Kernel: Block non-UID-0 profiling completely

[people/pmueller/ipfire-2.x.git] / src / patches / linux / linux-5.15.17-security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch

From: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2016 07:45:46 -0700
Message-Id: <1469630746-32279-1-git-send-email-jeffv@google.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security,
	perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open

When kernel.perf_event_paranoid is set to 3 (or greater), disallow
all access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

This new level of restriction is intended to reduce the attack
surface of the kernel. Perf is a valuable tool for developers but
is generally unnecessary and unused on production systems. Perf may
open up an attack vector to vulnerable device-specific drivers as
recently demonstrated in CVE-2016-0805, CVE-2016-0819,
CVE-2016-0843, CVE-2016-3768, and CVE-2016-3843. This new level of
restriction allows for a safe default to be set on production systems
while leaving a simple means for developers to grant access [1].

This feature is derived from CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN by Brad
Spengler. It is based on a patch by Ben Hutchings [2]. Ben's patches
have been modified and split up to address on-list feedback.

kernel.perf_event_paranoid=3 is the default on both Debian [2] and
Android [3].

[1] Making perf available to developers on Android:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/234400/
[2] Original patch by Ben Hutchings:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587
[3] https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/234743/

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 1 +
 include/linux/perf_event.h      | 5 +++++
 kernel/events/core.c            | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff -Naur linux-5.15.22.orig/include/linux/perf_event.h linux-5.15.22/include/linux/perf_event.h
--- linux-5.15.22.orig/include/linux/perf_event.h	2022-02-11 15:39:26.163576222 +0000
+++ linux-5.15.22/include/linux/perf_event.h	2022-02-11 15:42:16.719697397 +0000
@@ -1346,6 +1346,11 @@
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
 }
 
+static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
+{
+	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
+}
+
 extern void perf_event_init(void);
 extern void perf_tp_event(u16 event_type, u64 count, void *record,
 			  int entry_size, struct pt_regs *regs,
diff -Naur linux-5.15.22.orig/kernel/events/core.c linux-5.15.22/kernel/events/core.c
--- linux-5.15.22.orig/kernel/events/core.c	2022-02-11 15:39:27.667683028 +0000
+++ linux-5.15.22/kernel/events/core.c	2022-02-11 15:42:16.723697680 +0000
@@ -414,6 +414,7 @@
  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
+ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
  */
 int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
 
@@ -12090,6 +12091,9 @@
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+				return -EACCES;
+
 	err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
 	if (err)
 		return err;