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Commit | Line | Data |
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db9ecf05 | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
a7334b09 | 2 | |
034c6ed7 LP |
3 | #include <errno.h> |
4 | #include <fcntl.h> | |
8dd4c05b | 5 | #include <poll.h> |
d251207d | 6 | #include <sys/eventfd.h> |
f5947a5e | 7 | #include <sys/ioctl.h> |
f3e43635 | 8 | #include <sys/mman.h> |
bb0c0d6f | 9 | #include <sys/mount.h> |
8dd4c05b | 10 | #include <sys/personality.h> |
94f04347 | 11 | #include <sys/prctl.h> |
d2ffa389 | 12 | #include <sys/shm.h> |
d2ffa389 | 13 | #include <sys/types.h> |
8dd4c05b LP |
14 | #include <sys/un.h> |
15 | #include <unistd.h> | |
023a4f67 | 16 | #include <utmpx.h> |
5cb5a6ff | 17 | |
349cc4a5 | 18 | #if HAVE_PAM |
5b6319dc LP |
19 | #include <security/pam_appl.h> |
20 | #endif | |
21 | ||
349cc4a5 | 22 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
7b52a628 MS |
23 | #include <selinux/selinux.h> |
24 | #endif | |
25 | ||
349cc4a5 | 26 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
17df7223 LP |
27 | #include <seccomp.h> |
28 | #endif | |
29 | ||
349cc4a5 | 30 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
eef65bf3 MS |
31 | #include <sys/apparmor.h> |
32 | #endif | |
33 | ||
24882e06 | 34 | #include "sd-messages.h" |
8dd4c05b | 35 | |
bb0c0d6f | 36 | #include "acl-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 37 | #include "af-list.h" |
b5efdb8a | 38 | #include "alloc-util.h" |
349cc4a5 | 39 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
3ffd4af2 LP |
40 | #include "apparmor-util.h" |
41 | #endif | |
ee617a4e | 42 | #include "argv-util.h" |
8dd4c05b LP |
43 | #include "async.h" |
44 | #include "barrier.h" | |
b1994387 | 45 | #include "bpf-lsm.h" |
8dd4c05b | 46 | #include "cap-list.h" |
430f0182 | 47 | #include "capability-util.h" |
fdb3deca | 48 | #include "cgroup-setup.h" |
f461a28d | 49 | #include "chase.h" |
bb0c0d6f | 50 | #include "chown-recursive.h" |
28db6fbf | 51 | #include "constants.h" |
da681e1b | 52 | #include "cpu-set-util.h" |
43144be4 | 53 | #include "creds-util.h" |
6a818c3c | 54 | #include "data-fd-util.h" |
686d13b9 | 55 | #include "env-file.h" |
4d1a6904 | 56 | #include "env-util.h" |
17df7223 | 57 | #include "errno-list.h" |
8a62620e | 58 | #include "escape.h" |
3ffd4af2 | 59 | #include "execute.h" |
8dd4c05b | 60 | #include "exit-status.h" |
3ffd4af2 | 61 | #include "fd-util.h" |
bb0c0d6f | 62 | #include "fileio.h" |
f97b34a6 | 63 | #include "format-util.h" |
7d50b32a | 64 | #include "glob-util.h" |
0389f4fa | 65 | #include "hexdecoct.h" |
c004493c | 66 | #include "io-util.h" |
032b3afb | 67 | #include "ioprio-util.h" |
0690160e | 68 | #include "label-util.h" |
8dd4c05b LP |
69 | #include "log.h" |
70 | #include "macro.h" | |
e8a565cb | 71 | #include "manager.h" |
2a341bb9 | 72 | #include "manager-dump.h" |
0a970718 | 73 | #include "memory-util.h" |
f5947a5e | 74 | #include "missing_fs.h" |
5bead76e | 75 | #include "missing_ioprio.h" |
7a114ed4 | 76 | #include "missing_prctl.h" |
35cd0ba5 | 77 | #include "mkdir-label.h" |
21935150 | 78 | #include "mount-util.h" |
bb0c0d6f | 79 | #include "mountpoint-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 80 | #include "namespace.h" |
6bedfcbb | 81 | #include "parse-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 82 | #include "path-util.h" |
4d62ee55 | 83 | #include "proc-cmdline.h" |
0b452006 | 84 | #include "process-util.h" |
6bb00842 | 85 | #include "psi-util.h" |
d3dcf4e3 | 86 | #include "random-util.h" |
3989bdc1 | 87 | #include "recurse-dir.h" |
78f22b97 | 88 | #include "rlimit-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 89 | #include "rm-rf.h" |
349cc4a5 | 90 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
3ffd4af2 LP |
91 | #include "seccomp-util.h" |
92 | #endif | |
07d46372 | 93 | #include "securebits-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 94 | #include "selinux-util.h" |
24882e06 | 95 | #include "signal-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 96 | #include "smack-util.h" |
57b7a260 | 97 | #include "socket-util.h" |
a2ab603c | 98 | #include "sort-util.h" |
fd63e712 | 99 | #include "special.h" |
949befd3 | 100 | #include "stat-util.h" |
8b43440b | 101 | #include "string-table.h" |
07630cea | 102 | #include "string-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 103 | #include "strv.h" |
7ccbd1ae | 104 | #include "syslog-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 105 | #include "terminal-util.h" |
bb0c0d6f | 106 | #include "tmpfile-util.h" |
566b7d23 | 107 | #include "umask-util.h" |
2d3b784d | 108 | #include "unit-serialize.h" |
b1d4f8e1 | 109 | #include "user-util.h" |
8dd4c05b | 110 | #include "utmp-wtmp.h" |
5cb5a6ff | 111 | |
e056b01d | 112 | #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) |
31a7eb86 | 113 | #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) |
e6a26745 | 114 | |
531dca78 LP |
115 | #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024) |
116 | ||
da6053d0 | 117 | static int shift_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) { |
034c6ed7 LP |
118 | if (n_fds <= 0) |
119 | return 0; | |
120 | ||
a0d40ac5 LP |
121 | /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */ |
122 | ||
034c6ed7 LP |
123 | assert(fds); |
124 | ||
5b10116e ZJS |
125 | for (int start = 0;;) { |
126 | int restart_from = -1; | |
034c6ed7 | 127 | |
5b10116e | 128 | for (int i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { |
034c6ed7 LP |
129 | int nfd; |
130 | ||
131 | /* Already at right index? */ | |
132 | if (fds[i] == i+3) | |
133 | continue; | |
134 | ||
3cc2aff1 LP |
135 | nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3); |
136 | if (nfd < 0) | |
034c6ed7 LP |
137 | return -errno; |
138 | ||
03e334a1 | 139 | safe_close(fds[i]); |
034c6ed7 LP |
140 | fds[i] = nfd; |
141 | ||
142 | /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then | |
ee33e53a | 143 | * let's remember that and try again from here */ |
034c6ed7 LP |
144 | if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) |
145 | restart_from = i; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | if (restart_from < 0) | |
149 | break; | |
150 | ||
151 | start = restart_from; | |
152 | } | |
153 | ||
154 | return 0; | |
155 | } | |
156 | ||
cd48e23f RP |
157 | static int flags_fds( |
158 | const int fds[], | |
159 | size_t n_socket_fds, | |
160 | size_t n_fds, | |
161 | bool nonblock) { | |
162 | ||
e2c76839 | 163 | int r; |
47a71eed LP |
164 | |
165 | if (n_fds <= 0) | |
166 | return 0; | |
167 | ||
168 | assert(fds); | |
169 | ||
9b141911 FB |
170 | /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags. |
171 | * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */ | |
47a71eed | 172 | |
5b10116e | 173 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) { |
47a71eed | 174 | |
9b141911 FB |
175 | if (i < n_socket_fds) { |
176 | r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock); | |
177 | if (r < 0) | |
178 | return r; | |
179 | } | |
47a71eed | 180 | |
451a074f LP |
181 | /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds, |
182 | * since after all we want to pass these fds to our | |
183 | * children */ | |
47a71eed | 184 | |
3cc2aff1 LP |
185 | r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false); |
186 | if (r < 0) | |
e2c76839 | 187 | return r; |
47a71eed LP |
188 | } |
189 | ||
190 | return 0; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
1e22b5cd | 193 | static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { |
80876c20 LP |
194 | assert(context); |
195 | ||
1e22b5cd LP |
196 | if (context->stdio_as_fds) |
197 | return NULL; | |
198 | ||
80876c20 LP |
199 | if (context->tty_path) |
200 | return context->tty_path; | |
201 | ||
202 | return "/dev/console"; | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
4d62ee55 DDM |
205 | static int exec_context_tty_size(const ExecContext *context, unsigned *ret_rows, unsigned *ret_cols) { |
206 | _cleanup_free_ char *rowskey = NULL, *rowsvalue = NULL, *colskey = NULL, *colsvalue = NULL; | |
207 | unsigned rows, cols; | |
208 | const char *tty; | |
209 | int r; | |
210 | ||
211 | assert(context); | |
212 | assert(ret_rows); | |
213 | assert(ret_cols); | |
214 | ||
215 | rows = context->tty_rows; | |
216 | cols = context->tty_cols; | |
217 | ||
218 | tty = exec_context_tty_path(context); | |
219 | if (!tty || (rows != UINT_MAX && cols != UINT_MAX)) { | |
220 | *ret_rows = rows; | |
221 | *ret_cols = cols; | |
222 | return 0; | |
223 | } | |
224 | ||
225 | tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty); | |
226 | if (!in_charset(tty, ALPHANUMERICAL)) { | |
227 | log_debug("%s contains non-alphanumeric characters, ignoring", tty); | |
228 | *ret_rows = rows; | |
229 | *ret_cols = cols; | |
230 | return 0; | |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | rowskey = strjoin("systemd.tty.rows.", tty); | |
234 | if (!rowskey) | |
235 | return -ENOMEM; | |
236 | ||
237 | colskey = strjoin("systemd.tty.columns.", tty); | |
238 | if (!colskey) | |
239 | return -ENOMEM; | |
240 | ||
241 | r = proc_cmdline_get_key_many(/* flags = */ 0, | |
242 | rowskey, &rowsvalue, | |
243 | colskey, &colsvalue); | |
244 | if (r < 0) | |
245 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TTY size of %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", tty); | |
246 | ||
247 | if (rows == UINT_MAX && rowsvalue) { | |
248 | r = safe_atou(rowsvalue, &rows); | |
249 | if (r < 0) | |
250 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s=%s, ignoring: %m", rowskey, rowsvalue); | |
251 | } | |
252 | ||
253 | if (cols == UINT_MAX && colsvalue) { | |
254 | r = safe_atou(colsvalue, &cols); | |
255 | if (r < 0) | |
256 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s=%s, ignoring: %m", colskey, colsvalue); | |
257 | } | |
258 | ||
259 | *ret_rows = rows; | |
260 | *ret_cols = cols; | |
261 | ||
262 | return 0; | |
263 | } | |
264 | ||
1e22b5cd LP |
265 | static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { |
266 | const char *path; | |
267 | ||
6ea832a2 LP |
268 | assert(context); |
269 | ||
1e22b5cd | 270 | path = exec_context_tty_path(context); |
6ea832a2 | 271 | |
1e22b5cd LP |
272 | if (context->tty_vhangup) { |
273 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
274 | (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd); | |
275 | else if (path) | |
276 | (void) terminal_vhangup(path); | |
277 | } | |
6ea832a2 | 278 | |
1e22b5cd LP |
279 | if (context->tty_reset) { |
280 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
281 | (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true); | |
282 | else if (path) | |
283 | (void) reset_terminal(path); | |
284 | } | |
285 | ||
4d62ee55 DDM |
286 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) { |
287 | unsigned rows = context->tty_rows, cols = context->tty_cols; | |
288 | ||
289 | (void) exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); | |
290 | (void) terminal_set_size_fd(p->stdin_fd, path, rows, cols); | |
291 | } | |
51462135 | 292 | |
1e22b5cd LP |
293 | if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path) |
294 | (void) vt_disallocate(path); | |
6ea832a2 LP |
295 | } |
296 | ||
6af760f3 LP |
297 | static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) { |
298 | return IN_SET(i, | |
299 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY, | |
300 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, | |
301 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL); | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
3a1286b6 | 304 | static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { |
6af760f3 LP |
305 | return IN_SET(o, |
306 | EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY, | |
6af760f3 LP |
307 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, |
308 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE); | |
309 | } | |
310 | ||
aac8c0c3 LP |
311 | static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o) { |
312 | return IN_SET(o, | |
313 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
314 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE); | |
315 | } | |
316 | ||
6af760f3 LP |
317 | static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) { |
318 | assert(c); | |
319 | ||
320 | /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */ | |
321 | ||
322 | if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input)) | |
323 | return true; | |
324 | ||
325 | if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output)) | |
326 | return true; | |
327 | ||
328 | if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error)) | |
329 | return true; | |
330 | ||
331 | return !!c->tty_path; | |
3a1286b6 MS |
332 | } |
333 | ||
80876c20 | 334 | static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { |
046a82c1 | 335 | int fd; |
071830ff | 336 | |
80876c20 | 337 | assert(nfd >= 0); |
071830ff | 338 | |
613b411c LP |
339 | fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY); |
340 | if (fd < 0) | |
071830ff LP |
341 | return -errno; |
342 | ||
046a82c1 | 343 | return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); |
071830ff LP |
344 | } |
345 | ||
91dd5f7c LP |
346 | static int connect_journal_socket( |
347 | int fd, | |
348 | const char *log_namespace, | |
349 | uid_t uid, | |
350 | gid_t gid) { | |
351 | ||
524daa8c ZJS |
352 | uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; |
353 | gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; | |
91dd5f7c | 354 | const char *j; |
524daa8c ZJS |
355 | int r; |
356 | ||
91dd5f7c LP |
357 | j = log_namespace ? |
358 | strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace, "/stdout") : | |
359 | "/run/systemd/journal/stdout"; | |
91dd5f7c | 360 | |
cad93f29 | 361 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { |
524daa8c ZJS |
362 | oldgid = getgid(); |
363 | ||
92a17af9 | 364 | if (setegid(gid) < 0) |
524daa8c ZJS |
365 | return -errno; |
366 | } | |
367 | ||
cad93f29 | 368 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
524daa8c ZJS |
369 | olduid = getuid(); |
370 | ||
92a17af9 | 371 | if (seteuid(uid) < 0) { |
524daa8c ZJS |
372 | r = -errno; |
373 | goto restore_gid; | |
374 | } | |
375 | } | |
376 | ||
1861986a | 377 | r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, j); |
524daa8c | 378 | |
1861986a LP |
379 | /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely fail later on. This should only happen if |
380 | an LSM interferes. */ | |
524daa8c | 381 | |
cad93f29 | 382 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) |
524daa8c ZJS |
383 | (void) seteuid(olduid); |
384 | ||
385 | restore_gid: | |
cad93f29 | 386 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) |
524daa8c ZJS |
387 | (void) setegid(oldgid); |
388 | ||
389 | return r; | |
390 | } | |
391 | ||
fd1f9c89 | 392 | static int connect_logger_as( |
34cf6c43 | 393 | const Unit *unit, |
fd1f9c89 | 394 | const ExecContext *context, |
af635cf3 | 395 | const ExecParameters *params, |
fd1f9c89 LP |
396 | ExecOutput output, |
397 | const char *ident, | |
fd1f9c89 LP |
398 | int nfd, |
399 | uid_t uid, | |
400 | gid_t gid) { | |
401 | ||
254d1313 | 402 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
2ac1ff68 | 403 | int r; |
071830ff LP |
404 | |
405 | assert(context); | |
af635cf3 | 406 | assert(params); |
80876c20 LP |
407 | assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); |
408 | assert(ident); | |
409 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
071830ff | 410 | |
54fe0cdb LP |
411 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); |
412 | if (fd < 0) | |
80876c20 | 413 | return -errno; |
071830ff | 414 | |
91dd5f7c | 415 | r = connect_journal_socket(fd, context->log_namespace, uid, gid); |
524daa8c ZJS |
416 | if (r < 0) |
417 | return r; | |
071830ff | 418 | |
2ac1ff68 | 419 | if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) |
80876c20 | 420 | return -errno; |
071830ff | 421 | |
fd1f9c89 | 422 | (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE); |
531dca78 | 423 | |
2ac1ff68 | 424 | if (dprintf(fd, |
62bca2c6 | 425 | "%s\n" |
80876c20 LP |
426 | "%s\n" |
427 | "%i\n" | |
54fe0cdb LP |
428 | "%i\n" |
429 | "%i\n" | |
430 | "%i\n" | |
4f4a1dbf | 431 | "%i\n", |
c867611e | 432 | context->syslog_identifier ?: ident, |
af635cf3 | 433 | params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? unit->id : "", |
54fe0cdb LP |
434 | context->syslog_priority, |
435 | !!context->syslog_level_prefix, | |
f3dc6af2 | 436 | false, |
aac8c0c3 | 437 | is_kmsg_output(output), |
2ac1ff68 EV |
438 | is_terminal_output(output)) < 0) |
439 | return -errno; | |
80876c20 | 440 | |
2ac1ff68 | 441 | return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd), nfd, false); |
80876c20 | 442 | } |
2ac1ff68 | 443 | |
3a274a21 | 444 | static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, int flags, int nfd) { |
046a82c1 | 445 | int fd; |
071830ff | 446 | |
80876c20 LP |
447 | assert(path); |
448 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
fd1f9c89 | 449 | |
3a274a21 | 450 | fd = open_terminal(path, flags | O_NOCTTY); |
3cc2aff1 | 451 | if (fd < 0) |
80876c20 | 452 | return fd; |
071830ff | 453 | |
046a82c1 | 454 | return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); |
80876c20 | 455 | } |
071830ff | 456 | |
2038c3f5 | 457 | static int acquire_path(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { |
254d1313 | 458 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
86fca584 | 459 | int r; |
071830ff | 460 | |
80876c20 | 461 | assert(path); |
071830ff | 462 | |
2038c3f5 LP |
463 | if (IN_SET(flags & O_ACCMODE, O_WRONLY, O_RDWR)) |
464 | flags |= O_CREAT; | |
465 | ||
466 | fd = open(path, flags|O_NOCTTY, mode); | |
467 | if (fd >= 0) | |
15a3e96f | 468 | return TAKE_FD(fd); |
071830ff | 469 | |
2038c3f5 LP |
470 | if (errno != ENXIO) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */ |
471 | return -errno; | |
2038c3f5 LP |
472 | |
473 | /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */ | |
474 | ||
475 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
476 | if (fd < 0) | |
477 | return -errno; | |
478 | ||
1861986a LP |
479 | r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, path); |
480 | if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTSOCK, -EINVAL)) | |
481 | /* Propagate initial error if we get ENOTSOCK or EINVAL, i.e. we have indication that this | |
482 | * wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */ | |
483 | return -ENXIO; | |
484 | if (r < 0) | |
485 | return r; | |
071830ff | 486 | |
2038c3f5 LP |
487 | if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) |
488 | r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR); | |
489 | else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) | |
490 | r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD); | |
491 | else | |
86fca584 | 492 | r = 0; |
15a3e96f | 493 | if (r < 0) |
2038c3f5 | 494 | return -errno; |
2038c3f5 | 495 | |
15a3e96f | 496 | return TAKE_FD(fd); |
80876c20 | 497 | } |
071830ff | 498 | |
08f3be7a LP |
499 | static int fixup_input( |
500 | const ExecContext *context, | |
501 | int socket_fd, | |
502 | bool apply_tty_stdin) { | |
503 | ||
504 | ExecInput std_input; | |
505 | ||
506 | assert(context); | |
507 | ||
508 | std_input = context->std_input; | |
1e3ad081 LP |
509 | |
510 | if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin) | |
511 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
071830ff | 512 | |
03fd9c49 | 513 | if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) |
4f2d528d LP |
514 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; |
515 | ||
08f3be7a LP |
516 | if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_DATA && context->stdin_data_size == 0) |
517 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
518 | ||
03fd9c49 | 519 | return std_input; |
4f2d528d LP |
520 | } |
521 | ||
7966a916 | 522 | static int fixup_output(ExecOutput output, int socket_fd) { |
4f2d528d | 523 | |
7966a916 | 524 | if (output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) |
4f2d528d LP |
525 | return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT; |
526 | ||
7966a916 | 527 | return output; |
4f2d528d LP |
528 | } |
529 | ||
a34ceba6 LP |
530 | static int setup_input( |
531 | const ExecContext *context, | |
532 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
52c239d7 | 533 | int socket_fd, |
2caa38e9 | 534 | const int named_iofds[static 3]) { |
a34ceba6 | 535 | |
4f2d528d | 536 | ExecInput i; |
51462135 | 537 | int r; |
4f2d528d LP |
538 | |
539 | assert(context); | |
a34ceba6 | 540 | assert(params); |
2caa38e9 | 541 | assert(named_iofds); |
a34ceba6 LP |
542 | |
543 | if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) { | |
544 | if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) | |
545 | return -errno; | |
546 | ||
547 | /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */ | |
1fb0682e | 548 | if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { |
4d62ee55 DDM |
549 | unsigned rows = context->tty_rows, cols = context->tty_cols; |
550 | ||
551 | (void) exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); | |
1fb0682e LP |
552 | (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE); |
553 | (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true); | |
4d62ee55 | 554 | (void) terminal_set_size_fd(STDIN_FILENO, NULL, rows, cols); |
1fb0682e | 555 | } |
a34ceba6 LP |
556 | |
557 | return STDIN_FILENO; | |
558 | } | |
4f2d528d | 559 | |
08f3be7a | 560 | i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); |
4f2d528d LP |
561 | |
562 | switch (i) { | |
071830ff | 563 | |
80876c20 LP |
564 | case EXEC_INPUT_NULL: |
565 | return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO); | |
566 | ||
567 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY: | |
568 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE: | |
569 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: { | |
4d62ee55 | 570 | unsigned rows, cols; |
046a82c1 | 571 | int fd; |
071830ff | 572 | |
1e22b5cd | 573 | fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context), |
8854d795 LP |
574 | i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY : |
575 | i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE : | |
576 | ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, | |
3a43da28 | 577 | USEC_INFINITY); |
970edce6 | 578 | if (fd < 0) |
80876c20 LP |
579 | return fd; |
580 | ||
4d62ee55 DDM |
581 | r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); |
582 | if (r < 0) | |
583 | return r; | |
584 | ||
585 | r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, exec_context_tty_path(context), rows, cols); | |
51462135 DDM |
586 | if (r < 0) |
587 | return r; | |
588 | ||
046a82c1 | 589 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); |
80876c20 LP |
590 | } |
591 | ||
4f2d528d | 592 | case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET: |
e75a9ed1 LP |
593 | assert(socket_fd >= 0); |
594 | ||
7c248223 | 595 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO)); |
4f2d528d | 596 | |
52c239d7 | 597 | case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD: |
e75a9ed1 LP |
598 | assert(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] >= 0); |
599 | ||
52c239d7 | 600 | (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], false); |
7c248223 | 601 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], STDIN_FILENO)); |
52c239d7 | 602 | |
08f3be7a LP |
603 | case EXEC_INPUT_DATA: { |
604 | int fd; | |
605 | ||
606 | fd = acquire_data_fd(context->stdin_data, context->stdin_data_size, 0); | |
607 | if (fd < 0) | |
608 | return fd; | |
609 | ||
610 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
2038c3f5 LP |
613 | case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: { |
614 | bool rw; | |
615 | int fd; | |
616 | ||
617 | assert(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
618 | ||
619 | rw = (context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO])) || | |
620 | (context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO])); | |
621 | ||
622 | fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], rw ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY, 0666 & ~context->umask); | |
623 | if (fd < 0) | |
624 | return fd; | |
625 | ||
626 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
627 | } | |
628 | ||
80876c20 | 629 | default: |
04499a70 | 630 | assert_not_reached(); |
80876c20 LP |
631 | } |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
41fc585a LP |
634 | static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout( |
635 | const ExecContext *context, | |
636 | ExecOutput o, | |
637 | ExecOutput e) { | |
638 | ||
639 | assert(context); | |
640 | ||
641 | /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the | |
642 | * stderr fd */ | |
643 | ||
644 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) | |
645 | return true; | |
646 | if (e != o) | |
647 | return false; | |
648 | ||
649 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
650 | return streq_ptr(context->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
651 | ||
8d7dab1f | 652 | if (IN_SET(e, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE)) |
41fc585a LP |
653 | return streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); |
654 | ||
655 | return true; | |
656 | } | |
657 | ||
a34ceba6 | 658 | static int setup_output( |
34cf6c43 | 659 | const Unit *unit, |
a34ceba6 LP |
660 | const ExecContext *context, |
661 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
662 | int fileno, | |
663 | int socket_fd, | |
2caa38e9 | 664 | const int named_iofds[static 3], |
a34ceba6 | 665 | const char *ident, |
7bce046b LP |
666 | uid_t uid, |
667 | gid_t gid, | |
668 | dev_t *journal_stream_dev, | |
669 | ino_t *journal_stream_ino) { | |
a34ceba6 | 670 | |
4f2d528d LP |
671 | ExecOutput o; |
672 | ExecInput i; | |
47c1d80d | 673 | int r; |
4f2d528d | 674 | |
f2341e0a | 675 | assert(unit); |
80876c20 | 676 | assert(context); |
a34ceba6 | 677 | assert(params); |
80876c20 | 678 | assert(ident); |
7bce046b LP |
679 | assert(journal_stream_dev); |
680 | assert(journal_stream_ino); | |
80876c20 | 681 | |
a34ceba6 LP |
682 | if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) { |
683 | ||
684 | if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) | |
685 | return -errno; | |
686 | ||
687 | return STDOUT_FILENO; | |
688 | } | |
689 | ||
690 | if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) { | |
691 | if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) | |
692 | return -errno; | |
693 | ||
694 | return STDERR_FILENO; | |
695 | } | |
696 | ||
08f3be7a | 697 | i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); |
03fd9c49 | 698 | o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd); |
4f2d528d | 699 | |
eb17e935 MS |
700 | if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) { |
701 | ExecOutput e; | |
702 | e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd); | |
80876c20 | 703 | |
eb17e935 MS |
704 | /* This expects the input and output are already set up */ |
705 | ||
706 | /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all | |
707 | * the way and are not on a tty */ | |
708 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && | |
709 | o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && | |
710 | i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && | |
711 | !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) && | |
7966a916 | 712 | getppid() != 1) |
eb17e935 MS |
713 | return fileno; |
714 | ||
715 | /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */ | |
41fc585a | 716 | if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context, o, e)) |
7c248223 | 717 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno)); |
071830ff | 718 | |
eb17e935 | 719 | o = e; |
80876c20 | 720 | |
eb17e935 | 721 | } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) { |
21d21ea4 LP |
722 | /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */ |
723 | if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) | |
1e22b5cd | 724 | return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); |
21d21ea4 | 725 | |
08f3be7a LP |
726 | /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */ |
727 | if (!IN_SET(i, EXEC_INPUT_NULL, EXEC_INPUT_DATA)) | |
7c248223 | 728 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); |
071830ff | 729 | |
acb591e4 LP |
730 | /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */ |
731 | if (getppid() != 1) | |
eb17e935 | 732 | return fileno; |
94f04347 | 733 | |
eb17e935 MS |
734 | /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */ |
735 | return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
071830ff | 736 | } |
94f04347 | 737 | |
eb17e935 | 738 | switch (o) { |
80876c20 LP |
739 | |
740 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL: | |
eb17e935 | 741 | return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); |
80876c20 LP |
742 | |
743 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY: | |
4f2d528d | 744 | if (is_terminal_input(i)) |
7c248223 | 745 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); |
80876c20 LP |
746 | |
747 | /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */ | |
1e22b5cd | 748 | return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); |
80876c20 | 749 | |
9a6bca7a | 750 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG: |
28dbc1e8 | 751 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: |
706343f4 LP |
752 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: |
753 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: | |
af635cf3 | 754 | r = connect_logger_as(unit, context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); |
47c1d80d | 755 | if (r < 0) { |
7966a916 ZJS |
756 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", |
757 | fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); | |
eb17e935 | 758 | r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); |
7bce046b LP |
759 | } else { |
760 | struct stat st; | |
761 | ||
762 | /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed | |
763 | * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits | |
ab2116b1 LP |
764 | * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. |
765 | * | |
766 | * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data | |
767 | * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */ | |
7bce046b | 768 | |
ab2116b1 LP |
769 | if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0 && |
770 | (*journal_stream_ino == 0 || fileno == STDERR_FILENO)) { | |
7bce046b LP |
771 | *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev; |
772 | *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino; | |
773 | } | |
47c1d80d MS |
774 | } |
775 | return r; | |
4f2d528d LP |
776 | |
777 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET: | |
778 | assert(socket_fd >= 0); | |
e75a9ed1 | 779 | |
7c248223 | 780 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, fileno)); |
94f04347 | 781 | |
52c239d7 | 782 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD: |
e75a9ed1 LP |
783 | assert(named_iofds[fileno] >= 0); |
784 | ||
52c239d7 | 785 | (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[fileno], false); |
7c248223 | 786 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[fileno], fileno)); |
52c239d7 | 787 | |
566b7d23 | 788 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE: |
8d7dab1f LW |
789 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: |
790 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE: { | |
2038c3f5 | 791 | bool rw; |
566b7d23 | 792 | int fd, flags; |
2038c3f5 LP |
793 | |
794 | assert(context->stdio_file[fileno]); | |
795 | ||
796 | rw = context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE && | |
797 | streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[fileno], context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
798 | ||
799 | if (rw) | |
7c248223 | 800 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); |
2038c3f5 | 801 | |
566b7d23 ZD |
802 | flags = O_WRONLY; |
803 | if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) | |
804 | flags |= O_APPEND; | |
8d7dab1f LW |
805 | else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) |
806 | flags |= O_TRUNC; | |
566b7d23 ZD |
807 | |
808 | fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[fileno], flags, 0666 & ~context->umask); | |
2038c3f5 LP |
809 | if (fd < 0) |
810 | return fd; | |
811 | ||
566b7d23 | 812 | return move_fd(fd, fileno, 0); |
2038c3f5 LP |
813 | } |
814 | ||
94f04347 | 815 | default: |
04499a70 | 816 | assert_not_reached(); |
94f04347 | 817 | } |
071830ff LP |
818 | } |
819 | ||
02a51aba | 820 | static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) { |
4b3b5bc7 | 821 | int r; |
02a51aba LP |
822 | |
823 | assert(fd >= 0); | |
02a51aba | 824 | |
1ff74fb6 | 825 | /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */ |
4b3b5bc7 LP |
826 | if (isatty(fd) < 1) { |
827 | if (IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOTTY)) | |
828 | return 0; /* not a tty */ | |
1ff74fb6 | 829 | |
02a51aba | 830 | return -errno; |
4b3b5bc7 | 831 | } |
02a51aba | 832 | |
4b3b5bc7 | 833 | /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */ |
f2df231f | 834 | r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, uid, GID_INVALID); |
4b3b5bc7 LP |
835 | if (r < 0) |
836 | return r; | |
02a51aba | 837 | |
4b3b5bc7 | 838 | return 1; |
02a51aba LP |
839 | } |
840 | ||
aedec452 | 841 | static int setup_confirm_stdio( |
51462135 | 842 | const ExecContext *context, |
aedec452 LP |
843 | const char *vc, |
844 | int *ret_saved_stdin, | |
845 | int *ret_saved_stdout) { | |
846 | ||
254d1313 | 847 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, saved_stdin = -EBADF, saved_stdout = -EBADF; |
4d62ee55 | 848 | unsigned rows, cols; |
3d18b167 | 849 | int r; |
80876c20 | 850 | |
aedec452 LP |
851 | assert(ret_saved_stdin); |
852 | assert(ret_saved_stdout); | |
80876c20 | 853 | |
af6da548 LP |
854 | saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); |
855 | if (saved_stdin < 0) | |
856 | return -errno; | |
80876c20 | 857 | |
af6da548 | 858 | saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); |
3d18b167 LP |
859 | if (saved_stdout < 0) |
860 | return -errno; | |
80876c20 | 861 | |
8854d795 | 862 | fd = acquire_terminal(vc, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC); |
3d18b167 LP |
863 | if (fd < 0) |
864 | return fd; | |
80876c20 | 865 | |
af6da548 LP |
866 | r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid()); |
867 | if (r < 0) | |
3d18b167 | 868 | return r; |
02a51aba | 869 | |
3d18b167 LP |
870 | r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true); |
871 | if (r < 0) | |
872 | return r; | |
80876c20 | 873 | |
4d62ee55 DDM |
874 | r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); |
875 | if (r < 0) | |
876 | return r; | |
877 | ||
878 | r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, vc, rows, cols); | |
51462135 DDM |
879 | if (r < 0) |
880 | return r; | |
881 | ||
aedec452 LP |
882 | r = rearrange_stdio(fd, fd, STDERR_FILENO); /* Invalidates 'fd' also on failure */ |
883 | TAKE_FD(fd); | |
2b33ab09 LP |
884 | if (r < 0) |
885 | return r; | |
80876c20 | 886 | |
aedec452 LP |
887 | *ret_saved_stdin = TAKE_FD(saved_stdin); |
888 | *ret_saved_stdout = TAKE_FD(saved_stdout); | |
3d18b167 | 889 | return 0; |
80876c20 LP |
890 | } |
891 | ||
63d77c92 | 892 | static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const Unit *u) { |
3b20f877 FB |
893 | assert(err < 0); |
894 | ||
895 | if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) | |
63d77c92 | 896 | dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); |
3b20f877 FB |
897 | else { |
898 | errno = -err; | |
63d77c92 | 899 | dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); |
3b20f877 FB |
900 | } |
901 | } | |
902 | ||
63d77c92 | 903 | static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const Unit *u) { |
254d1313 | 904 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
80876c20 | 905 | |
3b20f877 | 906 | assert(vc); |
80876c20 | 907 | |
7d5ceb64 | 908 | fd = open_terminal(vc, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); |
af6da548 | 909 | if (fd < 0) |
3b20f877 | 910 | return; |
80876c20 | 911 | |
63d77c92 | 912 | write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, u); |
af6da548 | 913 | } |
80876c20 | 914 | |
3d18b167 | 915 | static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { |
af6da548 | 916 | int r = 0; |
80876c20 | 917 | |
af6da548 LP |
918 | assert(saved_stdin); |
919 | assert(saved_stdout); | |
920 | ||
921 | release_terminal(); | |
922 | ||
923 | if (*saved_stdin >= 0) | |
80876c20 | 924 | if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) |
af6da548 | 925 | r = -errno; |
80876c20 | 926 | |
af6da548 | 927 | if (*saved_stdout >= 0) |
80876c20 | 928 | if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) |
af6da548 | 929 | r = -errno; |
80876c20 | 930 | |
3d18b167 LP |
931 | *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin); |
932 | *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout); | |
af6da548 LP |
933 | |
934 | return r; | |
935 | } | |
936 | ||
3b20f877 FB |
937 | enum { |
938 | CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE = -1, | |
939 | CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS = 0, | |
940 | CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1, | |
941 | }; | |
942 | ||
51462135 | 943 | static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const char *vc, Unit *u, const char *cmdline) { |
af6da548 | 944 | int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; |
2bcd3c26 | 945 | _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL; |
3b20f877 | 946 | char c; |
af6da548 | 947 | |
3b20f877 | 948 | /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */ |
51462135 | 949 | r = setup_confirm_stdio(context, vc, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); |
3b20f877 | 950 | if (r < 0) { |
63d77c92 | 951 | write_confirm_error(r, vc, u); |
3b20f877 FB |
952 | return CONFIRM_EXECUTE; |
953 | } | |
af6da548 | 954 | |
b0eb2944 FB |
955 | /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */ |
956 | if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u->manager)) { | |
957 | r = 1; | |
958 | goto restore_stdio; | |
959 | } | |
af6da548 | 960 | |
2bcd3c26 FB |
961 | e = ellipsize(cmdline, 60, 100); |
962 | if (!e) { | |
963 | log_oom(); | |
964 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
965 | goto restore_stdio; | |
966 | } | |
af6da548 | 967 | |
d172b175 | 968 | for (;;) { |
539622bd | 969 | r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e); |
d172b175 | 970 | if (r < 0) { |
63d77c92 | 971 | write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, u); |
d172b175 FB |
972 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; |
973 | goto restore_stdio; | |
974 | } | |
af6da548 | 975 | |
d172b175 | 976 | switch (c) { |
b0eb2944 FB |
977 | case 'c': |
978 | printf("Resuming normal execution.\n"); | |
979 | manager_disable_confirm_spawn(); | |
980 | r = 1; | |
981 | break; | |
dd6f9ac0 FB |
982 | case 'D': |
983 | unit_dump(u, stdout, " "); | |
984 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
d172b175 FB |
985 | case 'f': |
986 | printf("Failing execution.\n"); | |
987 | r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE; | |
988 | break; | |
989 | case 'h': | |
b0eb2944 FB |
990 | printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n" |
991 | " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n" | |
dd6f9ac0 | 992 | " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n" |
d172b175 | 993 | " h - help\n" |
eedf223a | 994 | " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n" |
56fde33a | 995 | " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n" |
d172b175 FB |
996 | " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n" |
997 | " y - yes, execute the command\n"); | |
dd6f9ac0 | 998 | continue; /* ask again */ |
eedf223a FB |
999 | case 'i': |
1000 | printf(" Description: %s\n" | |
1001 | " Unit: %s\n" | |
1002 | " Command: %s\n", | |
1003 | u->id, u->description, cmdline); | |
1004 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
56fde33a | 1005 | case 'j': |
d1d8786c | 1006 | manager_dump_jobs(u->manager, stdout, /* patterns= */ NULL, " "); |
56fde33a | 1007 | continue; /* ask again */ |
539622bd FB |
1008 | case 'n': |
1009 | /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */ | |
1010 | printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n"); | |
1011 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
d172b175 FB |
1012 | case 's': |
1013 | printf("Skipping execution.\n"); | |
1014 | r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS; | |
1015 | break; | |
1016 | case 'y': | |
1017 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
1018 | break; | |
1019 | default: | |
04499a70 | 1020 | assert_not_reached(); |
d172b175 | 1021 | } |
3b20f877 | 1022 | break; |
3b20f877 | 1023 | } |
af6da548 | 1024 | |
3b20f877 | 1025 | restore_stdio: |
af6da548 | 1026 | restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); |
af6da548 | 1027 | return r; |
80876c20 LP |
1028 | } |
1029 | ||
4d885bd3 DH |
1030 | static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext *c, const char **user, |
1031 | uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, | |
1032 | const char **home, const char **shell) { | |
81a2b7ce | 1033 | int r; |
4d885bd3 | 1034 | const char *name; |
81a2b7ce | 1035 | |
4d885bd3 | 1036 | assert(c); |
81a2b7ce | 1037 | |
23deef88 LP |
1038 | if (!c->user) |
1039 | return 0; | |
1040 | ||
4d885bd3 DH |
1041 | /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway |
1042 | * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */ | |
81a2b7ce | 1043 | |
23deef88 | 1044 | name = c->user; |
fafff8f1 | 1045 | r = get_user_creds(&name, uid, gid, home, shell, USER_CREDS_CLEAN); |
4d885bd3 DH |
1046 | if (r < 0) |
1047 | return r; | |
81a2b7ce | 1048 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1049 | *user = name; |
1050 | return 0; | |
1051 | } | |
1052 | ||
1053 | static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext *c, const char **group, gid_t *gid) { | |
1054 | int r; | |
1055 | const char *name; | |
1056 | ||
1057 | assert(c); | |
1058 | ||
1059 | if (!c->group) | |
1060 | return 0; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | name = c->group; | |
fafff8f1 | 1063 | r = get_group_creds(&name, gid, 0); |
4d885bd3 DH |
1064 | if (r < 0) |
1065 | return r; | |
1066 | ||
1067 | *group = name; | |
1068 | return 0; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
cdc5d5c5 DH |
1071 | static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c, const char *user, |
1072 | const char *group, gid_t gid, | |
1073 | gid_t **supplementary_gids, int *ngids) { | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1074 | int r, k = 0; |
1075 | int ngroups_max; | |
1076 | bool keep_groups = false; | |
1077 | gid_t *groups = NULL; | |
1078 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *l_gids = NULL; | |
1079 | ||
1080 | assert(c); | |
1081 | ||
bbeea271 DH |
1082 | /* |
1083 | * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list. | |
1084 | * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups | |
cdc5d5c5 DH |
1085 | * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary |
1086 | * groups of the caller. | |
bbeea271 DH |
1087 | */ |
1088 | if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) { | |
1089 | /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */ | |
1090 | if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0) | |
1091 | return -errno; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | keep_groups = true; | |
1094 | } | |
1095 | ||
ac6e8be6 | 1096 | if (strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) |
4d885bd3 DH |
1097 | return 0; |
1098 | ||
366ddd25 DH |
1099 | /* |
1100 | * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to | |
1101 | * be positive, otherwise fail. | |
1102 | */ | |
1103 | errno = 0; | |
1104 | ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX); | |
66855de7 LP |
1105 | if (ngroups_max <= 0) |
1106 | return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP); | |
366ddd25 | 1107 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1108 | l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max); |
1109 | if (!l_gids) | |
1110 | return -ENOMEM; | |
81a2b7ce | 1111 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1112 | if (keep_groups) { |
1113 | /* | |
1114 | * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we | |
1115 | * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0. | |
1116 | */ | |
1117 | k = ngroups_max; | |
1118 | if (getgrouplist(user, gid, l_gids, &k) < 0) | |
1119 | return -EINVAL; | |
1120 | } else | |
1121 | k = 0; | |
81a2b7ce | 1122 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1123 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->supplementary_groups) { |
1124 | const char *g; | |
81a2b7ce | 1125 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1126 | if (k >= ngroups_max) |
1127 | return -E2BIG; | |
81a2b7ce | 1128 | |
4d885bd3 | 1129 | g = *i; |
fafff8f1 | 1130 | r = get_group_creds(&g, l_gids+k, 0); |
4d885bd3 DH |
1131 | if (r < 0) |
1132 | return r; | |
81a2b7ce | 1133 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1134 | k++; |
1135 | } | |
81a2b7ce | 1136 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1137 | /* |
1138 | * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens | |
1139 | * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty. | |
1140 | */ | |
1141 | if (k == 0) { | |
1142 | *ngids = 0; | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
81a2b7ce | 1145 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1146 | /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */ |
1147 | groups = memdup(l_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * k); | |
1148 | if (!groups) | |
1149 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | *supplementary_gids = groups; | |
1152 | *ngids = k; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | groups = NULL; | |
1155 | ||
1156 | return 0; | |
1157 | } | |
1158 | ||
34cf6c43 | 1159 | static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, int ngids) { |
4d885bd3 DH |
1160 | int r; |
1161 | ||
709dbeac YW |
1162 | /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */ |
1163 | if (ngids > 0) { | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1164 | r = maybe_setgroups(ngids, supplementary_gids); |
1165 | if (r < 0) | |
97f0e76f | 1166 | return r; |
4d885bd3 | 1167 | } |
81a2b7ce | 1168 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1169 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { |
1170 | /* Then set our gids */ | |
1171 | if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) | |
1172 | return -errno; | |
81a2b7ce LP |
1173 | } |
1174 | ||
1175 | return 0; | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
a954b249 LP |
1178 | static int set_securebits(unsigned bits, unsigned mask) { |
1179 | unsigned applied; | |
1180 | int current; | |
1181 | ||
dbdc4098 TK |
1182 | current = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS); |
1183 | if (current < 0) | |
1184 | return -errno; | |
a954b249 | 1185 | |
dbdc4098 | 1186 | /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */ |
a954b249 LP |
1187 | applied = ((unsigned) current & ~mask) | bits; |
1188 | if ((unsigned) current == applied) | |
dbdc4098 | 1189 | return 0; |
a954b249 | 1190 | |
dbdc4098 TK |
1191 | if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, applied) < 0) |
1192 | return -errno; | |
a954b249 | 1193 | |
dbdc4098 TK |
1194 | return 1; |
1195 | } | |
1196 | ||
638fd8cc LP |
1197 | static int enforce_user( |
1198 | const ExecContext *context, | |
1199 | uid_t uid, | |
1200 | uint64_t capability_ambient_set) { | |
81a2b7ce | 1201 | assert(context); |
dbdc4098 | 1202 | int r; |
81a2b7ce | 1203 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
1204 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
1205 | return 0; | |
1206 | ||
a954b249 LP |
1207 | /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the UIS and makes sure we keep the capabilities while doing so. For |
1208 | * setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is required, so we also need keep-caps in this | |
1209 | * case. */ | |
81a2b7ce | 1210 | |
638fd8cc | 1211 | if ((capability_ambient_set != 0 || context->secure_bits != 0) && uid != 0) { |
81a2b7ce | 1212 | |
a954b249 LP |
1213 | /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but drop privileges we need to make sure we |
1214 | * keep our caps, while we drop privileges. Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */ | |
1215 | r = set_securebits(1U << SECURE_KEEP_CAPS, 0); | |
1216 | if (r < 0) | |
1217 | return r; | |
81a2b7ce LP |
1218 | } |
1219 | ||
479050b3 | 1220 | /* Second step: actually set the uids */ |
81a2b7ce LP |
1221 | if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) |
1222 | return -errno; | |
1223 | ||
a954b249 LP |
1224 | /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but are otherwise a normal user. However, |
1225 | * the caps might got corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up later. This is done | |
1226 | * outside of this call. */ | |
81a2b7ce LP |
1227 | return 0; |
1228 | } | |
1229 | ||
349cc4a5 | 1230 | #if HAVE_PAM |
5b6319dc LP |
1231 | |
1232 | static int null_conv( | |
1233 | int num_msg, | |
1234 | const struct pam_message **msg, | |
1235 | struct pam_response **resp, | |
1236 | void *appdata_ptr) { | |
1237 | ||
1238 | /* We don't support conversations */ | |
1239 | ||
1240 | return PAM_CONV_ERR; | |
1241 | } | |
1242 | ||
cefc33ae LP |
1243 | #endif |
1244 | ||
5b6319dc LP |
1245 | static int setup_pam( |
1246 | const char *name, | |
1247 | const char *user, | |
940c5210 | 1248 | uid_t uid, |
2d6fce8d | 1249 | gid_t gid, |
5b6319dc | 1250 | const char *tty, |
421bb42d | 1251 | char ***env, /* updated on success */ |
5b8d1f6b | 1252 | const int fds[], size_t n_fds) { |
5b6319dc | 1253 | |
349cc4a5 | 1254 | #if HAVE_PAM |
cefc33ae | 1255 | |
5b6319dc LP |
1256 | static const struct pam_conv conv = { |
1257 | .conv = null_conv, | |
1258 | .appdata_ptr = NULL | |
1259 | }; | |
1260 | ||
2d7c6aa2 | 1261 | _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL; |
46e5bbab | 1262 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **e = NULL; |
5b6319dc | 1263 | pam_handle_t *handle = NULL; |
d6e5f3ad | 1264 | sigset_t old_ss; |
7bb70b6e | 1265 | int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r; |
5b6319dc LP |
1266 | bool close_session = false; |
1267 | pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid; | |
970edce6 | 1268 | int flags = 0; |
5b6319dc LP |
1269 | |
1270 | assert(name); | |
1271 | assert(user); | |
2065ca69 | 1272 | assert(env); |
5b6319dc LP |
1273 | |
1274 | /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child | |
35b8ca3a | 1275 | * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or |
5b6319dc LP |
1276 | * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM |
1277 | * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual | |
1278 | * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID | |
1279 | * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ | |
1280 | ||
7bb70b6e LP |
1281 | r = barrier_create(&barrier); |
1282 | if (r < 0) | |
2d7c6aa2 DH |
1283 | goto fail; |
1284 | ||
553d2243 | 1285 | if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) |
970edce6 ZJS |
1286 | flags |= PAM_SILENT; |
1287 | ||
f546241b ZJS |
1288 | pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); |
1289 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { | |
5b6319dc LP |
1290 | handle = NULL; |
1291 | goto fail; | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | ||
3cd24c1a LP |
1294 | if (!tty) { |
1295 | _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; | |
1296 | ||
1297 | /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure | |
1298 | * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */ | |
1299 | ||
1300 | if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO, &q) >= 0) | |
1301 | tty = strjoina("/dev/", q); | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
513cf7da MS |
1304 | if (tty) { |
1305 | pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty); | |
1306 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1307 | goto fail; | |
1308 | } | |
5b6319dc | 1309 | |
84eada2f JW |
1310 | STRV_FOREACH(nv, *env) { |
1311 | pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *nv); | |
2065ca69 JW |
1312 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
1313 | goto fail; | |
1314 | } | |
1315 | ||
970edce6 | 1316 | pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags); |
f546241b | 1317 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
5b6319dc LP |
1318 | goto fail; |
1319 | ||
3bb39ea9 DG |
1320 | pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | flags); |
1321 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
46d7c6af | 1322 | log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); |
3bb39ea9 | 1323 | |
970edce6 | 1324 | pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags); |
f546241b | 1325 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
5b6319dc LP |
1326 | goto fail; |
1327 | ||
1328 | close_session = true; | |
1329 | ||
f546241b ZJS |
1330 | e = pam_getenvlist(handle); |
1331 | if (!e) { | |
5b6319dc LP |
1332 | pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR; |
1333 | goto fail; | |
1334 | } | |
1335 | ||
cafc5ca1 | 1336 | /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in the child */ |
ce30c8dc | 1337 | |
72c0a2c2 | 1338 | assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0); |
5b6319dc | 1339 | |
df0ff127 | 1340 | parent_pid = getpid_cached(); |
5b6319dc | 1341 | |
4c253ed1 LP |
1342 | r = safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid); |
1343 | if (r < 0) | |
5b6319dc | 1344 | goto fail; |
4c253ed1 | 1345 | if (r == 0) { |
7bb70b6e | 1346 | int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM; |
5b6319dc | 1347 | |
cafc5ca1 | 1348 | /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on termination */ |
2d7c6aa2 | 1349 | barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD); |
5b6319dc | 1350 | |
1da37e58 ZJS |
1351 | /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only |
1352 | * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */ | |
4c253ed1 | 1353 | (void) close_many(fds, n_fds); |
5b6319dc | 1354 | |
cafc5ca1 LP |
1355 | /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session and this will make |
1356 | * PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases. If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam | |
1357 | * threads to fail to exit normally */ | |
2d6fce8d | 1358 | |
97f0e76f LP |
1359 | r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL); |
1360 | if (r < 0) | |
1361 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
2d6fce8d LP |
1362 | if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) |
1363 | log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
940c5210 | 1364 | if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) |
2d6fce8d | 1365 | log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); |
940c5210 | 1366 | |
9c274488 | 1367 | (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); |
ce30c8dc | 1368 | |
cafc5ca1 LP |
1369 | /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if the above setresuid() succeeds, |
1370 | * otherwise the kernel will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged children | |
1371 | * this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic to do the rest for us. */ | |
5b6319dc LP |
1372 | if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0) |
1373 | goto child_finish; | |
1374 | ||
cafc5ca1 LP |
1375 | /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially important regarding dropping |
1376 | * privileges. Otherwise, unit setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. | |
643f4706 | 1377 | * |
cafc5ca1 | 1378 | * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore return failure here. */ |
643f4706 | 1379 | (void) barrier_place(&barrier); |
2d7c6aa2 | 1380 | |
643f4706 | 1381 | /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */ |
5b6319dc | 1382 | if (getppid() == parent_pid) { |
d6e5f3ad DM |
1383 | sigset_t ss; |
1384 | ||
1385 | assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0); | |
1386 | assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0); | |
1387 | ||
3dead8d9 LP |
1388 | for (;;) { |
1389 | if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) { | |
1390 | if (errno == EINTR) | |
1391 | continue; | |
1392 | ||
1393 | goto child_finish; | |
1394 | } | |
5b6319dc | 1395 | |
3dead8d9 LP |
1396 | assert(sig == SIGTERM); |
1397 | break; | |
1398 | } | |
5b6319dc LP |
1399 | } |
1400 | ||
3bb39ea9 DG |
1401 | pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED | flags); |
1402 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1403 | goto child_finish; | |
1404 | ||
3dead8d9 | 1405 | /* If our parent died we'll end the session */ |
f546241b | 1406 | if (getppid() != parent_pid) { |
970edce6 | 1407 | pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); |
f546241b | 1408 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
5b6319dc | 1409 | goto child_finish; |
f546241b | 1410 | } |
5b6319dc | 1411 | |
7bb70b6e | 1412 | ret = 0; |
5b6319dc LP |
1413 | |
1414 | child_finish: | |
7feb2b57 LP |
1415 | /* NB: pam_end() when called in child processes should set PAM_DATA_SILENT to let the module |
1416 | * know about this. See pam_end(3) */ | |
1417 | (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags | PAM_DATA_SILENT); | |
7bb70b6e | 1418 | _exit(ret); |
5b6319dc LP |
1419 | } |
1420 | ||
2d7c6aa2 DH |
1421 | barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT); |
1422 | ||
cafc5ca1 LP |
1423 | /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the cleanups, so forget about the handle |
1424 | * here. */ | |
5b6319dc LP |
1425 | handle = NULL; |
1426 | ||
3b8bddde | 1427 | /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */ |
72c0a2c2 | 1428 | assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0); |
5b6319dc | 1429 | |
cafc5ca1 LP |
1430 | /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules might have opened it, but we don't want |
1431 | * this fd around. */ | |
5b6319dc LP |
1432 | closelog(); |
1433 | ||
cafc5ca1 LP |
1434 | /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for errors as we cannot |
1435 | * recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */ | |
2d7c6aa2 DH |
1436 | if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) |
1437 | log_error("PAM initialization failed"); | |
1438 | ||
130d3d22 | 1439 | return strv_free_and_replace(*env, e); |
5b6319dc LP |
1440 | |
1441 | fail: | |
970edce6 ZJS |
1442 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
1443 | log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); | |
7bb70b6e LP |
1444 | r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ |
1445 | } else | |
1446 | log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m"); | |
9ba35398 | 1447 | |
5b6319dc LP |
1448 | if (handle) { |
1449 | if (close_session) | |
970edce6 | 1450 | pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); |
5b6319dc | 1451 | |
7feb2b57 | 1452 | (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); |
5b6319dc LP |
1453 | } |
1454 | ||
5b6319dc | 1455 | closelog(); |
7bb70b6e | 1456 | return r; |
cefc33ae LP |
1457 | #else |
1458 | return 0; | |
5b6319dc | 1459 | #endif |
cefc33ae | 1460 | } |
5b6319dc | 1461 | |
5d6b1584 | 1462 | static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { |
a99626c1 | 1463 | _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL; |
5d6b1584 | 1464 | const char *p; |
5d6b1584 | 1465 | |
a99626c1 LP |
1466 | assert(path); |
1467 | ||
1468 | /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in | |
1469 | * /bin/ps */ | |
5d6b1584 | 1470 | |
a99626c1 | 1471 | if (path_extract_filename(path, &buf) < 0) { |
5d6b1584 LP |
1472 | rename_process("(...)"); |
1473 | return; | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | ||
a99626c1 | 1476 | size_t l = strlen(buf); |
5d6b1584 | 1477 | if (l > 8) { |
a99626c1 | 1478 | /* The end of the process name is usually more interesting, since the first bit might just be |
5d6b1584 | 1479 | * "systemd-" */ |
a99626c1 | 1480 | p = buf + l - 8; |
5d6b1584 | 1481 | l = 8; |
a99626c1 LP |
1482 | } else |
1483 | p = buf; | |
5d6b1584 | 1484 | |
a99626c1 | 1485 | char process_name[11]; |
5d6b1584 LP |
1486 | process_name[0] = '('; |
1487 | memcpy(process_name+1, p, l); | |
1488 | process_name[1+l] = ')'; | |
1489 | process_name[1+l+1] = 0; | |
1490 | ||
1491 | rename_process(process_name); | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1494 | static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { |
1495 | assert(c); | |
1496 | ||
6b000af4 | 1497 | return c->address_families_allow_list || |
469830d1 LP |
1498 | !set_isempty(c->address_families); |
1499 | } | |
1500 | ||
1501 | static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1502 | assert(c); | |
1503 | ||
6b000af4 | 1504 | return c->syscall_allow_list || |
8cfa775f | 1505 | !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter); |
469830d1 LP |
1506 | } |
1507 | ||
9df2cdd8 TM |
1508 | static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext *c) { |
1509 | assert(c); | |
1510 | ||
1511 | return c->syscall_log_allow_list || | |
1512 | !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_log); | |
1513 | } | |
1514 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1515 | static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { |
1516 | assert(c); | |
1517 | ||
1518 | if (c->no_new_privileges) | |
1519 | return true; | |
1520 | ||
26c45a6c | 1521 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */ |
469830d1 LP |
1522 | return false; |
1523 | ||
1524 | /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */ | |
0538d2a8 | 1525 | return c->lock_personality || |
469830d1 | 1526 | c->memory_deny_write_execute || |
0538d2a8 | 1527 | c->private_devices || |
fc64760d | 1528 | c->protect_clock || |
0538d2a8 | 1529 | c->protect_hostname || |
469830d1 LP |
1530 | c->protect_kernel_tunables || |
1531 | c->protect_kernel_modules || | |
84703040 | 1532 | c->protect_kernel_logs || |
0538d2a8 YW |
1533 | context_has_address_families(c) || |
1534 | exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) || | |
1535 | c->restrict_realtime || | |
1536 | c->restrict_suid_sgid || | |
78e864e5 | 1537 | !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) || |
0538d2a8 YW |
1538 | context_has_syscall_filters(c) || |
1539 | context_has_syscall_logs(c); | |
469830d1 LP |
1540 | } |
1541 | ||
ce18c396 | 1542 | bool exec_context_has_credentials(const ExecContext *context) { |
bb0c0d6f LP |
1543 | |
1544 | assert(context); | |
1545 | ||
1546 | return !hashmap_isempty(context->set_credentials) || | |
43144be4 | 1547 | !hashmap_isempty(context->load_credentials); |
bb0c0d6f LP |
1548 | } |
1549 | ||
349cc4a5 | 1550 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
17df7223 | 1551 | |
83f12b27 | 1552 | static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) { |
f673b62d LP |
1553 | |
1554 | if (is_seccomp_available()) | |
1555 | return false; | |
1556 | ||
f673b62d | 1557 | log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); |
f673b62d | 1558 | return true; |
83f12b27 FS |
1559 | } |
1560 | ||
165a31c0 | 1561 | static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ambient_hack) { |
469830d1 | 1562 | uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action; |
165a31c0 | 1563 | int r; |
8351ceae | 1564 | |
469830d1 | 1565 | assert(u); |
c0467cf3 | 1566 | assert(c); |
8351ceae | 1567 | |
469830d1 | 1568 | if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c)) |
83f12b27 FS |
1569 | return 0; |
1570 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1571 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallFilter=")) |
1572 | return 0; | |
e9642be2 | 1573 | |
005bfaf1 | 1574 | negative_action = c->syscall_errno == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); |
e9642be2 | 1575 | |
6b000af4 | 1576 | if (c->syscall_allow_list) { |
469830d1 LP |
1577 | default_action = negative_action; |
1578 | action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
7c66bae2 | 1579 | } else { |
469830d1 LP |
1580 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; |
1581 | action = negative_action; | |
57183d11 | 1582 | } |
8351ceae | 1583 | |
165a31c0 | 1584 | if (needs_ambient_hack) { |
6b000af4 | 1585 | r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_allow_list, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); |
165a31c0 LP |
1586 | if (r < 0) |
1587 | return r; | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
b54f36c6 | 1590 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false); |
4298d0b5 LP |
1591 | } |
1592 | ||
9df2cdd8 TM |
1593 | static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1594 | #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG | |
1595 | uint32_t default_action, action; | |
1596 | #endif | |
1597 | ||
1598 | assert(u); | |
1599 | assert(c); | |
1600 | ||
1601 | if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c)) | |
1602 | return 0; | |
1603 | ||
1604 | #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG | |
1605 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallLog=")) | |
1606 | return 0; | |
1607 | ||
1608 | if (c->syscall_log_allow_list) { | |
1609 | /* Log nothing but the ones listed */ | |
1610 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
1611 | action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; | |
1612 | } else { | |
1613 | /* Log everything but the ones listed */ | |
1614 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; | |
1615 | action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
1616 | } | |
1617 | ||
1618 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_log, action, false); | |
1619 | #else | |
1620 | /* old libseccomp */ | |
1621 | log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog="); | |
1622 | return 0; | |
1623 | #endif | |
1624 | } | |
1625 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1626 | static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1627 | assert(u); | |
4298d0b5 LP |
1628 | assert(c); |
1629 | ||
469830d1 | 1630 | if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) |
83f12b27 FS |
1631 | return 0; |
1632 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1633 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) |
1634 | return 0; | |
4298d0b5 | 1635 | |
469830d1 LP |
1636 | return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs); |
1637 | } | |
4298d0b5 | 1638 | |
469830d1 LP |
1639 | static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1640 | assert(u); | |
1641 | assert(c); | |
4298d0b5 | 1642 | |
469830d1 LP |
1643 | if (!context_has_address_families(c)) |
1644 | return 0; | |
4298d0b5 | 1645 | |
469830d1 LP |
1646 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) |
1647 | return 0; | |
4298d0b5 | 1648 | |
6b000af4 | 1649 | return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_allow_list); |
8351ceae | 1650 | } |
4298d0b5 | 1651 | |
83f12b27 | 1652 | static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
7a114ed4 TM |
1653 | int r; |
1654 | ||
469830d1 | 1655 | assert(u); |
f3e43635 TM |
1656 | assert(c); |
1657 | ||
469830d1 | 1658 | if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute) |
83f12b27 FS |
1659 | return 0; |
1660 | ||
7a114ed4 TM |
1661 | /* use prctl() if kernel supports it (6.3) */ |
1662 | r = prctl(PR_SET_MDWE, PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN, 0, 0, 0); | |
1663 | if (r == 0) { | |
1664 | log_unit_debug(u, "Enabled MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE"); | |
1665 | return 0; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | if (r < 0 && errno != EINVAL) | |
1668 | return log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE: %m"); | |
1669 | /* else use seccomp */ | |
1670 | log_unit_debug(u, "Kernel doesn't support PR_SET_MDWE: falling back to seccomp"); | |
1671 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1672 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) |
1673 | return 0; | |
f3e43635 | 1674 | |
469830d1 | 1675 | return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(); |
f3e43635 TM |
1676 | } |
1677 | ||
83f12b27 | 1678 | static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
469830d1 | 1679 | assert(u); |
f4170c67 LP |
1680 | assert(c); |
1681 | ||
469830d1 | 1682 | if (!c->restrict_realtime) |
83f12b27 FS |
1683 | return 0; |
1684 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1685 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime=")) |
1686 | return 0; | |
f4170c67 | 1687 | |
469830d1 | 1688 | return seccomp_restrict_realtime(); |
f4170c67 LP |
1689 | } |
1690 | ||
f69567cb LP |
1691 | static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1692 | assert(u); | |
1693 | assert(c); | |
1694 | ||
1695 | if (!c->restrict_suid_sgid) | |
1696 | return 0; | |
1697 | ||
1698 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) | |
1699 | return 0; | |
1700 | ||
1701 | return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(); | |
1702 | } | |
1703 | ||
59e856c7 | 1704 | static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
469830d1 | 1705 | assert(u); |
59eeb84b LP |
1706 | assert(c); |
1707 | ||
1708 | /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but | |
1709 | * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */ | |
1710 | ||
469830d1 | 1711 | if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables) |
59eeb84b LP |
1712 | return 0; |
1713 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1714 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) |
1715 | return 0; | |
59eeb84b | 1716 | |
469830d1 | 1717 | return seccomp_protect_sysctl(); |
59eeb84b LP |
1718 | } |
1719 | ||
59e856c7 | 1720 | static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
469830d1 | 1721 | assert(u); |
502d704e DH |
1722 | assert(c); |
1723 | ||
25a8d8a0 | 1724 | /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */ |
502d704e | 1725 | |
469830d1 LP |
1726 | if (!c->protect_kernel_modules) |
1727 | return 0; | |
1728 | ||
502d704e DH |
1729 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules=")) |
1730 | return 0; | |
1731 | ||
b54f36c6 | 1732 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); |
502d704e DH |
1733 | } |
1734 | ||
84703040 KK |
1735 | static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1736 | assert(u); | |
1737 | assert(c); | |
1738 | ||
1739 | if (!c->protect_kernel_logs) | |
1740 | return 0; | |
1741 | ||
1742 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) | |
1743 | return 0; | |
1744 | ||
1745 | return seccomp_protect_syslog(); | |
1746 | } | |
1747 | ||
daf8f72b | 1748 | static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
fc64760d KK |
1749 | assert(u); |
1750 | assert(c); | |
1751 | ||
1752 | if (!c->protect_clock) | |
1753 | return 0; | |
1754 | ||
1755 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectClock=")) | |
1756 | return 0; | |
1757 | ||
1758 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | ||
59e856c7 | 1761 | static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
469830d1 | 1762 | assert(u); |
ba128bb8 LP |
1763 | assert(c); |
1764 | ||
8f81a5f6 | 1765 | /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */ |
ba128bb8 | 1766 | |
469830d1 LP |
1767 | if (!c->private_devices) |
1768 | return 0; | |
1769 | ||
ba128bb8 LP |
1770 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices=")) |
1771 | return 0; | |
1772 | ||
b54f36c6 | 1773 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); |
ba128bb8 LP |
1774 | } |
1775 | ||
34cf6c43 | 1776 | static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
469830d1 | 1777 | assert(u); |
add00535 LP |
1778 | assert(c); |
1779 | ||
1780 | if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) | |
1781 | return 0; | |
1782 | ||
1783 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictNamespaces=")) | |
1784 | return 0; | |
1785 | ||
1786 | return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces); | |
1787 | } | |
1788 | ||
78e864e5 | 1789 | static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
e8132d63 LP |
1790 | unsigned long personality; |
1791 | int r; | |
78e864e5 TM |
1792 | |
1793 | assert(u); | |
1794 | assert(c); | |
1795 | ||
1796 | if (!c->lock_personality) | |
1797 | return 0; | |
1798 | ||
1799 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "LockPersonality=")) | |
1800 | return 0; | |
1801 | ||
e8132d63 LP |
1802 | personality = c->personality; |
1803 | ||
1804 | /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */ | |
1805 | if (personality == PERSONALITY_INVALID) { | |
1806 | ||
1807 | r = opinionated_personality(&personality); | |
1808 | if (r < 0) | |
1809 | return r; | |
1810 | } | |
78e864e5 TM |
1811 | |
1812 | return seccomp_lock_personality(personality); | |
1813 | } | |
1814 | ||
c0467cf3 | 1815 | #endif |
8351ceae | 1816 | |
7a8288f6 | 1817 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF |
7a8288f6 DM |
1818 | static int apply_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1819 | assert(u); | |
1820 | assert(c); | |
1821 | ||
1822 | if (!exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) | |
1823 | return 0; | |
1824 | ||
46004616 ZJS |
1825 | if (!u->manager->restrict_fs) { |
1826 | /* LSM BPF is unsupported or lsm_bpf_setup failed */ | |
1827 | log_unit_debug(u, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); | |
7a8288f6 | 1828 | return 0; |
46004616 | 1829 | } |
7a8288f6 DM |
1830 | |
1831 | return lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(u, c->restrict_filesystems, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); | |
1832 | } | |
1833 | #endif | |
1834 | ||
daf8f72b | 1835 | static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, int *ret_exit_status) { |
daf8f72b LP |
1836 | assert(u); |
1837 | assert(c); | |
1838 | ||
1839 | if (!c->protect_hostname) | |
1840 | return 0; | |
1841 | ||
1842 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) { | |
1843 | if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) { | |
1844 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) { | |
1845 | *ret_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
1846 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); | |
1847 | } | |
1848 | ||
1849 | log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); | |
1850 | } | |
1851 | } else | |
1852 | log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); | |
1853 | ||
1854 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
8f3e342f ZJS |
1855 | int r; |
1856 | ||
daf8f72b LP |
1857 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectHostname=")) |
1858 | return 0; | |
1859 | ||
1860 | r = seccomp_protect_hostname(); | |
1861 | if (r < 0) { | |
1862 | *ret_exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
1863 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); | |
1864 | } | |
1865 | #endif | |
1866 | ||
1867 | return 0; | |
1868 | } | |
1869 | ||
3042bbeb | 1870 | static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) { |
31a7eb86 ZJS |
1871 | assert(idle_pipe); |
1872 | ||
54eb2300 LP |
1873 | idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); |
1874 | idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); | |
31a7eb86 ZJS |
1875 | |
1876 | if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { | |
1877 | int r; | |
1878 | ||
1879 | r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC); | |
1880 | ||
1881 | if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) { | |
c7cc737f LP |
1882 | ssize_t n; |
1883 | ||
31a7eb86 | 1884 | /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */ |
c7cc737f LP |
1885 | n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1); |
1886 | if (n > 0) | |
cd972d69 | 1887 | /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */ |
54756dce | 1888 | (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); |
31a7eb86 ZJS |
1889 | } |
1890 | ||
54eb2300 | 1891 | idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); |
31a7eb86 ZJS |
1892 | |
1893 | } | |
1894 | ||
54eb2300 | 1895 | idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); |
31a7eb86 ZJS |
1896 | } |
1897 | ||
fb2042dd YW |
1898 | static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t); |
1899 | ||
7cae38c4 | 1900 | static int build_environment( |
34cf6c43 | 1901 | const Unit *u, |
9fa95f85 | 1902 | const ExecContext *c, |
1e22b5cd | 1903 | const ExecParameters *p, |
6bb00842 | 1904 | const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, |
da6053d0 | 1905 | size_t n_fds, |
cd48e23f | 1906 | char **fdnames, |
7cae38c4 LP |
1907 | const char *home, |
1908 | const char *username, | |
1909 | const char *shell, | |
7bce046b LP |
1910 | dev_t journal_stream_dev, |
1911 | ino_t journal_stream_ino, | |
6bb00842 | 1912 | const char *memory_pressure_path, |
7cae38c4 LP |
1913 | char ***ret) { |
1914 | ||
1915 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL; | |
da6053d0 | 1916 | size_t n_env = 0; |
7cae38c4 | 1917 | char *x; |
4d62ee55 | 1918 | int r; |
7cae38c4 | 1919 | |
4b58153d | 1920 | assert(u); |
7cae38c4 | 1921 | assert(c); |
7c1cb6f1 | 1922 | assert(p); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1923 | assert(ret); |
1924 | ||
6bb00842 | 1925 | #define N_ENV_VARS 19 |
8d5bb13d | 1926 | our_env = new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1927 | if (!our_env) |
1928 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1929 | ||
1930 | if (n_fds > 0) { | |
8dd4c05b LP |
1931 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; |
1932 | ||
df0ff127 | 1933 | if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) |
7cae38c4 LP |
1934 | return -ENOMEM; |
1935 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1936 | ||
da6053d0 | 1937 | if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds) < 0) |
7cae38c4 LP |
1938 | return -ENOMEM; |
1939 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
8dd4c05b | 1940 | |
cd48e23f | 1941 | joined = strv_join(fdnames, ":"); |
8dd4c05b LP |
1942 | if (!joined) |
1943 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1944 | ||
605405c6 | 1945 | x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined); |
8dd4c05b LP |
1946 | if (!x) |
1947 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1948 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
7cae38c4 LP |
1949 | } |
1950 | ||
b08af3b1 | 1951 | if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) { |
df0ff127 | 1952 | if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) |
09812eb7 LP |
1953 | return -ENOMEM; |
1954 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1955 | ||
1e22b5cd | 1956 | if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0) |
09812eb7 LP |
1957 | return -ENOMEM; |
1958 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1959 | } | |
1960 | ||
de90700f LP |
1961 | /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use blocking |
1962 | * Varlink calls back to us for look up dynamic users in PID 1. Break the deadlock between D-Bus and | |
1963 | * PID 1 by disabling use of PID1' NSS interface for looking up dynamic users. */ | |
1964 | if (p->flags & EXEC_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS) { | |
1965 | x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1"); | |
fd63e712 LP |
1966 | if (!x) |
1967 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1968 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1969 | } | |
1970 | ||
7cae38c4 | 1971 | if (home) { |
b910cc72 | 1972 | x = strjoin("HOME=", home); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1973 | if (!x) |
1974 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7bbead1d | 1975 | |
4ff361cc | 1976 | path_simplify(x + 5); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1977 | our_env[n_env++] = x; |
1978 | } | |
1979 | ||
1980 | if (username) { | |
b910cc72 | 1981 | x = strjoin("LOGNAME=", username); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1982 | if (!x) |
1983 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1984 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1985 | ||
b910cc72 | 1986 | x = strjoin("USER=", username); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1987 | if (!x) |
1988 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1989 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1990 | } | |
1991 | ||
1992 | if (shell) { | |
b910cc72 | 1993 | x = strjoin("SHELL=", shell); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1994 | if (!x) |
1995 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7bbead1d | 1996 | |
4ff361cc | 1997 | path_simplify(x + 6); |
7cae38c4 LP |
1998 | our_env[n_env++] = x; |
1999 | } | |
2000 | ||
4b58153d LP |
2001 | if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { |
2002 | if (asprintf(&x, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u->invocation_id)) < 0) | |
2003 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2004 | ||
2005 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2006 | } | |
2007 | ||
6af760f3 | 2008 | if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) { |
4d62ee55 | 2009 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; |
6af760f3 LP |
2010 | const char *tty_path, *term = NULL; |
2011 | ||
2012 | tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c); | |
2013 | ||
e8cf09b2 LP |
2014 | /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try |
2015 | * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the | |
2016 | * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */ | |
6af760f3 | 2017 | |
e8cf09b2 | 2018 | if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1) |
6af760f3 | 2019 | term = getenv("TERM"); |
4d62ee55 DDM |
2020 | else if (tty_path && in_charset(skip_dev_prefix(tty_path), ALPHANUMERICAL)) { |
2021 | _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL; | |
2022 | ||
2023 | key = strjoin("systemd.tty.term.", skip_dev_prefix(tty_path)); | |
2024 | if (!key) | |
2025 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2026 | ||
2027 | r = proc_cmdline_get_key(key, 0, &cmdline); | |
2028 | if (r < 0) | |
2029 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", key); | |
2030 | else if (r > 0) | |
2031 | term = cmdline; | |
2032 | } | |
e8cf09b2 | 2033 | |
6af760f3 LP |
2034 | if (!term) |
2035 | term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path); | |
7cae38c4 | 2036 | |
b910cc72 | 2037 | x = strjoin("TERM=", term); |
7cae38c4 LP |
2038 | if (!x) |
2039 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2040 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2041 | } | |
2042 | ||
7bce046b LP |
2043 | if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) { |
2044 | if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0) | |
2045 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2048 | } | |
2049 | ||
91dd5f7c LP |
2050 | if (c->log_namespace) { |
2051 | x = strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c->log_namespace); | |
2052 | if (!x) | |
2053 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2054 | ||
2055 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2056 | } | |
2057 | ||
5b10116e | 2058 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
211a3d87 | 2059 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; |
fb2042dd YW |
2060 | const char *n; |
2061 | ||
2062 | if (!p->prefix[t]) | |
2063 | continue; | |
2064 | ||
211a3d87 | 2065 | if (c->directories[t].n_items == 0) |
fb2042dd YW |
2066 | continue; |
2067 | ||
2068 | n = exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t); | |
2069 | if (!n) | |
2070 | continue; | |
2071 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
2072 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { |
2073 | _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed = NULL; | |
fb2042dd | 2074 | |
211a3d87 LB |
2075 | prefixed = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); |
2076 | if (!prefixed) | |
2077 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2078 | ||
2079 | if (!strextend_with_separator(&joined, ":", prefixed)) | |
2080 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2081 | } | |
fb2042dd YW |
2082 | |
2083 | x = strjoin(n, "=", joined); | |
2084 | if (!x) | |
2085 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2086 | ||
2087 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2088 | } | |
2089 | ||
bb0c0d6f LP |
2090 | if (exec_context_has_credentials(c) && p->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME]) { |
2091 | x = strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", p->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "/credentials/", u->id); | |
2092 | if (!x) | |
2093 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2094 | ||
2095 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2096 | } | |
2097 | ||
dc4e2940 YW |
2098 | if (asprintf(&x, "SYSTEMD_EXEC_PID=" PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) |
2099 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2100 | ||
2101 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2102 | ||
6bb00842 LP |
2103 | if (memory_pressure_path) { |
2104 | x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WATCH=", memory_pressure_path); | |
2105 | if (!x) | |
2106 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2107 | ||
2108 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2109 | ||
2110 | if (cgroup_context && !path_equal(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { | |
2111 | _cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL, *e = NULL; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (asprintf(&b, "%s " USEC_FMT " " USEC_FMT, | |
2114 | MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_TYPE, | |
2115 | cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec == USEC_INFINITY ? MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_USEC : | |
2116 | CLAMP(cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec, 1U, MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC), | |
2117 | MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC) < 0) | |
2118 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2119 | ||
2120 | if (base64mem(b, strlen(b) + 1, &e) < 0) | |
2121 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2122 | ||
2123 | x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WRITE=", e); | |
2124 | if (!x) | |
2125 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2126 | ||
2127 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2128 | } | |
2129 | } | |
2130 | ||
2131 | assert(n_env < N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); | |
8d5bb13d | 2132 | #undef N_ENV_VARS |
7cae38c4 | 2133 | |
ae2a15bc | 2134 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(our_env); |
7cae38c4 LP |
2135 | |
2136 | return 0; | |
2137 | } | |
2138 | ||
b4c14404 FB |
2139 | static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { |
2140 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL; | |
319a4f4b | 2141 | size_t n_env = 0; |
b4c14404 FB |
2142 | |
2143 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) { | |
2144 | _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; | |
2145 | char *v; | |
2146 | ||
2147 | v = getenv(*i); | |
2148 | if (!v) | |
2149 | continue; | |
605405c6 | 2150 | x = strjoin(*i, "=", v); |
b4c14404 FB |
2151 | if (!x) |
2152 | return -ENOMEM; | |
00819cc1 | 2153 | |
319a4f4b | 2154 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_env + 2)) |
b4c14404 | 2155 | return -ENOMEM; |
00819cc1 | 2156 | |
1cc6c93a | 2157 | pass_env[n_env++] = TAKE_PTR(x); |
b4c14404 | 2158 | pass_env[n_env] = NULL; |
b4c14404 FB |
2159 | } |
2160 | ||
ae2a15bc | 2161 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env); |
b4c14404 FB |
2162 | |
2163 | return 0; | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ||
fbbb9697 YW |
2166 | bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { |
2167 | assert(context); | |
2168 | ||
2169 | return context->private_network || context->network_namespace_path; | |
2170 | } | |
2171 | ||
fde36d25 YW |
2172 | static bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { |
2173 | assert(context); | |
2174 | ||
2175 | return context->private_ipc || context->ipc_namespace_path; | |
2176 | } | |
2177 | ||
5e8deb94 | 2178 | bool exec_needs_mount_namespace( |
8b44a3d2 LP |
2179 | const ExecContext *context, |
2180 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
28135da3 | 2181 | const ExecRuntime *runtime) { |
8b44a3d2 LP |
2182 | |
2183 | assert(context); | |
8b44a3d2 | 2184 | |
915e6d16 LP |
2185 | if (context->root_image) |
2186 | return true; | |
2187 | ||
2a624c36 AP |
2188 | if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || |
2189 | !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || | |
ddc155b2 TM |
2190 | !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths) || |
2191 | !strv_isempty(context->exec_paths) || | |
2192 | !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths)) | |
8b44a3d2 LP |
2193 | return true; |
2194 | ||
42b1d8e0 | 2195 | if (context->n_bind_mounts > 0) |
d2d6c096 LP |
2196 | return true; |
2197 | ||
2abd4e38 YW |
2198 | if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) |
2199 | return true; | |
2200 | ||
b3d13314 LB |
2201 | if (context->n_mount_images > 0) |
2202 | return true; | |
2203 | ||
93f59701 LB |
2204 | if (context->n_extension_images > 0) |
2205 | return true; | |
2206 | ||
a07b9926 LB |
2207 | if (!strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) |
2208 | return true; | |
2209 | ||
874cdcbc | 2210 | if (!IN_SET(context->mount_propagation_flag, 0, MS_SHARED)) |
8b44a3d2 LP |
2211 | return true; |
2212 | ||
28135da3 | 2213 | if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared && (runtime->shared->tmp_dir || runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir)) |
8b44a3d2 LP |
2214 | return true; |
2215 | ||
8b44a3d2 | 2216 | if (context->private_devices || |
24002121 | 2217 | context->private_mounts > 0 || |
c2da3bf2 | 2218 | (context->private_mounts < 0 && exec_needs_network_namespace(context)) || |
8b44a3d2 | 2219 | context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || |
59eeb84b LP |
2220 | context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || |
2221 | context->protect_kernel_tunables || | |
c575770b | 2222 | context->protect_kernel_modules || |
94a7b275 | 2223 | context->protect_kernel_logs || |
4e399953 LP |
2224 | context->protect_control_groups || |
2225 | context->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || | |
80271a44 | 2226 | context->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL || |
fde36d25 | 2227 | exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context)) |
8b44a3d2 LP |
2228 | return true; |
2229 | ||
37c56f89 | 2230 | if (context->root_directory) { |
5e98086d | 2231 | if (exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context)) |
37c56f89 YW |
2232 | return true; |
2233 | ||
5b10116e | 2234 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
5e8deb94 | 2235 | if (params && !params->prefix[t]) |
37c56f89 YW |
2236 | continue; |
2237 | ||
211a3d87 | 2238 | if (context->directories[t].n_items > 0) |
37c56f89 YW |
2239 | return true; |
2240 | } | |
2241 | } | |
5d997827 | 2242 | |
42b1d8e0 | 2243 | if (context->dynamic_user && |
211a3d87 LB |
2244 | (context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE].n_items > 0 || |
2245 | context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE].n_items > 0 || | |
2246 | context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].n_items > 0)) | |
42b1d8e0 YW |
2247 | return true; |
2248 | ||
91dd5f7c LP |
2249 | if (context->log_namespace) |
2250 | return true; | |
2251 | ||
8b44a3d2 LP |
2252 | return false; |
2253 | } | |
2254 | ||
5749f855 | 2255 | static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid, gid_t ogid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { |
d251207d | 2256 | _cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL; |
19ee48a6 | 2257 | _cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = PIPE_EBADF; |
254d1313 | 2258 | _cleanup_close_ int unshare_ready_fd = -EBADF; |
d251207d LP |
2259 | _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0; |
2260 | uint64_t c = 1; | |
d251207d LP |
2261 | ssize_t n; |
2262 | int r; | |
2263 | ||
5749f855 AZ |
2264 | /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e. |
2265 | * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to | |
d251207d LP |
2266 | * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which |
2267 | * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process, | |
2268 | * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The | |
2269 | * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and | |
5749f855 AZ |
2270 | * continues execution normally. |
2271 | * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it | |
2272 | * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */ | |
d251207d | 2273 | |
5749f855 | 2274 | /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */ |
26c45a6c | 2275 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID) > 0 && uid != ouid && uid_is_valid(uid)) |
587ab01b | 2276 | r = asprintf(&uid_map, |
5749f855 | 2277 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ |
587ab01b | 2278 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */ |
5749f855 AZ |
2279 | ouid, ouid, uid, uid); |
2280 | else | |
2281 | r = asprintf(&uid_map, | |
2282 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ | |
2283 | ouid, ouid); | |
d251207d | 2284 | |
5749f855 AZ |
2285 | if (r < 0) |
2286 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2287 | ||
2288 | /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */ | |
26c45a6c | 2289 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID) > 0 && gid != ogid && gid_is_valid(gid)) |
587ab01b | 2290 | r = asprintf(&gid_map, |
5749f855 | 2291 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */ |
587ab01b | 2292 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */ |
5749f855 AZ |
2293 | ogid, ogid, gid, gid); |
2294 | else | |
2295 | r = asprintf(&gid_map, | |
2296 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */ | |
2297 | ogid, ogid); | |
2298 | ||
2299 | if (r < 0) | |
2300 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d251207d LP |
2301 | |
2302 | /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user | |
2303 | * namespace. */ | |
2304 | unshare_ready_fd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC); | |
2305 | if (unshare_ready_fd < 0) | |
2306 | return -errno; | |
2307 | ||
2308 | /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it | |
2309 | * failed. */ | |
2310 | if (pipe2(errno_pipe, O_CLOEXEC) < 0) | |
2311 | return -errno; | |
2312 | ||
4c253ed1 LP |
2313 | r = safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_DEATHSIG, &pid); |
2314 | if (r < 0) | |
2315 | return r; | |
2316 | if (r == 0) { | |
254d1313 | 2317 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
d251207d LP |
2318 | const char *a; |
2319 | pid_t ppid; | |
2320 | ||
2321 | /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from | |
2322 | * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */ | |
2323 | ||
2324 | ppid = getppid(); | |
2325 | errno_pipe[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe[0]); | |
2326 | ||
2327 | /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */ | |
2328 | if (read(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) { | |
2329 | r = -errno; | |
2330 | goto child_fail; | |
2331 | } | |
2332 | ||
2333 | /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */ | |
2334 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "setgroups"); | |
2335 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2336 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2337 | if (errno != ENOENT) { | |
2338 | r = -errno; | |
2339 | goto child_fail; | |
2340 | } | |
2341 | ||
2342 | /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */ | |
2343 | } else { | |
2344 | if (write(fd, "deny\n", 5) < 0) { | |
2345 | r = -errno; | |
2346 | goto child_fail; | |
2347 | } | |
2348 | ||
2349 | fd = safe_close(fd); | |
2350 | } | |
2351 | ||
2352 | /* First write the GID map */ | |
2353 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "gid_map"); | |
2354 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2355 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2356 | r = -errno; | |
2357 | goto child_fail; | |
2358 | } | |
2359 | if (write(fd, gid_map, strlen(gid_map)) < 0) { | |
2360 | r = -errno; | |
2361 | goto child_fail; | |
2362 | } | |
2363 | fd = safe_close(fd); | |
2364 | ||
2365 | /* The write the UID map */ | |
2366 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "uid_map"); | |
2367 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2368 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2369 | r = -errno; | |
2370 | goto child_fail; | |
2371 | } | |
2372 | if (write(fd, uid_map, strlen(uid_map)) < 0) { | |
2373 | r = -errno; | |
2374 | goto child_fail; | |
2375 | } | |
2376 | ||
2377 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); | |
2378 | ||
2379 | child_fail: | |
2380 | (void) write(errno_pipe[1], &r, sizeof(r)); | |
2381 | _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); | |
2382 | } | |
2383 | ||
2384 | errno_pipe[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe[1]); | |
2385 | ||
2386 | if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0) | |
2387 | return -errno; | |
2388 | ||
2389 | /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */ | |
2390 | if (write(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) | |
2391 | return -errno; | |
2392 | ||
2393 | /* Try to read an error code from the child */ | |
2394 | n = read(errno_pipe[0], &r, sizeof(r)); | |
2395 | if (n < 0) | |
2396 | return -errno; | |
2397 | if (n == sizeof(r)) { /* an error code was sent to us */ | |
2398 | if (r < 0) | |
2399 | return r; | |
2400 | return -EIO; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | if (n != 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */ | |
2403 | return -EIO; | |
2404 | ||
8f03de53 | 2405 | r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", TAKE_PID(pid), 0); |
d251207d LP |
2406 | if (r < 0) |
2407 | return r; | |
2e87a1fd | 2408 | if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */ |
d251207d LP |
2409 | return -EIO; |
2410 | ||
2411 | return 0; | |
2412 | } | |
2413 | ||
494d0247 | 2414 | static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type) { |
e43911a7 LP |
2415 | assert(context); |
2416 | ||
494d0247 YW |
2417 | if (!context->dynamic_user) |
2418 | return false; | |
2419 | ||
2420 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) | |
2421 | return false; | |
2422 | ||
2423 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME && context->runtime_directory_preserve_mode == EXEC_PRESERVE_NO) | |
2424 | return false; | |
2425 | ||
2426 | return true; | |
2427 | } | |
2428 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
2429 | static int create_many_symlinks(const char *root, const char *source, char **symlinks) { |
2430 | _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL; | |
211a3d87 LB |
2431 | int r; |
2432 | ||
2433 | assert(source); | |
2434 | ||
2435 | src_abs = path_join(root, source); | |
2436 | if (!src_abs) | |
2437 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2438 | ||
2439 | STRV_FOREACH(dst, symlinks) { | |
2440 | _cleanup_free_ char *dst_abs = NULL; | |
2441 | ||
2442 | dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst); | |
2443 | if (!dst_abs) | |
2444 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2445 | ||
2446 | r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755); | |
2447 | if (r < 0) | |
2448 | return r; | |
2449 | ||
2450 | r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true); | |
2451 | if (r < 0) | |
2452 | return r; | |
2453 | } | |
2454 | ||
2455 | return 0; | |
2456 | } | |
2457 | ||
3536f49e | 2458 | static int setup_exec_directory( |
07689d5d LP |
2459 | const ExecContext *context, |
2460 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2461 | uid_t uid, | |
3536f49e | 2462 | gid_t gid, |
3536f49e | 2463 | ExecDirectoryType type, |
211a3d87 | 2464 | bool needs_mount_namespace, |
3536f49e | 2465 | int *exit_status) { |
07689d5d | 2466 | |
72fd1768 | 2467 | static const int exit_status_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
3536f49e YW |
2468 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY, |
2469 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY, | |
2470 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY, | |
2471 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY, | |
2472 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY, | |
2473 | }; | |
07689d5d LP |
2474 | int r; |
2475 | ||
2476 | assert(context); | |
2477 | assert(params); | |
72fd1768 | 2478 | assert(type >= 0 && type < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); |
3536f49e | 2479 | assert(exit_status); |
07689d5d | 2480 | |
3536f49e YW |
2481 | if (!params->prefix[type]) |
2482 | return 0; | |
2483 | ||
8679efde | 2484 | if (params->flags & EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES) { |
3536f49e YW |
2485 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
2486 | uid = 0; | |
2487 | if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
2488 | gid = 0; | |
2489 | } | |
2490 | ||
211a3d87 | 2491 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { |
6c47cd7d | 2492 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL; |
07689d5d | 2493 | |
211a3d87 | 2494 | p = path_join(params->prefix[type], context->directories[type].items[i].path); |
3536f49e YW |
2495 | if (!p) { |
2496 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2497 | goto fail; | |
2498 | } | |
07689d5d | 2499 | |
23a7448e YW |
2500 | r = mkdir_parents_label(p, 0755); |
2501 | if (r < 0) | |
3536f49e | 2502 | goto fail; |
23a7448e | 2503 | |
494d0247 | 2504 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, type)) { |
3f5b1508 LP |
2505 | /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that |
2506 | * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by | |
2507 | * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same | |
2508 | * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of | |
2509 | * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an | |
2510 | * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary | |
2511 | * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory | |
2512 | * permeable for the service itself. | |
6c47cd7d | 2513 | * |
3f5b1508 LP |
2514 | * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create |
2515 | * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place | |
2516 | * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to | |
2517 | * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but | |
2518 | * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit | |
2519 | * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's | |
2520 | * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary | |
2521 | * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no | |
2522 | * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works! | |
6c47cd7d | 2523 | * |
3f5b1508 LP |
2524 | * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not |
2525 | * to be owned by the service itself. | |
2526 | * | |
2527 | * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used | |
2528 | * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */ | |
6c47cd7d | 2529 | |
4ede9802 LP |
2530 | pp = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private"); |
2531 | if (!pp) { | |
6c47cd7d LP |
2532 | r = -ENOMEM; |
2533 | goto fail; | |
2534 | } | |
2535 | ||
2536 | /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */ | |
4ede9802 | 2537 | r = mkdir_safe_label(pp, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE); |
6c47cd7d LP |
2538 | if (r < 0) |
2539 | goto fail; | |
2540 | ||
211a3d87 | 2541 | if (!path_extend(&pp, context->directories[type].items[i].path)) { |
6c47cd7d LP |
2542 | r = -ENOMEM; |
2543 | goto fail; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | ||
2546 | /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */ | |
2547 | r = mkdir_parents_label(pp, 0755); | |
2548 | if (r < 0) | |
2549 | goto fail; | |
2550 | ||
949befd3 LP |
2551 | if (is_dir(p, false) > 0 && |
2552 | (laccess(pp, F_OK) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)) { | |
2553 | ||
2554 | /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move | |
2555 | * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use | |
2556 | * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */ | |
2557 | ||
cf52c45d LP |
2558 | log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" |
2559 | "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.", | |
2560 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), p, pp); | |
2561 | ||
949befd3 LP |
2562 | if (rename(p, pp) < 0) { |
2563 | r = -errno; | |
2564 | goto fail; | |
2565 | } | |
2566 | } else { | |
2567 | /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */ | |
2568 | ||
2569 | r = mkdir_label(pp, context->directories[type].mode); | |
2570 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
2571 | goto fail; | |
2572 | } | |
6c47cd7d | 2573 | |
a2ab603c YW |
2574 | if (!context->directories[type].items[i].only_create) { |
2575 | /* And link it up from the original place. | |
2576 | * Notes | |
2577 | * 1) If a mount namespace is going to be used, then this symlink remains on | |
2578 | * the host, and a new one for the child namespace will be created later. | |
2579 | * 2) It is not necessary to create this symlink when one of its parent | |
2580 | * directories is specified and already created. E.g. | |
2581 | * StateDirectory=foo foo/bar | |
2582 | * In that case, the inode points to pp and p for "foo/bar" are the same: | |
2583 | * pp = "/var/lib/private/foo/bar" | |
2584 | * p = "/var/lib/foo/bar" | |
2585 | * and, /var/lib/foo is a symlink to /var/lib/private/foo. So, not only | |
2586 | * we do not need to create the symlink, but we cannot create the symlink. | |
2587 | * See issue #24783. */ | |
2588 | r = symlink_idempotent(pp, p, true); | |
2589 | if (r < 0) | |
2590 | goto fail; | |
2591 | } | |
6c47cd7d | 2592 | |
6c47cd7d | 2593 | } else { |
5c6d40d1 LP |
2594 | _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; |
2595 | ||
2596 | if (type != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION && | |
2597 | readlink_and_make_absolute(p, &target) >= 0) { | |
578dc69f | 2598 | _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL, *q_resolved = NULL, *target_resolved = NULL; |
5c6d40d1 LP |
2599 | |
2600 | /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created | |
2193f17c LP |
2601 | * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)? |
2602 | * | |
2603 | * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=, | |
2604 | * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some | |
2605 | * configurations, see above. */ | |
5c6d40d1 | 2606 | |
f461a28d | 2607 | r = chase(target, NULL, 0, &target_resolved, NULL); |
578dc69f YW |
2608 | if (r < 0) |
2609 | goto fail; | |
2610 | ||
211a3d87 | 2611 | q = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private", context->directories[type].items[i].path); |
5c6d40d1 LP |
2612 | if (!q) { |
2613 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2614 | goto fail; | |
2615 | } | |
2616 | ||
578dc69f | 2617 | /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */ |
f461a28d | 2618 | r = chase(q, NULL, CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &q_resolved, NULL); |
578dc69f YW |
2619 | if (r < 0) |
2620 | goto fail; | |
2621 | ||
2622 | if (path_equal(q_resolved, target_resolved)) { | |
5c6d40d1 LP |
2623 | |
2624 | /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service, | |
2625 | * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */ | |
2626 | ||
cf52c45d LP |
2627 | log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" |
2628 | "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.", | |
2629 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), q, p); | |
2630 | ||
5c6d40d1 LP |
2631 | if (unlink(p) < 0) { |
2632 | r = -errno; | |
2633 | goto fail; | |
2634 | } | |
2635 | ||
2636 | if (rename(q, p) < 0) { | |
2637 | r = -errno; | |
2638 | goto fail; | |
2639 | } | |
2640 | } | |
2641 | } | |
2642 | ||
6c47cd7d | 2643 | r = mkdir_label(p, context->directories[type].mode); |
d484580c | 2644 | if (r < 0) { |
d484580c LP |
2645 | if (r != -EEXIST) |
2646 | goto fail; | |
2647 | ||
206e9864 LP |
2648 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { |
2649 | struct stat st; | |
2650 | ||
2651 | /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory, | |
2652 | * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall | |
2653 | * not be writable. */ | |
2654 | ||
2655 | if (stat(p, &st) < 0) { | |
2656 | r = -errno; | |
2657 | goto fail; | |
2658 | } | |
2659 | ||
2660 | /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */ | |
2661 | if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0) | |
2662 | log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " | |
2663 | "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)", | |
211a3d87 | 2664 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].items[i].path, |
206e9864 LP |
2665 | st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777); |
2666 | ||
6cff72eb | 2667 | continue; |
206e9864 | 2668 | } |
6cff72eb | 2669 | } |
a1164ae3 | 2670 | } |
07689d5d | 2671 | |
206e9864 | 2672 | /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't |
5238e957 | 2673 | * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the |
206e9864 LP |
2674 | * current UID/GID ownership.) */ |
2675 | r = chmod_and_chown(pp ?: p, context->directories[type].mode, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); | |
2676 | if (r < 0) | |
2677 | goto fail; | |
c71b2eb7 | 2678 | |
607b358e LP |
2679 | /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we |
2680 | * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID | |
7802194a | 2681 | * assignments to exist. */ |
607b358e | 2682 | r = path_chown_recursive(pp ?: p, uid, gid, context->dynamic_user ? 01777 : 07777); |
07689d5d | 2683 | if (r < 0) |
3536f49e | 2684 | goto fail; |
07689d5d LP |
2685 | } |
2686 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
2687 | /* If we are not going to run in a namespace, set up the symlinks - otherwise |
2688 | * they are set up later, to allow configuring empty var/run/etc. */ | |
2689 | if (!needs_mount_namespace) | |
2690 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { | |
2691 | r = create_many_symlinks(params->prefix[type], | |
2692 | context->directories[type].items[i].path, | |
2693 | context->directories[type].items[i].symlinks); | |
2694 | if (r < 0) | |
2695 | goto fail; | |
2696 | } | |
2697 | ||
07689d5d | 2698 | return 0; |
3536f49e YW |
2699 | |
2700 | fail: | |
2701 | *exit_status = exit_status_table[type]; | |
3536f49e | 2702 | return r; |
07689d5d LP |
2703 | } |
2704 | ||
bb0c0d6f LP |
2705 | static int write_credential( |
2706 | int dfd, | |
2707 | const char *id, | |
2708 | const void *data, | |
2709 | size_t size, | |
2710 | uid_t uid, | |
2711 | bool ownership_ok) { | |
2712 | ||
2713 | _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *tmp = NULL; | |
254d1313 | 2714 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
bb0c0d6f LP |
2715 | int r; |
2716 | ||
2717 | r = tempfn_random_child("", "cred", &tmp); | |
2718 | if (r < 0) | |
2719 | return r; | |
2720 | ||
2721 | fd = openat(dfd, tmp, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOCTTY, 0600); | |
2722 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2723 | tmp = mfree(tmp); | |
2724 | return -errno; | |
2725 | } | |
2726 | ||
43144be4 | 2727 | r = loop_write(fd, data, size, /* do_poll = */ false); |
bb0c0d6f LP |
2728 | if (r < 0) |
2729 | return r; | |
2730 | ||
2731 | if (fchmod(fd, 0400) < 0) /* Take away "w" bit */ | |
2732 | return -errno; | |
2733 | ||
2734 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != getuid()) { | |
567aeb58 | 2735 | r = fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd, uid, ACL_READ); |
bb0c0d6f LP |
2736 | if (r < 0) { |
2737 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
2738 | return r; | |
2739 | ||
2740 | if (!ownership_ok) /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want | |
2741 | * to express: that the user gets read access and nothing | |
2742 | * else. But if the backing fs can't support that (e.g. ramfs) | |
2743 | * then we can use file ownership instead. But that's only safe if | |
2744 | * we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the | |
2745 | * user can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */ | |
2746 | return r; | |
2747 | ||
f5fbe71d | 2748 | if (fchown(fd, uid, GID_INVALID) < 0) |
bb0c0d6f LP |
2749 | return -errno; |
2750 | } | |
2751 | } | |
2752 | ||
2753 | if (renameat(dfd, tmp, dfd, id) < 0) | |
2754 | return -errno; | |
2755 | ||
2756 | tmp = mfree(tmp); | |
2757 | return 0; | |
2758 | } | |
2759 | ||
2ad591a3 LP |
2760 | static char **credential_search_path( |
2761 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2762 | bool encrypted) { | |
2763 | ||
2764 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
2765 | ||
2766 | assert(params); | |
2767 | ||
2768 | /* Assemble a search path to find credentials in. We'll look in /etc/credstore/ (and similar | |
2769 | * directories in /usr/lib/ + /run/) for all types of credentials. If we are looking for encrypted | |
2770 | * credentials, also look in /etc/credstore.encrypted/ (and similar dirs). */ | |
2771 | ||
2772 | if (encrypted) { | |
2773 | if (strv_extend(&l, params->received_encrypted_credentials_directory) < 0) | |
2774 | return NULL; | |
2775 | ||
2776 | if (strv_extend_strv(&l, CONF_PATHS_STRV("credstore.encrypted"), /* filter_duplicates= */ true) < 0) | |
2777 | return NULL; | |
2778 | } | |
2779 | ||
2780 | if (params->received_credentials_directory) | |
2781 | if (strv_extend(&l, params->received_credentials_directory) < 0) | |
2782 | return NULL; | |
2783 | ||
2784 | if (strv_extend_strv(&l, CONF_PATHS_STRV("credstore"), /* filter_duplicates= */ true) < 0) | |
2785 | return NULL; | |
2786 | ||
2787 | if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { | |
2788 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = strv_join(l, ":"); | |
2789 | ||
00078fb3 | 2790 | log_debug("Credential search path is: %s", strempty(t)); |
2ad591a3 LP |
2791 | } |
2792 | ||
2793 | return TAKE_PTR(l); | |
2794 | } | |
2795 | ||
3989bdc1 AB |
2796 | static int load_credential( |
2797 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2798 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
10b44e1d LP |
2799 | const char *id, |
2800 | const char *path, | |
2801 | bool encrypted, | |
3989bdc1 AB |
2802 | const char *unit, |
2803 | int read_dfd, | |
2804 | int write_dfd, | |
2805 | uid_t uid, | |
2806 | bool ownership_ok, | |
2807 | uint64_t *left) { | |
2808 | ||
3989bdc1 | 2809 | ReadFullFileFlags flags = READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER; |
2ad591a3 | 2810 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **search_path = NULL; |
3989bdc1 | 2811 | _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *data = NULL; |
2ad591a3 LP |
2812 | _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; |
2813 | const char *source = NULL; | |
3989bdc1 | 2814 | bool missing_ok = true; |
2ad591a3 | 2815 | size_t size, add, maxsz; |
3989bdc1 AB |
2816 | int r; |
2817 | ||
10b44e1d LP |
2818 | assert(context); |
2819 | assert(params); | |
2820 | assert(id); | |
2821 | assert(path); | |
2822 | assert(unit); | |
661e4251 | 2823 | assert(read_dfd >= 0 || read_dfd == AT_FDCWD); |
10b44e1d LP |
2824 | assert(write_dfd >= 0); |
2825 | assert(left); | |
2826 | ||
2ad591a3 LP |
2827 | if (read_dfd >= 0) { |
2828 | /* If a directory fd is specified, then read the file directly from that dir. In this case we | |
2829 | * won't do AF_UNIX stuff (we simply don't want to recursively iterate down a tree of AF_UNIX | |
2830 | * IPC sockets). It's OK if a file vanishes here in the time we enumerate it and intend to | |
2831 | * open it. */ | |
2832 | ||
2833 | if (!filename_is_valid(path)) /* safety check */ | |
2834 | return -EINVAL; | |
2835 | ||
2836 | missing_ok = true; | |
10b44e1d | 2837 | source = path; |
2ad591a3 LP |
2838 | |
2839 | } else if (path_is_absolute(path)) { | |
2840 | /* If this is an absolute path, read the data directly from it, and support AF_UNIX | |
2841 | * sockets */ | |
2842 | ||
2843 | if (!path_is_valid(path)) /* safety check */ | |
2844 | return -EINVAL; | |
2845 | ||
3989bdc1 AB |
2846 | flags |= READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET; |
2847 | ||
2848 | /* Pass some minimal info about the unit and the credential name we are looking to acquire | |
2849 | * via the source socket address in case we read off an AF_UNIX socket. */ | |
10b44e1d | 2850 | if (asprintf(&bindname, "@%" PRIx64"/unit/%s/%s", random_u64(), unit, id) < 0) |
3989bdc1 AB |
2851 | return -ENOMEM; |
2852 | ||
2853 | missing_ok = false; | |
2ad591a3 | 2854 | source = path; |
3989bdc1 | 2855 | |
2ad591a3 LP |
2856 | } else if (credential_name_valid(path)) { |
2857 | /* If this is a relative path, take it as credential name relative to the credentials | |
2858 | * directory we received ourselves. We don't support the AF_UNIX stuff in this mode, since we | |
2859 | * are operating on a credential store, i.e. this is guaranteed to be regular files. */ | |
2860 | ||
2861 | search_path = credential_search_path(params, encrypted); | |
2862 | if (!search_path) | |
3989bdc1 AB |
2863 | return -ENOMEM; |
2864 | ||
2ad591a3 | 2865 | missing_ok = true; |
3989bdc1 AB |
2866 | } else |
2867 | source = NULL; | |
2868 | ||
2ad591a3 LP |
2869 | if (encrypted) |
2870 | flags |= READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64; | |
2871 | ||
2872 | maxsz = encrypted ? CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTED_SIZE_MAX : CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX; | |
2873 | ||
2874 | if (search_path) { | |
2875 | STRV_FOREACH(d, search_path) { | |
2876 | _cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL; | |
2877 | ||
2878 | j = path_join(*d, path); | |
2879 | if (!j) | |
2880 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2881 | ||
2882 | r = read_full_file_full( | |
2883 | AT_FDCWD, j, /* path is absolute, hence pass AT_FDCWD as nop dir fd here */ | |
2884 | UINT64_MAX, | |
2885 | maxsz, | |
2886 | flags, | |
2887 | NULL, | |
2888 | &data, &size); | |
2889 | if (r != -ENOENT) | |
2890 | break; | |
2891 | } | |
2892 | } else if (source) | |
3989bdc1 AB |
2893 | r = read_full_file_full( |
2894 | read_dfd, source, | |
2895 | UINT64_MAX, | |
2ad591a3 LP |
2896 | maxsz, |
2897 | flags, | |
3989bdc1 AB |
2898 | bindname, |
2899 | &data, &size); | |
2900 | else | |
2901 | r = -ENOENT; | |
2902 | ||
10b44e1d | 2903 | if (r == -ENOENT && (missing_ok || hashmap_contains(context->set_credentials, id))) { |
3989bdc1 AB |
2904 | /* Make a missing inherited credential non-fatal, let's just continue. After all apps |
2905 | * will get clear errors if we don't pass such a missing credential on as they | |
2906 | * themselves will get ENOENT when trying to read them, which should not be much | |
2907 | * worse than when we handle the error here and make it fatal. | |
2908 | * | |
2909 | * Also, if the source file doesn't exist, but a fallback is set via SetCredentials= | |
2910 | * we are fine, too. */ | |
10b44e1d | 2911 | log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read inherited credential '%s', skipping: %m", path); |
3989bdc1 AB |
2912 | return 0; |
2913 | } | |
2914 | if (r < 0) | |
10b44e1d | 2915 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read credential '%s': %m", path); |
3989bdc1 | 2916 | |
10b44e1d | 2917 | if (encrypted) { |
3989bdc1 AB |
2918 | _cleanup_free_ void *plaintext = NULL; |
2919 | size_t plaintext_size = 0; | |
2920 | ||
6a0779cb | 2921 | r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(id, now(CLOCK_REALTIME), NULL, NULL, data, size, &plaintext, &plaintext_size); |
3989bdc1 AB |
2922 | if (r < 0) |
2923 | return r; | |
2924 | ||
2925 | free_and_replace(data, plaintext); | |
2926 | size = plaintext_size; | |
2927 | } | |
2928 | ||
10b44e1d | 2929 | add = strlen(id) + size; |
3989bdc1 AB |
2930 | if (add > *left) |
2931 | return -E2BIG; | |
2932 | ||
10b44e1d | 2933 | r = write_credential(write_dfd, id, data, size, uid, ownership_ok); |
3989bdc1 | 2934 | if (r < 0) |
94602bff | 2935 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to write credential '%s': %m", id); |
3989bdc1 AB |
2936 | |
2937 | *left -= add; | |
2938 | return 0; | |
2939 | } | |
2940 | ||
2941 | struct load_cred_args { | |
3989bdc1 AB |
2942 | const ExecContext *context; |
2943 | const ExecParameters *params; | |
461345a1 | 2944 | bool encrypted; |
3989bdc1 AB |
2945 | const char *unit; |
2946 | int dfd; | |
2947 | uid_t uid; | |
2948 | bool ownership_ok; | |
2949 | uint64_t *left; | |
2950 | }; | |
2951 | ||
2952 | static int load_cred_recurse_dir_cb( | |
2953 | RecurseDirEvent event, | |
2954 | const char *path, | |
2955 | int dir_fd, | |
2956 | int inode_fd, | |
2957 | const struct dirent *de, | |
2958 | const struct statx *sx, | |
2959 | void *userdata) { | |
2960 | ||
6394e5cd | 2961 | struct load_cred_args *args = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); |
11348386 | 2962 | _cleanup_free_ char *sub_id = NULL; |
3989bdc1 AB |
2963 | int r; |
2964 | ||
2965 | if (event != RECURSE_DIR_ENTRY) | |
2966 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
2967 | ||
2968 | if (!IN_SET(de->d_type, DT_REG, DT_SOCK)) | |
2969 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
2970 | ||
11348386 | 2971 | sub_id = strreplace(path, "/", "_"); |
3989bdc1 AB |
2972 | if (!sub_id) |
2973 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2974 | ||
2975 | if (!credential_name_valid(sub_id)) | |
1451435c | 2976 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential would get ID %s, which is not valid, refusing", sub_id); |
3989bdc1 | 2977 | |
5bec447a | 2978 | if (faccessat(args->dfd, sub_id, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) >= 0) { |
3989bdc1 AB |
2979 | log_debug("Skipping credential with duplicated ID %s at %s", sub_id, path); |
2980 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
2981 | } | |
5bec447a LP |
2982 | if (errno != ENOENT) |
2983 | return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to test if credential %s exists: %m", sub_id); | |
3989bdc1 | 2984 | |
10b44e1d LP |
2985 | r = load_credential( |
2986 | args->context, | |
2987 | args->params, | |
2988 | sub_id, | |
2989 | de->d_name, | |
461345a1 | 2990 | args->encrypted, |
10b44e1d LP |
2991 | args->unit, |
2992 | dir_fd, | |
2993 | args->dfd, | |
2994 | args->uid, | |
2995 | args->ownership_ok, | |
2996 | args->left); | |
3989bdc1 AB |
2997 | if (r < 0) |
2998 | return r; | |
2999 | ||
3000 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
3001 | } | |
3002 | ||
bb0c0d6f LP |
3003 | static int acquire_credentials( |
3004 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3005 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
d3dcf4e3 | 3006 | const char *unit, |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3007 | const char *p, |
3008 | uid_t uid, | |
3009 | bool ownership_ok) { | |
3010 | ||
43144be4 | 3011 | uint64_t left = CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX; |
254d1313 | 3012 | _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF; |
43144be4 | 3013 | ExecLoadCredential *lc; |
bb0c0d6f | 3014 | ExecSetCredential *sc; |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3015 | int r; |
3016 | ||
3017 | assert(context); | |
3018 | assert(p); | |
3019 | ||
3020 | dfd = open(p, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
3021 | if (dfd < 0) | |
3022 | return -errno; | |
3023 | ||
43144be4 LP |
3024 | /* First, load credentials off disk (or acquire via AF_UNIX socket) */ |
3025 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(lc, context->load_credentials) { | |
254d1313 | 3026 | _cleanup_close_ int sub_fd = -EBADF; |
d3dcf4e3 | 3027 | |
f344f7fd LP |
3028 | /* If this is an absolute path, then try to open it as a directory. If that works, then we'll |
3029 | * recurse into it. If it is an absolute path but it isn't a directory, then we'll open it as | |
3030 | * a regular file. Finally, if it's a relative path we will use it as a credential name to | |
3031 | * propagate a credential passed to us from further up. */ | |
43144be4 | 3032 | |
f344f7fd LP |
3033 | if (path_is_absolute(lc->path)) { |
3034 | sub_fd = open(lc->path, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY); | |
1d68a2e1 LP |
3035 | if (sub_fd < 0 && !IN_SET(errno, |
3036 | ENOTDIR, /* Not a directory */ | |
3037 | ENOENT)) /* Doesn't exist? */ | |
3038 | return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open '%s': %m", lc->path); | |
f344f7fd | 3039 | } |
43144be4 | 3040 | |
61c5a49e | 3041 | if (sub_fd < 0) |
f344f7fd | 3042 | /* Regular file (incl. a credential passed in from higher up) */ |
10b44e1d LP |
3043 | r = load_credential( |
3044 | context, | |
3045 | params, | |
3046 | lc->id, | |
3047 | lc->path, | |
3048 | lc->encrypted, | |
3049 | unit, | |
661e4251 | 3050 | AT_FDCWD, |
10b44e1d LP |
3051 | dfd, |
3052 | uid, | |
3053 | ownership_ok, | |
3054 | &left); | |
61c5a49e | 3055 | else |
10b44e1d | 3056 | /* Directory */ |
3989bdc1 AB |
3057 | r = recurse_dir( |
3058 | sub_fd, | |
11348386 | 3059 | /* path= */ lc->id, /* recurse_dir() will suffix the subdir paths from here to the top-level id */ |
3989bdc1 AB |
3060 | /* statx_mask= */ 0, |
3061 | /* n_depth_max= */ UINT_MAX, | |
9883cbb2 | 3062 | RECURSE_DIR_SORT|RECURSE_DIR_IGNORE_DOT|RECURSE_DIR_ENSURE_TYPE, |
3989bdc1 AB |
3063 | load_cred_recurse_dir_cb, |
3064 | &(struct load_cred_args) { | |
3989bdc1 AB |
3065 | .context = context, |
3066 | .params = params, | |
461345a1 | 3067 | .encrypted = lc->encrypted, |
3989bdc1 AB |
3068 | .unit = unit, |
3069 | .dfd = dfd, | |
3070 | .uid = uid, | |
3071 | .ownership_ok = ownership_ok, | |
3072 | .left = &left, | |
3073 | }); | |
61c5a49e LP |
3074 | if (r < 0) |
3075 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3076 | } |
3077 | ||
9e6e9d61 LP |
3078 | /* Second, we add in literally specified credentials. If the credentials already exist, we'll not add |
3079 | * them, so that they can act as a "default" if the same credential is specified multiple times. */ | |
43144be4 LP |
3080 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(sc, context->set_credentials) { |
3081 | _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *plaintext = NULL; | |
3082 | const char *data; | |
3083 | size_t size, add; | |
3084 | ||
9e6e9d61 LP |
3085 | /* Note that we check ahead of time here instead of relying on O_EXCL|O_CREAT later to return |
3086 | * EEXIST if the credential already exists. That's because the TPM2-based decryption is kinda | |
3087 | * slow and involved, hence it's nice to be able to skip that if the credential already | |
3088 | * exists anyway. */ | |
43144be4 LP |
3089 | if (faccessat(dfd, sc->id, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) >= 0) |
3090 | continue; | |
3091 | if (errno != ENOENT) | |
3092 | return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to test if credential %s exists: %m", sc->id); | |
3093 | ||
3094 | if (sc->encrypted) { | |
6a0779cb | 3095 | r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(sc->id, now(CLOCK_REALTIME), NULL, NULL, sc->data, sc->size, &plaintext, &size); |
43144be4 LP |
3096 | if (r < 0) |
3097 | return r; | |
3098 | ||
3099 | data = plaintext; | |
3100 | } else { | |
3101 | data = sc->data; | |
3102 | size = sc->size; | |
3103 | } | |
3104 | ||
3105 | add = strlen(sc->id) + size; | |
3106 | if (add > left) | |
3107 | return -E2BIG; | |
3108 | ||
3109 | r = write_credential(dfd, sc->id, data, size, uid, ownership_ok); | |
3110 | if (r < 0) | |
3111 | return r; | |
3112 | ||
43144be4 LP |
3113 | left -= add; |
3114 | } | |
3115 | ||
bb0c0d6f LP |
3116 | if (fchmod(dfd, 0500) < 0) /* Now take away the "w" bit */ |
3117 | return -errno; | |
3118 | ||
3119 | /* After we created all keys with the right perms, also make sure the credential store as a whole is | |
3120 | * accessible */ | |
3121 | ||
3122 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != getuid()) { | |
567aeb58 | 3123 | r = fd_add_uid_acl_permission(dfd, uid, ACL_READ | ACL_EXECUTE); |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3124 | if (r < 0) { |
3125 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
3126 | return r; | |
3127 | ||
3128 | if (!ownership_ok) | |
3129 | return r; | |
3130 | ||
f5fbe71d | 3131 | if (fchown(dfd, uid, GID_INVALID) < 0) |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3132 | return -errno; |
3133 | } | |
3134 | } | |
3135 | ||
3136 | return 0; | |
3137 | } | |
3138 | ||
3139 | static int setup_credentials_internal( | |
3140 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3141 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
d3dcf4e3 | 3142 | const char *unit, |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3143 | const char *final, /* This is where the credential store shall eventually end up at */ |
3144 | const char *workspace, /* This is where we can prepare it before moving it to the final place */ | |
3145 | bool reuse_workspace, /* Whether to reuse any existing workspace mount if it already is a mount */ | |
3146 | bool must_mount, /* Whether to require that we mount something, it's not OK to use the plain directory fall back */ | |
3147 | uid_t uid) { | |
3148 | ||
3149 | int r, workspace_mounted; /* negative if we don't know yet whether we have/can mount something; true | |
3150 | * if we mounted something; false if we definitely can't mount anything */ | |
3151 | bool final_mounted; | |
3152 | const char *where; | |
3153 | ||
3154 | assert(context); | |
3155 | assert(final); | |
3156 | assert(workspace); | |
3157 | ||
3158 | if (reuse_workspace) { | |
3159 | r = path_is_mount_point(workspace, NULL, 0); | |
3160 | if (r < 0) | |
3161 | return r; | |
3162 | if (r > 0) | |
3163 | workspace_mounted = true; /* If this is already a mount, and we are supposed to reuse it, let's keep this in mind */ | |
3164 | else | |
3165 | workspace_mounted = -1; /* We need to figure out if we can mount something to the workspace */ | |
3166 | } else | |
3167 | workspace_mounted = -1; /* ditto */ | |
3168 | ||
3169 | r = path_is_mount_point(final, NULL, 0); | |
3170 | if (r < 0) | |
3171 | return r; | |
3172 | if (r > 0) { | |
3173 | /* If the final place already has something mounted, we use that. If the workspace also has | |
3174 | * something mounted we assume it's actually the same mount (but with MS_RDONLY | |
3175 | * different). */ | |
3176 | final_mounted = true; | |
3177 | ||
3178 | if (workspace_mounted < 0) { | |
f0353cf2 | 3179 | /* If the final place is mounted, but the workspace isn't, then let's bind mount |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3180 | * the final version to the workspace, and make it writable, so that we can make |
3181 | * changes */ | |
3182 | ||
21935150 LP |
3183 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, final, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); |
3184 | if (r < 0) | |
3185 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f | 3186 | |
21935150 LP |
3187 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL); |
3188 | if (r < 0) | |
3189 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3190 | |
3191 | workspace_mounted = true; | |
3192 | } | |
3193 | } else | |
3194 | final_mounted = false; | |
3195 | ||
3196 | if (workspace_mounted < 0) { | |
3197 | /* Nothing is mounted on the workspace yet, let's try to mount something now */ | |
3198 | for (int try = 0;; try++) { | |
3199 | ||
3200 | if (try == 0) { | |
3201 | /* Try "ramfs" first, since it's not swap backed */ | |
21935150 LP |
3202 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "ramfs", workspace, "ramfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, "mode=0700"); |
3203 | if (r >= 0) { | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3204 | workspace_mounted = true; |
3205 | break; | |
3206 | } | |
3207 | ||
3208 | } else if (try == 1) { | |
3209 | _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL; | |
3210 | ||
43144be4 | 3211 | if (asprintf(&opts, "mode=0700,nr_inodes=1024,size=%zu", (size_t) CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX) < 0) |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3212 | return -ENOMEM; |
3213 | ||
3214 | /* Fall back to "tmpfs" otherwise */ | |
21935150 LP |
3215 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", workspace, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, opts); |
3216 | if (r >= 0) { | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3217 | workspace_mounted = true; |
3218 | break; | |
3219 | } | |
3220 | ||
3221 | } else { | |
3222 | /* If that didn't work, try to make a bind mount from the final to the workspace, so that we can make it writable there. */ | |
21935150 LP |
3223 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, final, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); |
3224 | if (r < 0) { | |
3225 | if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) /* Propagate anything that isn't a permission problem */ | |
3226 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3227 | |
3228 | if (must_mount) /* If we it's not OK to use the plain directory | |
3229 | * fallback, propagate all errors too */ | |
21935150 | 3230 | return r; |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3231 | |
3232 | /* If we lack privileges to bind mount stuff, then let's gracefully | |
3233 | * proceed for compat with container envs, and just use the final dir | |
3234 | * as is. */ | |
3235 | ||
3236 | workspace_mounted = false; | |
3237 | break; | |
3238 | } | |
3239 | ||
3240 | /* Make the new bind mount writable (i.e. drop MS_RDONLY) */ | |
21935150 LP |
3241 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL); |
3242 | if (r < 0) | |
3243 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3244 | |
3245 | workspace_mounted = true; | |
3246 | break; | |
3247 | } | |
3248 | } | |
3249 | } | |
3250 | ||
3251 | assert(!must_mount || workspace_mounted > 0); | |
3252 | where = workspace_mounted ? workspace : final; | |
3253 | ||
03bc11d1 | 3254 | (void) label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, where, final, 0); |
e3a0a862 | 3255 | |
d3dcf4e3 | 3256 | r = acquire_credentials(context, params, unit, where, uid, workspace_mounted); |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3257 | if (r < 0) |
3258 | return r; | |
3259 | ||
3260 | if (workspace_mounted) { | |
21dd1de6 | 3261 | bool install; |
bb0c0d6f | 3262 | |
21dd1de6 LP |
3263 | /* Determine if we should actually install the prepared mount in the final location by bind |
3264 | * mounting it there. We do so only if the mount is not established there already, and if the | |
3265 | * mount is actually non-empty (i.e. carries at least one credential). Not that in the best | |
fa18faf1 | 3266 | * case we are doing all this in a mount namespace, thus no one else will see that we |
21dd1de6 | 3267 | * allocated a file system we are getting rid of again here. */ |
21935150 | 3268 | if (final_mounted) |
21dd1de6 LP |
3269 | install = false; /* already installed */ |
3270 | else { | |
3271 | r = dir_is_empty(where, /* ignore_hidden_or_backup= */ false); | |
3272 | if (r < 0) | |
3273 | return r; | |
3274 | ||
3275 | install = r == 0; /* install only if non-empty */ | |
3276 | } | |
3277 | ||
3278 | if (install) { | |
3279 | /* Make workspace read-only now, so that any bind mount we make from it defaults to read-only too */ | |
3280 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL); | |
3281 | if (r < 0) | |
3282 | return r; | |
3283 | ||
3284 | /* And mount it to the final place, read-only */ | |
21935150 | 3285 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, workspace, final, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL); |
21dd1de6 LP |
3286 | } else |
3287 | /* Otherwise get rid of it */ | |
3288 | r = umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, workspace, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); | |
21935150 LP |
3289 | if (r < 0) |
3290 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3291 | } else { |
3292 | _cleanup_free_ char *parent = NULL; | |
3293 | ||
3294 | /* If we do not have our own mount put used the plain directory fallback, then we need to | |
3295 | * open access to the top-level credential directory and the per-service directory now */ | |
3296 | ||
45519d13 LP |
3297 | r = path_extract_directory(final, &parent); |
3298 | if (r < 0) | |
3299 | return r; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3300 | if (chmod(parent, 0755) < 0) |
3301 | return -errno; | |
3302 | } | |
3303 | ||
3304 | return 0; | |
3305 | } | |
3306 | ||
3307 | static int setup_credentials( | |
3308 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3309 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3310 | const char *unit, | |
3311 | uid_t uid) { | |
3312 | ||
3313 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *q = NULL; | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3314 | int r; |
3315 | ||
3316 | assert(context); | |
3317 | assert(params); | |
3318 | ||
3319 | if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context)) | |
3320 | return 0; | |
3321 | ||
3322 | if (!params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME]) | |
3323 | return -EINVAL; | |
3324 | ||
3325 | /* This where we'll place stuff when we are done; this main credentials directory is world-readable, | |
3326 | * and the subdir we mount over with a read-only file system readable by the service's user */ | |
3327 | q = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "credentials"); | |
3328 | if (!q) | |
3329 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3330 | ||
3331 | r = mkdir_label(q, 0755); /* top-level dir: world readable/searchable */ | |
3332 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
3333 | return r; | |
3334 | ||
3335 | p = path_join(q, unit); | |
3336 | if (!p) | |
3337 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3338 | ||
3339 | r = mkdir_label(p, 0700); /* per-unit dir: private to user */ | |
3340 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
3341 | return r; | |
3342 | ||
3343 | r = safe_fork("(sd-mkdcreds)", FORK_DEATHSIG|FORK_WAIT|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS, NULL); | |
3344 | if (r < 0) { | |
3345 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *u = NULL; | |
3346 | ||
3347 | /* If this is not a privilege or support issue then propagate the error */ | |
3348 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
3349 | return r; | |
3350 | ||
3351 | /* Temporary workspace, that remains inaccessible all the time. We prepare stuff there before moving | |
3352 | * it into place, so that users can't access half-initialized credential stores. */ | |
3353 | t = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "systemd/temporary-credentials"); | |
3354 | if (!t) | |
3355 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3356 | ||
3357 | /* We can't set up a mount namespace. In that case operate on a fixed, inaccessible per-unit | |
3358 | * directory outside of /run/credentials/ first, and then move it over to /run/credentials/ | |
3359 | * after it is fully set up */ | |
3360 | u = path_join(t, unit); | |
3361 | if (!u) | |
3362 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3363 | ||
3364 | FOREACH_STRING(i, t, u) { | |
3365 | r = mkdir_label(i, 0700); | |
3366 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
3367 | return r; | |
3368 | } | |
3369 | ||
3370 | r = setup_credentials_internal( | |
3371 | context, | |
3372 | params, | |
d3dcf4e3 | 3373 | unit, |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3374 | p, /* final mount point */ |
3375 | u, /* temporary workspace to overmount */ | |
3376 | true, /* reuse the workspace if it is already a mount */ | |
3377 | false, /* it's OK to fall back to a plain directory if we can't mount anything */ | |
3378 | uid); | |
3379 | ||
3380 | (void) rmdir(u); /* remove the workspace again if we can. */ | |
3381 | ||
3382 | if (r < 0) | |
3383 | return r; | |
3384 | ||
3385 | } else if (r == 0) { | |
3386 | ||
3387 | /* We managed to set up a mount namespace, and are now in a child. That's great. In this case | |
3388 | * we can use the same directory for all cases, after turning off propagation. Question | |
3389 | * though is: where do we turn off propagation exactly, and where do we place the workspace | |
3390 | * directory? We need some place that is guaranteed to be a mount point in the host, and | |
3391 | * which is guaranteed to have a subdir we can mount over. /run/ is not suitable for this, | |
3392 | * since we ultimately want to move the resulting file system there, i.e. we need propagation | |
3393 | * for /run/ eventually. We could use our own /run/systemd/bind mount on itself, but that | |
3394 | * would be visible in the host mount table all the time, which we want to avoid. Hence, what | |
3395 | * we do here instead we use /dev/ and /dev/shm/ for our purposes. We know for sure that | |
3396 | * /dev/ is a mount point and we now for sure that /dev/shm/ exists. Hence we can turn off | |
3397 | * propagation on the former, and then overmount the latter. | |
3398 | * | |
3399 | * Yes it's nasty playing games with /dev/ and /dev/shm/ like this, since it does not exist | |
3400 | * for this purpose, but there are few other candidates that work equally well for us, and | |
3401 | * given that the we do this in a privately namespaced short-lived single-threaded process | |
7802194a | 3402 | * that no one else sees this should be OK to do. */ |
bb0c0d6f | 3403 | |
21935150 LP |
3404 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, "/dev", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL); /* Turn off propagation from our namespace to host */ |
3405 | if (r < 0) | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3406 | goto child_fail; |
3407 | ||
3408 | r = setup_credentials_internal( | |
3409 | context, | |
3410 | params, | |
d3dcf4e3 | 3411 | unit, |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3412 | p, /* final mount point */ |
3413 | "/dev/shm", /* temporary workspace to overmount */ | |
3414 | false, /* do not reuse /dev/shm if it is already a mount, under no circumstances */ | |
3415 | true, /* insist that something is mounted, do not allow fallback to plain directory */ | |
3416 | uid); | |
3417 | if (r < 0) | |
3418 | goto child_fail; | |
3419 | ||
3420 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); | |
3421 | ||
3422 | child_fail: | |
3423 | _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); | |
3424 | } | |
3425 | ||
3aaa3763 LP |
3426 | /* If the credentials dir is empty and not a mount point, then there's no point in having it. Let's |
3427 | * try to remove it. This matters in particular if we created the dir as mount point but then didn't | |
3428 | * actually end up mounting anything on it. In that case we'd rather have ENOENT than EACCESS being | |
3429 | * seen by users when trying access this inode. */ | |
3430 | (void) rmdir(p); | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
3431 | return 0; |
3432 | } | |
3433 | ||
92b423b9 | 3434 | #if ENABLE_SMACK |
cefc33ae | 3435 | static int setup_smack( |
aa5ae971 | 3436 | const Manager *manager, |
cefc33ae | 3437 | const ExecContext *context, |
b83d5050 | 3438 | int executable_fd) { |
cefc33ae LP |
3439 | int r; |
3440 | ||
3441 | assert(context); | |
b83d5050 | 3442 | assert(executable_fd >= 0); |
cefc33ae | 3443 | |
cefc33ae LP |
3444 | if (context->smack_process_label) { |
3445 | r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); | |
3446 | if (r < 0) | |
3447 | return r; | |
aa5ae971 | 3448 | } else if (manager->default_smack_process_label) { |
cefc33ae LP |
3449 | _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; |
3450 | ||
b83d5050 | 3451 | r = mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); |
00675c36 | 3452 | if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r)) |
cefc33ae LP |
3453 | return r; |
3454 | ||
1da3cb81 | 3455 | r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ?: manager->default_smack_process_label); |
cefc33ae LP |
3456 | if (r < 0) |
3457 | return r; | |
3458 | } | |
cefc33ae LP |
3459 | |
3460 | return 0; | |
3461 | } | |
92b423b9 | 3462 | #endif |
cefc33ae | 3463 | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3464 | static int compile_bind_mounts( |
3465 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3466 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3467 | BindMount **ret_bind_mounts, | |
da6053d0 | 3468 | size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts, |
6c47cd7d LP |
3469 | char ***ret_empty_directories) { |
3470 | ||
3471 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL; | |
ed8267c7 | 3472 | BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; |
5b10116e | 3473 | size_t n, h = 0; |
6c47cd7d LP |
3474 | int r; |
3475 | ||
3476 | assert(context); | |
3477 | assert(params); | |
3478 | assert(ret_bind_mounts); | |
3479 | assert(ret_n_bind_mounts); | |
3480 | assert(ret_empty_directories); | |
3481 | ||
ed8267c7 DT |
3482 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, h, bind_mount_free_many); |
3483 | ||
6c47cd7d | 3484 | n = context->n_bind_mounts; |
5b10116e | 3485 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
6c47cd7d LP |
3486 | if (!params->prefix[t]) |
3487 | continue; | |
3488 | ||
a2ab603c YW |
3489 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) |
3490 | n += !context->directories[t].items[i].only_create; | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3491 | } |
3492 | ||
3493 | if (n <= 0) { | |
3494 | *ret_bind_mounts = NULL; | |
3495 | *ret_n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
3496 | *ret_empty_directories = NULL; | |
3497 | return 0; | |
3498 | } | |
3499 | ||
3500 | bind_mounts = new(BindMount, n); | |
3501 | if (!bind_mounts) | |
3502 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3503 | ||
5b10116e | 3504 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->n_bind_mounts; i++) { |
6c47cd7d | 3505 | BindMount *item = context->bind_mounts + i; |
93404d34 | 3506 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; |
6c47cd7d LP |
3507 | |
3508 | s = strdup(item->source); | |
ed8267c7 DT |
3509 | if (!s) |
3510 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3511 | |
3512 | d = strdup(item->destination); | |
93404d34 | 3513 | if (!d) |
ed8267c7 | 3514 | return -ENOMEM; |
6c47cd7d LP |
3515 | |
3516 | bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { | |
93404d34 DT |
3517 | .source = TAKE_PTR(s), |
3518 | .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3519 | .read_only = item->read_only, |
3520 | .recursive = item->recursive, | |
3521 | .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, | |
3522 | }; | |
3523 | } | |
3524 | ||
5b10116e | 3525 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
6c47cd7d LP |
3526 | if (!params->prefix[t]) |
3527 | continue; | |
3528 | ||
211a3d87 | 3529 | if (context->directories[t].n_items == 0) |
6c47cd7d LP |
3530 | continue; |
3531 | ||
494d0247 | 3532 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && |
74e12520 | 3533 | !exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) { |
6c47cd7d LP |
3534 | char *private_root; |
3535 | ||
3536 | /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own | |
3537 | * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a | |
3538 | * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */ | |
3539 | ||
657ee2d8 | 3540 | private_root = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private"); |
ed8267c7 DT |
3541 | if (!private_root) |
3542 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3543 | |
3544 | r = strv_consume(&empty_directories, private_root); | |
a635a7ae | 3545 | if (r < 0) |
ed8267c7 | 3546 | return r; |
6c47cd7d LP |
3547 | } |
3548 | ||
211a3d87 | 3549 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) { |
93404d34 | 3550 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; |
6c47cd7d | 3551 | |
a2ab603c YW |
3552 | /* When one of the parent directories is in the list, we cannot create the symlink |
3553 | * for the child directory. See also the comments in setup_exec_directory(). */ | |
3554 | if (context->directories[t].items[i].only_create) | |
3555 | continue; | |
3556 | ||
494d0247 | 3557 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t)) |
211a3d87 | 3558 | s = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private", context->directories[t].items[i].path); |
6c47cd7d | 3559 | else |
211a3d87 | 3560 | s = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); |
ed8267c7 DT |
3561 | if (!s) |
3562 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6c47cd7d | 3563 | |
494d0247 | 3564 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && |
74e12520 | 3565 | exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) |
5609f688 YW |
3566 | /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private |
3567 | * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory | |
3568 | * on the 'non-private' place. */ | |
211a3d87 | 3569 | d = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); |
5609f688 YW |
3570 | else |
3571 | d = strdup(s); | |
93404d34 | 3572 | if (!d) |
ed8267c7 | 3573 | return -ENOMEM; |
6c47cd7d LP |
3574 | |
3575 | bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { | |
93404d34 DT |
3576 | .source = TAKE_PTR(s), |
3577 | .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), | |
6c47cd7d | 3578 | .read_only = false, |
9ce4e4b0 | 3579 | .nosuid = context->dynamic_user, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */ |
6c47cd7d LP |
3580 | .recursive = true, |
3581 | .ignore_enoent = false, | |
3582 | }; | |
3583 | } | |
3584 | } | |
3585 | ||
3586 | assert(h == n); | |
3587 | ||
ed8267c7 | 3588 | *ret_bind_mounts = TAKE_PTR(bind_mounts); |
6c47cd7d | 3589 | *ret_n_bind_mounts = n; |
ae2a15bc | 3590 | *ret_empty_directories = TAKE_PTR(empty_directories); |
6c47cd7d LP |
3591 | |
3592 | return (int) n; | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3593 | } |
3594 | ||
df61e79a LB |
3595 | /* ret_symlinks will contain a list of pairs src:dest that describes |
3596 | * the symlinks to create later on. For example, the symlinks needed | |
3597 | * to safely give private directories to DynamicUser=1 users. */ | |
3598 | static int compile_symlinks( | |
3599 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3600 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3601 | char ***ret_symlinks) { | |
3602 | ||
3603 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **symlinks = NULL; | |
3604 | int r; | |
3605 | ||
3606 | assert(context); | |
3607 | assert(params); | |
3608 | assert(ret_symlinks); | |
3609 | ||
3610 | for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { | |
211a3d87 LB |
3611 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { |
3612 | _cleanup_free_ char *private_path = NULL, *path = NULL; | |
df61e79a | 3613 | |
211a3d87 LB |
3614 | STRV_FOREACH(symlink, context->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) { |
3615 | _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL; | |
df61e79a | 3616 | |
211a3d87 LB |
3617 | src_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); |
3618 | dst_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], *symlink); | |
3619 | if (!src_abs || !dst_abs) | |
3620 | return -ENOMEM; | |
df61e79a | 3621 | |
211a3d87 LB |
3622 | r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(src_abs), TAKE_PTR(dst_abs)); |
3623 | if (r < 0) | |
3624 | return r; | |
3625 | } | |
3626 | ||
a2ab603c YW |
3627 | if (!exec_directory_is_private(context, dt) || |
3628 | exec_context_with_rootfs(context) || | |
3629 | context->directories[dt].items[i].only_create) | |
211a3d87 LB |
3630 | continue; |
3631 | ||
3632 | private_path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], "private", context->directories[dt].items[i].path); | |
df61e79a LB |
3633 | if (!private_path) |
3634 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3635 | ||
211a3d87 | 3636 | path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); |
df61e79a LB |
3637 | if (!path) |
3638 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3639 | ||
3640 | r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(private_path), TAKE_PTR(path)); | |
3641 | if (r < 0) | |
3642 | return r; | |
3643 | } | |
3644 | } | |
3645 | ||
3646 | *ret_symlinks = TAKE_PTR(symlinks); | |
3647 | ||
3648 | return 0; | |
3649 | } | |
3650 | ||
4e677599 LP |
3651 | static bool insist_on_sandboxing( |
3652 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3653 | const char *root_dir, | |
3654 | const char *root_image, | |
3655 | const BindMount *bind_mounts, | |
3656 | size_t n_bind_mounts) { | |
3657 | ||
4e677599 LP |
3658 | assert(context); |
3659 | assert(n_bind_mounts == 0 || bind_mounts); | |
3660 | ||
3661 | /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that | |
86b52a39 | 3662 | * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would |
4e677599 LP |
3663 | * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */ |
3664 | ||
3665 | if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) | |
3666 | return true; | |
3667 | ||
3668 | if (root_dir || root_image) | |
3669 | return true; | |
3670 | ||
b3d13314 LB |
3671 | if (context->n_mount_images > 0) |
3672 | return true; | |
3673 | ||
4e677599 LP |
3674 | if (context->dynamic_user) |
3675 | return true; | |
3676 | ||
4355c04f LB |
3677 | if (context->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) |
3678 | return true; | |
3679 | ||
4e677599 LP |
3680 | /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes |
3681 | * essential. */ | |
5b10116e | 3682 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) |
4e677599 LP |
3683 | if (!path_equal(bind_mounts[i].source, bind_mounts[i].destination)) |
3684 | return true; | |
3685 | ||
91dd5f7c LP |
3686 | if (context->log_namespace) |
3687 | return true; | |
3688 | ||
4e677599 LP |
3689 | return false; |
3690 | } | |
3691 | ||
6818c54c | 3692 | static int apply_mount_namespace( |
34cf6c43 | 3693 | const Unit *u, |
9f71ba8d | 3694 | ExecCommandFlags command_flags, |
6818c54c LP |
3695 | const ExecContext *context, |
3696 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
28135da3 | 3697 | const ExecRuntime *runtime, |
d4b6ec98 | 3698 | const char *memory_pressure_path, |
7cc5ef5f | 3699 | char **error_path) { |
6818c54c | 3700 | |
d4b6ec98 LB |
3701 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL, **symlinks = NULL, |
3702 | **read_write_paths_cleanup = NULL; | |
56a13a49 | 3703 | const char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; |
915e6d16 | 3704 | const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL; |
24759d8f LB |
3705 | _cleanup_free_ char *creds_path = NULL, *incoming_dir = NULL, *propagate_dir = NULL, |
3706 | *extension_dir = NULL; | |
d4b6ec98 | 3707 | char **read_write_paths; |
228af36f | 3708 | NamespaceInfo ns_info; |
165a31c0 | 3709 | bool needs_sandboxing; |
6c47cd7d | 3710 | BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; |
da6053d0 | 3711 | size_t n_bind_mounts = 0; |
6818c54c | 3712 | int r; |
93c6bb51 | 3713 | |
2b3c1b9e DH |
3714 | assert(context); |
3715 | ||
29933daf DT |
3716 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, bind_mount_free_many); |
3717 | ||
915e6d16 LP |
3718 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) { |
3719 | root_image = context->root_image; | |
3720 | ||
3721 | if (!root_image) | |
3722 | root_dir = context->root_directory; | |
3723 | } | |
93c6bb51 | 3724 | |
6c47cd7d LP |
3725 | r = compile_bind_mounts(context, params, &bind_mounts, &n_bind_mounts, &empty_directories); |
3726 | if (r < 0) | |
3727 | return r; | |
3728 | ||
211a3d87 | 3729 | /* Symlinks for exec dirs are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */ |
df61e79a LB |
3730 | r = compile_symlinks(context, params, &symlinks); |
3731 | if (r < 0) | |
29933daf | 3732 | return r; |
df61e79a | 3733 | |
d4b6ec98 LB |
3734 | /* We need to make the pressure path writable even if /sys/fs/cgroups is made read-only, as the |
3735 | * service will need to write to it in order to start the notifications. */ | |
3736 | if (context->protect_control_groups && memory_pressure_path && !streq(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { | |
3737 | read_write_paths_cleanup = strv_copy(context->read_write_paths); | |
29933daf DT |
3738 | if (!read_write_paths_cleanup) |
3739 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d4b6ec98 LB |
3740 | |
3741 | r = strv_extend(&read_write_paths_cleanup, memory_pressure_path); | |
3742 | if (r < 0) | |
29933daf | 3743 | return r; |
d4b6ec98 LB |
3744 | |
3745 | read_write_paths = read_write_paths_cleanup; | |
3746 | } else | |
3747 | read_write_paths = context->read_write_paths; | |
3748 | ||
9f71ba8d | 3749 | needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); |
ecf63c91 NJ |
3750 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
3751 | /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, | |
3752 | * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
3753 | * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. |
3754 | * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */ | |
ecf63c91 | 3755 | |
28135da3 DDM |
3756 | if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) { |
3757 | if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) | |
3758 | tmp_dir = runtime->shared->tmp_dir; | |
3759 | else if (runtime->shared->tmp_dir) | |
3760 | tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); | |
56a13a49 | 3761 | |
28135da3 DDM |
3762 | if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) |
3763 | var_tmp_dir = runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir; | |
3764 | else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir) | |
3765 | var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); | |
ecf63c91 NJ |
3766 | } |
3767 | ||
b5a33299 YW |
3768 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) { |
3769 | .ignore_protect_paths = false, | |
3770 | .private_dev = context->private_devices, | |
3771 | .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups, | |
3772 | .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables, | |
3773 | .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules, | |
94a7b275 | 3774 | .protect_kernel_logs = context->protect_kernel_logs, |
aecd5ac6 | 3775 | .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname, |
5e98086d | 3776 | .mount_apivfs = exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context), |
52b3d652 LP |
3777 | .protect_home = context->protect_home, |
3778 | .protect_system = context->protect_system, | |
4e399953 LP |
3779 | .protect_proc = context->protect_proc, |
3780 | .proc_subset = context->proc_subset, | |
c2da3bf2 | 3781 | .private_network = exec_needs_network_namespace(context), |
fde36d25 | 3782 | .private_ipc = exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context), |
6720e356 | 3783 | /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */ |
5181630f | 3784 | .mount_nosuid = context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(), |
b5a33299 | 3785 | }; |
ecf63c91 | 3786 | } else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir) |
228af36f LP |
3787 | /* |
3788 | * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed | |
3789 | * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and | |
3790 | * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace. | |
3791 | */ | |
3792 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) { | |
3793 | .ignore_protect_paths = true, | |
3794 | }; | |
3795 | else | |
3796 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {}; | |
b5a33299 | 3797 | |
874cdcbc | 3798 | if (context->mount_propagation_flag == MS_SHARED) |
37ed15d7 FB |
3799 | log_unit_debug(u, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); |
3800 | ||
a631cbfa LP |
3801 | if (exec_context_has_credentials(context) && |
3802 | params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] && | |
3803 | FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { | |
bbb4e7f3 | 3804 | creds_path = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "credentials", u->id); |
29933daf DT |
3805 | if (!creds_path) |
3806 | return -ENOMEM; | |
bbb4e7f3 LP |
3807 | } |
3808 | ||
5e8deb94 LB |
3809 | if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)) { |
3810 | propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id); | |
29933daf DT |
3811 | if (!propagate_dir) |
3812 | return -ENOMEM; | |
f2550b98 | 3813 | |
5e8deb94 | 3814 | incoming_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/incoming"); |
29933daf DT |
3815 | if (!incoming_dir) |
3816 | return -ENOMEM; | |
24759d8f LB |
3817 | |
3818 | extension_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/unit-extensions"); | |
29933daf DT |
3819 | if (!extension_dir) |
3820 | return -ENOMEM; | |
24759d8f | 3821 | } else |
29933daf DT |
3822 | if (asprintf(&extension_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT "/systemd/unit-extensions", geteuid()) < 0) |
3823 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5e8deb94 | 3824 | |
84be0c71 LP |
3825 | r = setup_namespace( |
3826 | root_dir, | |
3827 | root_image, | |
3828 | context->root_image_options, | |
3829 | context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, | |
3830 | &ns_info, | |
3831 | read_write_paths, | |
3832 | needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL, | |
3833 | needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL, | |
3834 | needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL, | |
3835 | needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL, | |
3836 | empty_directories, | |
3837 | symlinks, | |
3838 | bind_mounts, | |
3839 | n_bind_mounts, | |
3840 | context->temporary_filesystems, | |
3841 | context->n_temporary_filesystems, | |
3842 | context->mount_images, | |
3843 | context->n_mount_images, | |
3844 | context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, | |
3845 | tmp_dir, | |
3846 | var_tmp_dir, | |
3847 | creds_path, | |
3848 | context->log_namespace, | |
3849 | context->mount_propagation_flag, | |
3850 | context->root_hash, context->root_hash_size, context->root_hash_path, | |
3851 | context->root_hash_sig, context->root_hash_sig_size, context->root_hash_sig_path, | |
3852 | context->root_verity, | |
3853 | context->extension_images, | |
3854 | context->n_extension_images, | |
3855 | context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext, | |
3856 | context->extension_directories, | |
3857 | propagate_dir, | |
3858 | incoming_dir, | |
3859 | extension_dir, | |
3860 | root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL, | |
3861 | error_path); | |
93c6bb51 | 3862 | |
1beab8b0 | 3863 | /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports |
5238e957 | 3864 | * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively |
1beab8b0 LP |
3865 | * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a |
3866 | * completely different execution environment. */ | |
aca835ed | 3867 | if (r == -ENOANO) { |
4e677599 LP |
3868 | if (insist_on_sandboxing( |
3869 | context, | |
3870 | root_dir, root_image, | |
3871 | bind_mounts, | |
29933daf DT |
3872 | n_bind_mounts)) |
3873 | return log_unit_debug_errno(u, | |
3874 | SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
3875 | "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since " | |
3876 | "the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n" | |
3877 | "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s", | |
3878 | n_bind_mounts, | |
3879 | context->n_temporary_filesystems, | |
3880 | yes_no(root_dir), | |
3881 | yes_no(root_image), | |
3882 | yes_no(context->dynamic_user)); | |
3883 | ||
3884 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); | |
3885 | return 0; | |
93c6bb51 DH |
3886 | } |
3887 | ||
3888 | return r; | |
3889 | } | |
3890 | ||
915e6d16 LP |
3891 | static int apply_working_directory( |
3892 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3893 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3894 | const char *home, | |
376fecf6 | 3895 | int *exit_status) { |
915e6d16 | 3896 | |
6732edab | 3897 | const char *d, *wd; |
2b3c1b9e DH |
3898 | |
3899 | assert(context); | |
376fecf6 | 3900 | assert(exit_status); |
2b3c1b9e | 3901 | |
6732edab LP |
3902 | if (context->working_directory_home) { |
3903 | ||
376fecf6 LP |
3904 | if (!home) { |
3905 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
6732edab | 3906 | return -ENXIO; |
376fecf6 | 3907 | } |
6732edab | 3908 | |
2b3c1b9e | 3909 | wd = home; |
6732edab | 3910 | |
14eb3285 LP |
3911 | } else |
3912 | wd = empty_to_root(context->working_directory); | |
e7f1e7c6 | 3913 | |
fa97f630 | 3914 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) |
2b3c1b9e | 3915 | d = wd; |
fa97f630 | 3916 | else |
3b0e5bb5 | 3917 | d = prefix_roota(context->root_directory, wd); |
e7f1e7c6 | 3918 | |
376fecf6 LP |
3919 | if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { |
3920 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
2b3c1b9e | 3921 | return -errno; |
376fecf6 | 3922 | } |
e7f1e7c6 DH |
3923 | |
3924 | return 0; | |
3925 | } | |
3926 | ||
fa97f630 JB |
3927 | static int apply_root_directory( |
3928 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3929 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3930 | const bool needs_mount_ns, | |
3931 | int *exit_status) { | |
3932 | ||
3933 | assert(context); | |
3934 | assert(exit_status); | |
3935 | ||
5b10116e | 3936 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) |
fa97f630 JB |
3937 | if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory) |
3938 | if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) { | |
3939 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT; | |
3940 | return -errno; | |
3941 | } | |
fa97f630 JB |
3942 | |
3943 | return 0; | |
3944 | } | |
3945 | ||
b1edf445 | 3946 | static int setup_keyring( |
34cf6c43 | 3947 | const Unit *u, |
b1edf445 LP |
3948 | const ExecContext *context, |
3949 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
3950 | uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { | |
3951 | ||
74dd6b51 | 3952 | key_serial_t keyring; |
e64c2d0b DJL |
3953 | int r = 0; |
3954 | uid_t saved_uid; | |
3955 | gid_t saved_gid; | |
74dd6b51 LP |
3956 | |
3957 | assert(u); | |
b1edf445 | 3958 | assert(context); |
74dd6b51 LP |
3959 | assert(p); |
3960 | ||
3961 | /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that | |
3962 | * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond | |
3963 | * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be | |
3964 | * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in | |
3965 | * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where | |
3966 | * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */ | |
3967 | ||
b1edf445 LP |
3968 | if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT) |
3969 | return 0; | |
3970 | ||
e64c2d0b DJL |
3971 | /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up |
3972 | * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel | |
3973 | * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user | |
3974 | * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */ | |
3975 | ||
3976 | saved_uid = getuid(); | |
3977 | saved_gid = getgid(); | |
3978 | ||
3979 | if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { | |
3980 | if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0) | |
3981 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); | |
3982 | } | |
3983 | ||
3984 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { | |
3985 | if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) { | |
3986 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); | |
3987 | goto out; | |
3988 | } | |
3989 | } | |
3990 | ||
74dd6b51 LP |
3991 | keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); |
3992 | if (keyring == -1) { | |
3993 | if (errno == ENOSYS) | |
8002fb97 | 3994 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); |
065b4774 | 3995 | else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) |
8002fb97 | 3996 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); |
74dd6b51 | 3997 | else if (errno == EDQUOT) |
8002fb97 | 3998 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); |
74dd6b51 | 3999 | else |
e64c2d0b | 4000 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); |
74dd6b51 | 4001 | |
e64c2d0b | 4002 | goto out; |
74dd6b51 LP |
4003 | } |
4004 | ||
e64c2d0b DJL |
4005 | /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */ |
4006 | if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) { | |
4007 | ||
4008 | if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, | |
4009 | KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, | |
4010 | KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) { | |
4011 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); | |
4012 | goto out; | |
4013 | } | |
4014 | } | |
4015 | ||
4016 | /* Restore uid/gid back */ | |
4017 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { | |
4018 | if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) { | |
4019 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); | |
4020 | goto out; | |
4021 | } | |
4022 | } | |
4023 | ||
4024 | if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { | |
4025 | if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0) | |
4026 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); | |
4027 | } | |
4028 | ||
4029 | /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */ | |
b3415f5d LP |
4030 | if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { |
4031 | key_serial_t key; | |
4032 | ||
4033 | key = add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u->invocation_id, sizeof(u->invocation_id), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); | |
4034 | if (key == -1) | |
8002fb97 | 4035 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); |
b3415f5d LP |
4036 | else { |
4037 | if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, | |
4038 | KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH| | |
4039 | KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0) | |
e64c2d0b | 4040 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); |
b3415f5d LP |
4041 | } |
4042 | } | |
4043 | ||
e64c2d0b | 4044 | out: |
37b22b3b | 4045 | /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */ |
e64c2d0b DJL |
4046 | /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */ |
4047 | if (getuid() != saved_uid) | |
4048 | (void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1); | |
b1edf445 | 4049 | |
e64c2d0b DJL |
4050 | if (getgid() != saved_gid) |
4051 | (void) setregid(saved_gid, -1); | |
b1edf445 | 4052 | |
e64c2d0b | 4053 | return r; |
74dd6b51 LP |
4054 | } |
4055 | ||
3042bbeb | 4056 | static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) { |
29206d46 LP |
4057 | assert(array); |
4058 | assert(n); | |
2caa38e9 | 4059 | assert(pair); |
29206d46 LP |
4060 | |
4061 | if (pair[0] >= 0) | |
4062 | array[(*n)++] = pair[0]; | |
4063 | if (pair[1] >= 0) | |
4064 | array[(*n)++] = pair[1]; | |
4065 | } | |
4066 | ||
a34ceba6 LP |
4067 | static int close_remaining_fds( |
4068 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
28135da3 | 4069 | const ExecRuntime *runtime, |
00d9ef85 | 4070 | int user_lookup_fd, |
a34ceba6 | 4071 | int socket_fd, |
5b8d1f6b | 4072 | const int *fds, size_t n_fds) { |
a34ceba6 | 4073 | |
da6053d0 | 4074 | size_t n_dont_close = 0; |
00d9ef85 | 4075 | int dont_close[n_fds + 12]; |
a34ceba6 LP |
4076 | |
4077 | assert(params); | |
4078 | ||
4079 | if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
4080 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd; | |
4081 | if (params->stdout_fd >= 0) | |
4082 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd; | |
4083 | if (params->stderr_fd >= 0) | |
4084 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd; | |
4085 | ||
4086 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
4087 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; | |
4088 | if (n_fds > 0) { | |
4089 | memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); | |
4090 | n_dont_close += n_fds; | |
4091 | } | |
4092 | ||
28135da3 DDM |
4093 | if (runtime && runtime->shared) { |
4094 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket); | |
4095 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket); | |
a70581ff | 4096 | } |
29206d46 | 4097 | |
15220772 DDM |
4098 | if (runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { |
4099 | if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) | |
4100 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->user->storage_socket); | |
4101 | if (runtime->dynamic_creds->group) | |
4102 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->group->storage_socket); | |
a34ceba6 LP |
4103 | } |
4104 | ||
00d9ef85 LP |
4105 | if (user_lookup_fd >= 0) |
4106 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = user_lookup_fd; | |
4107 | ||
a34ceba6 LP |
4108 | return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); |
4109 | } | |
4110 | ||
00d9ef85 LP |
4111 | static int send_user_lookup( |
4112 | Unit *unit, | |
4113 | int user_lookup_fd, | |
4114 | uid_t uid, | |
4115 | gid_t gid) { | |
4116 | ||
4117 | assert(unit); | |
4118 | ||
4119 | /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID | |
4120 | * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was | |
4121 | * specified. */ | |
4122 | ||
4123 | if (user_lookup_fd < 0) | |
4124 | return 0; | |
4125 | ||
4126 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
4127 | return 0; | |
4128 | ||
4129 | if (writev(user_lookup_fd, | |
4130 | (struct iovec[]) { | |
ce16d177 YW |
4131 | IOVEC_MAKE(&uid, sizeof(uid)), |
4132 | IOVEC_MAKE(&gid, sizeof(gid)), | |
4133 | IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(unit->id) }, 3) < 0) | |
00d9ef85 LP |
4134 | return -errno; |
4135 | ||
4136 | return 0; | |
4137 | } | |
4138 | ||
6732edab LP |
4139 | static int acquire_home(const ExecContext *c, uid_t uid, const char** home, char **buf) { |
4140 | int r; | |
4141 | ||
4142 | assert(c); | |
4143 | assert(home); | |
4144 | assert(buf); | |
4145 | ||
4146 | /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */ | |
4147 | ||
4148 | if (*home) | |
4149 | return 0; | |
4150 | ||
4151 | if (!c->working_directory_home) | |
4152 | return 0; | |
4153 | ||
6732edab LP |
4154 | r = get_home_dir(buf); |
4155 | if (r < 0) | |
4156 | return r; | |
4157 | ||
4158 | *home = *buf; | |
4159 | return 1; | |
4160 | } | |
4161 | ||
da50b85a LP |
4162 | static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, char ***ret) { |
4163 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char ** list = NULL; | |
da50b85a LP |
4164 | int r; |
4165 | ||
4166 | assert(c); | |
4167 | assert(p); | |
4168 | assert(ret); | |
4169 | ||
4170 | assert(c->dynamic_user); | |
4171 | ||
4172 | /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for | |
4173 | * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special | |
4174 | * directories. */ | |
4175 | ||
5b10116e | 4176 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
da50b85a LP |
4177 | if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) |
4178 | continue; | |
4179 | ||
4180 | if (!p->prefix[t]) | |
4181 | continue; | |
4182 | ||
211a3d87 | 4183 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { |
da50b85a LP |
4184 | char *e; |
4185 | ||
494d0247 | 4186 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, t)) |
211a3d87 | 4187 | e = path_join(p->prefix[t], "private", c->directories[t].items[i].path); |
494d0247 | 4188 | else |
211a3d87 | 4189 | e = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); |
da50b85a LP |
4190 | if (!e) |
4191 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4192 | ||
4193 | r = strv_consume(&list, e); | |
4194 | if (r < 0) | |
4195 | return r; | |
4196 | } | |
4197 | } | |
4198 | ||
ae2a15bc | 4199 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(list); |
da50b85a LP |
4200 | |
4201 | return 0; | |
4202 | } | |
4203 | ||
a8b993dc LP |
4204 | static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path( |
4205 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
4206 | const CGroupContext *c, | |
4207 | char **ret) { | |
4208 | ||
4209 | const char *subgroup = NULL; | |
78f93209 LP |
4210 | char *p; |
4211 | ||
4212 | assert(params); | |
4213 | assert(ret); | |
4214 | ||
4215 | if (!params->cgroup_path) | |
4216 | return -EINVAL; | |
4217 | ||
4218 | /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated | |
4219 | * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control | |
4220 | * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one, | |
4221 | * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process, | |
4222 | * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=, | |
4223 | * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre= | |
4224 | * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP | |
4225 | * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */ | |
4226 | ||
a8b993dc LP |
4227 | if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE) && (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP) || c->delegate_subgroup)) { |
4228 | if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_IS_CONTROL)) | |
4229 | subgroup = ".control"; | |
4230 | else | |
4231 | subgroup = c->delegate_subgroup; | |
4232 | } | |
4233 | ||
4234 | if (subgroup) | |
4235 | p = path_join(params->cgroup_path, subgroup); | |
78f93209 LP |
4236 | else |
4237 | p = strdup(params->cgroup_path); | |
4238 | if (!p) | |
4239 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4240 | ||
4241 | *ret = p; | |
a8b993dc | 4242 | return !!subgroup; |
78f93209 LP |
4243 | } |
4244 | ||
e2b2fb7f MS |
4245 | static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c, CPUSet *ret) { |
4246 | _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet s = {}; | |
4247 | int r; | |
4248 | ||
4249 | assert(c); | |
4250 | assert(ret); | |
4251 | ||
4252 | if (!c->numa_policy.nodes.set) { | |
4253 | log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring"); | |
4254 | return 0; | |
4255 | } | |
4256 | ||
4257 | r = numa_to_cpu_set(&c->numa_policy, &s); | |
4258 | if (r < 0) | |
4259 | return r; | |
4260 | ||
4261 | cpu_set_reset(ret); | |
4262 | ||
4263 | return cpu_set_add_all(ret, &s); | |
4264 | } | |
4265 | ||
4266 | bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c) { | |
4267 | assert(c); | |
4268 | ||
4269 | return c->cpu_affinity_from_numa; | |
4270 | } | |
4271 | ||
1da37e58 ZJS |
4272 | static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds, size_t fds_size, size_t *n_fds, int fd, int *ret_fd) { |
4273 | int r; | |
4274 | ||
4275 | assert(fds); | |
4276 | assert(n_fds); | |
4277 | assert(*n_fds < fds_size); | |
4278 | assert(ret_fd); | |
4279 | ||
4280 | if (fd < 0) { | |
254d1313 | 4281 | *ret_fd = -EBADF; |
1da37e58 ZJS |
4282 | return 0; |
4283 | } | |
4284 | ||
4285 | if (fd < 3 + (int) *n_fds) { | |
4286 | /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store | |
4287 | * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */ | |
4288 | ||
4289 | r = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) *n_fds); | |
4290 | if (r < 0) | |
4291 | return -errno; | |
4292 | ||
ee3455cf | 4293 | close_and_replace(fd, r); |
1da37e58 ZJS |
4294 | } |
4295 | ||
4296 | *ret_fd = fds[*n_fds] = fd; | |
4297 | (*n_fds) ++; | |
4298 | return 1; | |
4299 | } | |
4300 | ||
cd48e23f RP |
4301 | static int connect_unix_harder(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { |
4302 | union sockaddr_union addr = { | |
4303 | .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, | |
4304 | }; | |
4305 | socklen_t sa_len; | |
4306 | static const int socket_types[] = { SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_SEQPACKET }; | |
4307 | int r; | |
4308 | ||
4309 | assert(u); | |
4310 | assert(of); | |
4311 | assert(ofd >= 0); | |
4312 | ||
4313 | r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&addr.un, FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(ofd)); | |
4314 | if (r < 0) | |
4315 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to set sockaddr for %s: %m", of->path); | |
4316 | ||
4317 | sa_len = r; | |
4318 | ||
4319 | for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(socket_types); i++) { | |
4320 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
4321 | ||
4322 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, socket_types[i] | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); | |
4323 | if (fd < 0) | |
4324 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to create socket for %s: %m", of->path); | |
4325 | ||
4326 | r = RET_NERRNO(connect(fd, &addr.sa, sa_len)); | |
4327 | if (r == -EPROTOTYPE) | |
4328 | continue; | |
4329 | if (r < 0) | |
4330 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to connect socket for %s: %m", of->path); | |
4331 | ||
4332 | return TAKE_FD(fd); | |
4333 | } | |
4334 | ||
4335 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPROTOTYPE), "Failed to connect socket for \"%s\".", of->path); | |
4336 | } | |
4337 | ||
4338 | static int get_open_file_fd(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of) { | |
4339 | struct stat st; | |
4340 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, ofd = -EBADF; | |
4341 | ||
4342 | assert(u); | |
4343 | assert(of); | |
4344 | ||
4345 | ofd = open(of->path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); | |
4346 | if (ofd < 0) | |
dcebb015 DDM |
4347 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Could not open \"%s\": %m", of->path); |
4348 | ||
cd48e23f | 4349 | if (fstat(ofd, &st) < 0) |
dcebb015 | 4350 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to stat %s: %m", of->path); |
cd48e23f RP |
4351 | |
4352 | if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) { | |
4353 | fd = connect_unix_harder(u, of, ofd); | |
4354 | if (fd < 0) | |
4355 | return fd; | |
4356 | ||
4357 | if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) && shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR) < 0) | |
dcebb015 DDM |
4358 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to shutdown send for socket %s: %m", |
4359 | of->path); | |
cd48e23f RP |
4360 | |
4361 | log_unit_debug(u, "socket %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); | |
4362 | } else { | |
4363 | int flags = FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR; | |
4364 | if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_APPEND)) | |
4365 | flags |= O_APPEND; | |
4366 | else if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_TRUNCATE)) | |
4367 | flags |= O_TRUNC; | |
4368 | ||
4369 | fd = fd_reopen(ofd, flags | O_CLOEXEC); | |
4370 | if (fd < 0) | |
4371 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, fd, "Failed to open file %s: %m", of->path); | |
4372 | ||
4373 | log_unit_debug(u, "file %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); | |
4374 | } | |
4375 | ||
4376 | return TAKE_FD(fd); | |
4377 | } | |
4378 | ||
4379 | static int collect_open_file_fds( | |
4380 | Unit *u, | |
4381 | OpenFile* open_files, | |
4382 | int **fds, | |
4383 | char ***fdnames, | |
4384 | size_t *n_fds) { | |
4385 | int r; | |
4386 | ||
4387 | assert(u); | |
4388 | assert(fds); | |
4389 | assert(fdnames); | |
4390 | assert(n_fds); | |
4391 | ||
4392 | LIST_FOREACH(open_files, of, open_files) { | |
4393 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
4394 | ||
4395 | fd = get_open_file_fd(u, of); | |
4396 | if (fd < 0) { | |
4397 | if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_GRACEFUL)) { | |
4398 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, fd, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptor for %s, ignoring: %m", of->path); | |
4399 | continue; | |
4400 | } | |
4401 | ||
4402 | return fd; | |
4403 | } | |
4404 | ||
4405 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*fds, *n_fds + 1)) | |
4406 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4407 | ||
4408 | r = strv_extend(fdnames, of->fdname); | |
4409 | if (r < 0) | |
4410 | return r; | |
4411 | ||
4412 | (*fds)[*n_fds] = TAKE_FD(fd); | |
4413 | ||
4414 | (*n_fds)++; | |
4415 | } | |
4416 | ||
4417 | return 0; | |
4418 | } | |
4419 | ||
3ff67ec4 ZJS |
4420 | static void log_command_line(Unit *unit, const char *msg, const char *executable, char **argv) { |
4421 | assert(unit); | |
4422 | assert(msg); | |
4423 | assert(executable); | |
4424 | ||
4425 | if (!DEBUG_LOGGING) | |
4426 | return; | |
4427 | ||
4428 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); | |
4429 | ||
4430 | log_unit_struct(unit, LOG_DEBUG, | |
4431 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable, | |
4432 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), | |
4433 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); | |
4434 | } | |
4435 | ||
6ef721cb LB |
4436 | static bool exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users(const ExecContext *context, const Manager *manager) { |
4437 | assert(context); | |
4438 | assert(manager); | |
4439 | ||
4440 | /* These options require PrivateUsers= when used in user units, as we need to be in a user namespace | |
4441 | * to have permission to enable them when not running as root. If we have effective CAP_SYS_ADMIN | |
4442 | * (system manager) then we have privileges and don't need this. */ | |
4443 | if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(manager)) | |
4444 | return false; | |
4445 | ||
4446 | return context->private_users || | |
4447 | context->private_tmp || | |
4448 | context->private_devices || | |
4449 | context->private_network || | |
4450 | context->network_namespace_path || | |
4451 | context->private_ipc || | |
4452 | context->ipc_namespace_path || | |
4453 | context->private_mounts || | |
4454 | context->mount_apivfs || | |
4455 | context->n_bind_mounts > 0 || | |
4456 | context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0 || | |
4457 | context->root_directory || | |
4458 | !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories) || | |
4459 | context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || | |
4460 | context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || | |
4461 | context->protect_kernel_tunables || | |
4462 | context->protect_kernel_modules || | |
4463 | context->protect_kernel_logs || | |
4464 | context->protect_control_groups || | |
4465 | context->protect_clock || | |
4466 | context->protect_hostname || | |
4467 | !strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || | |
4468 | !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || | |
4469 | !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths) || | |
4470 | !strv_isempty(context->exec_paths) || | |
4471 | !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths); | |
4472 | } | |
4473 | ||
ff0af2a1 | 4474 | static int exec_child( |
f2341e0a | 4475 | Unit *unit, |
34cf6c43 | 4476 | const ExecCommand *command, |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4477 | const ExecContext *context, |
4478 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
28135da3 | 4479 | ExecRuntime *runtime, |
6bb00842 | 4480 | const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, |
ff0af2a1 | 4481 | int socket_fd, |
2caa38e9 | 4482 | const int named_iofds[static 3], |
cd48e23f | 4483 | int *params_fds, |
da6053d0 | 4484 | size_t n_socket_fds, |
25b583d7 | 4485 | size_t n_storage_fds, |
ff0af2a1 | 4486 | char **files_env, |
00d9ef85 | 4487 | int user_lookup_fd, |
12145637 | 4488 | int *exit_status) { |
d35fbf6b | 4489 | |
8c35c10d | 4490 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **joined_exec_search_path = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL; |
1da37e58 | 4491 | int r, ngids = 0, exec_fd; |
4d885bd3 DH |
4492 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL; |
4493 | const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL; | |
6bb00842 | 4494 | _cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL, *memory_pressure_path = NULL; |
2b3c1b9e | 4495 | const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; |
7ca69792 | 4496 | char **final_argv = NULL; |
7bce046b LP |
4497 | dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0; |
4498 | ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0; | |
5749f855 | 4499 | bool userns_set_up = false; |
165a31c0 LP |
4500 | bool needs_sandboxing, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */ |
4501 | needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */ | |
4502 | needs_mount_namespace, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */ | |
4503 | needs_ambient_hack; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */ | |
349cc4a5 | 4504 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
7f59dd35 | 4505 | _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; |
43b1f709 | 4506 | bool use_selinux = false; |
ecfbc84f | 4507 | #endif |
f9fa32f0 | 4508 | #if ENABLE_SMACK |
43b1f709 | 4509 | bool use_smack = false; |
ecfbc84f | 4510 | #endif |
349cc4a5 | 4511 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
43b1f709 | 4512 | bool use_apparmor = false; |
ecfbc84f | 4513 | #endif |
5749f855 AZ |
4514 | uid_t saved_uid = getuid(); |
4515 | gid_t saved_gid = getgid(); | |
fed1e721 LP |
4516 | uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; |
4517 | gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; | |
1da37e58 ZJS |
4518 | size_t n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */ |
4519 | n_keep_fds; /* total number of fds not to close */ | |
165a31c0 | 4520 | int secure_bits; |
afb11bf1 DG |
4521 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL; |
4522 | int ngids_after_pam = 0; | |
cd48e23f RP |
4523 | _cleanup_free_ int *fds = NULL; |
4524 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **fdnames = NULL; | |
034c6ed7 | 4525 | |
f2341e0a | 4526 | assert(unit); |
5cb5a6ff LP |
4527 | assert(command); |
4528 | assert(context); | |
d35fbf6b | 4529 | assert(params); |
ff0af2a1 | 4530 | assert(exit_status); |
d35fbf6b | 4531 | |
69339ae9 LP |
4532 | /* Explicitly test for CVE-2021-4034 inspired invocations */ |
4533 | assert(command->path); | |
4534 | assert(!strv_isempty(command->argv)); | |
4535 | ||
d35fbf6b DM |
4536 | rename_process_from_path(command->path); |
4537 | ||
9c274488 LP |
4538 | /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main |
4539 | * daemon. All others we leave untouched because we set them to SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, | |
4540 | * both of which will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ | |
ce30c8dc | 4541 | (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, |
9c274488 | 4542 | SIGNALS_IGNORE); |
d35fbf6b DM |
4543 | |
4544 | if (context->ignore_sigpipe) | |
9c274488 | 4545 | (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); |
d35fbf6b | 4546 | |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4547 | r = reset_signal_mask(); |
4548 | if (r < 0) { | |
4549 | *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; | |
12145637 | 4550 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); |
d35fbf6b | 4551 | } |
034c6ed7 | 4552 | |
d35fbf6b DM |
4553 | if (params->idle_pipe) |
4554 | do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); | |
4f2d528d | 4555 | |
2c027c62 LP |
4556 | /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its |
4557 | * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have | |
4558 | * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the | |
4559 | * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */ | |
ff0af2a1 | 4560 | |
d35fbf6b | 4561 | log_forget_fds(); |
2c027c62 | 4562 | log_set_open_when_needed(true); |
a3b00f91 | 4563 | log_settle_target(); |
4f2d528d | 4564 | |
40a80078 LP |
4565 | /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */ |
4566 | closelog(); | |
4567 | ||
cd48e23f RP |
4568 | fds = newdup(int, params_fds, n_fds); |
4569 | if (!fds) { | |
4570 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4571 | return log_oom(); | |
4572 | } | |
4573 | ||
4574 | fdnames = strv_copy((char**) params->fd_names); | |
4575 | if (!fdnames) { | |
4576 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4577 | return log_oom(); | |
4578 | } | |
4579 | ||
4580 | r = collect_open_file_fds(unit, params->open_files, &fds, &fdnames, &n_fds); | |
4581 | if (r < 0) { | |
4582 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4583 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptors: %m"); | |
4584 | } | |
4585 | ||
b1994387 | 4586 | int keep_fds[n_fds + 3]; |
1da37e58 ZJS |
4587 | memcpy_safe(keep_fds, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int)); |
4588 | n_keep_fds = n_fds; | |
4589 | ||
4590 | r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->exec_fd, &exec_fd); | |
4591 | if (r < 0) { | |
4592 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4593 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
4594 | } | |
4595 | ||
b1994387 | 4596 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF |
46004616 ZJS |
4597 | if (unit->manager->restrict_fs) { |
4598 | int bpf_map_fd = lsm_bpf_map_restrict_fs_fd(unit); | |
b1994387 ILG |
4599 | if (bpf_map_fd < 0) { |
4600 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
46004616 | 4601 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, bpf_map_fd, "Failed to get restrict filesystems BPF map fd: %m"); |
b1994387 ILG |
4602 | } |
4603 | ||
4604 | r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, bpf_map_fd, &bpf_map_fd); | |
4605 | if (r < 0) { | |
4606 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4607 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
4608 | } | |
4609 | } | |
4610 | #endif | |
4611 | ||
15220772 | 4612 | r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4613 | if (r < 0) { |
4614 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
12145637 | 4615 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); |
8c7be95e LP |
4616 | } |
4617 | ||
0af07108 ZJS |
4618 | if (!context->same_pgrp && |
4619 | setsid() < 0) { | |
4620 | *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; | |
4621 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); | |
4622 | } | |
9e2f7c11 | 4623 | |
1e22b5cd | 4624 | exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); |
d35fbf6b | 4625 | |
c891efaf | 4626 | if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) { |
3b20f877 FB |
4627 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; |
4628 | ||
4ef15008 | 4629 | cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); |
3b20f877 | 4630 | if (!cmdline) { |
0460aa5c | 4631 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; |
12145637 | 4632 | return log_oom(); |
3b20f877 | 4633 | } |
d35fbf6b | 4634 | |
4ef15008 | 4635 | r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params->confirm_spawn, unit, cmdline); |
3b20f877 FB |
4636 | if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) { |
4637 | if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) { | |
4638 | *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
4639 | return 0; | |
4640 | } | |
ff0af2a1 | 4641 | *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; |
0af07108 ZJS |
4642 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED), |
4643 | "Execution cancelled by the user"); | |
d35fbf6b DM |
4644 | } |
4645 | } | |
1a63a750 | 4646 | |
d521916d LP |
4647 | /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is |
4648 | * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note | |
4649 | * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS | |
4650 | * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they | |
4651 | * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */ | |
4652 | if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit->id, true) != 0 || | |
4870133b | 4653 | setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", runtime_scope_to_string(unit->manager->runtime_scope), true) != 0) { |
d521916d LP |
4654 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; |
4655 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); | |
4656 | } | |
4657 | ||
15220772 | 4658 | if (context->dynamic_user && runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { |
da50b85a | 4659 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL; |
29206d46 | 4660 | |
d521916d | 4661 | /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS |
7802194a | 4662 | * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here. */ |
409093fe LP |
4663 | if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) { |
4664 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
12145637 | 4665 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); |
409093fe LP |
4666 | } |
4667 | ||
da50b85a LP |
4668 | r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths); |
4669 | if (r < 0) { | |
4670 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4671 | return log_oom(); | |
4672 | } | |
4673 | ||
15220772 | 4674 | r = dynamic_creds_realize(runtime->dynamic_creds, suggested_paths, &uid, &gid); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4675 | if (r < 0) { |
4676 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
d85ff944 YW |
4677 | if (r == -EILSEQ) |
4678 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
4679 | "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists."); | |
12145637 | 4680 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); |
524daa8c | 4681 | } |
524daa8c | 4682 | |
70dd455c | 4683 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
29206d46 | 4684 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; |
d85ff944 | 4685 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); |
70dd455c ZJS |
4686 | } |
4687 | ||
4688 | if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) { | |
4689 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
d85ff944 | 4690 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); |
29206d46 | 4691 | } |
5bc7452b | 4692 | |
15220772 DDM |
4693 | if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) |
4694 | username = runtime->dynamic_creds->user->name; | |
29206d46 LP |
4695 | |
4696 | } else { | |
4d885bd3 DH |
4697 | r = get_fixed_user(context, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); |
4698 | if (r < 0) { | |
4699 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
12145637 | 4700 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); |
5bc7452b | 4701 | } |
5bc7452b | 4702 | |
4d885bd3 DH |
4703 | r = get_fixed_group(context, &groupname, &gid); |
4704 | if (r < 0) { | |
4705 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
12145637 | 4706 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); |
4d885bd3 | 4707 | } |
cdc5d5c5 | 4708 | } |
29206d46 | 4709 | |
cdc5d5c5 DH |
4710 | /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */ |
4711 | r = get_supplementary_groups(context, username, groupname, gid, | |
4712 | &supplementary_gids, &ngids); | |
4713 | if (r < 0) { | |
4714 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
12145637 | 4715 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); |
29206d46 | 4716 | } |
5bc7452b | 4717 | |
00d9ef85 LP |
4718 | r = send_user_lookup(unit, user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); |
4719 | if (r < 0) { | |
4720 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
12145637 | 4721 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); |
00d9ef85 LP |
4722 | } |
4723 | ||
4724 | user_lookup_fd = safe_close(user_lookup_fd); | |
4725 | ||
6732edab LP |
4726 | r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); |
4727 | if (r < 0) { | |
4728 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
12145637 | 4729 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); |
6732edab LP |
4730 | } |
4731 | ||
4a055e5a | 4732 | /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we must drop O_NONBLOCK */ |
d35fbf6b | 4733 | if (socket_fd >= 0) |
a34ceba6 | 4734 | (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); |
acbb0225 | 4735 | |
4c70a4a7 MS |
4736 | /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields. |
4737 | * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */ | |
4738 | if (params->cgroup_path) { | |
4739 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
4740 | ||
a8b993dc | 4741 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); |
4c70a4a7 MS |
4742 | if (r < 0) { |
4743 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4744 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); | |
4745 | } | |
4746 | ||
4747 | r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL); | |
702cf08f YW |
4748 | if (r == -EUCLEAN) { |
4749 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4750 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach process to cgroup %s " | |
4751 | "because the cgroup or one of its parents or " | |
4752 | "siblings is in the threaded mode: %m", p); | |
4753 | } | |
4c70a4a7 MS |
4754 | if (r < 0) { |
4755 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4756 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); | |
4757 | } | |
4758 | } | |
4759 | ||
28135da3 DDM |
4760 | if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
4761 | r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWNET); | |
a8d08f39 LP |
4762 | if (r < 0) { |
4763 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
4764 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); | |
4765 | } | |
4766 | } | |
4767 | ||
28135da3 DDM |
4768 | if (context->ipc_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
4769 | r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, context->ipc_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWIPC); | |
a70581ff XR |
4770 | if (r < 0) { |
4771 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
4772 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open IPC namespace path %s: %m", context->ipc_namespace_path); | |
4773 | } | |
4774 | } | |
4775 | ||
52c239d7 | 4776 | r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4777 | if (r < 0) { |
4778 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; | |
12145637 | 4779 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); |
d35fbf6b | 4780 | } |
034c6ed7 | 4781 | |
52c239d7 | 4782 | r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4783 | if (r < 0) { |
4784 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; | |
12145637 | 4785 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); |
d35fbf6b DM |
4786 | } |
4787 | ||
52c239d7 | 4788 | r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4789 | if (r < 0) { |
4790 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; | |
12145637 | 4791 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); |
d35fbf6b DM |
4792 | } |
4793 | ||
d35fbf6b | 4794 | if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { |
9f8168eb LP |
4795 | /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces |
4796 | * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */ | |
4797 | r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust); | |
065b4774 | 4798 | if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) |
f2341e0a | 4799 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); |
12145637 | 4800 | else if (r < 0) { |
ff0af2a1 | 4801 | *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; |
12145637 | 4802 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); |
613b411c | 4803 | } |
d35fbf6b DM |
4804 | } |
4805 | ||
ad21e542 ZJS |
4806 | if (context->coredump_filter_set) { |
4807 | r = set_coredump_filter(context->coredump_filter); | |
4808 | if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
4809 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); | |
4810 | else if (r < 0) | |
4811 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m"); | |
4812 | } | |
4813 | ||
39090201 DJL |
4814 | if (context->nice_set) { |
4815 | r = setpriority_closest(context->nice); | |
4816 | if (r < 0) | |
4817 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); | |
4818 | } | |
613b411c | 4819 | |
d35fbf6b DM |
4820 | if (context->cpu_sched_set) { |
4821 | struct sched_param param = { | |
4822 | .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, | |
4823 | }; | |
4824 | ||
ff0af2a1 LP |
4825 | r = sched_setscheduler(0, |
4826 | context->cpu_sched_policy | | |
4827 | (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? | |
4828 | SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), | |
4829 | ¶m); | |
4830 | if (r < 0) { | |
4831 | *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; | |
12145637 | 4832 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); |
fc9b2a84 | 4833 | } |
d35fbf6b | 4834 | } |
fc9b2a84 | 4835 | |
e2b2fb7f MS |
4836 | if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa || context->cpu_set.set) { |
4837 | _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet converted_cpu_set = {}; | |
4838 | const CPUSet *cpu_set; | |
4839 | ||
4840 | if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa) { | |
4841 | r = exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context, &converted_cpu_set); | |
4842 | if (r < 0) { | |
4843 | *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; | |
4844 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); | |
4845 | } | |
4846 | ||
4847 | cpu_set = &converted_cpu_set; | |
4848 | } else | |
4849 | cpu_set = &context->cpu_set; | |
4850 | ||
4851 | if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set->allocated, cpu_set->set) < 0) { | |
ff0af2a1 | 4852 | *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; |
12145637 | 4853 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); |
034c6ed7 | 4854 | } |
e2b2fb7f | 4855 | } |
034c6ed7 | 4856 | |
b070c7c0 MS |
4857 | if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context->numa_policy))) { |
4858 | r = apply_numa_policy(&context->numa_policy); | |
1406bd66 LP |
4859 | if (r < 0) { |
4860 | if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) | |
4861 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); | |
4862 | else { | |
4863 | *exit_status = EXIT_NUMA_POLICY; | |
4864 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); | |
4865 | } | |
b070c7c0 MS |
4866 | } |
4867 | } | |
4868 | ||
d35fbf6b DM |
4869 | if (context->ioprio_set) |
4870 | if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { | |
ff0af2a1 | 4871 | *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; |
12145637 | 4872 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); |
d35fbf6b | 4873 | } |
da726a4d | 4874 | |
d35fbf6b DM |
4875 | if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) |
4876 | if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { | |
ff0af2a1 | 4877 | *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; |
12145637 | 4878 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); |
4c2630eb | 4879 | } |
9eba9da4 | 4880 | |
21022b9d LP |
4881 | if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { |
4882 | r = safe_personality(context->personality); | |
4883 | if (r < 0) { | |
ff0af2a1 | 4884 | *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; |
12145637 | 4885 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); |
4c2630eb | 4886 | } |
21022b9d | 4887 | } |
94f04347 | 4888 | |
33331d11 VB |
4889 | if (context->utmp_id) { |
4890 | const char *line = context->tty_path ? | |
4891 | (path_startswith(context->tty_path, "/dev/") ?: context->tty_path) : | |
4892 | NULL; | |
df0ff127 | 4893 | utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid_cached(), getsid(0), |
33331d11 | 4894 | line, |
023a4f67 LP |
4895 | context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS : |
4896 | context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS : | |
4897 | USER_PROCESS, | |
6a93917d | 4898 | username); |
33331d11 | 4899 | } |
d35fbf6b | 4900 | |
08f67696 | 4901 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
ff0af2a1 LP |
4902 | r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); |
4903 | if (r < 0) { | |
4904 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; | |
12145637 | 4905 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); |
071830ff | 4906 | } |
d35fbf6b | 4907 | } |
8e274523 | 4908 | |
6bb00842 LP |
4909 | if (params->cgroup_path) { |
4910 | /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1 | |
4911 | * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not | |
4912 | * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only | |
4913 | * touch a single hierarchy too. */ | |
4914 | ||
4915 | if (params->flags & EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE) { | |
a8b993dc LP |
4916 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; |
4917 | ||
6bb00842 LP |
4918 | r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid); |
4919 | if (r < 0) { | |
4920 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4921 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); | |
4922 | } | |
a8b993dc LP |
4923 | |
4924 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); | |
4925 | if (r < 0) { | |
4926 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4927 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); | |
4928 | } | |
4929 | if (r > 0) { | |
bcd9b981 | 4930 | r = cg_set_access_recursive(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, p, uid, gid); |
a8b993dc LP |
4931 | if (r < 0) { |
4932 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4933 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control subgroup access: %m"); | |
4934 | } | |
4935 | } | |
6bb00842 LP |
4936 | } |
4937 | ||
4938 | if (cgroup_context && cg_unified() > 0 && is_pressure_supported() > 0) { | |
4939 | if (cgroup_context_want_memory_pressure(cgroup_context)) { | |
4940 | r = cg_get_path("memory", params->cgroup_path, "memory.pressure", &memory_pressure_path); | |
4941 | if (r < 0) { | |
4942 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4943 | return log_oom(); | |
4944 | } | |
4945 | ||
4946 | r = chmod_and_chown(memory_pressure_path, 0644, uid, gid); | |
4947 | if (r < 0) { | |
4948 | log_unit_full_errno(unit, r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, | |
4949 | "Failed to adjust ownership of '%s', ignoring: %m", memory_pressure_path); | |
4950 | memory_pressure_path = mfree(memory_pressure_path); | |
4951 | } | |
4952 | } else if (cgroup_context->memory_pressure_watch == CGROUP_PRESSURE_WATCH_OFF) { | |
4953 | memory_pressure_path = strdup("/dev/null"); /* /dev/null is explicit indicator for turning of memory pressure watch */ | |
4954 | if (!memory_pressure_path) { | |
4955 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4956 | return log_oom(); | |
4957 | } | |
4958 | } | |
034c6ed7 | 4959 | } |
d35fbf6b | 4960 | } |
034c6ed7 | 4961 | |
211a3d87 LB |
4962 | needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); |
4963 | ||
5b10116e | 4964 | for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { |
211a3d87 | 4965 | r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); |
12145637 LP |
4966 | if (r < 0) |
4967 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); | |
d35fbf6b | 4968 | } |
94f04347 | 4969 | |
bb0c0d6f LP |
4970 | if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { |
4971 | r = setup_credentials(context, params, unit->id, uid); | |
4972 | if (r < 0) { | |
4973 | *exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS; | |
4974 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m"); | |
4975 | } | |
4976 | } | |
4977 | ||
7bce046b | 4978 | r = build_environment( |
fd63e712 | 4979 | unit, |
7bce046b LP |
4980 | context, |
4981 | params, | |
6bb00842 | 4982 | cgroup_context, |
7bce046b | 4983 | n_fds, |
cd48e23f | 4984 | fdnames, |
7bce046b LP |
4985 | home, |
4986 | username, | |
4987 | shell, | |
4988 | journal_stream_dev, | |
4989 | journal_stream_ino, | |
6bb00842 | 4990 | memory_pressure_path, |
7bce046b | 4991 | &our_env); |
2065ca69 JW |
4992 | if (r < 0) { |
4993 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
12145637 | 4994 | return log_oom(); |
2065ca69 JW |
4995 | } |
4996 | ||
4997 | r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env); | |
4998 | if (r < 0) { | |
4999 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
12145637 | 5000 | return log_oom(); |
2065ca69 JW |
5001 | } |
5002 | ||
adf769b0 ZJS |
5003 | /* The $PATH variable is set to the default path in params->environment. However, this is overridden |
5004 | * if user-specified fields have $PATH set. The intention is to also override $PATH if the unit does | |
5005 | * not specify PATH but the unit has ExecSearchPath. */ | |
8c35c10d | 5006 | if (!strv_isempty(context->exec_search_path)) { |
5007 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; | |
5008 | ||
5009 | joined = strv_join(context->exec_search_path, ":"); | |
5010 | if (!joined) { | |
5011 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5012 | return log_oom(); | |
5013 | } | |
5014 | ||
5015 | r = strv_env_assign(&joined_exec_search_path, "PATH", joined); | |
5016 | if (r < 0) { | |
5017 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5018 | return log_oom(); | |
5019 | } | |
5020 | } | |
5021 | ||
4ab3d29f | 5022 | accum_env = strv_env_merge(params->environment, |
2065ca69 | 5023 | our_env, |
8c35c10d | 5024 | joined_exec_search_path, |
2065ca69 JW |
5025 | pass_env, |
5026 | context->environment, | |
44e5d006 | 5027 | files_env); |
2065ca69 JW |
5028 | if (!accum_env) { |
5029 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
12145637 | 5030 | return log_oom(); |
2065ca69 | 5031 | } |
1280503b | 5032 | accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env); |
2065ca69 | 5033 | |
096424d1 | 5034 | (void) umask(context->umask); |
b213e1c1 | 5035 | |
b1edf445 | 5036 | r = setup_keyring(unit, context, params, uid, gid); |
74dd6b51 LP |
5037 | if (r < 0) { |
5038 | *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING; | |
12145637 | 5039 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); |
74dd6b51 LP |
5040 | } |
5041 | ||
adf769b0 ZJS |
5042 | /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted |
5043 | * from it. */ | |
1703fa41 | 5044 | needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); |
7f18ef0a | 5045 | |
adf769b0 ZJS |
5046 | /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked |
5047 | * for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps. */ | |
165a31c0 | 5048 | needs_ambient_hack = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC) && !ambient_capabilities_supported(); |
7f18ef0a | 5049 | |
adf769b0 ZJS |
5050 | /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly |
5051 | * excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not | |
5052 | * desired. */ | |
165a31c0 LP |
5053 | if (needs_ambient_hack) |
5054 | needs_setuid = false; | |
5055 | else | |
5056 | needs_setuid = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID)); | |
5057 | ||
638fd8cc LP |
5058 | uint64_t capability_ambient_set = context->capability_ambient_set; |
5059 | ||
165a31c0 | 5060 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
adf769b0 ZJS |
5061 | /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on |
5062 | * /sys being present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as | |
5063 | * possible, to avoid impacting our own code paths. */ | |
7f18ef0a | 5064 | |
349cc4a5 | 5065 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
43b1f709 | 5066 | use_selinux = mac_selinux_use(); |
7f18ef0a | 5067 | #endif |
f9fa32f0 | 5068 | #if ENABLE_SMACK |
43b1f709 | 5069 | use_smack = mac_smack_use(); |
7f18ef0a | 5070 | #endif |
349cc4a5 | 5071 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
43b1f709 | 5072 | use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use(); |
7f18ef0a | 5073 | #endif |
165a31c0 | 5074 | } |
7f18ef0a | 5075 | |
ce932d2d LP |
5076 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
5077 | int which_failed; | |
5078 | ||
5079 | /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what | |
5080 | * is set here. (See below.) */ | |
5081 | ||
5082 | r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed); | |
5083 | if (r < 0) { | |
5084 | *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; | |
5085 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); | |
5086 | } | |
5087 | } | |
5088 | ||
0af07108 | 5089 | if (needs_setuid && context->pam_name && username) { |
ce932d2d LP |
5090 | /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits |
5091 | * wins here. (See above.) */ | |
5092 | ||
1da37e58 | 5093 | /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */ |
0af07108 ZJS |
5094 | r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds); |
5095 | if (r < 0) { | |
5096 | *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; | |
5097 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); | |
165a31c0 | 5098 | } |
ac45f971 | 5099 | |
638fd8cc LP |
5100 | if (ambient_capabilities_supported()) { |
5101 | uint64_t ambient_after_pam; | |
5102 | ||
5103 | /* PAM modules might have set some ambient caps. Query them here and merge them into | |
5104 | * the caps we want to set in the end, so that we don't end up unsetting them. */ | |
5105 | r = capability_get_ambient(&ambient_after_pam); | |
5106 | if (r < 0) { | |
5107 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5108 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to query ambient caps: %m"); | |
5109 | } | |
5110 | ||
5111 | capability_ambient_set |= ambient_after_pam; | |
5112 | } | |
5113 | ||
0af07108 ZJS |
5114 | ngids_after_pam = getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam); |
5115 | if (ngids_after_pam < 0) { | |
5116 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5117 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); | |
5749f855 | 5118 | } |
b213e1c1 | 5119 | } |
5749f855 | 5120 | |
6ef721cb | 5121 | if (needs_sandboxing && exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users(context, unit->manager)) { |
5749f855 AZ |
5122 | /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces. |
5123 | * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to | |
5124 | * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */ | |
0af07108 | 5125 | |
0af07108 | 5126 | r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); |
6ef721cb LB |
5127 | /* If it was requested explicitly and we can't set it up, fail early. Otherwise, continue and let |
5128 | * the actual requested operations fail (or silently continue). */ | |
5129 | if (r < 0 && context->private_users) { | |
0af07108 ZJS |
5130 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; |
5131 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); | |
5749f855 | 5132 | } |
6ef721cb LB |
5133 | if (r < 0) |
5134 | log_unit_info_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user, ignoring: %m"); | |
5135 | else | |
5136 | userns_set_up = true; | |
5749f855 AZ |
5137 | } |
5138 | ||
28135da3 | 5139 | if (exec_needs_network_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
a8d08f39 | 5140 | |
6e2d7c4f | 5141 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET)) { |
28135da3 | 5142 | r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWNET); |
1406bd66 LP |
5143 | if (r < 0) { |
5144 | if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
5145 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, | |
5146 | "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); | |
5147 | else { | |
5148 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
5149 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); | |
5150 | } | |
6e2d7c4f | 5151 | } |
a8d08f39 LP |
5152 | } else if (context->network_namespace_path) { |
5153 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
ee00d1e9 ZJS |
5154 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), |
5155 | "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); | |
6e2d7c4f MS |
5156 | } else |
5157 | log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring."); | |
d35fbf6b | 5158 | } |
169c1bda | 5159 | |
28135da3 | 5160 | if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
a70581ff XR |
5161 | |
5162 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_IPC)) { | |
28135da3 | 5163 | r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWIPC); |
a70581ff XR |
5164 | if (r == -EPERM) |
5165 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, | |
5166 | "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but IPC namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); | |
5167 | else if (r < 0) { | |
5168 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
5169 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up IPC namespacing: %m"); | |
5170 | } | |
5171 | } else if (context->ipc_namespace_path) { | |
5172 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
5173 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
5174 | "IPCNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); | |
5175 | } else | |
5176 | log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support IPC namespaces, ignoring."); | |
5177 | } | |
5178 | ||
ee818b89 | 5179 | if (needs_mount_namespace) { |
7cc5ef5f ZJS |
5180 | _cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL; |
5181 | ||
d4b6ec98 | 5182 | r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path); |
3fbe8dbe LP |
5183 | if (r < 0) { |
5184 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
7cc5ef5f ZJS |
5185 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", |
5186 | error_path ? ": " : "", strempty(error_path)); | |
3fbe8dbe | 5187 | } |
d35fbf6b | 5188 | } |
81a2b7ce | 5189 | |
daf8f72b LP |
5190 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
5191 | r = apply_protect_hostname(unit, context, exit_status); | |
5192 | if (r < 0) | |
5193 | return r; | |
aecd5ac6 TM |
5194 | } |
5195 | ||
85614c6e SR |
5196 | if (context->memory_ksm >= 0) |
5197 | if (prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE, context->memory_ksm) < 0) { | |
5198 | if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno)) | |
5199 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, errno, "KSM support not available, ignoring."); | |
5200 | else { | |
5201 | *exit_status = EXIT_KSM; | |
5202 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set KSM: %m"); | |
5203 | } | |
5204 | } | |
5205 | ||
5749f855 AZ |
5206 | /* Drop groups as early as possible. |
5207 | * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root. | |
5208 | * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */ | |
165a31c0 | 5209 | if (needs_setuid) { |
afb11bf1 DG |
5210 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_to_enforce = NULL; |
5211 | int ngids_to_enforce = 0; | |
5212 | ||
5213 | ngids_to_enforce = merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids, | |
5214 | ngids, | |
5215 | gids_after_pam, | |
5216 | ngids_after_pam, | |
5217 | &gids_to_enforce); | |
5218 | if (ngids_to_enforce < 0) { | |
5219 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5220 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, | |
5221 | ngids_to_enforce, | |
5222 | "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m"); | |
5223 | } | |
5224 | ||
5225 | r = enforce_groups(gid, gids_to_enforce, ngids_to_enforce); | |
096424d1 LP |
5226 | if (r < 0) { |
5227 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
12145637 | 5228 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); |
096424d1 | 5229 | } |
165a31c0 | 5230 | } |
096424d1 | 5231 | |
5749f855 AZ |
5232 | /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now. |
5233 | * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be | |
d09df6b9 | 5234 | * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namespaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the |
5749f855 AZ |
5235 | * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a |
5236 | * different user namespace). */ | |
9008e1ac | 5237 | |
5749f855 AZ |
5238 | if (needs_sandboxing && context->private_users && !userns_set_up) { |
5239 | r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); | |
5240 | if (r < 0) { | |
5241 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
5242 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); | |
d251207d LP |
5243 | } |
5244 | } | |
5245 | ||
9f71ba8d ZJS |
5246 | /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we |
5247 | * shall execute. */ | |
5248 | ||
5249 | _cleanup_free_ char *executable = NULL; | |
254d1313 | 5250 | _cleanup_close_ int executable_fd = -EBADF; |
8c35c10d | 5251 | r = find_executable_full(command->path, /* root= */ NULL, context->exec_search_path, false, &executable, &executable_fd); |
9f71ba8d ZJS |
5252 | if (r < 0) { |
5253 | if (r != -ENOMEM && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) { | |
c2503e35 RH |
5254 | log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_INFO, r, |
5255 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
5256 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
5257 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", | |
5258 | command->path), | |
5259 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); | |
9f71ba8d ZJS |
5260 | return 0; |
5261 | } | |
5262 | ||
5263 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
c2503e35 RH |
5264 | |
5265 | return log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_INFO, r, | |
5266 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
5267 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
5268 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed to locate executable %s: %m", | |
5269 | command->path), | |
5270 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); | |
9f71ba8d ZJS |
5271 | } |
5272 | ||
b83d5050 ZJS |
5273 | r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, executable_fd, &executable_fd); |
5274 | if (r < 0) { | |
5275 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
5276 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
5277 | } | |
5278 | ||
9f71ba8d | 5279 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
49590d67 | 5280 | if (needs_sandboxing && use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net) { |
254d1313 | 5281 | int fd = -EBADF; |
49590d67 MS |
5282 | |
5283 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
5284 | fd = socket_fd; | |
5285 | else if (params->n_socket_fds == 1) | |
5286 | /* If stdin is not connected to a socket but we are triggered by exactly one socket unit then we | |
5287 | * use context from that fd to compute the label. */ | |
5288 | fd = params->fds[0]; | |
5289 | ||
5290 | if (fd >= 0) { | |
5291 | r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(fd, executable, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); | |
006d1864 TM |
5292 | if (r < 0) { |
5293 | if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { | |
5294 | *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; | |
5295 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); | |
5296 | } | |
5297 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context, ignoring: %m"); | |
49590d67 | 5298 | } |
9f71ba8d ZJS |
5299 | } |
5300 | } | |
5301 | #endif | |
5302 | ||
4a055e5a ZJS |
5303 | /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that |
5304 | * we are more aggressive this time, since we don't need socket_fd and the netns and ipcns fds any | |
5305 | * more. We do keep exec_fd however, if we have it, since we need to keep it open until the final | |
5306 | * execve(). */ | |
5686391b | 5307 | |
1da37e58 | 5308 | r = close_all_fds(keep_fds, n_keep_fds); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
5309 | if (r >= 0) |
5310 | r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); | |
5311 | if (r >= 0) | |
cd48e23f | 5312 | r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
5313 | if (r < 0) { |
5314 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
12145637 | 5315 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); |
d35fbf6b | 5316 | } |
e66cf1a3 | 5317 | |
5686391b LP |
5318 | /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off |
5319 | * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined, | |
5320 | * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we | |
5321 | * came this far. */ | |
5322 | ||
165a31c0 | 5323 | secure_bits = context->secure_bits; |
e66cf1a3 | 5324 | |
165a31c0 LP |
5325 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
5326 | uint64_t bset; | |
e66cf1a3 | 5327 | |
4a055e5a ZJS |
5328 | /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. |
5329 | * (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see above, in order | |
5330 | * to take precedence.) */ | |
f4170c67 LP |
5331 | if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) { |
5332 | if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) { | |
5333 | *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; | |
12145637 | 5334 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); |
f4170c67 LP |
5335 | } |
5336 | } | |
5337 | ||
37ac2744 JB |
5338 | #if ENABLE_SMACK |
5339 | /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the | |
5340 | * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */ | |
5341 | if (use_smack) { | |
aa5ae971 | 5342 | r = setup_smack(unit->manager, context, executable_fd); |
29ff6247 | 5343 | if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) { |
37ac2744 JB |
5344 | *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; |
5345 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); | |
5346 | } | |
5347 | } | |
5348 | #endif | |
5349 | ||
165a31c0 LP |
5350 | bset = context->capability_bounding_set; |
5351 | /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for | |
5352 | * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own, | |
5353 | * instead of us doing that */ | |
5354 | if (needs_ambient_hack) | |
5355 | bset |= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP) | | |
5356 | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID) | | |
5357 | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID); | |
5358 | ||
5359 | if (!cap_test_all(bset)) { | |
638fd8cc | 5360 | r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, /* right_now= */ false); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
5361 | if (r < 0) { |
5362 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
12145637 | 5363 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); |
3b8bddde | 5364 | } |
4c2630eb | 5365 | } |
3b8bddde | 5366 | |
16fcb191 TK |
5367 | /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with |
5368 | * keep-caps set. | |
a954b249 LP |
5369 | * |
5370 | * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be added to | |
5371 | * the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()). After setresuid() | |
5372 | * the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in the permitted and | |
5373 | * inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to set ambient capabilities | |
5374 | * without changing the user, so we also set the ambient capabilities here. | |
5375 | * | |
5376 | * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the second | |
5377 | * argument is true. */ | |
943800f4 | 5378 | if (!needs_ambient_hack) { |
638fd8cc | 5379 | r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ true); |
755d4b67 IP |
5380 | if (r < 0) { |
5381 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
12145637 | 5382 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); |
755d4b67 | 5383 | } |
755d4b67 | 5384 | } |
165a31c0 | 5385 | } |
755d4b67 | 5386 | |
fa97f630 JB |
5387 | /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */ |
5388 | r = apply_root_directory(context, params, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); | |
5389 | if (r < 0) | |
5390 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); | |
5391 | ||
165a31c0 | 5392 | if (needs_setuid) { |
08f67696 | 5393 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
638fd8cc | 5394 | r = enforce_user(context, uid, capability_ambient_set); |
ff0af2a1 LP |
5395 | if (r < 0) { |
5396 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
12145637 | 5397 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); |
5b6319dc | 5398 | } |
165a31c0 | 5399 | |
638fd8cc | 5400 | if (!needs_ambient_hack && capability_ambient_set != 0) { |
755d4b67 | 5401 | |
16fcb191 | 5402 | /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */ |
638fd8cc | 5403 | r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ false); |
755d4b67 IP |
5404 | if (r < 0) { |
5405 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
12145637 | 5406 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); |
755d4b67 | 5407 | } |
755d4b67 | 5408 | } |
5b6319dc | 5409 | } |
165a31c0 | 5410 | } |
d35fbf6b | 5411 | |
56ef8db9 JB |
5412 | /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running |
5413 | * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */ | |
fa97f630 | 5414 | r = apply_working_directory(context, params, home, exit_status); |
56ef8db9 JB |
5415 | if (r < 0) |
5416 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); | |
5417 | ||
165a31c0 | 5418 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
37ac2744 | 5419 | /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to |
5cd9cd35 LP |
5420 | * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires |
5421 | * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls | |
5422 | * are restricted. */ | |
5423 | ||
349cc4a5 | 5424 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
43b1f709 | 5425 | if (use_selinux) { |
5cd9cd35 LP |
5426 | char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; |
5427 | ||
5428 | if (exec_context) { | |
5429 | r = setexeccon(exec_context); | |
006d1864 TM |
5430 | if (r < 0) { |
5431 | if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { | |
5432 | *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; | |
5433 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); | |
5434 | } | |
5435 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s, ignoring: %m", exec_context); | |
5cd9cd35 LP |
5436 | } |
5437 | } | |
5438 | } | |
5439 | #endif | |
5440 | ||
349cc4a5 | 5441 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
43b1f709 | 5442 | if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) { |
5cd9cd35 LP |
5443 | r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); |
5444 | if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { | |
5445 | *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; | |
12145637 | 5446 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context->apparmor_profile); |
5cd9cd35 LP |
5447 | } |
5448 | } | |
5449 | #endif | |
5450 | ||
a954b249 LP |
5451 | /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential |
5452 | * EPERMs we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits | |
5453 | * requires CAP_SETPCAP. */ | |
dbdc4098 | 5454 | if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits) { |
69e3234d | 5455 | /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the |
dbdc4098 | 5456 | * effective set here. |
a954b249 LP |
5457 | * |
5458 | * The effective set is overwritten during execve() with the following values: | |
5459 | * | |
dbdc4098 | 5460 | * - ambient set (for non-root processes) |
a954b249 | 5461 | * |
dbdc4098 TK |
5462 | * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes) |
5463 | * | |
5464 | * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve | |
5465 | */ | |
a954b249 | 5466 | r = capability_gain_cap_setpcap(/* return_caps= */ NULL); |
dbdc4098 TK |
5467 | if (r < 0) { |
5468 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5469 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits"); | |
5470 | } | |
755d4b67 | 5471 | if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { |
ff0af2a1 | 5472 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; |
12145637 | 5473 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); |
ff01d048 | 5474 | } |
dbdc4098 | 5475 | } |
5b6319dc | 5476 | |
59eeb84b | 5477 | if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context)) |
d35fbf6b | 5478 | if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { |
ff0af2a1 | 5479 | *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; |
12145637 | 5480 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); |
d35fbf6b DM |
5481 | } |
5482 | ||
349cc4a5 | 5483 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
469830d1 LP |
5484 | r = apply_address_families(unit, context); |
5485 | if (r < 0) { | |
5486 | *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; | |
12145637 | 5487 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); |
4c2630eb | 5488 | } |
04aa0cb9 | 5489 | |
469830d1 LP |
5490 | r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit, context); |
5491 | if (r < 0) { | |
5492 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5493 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); |
f3e43635 | 5494 | } |
f4170c67 | 5495 | |
469830d1 LP |
5496 | r = apply_restrict_realtime(unit, context); |
5497 | if (r < 0) { | |
5498 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5499 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); |
f4170c67 LP |
5500 | } |
5501 | ||
f69567cb LP |
5502 | r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit, context); |
5503 | if (r < 0) { | |
5504 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5505 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); | |
5506 | } | |
5507 | ||
add00535 LP |
5508 | r = apply_restrict_namespaces(unit, context); |
5509 | if (r < 0) { | |
5510 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5511 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); |
add00535 LP |
5512 | } |
5513 | ||
469830d1 LP |
5514 | r = apply_protect_sysctl(unit, context); |
5515 | if (r < 0) { | |
5516 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5517 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); |
502d704e DH |
5518 | } |
5519 | ||
469830d1 LP |
5520 | r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context); |
5521 | if (r < 0) { | |
5522 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5523 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); |
59eeb84b LP |
5524 | } |
5525 | ||
84703040 KK |
5526 | r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit, context); |
5527 | if (r < 0) { | |
5528 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5529 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); | |
5530 | } | |
5531 | ||
fc64760d KK |
5532 | r = apply_protect_clock(unit, context); |
5533 | if (r < 0) { | |
5534 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5535 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); | |
5536 | } | |
5537 | ||
469830d1 LP |
5538 | r = apply_private_devices(unit, context); |
5539 | if (r < 0) { | |
5540 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5541 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); |
469830d1 LP |
5542 | } |
5543 | ||
5544 | r = apply_syscall_archs(unit, context); | |
5545 | if (r < 0) { | |
5546 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5547 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); |
ba128bb8 LP |
5548 | } |
5549 | ||
78e864e5 TM |
5550 | r = apply_lock_personality(unit, context); |
5551 | if (r < 0) { | |
5552 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5553 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); |
78e864e5 TM |
5554 | } |
5555 | ||
9df2cdd8 TM |
5556 | r = apply_syscall_log(unit, context); |
5557 | if (r < 0) { | |
5558 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5559 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m"); | |
5560 | } | |
5561 | ||
5cd9cd35 LP |
5562 | /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected |
5563 | * by the filter as little as possible. */ | |
165a31c0 | 5564 | r = apply_syscall_filter(unit, context, needs_ambient_hack); |
469830d1 LP |
5565 | if (r < 0) { |
5566 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
12145637 | 5567 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); |
d35fbf6b DM |
5568 | } |
5569 | #endif | |
b1994387 ILG |
5570 | |
5571 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF | |
5572 | r = apply_restrict_filesystems(unit, context); | |
5573 | if (r < 0) { | |
5574 | *exit_status = EXIT_BPF; | |
5575 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); | |
5576 | } | |
5577 | #endif | |
5578 | ||
d35fbf6b | 5579 | } |
034c6ed7 | 5580 | |
00819cc1 LP |
5581 | if (!strv_isempty(context->unset_environment)) { |
5582 | char **ee = NULL; | |
5583 | ||
5584 | ee = strv_env_delete(accum_env, 1, context->unset_environment); | |
5585 | if (!ee) { | |
5586 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
12145637 | 5587 | return log_oom(); |
00819cc1 LP |
5588 | } |
5589 | ||
130d3d22 | 5590 | strv_free_and_replace(accum_env, ee); |
00819cc1 LP |
5591 | } |
5592 | ||
7ca69792 AZ |
5593 | if (!FLAGS_SET(command->flags, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND)) { |
5594 | replaced_argv = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env); | |
5595 | if (!replaced_argv) { | |
5596 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5597 | return log_oom(); | |
5598 | } | |
5599 | final_argv = replaced_argv; | |
5600 | } else | |
5601 | final_argv = command->argv; | |
034c6ed7 | 5602 | |
3ff67ec4 | 5603 | log_command_line(unit, "Executing", executable, final_argv); |
dd305ec9 | 5604 | |
5686391b LP |
5605 | if (exec_fd >= 0) { |
5606 | uint8_t hot = 1; | |
5607 | ||
5608 | /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point | |
5609 | * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */ | |
5610 | ||
5611 | if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { | |
5612 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
5613 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); | |
5614 | } | |
5615 | } | |
5616 | ||
a6d9111c | 5617 | r = fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd, executable, final_argv, accum_env); |
5686391b LP |
5618 | |
5619 | if (exec_fd >= 0) { | |
5620 | uint8_t hot = 0; | |
5621 | ||
5622 | /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager | |
5623 | * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */ | |
5624 | ||
5625 | if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { | |
5626 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
5627 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); | |
5628 | } | |
5629 | } | |
12145637 | 5630 | |
ff0af2a1 | 5631 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; |
9f71ba8d | 5632 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); |
d35fbf6b | 5633 | } |
81a2b7ce | 5634 | |
34cf6c43 | 5635 | static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); |
2caa38e9 | 5636 | static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); |
34cf6c43 | 5637 | |
f2341e0a LP |
5638 | int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, |
5639 | ExecCommand *command, | |
d35fbf6b DM |
5640 | const ExecContext *context, |
5641 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
28135da3 | 5642 | ExecRuntime *runtime, |
6bb00842 | 5643 | const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, |
d35fbf6b | 5644 | pid_t *ret) { |
8351ceae | 5645 | |
ee39ca20 | 5646 | int socket_fd, r, named_iofds[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds = NULL; |
78f93209 | 5647 | _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL; |
d35fbf6b | 5648 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; |
da6053d0 | 5649 | size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; |
d35fbf6b | 5650 | pid_t pid; |
8351ceae | 5651 | |
f2341e0a | 5652 | assert(unit); |
d35fbf6b DM |
5653 | assert(command); |
5654 | assert(context); | |
5655 | assert(ret); | |
5656 | assert(params); | |
25b583d7 | 5657 | assert(params->fds || (params->n_socket_fds + params->n_storage_fds <= 0)); |
4298d0b5 | 5658 | |
4b2af439 DDM |
5659 | LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_UNIT(unit); |
5660 | ||
d35fbf6b DM |
5661 | if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || |
5662 | context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || | |
5663 | context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { | |
17df7223 | 5664 | |
d85ff944 YW |
5665 | if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) |
5666 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); | |
eef65bf3 | 5667 | |
d85ff944 YW |
5668 | if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) |
5669 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); | |
488ab41c | 5670 | |
d35fbf6b DM |
5671 | socket_fd = params->fds[0]; |
5672 | } else { | |
254d1313 | 5673 | socket_fd = -EBADF; |
d35fbf6b | 5674 | fds = params->fds; |
9b141911 | 5675 | n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; |
25b583d7 | 5676 | n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; |
d35fbf6b | 5677 | } |
94f04347 | 5678 | |
34cf6c43 | 5679 | r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); |
52c239d7 LB |
5680 | if (r < 0) |
5681 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); | |
5682 | ||
f2341e0a | 5683 | r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env); |
ff0af2a1 | 5684 | if (r < 0) |
f2341e0a | 5685 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m"); |
034c6ed7 | 5686 | |
9f71ba8d ZJS |
5687 | /* Fork with up-to-date SELinux label database, so the child inherits the up-to-date db |
5688 | and, until the next SELinux policy changes, we save further reloads in future children. */ | |
2df2152c CG |
5689 | mac_selinux_maybe_reload(); |
5690 | ||
3ff67ec4 ZJS |
5691 | /* We won't know the real executable path until we create the mount namespace in the child, but we |
5692 | want to log from the parent, so we use the possibly inaccurate path here. */ | |
5693 | log_command_line(unit, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); | |
12145637 | 5694 | |
78f93209 | 5695 | if (params->cgroup_path) { |
a8b993dc | 5696 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &subcgroup_path); |
78f93209 LP |
5697 | if (r < 0) |
5698 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m"); | |
18c1e481 LP |
5699 | if (r > 0) { |
5700 | /* If there's a subcgroup, then let's create it here now (the main cgroup was already | |
5701 | * realized by the unit logic) */ | |
5702 | ||
78f93209 LP |
5703 | r = cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path); |
5704 | if (r < 0) | |
a8b993dc | 5705 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to create subcgroup '%s': %m", subcgroup_path); |
78f93209 LP |
5706 | } |
5707 | } | |
5708 | ||
d35fbf6b DM |
5709 | pid = fork(); |
5710 | if (pid < 0) | |
74129a12 | 5711 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m"); |
d35fbf6b DM |
5712 | |
5713 | if (pid == 0) { | |
12145637 | 5714 | int exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; |
ff0af2a1 | 5715 | |
f2341e0a LP |
5716 | r = exec_child(unit, |
5717 | command, | |
ff0af2a1 LP |
5718 | context, |
5719 | params, | |
5720 | runtime, | |
6bb00842 | 5721 | cgroup_context, |
ff0af2a1 | 5722 | socket_fd, |
52c239d7 | 5723 | named_iofds, |
4c47affc | 5724 | fds, |
9b141911 | 5725 | n_socket_fds, |
25b583d7 | 5726 | n_storage_fds, |
ff0af2a1 | 5727 | files_env, |
00d9ef85 | 5728 | unit->manager->user_lookup_fds[1], |
12145637 LP |
5729 | &exit_status); |
5730 | ||
e1714f02 ZJS |
5731 | if (r < 0) { |
5732 | const char *status = | |
5733 | exit_status_to_string(exit_status, | |
e04ed6db | 5734 | EXIT_STATUS_LIBC | EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD); |
e1714f02 | 5735 | |
c2503e35 RH |
5736 | log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_ERR, r, |
5737 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
5738 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
5739 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m", | |
5740 | status, command->path), | |
5741 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); | |
e1714f02 | 5742 | } |
4c2630eb | 5743 | |
ff0af2a1 | 5744 | _exit(exit_status); |
034c6ed7 LP |
5745 | } |
5746 | ||
f2341e0a | 5747 | log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid); |
23635a85 | 5748 | |
78f93209 LP |
5749 | /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever |
5750 | * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the | |
5751 | * process will be killed too). */ | |
5752 | if (subcgroup_path) | |
5753 | (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path, pid); | |
2da3263a | 5754 | |
b58b4116 | 5755 | exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid); |
9fb86720 | 5756 | |
034c6ed7 | 5757 | *ret = pid; |
5cb5a6ff LP |
5758 | return 0; |
5759 | } | |
5760 | ||
034c6ed7 LP |
5761 | void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { |
5762 | assert(c); | |
5763 | ||
4c12626c | 5764 | c->umask = 0022; |
0692548c | 5765 | c->ioprio = IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO; |
94f04347 | 5766 | c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER; |
071830ff | 5767 | c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO; |
74922904 | 5768 | c->syslog_level_prefix = true; |
353e12c2 | 5769 | c->ignore_sigpipe = true; |
3a43da28 | 5770 | c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY; |
050f7277 | 5771 | c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID; |
5b10116e ZJS |
5772 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) |
5773 | c->directories[t].mode = 0755; | |
12213aed | 5774 | c->timeout_clean_usec = USEC_INFINITY; |
3fd5190b | 5775 | c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_MASK_UNSET; |
aa9d574d YW |
5776 | assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL != NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL); |
5777 | c->restrict_namespaces = NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL; | |
d3070fbd | 5778 | c->log_level_max = -1; |
005bfaf1 TM |
5779 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
5780 | c->syscall_errno = SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL; | |
5781 | #endif | |
51462135 DDM |
5782 | c->tty_rows = UINT_MAX; |
5783 | c->tty_cols = UINT_MAX; | |
b070c7c0 | 5784 | numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); |
24002121 | 5785 | c->private_mounts = -1; |
85614c6e | 5786 | c->memory_ksm = -1; |
034c6ed7 LP |
5787 | } |
5788 | ||
613b411c | 5789 | void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { |
5cb5a6ff LP |
5790 | assert(c); |
5791 | ||
6796073e LP |
5792 | c->environment = strv_free(c->environment); |
5793 | c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files); | |
b4c14404 | 5794 | c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment); |
00819cc1 | 5795 | c->unset_environment = strv_free(c->unset_environment); |
8c7be95e | 5796 | |
31ce987c | 5797 | rlimit_free_all(c->rlimit); |
034c6ed7 | 5798 | |
5b10116e | 5799 | for (size_t l = 0; l < 3; l++) { |
52c239d7 | 5800 | c->stdio_fdname[l] = mfree(c->stdio_fdname[l]); |
2038c3f5 LP |
5801 | c->stdio_file[l] = mfree(c->stdio_file[l]); |
5802 | } | |
52c239d7 | 5803 | |
a1e58e8e LP |
5804 | c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory); |
5805 | c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory); | |
915e6d16 | 5806 | c->root_image = mfree(c->root_image); |
18d73705 | 5807 | c->root_image_options = mount_options_free_all(c->root_image_options); |
0389f4fa LB |
5808 | c->root_hash = mfree(c->root_hash); |
5809 | c->root_hash_size = 0; | |
5810 | c->root_hash_path = mfree(c->root_hash_path); | |
d4d55b0d LB |
5811 | c->root_hash_sig = mfree(c->root_hash_sig); |
5812 | c->root_hash_sig_size = 0; | |
5813 | c->root_hash_sig_path = mfree(c->root_hash_sig_path); | |
0389f4fa | 5814 | c->root_verity = mfree(c->root_verity); |
93f59701 | 5815 | c->extension_images = mount_image_free_many(c->extension_images, &c->n_extension_images); |
a07b9926 | 5816 | c->extension_directories = strv_free(c->extension_directories); |
a1e58e8e LP |
5817 | c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path); |
5818 | c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier); | |
5819 | c->user = mfree(c->user); | |
5820 | c->group = mfree(c->group); | |
034c6ed7 | 5821 | |
6796073e | 5822 | c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups); |
94f04347 | 5823 | |
a1e58e8e | 5824 | c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name); |
5b6319dc | 5825 | |
2a624c36 AP |
5826 | c->read_only_paths = strv_free(c->read_only_paths); |
5827 | c->read_write_paths = strv_free(c->read_write_paths); | |
5828 | c->inaccessible_paths = strv_free(c->inaccessible_paths); | |
ddc155b2 TM |
5829 | c->exec_paths = strv_free(c->exec_paths); |
5830 | c->no_exec_paths = strv_free(c->no_exec_paths); | |
8c35c10d | 5831 | c->exec_search_path = strv_free(c->exec_search_path); |
82c121a4 | 5832 | |
d2d6c096 | 5833 | bind_mount_free_many(c->bind_mounts, c->n_bind_mounts); |
8e06d57c YW |
5834 | c->bind_mounts = NULL; |
5835 | c->n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
2abd4e38 YW |
5836 | temporary_filesystem_free_many(c->temporary_filesystems, c->n_temporary_filesystems); |
5837 | c->temporary_filesystems = NULL; | |
5838 | c->n_temporary_filesystems = 0; | |
b3d13314 | 5839 | c->mount_images = mount_image_free_many(c->mount_images, &c->n_mount_images); |
d2d6c096 | 5840 | |
0985c7c4 | 5841 | cpu_set_reset(&c->cpu_set); |
b070c7c0 | 5842 | numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); |
86a3475b | 5843 | |
a1e58e8e LP |
5844 | c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id); |
5845 | c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context); | |
5846 | c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile); | |
5b8e1b77 | 5847 | c->smack_process_label = mfree(c->smack_process_label); |
eef65bf3 | 5848 | |
b1994387 ILG |
5849 | c->restrict_filesystems = set_free(c->restrict_filesystems); |
5850 | ||
8cfa775f | 5851 | c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter); |
525d3cc7 LP |
5852 | c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs); |
5853 | c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); | |
e66cf1a3 | 5854 | |
5b10116e | 5855 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) |
211a3d87 | 5856 | exec_directory_done(&c->directories[t]); |
d3070fbd LP |
5857 | |
5858 | c->log_level_max = -1; | |
5859 | ||
5860 | exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c); | |
523ea123 QD |
5861 | c->log_filter_allowed_patterns = set_free(c->log_filter_allowed_patterns); |
5862 | c->log_filter_denied_patterns = set_free(c->log_filter_denied_patterns); | |
08f3be7a | 5863 | |
5ac1530e ZJS |
5864 | c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec = 0; |
5865 | c->log_ratelimit_burst = 0; | |
90fc172e | 5866 | |
08f3be7a LP |
5867 | c->stdin_data = mfree(c->stdin_data); |
5868 | c->stdin_data_size = 0; | |
a8d08f39 LP |
5869 | |
5870 | c->network_namespace_path = mfree(c->network_namespace_path); | |
71d1e583 | 5871 | c->ipc_namespace_path = mfree(c->ipc_namespace_path); |
91dd5f7c LP |
5872 | |
5873 | c->log_namespace = mfree(c->log_namespace); | |
bb0c0d6f | 5874 | |
43144be4 | 5875 | c->load_credentials = hashmap_free(c->load_credentials); |
bb0c0d6f | 5876 | c->set_credentials = hashmap_free(c->set_credentials); |
84be0c71 LP |
5877 | |
5878 | c->root_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->root_image_policy); | |
5879 | c->mount_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->mount_image_policy); | |
5880 | c->extension_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->extension_image_policy); | |
e66cf1a3 LP |
5881 | } |
5882 | ||
34cf6c43 | 5883 | int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) { |
e66cf1a3 LP |
5884 | assert(c); |
5885 | ||
5886 | if (!runtime_prefix) | |
5887 | return 0; | |
5888 | ||
211a3d87 | 5889 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].n_items; i++) { |
c2b2df60 | 5890 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; |
e66cf1a3 | 5891 | |
494d0247 | 5892 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) |
211a3d87 | 5893 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items[i].path); |
494d0247 | 5894 | else |
211a3d87 | 5895 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items[i].path); |
e66cf1a3 LP |
5896 | if (!p) |
5897 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5898 | ||
7bc4bf4a LP |
5899 | /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the |
5900 | * service next. */ | |
c6878637 | 5901 | (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT); |
211a3d87 | 5902 | |
211a3d87 LB |
5903 | STRV_FOREACH(symlink, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items[i].symlinks) { |
5904 | _cleanup_free_ char *symlink_abs = NULL; | |
5905 | ||
5906 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) | |
5907 | symlink_abs = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", *symlink); | |
5908 | else | |
5909 | symlink_abs = path_join(runtime_prefix, *symlink); | |
5910 | if (!symlink_abs) | |
5911 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5912 | ||
5913 | (void) unlink(symlink_abs); | |
5914 | } | |
e66cf1a3 LP |
5915 | } |
5916 | ||
5917 | return 0; | |
5cb5a6ff LP |
5918 | } |
5919 | ||
bb0c0d6f LP |
5920 | int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix, const char *unit) { |
5921 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
5922 | ||
5923 | assert(c); | |
5924 | ||
5925 | if (!runtime_prefix || !unit) | |
5926 | return 0; | |
5927 | ||
5928 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, "credentials", unit); | |
5929 | if (!p) | |
5930 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5931 | ||
5932 | /* This is either a tmpfs/ramfs of its own, or a plain directory. Either way, let's first try to | |
5933 | * unmount it, and afterwards remove the mount point */ | |
5934 | (void) umount2(p, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); | |
5935 | (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_CHMOD); | |
5936 | ||
5937 | return 0; | |
5938 | } | |
5939 | ||
b9f976fb MK |
5940 | int exec_context_destroy_mount_ns_dir(Unit *u) { |
5941 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
5942 | ||
5943 | if (!u || !MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)) | |
5944 | return 0; | |
5945 | ||
5946 | p = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id); | |
5947 | if (!p) | |
5948 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5949 | ||
5950 | /* This is only filled transiently (see mount_in_namespace()), should be empty or even non-existent*/ | |
5951 | if (rmdir(p) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) | |
5952 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Unable to remove propagation dir '%s', ignoring: %m", p); | |
5953 | ||
5954 | return 0; | |
5955 | } | |
5956 | ||
34cf6c43 | 5957 | static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { |
43d0fcbd LP |
5958 | assert(c); |
5959 | ||
a1e58e8e | 5960 | c->path = mfree(c->path); |
6796073e | 5961 | c->argv = strv_free(c->argv); |
43d0fcbd LP |
5962 | } |
5963 | ||
da6053d0 | 5964 | void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { |
fe96c0f8 | 5965 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) |
43d0fcbd LP |
5966 | exec_command_done(c+i); |
5967 | } | |
5968 | ||
f1acf85a | 5969 | ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { |
5cb5a6ff LP |
5970 | ExecCommand *i; |
5971 | ||
5972 | while ((i = c)) { | |
71fda00f | 5973 | LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i); |
43d0fcbd | 5974 | exec_command_done(i); |
5cb5a6ff LP |
5975 | free(i); |
5976 | } | |
f1acf85a ZJS |
5977 | |
5978 | return NULL; | |
5cb5a6ff LP |
5979 | } |
5980 | ||
da6053d0 | 5981 | void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { |
5b10116e | 5982 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) |
f1acf85a | 5983 | c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]); |
034c6ed7 LP |
5984 | } |
5985 | ||
6a1d4d9f | 5986 | void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { |
5b10116e | 5987 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) |
6a1d4d9f LP |
5988 | exec_status_reset(&c[i].exec_status); |
5989 | } | |
5990 | ||
5991 | void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { | |
03677889 | 5992 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) |
6a1d4d9f LP |
5993 | LIST_FOREACH(command, z, c[i]) |
5994 | exec_status_reset(&z->exec_status); | |
6a1d4d9f LP |
5995 | } |
5996 | ||
039f0e70 | 5997 | typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo { |
34cf6c43 | 5998 | const Unit *unit; |
039f0e70 LP |
5999 | const char *path; |
6000 | } InvalidEnvInfo; | |
6001 | ||
6002 | static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) { | |
6003 | InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata; | |
6004 | ||
f2341e0a | 6005 | log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path); |
039f0e70 LP |
6006 | } |
6007 | ||
52c239d7 LB |
6008 | const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext *c, int fd_index) { |
6009 | assert(c); | |
6010 | ||
6011 | switch (fd_index) { | |
5073ff6b | 6012 | |
52c239d7 LB |
6013 | case STDIN_FILENO: |
6014 | if (c->std_input != EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6015 | return NULL; | |
5073ff6b | 6016 | |
52c239d7 | 6017 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] ?: "stdin"; |
5073ff6b | 6018 | |
52c239d7 LB |
6019 | case STDOUT_FILENO: |
6020 | if (c->std_output != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6021 | return NULL; | |
5073ff6b | 6022 | |
52c239d7 | 6023 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] ?: "stdout"; |
5073ff6b | 6024 | |
52c239d7 LB |
6025 | case STDERR_FILENO: |
6026 | if (c->std_error != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6027 | return NULL; | |
5073ff6b | 6028 | |
52c239d7 | 6029 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] ?: "stderr"; |
5073ff6b | 6030 | |
52c239d7 LB |
6031 | default: |
6032 | return NULL; | |
6033 | } | |
6034 | } | |
6035 | ||
2caa38e9 LP |
6036 | static int exec_context_named_iofds( |
6037 | const ExecContext *c, | |
6038 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
6039 | int named_iofds[static 3]) { | |
6040 | ||
5b10116e | 6041 | size_t targets; |
56fbd561 | 6042 | const char* stdio_fdname[3]; |
da6053d0 | 6043 | size_t n_fds; |
52c239d7 LB |
6044 | |
6045 | assert(c); | |
6046 | assert(p); | |
2caa38e9 | 6047 | assert(named_iofds); |
52c239d7 LB |
6048 | |
6049 | targets = (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + | |
6050 | (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + | |
6051 | (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD); | |
6052 | ||
5b10116e | 6053 | for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) |
52c239d7 LB |
6054 | stdio_fdname[i] = exec_context_fdname(c, i); |
6055 | ||
4c47affc FB |
6056 | n_fds = p->n_storage_fds + p->n_socket_fds; |
6057 | ||
5b10116e | 6058 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds && targets > 0; i++) |
56fbd561 ZJS |
6059 | if (named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] < 0 && |
6060 | c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
6061 | stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] && | |
6062 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO])) { | |
6063 | ||
52c239d7 LB |
6064 | named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; |
6065 | targets--; | |
56fbd561 ZJS |
6066 | |
6067 | } else if (named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] < 0 && | |
6068 | c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
6069 | stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] && | |
6070 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO])) { | |
6071 | ||
52c239d7 LB |
6072 | named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; |
6073 | targets--; | |
56fbd561 ZJS |
6074 | |
6075 | } else if (named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] < 0 && | |
6076 | c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
6077 | stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] && | |
6078 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO])) { | |
6079 | ||
52c239d7 LB |
6080 | named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; |
6081 | targets--; | |
6082 | } | |
6083 | ||
56fbd561 | 6084 | return targets == 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT; |
52c239d7 LB |
6085 | } |
6086 | ||
398a5009 ZJS |
6087 | static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { |
6088 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **v = NULL; | |
398a5009 | 6089 | int r; |
8c7be95e LP |
6090 | |
6091 | assert(c); | |
398a5009 | 6092 | assert(ret); |
8c7be95e LP |
6093 | |
6094 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) { | |
7fd1b19b | 6095 | _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {}; |
398a5009 ZJS |
6096 | bool ignore = false; |
6097 | char *fn = *i; | |
8c7be95e LP |
6098 | |
6099 | if (fn[0] == '-') { | |
6100 | ignore = true; | |
313cefa1 | 6101 | fn++; |
8c7be95e LP |
6102 | } |
6103 | ||
6104 | if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) { | |
8c7be95e LP |
6105 | if (ignore) |
6106 | continue; | |
8c7be95e LP |
6107 | return -EINVAL; |
6108 | } | |
6109 | ||
2bef10ab | 6110 | /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */ |
398a5009 ZJS |
6111 | r = safe_glob(fn, 0, &pglob); |
6112 | if (r < 0) { | |
2bef10ab PL |
6113 | if (ignore) |
6114 | continue; | |
398a5009 | 6115 | return r; |
2bef10ab | 6116 | } |
8c7be95e | 6117 | |
d8c92e8b ZJS |
6118 | /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */ |
6119 | assert(pglob.gl_pathc > 0); | |
6120 | ||
5b10116e | 6121 | for (unsigned n = 0; n < pglob.gl_pathc; n++) { |
398a5009 ZJS |
6122 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **p = NULL; |
6123 | ||
6124 | r = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], &p); | |
6125 | if (r < 0) { | |
2bef10ab PL |
6126 | if (ignore) |
6127 | continue; | |
398a5009 | 6128 | return r; |
e9c1ea9d | 6129 | } |
398a5009 | 6130 | |
ebc05a09 | 6131 | /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ |
039f0e70 LP |
6132 | if (p) { |
6133 | InvalidEnvInfo info = { | |
f2341e0a | 6134 | .unit = unit, |
039f0e70 LP |
6135 | .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n] |
6136 | }; | |
6137 | ||
6138 | p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info); | |
6139 | } | |
8c7be95e | 6140 | |
398a5009 ZJS |
6141 | if (!v) |
6142 | v = TAKE_PTR(p); | |
2bef10ab | 6143 | else { |
398a5009 | 6144 | char **m = strv_env_merge(v, p); |
c84a9488 | 6145 | if (!m) |
2bef10ab | 6146 | return -ENOMEM; |
2bef10ab | 6147 | |
398a5009 | 6148 | strv_free_and_replace(v, m); |
2bef10ab | 6149 | } |
8c7be95e LP |
6150 | } |
6151 | } | |
6152 | ||
398a5009 | 6153 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(v); |
8c7be95e LP |
6154 | |
6155 | return 0; | |
6156 | } | |
6157 | ||
6ac8fdc9 | 6158 | static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { |
7b912648 | 6159 | _cleanup_free_ char *resolved = NULL; |
6ac8fdc9 | 6160 | |
1e22b5cd LP |
6161 | if (!tty) |
6162 | return true; | |
6163 | ||
a119ec7c | 6164 | tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty); |
6ac8fdc9 MS |
6165 | |
6166 | /* trivial identity? */ | |
6167 | if (streq(tty, "console")) | |
6168 | return true; | |
6169 | ||
7b912648 LP |
6170 | if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved) < 0) |
6171 | return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */ | |
6ac8fdc9 MS |
6172 | |
6173 | /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */ | |
955f1c85 | 6174 | return path_equal(resolved, tty) || (streq(resolved, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); |
6ac8fdc9 MS |
6175 | } |
6176 | ||
6c0ae739 LP |
6177 | static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext *ec) { |
6178 | assert(ec); | |
1e22b5cd | 6179 | |
6c0ae739 | 6180 | return ec->tty_reset || |
1e22b5cd LP |
6181 | ec->tty_vhangup || |
6182 | ec->tty_vt_disallocate || | |
6ac8fdc9 MS |
6183 | is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) || |
6184 | is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) || | |
6c0ae739 LP |
6185 | is_terminal_output(ec->std_error); |
6186 | } | |
6187 | ||
6188 | bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext *ec) { | |
6189 | ||
6190 | return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec) && | |
1e22b5cd | 6191 | tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec)); |
6ac8fdc9 MS |
6192 | } |
6193 | ||
15ae422b | 6194 | static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) { |
15ae422b LP |
6195 | assert(f); |
6196 | ||
6197 | STRV_FOREACH(g, l) | |
6198 | fprintf(f, " %s", *g); | |
6199 | } | |
6200 | ||
ddc155b2 TM |
6201 | static void strv_dump(FILE* f, const char *prefix, const char *name, char **strv) { |
6202 | assert(f); | |
6203 | assert(prefix); | |
6204 | assert(name); | |
6205 | ||
6206 | if (!strv_isempty(strv)) { | |
a7bd1656 | 6207 | fprintf(f, "%s%s:", prefix, name); |
ddc155b2 TM |
6208 | strv_fprintf(f, strv); |
6209 | fputs("\n", f); | |
6210 | } | |
6211 | } | |
6212 | ||
34cf6c43 | 6213 | void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { |
add00535 | 6214 | int r; |
9eba9da4 | 6215 | |
5cb5a6ff LP |
6216 | assert(c); |
6217 | assert(f); | |
6218 | ||
4ad49000 | 6219 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
5cb5a6ff LP |
6220 | |
6221 | fprintf(f, | |
94f04347 LP |
6222 | "%sUMask: %04o\n" |
6223 | "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n" | |
451a074f | 6224 | "%sRootDirectory: %s\n" |
15ae422b | 6225 | "%sNonBlocking: %s\n" |
64747e2d | 6226 | "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n" |
7f112f50 | 6227 | "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n" |
59eeb84b | 6228 | "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n" |
e66a2f65 | 6229 | "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n" |
84703040 | 6230 | "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n" |
fc64760d | 6231 | "%sProtectClock: %s\n" |
59eeb84b | 6232 | "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n" |
d251207d LP |
6233 | "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n" |
6234 | "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n" | |
1b8689f9 LP |
6235 | "%sProtectHome: %s\n" |
6236 | "%sProtectSystem: %s\n" | |
5d997827 | 6237 | "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n" |
f3e43635 | 6238 | "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n" |
f4170c67 | 6239 | "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n" |
b1edf445 | 6240 | "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n" |
f69567cb | 6241 | "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n" |
aecd5ac6 | 6242 | "%sKeyringMode: %s\n" |
4e399953 LP |
6243 | "%sProtectHostname: %s\n" |
6244 | "%sProtectProc: %s\n" | |
6245 | "%sProcSubset: %s\n", | |
5cb5a6ff | 6246 | prefix, c->umask, |
14eb3285 LP |
6247 | prefix, empty_to_root(c->working_directory), |
6248 | prefix, empty_to_root(c->root_directory), | |
15ae422b | 6249 | prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking), |
64747e2d | 6250 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp), |
7f112f50 | 6251 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices), |
59eeb84b | 6252 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables), |
e66a2f65 | 6253 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules), |
84703040 | 6254 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_logs), |
fc64760d | 6255 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_clock), |
59eeb84b | 6256 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups), |
d251207d LP |
6257 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_network), |
6258 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_users), | |
1b8689f9 LP |
6259 | prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home), |
6260 | prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system), | |
5e98086d | 6261 | prefix, yes_no(exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(c)), |
f3e43635 | 6262 | prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe), |
f4170c67 | 6263 | prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute), |
b1edf445 | 6264 | prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime), |
f69567cb | 6265 | prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_suid_sgid), |
aecd5ac6 | 6266 | prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode), |
4e399953 LP |
6267 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname), |
6268 | prefix, protect_proc_to_string(c->protect_proc), | |
6269 | prefix, proc_subset_to_string(c->proc_subset)); | |
fb33a393 | 6270 | |
915e6d16 LP |
6271 | if (c->root_image) |
6272 | fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image); | |
6273 | ||
18d73705 | 6274 | if (c->root_image_options) { |
18d73705 LB |
6275 | fprintf(f, "%sRootImageOptions:", prefix); |
6276 | LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->root_image_options) | |
6277 | if (!isempty(o->options)) | |
9ece6444 LB |
6278 | fprintf(f, " %s:%s", |
6279 | partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), | |
6280 | o->options); | |
18d73705 LB |
6281 | fprintf(f, "\n"); |
6282 | } | |
6283 | ||
0389f4fa LB |
6284 | if (c->root_hash) { |
6285 | _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; | |
6286 | encoded = hexmem(c->root_hash, c->root_hash_size); | |
6287 | if (encoded) | |
6288 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix, encoded); | |
6289 | } | |
6290 | ||
6291 | if (c->root_hash_path) | |
6292 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix, c->root_hash_path); | |
6293 | ||
d4d55b0d LB |
6294 | if (c->root_hash_sig) { |
6295 | _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; | |
6296 | ssize_t len; | |
6297 | len = base64mem(c->root_hash_sig, c->root_hash_sig_size, &encoded); | |
6298 | if (len) | |
6299 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix, encoded); | |
6300 | } | |
6301 | ||
6302 | if (c->root_hash_sig_path) | |
6303 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix, c->root_hash_sig_path); | |
6304 | ||
0389f4fa LB |
6305 | if (c->root_verity) |
6306 | fprintf(f, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix, c->root_verity); | |
6307 | ||
8c7be95e LP |
6308 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment) |
6309 | fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6310 | ||
6311 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files) | |
6312 | fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
94f04347 | 6313 | |
b4c14404 FB |
6314 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment) |
6315 | fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6316 | ||
00819cc1 LP |
6317 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->unset_environment) |
6318 | fprintf(f, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6319 | ||
53f47dfc YW |
6320 | fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode)); |
6321 | ||
5b10116e | 6322 | for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { |
3536f49e YW |
6323 | fprintf(f, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].mode); |
6324 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
6325 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { |
6326 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].items[i].path); | |
6327 | ||
6328 | STRV_FOREACH(d, c->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) | |
6329 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s:%s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_symlink_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].items[i].path, *d); | |
6330 | } | |
3536f49e | 6331 | } |
c2bbd90b | 6332 | |
5291f26d | 6333 | fprintf(f, "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n", prefix, FORMAT_TIMESPAN(c->timeout_clean_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); |
12213aed | 6334 | |
fb33a393 | 6335 | if (c->nice_set) |
5291f26d | 6336 | fprintf(f, "%sNice: %i\n", prefix, c->nice); |
fb33a393 | 6337 | |
dd6c17b1 | 6338 | if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) |
5291f26d | 6339 | fprintf(f, "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n", prefix, c->oom_score_adjust); |
9eba9da4 | 6340 | |
ad21e542 | 6341 | if (c->coredump_filter_set) |
5291f26d | 6342 | fprintf(f, "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64"\n", prefix, c->coredump_filter); |
ad21e542 | 6343 | |
5b10116e | 6344 | for (unsigned i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) |
3c11da9d | 6345 | if (c->rlimit[i]) { |
4c3a2b84 | 6346 | fprintf(f, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n", |
3c11da9d | 6347 | prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); |
4c3a2b84 | 6348 | fprintf(f, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n", |
3c11da9d EV |
6349 | prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur); |
6350 | } | |
94f04347 | 6351 | |
f8b69d1d | 6352 | if (c->ioprio_set) { |
1756a011 | 6353 | _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL; |
f8b69d1d | 6354 | |
5bead76e | 6355 | r = ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(ioprio_prio_class(c->ioprio), &class_str); |
837df140 YW |
6356 | if (r >= 0) |
6357 | fprintf(f, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix, class_str); | |
6358 | ||
5bead76e | 6359 | fprintf(f, "%sIOPriority: %d\n", prefix, ioprio_prio_data(c->ioprio)); |
f8b69d1d | 6360 | } |
94f04347 | 6361 | |
f8b69d1d | 6362 | if (c->cpu_sched_set) { |
1756a011 | 6363 | _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; |
f8b69d1d | 6364 | |
837df140 YW |
6365 | r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); |
6366 | if (r >= 0) | |
6367 | fprintf(f, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix, policy_str); | |
6368 | ||
94f04347 | 6369 | fprintf(f, |
38b48754 LP |
6370 | "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n" |
6371 | "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n", | |
38b48754 LP |
6372 | prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority, |
6373 | prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork)); | |
b929bf04 | 6374 | } |
94f04347 | 6375 | |
0985c7c4 | 6376 | if (c->cpu_set.set) { |
e7fca352 MS |
6377 | _cleanup_free_ char *affinity = NULL; |
6378 | ||
6379 | affinity = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpu_set); | |
6380 | fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix, affinity); | |
94f04347 LP |
6381 | } |
6382 | ||
b070c7c0 MS |
6383 | if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))) { |
6384 | _cleanup_free_ char *nodes = NULL; | |
6385 | ||
6386 | nodes = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->numa_policy.nodes); | |
6387 | fprintf(f, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))); | |
6388 | fprintf(f, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix, strnull(nodes)); | |
6389 | } | |
6390 | ||
3a43da28 | 6391 | if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) |
ccd06097 | 6392 | fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec); |
94f04347 LP |
6393 | |
6394 | fprintf(f, | |
80876c20 LP |
6395 | "%sStandardInput: %s\n" |
6396 | "%sStandardOutput: %s\n" | |
6397 | "%sStandardError: %s\n", | |
6398 | prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input), | |
6399 | prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output), | |
6400 | prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error)); | |
6401 | ||
befc4a80 LP |
6402 | if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) |
6403 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
6404 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6405 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
6406 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6407 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
6408 | ||
6409 | if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE) | |
6410 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
6411 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) | |
6412 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
566b7d23 ZD |
6413 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) |
6414 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
8d7dab1f LW |
6415 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) |
6416 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
befc4a80 LP |
6417 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) |
6418 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
566b7d23 ZD |
6419 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) |
6420 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
8d7dab1f LW |
6421 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) |
6422 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
befc4a80 | 6423 | |
80876c20 LP |
6424 | if (c->tty_path) |
6425 | fprintf(f, | |
6ea832a2 LP |
6426 | "%sTTYPath: %s\n" |
6427 | "%sTTYReset: %s\n" | |
6428 | "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n" | |
51462135 DDM |
6429 | "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n" |
6430 | "%sTTYRows: %u\n" | |
6431 | "%sTTYColumns: %u\n", | |
6ea832a2 LP |
6432 | prefix, c->tty_path, |
6433 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset), | |
6434 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup), | |
51462135 DDM |
6435 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate), |
6436 | prefix, c->tty_rows, | |
6437 | prefix, c->tty_cols); | |
94f04347 | 6438 | |
9f6444eb | 6439 | if (IN_SET(c->std_output, |
9f6444eb LP |
6440 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, |
6441 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, | |
9f6444eb LP |
6442 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, |
6443 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) || | |
6444 | IN_SET(c->std_error, | |
9f6444eb LP |
6445 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, |
6446 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, | |
9f6444eb LP |
6447 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, |
6448 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE)) { | |
f8b69d1d | 6449 | |
5ce70e5b | 6450 | _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL; |
f8b69d1d | 6451 | |
837df140 YW |
6452 | r = log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str); |
6453 | if (r >= 0) | |
6454 | fprintf(f, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix, fac_str); | |
f8b69d1d | 6455 | |
837df140 YW |
6456 | r = log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str); |
6457 | if (r >= 0) | |
6458 | fprintf(f, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix, lvl_str); | |
f8b69d1d | 6459 | } |
94f04347 | 6460 | |
d3070fbd LP |
6461 | if (c->log_level_max >= 0) { |
6462 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; | |
6463 | ||
6464 | (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c->log_level_max, &t); | |
6465 | ||
6466 | fprintf(f, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix, strna(t)); | |
6467 | } | |
6468 | ||
5291f26d | 6469 | if (c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec > 0) |
90fc172e AZ |
6470 | fprintf(f, |
6471 | "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n", | |
5291f26d | 6472 | prefix, FORMAT_TIMESPAN(c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); |
90fc172e | 6473 | |
5ac1530e ZJS |
6474 | if (c->log_ratelimit_burst > 0) |
6475 | fprintf(f, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix, c->log_ratelimit_burst); | |
90fc172e | 6476 | |
523ea123 QD |
6477 | if (!set_isempty(c->log_filter_allowed_patterns) || !set_isempty(c->log_filter_denied_patterns)) { |
6478 | fprintf(f, "%sLogFilterPatterns:", prefix); | |
6479 | ||
6480 | char *pattern; | |
6481 | SET_FOREACH(pattern, c->log_filter_allowed_patterns) | |
6482 | fprintf(f, " %s", pattern); | |
6483 | SET_FOREACH(pattern, c->log_filter_denied_patterns) | |
6484 | fprintf(f, " ~%s", pattern); | |
6485 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6486 | } | |
6487 | ||
5b10116e ZJS |
6488 | for (size_t j = 0; j < c->n_log_extra_fields; j++) { |
6489 | fprintf(f, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix); | |
6490 | fwrite(c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_base, | |
6491 | 1, c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_len, | |
6492 | f); | |
6493 | fputc('\n', f); | |
d3070fbd LP |
6494 | } |
6495 | ||
91dd5f7c LP |
6496 | if (c->log_namespace) |
6497 | fprintf(f, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix, c->log_namespace); | |
6498 | ||
07d46372 YW |
6499 | if (c->secure_bits) { |
6500 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; | |
6501 | ||
6502 | r = secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c->secure_bits, &str); | |
6503 | if (r >= 0) | |
6504 | fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
6505 | } | |
94f04347 | 6506 | |
3fd5190b | 6507 | if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_MASK_UNSET) { |
dd1f5bd0 | 6508 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; |
94f04347 | 6509 | |
8142d735 | 6510 | r = capability_set_to_string(c->capability_bounding_set, &str); |
dd1f5bd0 YW |
6511 | if (r >= 0) |
6512 | fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
755d4b67 IP |
6513 | } |
6514 | ||
6515 | if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) { | |
dd1f5bd0 | 6516 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; |
755d4b67 | 6517 | |
8142d735 | 6518 | r = capability_set_to_string(c->capability_ambient_set, &str); |
dd1f5bd0 YW |
6519 | if (r >= 0) |
6520 | fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
94f04347 LP |
6521 | } |
6522 | ||
6523 | if (c->user) | |
f2d3769a | 6524 | fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user); |
94f04347 | 6525 | if (c->group) |
f2d3769a | 6526 | fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group); |
94f04347 | 6527 | |
29206d46 LP |
6528 | fprintf(f, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->dynamic_user)); |
6529 | ||
ddc155b2 | 6530 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "SupplementaryGroups", c->supplementary_groups); |
94f04347 | 6531 | |
5b6319dc | 6532 | if (c->pam_name) |
f2d3769a | 6533 | fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name); |
5b6319dc | 6534 | |
ddc155b2 TM |
6535 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ReadWritePaths", c->read_write_paths); |
6536 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ReadOnlyPaths", c->read_only_paths); | |
6537 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "InaccessiblePaths", c->inaccessible_paths); | |
6538 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExecPaths", c->exec_paths); | |
6539 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "NoExecPaths", c->no_exec_paths); | |
8c35c10d | 6540 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExecSearchPath", c->exec_search_path); |
2e22afe9 | 6541 | |
5b10116e ZJS |
6542 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_bind_mounts; i++) |
6543 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix, | |
6544 | c->bind_mounts[i].read_only ? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths", | |
6545 | c->bind_mounts[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", | |
6546 | c->bind_mounts[i].source, | |
6547 | c->bind_mounts[i].destination, | |
6548 | c->bind_mounts[i].recursive ? "rbind" : "norbind"); | |
d2d6c096 | 6549 | |
5b10116e ZJS |
6550 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_temporary_filesystems; i++) { |
6551 | const TemporaryFileSystem *t = c->temporary_filesystems + i; | |
2abd4e38 | 6552 | |
5b10116e ZJS |
6553 | fprintf(f, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix, |
6554 | t->path, | |
6555 | isempty(t->options) ? "" : ":", | |
6556 | strempty(t->options)); | |
6557 | } | |
2abd4e38 | 6558 | |
169c1bda LP |
6559 | if (c->utmp_id) |
6560 | fprintf(f, | |
6561 | "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n", | |
6562 | prefix, c->utmp_id); | |
7b52a628 MS |
6563 | |
6564 | if (c->selinux_context) | |
6565 | fprintf(f, | |
5f8640fb LP |
6566 | "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n", |
6567 | prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context); | |
17df7223 | 6568 | |
80c21aea WC |
6569 | if (c->apparmor_profile) |
6570 | fprintf(f, | |
6571 | "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n", | |
6572 | prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile); | |
6573 | ||
6574 | if (c->smack_process_label) | |
6575 | fprintf(f, | |
6576 | "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n", | |
6577 | prefix, c->smack_process_label_ignore ? "-" : "", c->smack_process_label); | |
6578 | ||
050f7277 | 6579 | if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) |
ac45f971 LP |
6580 | fprintf(f, |
6581 | "%sPersonality: %s\n", | |
6582 | prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality))); | |
6583 | ||
78e864e5 TM |
6584 | fprintf(f, |
6585 | "%sLockPersonality: %s\n", | |
6586 | prefix, yes_no(c->lock_personality)); | |
6587 | ||
17df7223 | 6588 | if (c->syscall_filter) { |
17df7223 | 6589 | fprintf(f, |
57183d11 | 6590 | "%sSystemCallFilter: ", |
17df7223 LP |
6591 | prefix); |
6592 | ||
6b000af4 | 6593 | if (!c->syscall_allow_list) |
17df7223 LP |
6594 | fputc('~', f); |
6595 | ||
349cc4a5 | 6596 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
d5a99b7c JJ |
6597 | void *id, *val; |
6598 | bool first = true; | |
90e74a66 | 6599 | HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_filter) { |
17df7223 | 6600 | _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; |
8cfa775f YW |
6601 | const char *errno_name = NULL; |
6602 | int num = PTR_TO_INT(val); | |
17df7223 LP |
6603 | |
6604 | if (first) | |
6605 | first = false; | |
6606 | else | |
6607 | fputc(' ', f); | |
6608 | ||
57183d11 | 6609 | name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); |
17df7223 | 6610 | fputs(strna(name), f); |
8cfa775f YW |
6611 | |
6612 | if (num >= 0) { | |
005bfaf1 | 6613 | errno_name = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num); |
8cfa775f YW |
6614 | if (errno_name) |
6615 | fprintf(f, ":%s", errno_name); | |
6616 | else | |
6617 | fprintf(f, ":%d", num); | |
6618 | } | |
17df7223 | 6619 | } |
351a19b1 | 6620 | #endif |
17df7223 LP |
6621 | |
6622 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6623 | } | |
6624 | ||
57183d11 | 6625 | if (c->syscall_archs) { |
57183d11 LP |
6626 | fprintf(f, |
6627 | "%sSystemCallArchitectures:", | |
6628 | prefix); | |
6629 | ||
349cc4a5 | 6630 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
d5a99b7c | 6631 | void *id; |
90e74a66 | 6632 | SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs) |
57183d11 LP |
6633 | fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1))); |
6634 | #endif | |
6635 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6636 | } | |
6637 | ||
add00535 LP |
6638 | if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) { |
6639 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; | |
6640 | ||
86c2a9f1 | 6641 | r = namespace_flags_to_string(c->restrict_namespaces, &s); |
add00535 LP |
6642 | if (r >= 0) |
6643 | fprintf(f, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n", | |
dd0395b5 | 6644 | prefix, strna(s)); |
add00535 LP |
6645 | } |
6646 | ||
b1994387 | 6647 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF |
8fe84dc8 YW |
6648 | if (exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) { |
6649 | char *fs; | |
6650 | SET_FOREACH(fs, c->restrict_filesystems) | |
6651 | fprintf(f, "%sRestrictFileSystems: %s\n", prefix, fs); | |
6652 | } | |
b1994387 ILG |
6653 | #endif |
6654 | ||
a8d08f39 LP |
6655 | if (c->network_namespace_path) |
6656 | fprintf(f, | |
6657 | "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n", | |
6658 | prefix, c->network_namespace_path); | |
6659 | ||
3df90f24 | 6660 | if (c->syscall_errno > 0) { |
3df90f24 YW |
6661 | fprintf(f, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix); |
6662 | ||
005bfaf1 | 6663 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
d5a99b7c | 6664 | const char *errno_name = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(c->syscall_errno); |
3df90f24 | 6665 | if (errno_name) |
005bfaf1 | 6666 | fputs(errno_name, f); |
3df90f24 | 6667 | else |
005bfaf1 TM |
6668 | fprintf(f, "%d", c->syscall_errno); |
6669 | #endif | |
6670 | fputc('\n', f); | |
3df90f24 | 6671 | } |
b3d13314 | 6672 | |
5b10116e | 6673 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_mount_images; i++) { |
79e20ceb | 6674 | fprintf(f, "%sMountImages: %s%s:%s", prefix, |
b3d13314 LB |
6675 | c->mount_images[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", |
6676 | c->mount_images[i].source, | |
79e20ceb | 6677 | c->mount_images[i].destination); |
427353f6 | 6678 | LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->mount_images[i].mount_options) |
79e20ceb | 6679 | fprintf(f, ":%s:%s", |
427353f6 | 6680 | partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), |
79e20ceb | 6681 | strempty(o->options)); |
427353f6 LB |
6682 | fprintf(f, "\n"); |
6683 | } | |
93f59701 LB |
6684 | |
6685 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_extension_images; i++) { | |
93f59701 LB |
6686 | fprintf(f, "%sExtensionImages: %s%s", prefix, |
6687 | c->extension_images[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", | |
6688 | c->extension_images[i].source); | |
6689 | LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->extension_images[i].mount_options) | |
6690 | fprintf(f, ":%s:%s", | |
6691 | partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), | |
6692 | strempty(o->options)); | |
6693 | fprintf(f, "\n"); | |
6694 | } | |
a07b9926 LB |
6695 | |
6696 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExtensionDirectories", c->extension_directories); | |
5cb5a6ff LP |
6697 | } |
6698 | ||
34cf6c43 | 6699 | bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { |
a931ad47 LP |
6700 | assert(c); |
6701 | ||
61233823 | 6702 | /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under |
a931ad47 LP |
6703 | * an unchanged UID or as root. */ |
6704 | ||
6705 | if (!c->user) | |
6706 | return true; | |
6707 | ||
6708 | if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0")) | |
6709 | return true; | |
6710 | ||
6711 | return false; | |
6712 | } | |
6713 | ||
34cf6c43 | 6714 | int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext *c) { |
7f452159 LP |
6715 | int p; |
6716 | ||
6717 | assert(c); | |
6718 | ||
6719 | if (c->ioprio_set) | |
6720 | return c->ioprio; | |
6721 | ||
6722 | p = ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0); | |
6723 | if (p < 0) | |
0692548c | 6724 | return IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO; |
7f452159 | 6725 | |
8b330d7d | 6726 | return ioprio_normalize(p); |
7f452159 LP |
6727 | } |
6728 | ||
5e98086d ZJS |
6729 | bool exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(const ExecContext *c) { |
6730 | assert(c); | |
6731 | ||
61198784 | 6732 | /* Explicit setting wins */ |
5e98086d ZJS |
6733 | if (c->mount_apivfs_set) |
6734 | return c->mount_apivfs; | |
6735 | ||
61198784 | 6736 | /* Default to "yes" if root directory or image are specified */ |
74e12520 | 6737 | if (exec_context_with_rootfs(c)) |
61198784 ZJS |
6738 | return true; |
6739 | ||
5e98086d ZJS |
6740 | return false; |
6741 | } | |
6742 | ||
d3070fbd | 6743 | void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext *c) { |
d3070fbd LP |
6744 | assert(c); |
6745 | ||
5b10116e | 6746 | for (size_t l = 0; l < c->n_log_extra_fields; l++) |
d3070fbd LP |
6747 | free(c->log_extra_fields[l].iov_base); |
6748 | c->log_extra_fields = mfree(c->log_extra_fields); | |
6749 | c->n_log_extra_fields = 0; | |
6750 | } | |
6751 | ||
6f765baf | 6752 | void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext *c) { |
254d1313 | 6753 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
0ba976e8 LP |
6754 | const char *path; |
6755 | struct stat st; | |
6f765baf LP |
6756 | int r; |
6757 | ||
6758 | assert(c); | |
6759 | ||
6760 | /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */ | |
6761 | exec_context_tty_reset(c, NULL); | |
6762 | ||
6763 | /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path | |
6764 | * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed | |
6765 | * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */ | |
0ba976e8 LP |
6766 | if (!exec_context_may_touch_tty(c)) |
6767 | return; | |
6f765baf | 6768 | |
0ba976e8 LP |
6769 | path = exec_context_tty_path(c); |
6770 | if (!path) | |
6771 | return; | |
6f765baf | 6772 | |
0ba976e8 LP |
6773 | fd = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC); |
6774 | if (fd < 0) | |
6775 | return (void) log_full_errno(errno == ENOENT ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno, | |
6776 | "Failed to open TTY inode of '%s' to adjust ownership/access mode, ignoring: %m", | |
6777 | path); | |
6778 | ||
6779 | if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) | |
6780 | return (void) log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to stat TTY '%s', ignoring: %m", path); | |
6781 | ||
6782 | /* Let's add a superficial check that we only do this for stuff that looks like a TTY. We only check | |
6783 | * if things are a character device, since a proper check either means we'd have to open the TTY and | |
6784 | * use isatty(), but we'd rather not do that since opening TTYs comes with all kinds of side-effects | |
6785 | * and is slow. Or we'd have to hardcode dev_t major information, which we'd rather avoid. Why bother | |
6786 | * with this at all? → https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/19213 */ | |
6787 | if (!S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) | |
6788 | return log_warning("Configured TTY '%s' is not actually a character device, ignoring.", path); | |
6789 | ||
6790 | r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, 0, TTY_GID); | |
6791 | if (r < 0) | |
6792 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path); | |
6f765baf LP |
6793 | } |
6794 | ||
4c2f5842 LP |
6795 | int exec_context_get_clean_directories( |
6796 | ExecContext *c, | |
6797 | char **prefix, | |
6798 | ExecCleanMask mask, | |
6799 | char ***ret) { | |
6800 | ||
6801 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
4c2f5842 LP |
6802 | int r; |
6803 | ||
6804 | assert(c); | |
6805 | assert(prefix); | |
6806 | assert(ret); | |
6807 | ||
5b10116e | 6808 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
4c2f5842 LP |
6809 | if (!FLAGS_SET(mask, 1U << t)) |
6810 | continue; | |
6811 | ||
6812 | if (!prefix[t]) | |
6813 | continue; | |
6814 | ||
211a3d87 | 6815 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { |
4c2f5842 LP |
6816 | char *j; |
6817 | ||
211a3d87 | 6818 | j = path_join(prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); |
4c2f5842 LP |
6819 | if (!j) |
6820 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6821 | ||
6822 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
6823 | if (r < 0) | |
6824 | return r; | |
7f622a19 YW |
6825 | |
6826 | /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */ | |
6827 | if (t != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { | |
211a3d87 LB |
6828 | j = path_join(prefix[t], "private", c->directories[t].items[i].path); |
6829 | if (!j) | |
6830 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6831 | ||
6832 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
6833 | if (r < 0) | |
6834 | return r; | |
6835 | } | |
6836 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
6837 | STRV_FOREACH(symlink, c->directories[t].items[i].symlinks) { |
6838 | j = path_join(prefix[t], *symlink); | |
7f622a19 YW |
6839 | if (!j) |
6840 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6841 | ||
6842 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
6843 | if (r < 0) | |
6844 | return r; | |
6845 | } | |
4c2f5842 LP |
6846 | } |
6847 | } | |
6848 | ||
6849 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(l); | |
6850 | return 0; | |
6851 | } | |
6852 | ||
6853 | int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext *c, ExecCleanMask *ret) { | |
6854 | ExecCleanMask mask = 0; | |
6855 | ||
6856 | assert(c); | |
6857 | assert(ret); | |
6858 | ||
6859 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) | |
211a3d87 | 6860 | if (c->directories[t].n_items > 0) |
4c2f5842 LP |
6861 | mask |= 1U << t; |
6862 | ||
6863 | *ret = mask; | |
6864 | return 0; | |
6865 | } | |
6866 | ||
50a4217b LP |
6867 | bool exec_context_has_encrypted_credentials(ExecContext *c) { |
6868 | ExecLoadCredential *load_cred; | |
6869 | ExecSetCredential *set_cred; | |
6870 | ||
6871 | assert(c); | |
6872 | ||
6873 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(load_cred, c->load_credentials) | |
6874 | if (load_cred->encrypted) | |
6875 | return true; | |
6876 | ||
6877 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(set_cred, c->set_credentials) | |
6878 | if (set_cred->encrypted) | |
6879 | return true; | |
6880 | ||
6881 | return false; | |
6882 | } | |
6883 | ||
e019ea73 ZJS |
6884 | int exec_context_add_default_dependencies(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
6885 | assert(u); | |
6886 | assert(u->default_dependencies); | |
6887 | ||
6888 | if (c && exec_context_needs_term(c)) | |
6889 | return unit_add_dependency_by_name(u, UNIT_AFTER, SPECIAL_VCONSOLE_SETUP_SERVICE, | |
6890 | /* add_reference= */ true, UNIT_DEPENDENCY_DEFAULT); | |
6891 | return 0; | |
6892 | } | |
6893 | ||
b58b4116 | 6894 | void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) { |
034c6ed7 | 6895 | assert(s); |
5cb5a6ff | 6896 | |
2ed26ed0 LP |
6897 | *s = (ExecStatus) { |
6898 | .pid = pid, | |
6899 | }; | |
6900 | ||
b58b4116 LP |
6901 | dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp); |
6902 | } | |
6903 | ||
34cf6c43 | 6904 | void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, const ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) { |
b58b4116 LP |
6905 | assert(s); |
6906 | ||
d46b79bb | 6907 | if (s->pid != pid) |
2ed26ed0 LP |
6908 | *s = (ExecStatus) { |
6909 | .pid = pid, | |
6910 | }; | |
b58b4116 | 6911 | |
63983207 | 6912 | dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp); |
9fb86720 | 6913 | |
034c6ed7 LP |
6914 | s->code = code; |
6915 | s->status = status; | |
169c1bda | 6916 | |
6f765baf LP |
6917 | if (context && context->utmp_id) |
6918 | (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status); | |
9fb86720 LP |
6919 | } |
6920 | ||
6a1d4d9f LP |
6921 | void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus *s) { |
6922 | assert(s); | |
6923 | ||
6924 | *s = (ExecStatus) {}; | |
6925 | } | |
6926 | ||
34cf6c43 | 6927 | void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { |
9fb86720 LP |
6928 | assert(s); |
6929 | assert(f); | |
6930 | ||
9fb86720 LP |
6931 | if (s->pid <= 0) |
6932 | return; | |
6933 | ||
4c940960 LP |
6934 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
6935 | ||
9fb86720 | 6936 | fprintf(f, |
ccd06097 ZJS |
6937 | "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n", |
6938 | prefix, s->pid); | |
9fb86720 | 6939 | |
af9d16e1 | 6940 | if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->start_timestamp)) |
9fb86720 LP |
6941 | fprintf(f, |
6942 | "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n", | |
04f5c018 | 6943 | prefix, FORMAT_TIMESTAMP(s->start_timestamp.realtime)); |
9fb86720 | 6944 | |
af9d16e1 | 6945 | if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->exit_timestamp)) |
9fb86720 LP |
6946 | fprintf(f, |
6947 | "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n" | |
6948 | "%sExit Code: %s\n" | |
6949 | "%sExit Status: %i\n", | |
04f5c018 | 6950 | prefix, FORMAT_TIMESTAMP(s->exit_timestamp.realtime), |
9fb86720 LP |
6951 | prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code), |
6952 | prefix, s->status); | |
5cb5a6ff | 6953 | } |
44d8db9e | 6954 | |
34cf6c43 | 6955 | static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { |
e1d75803 | 6956 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL; |
4c940960 | 6957 | const char *prefix2; |
44d8db9e LP |
6958 | |
6959 | assert(c); | |
6960 | assert(f); | |
6961 | ||
4c940960 | 6962 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
63c372cb | 6963 | prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t"); |
44d8db9e | 6964 | |
4ef15008 | 6965 | cmd = quote_command_line(c->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); |
38553034 | 6966 | |
44d8db9e LP |
6967 | fprintf(f, |
6968 | "%sCommand Line: %s\n", | |
38553034 | 6969 | prefix, strnull(cmd)); |
44d8db9e | 6970 | |
9fb86720 | 6971 | exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2); |
44d8db9e LP |
6972 | } |
6973 | ||
6974 | void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { | |
6975 | assert(f); | |
6976 | ||
4c940960 | 6977 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
44d8db9e | 6978 | |
03677889 YW |
6979 | LIST_FOREACH(command, i, c) |
6980 | exec_command_dump(i, f, prefix); | |
44d8db9e | 6981 | } |
94f04347 | 6982 | |
a6a80b4f LP |
6983 | void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) { |
6984 | ExecCommand *end; | |
6985 | ||
6986 | assert(l); | |
6987 | assert(e); | |
6988 | ||
6989 | if (*l) { | |
35b8ca3a | 6990 | /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */ |
cc232fa0 | 6991 | end = LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l); |
71fda00f | 6992 | LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e); |
a6a80b4f | 6993 | } else |
3ff67ec4 | 6994 | *l = e; |
a6a80b4f LP |
6995 | } |
6996 | ||
26fd040d LP |
6997 | int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { |
6998 | va_list ap; | |
6999 | char **l, *p; | |
7000 | ||
7001 | assert(c); | |
7002 | assert(path); | |
7003 | ||
7004 | va_start(ap, path); | |
7005 | l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); | |
7006 | va_end(ap); | |
7007 | ||
7008 | if (!l) | |
7009 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7010 | ||
250a918d LP |
7011 | p = strdup(path); |
7012 | if (!p) { | |
26fd040d LP |
7013 | strv_free(l); |
7014 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7015 | } | |
7016 | ||
6897dfe8 | 7017 | free_and_replace(c->path, p); |
26fd040d | 7018 | |
130d3d22 | 7019 | return strv_free_and_replace(c->argv, l); |
26fd040d LP |
7020 | } |
7021 | ||
86b23b07 | 7022 | int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { |
e63ff941 | 7023 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; |
86b23b07 | 7024 | va_list ap; |
86b23b07 JS |
7025 | int r; |
7026 | ||
7027 | assert(c); | |
7028 | assert(path); | |
7029 | ||
7030 | va_start(ap, path); | |
7031 | l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); | |
7032 | va_end(ap); | |
7033 | ||
7034 | if (!l) | |
7035 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7036 | ||
e287086b | 7037 | r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false); |
e63ff941 | 7038 | if (r < 0) |
86b23b07 | 7039 | return r; |
86b23b07 JS |
7040 | |
7041 | return 0; | |
7042 | } | |
7043 | ||
e8a565cb YW |
7044 | static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) { |
7045 | _cleanup_free_ char *path = p; | |
86b23b07 | 7046 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7047 | (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL); |
7048 | return NULL; | |
7049 | } | |
7050 | ||
e52a696a | 7051 | static ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_free(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { |
e8a565cb YW |
7052 | if (!rt) |
7053 | return NULL; | |
7054 | ||
7055 | if (rt->manager) | |
e76506b7 | 7056 | (void) hashmap_remove(rt->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt->id); |
e8a565cb | 7057 | |
e52a696a DDM |
7058 | rt->id = mfree(rt->id); |
7059 | rt->tmp_dir = mfree(rt->tmp_dir); | |
7060 | rt->var_tmp_dir = mfree(rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
7061 | safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); | |
7062 | safe_close_pair(rt->ipcns_storage_socket); | |
7063 | return mfree(rt); | |
7064 | } | |
7065 | ||
7066 | DEFINE_TRIVIAL_UNREF_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime, exec_shared_runtime, exec_shared_runtime_free); | |
7067 | DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime*, exec_shared_runtime_free); | |
7068 | ||
7069 | ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_destroy(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { | |
7070 | int r; | |
7071 | ||
7072 | if (!rt) | |
7073 | return NULL; | |
7074 | ||
7075 | assert(rt->n_ref > 0); | |
7076 | rt->n_ref--; | |
7077 | ||
7078 | if (rt->n_ref > 0) | |
7079 | return NULL; | |
56a13a49 | 7080 | |
e52a696a | 7081 | if (rt->tmp_dir && !streq(rt->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) { |
e8a565cb YW |
7082 | log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir); |
7083 | ||
7084 | r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir); | |
56a13a49 | 7085 | if (r < 0) |
e8a565cb | 7086 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir); |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7087 | else |
7088 | rt->tmp_dir = NULL; | |
e8a565cb | 7089 | } |
613b411c | 7090 | |
e52a696a | 7091 | if (rt->var_tmp_dir && !streq(rt->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) { |
e8a565cb YW |
7092 | log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir); |
7093 | ||
7094 | r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
56a13a49 | 7095 | if (r < 0) |
e8a565cb | 7096 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir); |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7097 | else |
7098 | rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
e8a565cb YW |
7099 | } |
7100 | ||
e52a696a | 7101 | return exec_shared_runtime_free(rt); |
e8a565cb YW |
7102 | } |
7103 | ||
e76506b7 | 7104 | static int exec_shared_runtime_allocate(ExecSharedRuntime **ret, const char *id) { |
56a13a49 | 7105 | _cleanup_free_ char *id_copy = NULL; |
e76506b7 | 7106 | ExecSharedRuntime *n; |
613b411c | 7107 | |
8e8009dc | 7108 | assert(ret); |
613b411c | 7109 | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7110 | id_copy = strdup(id); |
7111 | if (!id_copy) | |
7112 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7113 | ||
e76506b7 | 7114 | n = new(ExecSharedRuntime, 1); |
8e8009dc | 7115 | if (!n) |
613b411c LP |
7116 | return -ENOMEM; |
7117 | ||
e76506b7 | 7118 | *n = (ExecSharedRuntime) { |
56a13a49 | 7119 | .id = TAKE_PTR(id_copy), |
19ee48a6 YW |
7120 | .netns_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, |
7121 | .ipcns_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, | |
8e8009dc LP |
7122 | }; |
7123 | ||
7124 | *ret = n; | |
613b411c LP |
7125 | return 0; |
7126 | } | |
7127 | ||
e76506b7 | 7128 | static int exec_shared_runtime_add( |
e8a565cb YW |
7129 | Manager *m, |
7130 | const char *id, | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7131 | char **tmp_dir, |
7132 | char **var_tmp_dir, | |
7133 | int netns_storage_socket[2], | |
a70581ff | 7134 | int ipcns_storage_socket[2], |
e76506b7 | 7135 | ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { |
e8a565cb | 7136 | |
e76506b7 | 7137 | _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt = NULL; |
613b411c LP |
7138 | int r; |
7139 | ||
e8a565cb | 7140 | assert(m); |
613b411c LP |
7141 | assert(id); |
7142 | ||
a70581ff | 7143 | /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, {net,ipc}ns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */ |
56a13a49 | 7144 | |
e76506b7 | 7145 | r = exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt, id); |
613b411c LP |
7146 | if (r < 0) |
7147 | return r; | |
7148 | ||
e76506b7 | 7149 | r = hashmap_ensure_put(&m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops, rt->id, rt); |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7150 | if (r < 0) |
7151 | return r; | |
e8a565cb | 7152 | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7153 | assert(!!rt->tmp_dir == !!rt->var_tmp_dir); /* We require both to be set together */ |
7154 | rt->tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir); | |
7155 | rt->var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir); | |
e8a565cb YW |
7156 | |
7157 | if (netns_storage_socket) { | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7158 | rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket[0]); |
7159 | rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket[1]); | |
613b411c LP |
7160 | } |
7161 | ||
a70581ff XR |
7162 | if (ipcns_storage_socket) { |
7163 | rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(ipcns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7164 | rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(ipcns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7165 | } | |
7166 | ||
e8a565cb YW |
7167 | rt->manager = m; |
7168 | ||
7169 | if (ret) | |
7170 | *ret = rt; | |
e76506b7 | 7171 | /* do not remove created ExecSharedRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */ |
56a13a49 | 7172 | TAKE_PTR(rt); |
e8a565cb YW |
7173 | return 0; |
7174 | } | |
7175 | ||
e76506b7 | 7176 | static int exec_shared_runtime_make( |
74aaf59b LP |
7177 | Manager *m, |
7178 | const ExecContext *c, | |
7179 | const char *id, | |
e76506b7 | 7180 | ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { |
74aaf59b | 7181 | |
56a13a49 | 7182 | _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; |
19ee48a6 | 7183 | _cleanup_close_pair_ int netns_storage_socket[2] = PIPE_EBADF, ipcns_storage_socket[2] = PIPE_EBADF; |
e8a565cb YW |
7184 | int r; |
7185 | ||
7186 | assert(m); | |
7187 | assert(c); | |
7188 | assert(id); | |
7189 | ||
e76506b7 | 7190 | /* It is not necessary to create ExecSharedRuntime object. */ |
fde36d25 | 7191 | if (!exec_needs_network_namespace(c) && !exec_needs_ipc_namespace(c) && !c->private_tmp) { |
74aaf59b | 7192 | *ret = NULL; |
e8a565cb | 7193 | return 0; |
74aaf59b | 7194 | } |
e8a565cb | 7195 | |
efa2f3a1 TM |
7196 | if (c->private_tmp && |
7197 | !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/tmp") && | |
7198 | (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/var/tmp") || | |
7199 | prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/var")))) { | |
e8a565cb | 7200 | r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir); |
613b411c LP |
7201 | if (r < 0) |
7202 | return r; | |
7203 | } | |
7204 | ||
fbbb9697 | 7205 | if (exec_needs_network_namespace(c)) { |
e8a565cb YW |
7206 | if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, netns_storage_socket) < 0) |
7207 | return -errno; | |
7208 | } | |
7209 | ||
fde36d25 | 7210 | if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(c)) { |
a70581ff XR |
7211 | if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, ipcns_storage_socket) < 0) |
7212 | return -errno; | |
7213 | } | |
7214 | ||
e76506b7 | 7215 | r = exec_shared_runtime_add(m, id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket, ipcns_storage_socket, ret); |
e8a565cb YW |
7216 | if (r < 0) |
7217 | return r; | |
7218 | ||
613b411c LP |
7219 | return 1; |
7220 | } | |
7221 | ||
e76506b7 DDM |
7222 | int exec_shared_runtime_acquire(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, bool create, ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { |
7223 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
e8a565cb | 7224 | int r; |
613b411c | 7225 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7226 | assert(m); |
7227 | assert(id); | |
7228 | assert(ret); | |
7229 | ||
e76506b7 | 7230 | rt = hashmap_get(m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, id); |
e8a565cb | 7231 | if (rt) |
e76506b7 | 7232 | /* We already have an ExecSharedRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */ |
e8a565cb YW |
7233 | goto ref; |
7234 | ||
74aaf59b LP |
7235 | if (!create) { |
7236 | *ret = NULL; | |
e8a565cb | 7237 | return 0; |
74aaf59b | 7238 | } |
e8a565cb YW |
7239 | |
7240 | /* If not found, then create a new object. */ | |
e76506b7 | 7241 | r = exec_shared_runtime_make(m, c, id, &rt); |
74aaf59b | 7242 | if (r < 0) |
e8a565cb | 7243 | return r; |
74aaf59b | 7244 | if (r == 0) { |
e76506b7 | 7245 | /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecSharedRuntime object. */ |
74aaf59b LP |
7246 | *ret = NULL; |
7247 | return 0; | |
7248 | } | |
613b411c | 7249 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7250 | ref: |
7251 | /* increment reference counter. */ | |
7252 | rt->n_ref++; | |
7253 | *ret = rt; | |
7254 | return 1; | |
7255 | } | |
613b411c | 7256 | |
e76506b7 DDM |
7257 | int exec_shared_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { |
7258 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
e8a565cb YW |
7259 | |
7260 | assert(m); | |
613b411c LP |
7261 | assert(f); |
7262 | assert(fds); | |
7263 | ||
e76506b7 | 7264 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id) { |
e8a565cb | 7265 | fprintf(f, "exec-runtime=%s", rt->id); |
613b411c | 7266 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7267 | if (rt->tmp_dir) |
7268 | fprintf(f, " tmp-dir=%s", rt->tmp_dir); | |
613b411c | 7269 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7270 | if (rt->var_tmp_dir) |
7271 | fprintf(f, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
613b411c | 7272 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7273 | if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
7274 | int copy; | |
613b411c | 7275 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7276 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); |
7277 | if (copy < 0) | |
7278 | return copy; | |
613b411c | 7279 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7280 | fprintf(f, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy); |
7281 | } | |
613b411c | 7282 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7283 | if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { |
7284 | int copy; | |
613b411c | 7285 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7286 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); |
7287 | if (copy < 0) | |
7288 | return copy; | |
613b411c | 7289 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7290 | fprintf(f, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy); |
7291 | } | |
7292 | ||
a70581ff XR |
7293 | if (rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
7294 | int copy; | |
7295 | ||
7296 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7297 | if (copy < 0) | |
7298 | return copy; | |
7299 | ||
7300 | fprintf(f, " ipcns-socket-0=%i", copy); | |
7301 | } | |
7302 | ||
7303 | if (rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { | |
7304 | int copy; | |
7305 | ||
7306 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7307 | if (copy < 0) | |
7308 | return copy; | |
7309 | ||
7310 | fprintf(f, " ipcns-socket-1=%i", copy); | |
7311 | } | |
7312 | ||
e8a565cb | 7313 | fputc('\n', f); |
613b411c LP |
7314 | } |
7315 | ||
7316 | return 0; | |
7317 | } | |
7318 | ||
e76506b7 DDM |
7319 | int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { |
7320 | _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt_create = NULL; | |
7321 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
613b411c LP |
7322 | int r; |
7323 | ||
e8a565cb YW |
7324 | /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text. |
7325 | * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=. | |
e76506b7 | 7326 | * Even if the ExecSharedRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge |
e8a565cb YW |
7327 | * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */ |
7328 | ||
7329 | assert(u); | |
613b411c LP |
7330 | assert(key); |
7331 | assert(value); | |
7332 | ||
e76506b7 | 7333 | /* Manager manages ExecSharedRuntime objects by the unit id. |
e8a565cb YW |
7334 | * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */ |
7335 | if (isempty(u->id)) { | |
7336 | log_unit_debug(u, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter."); | |
7337 | return 0; | |
7338 | } | |
613b411c | 7339 | |
e76506b7 | 7340 | if (hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops) < 0) |
cbc165d1 | 7341 | return log_oom(); |
e8a565cb | 7342 | |
e76506b7 | 7343 | rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, u->id); |
e8a565cb | 7344 | if (!rt) { |
e76506b7 | 7345 | if (exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt_create, u->id) < 0) |
f2341e0a | 7346 | return log_oom(); |
613b411c | 7347 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7348 | rt = rt_create; |
7349 | } | |
7350 | ||
7351 | if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) { | |
cbc165d1 ZJS |
7352 | if (free_and_strdup_warn(&rt->tmp_dir, value) < 0) |
7353 | return -ENOMEM; | |
613b411c LP |
7354 | |
7355 | } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) { | |
cbc165d1 ZJS |
7356 | if (free_and_strdup_warn(&rt->var_tmp_dir, value) < 0) |
7357 | return -ENOMEM; | |
613b411c LP |
7358 | |
7359 | } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) { | |
7360 | int fd; | |
7361 | ||
e652663a | 7362 | if ((fd = parse_fd(value)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) { |
f2341e0a | 7363 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); |
e8a565cb | 7364 | return 0; |
613b411c | 7365 | } |
e8a565cb YW |
7366 | |
7367 | safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7368 | rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); | |
7369 | ||
613b411c LP |
7370 | } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) { |
7371 | int fd; | |
7372 | ||
e652663a | 7373 | if ((fd = parse_fd(value)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) { |
f2341e0a | 7374 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); |
e8a565cb | 7375 | return 0; |
613b411c | 7376 | } |
e8a565cb YW |
7377 | |
7378 | safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7379 | rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); | |
a70581ff | 7380 | |
613b411c LP |
7381 | } else |
7382 | return 0; | |
7383 | ||
e76506b7 | 7384 | /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecSharedRuntime objects. */ |
e8a565cb | 7385 | if (rt_create) { |
e76506b7 | 7386 | r = hashmap_put(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt_create->id, rt_create); |
e8a565cb | 7387 | if (r < 0) { |
3fe91079 | 7388 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m"); |
e8a565cb YW |
7389 | return 0; |
7390 | } | |
613b411c | 7391 | |
e8a565cb | 7392 | rt_create->manager = u->manager; |
613b411c | 7393 | |
e8a565cb | 7394 | /* Avoid cleanup */ |
56a13a49 | 7395 | TAKE_PTR(rt_create); |
e8a565cb | 7396 | } |
98b47d54 | 7397 | |
e8a565cb YW |
7398 | return 1; |
7399 | } | |
613b411c | 7400 | |
e76506b7 | 7401 | int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7402 | _cleanup_free_ char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; |
7403 | char *id = NULL; | |
a70581ff | 7404 | int r, netns_fdpair[] = {-1, -1}, ipcns_fdpair[] = {-1, -1}; |
99534007 | 7405 | const char *p, *v = ASSERT_PTR(value); |
e8a565cb | 7406 | size_t n; |
613b411c | 7407 | |
e8a565cb | 7408 | assert(m); |
e8a565cb | 7409 | assert(fds); |
98b47d54 | 7410 | |
e8a565cb | 7411 | n = strcspn(v, " "); |
2f82562b | 7412 | id = strndupa_safe(v, n); |
e8a565cb YW |
7413 | if (v[n] != ' ') |
7414 | goto finalize; | |
7415 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7416 | ||
7417 | v = startswith(p, "tmp-dir="); | |
7418 | if (v) { | |
7419 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7420 | tmp_dir = strndup(v, n); |
7421 | if (!tmp_dir) | |
7422 | return log_oom(); | |
e8a565cb YW |
7423 | if (v[n] != ' ') |
7424 | goto finalize; | |
7425 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7426 | } | |
7427 | ||
7428 | v = startswith(p, "var-tmp-dir="); | |
7429 | if (v) { | |
7430 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7431 | var_tmp_dir = strndup(v, n); |
7432 | if (!var_tmp_dir) | |
7433 | return log_oom(); | |
e8a565cb YW |
7434 | if (v[n] != ' ') |
7435 | goto finalize; | |
7436 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7437 | } | |
7438 | ||
7439 | v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-0="); | |
7440 | if (v) { | |
7441 | char *buf; | |
7442 | ||
7443 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
2f82562b | 7444 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); |
c413bb28 | 7445 | |
e652663a DT |
7446 | netns_fdpair[0] = parse_fd(buf); |
7447 | if (netns_fdpair[0] < 0) | |
7448 | return log_debug_errno(netns_fdpair[0], "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf); | |
a70581ff | 7449 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, netns_fdpair[0])) |
c413bb28 | 7450 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), |
a70581ff XR |
7451 | "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", netns_fdpair[0]); |
7452 | netns_fdpair[0] = fdset_remove(fds, netns_fdpair[0]); | |
e8a565cb YW |
7453 | if (v[n] != ' ') |
7454 | goto finalize; | |
7455 | p = v + n + 1; | |
613b411c LP |
7456 | } |
7457 | ||
e8a565cb YW |
7458 | v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-1="); |
7459 | if (v) { | |
7460 | char *buf; | |
98b47d54 | 7461 | |
e8a565cb | 7462 | n = strcspn(v, " "); |
2f82562b | 7463 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); |
a70581ff | 7464 | |
e652663a DT |
7465 | netns_fdpair[1] = parse_fd(buf); |
7466 | if (netns_fdpair[1] < 0) | |
7467 | return log_debug_errno(netns_fdpair[1], "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf); | |
a70581ff XR |
7468 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, netns_fdpair[1])) |
7469 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), | |
7470 | "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", netns_fdpair[1]); | |
7471 | netns_fdpair[1] = fdset_remove(fds, netns_fdpair[1]); | |
7472 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7473 | goto finalize; | |
7474 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7475 | } | |
7476 | ||
7477 | v = startswith(p, "ipcns-socket-0="); | |
7478 | if (v) { | |
7479 | char *buf; | |
7480 | ||
7481 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
2f82562b | 7482 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); |
a70581ff | 7483 | |
e652663a DT |
7484 | ipcns_fdpair[0] = parse_fd(buf); |
7485 | if (ipcns_fdpair[0] < 0) | |
7486 | return log_debug_errno(ipcns_fdpair[0], "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf); | |
a70581ff XR |
7487 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, ipcns_fdpair[0])) |
7488 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), | |
7489 | "exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", ipcns_fdpair[0]); | |
7490 | ipcns_fdpair[0] = fdset_remove(fds, ipcns_fdpair[0]); | |
7491 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7492 | goto finalize; | |
7493 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7494 | } | |
7495 | ||
7496 | v = startswith(p, "ipcns-socket-1="); | |
7497 | if (v) { | |
7498 | char *buf; | |
7499 | ||
7500 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
2f82562b | 7501 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); |
a70581ff | 7502 | |
e652663a DT |
7503 | ipcns_fdpair[1] = parse_fd(buf); |
7504 | if (ipcns_fdpair[1] < 0) | |
7505 | return log_debug_errno(ipcns_fdpair[1], "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf); | |
a70581ff | 7506 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, ipcns_fdpair[1])) |
c413bb28 | 7507 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), |
a70581ff XR |
7508 | "exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", ipcns_fdpair[1]); |
7509 | ipcns_fdpair[1] = fdset_remove(fds, ipcns_fdpair[1]); | |
e8a565cb | 7510 | } |
98b47d54 | 7511 | |
e8a565cb | 7512 | finalize: |
e76506b7 | 7513 | r = exec_shared_runtime_add(m, id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir, netns_fdpair, ipcns_fdpair, NULL); |
7d853ca6 | 7514 | if (r < 0) |
56a13a49 ZJS |
7515 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m"); |
7516 | return 0; | |
e8a565cb | 7517 | } |
613b411c | 7518 | |
e76506b7 DDM |
7519 | void exec_shared_runtime_vacuum(Manager *m) { |
7520 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
e8a565cb YW |
7521 | |
7522 | assert(m); | |
7523 | ||
e76506b7 | 7524 | /* Free unreferenced ExecSharedRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */ |
e8a565cb | 7525 | |
e76506b7 | 7526 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id) { |
e8a565cb YW |
7527 | if (rt->n_ref > 0) |
7528 | continue; | |
7529 | ||
e52a696a | 7530 | (void) exec_shared_runtime_free(rt); |
e8a565cb | 7531 | } |
613b411c LP |
7532 | } |
7533 | ||
15220772 | 7534 | int exec_runtime_make(ExecSharedRuntime *shared, DynamicCreds *creds, ExecRuntime **ret) { |
28135da3 DDM |
7535 | _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt = NULL; |
7536 | ||
7537 | assert(ret); | |
7538 | ||
15220772 | 7539 | if (!shared && !creds) { |
28135da3 DDM |
7540 | *ret = NULL; |
7541 | return 0; | |
7542 | } | |
7543 | ||
7544 | rt = new(ExecRuntime, 1); | |
7545 | if (!rt) | |
7546 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7547 | ||
7548 | *rt = (ExecRuntime) { | |
7549 | .shared = shared, | |
15220772 | 7550 | .dynamic_creds = creds, |
28135da3 DDM |
7551 | }; |
7552 | ||
7553 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(rt); | |
7554 | return 1; | |
7555 | } | |
7556 | ||
7557 | ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime *rt) { | |
7558 | if (!rt) | |
7559 | return NULL; | |
7560 | ||
7561 | exec_shared_runtime_unref(rt->shared); | |
15220772 | 7562 | dynamic_creds_unref(rt->dynamic_creds); |
28135da3 DDM |
7563 | return mfree(rt); |
7564 | } | |
7565 | ||
7566 | ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { | |
7567 | if (!rt) | |
7568 | return NULL; | |
7569 | ||
7570 | rt->shared = exec_shared_runtime_destroy(rt->shared); | |
15220772 | 7571 | rt->dynamic_creds = dynamic_creds_destroy(rt->dynamic_creds); |
28135da3 DDM |
7572 | return exec_runtime_free(rt); |
7573 | } | |
7574 | ||
b9c04eaf YW |
7575 | void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { |
7576 | if (!p) | |
7577 | return; | |
7578 | ||
c3f8a065 LP |
7579 | p->environment = strv_free(p->environment); |
7580 | p->fd_names = strv_free(p->fd_names); | |
7581 | p->fds = mfree(p->fds); | |
7582 | p->exec_fd = safe_close(p->exec_fd); | |
b9c04eaf YW |
7583 | } |
7584 | ||
bb0c0d6f LP |
7585 | ExecSetCredential *exec_set_credential_free(ExecSetCredential *sc) { |
7586 | if (!sc) | |
7587 | return NULL; | |
7588 | ||
7589 | free(sc->id); | |
7590 | free(sc->data); | |
7591 | return mfree(sc); | |
7592 | } | |
7593 | ||
43144be4 LP |
7594 | ExecLoadCredential *exec_load_credential_free(ExecLoadCredential *lc) { |
7595 | if (!lc) | |
7596 | return NULL; | |
7597 | ||
7598 | free(lc->id); | |
7599 | free(lc->path); | |
7600 | return mfree(lc); | |
7601 | } | |
7602 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
7603 | void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d) { |
7604 | if (!d) | |
7605 | return; | |
7606 | ||
7607 | for (size_t i = 0; i < d->n_items; i++) { | |
7608 | free(d->items[i].path); | |
7609 | strv_free(d->items[i].symlinks); | |
7610 | } | |
7611 | ||
7612 | d->items = mfree(d->items); | |
7613 | d->n_items = 0; | |
7614 | d->mode = 0755; | |
7615 | } | |
7616 | ||
564e5c98 YW |
7617 | static ExecDirectoryItem *exec_directory_find(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path) { |
7618 | assert(d); | |
7619 | assert(path); | |
7620 | ||
7621 | for (size_t i = 0; i < d->n_items; i++) | |
7622 | if (path_equal(d->items[i].path, path)) | |
7623 | return &d->items[i]; | |
7624 | ||
7625 | return NULL; | |
7626 | } | |
7627 | ||
7628 | int exec_directory_add(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path, const char *symlink) { | |
211a3d87 LB |
7629 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **s = NULL; |
7630 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
564e5c98 YW |
7631 | ExecDirectoryItem *existing; |
7632 | int r; | |
211a3d87 LB |
7633 | |
7634 | assert(d); | |
211a3d87 LB |
7635 | assert(path); |
7636 | ||
564e5c98 YW |
7637 | existing = exec_directory_find(d, path); |
7638 | if (existing) { | |
7639 | r = strv_extend(&existing->symlinks, symlink); | |
7640 | if (r < 0) | |
7641 | return r; | |
7642 | ||
7643 | return 0; /* existing item is updated */ | |
7644 | } | |
7645 | ||
211a3d87 LB |
7646 | p = strdup(path); |
7647 | if (!p) | |
7648 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7649 | ||
564e5c98 YW |
7650 | if (symlink) { |
7651 | s = strv_new(symlink); | |
211a3d87 LB |
7652 | if (!s) |
7653 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7654 | } | |
7655 | ||
564e5c98 | 7656 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(d->items, d->n_items + 1)) |
211a3d87 LB |
7657 | return -ENOMEM; |
7658 | ||
564e5c98 | 7659 | d->items[d->n_items++] = (ExecDirectoryItem) { |
211a3d87 LB |
7660 | .path = TAKE_PTR(p), |
7661 | .symlinks = TAKE_PTR(s), | |
7662 | }; | |
7663 | ||
564e5c98 | 7664 | return 1; /* new item is added */ |
211a3d87 LB |
7665 | } |
7666 | ||
a2ab603c YW |
7667 | static int exec_directory_item_compare_func(const ExecDirectoryItem *a, const ExecDirectoryItem *b) { |
7668 | assert(a); | |
7669 | assert(b); | |
7670 | ||
7671 | return path_compare(a->path, b->path); | |
7672 | } | |
7673 | ||
7674 | void exec_directory_sort(ExecDirectory *d) { | |
7675 | assert(d); | |
7676 | ||
7677 | /* Sort the exec directories to make always parent directories processed at first in | |
7678 | * setup_exec_directory(), e.g., even if StateDirectory=foo/bar foo, we need to create foo at first, | |
7679 | * then foo/bar. Also, set .only_create flag if one of the parent directories is contained in the | |
7680 | * list. See also comments in setup_exec_directory() and issue #24783. */ | |
7681 | ||
7682 | if (d->n_items <= 1) | |
7683 | return; | |
7684 | ||
7685 | typesafe_qsort(d->items, d->n_items, exec_directory_item_compare_func); | |
7686 | ||
7687 | for (size_t i = 1; i < d->n_items; i++) | |
7688 | for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) | |
7689 | if (path_startswith(d->items[i].path, d->items[j].path)) { | |
7690 | d->items[i].only_create = true; | |
7691 | break; | |
7692 | } | |
211a3d87 LB |
7693 | } |
7694 | ||
4fb8f1e8 LP |
7695 | ExecCleanMask exec_clean_mask_from_string(const char *s) { |
7696 | ExecDirectoryType t; | |
7697 | ||
7698 | assert(s); | |
7699 | ||
7700 | if (streq(s, "all")) | |
7701 | return EXEC_CLEAN_ALL; | |
7702 | if (streq(s, "fdstore")) | |
7703 | return EXEC_CLEAN_FDSTORE; | |
7704 | ||
7705 | t = exec_resource_type_from_string(s); | |
7706 | if (t < 0) | |
7707 | return (ExecCleanMask) t; | |
7708 | ||
7709 | return 1U << t; | |
7710 | } | |
7711 | ||
bb0c0d6f | 7712 | DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_set_credential_hash_ops, char, string_hash_func, string_compare_func, ExecSetCredential, exec_set_credential_free); |
43144be4 | 7713 | DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_load_credential_hash_ops, char, string_hash_func, string_compare_func, ExecLoadCredential, exec_load_credential_free); |
bb0c0d6f | 7714 | |
80876c20 LP |
7715 | static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = { |
7716 | [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null", | |
7717 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty", | |
7718 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force", | |
4f2d528d | 7719 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail", |
52c239d7 LB |
7720 | [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", |
7721 | [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", | |
08f3be7a | 7722 | [EXEC_INPUT_DATA] = "data", |
2038c3f5 | 7723 | [EXEC_INPUT_FILE] = "file", |
80876c20 LP |
7724 | }; |
7725 | ||
8a0867d6 LP |
7726 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput); |
7727 | ||
94f04347 | 7728 | static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = { |
80876c20 | 7729 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit", |
94f04347 | 7730 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null", |
80876c20 | 7731 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty", |
9a6bca7a | 7732 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg", |
28dbc1e8 | 7733 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console", |
706343f4 LP |
7734 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal", |
7735 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console", | |
52c239d7 LB |
7736 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", |
7737 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", | |
2038c3f5 | 7738 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE] = "file", |
566b7d23 | 7739 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND] = "append", |
8d7dab1f | 7740 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE] = "truncate", |
94f04347 LP |
7741 | }; |
7742 | ||
7743 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput); | |
023a4f67 LP |
7744 | |
7745 | static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = { | |
7746 | [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init", | |
7747 | [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login", | |
7748 | [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user", | |
7749 | }; | |
7750 | ||
7751 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode); | |
53f47dfc YW |
7752 | |
7753 | static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX] = { | |
7754 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO] = "no", | |
7755 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES] = "yes", | |
7756 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART] = "restart", | |
7757 | }; | |
7758 | ||
7759 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES); | |
3536f49e | 7760 | |
6b7b2ed9 | 7761 | /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */ |
72fd1768 | 7762 | static const char* const exec_directory_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
3536f49e YW |
7763 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectory", |
7764 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectory", | |
7765 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectory", | |
7766 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectory", | |
7767 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectory", | |
7768 | }; | |
7769 | ||
7770 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type, ExecDirectoryType); | |
b1edf445 | 7771 | |
211a3d87 LB |
7772 | /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the symlink setting it is configured with in the unit */ |
7773 | static const char* const exec_directory_type_symlink_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
7774 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectorySymlink", | |
7775 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectorySymlink", | |
7776 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectorySymlink", | |
7777 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectorySymlink", | |
7778 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectorySymlink", | |
7779 | }; | |
7780 | ||
7781 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type_symlink, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7782 | ||
6b7b2ed9 LP |
7783 | /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This |
7784 | * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit | |
7785 | * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */ | |
7786 | static const char* const exec_resource_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
7787 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "runtime", | |
7788 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "state", | |
7789 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "cache", | |
7790 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "logs", | |
7791 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "configuration", | |
7792 | }; | |
7793 | ||
7794 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7795 | ||
7796 | /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to | |
7797 | * the service payload in. */ | |
fb2042dd YW |
7798 | static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
7799 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY", | |
7800 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "STATE_DIRECTORY", | |
7801 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY", | |
7802 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY", | |
7803 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY", | |
7804 | }; | |
7805 | ||
7806 | DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7807 | ||
b1edf445 LP |
7808 | static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = { |
7809 | [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT] = "inherit", | |
7810 | [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE] = "private", | |
7811 | [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED] = "shared", | |
7812 | }; | |
7813 | ||
7814 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode); |