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25670f3e MC |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
11 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
12 | #include "statem_locl.h" | |
13 | ||
14 | /* | |
15 | * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right | |
16 | */ | |
e56c33b9 | 17 | int tls_parse_client_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
18 | { |
19 | unsigned int ilen; | |
20 | const unsigned char *data; | |
21 | ||
22 | /* Parse the length byte */ | |
23 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) | |
24 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 25 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
26 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); |
27 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
28 | return 0; | |
29 | } | |
30 | ||
31 | /* Check that the extension matches */ | |
32 | if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { | |
e56c33b9 | 33 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
34 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
35 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
36 | return 0; | |
37 | } | |
38 | ||
39 | if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
40 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 41 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATE, |
25670f3e MC |
42 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
43 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
44 | return 0; | |
45 | } | |
46 | ||
47 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
48 | ||
49 | return 1; | |
50 | } | |
51 | ||
e56c33b9 | 52 | int tls_parse_client_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
53 | { |
54 | unsigned int servname_type; | |
55 | PACKET sni, hostname; | |
56 | ||
57 | /*- | |
58 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
59 | * | |
60 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
61 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
62 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
63 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
64 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
65 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. | |
66 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
67 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
68 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time | |
69 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
70 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
71 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
72 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
73 | * the value of the Host: field. | |
74 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
75 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the | |
76 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
77 | * extension. | |
78 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
79 | * | |
80 | */ | |
81 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) | |
82 | /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ | |
83 | || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { | |
84 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
85 | return 0; | |
86 | } | |
87 | ||
88 | /* | |
89 | * Although the server_name extension was intended to be | |
90 | * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the | |
91 | * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as | |
92 | * such. | |
93 | * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types | |
94 | * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other | |
95 | * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. | |
96 | * | |
97 | * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, | |
98 | * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. | |
99 | */ | |
100 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) | |
101 | || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name | |
102 | || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { | |
103 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
104 | return 0; | |
105 | } | |
106 | ||
107 | if (!s->hit) { | |
108 | if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
109 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
110 | return 0; | |
111 | } | |
112 | ||
113 | if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { | |
114 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
117 | ||
118 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { | |
119 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
120 | return 0; | |
121 | } | |
122 | ||
123 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
124 | } else { | |
125 | /* | |
126 | * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST | |
127 | * fall back to a full handshake. | |
128 | */ | |
129 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | |
130 | && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, | |
131 | strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); | |
132 | } | |
133 | ||
134 | return 1; | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
137 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
e56c33b9 | 138 | int tls_parse_client_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
139 | { |
140 | PACKET srp_I; | |
141 | ||
142 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) | |
143 | || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { | |
144 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
145 | return 0; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | /* | |
149 | * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user | |
150 | * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. | |
151 | */ | |
152 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { | |
153 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
154 | return 0; | |
155 | } | |
156 | ||
157 | return 1; | |
158 | } | |
159 | #endif | |
160 | ||
161 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
e56c33b9 | 162 | int tls_parse_client_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
163 | { |
164 | PACKET ec_point_format_list; | |
165 | ||
166 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) | |
167 | || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { | |
168 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
169 | return 0; | |
170 | } | |
171 | ||
172 | if (!s->hit) { | |
173 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, | |
174 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
175 | &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
176 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
177 | return 0; | |
178 | } | |
179 | } | |
180 | ||
181 | return 1; | |
182 | } | |
183 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
184 | ||
e56c33b9 | 185 | int tls_parse_client_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
186 | { |
187 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | |
188 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), | |
189 | PACKET_remaining(pkt), | |
190 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { | |
191 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
192 | return 0; | |
193 | } | |
194 | ||
195 | return 1; | |
196 | } | |
197 | ||
e56c33b9 | 198 | int tls_parse_client_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
199 | { |
200 | PACKET supported_sig_algs; | |
201 | ||
202 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) | |
203 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 | |
204 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { | |
205 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
206 | return 0; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
209 | if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), | |
210 | PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { | |
211 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
212 | return 0; | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | return 1; | |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
ab83e314 | 218 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
e56c33b9 | 219 | int tls_parse_client_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
220 | { |
221 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { | |
222 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
223 | return 0; | |
224 | } | |
ab83e314 | 225 | |
25670f3e MC |
226 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
227 | const unsigned char *ext_data; | |
228 | PACKET responder_id_list, exts; | |
229 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { | |
230 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
231 | return 0; | |
232 | } | |
233 | ||
234 | /* | |
235 | * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake | |
236 | * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 | |
237 | */ | |
238 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); | |
239 | if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
240 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); | |
241 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { | |
242 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
243 | return 0; | |
244 | } | |
245 | } else { | |
246 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; | |
247 | } | |
248 | ||
249 | while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
250 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
251 | PACKET responder_id; | |
252 | const unsigned char *id_data; | |
253 | ||
254 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, | |
255 | &responder_id) | |
256 | || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { | |
257 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
258 | return 0; | |
259 | } | |
260 | ||
261 | id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); | |
262 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ | |
263 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, | |
264 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); | |
265 | if (id == NULL) { | |
266 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
267 | return 0; | |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
270 | if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { | |
271 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
272 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
273 | return 0; | |
274 | } | |
275 | ||
276 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { | |
277 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
278 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
279 | return 0; | |
280 | } | |
281 | } | |
282 | ||
283 | /* Read in request_extensions */ | |
284 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { | |
285 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
286 | return 0; | |
287 | } | |
288 | ||
289 | if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { | |
290 | ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); | |
291 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, | |
292 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
293 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = | |
294 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, | |
295 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); | |
296 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { | |
297 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
298 | return 0; | |
299 | } | |
300 | } | |
ab83e314 | 301 | } else { |
25670f3e MC |
302 | /* |
303 | * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. | |
304 | */ | |
305 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
306 | } | |
307 | ||
308 | return 1; | |
309 | } | |
ab83e314 | 310 | #endif |
25670f3e MC |
311 | |
312 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
e56c33b9 | 313 | int tls_parse_client_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
314 | { |
315 | if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { | |
316 | /*- | |
317 | * We shouldn't accept this extension on a | |
318 | * renegotiation. | |
319 | * | |
320 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we | |
321 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on | |
322 | * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when | |
323 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an | |
324 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing | |
325 | * anything like that, but this might change). | |
326 | * | |
327 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake | |
328 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > | |
329 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen | |
330 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new | |
331 | * Finished message could have been computed.) | |
332 | */ | |
333 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
334 | } | |
335 | ||
336 | return 1; | |
337 | } | |
338 | #endif | |
339 | ||
340 | /* | |
341 | * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. | |
342 | * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. | |
343 | * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. | |
344 | * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. | |
345 | */ | |
e56c33b9 | 346 | int tls_parse_client_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
347 | { |
348 | PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; | |
349 | ||
350 | if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) | |
351 | return 1; | |
352 | ||
353 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) | |
354 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { | |
355 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
356 | return 0; | |
357 | } | |
358 | ||
359 | save_protocol_list = protocol_list; | |
360 | do { | |
361 | /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ | |
362 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) | |
363 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { | |
364 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
365 | return 0; | |
366 | } | |
367 | } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); | |
368 | ||
369 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, | |
370 | &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { | |
371 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
372 | return 0; | |
373 | } | |
374 | ||
375 | return 1; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
e56c33b9 | 379 | int tls_parse_client_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
380 | { |
381 | SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof; | |
382 | STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; | |
383 | unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; | |
384 | int i, srtp_pref; | |
385 | PACKET subpkt; | |
386 | ||
387 | /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ | |
388 | if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) | |
389 | return 1; | |
390 | ||
391 | /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ | |
392 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) | |
393 | || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 394 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
395 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
396 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
397 | return 0; | |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
400 | srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); | |
401 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
402 | /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ | |
403 | srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); | |
404 | ||
405 | while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { | |
406 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
408 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
409 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
410 | return 0; | |
411 | } | |
412 | ||
413 | /* | |
414 | * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than | |
415 | * current match. | |
416 | * If no profiles have been have been configured then this | |
417 | * does nothing. | |
418 | */ | |
419 | for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { | |
420 | sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); | |
421 | if (sprof->id == id) { | |
422 | s->srtp_profile = sprof; | |
423 | srtp_pref = i; | |
424 | break; | |
425 | } | |
426 | } | |
427 | } | |
428 | ||
429 | /* | |
430 | * Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now | |
431 | */ | |
432 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 433 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, |
25670f3e MC |
434 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
435 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
436 | return 0; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
439 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) | |
440 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { | |
e56c33b9 | 441 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); |
25670f3e MC |
442 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
443 | return 0; | |
444 | } | |
445 | ||
446 | return 1; | |
447 | } | |
448 | #endif | |
449 | ||
e56c33b9 | 450 | int tls_parse_client_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
451 | { |
452 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) | |
453 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
454 | ||
455 | return 1; | |
456 | } | |
457 | ||
458 | /* | |
459 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
460 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
461 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
462 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
463 | */ | |
464 | static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, | |
465 | const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups, | |
466 | int checkallow) | |
467 | { | |
468 | size_t i; | |
469 | ||
470 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
471 | return 0; | |
472 | ||
473 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
474 | unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]); | |
475 | ||
476 | if (group_id == share_id | |
477 | && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, | |
478 | SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { | |
479 | break; | |
480 | } | |
481 | } | |
482 | ||
483 | /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */ | |
484 | return i < num_groups; | |
485 | } | |
486 | ||
487 | /* | |
488 | * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains | |
489 | * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
490 | * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. | |
491 | */ | |
e56c33b9 | 492 | int tls_parse_client_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
493 | { |
494 | unsigned int group_id; | |
495 | PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; | |
496 | const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves; | |
497 | size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves; | |
498 | int group_nid, found = 0; | |
499 | unsigned int curve_flags; | |
500 | ||
501 | if (s->hit) | |
502 | return 1; | |
503 | ||
504 | /* Sanity check */ | |
505 | if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { | |
506 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 507 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
508 | return 0; |
509 | } | |
510 | ||
511 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { | |
512 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e56c33b9 | 513 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
25670f3e MC |
514 | return 0; |
515 | } | |
516 | ||
517 | /* Get our list of supported curves */ | |
518 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) { | |
519 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 520 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
521 | return 0; |
522 | } | |
523 | ||
24b8e4b2 | 524 | /* |
70af3d8e | 525 | * Get the clients list of supported curves. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
526 | * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received |
527 | * supported_groups! | |
528 | */ | |
25670f3e MC |
529 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) { |
530 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
25670f3e MC |
532 | return 0; |
533 | } | |
534 | ||
535 | while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { | |
536 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) | |
537 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) | |
538 | || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { | |
539 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e56c33b9 | 540 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, |
25670f3e MC |
541 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
542 | return 0; | |
543 | } | |
544 | ||
545 | /* | |
546 | * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the | |
547 | * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. | |
548 | */ | |
549 | if (found) | |
550 | continue; | |
551 | ||
552 | /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ | |
553 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) { | |
554 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e56c33b9 | 555 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
25670f3e MC |
556 | return 0; |
557 | } | |
558 | ||
559 | /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ | |
560 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) { | |
561 | /* Share not suitable */ | |
562 | continue; | |
563 | } | |
564 | ||
565 | group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags); | |
566 | ||
567 | if (group_nid == 0) { | |
568 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 569 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, |
25670f3e MC |
570 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); |
571 | return 0; | |
572 | } | |
573 | ||
574 | if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { | |
575 | /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */ | |
576 | EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
577 | ||
578 | if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) { | |
579 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 580 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
25670f3e MC |
581 | EVP_PKEY_free(key); |
582 | return 0; | |
583 | } | |
584 | s->s3->peer_tmp = key; | |
585 | } else { | |
586 | /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ | |
587 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); | |
588 | if (pctx == NULL | |
589 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
590 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, | |
591 | group_nid) <= 0 | |
592 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { | |
593 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 594 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
25670f3e MC |
595 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
596 | return 0; | |
597 | } | |
598 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
599 | pctx = NULL; | |
600 | } | |
601 | s->s3->group_id = group_id; | |
602 | ||
603 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, | |
604 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
605 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
606 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
e56c33b9 | 607 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
25670f3e MC |
608 | return 0; |
609 | } | |
610 | ||
611 | found = 1; | |
612 | } | |
613 | ||
614 | return 1; | |
615 | } | |
616 | ||
617 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
e56c33b9 | 618 | int tls_parse_client_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
619 | { |
620 | PACKET supported_groups_list; | |
621 | ||
622 | /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ | |
623 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) | |
624 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 | |
625 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { | |
626 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
627 | return 0; | |
628 | } | |
629 | ||
630 | if (!s->hit | |
631 | && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list, | |
632 | &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist, | |
633 | &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) { | |
634 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
635 | return 0; | |
636 | } | |
637 | ||
638 | return 1; | |
639 | } | |
640 | #endif | |
641 | ||
e56c33b9 | 642 | int tls_parse_client_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
25670f3e MC |
643 | { |
644 | /* The extension must always be empty */ | |
645 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
646 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
647 | return 0; | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; | |
651 | ||
652 | return 1; | |
653 | } | |
7da160b0 | 654 | |
7da160b0 MC |
655 | /* Add the server's renegotiation binding */ |
656 | int tls_construct_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
657 | { | |
658 | if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
659 | return 1; | |
660 | ||
661 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) | |
662 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
663 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
664 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
665 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) | |
666 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, | |
667 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) | |
668 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
669 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
670 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
671 | return 0; | |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
674 | return 1; | |
675 | } | |
676 | ||
677 | int tls_construct_server_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
678 | { | |
679 | if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 | |
680 | || s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) | |
681 | return 1; | |
682 | ||
683 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
684 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
685 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
686 | return 0; | |
687 | } | |
688 | ||
689 | return 1; | |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
692 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
693 | int tls_construct_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
694 | { | |
695 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
696 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
697 | int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); | |
698 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); | |
699 | const unsigned char *plist; | |
700 | size_t plistlen; | |
701 | ||
702 | if (!using_ecc) | |
703 | return 1; | |
704 | ||
705 | tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); | |
706 | ||
707 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) | |
708 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
709 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) | |
710 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
711 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
712 | return 0; | |
713 | } | |
714 | ||
715 | return 1; | |
716 | } | |
717 | #endif | |
718 | ||
719 | int tls_construct_server_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
720 | { | |
721 | if (!s->tlsext_ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { | |
722 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
723 | return 1; | |
724 | } | |
725 | ||
726 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | |
727 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
728 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
729 | return 0; | |
730 | } | |
731 | ||
732 | return 1; | |
733 | } | |
734 | ||
ab83e314 | 735 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
7da160b0 MC |
736 | int tls_construct_server_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) |
737 | { | |
738 | if (!s->tlsext_status_expected) | |
739 | return 1; | |
740 | ||
741 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) | |
742 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
743 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
744 | return 0; | |
745 | } | |
746 | ||
747 | return 1; | |
748 | } | |
ab83e314 | 749 | #endif |
7da160b0 MC |
750 | |
751 | ||
752 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
753 | int tls_construct_server_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
754 | { | |
755 | const unsigned char *npa; | |
756 | unsigned int npalen; | |
757 | int ret; | |
758 | int next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; | |
759 | ||
760 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
761 | if (!next_proto_neg_seen || s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL) | |
762 | return 1; | |
763 | ||
764 | ret = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, | |
765 | s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); | |
766 | if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
767 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) | |
768 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { | |
769 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, | |
770 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
771 | return 0; | |
772 | } | |
773 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | return 1; | |
777 | } | |
778 | #endif | |
779 | ||
780 | int tls_construct_server_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
781 | { | |
782 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) | |
783 | return 1; | |
784 | ||
785 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, | |
786 | TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) | |
787 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
788 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
789 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, | |
790 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len) | |
791 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
792 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
793 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
794 | return 0; | |
795 | } | |
796 | ||
797 | return 1; | |
798 | } | |
799 | ||
800 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
801 | int tls_construct_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
802 | { | |
803 | if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) | |
804 | return 1; | |
805 | ||
806 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) | |
807 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
808 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) | |
809 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) | |
810 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
811 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
812 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
813 | return 0; | |
814 | } | |
815 | ||
816 | return 1; | |
817 | } | |
818 | #endif | |
819 | ||
820 | int tls_construct_server_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
821 | { | |
822 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0) | |
823 | return 1; | |
824 | ||
825 | /* | |
826 | * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable | |
827 | * for other cases too. | |
828 | */ | |
829 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD | |
830 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 | |
831 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | |
832 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { | |
833 | s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; | |
834 | return 1; | |
835 | } | |
836 | ||
837 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) | |
838 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
839 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
840 | return 0; | |
841 | } | |
842 | ||
843 | return 1; | |
844 | } | |
845 | ||
846 | int tls_construct_server_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
847 | { | |
848 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) | |
849 | return 1; | |
850 | ||
851 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) | |
852 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
853 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
854 | return 0; | |
855 | } | |
856 | ||
857 | return 1; | |
858 | } | |
859 | ||
860 | int tls_construct_server_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
861 | { | |
862 | unsigned char *encodedPoint; | |
863 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; | |
864 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; | |
865 | ||
866 | if (s->hit) | |
867 | return 1; | |
868 | ||
869 | if (ckey == NULL) { | |
870 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
871 | return 0; | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) | |
875 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
876 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { | |
877 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
878 | return 0; | |
879 | } | |
880 | ||
881 | skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); | |
882 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
883 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
884 | return 0; | |
885 | } | |
886 | ||
887 | /* Generate encoding of server key */ | |
888 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); | |
889 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
890 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
891 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); | |
892 | return 0; | |
893 | } | |
894 | ||
895 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) | |
896 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
897 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
898 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); | |
899 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
900 | return 0; | |
901 | } | |
902 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
903 | ||
904 | /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ | |
905 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; | |
906 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { | |
907 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
908 | return 0; | |
909 | } | |
910 | ||
911 | return 1; | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | int tls_construct_server_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
915 | { | |
916 | const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | |
917 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ | |
918 | 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ | |
919 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | |
920 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | |
921 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | |
922 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 | |
923 | }; | |
924 | ||
925 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 | |
926 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) | |
927 | || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) | |
928 | return 1; | |
929 | ||
930 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { | |
931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
932 | return 0; | |
933 | } | |
934 | ||
935 | return 1; | |
936 | } |