Make sure unconfined creates ~/.pulse ~/.pulse-cookie with the right label

[people/stevee/selinux-policy.git] / policy / modules / kernel / domain.te

policy_module(domain, 1.9.1)

########################################
#
# Declarations
#
## <desc>
## <p>
## Allow all domains to use other domains file descriptors
## </p>
## </desc>
#
gen_tunable(allow_domain_fd_use, true)

## <desc>
## <p>
## Allow all domains to have the kernel load modules
## </p>
## </desc>
#
gen_tunable(domain_kernel_load_modules, false)

## <desc>
## <p>
##	Control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space,
##	as configured by /proc/sys/kernel/mmap_min_addr.
## </p>
## </desc>
gen_tunable(mmap_low_allowed, false)

# Mark process types as domains
attribute domain;

# Transitions only allowed from domains to other domains
neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };

# Domains that are unconfined
attribute unconfined_domain_type;

# Domains that can mmap low memory.
attribute mmap_low_domain_type;
neverallow { domain -mmap_low_domain_type } self:memprotect mmap_zero;

# Domains that can set their current context
# (perform dynamic transitions)
attribute set_curr_context;

# enabling setcurrent breaks process tranquility.  If you do not
# know what this means or do not understand the implications of a
# dynamic transition, you should not be using it!!!
neverallow { domain -set_curr_context } self:process setcurrent;

# entrypoint executables
attribute entry_type;

# widely-inheritable file descriptors
attribute privfd;

#
# constraint related attributes
#

# [1] types that can change SELinux identity on transition
attribute can_change_process_identity;

# [2] types that can change SELinux role on transition
attribute can_change_process_role;

# [3] types that can change the SELinux identity on a filesystem
# object or a socket object on a create or relabel
attribute can_change_object_identity;

# [3] types that can change to system_u:system_r
attribute can_system_change;

# [4] types that have attribute 1 can change the SELinux
# identity only if the target domain has this attribute.
# Types that have attribute 2 can change the SELinux role
# only if the target domain has this attribute.
attribute process_user_target;

# For cron jobs
# [5] types used for cron daemons
attribute cron_source_domain;
# [6] types used for cron jobs
attribute cron_job_domain;

# [7] types that are unconditionally exempt from
# SELinux identity and role change constraints
attribute process_uncond_exempt;	# add userhelperdomain to this one

neverallow { domain unlabeled_t } ~{ domain unlabeled_t }:process *;
neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *;

########################################
#
# Rules applied to all domains
#

# read /proc/(pid|self) entries
allow domain self:dir list_dir_perms;
allow domain self:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms lock ioctl };
allow domain self:file rw_file_perms;
kernel_read_proc_symlinks(domain)
kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(domain)

# Every domain gets the key ring, so we should default
# to no one allowed to look at it; afs kernel support creates
# a keyring
kernel_dontaudit_search_key(domain)
kernel_dontaudit_link_key(domain)
kernel_dontaudit_search_debugfs(domain)

# create child processes in the domain
allow domain self:process { fork getsched sigchld };

# Use trusted objects in /dev
dev_rw_null(domain)
dev_rw_zero(domain)
term_use_controlling_term(domain)

# list the root directory
files_list_root(domain)
# allow all domains to search through default_t directory, since users sometimes
# place labels within these directories.  (samba_share_t) for example.
files_search_default(domain)

# All executables should be able to search the directory they are in
corecmd_search_bin(domain)

tunable_policy(`domain_kernel_load_modules',`
	kernel_request_load_module(domain)
')

tunable_policy(`global_ssp',`
	# enable reading of urandom for all domains:
	# this should be enabled when all programs
	# are compiled with ProPolice/SSP
	# stack smashing protection.
	dev_read_urand(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	afs_rw_cache(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	libs_use_ld_so(domain)
	libs_use_shared_libs(domain)
	libs_read_lib_files(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	setrans_translate_context(domain)
')

# xdm passes an open file descriptor to xsession-errors.log which is then audited by all confined domains.
optional_policy(`
	xserver_dontaudit_use_xdm_fds(domain)
	xserver_dontaudit_rw_xdm_pipes(domain)
	xserver_dontaudit_append_xdm_home_files(domain)
	xserver_dontaudit_write_log(domain)
')

########################################
#
# Unconfined access to this module
#

# unconfined access also allows constraints, but this
# is handled in the interface as typeattribute cannot
# be used on an attribute.

# Use/sendto/connectto sockets created by any domain.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;

# Use descriptors and pipes created by any domain.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fd use;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

allow unconfined_domain_type unconfined_domain_type:dbus send_msg;

# Act upon any other process.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap };

# Create/access any System V IPC objects.
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ sem msgq shm } *;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:msg { send receive };

# For /proc/pid
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:dir list_dir_perms;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:file rw_file_perms;
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock };

# act on all domains keys
allow unconfined_domain_type domain:key *;

# receive from all domains over labeled networking
domain_all_recvfrom_all_domains(unconfined_domain_type)

selinux_getattr_fs(domain)
selinux_search_fs(domain)
selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(domain)

optional_policy(`
	seutil_dontaudit_read_config(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	init_sigchld(domain)
	init_signull(domain)
')

ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
	files_search_mnt(domain)
	optional_policy(`
		unconfined_use_fds(domain)
	')
')

# these seem questionable:

optional_policy(`
	abrt_domtrans_helper(domain)
	abrt_read_pid_files(domain)
	abrt_read_state(domain)
	abrt_signull(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	rpm_use_fds(domain)
	rpm_read_pipes(domain)
	rpm_search_log(domain)
	rpm_append_tmp_files(domain)
	rpm_dontaudit_leaks(domain)
	rpm_read_script_tmp_files(domain)
	rpm_inherited_fifo(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	sosreport_append_tmp_files(domain)
')

tunable_policy(`allow_domain_fd_use',`
	# Allow all domains to use fds past to them
	allow domain domain:fd use;
')

optional_policy(`
	cron_dontaudit_write_system_job_tmp_files(domain)
	cron_rw_pipes(domain)
	cron_rw_system_job_pipes(domain)
')

ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
	dontaudit domain self:udp_socket listen;
	allow domain domain:key { link search };
	dontaudit domain domain:socket_class_set { read write };
	dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module;
')

optional_policy(`
	hal_dontaudit_read_pid_files(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	ipsec_match_default_spd(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
		afs_rw_udp_sockets(domain)
	')
')

optional_policy(`
	ssh_rw_pipes(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes(domain)
	unconfined_sigchld(domain)
')

# broken kernel
dontaudit can_change_object_identity can_change_object_identity:key link;

ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
	optional_policy(`
		unconfined_use_fds(domain)
	')
')

# send init a sigchld and signull
optional_policy(`
	init_sigchld(domain)
	init_signull(domain)
')

# these seem questionable:

optional_policy(`
	rpm_use_fds(domain)
	rpm_read_pipes(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	selinux_dontaudit_getattr_fs(domain)
	selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(domain)
')

optional_policy(`
	seutil_dontaudit_read_config(domain)
')