
2657 dane->mtlsa = t;
2658 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2659 dane->mcert = cert;
2660 X509_up_ref(cert);
2661 }
2662 break;
2663 }
2664 }
2665
2666 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2667 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2668 return matched;
2669}
2670
2671static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2672{
b9aec69a 2673 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
170b7358
VD		 2674 int matched = 0;
2675 X509 *cert;
2676
2677 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2678 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2679
2680 /*
89ff989d 2681 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
170b7358
VD		 2682 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2683 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2684 */
2685 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2686 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2687 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2688 if (matched > 0) {
2689 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2690 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2691 }
2692
2693 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2694}
2695
2696static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2697{
b9aec69a 2698 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
170b7358
VD		 2699 danetls_record *t;
2700 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2701 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2702 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2703 int i;
2704
2705 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2706 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2707 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2708 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2709 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2710 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2711 continue;
2712
c0a445a9 2713 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
170b7358
VD		 2714 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2715 dane->mcert = NULL;
2716
2717 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2718 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2719 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2720 dane->mtlsa = t;
2721
2722 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2723 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2724 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2725 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2726
2727 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2728 }
2729
2730 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2731}
2732
b9aec69a 2733static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
170b7358
VD		 2734{
2735 /*
2736 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2737 */
2738 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2739 dane->mcert = NULL;
2740 dane->mtlsa = NULL;
2741 dane->mdpth = -1;
2742 dane->pdpth = -1;
2743}
2744
6e328256
VD		 2745static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2746{
2747 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2748
2749 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2750 return 1;
70dd3c65 2751 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
6e328256
VD		 2752}
2753
170b7358
VD		 2754static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2755{
2756 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
b9aec69a 2757 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
170b7358
VD		 2758 int matched;
2759 int done;
2760
2761 dane_reset(dane);
2762
89ff989d
VD		 2763 /*-
2764 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2765 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2766 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2767 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2768 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2769 * if:
2770 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2771 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2772 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2773 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2774 */
170b7358
VD		 2775 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2776 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2777
2778 if (done)
2779 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2780
2781 if (matched > 0) {
70dd3c65 2782 /* Callback invoked as needed */
6e328256
VD		 2783 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2784 return 0;
5ae4ceb9
VD		 2785 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2786 if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2787 !check_id(ctx))
2788 return 0;
70dd3c65 2789 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
170b7358
VD		 2790 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2791 ctx->current_cert = cert;
6e328256 2792 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
170b7358
VD		 2793 }
2794
2795 if (matched < 0) {
2796 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2797 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2798 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2799 return -1;
2800 }
2801
2802 if (done) {
2803 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
6e328256
VD		 2804 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2805 return 0;
70dd3c65 2806 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
170b7358
VD		 2807 }
2808
2809 /*
2810 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2811 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2812 */
2813 return verify_chain(ctx);
2814}
2815
fbb82a60
VD		 2816/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2817static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2818{
2819 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2820 int ok;
2821
2822 ctx->chain = NULL;
2823 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2824 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2825
2826 return ok;
2827}
2828
d9b8b89b
VD		 2829static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2830{
b9aec69a 2831 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
d9b8b89b
VD		 2832 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2833 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2834 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2835 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2836 unsigned int search;
170b7358 2837 int may_trusted = 0;
d9b8b89b
VD		 2838 int may_alternate = 0;
2839 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2840 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2841 int depth;
2842 int ok = 0;
2843 int i;
2844
2845 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2846 OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
2847
2848#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2849#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2850#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2851 /*
2852 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
170b7358
VD		 2853 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2854 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2855 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2856 * if no luck with untrusted first.
d9b8b89b
VD		 2857 */
2858 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
170b7358
VD		 2859 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2860 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2861 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2862 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2863 may_alternate = 1;
2864 may_trusted = 1;
2865 }
d9b8b89b
VD		 2866
2867 /*
2868 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2869 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2870 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2871 */
2872 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2873 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
f3e235ed 2874 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
d9b8b89b
VD		 2875 return 0;
2876 }
2877
69664d6a
VD		 2878 /*
2879 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2880 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2881 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2882 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2883 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2884 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2885 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2886 * this to change. ]
2887 */
170b7358 2888 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
69664d6a
VD		 2889 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2890 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
f3e235ed 2891 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
69664d6a
VD		 2892 return 0;
2893 }
170b7358
VD		 2894 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2895 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2896 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2897 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
f3e235ed 2898 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
170b7358
VD		 2899 return 0;
2900 }
2901 }
2902 }
2903
d9b8b89b
VD		 2904 /*
2905 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2906 * might be reasonable.
2907 */
2908 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2909 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2910
2911 /*
2912 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2913 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2914 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2915 */
2916 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2917
2918 while (search != 0) {
2919 X509 *x;
2920 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
2921
2922 /*
2923 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
fbb82a60
VD		 2924 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2925 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2926 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2927 *
2928 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2929 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2930 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2931 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2932 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2933 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2934 * would be a-priori too long.
d9b8b89b
VD		 2935 */
2936 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
d9b8b89b
VD		 2937 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2938 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2939 /*
2940 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2941 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2942 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2943 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2944 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2945 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2946 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2947 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2948 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2949 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2950 *
2951 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2952 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2953 */
2954 i = alt_untrusted;
2955 }
2956 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
2957
fbb82a60 2958 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
d9b8b89b
VD		 2959
2960 if (ok < 0) {
2961 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
f3e235ed 2962 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
d9b8b89b
VD		 2963 search = 0;
2964 continue;
2965 }
2966
2967 if (ok > 0) {
2968 /*
2969 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
2970 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
2971 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
2972 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
2973 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
2974 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
2975 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
2976 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
170b7358
VD		 2977 *
2978 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
2979 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
2980 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
d9b8b89b
VD		 2981 */
2982 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2983 OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
2984 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
2985 for (; num > i; --num)
2986 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2987 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
170b7358
VD		 2988
2989 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
2990 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
2991 dane->mdpth = -1;
2992 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2993 dane->mcert = NULL;
2994 }
2995 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
2996 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2997 dane->pdpth = -1;
d9b8b89b
VD		 2998 }
2999
3000 /*
3001 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3002 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3003 */
3004 if (ss == 0) {
3005 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3006 X509_free(xtmp);
3007 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3008 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
f3e235ed 3009 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
d9b8b89b
VD		 3010 search = 0;
3011 continue;
3012 }
3013 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3014 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3015 /*
3016 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3017 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3018 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3019 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3020 */
3021 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3022 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3023 X509_free(xtmp);
3024 ok = 0;
3025 } else {
3026 X509_free(x);
3027 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3028 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3029 }
3030 }
3031
3032 /*
3033 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3034 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3035 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3036 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
170b7358
VD		 3037 *
3038 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3039 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3040 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3041 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3042 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3043 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
d9b8b89b
VD		 3044 */
3045 if (ok) {
3046 OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
3047 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3048 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3049 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3050 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3051 search = 0;
3052 continue;
3053 }
3054 if (ss == 0)
3055 continue;
3056 }
3057 }
3058
3059 /*
3060 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3061 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3062 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3063 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3064 */
3065 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3066 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3067 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3068 continue;
3069 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3070 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3071 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3072 break;
3073 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3074 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3075 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3076 ss = 0;
3077 }
3078 }
3079
3080 /*
3081 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3082 */
3083 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3084 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3085 OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
3086 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
d9b8b89b
VD		 3087
3088 /*
3089 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3090 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3091 */
fbb82a60 3092 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
d9b8b89b
VD		 3093 if (xtmp == NULL) {
3094 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3095 if (may_trusted)
3096 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3097 continue;
3098 }
3099
fbb82a60
VD		 3100 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3101 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3102
3103 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
d9b8b89b
VD		 3104 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3105 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
f3e235ed 3106 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
d9b8b89b
VD		 3107 search = 0;
3108 continue;
3109 }
fbb82a60
VD		 3110
3111 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
d9b8b89b
VD		 3112 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3113 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3114
170b7358
VD		 3115 /*
3116 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3117 */
3118 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3119 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3120 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3121 search = 0;
3122 continue;
3123 }
d9b8b89b
VD		 3124 }
3125 }
3126 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3127
3128 /*
170b7358
VD		 3129 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3130 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
d9b8b89b 3131 */
497ecc0d
VD		 3132 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3133 if (num <= depth) {
170b7358
VD		 3134 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3135 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
497ecc0d
VD		 3136 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3137 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
d9b8b89b
VD		 3138 }
3139
3140 switch (trust) {
3141 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3142 return 1;
3143 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
70dd3c65 3144 /* Callback already issued */
d9b8b89b
VD		 3145 return 0;
3146 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3147 default:
3148 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
d9b8b89b 3149 if (num > depth)
70dd3c65
VD		 3150 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3151 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3152 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3153 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3154 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3155 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3156 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3157 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3158 if (ss)
3159 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3160 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3161 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3162 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3163 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3164 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3165 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
d9b8b89b
VD		 3166 }
3167}
fbb82a60
VD		 3168
3169static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3170static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3171
3172/*
3173 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3174 * ``ctx``.
3175 *
3176 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3177 */
3178static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3179{
3180 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3181 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3182
3183 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3184 if (pkey == NULL)
3185 return 0;
3186
3187 if (level <= 0)
3188 return 1;
3189 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3190 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3191
3192 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3193}
3194
3195/*
3196 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3197 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3198 * self-signed or otherwise).
3199 *
3200 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3201 */
3202static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3203{
fbb82a60
VD		 3204 int secbits = -1;
3205 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3206
3207 if (level <= 0)
3208 return 1;
3209 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3210 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3211
c3c8823c
DSH		 3212 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
3213 return 0;
fbb82a60
VD		 3214
3215 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3216}
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