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Commit | Line | Data |
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43c69e28 SS |
1 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c |
2 | --- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.238524384 +0100 | |
3 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2012-11-28 17:12:43.263524297 +0100 | |
4 | @@ -27,9 +27,13 @@ | |
5 | ||
6 | #include <sys/types.h> | |
7 | #include <sys/stat.h> | |
8 | +#include <sys/wait.h> | |
9 | ||
10 | +#include <errno.h> | |
11 | #include <fcntl.h> | |
12 | +#include <paths.h> | |
13 | #include <pwd.h> | |
14 | +#include <signal.h> | |
15 | #include <stdio.h> | |
16 | #include <stdarg.h> | |
17 | #include <string.h> | |
18 | @@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct | |
19 | if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { | |
20 | debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" " | |
21 | "from file \"%s\" on line %lu", | |
22 | - cert->principals[i], file, linenum); | |
23 | + cert->principals[i], file, linenum); | |
24 | if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, | |
25 | file, linenum) != 1) | |
26 | continue; | |
27 | @@ -273,31 +277,22 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct | |
28 | fclose(f); | |
29 | restore_uid(); | |
30 | return 0; | |
31 | -} | |
32 | +} | |
33 | ||
34 | -/* return 1 if user allows given key */ | |
35 | +/* | |
36 | + * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, | |
37 | + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. | |
38 | + */ | |
39 | static int | |
40 | -user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) | |
41 | +check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) | |
42 | { | |
43 | char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; | |
44 | const char *reason; | |
45 | int found_key = 0; | |
46 | - FILE *f; | |
47 | u_long linenum = 0; | |
48 | Key *found; | |
49 | char *fp; | |
50 | ||
51 | - /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ | |
52 | - temporarily_use_uid(pw); | |
53 | - | |
54 | - debug("trying public key file %s", file); | |
55 | - f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes); | |
56 | - | |
57 | - if (!f) { | |
58 | - restore_uid(); | |
59 | - return 0; | |
60 | - } | |
61 | - | |
62 | found_key = 0; | |
63 | found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); | |
64 | ||
65 | @@ -390,8 +385,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key | |
66 | break; | |
67 | } | |
68 | } | |
69 | - restore_uid(); | |
70 | - fclose(f); | |
71 | key_free(found); | |
72 | if (!found_key) | |
73 | debug2("key not found"); | |
74 | @@ -453,7 +446,173 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, | |
75 | return ret; | |
76 | } | |
77 | ||
78 | -/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */ | |
79 | +/* | |
80 | + * Checks whether key is allowed in file. | |
81 | + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. | |
82 | + */ | |
83 | +static int | |
84 | +user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) | |
85 | +{ | |
86 | + FILE *f; | |
87 | + int found_key = 0; | |
88 | + | |
89 | + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ | |
90 | + temporarily_use_uid(pw); | |
91 | + | |
92 | + debug("trying public key file %s", file); | |
93 | + if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { | |
94 | + found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw); | |
95 | + fclose(f); | |
96 | + } | |
97 | + | |
98 | + restore_uid(); | |
99 | + return found_key; | |
100 | +} | |
101 | + | |
102 | +/* | |
103 | + * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. | |
104 | + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. | |
105 | + */ | |
106 | +static int | |
107 | +user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) | |
108 | +{ | |
109 | + FILE *f; | |
110 | + int ok, found_key = 0; | |
111 | + struct passwd *pw; | |
112 | + struct stat st; | |
113 | + int status, devnull, p[2], i; | |
114 | + pid_t pid; | |
115 | + char errmsg[512]; | |
116 | + | |
117 | + if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL || | |
118 | + options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/') | |
119 | + return 0; | |
120 | + | |
121 | + /* If no user specified to run commands the default to target user */ | |
122 | + if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) | |
123 | + pw = user_pw; | |
124 | + else { | |
125 | + pw = getpwnam(options.authorized_keys_command_user); | |
126 | + if (pw == NULL) { | |
127 | + error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", | |
128 | + options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); | |
129 | + return 0; | |
130 | + } | |
131 | + } | |
132 | + | |
133 | + temporarily_use_uid(pw); | |
134 | + if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) { | |
135 | + error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s", | |
136 | + options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); | |
137 | + goto out; | |
138 | + } | |
139 | + | |
140 | + if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, | |
141 | + errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { | |
142 | + error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); | |
143 | + goto out; | |
144 | + } | |
145 | + | |
146 | + /* open the pipe and read the keys */ | |
147 | + if (pipe(p) != 0) { | |
148 | + error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); | |
149 | + goto out; | |
150 | + } | |
151 | + | |
152 | + debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\"", | |
153 | + options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name); | |
154 | + | |
155 | + /* | |
156 | + * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and | |
157 | + * run cleanup_exit() code. | |
158 | + */ | |
159 | + restore_uid(); | |
160 | + | |
161 | + switch ((pid = fork())) { | |
162 | + case -1: /* error */ | |
163 | + error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); | |
164 | + close(p[0]); | |
165 | + close(p[1]); | |
166 | + return 0; | |
167 | + case 0: /* child */ | |
168 | + for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) | |
169 | + signal(i, SIG_DFL); | |
170 | + | |
171 | + /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ | |
172 | + if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { | |
173 | + error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, | |
174 | + strerror(errno)); | |
175 | + _exit(1); | |
176 | + } | |
177 | + if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { | |
178 | + error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, | |
179 | + strerror(errno)); | |
180 | + _exit(1); | |
181 | + } | |
182 | + | |
183 | + close(p[0]); | |
184 | + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { | |
185 | + error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, | |
186 | + strerror(errno)); | |
187 | + _exit(1); | |
188 | + } | |
189 | + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || | |
190 | + dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || | |
191 | + dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { | |
192 | + error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); | |
193 | + _exit(1); | |
194 | + } | |
195 | + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); | |
196 | + | |
197 | + execl(options.authorized_keys_command, | |
198 | + options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL); | |
199 | + | |
200 | + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", | |
201 | + options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); | |
202 | + _exit(127); | |
203 | + default: /* parent */ | |
204 | + break; | |
205 | + } | |
206 | + | |
207 | + temporarily_use_uid(pw); | |
208 | + | |
209 | + close(p[1]); | |
210 | + if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { | |
211 | + error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); | |
212 | + close(p[0]); | |
213 | + /* Don't leave zombie child */ | |
214 | + while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) | |
215 | + ; | |
216 | + goto out; | |
217 | + } | |
218 | + ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); | |
219 | + fclose(f); | |
220 | + | |
221 | + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { | |
222 | + if (errno != EINTR) { | |
223 | + error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); | |
224 | + goto out; | |
225 | + } | |
226 | + } | |
227 | + if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { | |
228 | + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", | |
229 | + options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status)); | |
230 | + goto out; | |
231 | + } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { | |
232 | + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", | |
233 | + options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status)); | |
234 | + goto out; | |
235 | + } | |
236 | + found_key = ok; | |
237 | + out: | |
238 | + restore_uid(); | |
239 | + | |
240 | + return found_key; | |
241 | +} | |
242 | + | |
243 | +/* | |
244 | + * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. | |
245 | + */ | |
246 | int | |
247 | user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) | |
248 | { | |
249 | @@ -469,6 +628,10 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key | |
250 | if (success) | |
251 | return success; | |
252 | ||
253 | + success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key); | |
254 | + if (success > 0) | |
255 | + return success; | |
256 | + | |
257 | for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { | |
258 | file = expand_authorized_keys( | |
259 | options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); | |
260 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.c | |
261 | --- openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.187524558 +0100 | |
262 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.c 2012-11-28 17:12:43.263524297 +0100 | |
263 | @@ -411,39 +411,41 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw | |
264 | ||
265 | ||
266 | /* | |
267 | - * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components | |
268 | + * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components | |
269 | * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of | |
270 | * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. | |
271 | * | |
272 | * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? | |
273 | * | |
274 | - * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and | |
275 | + * Takes an the file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to | |
276 | + * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an | |
277 | * error buffer plus max size as arguments. | |
278 | * | |
279 | * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure | |
280 | */ | |
281 | -static int | |
282 | -secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, | |
283 | - char *err, size_t errlen) | |
284 | +int | |
285 | +auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, | |
286 | + uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) | |
287 | { | |
288 | - uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; | |
289 | char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; | |
290 | char *cp; | |
291 | int comparehome = 0; | |
292 | struct stat st; | |
293 | ||
294 | - if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) { | |
295 | - snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file, | |
296 | + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { | |
297 | + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, | |
298 | strerror(errno)); | |
299 | return -1; | |
300 | } | |
301 | - if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) | |
302 | + if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) | |
303 | comparehome = 1; | |
304 | ||
305 | - /* check the open file to avoid races */ | |
306 | - if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 || | |
307 | - (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || | |
308 | - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { | |
309 | + if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { | |
310 | + snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); | |
311 | + return -1; | |
312 | + } | |
313 | + if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) || | |
314 | + (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { | |
315 | snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", | |
316 | buf); | |
317 | return -1; | |
318 | @@ -479,6 +481,31 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *fil | |
319 | return 0; | |
320 | } | |
321 | ||
322 | +/* | |
323 | + * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to | |
324 | + * avoid races. | |
325 | + * | |
326 | + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure | |
327 | + */ | |
328 | +static int | |
329 | +secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, | |
330 | + char *err, size_t errlen) | |
331 | +{ | |
332 | + uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid; | |
333 | + char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; | |
334 | + char *cp; | |
335 | + int comparehome = 0; | |
336 | + struct stat st; | |
337 | + | |
338 | + /* check the open file to avoid races */ | |
339 | + if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { | |
340 | + snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", | |
341 | + buf, strerror(errno)); | |
342 | + return -1; | |
343 | + } | |
344 | + return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); | |
345 | +} | |
346 | + | |
347 | static FILE * | |
348 | auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, | |
349 | int log_missing, char *file_type) | |
350 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.h | |
351 | --- openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.239524381 +0100 | |
352 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.h 2012-11-28 17:12:43.263524297 +0100 | |
353 | @@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct | |
354 | int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); | |
355 | int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); | |
356 | ||
357 | +struct stat; | |
358 | +int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, | |
359 | + char *, size_t); | |
360 | + | |
361 | #ifdef KRB5 | |
362 | int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); | |
363 | int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); | |
364 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c | |
365 | --- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.198524521 +0100 | |
366 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c 2012-11-28 17:14:50.314005026 +0100 | |
367 | @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions | |
368 | options->num_permitted_opens = -1; | |
369 | options->adm_forced_command = NULL; | |
370 | options->chroot_directory = NULL; | |
371 | + options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; | |
372 | + options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; | |
373 | options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1; | |
374 | options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; | |
375 | options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; | |
376 | @@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ typedef enum { | |
377 | sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, | |
378 | sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, | |
379 | sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, | |
380 | + sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, | |
381 | sAuthenticationMethods, | |
382 | sDeprecated, sUnsupported | |
383 | } ServerOpCodes; | |
384 | @@ -457,6 +460,9 @@ static struct { | |
385 | { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, | |
386 | { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, | |
387 | { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, | |
388 | + { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, | |
389 | + { "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, | |
390 | + { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, | |
391 | { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, | |
392 | { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } | |
393 | }; | |
394 | @@ -1520,6 +1526,26 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions | |
395 | } | |
396 | return 0; | |
397 | ||
398 | + case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: | |
399 | + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); | |
400 | + if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) { | |
401 | + options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len); | |
402 | + if (*options->authorized_keys_command != '/') { | |
403 | + fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand " | |
404 | + "must be an absolute path", | |
405 | + filename, linenum); | |
406 | + } | |
407 | + } | |
408 | + return 0; | |
409 | + | |
410 | + case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: | |
411 | + charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; | |
412 | + | |
413 | + arg = strdelim(&cp); | |
414 | + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) | |
415 | + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); | |
416 | + break; | |
417 | + | |
418 | case sDeprecated: | |
419 | logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", | |
420 | filename, linenum, arg); | |
421 | @@ -1670,6 +1696,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d | |
422 | M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); | |
423 | M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); | |
424 | M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication); | |
425 | + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); | |
426 | + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); | |
427 | M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); | |
428 | M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); | |
429 | ||
430 | @@ -1930,6 +1958,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) | |
431 | dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, | |
432 | o->authorized_principals_file); | |
433 | dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum); | |
434 | + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); | |
435 | + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); | |
436 | ||
437 | /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ | |
438 | dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); | |
439 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h | |
440 | --- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.000000000 +0100 | |
441 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h 2012-11-28 17:18:41.217055157 +0100 | |
442 | @@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ typedef struct { | |
443 | char *revoked_keys_file; | |
444 | char *trusted_user_ca_keys; | |
445 | char *authorized_principals_file; | |
446 | + char *authorized_keys_command; | |
447 | + char *authorized_keys_command_user; | |
448 | ||
449 | char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ | |
450 | ||
451 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c | |
452 | --- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.245524360 +0100 | |
453 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c 2012-11-28 17:12:43.265524291 +0100 | |
454 | @@ -366,9 +366,20 @@ main_sigchld_handler(int sig) | |
455 | static void | |
456 | grace_alarm_handler(int sig) | |
457 | { | |
458 | + pid_t pgid; | |
459 | + | |
460 | if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0) | |
461 | kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM); | |
462 | ||
463 | + /* | |
464 | + * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized | |
465 | + * keys command helpers. | |
466 | + */ | |
467 | + if ((pgid = getpgid(0)) == getpid()) { | |
468 | + signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); | |
469 | + killpg(pgid, SIGTERM); | |
470 | + } | |
471 | + | |
472 | /* Log error and exit. */ | |
473 | sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
474 | } | |
475 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0 | |
476 | --- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc 2012-08-29 02:53:04.000000000 +0200 | |
477 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0 2012-11-28 17:12:43.265524291 +0100 | |
478 | @@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ DESCRIPTION | |
479 | ||
480 | See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. | |
481 | ||
482 | + AuthorizedKeysCommand | |
483 | + | |
484 | + Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's | |
485 | + public keys. The program will be invoked with its first | |
486 | + argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce | |
487 | + on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS | |
488 | + in sshd(8)). By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no | |
489 | + AuthorizedKeysCommand run. If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully | |
490 | + authorize the user, authorization falls through to the | |
491 | + AuthorizedKeysFile. Note that this option has an effect | |
492 | + only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on. | |
493 | + | |
494 | + AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs | |
495 | + Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. | |
496 | + Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized | |
497 | + is used. | |
498 | + | |
499 | AuthorizedKeysFile | |
500 | Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used | |
501 | for user authentication. The format is described in the | |
502 | @@ -402,7 +419,8 @@ DESCRIPTION | |
503 | Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a | |
504 | Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv, | |
505 | AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding, | |
506 | - AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner, | |
507 | + AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedKeysCommand, | |
508 | + AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner, | |
509 | ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand, | |
510 | GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, | |
511 | HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication, | |
512 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5 | |
513 | --- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc 2012-11-28 17:12:43.199524517 +0100 | |
514 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5 2012-11-28 17:16:23.736624980 +0100 | |
515 | @@ -173,6 +173,20 @@ Note that each authentication method lis | |
516 | in the configuration. | |
517 | The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion | |
518 | of a single authentication method is sufficient. | |
519 | +.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand | |
520 | +Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's public keys. | |
521 | +The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username | |
522 | +being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or | |
523 | +more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in | |
524 | +.Xr sshd 8 ) | |
525 | +If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate | |
526 | +and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual | |
527 | +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile | |
528 | +files. | |
529 | +By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. | |
530 | +.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser | |
531 | +Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. | |
532 | +The default is the user being authenticated. | |
533 | .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile | |
534 | Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used | |
535 | for user authentication. | |
536 | @@ -734,6 +748,8 @@ Available keywords are | |
537 | .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , | |
538 | .Cm AllowUsers , | |
539 | .Cm AuthenticationMethods , | |
540 | +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , | |
541 | +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , | |
542 | .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , | |
543 | .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , | |
544 | .Cm Banner , | |
545 | @@ -749,6 +765,7 @@ Available keywords are | |
546 | .Cm KerberosAuthentication , | |
547 | .Cm MaxAuthTries , | |
548 | .Cm MaxSessions , | |
549 | +.Cm PubkeyAuthentication , | |
550 | .Cm PasswordAuthentication , | |
551 | .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , | |
552 | .Cm PermitOpen , | |
553 | diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config | |
554 | --- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc 2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200 | |
555 | +++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config 2012-11-28 17:12:43.265524291 +0100 | |
556 | @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ | |
557 | # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys | |
558 | AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys | |
559 | ||
560 | +#AuthorizedKeysCommand none | |
561 | +#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody | |
562 | + | |
563 | #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none | |
564 | ||
565 | # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts |