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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
0f113f3e MC |
22 | /* |
23 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
24 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
25 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 26 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
27 | { |
28 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 29 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
30 | |
31 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 32 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 33 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 34 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
35 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
36 | /* | |
37 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
38 | * ignore the result anyway | |
39 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
40 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
41 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 42 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 43 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 44 | |
7ee8627f | 45 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
46 | if (s->msg_callback) |
47 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
48 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
49 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 50 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 51 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
52 | s->init_off += written; |
53 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 54 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 55 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 56 | |
4a01c59f | 57 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
58 | { |
59 | size_t msglen; | |
60 | ||
4a01c59f | 61 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 62 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 63 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
64 | return 0; |
65 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
66 | s->init_off = 0; | |
67 | ||
68 | return 1; | |
69 | } | |
70 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
71 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
72 | { | |
c7f47786 MC |
73 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) |
74 | return 0; | |
75 | ||
b186a592 MC |
76 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
77 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
78 | ||
c7f47786 | 79 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
80 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
81 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
82 | ||
83 | /* | |
84 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
85 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
86 | * ClientHello. | |
87 | */ | |
88 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
89 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
90 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
91 | return 0; | |
92 | } | |
93 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
94 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
95 | ||
96 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
97 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
98 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
99 | ok = 1; | |
100 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
101 | ok = 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | if (ok) | |
104 | break; | |
105 | } | |
106 | if (!ok) { | |
107 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
108 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
109 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
110 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
111 | return 0; | |
112 | } | |
c7f47786 | 113 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
1fcb4e4d | 114 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, s->ctx->lock); |
db0f35dd TS |
115 | } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
116 | /* Renegotiation is disabled */ | |
117 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
118 | return 0; | |
c7f47786 MC |
119 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
120 | !(s->options & | |
121 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
122 | /* | |
123 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
124 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
125 | */ | |
126 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, | |
127 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
128 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
129 | return 0; | |
130 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d BK |
131 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, |
132 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
133 | |
134 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
135 | } | |
136 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d | 137 | int discard; |
c7f47786 | 138 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
1fcb4e4d BK |
139 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, |
140 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 141 | else |
1fcb4e4d BK |
142 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, 1, |
143 | &discard, s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
144 | |
145 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
146 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
147 | s->hit = 0; | |
148 | ||
149 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
150 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 151 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 152 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
153 | } |
154 | ||
155 | return 1; | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
158 | /* |
159 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
160 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
161 | */ | |
162 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
163 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
164 | ||
165 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
166 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
167 | { | |
168 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
169 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
170 | ||
171 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
172 | size_t hashlen; | |
173 | ||
174 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
175 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
176 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
177 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
178 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
179 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
180 | else | |
181 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
182 | ||
183 | /* | |
184 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
185 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
186 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
187 | */ | |
188 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
189 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
190 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
191 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
192 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
193 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
194 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | } | |
197 | ||
198 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
199 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
200 | } else { | |
201 | size_t retlen; | |
202 | ||
203 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
204 | if (retlen <= 0) | |
205 | return 0; | |
206 | *hdatalen = retlen; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
209 | return 1; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
212 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
213 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
214 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
215 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 216 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
217 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
218 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
219 | void *hdata; |
220 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 221 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 222 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 223 | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
224 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
226 | goto err; | |
227 | } | |
228 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 229 | |
168067b6 | 230 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
ad4dd362 DSH |
231 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
232 | goto err; | |
233 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
234 | |
235 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
236 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
237 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
238 | goto err; | |
239 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 240 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
241 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
242 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
243 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
244 | goto err; | |
245 | } | |
246 | ||
ad4dd362 | 247 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
248 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
249 | goto err; | |
250 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
251 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
252 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
253 | if (sig == NULL) { |
254 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
255 | goto err; | |
256 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 257 | |
75394189 | 258 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
5f9b64a2 MC |
259 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
260 | goto err; | |
261 | } | |
262 | ||
ad4dd362 | 263 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 264 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
265 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
266 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
268 | goto err; | |
269 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
270 | } |
271 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
272 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
273 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
274 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
275 | s->session->master_key) | |
276 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
277 | ||
5f9b64a2 MC |
278 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
279 | goto err; | |
280 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 281 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
282 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
283 | goto err; | |
284 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 285 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
286 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
287 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
288 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
289 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
290 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
291 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
292 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 293 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
294 | } |
295 | #endif | |
296 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 297 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
298 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
299 | goto err; | |
300 | } | |
301 | ||
302 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
303 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
304 | goto err; | |
305 | ||
306 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
307 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
308 | return 1; | |
309 | err: | |
310 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
311 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
312 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
313 | return 0; | |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
316 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
317 | { | |
318 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 319 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
320 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
321 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
322 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b AP |
323 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
324 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
dd24857b | 325 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
326 | unsigned int len; |
327 | X509 *peer; | |
328 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 329 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 330 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 331 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 332 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 333 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
334 | |
335 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
336 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
337 | goto f_err; |
338 | } | |
339 | ||
340 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
341 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
fb34a0f4 | 342 | if (pkey == NULL) |
83b4049a | 343 | goto f_err; |
83b4049a | 344 | |
dd24857b | 345 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
346 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
347 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
348 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
349 | goto f_err; | |
350 | } | |
351 | ||
f464f9c0 PD |
352 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
353 | int rv; | |
354 | unsigned int sigalg; | |
355 | ||
356 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
357 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
358 | goto f_err; | |
359 | } | |
360 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); | |
361 | if (rv == -1) { | |
362 | goto f_err; | |
363 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
364 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
365 | goto f_err; | |
366 | } | |
367 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
368 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
369 | #endif | |
370 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
371 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
372 | goto f_err; | |
373 | } | |
374 | ||
168067b6 DSH |
375 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
376 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
377 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
378 | goto f_err; | |
379 | } | |
f464f9c0 | 380 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
381 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
382 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
383 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
384 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
385 | */ |
386 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
387 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
388 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
389 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
390 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
391 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
392 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
393 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
394 | } else |
395 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 PD |
396 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
397 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
398 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
399 | goto f_err; | |
d8bc1399 | 400 | } |
f464f9c0 | 401 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
402 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
403 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
404 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
405 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
406 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
407 | goto f_err; | |
408 | } | |
409 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
410 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
411 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
412 | goto f_err; | |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 415 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
d8bc1399 | 416 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
417 | goto f_err; |
418 | } | |
419 | ||
420 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
421 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
422 | #endif | |
75394189 | 423 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 | 424 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
425 | goto f_err; |
426 | } | |
427 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
428 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 429 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
430 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
431 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
432 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
433 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
434 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
435 | goto f_err; |
436 | } | |
437 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
438 | data = gost_data; | |
439 | } | |
440 | } | |
441 | #endif | |
442 | ||
5554facb | 443 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 444 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
445 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
446 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
447 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
448 | goto f_err; | |
449 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 450 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
451 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
452 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
453 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
454 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
455 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
457 | goto f_err; | |
458 | } | |
459 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
460 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
461 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
462 | goto f_err; | |
463 | } | |
464 | } else { | |
465 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 466 | if (j <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
467 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
468 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
469 | goto f_err; | |
470 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
471 | } |
472 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 473 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
d8bc1399 MC |
474 | if (0) { |
475 | f_err: | |
476 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
477 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
478 | } | |
479 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
480 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
481 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
482 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
483 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
484 | #endif | |
485 | return ret; | |
486 | } | |
487 | ||
229185e6 | 488 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 489 | { |
12472b45 | 490 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 491 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 492 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 493 | |
f7e393be MC |
494 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
495 | if (!s->server) | |
496 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
497 | ||
498 | /* | |
499 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
500 | * client certificate | |
501 | */ | |
502 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
503 | && !s->server | |
504 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
505 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
506 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
507 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
b43c3765 BE |
508 | /* |
509 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves | |
510 | * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state | |
511 | * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. | |
512 | */ | |
513 | return 0; | |
f7e393be MC |
514 | } |
515 | ||
229185e6 MC |
516 | if (s->server) { |
517 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
518 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
519 | } else { | |
520 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
521 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
522 | } | |
0f113f3e | 523 | |
12472b45 MC |
524 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
525 | sender, slen, | |
526 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
527 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
528 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
529 | goto err; | |
530 | } | |
531 | ||
12472b45 | 532 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 533 | |
12472b45 | 534 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
535 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
536 | goto err; | |
537 | } | |
0f113f3e | 538 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
539 | /* |
540 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
541 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
542 | */ | |
543 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
544 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f MC |
545 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
546 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
547 | goto err; | |
548 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 549 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
550 | /* |
551 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
552 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
553 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
554 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
555 | goto err; | |
556 | } | |
23a635c0 | 557 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
558 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
559 | finish_md_len); | |
560 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 561 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
562 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
563 | finish_md_len); | |
564 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 565 | } |
0f113f3e | 566 | |
b9908bf9 | 567 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 568 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
569 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
570 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 571 | } |
d02b48c6 | 572 | |
44c04a2e MC |
573 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
574 | { | |
575 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
576 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
577 | goto err; | |
578 | } | |
579 | ||
9412b3ad | 580 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 581 | return 1; |
f14afcaa | 582 | |
44c04a2e MC |
583 | err: |
584 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
585 | return 0; | |
586 | } | |
587 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
588 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
589 | { | |
57389a32 | 590 | int al; |
e1c3de44 MC |
591 | unsigned int updatetype; |
592 | ||
82f992cb MC |
593 | s->key_update_count++; |
594 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
595 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
596 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
597 | goto err; | |
598 | } | |
599 | ||
524420d8 MC |
600 | /* |
601 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
602 | * be on a record boundary. | |
603 | */ | |
604 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
605 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
606 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
607 | goto err; | |
608 | } | |
609 | ||
e1c3de44 | 610 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 611 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
57389a32 | 612 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 | 613 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
57389a32 | 614 | goto err; |
e1c3de44 MC |
615 | } |
616 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
617 | /* |
618 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
619 | * didn't recognise. | |
620 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
621 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
622 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
623 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
624 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
625 | goto err; | |
626 | } | |
627 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
628 | /* |
629 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
630 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
631 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
632 | */ | |
633 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
634 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
635 | ||
57389a32 MC |
636 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
637 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
638 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
639 | goto err; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
e1c3de44 | 642 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
57389a32 MC |
643 | err: |
644 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
645 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
646 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
647 | } |
648 | ||
bf48836c | 649 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
650 | /* |
651 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
652 | * to far. | |
653 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 654 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
655 | { |
656 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 657 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
658 | /* |
659 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
660 | * the appropriate error. | |
661 | */ | |
662 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
663 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 664 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
665 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
666 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
667 | } else { | |
668 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
669 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
670 | } | |
671 | ||
672 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
673 | sender, | |
674 | slen, | |
675 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
676 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
677 | #endif |
678 | ||
be3583fa | 679 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
680 | { |
681 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 682 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 683 | |
73999b62 | 684 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
685 | /* |
686 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
687 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
688 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 689 | */ |
c69f2adf | 690 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 691 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
692 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
693 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
694 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
fb34a0f4 | 695 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
a230b26e EK |
696 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
697 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
698 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
699 | } |
700 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 701 | if (remain != 0) { |
fb34a0f4 | 702 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
703 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
704 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
705 | goto f_err; |
706 | } | |
657da85e MC |
707 | } |
708 | ||
709 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
710 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
711 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 712 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
713 | goto f_err; |
714 | } | |
715 | ||
716 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
717 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
718 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 719 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
720 | goto f_err; |
721 | } | |
722 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
723 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
724 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
725 | ||
726 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
727 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
728 | ||
729 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
730 | /* | |
731 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
732 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
733 | * SCTP is used | |
734 | */ | |
735 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
736 | #endif | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
b9908bf9 | 739 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
740 | f_err: |
741 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 742 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 743 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
744 | } |
745 | ||
be3583fa | 746 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 747 | { |
7776a36c | 748 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 749 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 750 | |
d781d247 MC |
751 | |
752 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
753 | if (s->server) |
754 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 755 | |
524420d8 MC |
756 | /* |
757 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
758 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
759 | */ | |
760 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
761 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
762 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
763 | goto f_err; | |
764 | } | |
765 | ||
0f113f3e | 766 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 767 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 768 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 769 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
770 | goto f_err; |
771 | } | |
772 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
773 | ||
12472b45 | 774 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 775 | |
12472b45 | 776 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 777 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 778 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
779 | goto f_err; |
780 | } | |
781 | ||
12472b45 MC |
782 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
783 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 784 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 785 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
786 | goto f_err; |
787 | } | |
788 | ||
789 | /* | |
790 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
791 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
792 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
793 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
794 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
795 | goto f_err; | |
796 | } | |
23a635c0 | 797 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
798 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
799 | md_len); | |
800 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 801 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
802 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
803 | md_len); | |
804 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
805 | } |
806 | ||
7776a36c MC |
807 | /* |
808 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
809 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
810 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
811 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
812 | if (s->server) { | |
813 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
814 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
815 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
816 | goto f_err; | |
817 | } | |
818 | } else { | |
819 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 820 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 821 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
92760c21 MC |
822 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
823 | goto f_err; | |
824 | } | |
825 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
826 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
827 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
828 | goto f_err; | |
829 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
830 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
831 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
832 | } |
833 | } | |
834 | ||
e6575156 | 835 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
836 | f_err: |
837 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 838 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 839 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 840 | } |
d02b48c6 | 841 | |
7cea05dc | 842 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 843 | { |
7cea05dc | 844 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 845 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
846 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
847 | return 0; | |
848 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 849 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
850 | return 1; |
851 | } | |
852 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
853 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
854 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
855 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 856 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
857 | int len; |
858 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
859 | ||
860 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
861 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 862 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
863 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
864 | return 0; | |
865 | } | |
866 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
867 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 868 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
869 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
870 | return 0; | |
871 | } | |
872 | ||
873 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 874 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
e96e0f8e MC |
875 | chain, al)) |
876 | return 0; | |
877 | ||
878 | return 1; | |
879 | } | |
880 | ||
881 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
882 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
883 | { | |
884 | int i, chain_count; | |
885 | X509 *x; | |
886 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
887 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
888 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
889 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
890 | ||
891 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
892 | return 1; | |
893 | ||
894 | x = cpk->x509; | |
895 | ||
896 | /* | |
897 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
898 | */ | |
d805a57b | 899 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
900 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
901 | else | |
902 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
903 | ||
904 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
905 | chain_store = NULL; | |
906 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
907 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
908 | else | |
909 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
910 | ||
d805a57b | 911 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
912 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
913 | ||
914 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
915 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
916 | goto err; | |
917 | } | |
918 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
919 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
920 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
921 | goto err; | |
922 | } | |
923 | /* | |
924 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
925 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
926 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
927 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
928 | */ | |
929 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
930 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
931 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
932 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
933 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
934 | if (i != 1) { | |
935 | #if 0 | |
936 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
937 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
938 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
939 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
940 | #endif | |
941 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
942 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
943 | goto err; | |
944 | } | |
945 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
946 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
947 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
948 | ||
949 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
950 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
951 | goto err; | |
952 | } | |
953 | } | |
954 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
955 | } else { | |
956 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
957 | if (i != 1) { | |
958 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
959 | goto err; | |
960 | } | |
961 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
962 | goto err; | |
963 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
964 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
965 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
966 | goto err; | |
967 | } | |
968 | } | |
969 | return 1; | |
970 | ||
971 | err: | |
972 | *al = tmpal; | |
973 | return 0; | |
974 | } | |
975 | ||
976 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
977 | int *al) | |
978 | { | |
979 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
980 | ||
5923ad4b | 981 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 982 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 983 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 984 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 985 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 986 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 987 | } |
c49e1912 | 988 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
989 | } |
990 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
991 | /* |
992 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
993 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
994 | * freed up as well. | |
995 | */ | |
996 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) | |
8723588e | 997 | { |
1fcb4e4d | 998 | int discard; |
8723588e MC |
999 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
1000 | ||
1001 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1002 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 1003 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
1004 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
1005 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
1006 | return ret; | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | #endif | |
1009 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1010 | if (clearbufs) { |
1011 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1012 | /* | |
1013 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1014 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1015 | */ | |
1016 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1017 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1018 | } | |
b77f3ed1 MC |
1019 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) |
1020 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
30f05b19 | 1021 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1022 | } |
8723588e | 1023 | |
c7f47786 | 1024 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1025 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1026 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1027 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1028 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1029 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1030 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1031 | ||
8723588e | 1032 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1033 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1034 | ||
1fcb4e4d BK |
1035 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, |
1036 | s->ctx->lock); | |
fe3a3291 | 1037 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1038 | } else { |
5d61491c MC |
1039 | /* |
1040 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1041 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1042 | */ | |
1043 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1044 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
8723588e | 1045 | if (s->hit) |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1046 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, |
1047 | s->ctx->lock); | |
8723588e | 1048 | |
fe3a3291 | 1049 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1050 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, &discard, |
1051 | s->ctx->lock); | |
8723588e MC |
1052 | } |
1053 | ||
1054 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1055 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1056 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1057 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1060 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1061 | ||
1062 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1063 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1064 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1065 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1066 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1067 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1068 | } |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1071 | /* |
1072 | * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, | |
1073 | * so continue. | |
1074 | */ | |
1075 | if (!clearbufs) | |
1076 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1077 | ||
4004ce5f | 1078 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1079 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1080 | } | |
1081 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1082 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1083 | { | |
1084 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1085 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
1086 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 1087 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1088 | |
1089 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1090 | ||
1091 | do { | |
1092 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1093 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1094 | &p[s->init_num], |
1095 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1096 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1097 | if (i <= 0) { |
1098 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1099 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1100 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1101 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1102 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1103 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1104 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1105 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1106 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
1107 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1108 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1109 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1110 | goto f_err; | |
1111 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1112 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1113 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1114 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1115 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1116 | return 1; |
1117 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1118 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1119 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
1120 | goto f_err; |
1121 | } | |
54105ddd | 1122 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1123 | } |
1124 | ||
1125 | skip_message = 0; | |
1126 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1127 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1128 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1129 | /* |
1130 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1131 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1132 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1133 | * MAC. | |
1134 | */ | |
1135 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1136 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1137 | skip_message = 1; | |
1138 | ||
1139 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1140 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1141 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1142 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | } while (skip_message); | |
1145 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1146 | ||
1147 | *mt = *p; | |
1148 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1149 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1150 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1151 | /* |
1152 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1153 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1154 | * |
1155 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1156 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1157 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1158 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1159 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1160 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1161 | ||
1162 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1163 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1164 | } else { | |
1165 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1166 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1167 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1168 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1169 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1170 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 1171 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1172 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1173 | ||
1174 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1175 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
1178 | return 1; | |
1179 | f_err: | |
1180 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1181 | return 0; |
1182 | } | |
1183 | ||
eda75751 | 1184 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1185 | { |
54105ddd | 1186 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1187 | unsigned char *p; |
1188 | int i; | |
1189 | ||
1190 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1191 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1192 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1193 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1194 | } |
1195 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1196 | p = s->init_msg; |
1197 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1198 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1199 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1200 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1201 | if (i <= 0) { |
1202 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1203 | *len = 0; |
1204 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1205 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1206 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1207 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1208 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1209 | |
bf48836c | 1210 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1211 | /* |
1212 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1213 | * Finished verification. | |
1214 | */ | |
1215 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1216 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1217 | #endif |
1218 | ||
0f113f3e | 1219 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1220 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1221 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1222 | s->init_num)) { | |
1223 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
1224 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1225 | *len = 0; | |
1226 | return 0; | |
1227 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1228 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1229 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1230 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1231 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1232 | /* |
1233 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1234 | * processing the message | |
1235 | */ | |
1236 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
1237 | && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1238 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d166ed8c DSH |
1239 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
1240 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1241 | *len = 0; | |
1242 | return 0; | |
1243 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
1244 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1245 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1246 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1247 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | ||
eda75751 | 1250 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1251 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1252 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1253 | |
6b691a5c | 1254 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1255 | { |
1256 | int al; | |
1257 | ||
1258 | switch (type) { | |
1259 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1260 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1261 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1262 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1263 | break; | |
1264 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1265 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1266 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1267 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1268 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1269 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1270 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1271 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1272 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1273 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1274 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1275 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1276 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1277 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1279 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1280 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1281 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1282 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1283 | break; | |
1284 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1285 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1286 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1287 | break; | |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1289 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1290 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1291 | break; | |
1292 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1293 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1294 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1295 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1296 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1297 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1298 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1299 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1300 | break; | |
1301 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1302 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1303 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1304 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1305 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1306 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1307 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1308 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1309 | break; | |
1310 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1311 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1312 | break; | |
1313 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1314 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1315 | break; | |
1316 | default: | |
1317 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1318 | break; | |
1319 | } | |
26a7d938 | 1320 | return al; |
0f113f3e | 1321 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1322 | |
b362ccab | 1323 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1324 | { |
1325 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1326 | return 0; | |
1327 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1328 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1329 | |
068c358a | 1330 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1331 | { |
1332 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1333 | ||
1334 | if (a == b) | |
1335 | return 0; | |
1336 | if (!dtls) | |
1337 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1338 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1339 | } | |
1340 | ||
1341 | typedef struct { | |
1342 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1343 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1344 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1345 | } version_info; |
1346 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1347 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1348 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1349 | #endif |
1350 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1351 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1352 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1353 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1354 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1355 | #else | |
1356 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1357 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1358 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1359 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1360 | #else |
a230b26e | 1361 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1362 | #endif |
1363 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1364 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1365 | #else |
a230b26e | 1366 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1367 | #endif |
1368 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1369 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1370 | #else |
a230b26e | 1371 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1372 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1373 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1374 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1375 | #else |
a230b26e | 1376 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1377 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1378 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1379 | }; |
1380 | ||
1381 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1382 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1383 | #endif | |
1384 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1385 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1386 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1387 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1388 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1389 | #else |
a230b26e | 1390 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1391 | #endif |
1392 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1393 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1394 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1395 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1396 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1397 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1398 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1399 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1400 | }; |
1401 | ||
1402 | /* | |
1403 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1404 | * | |
1405 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1406 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1407 | * | |
1408 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1409 | */ | |
068c358a | 1410 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1411 | { |
1412 | int version = method->version; | |
1413 | ||
1414 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1415 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1416 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1417 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1418 | ||
1419 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1420 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1421 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1422 | ||
1423 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1424 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1425 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1426 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1427 | |
1428 | return 0; | |
1429 | } | |
1430 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1431 | /* |
1432 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1433 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1434 | * | |
1435 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1436 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1437 | * | |
1438 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1439 | */ | |
1440 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1441 | { | |
1442 | const version_info *vent; | |
1443 | const version_info *table; | |
1444 | ||
1445 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1446 | default: | |
1447 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1448 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1449 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1450 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1451 | break; | |
1452 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1453 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1454 | break; | |
1455 | } | |
1456 | ||
1457 | for (vent = table; | |
1458 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1459 | ++vent) { | |
1460 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1461 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1462 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1463 | return 1; | |
1464 | } | |
1465 | } | |
1466 | return 0; | |
1467 | } | |
1468 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1469 | /* |
1470 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1471 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1472 | * supported protocol version. | |
1473 | * | |
1474 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1475 | * | |
1476 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1477 | */ | |
1478 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1479 | { | |
1480 | const version_info *vent; | |
1481 | const version_info *table; | |
1482 | ||
1483 | /* | |
1484 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1485 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1486 | * s->method). | |
1487 | */ | |
1488 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1489 | return 1; | |
1490 | ||
1491 | /* | |
1492 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1493 | * highest protocol version). | |
1494 | */ | |
1495 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1496 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1497 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1498 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1499 | else { | |
1500 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1501 | return 0; | |
1502 | } | |
1503 | ||
1504 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1505 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1506 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1507 | } | |
1508 | return 0; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
1511 | /* | |
1512 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1513 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1514 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1515 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1516 | * | |
1517 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1518 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1519 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1520 | * | |
1521 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1522 | */ | |
1523 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1524 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1525 | if (version == 0) { |
1526 | *bound = version; | |
1527 | return 1; | |
1528 | } | |
1529 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1530 | /*- |
1531 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1532 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1533 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1534 | * | |
1535 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1536 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1537 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1538 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1539 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1540 | */ | |
1541 | switch (method_version) { | |
1542 | default: | |
1543 | /* | |
1544 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1545 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1546 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1547 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1548 | * versions. | |
1549 | */ | |
1550 | return 0; | |
1551 | ||
1552 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1553 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1554 | return 0; | |
1555 | break; | |
1556 | ||
1557 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1558 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1559 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1560 | return 0; |
1561 | break; | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | ||
1564 | *bound = version; | |
1565 | return 1; | |
1566 | } | |
1567 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1568 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1569 | { | |
1570 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1571 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1572 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1573 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1574 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1575 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1576 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1577 | } else { | |
1578 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1579 | } | |
1580 | } | |
1581 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1582 | /* |
1583 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1584 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1585 | * the version specific method. | |
1586 | * | |
1587 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1588 | * | |
1589 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1590 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1591 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1592 | { |
1593 | /*- | |
1594 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1595 | * | |
1596 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1597 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1598 | * | |
1599 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1600 | * handle version. | |
1601 | */ | |
1602 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1603 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1604 | const version_info *vent; |
1605 | const version_info *table; | |
1606 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1607 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1608 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1609 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1610 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1611 | switch (server_version) { |
1612 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1613 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1614 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1615 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1616 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1617 | /* |
1618 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1619 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1620 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1621 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1622 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1623 | */ | |
1624 | return 0; | |
1625 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1626 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1627 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1628 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1629 | */ |
018fcbec | 1630 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1631 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1632 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1633 | break; | |
1634 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1635 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1636 | break; | |
1637 | } | |
1638 | ||
70af3d8e | 1639 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1640 | |
70af3d8e | 1641 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1642 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1643 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1644 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1645 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1646 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1647 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1648 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1649 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1650 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1651 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1652 | } | |
1653 | ||
1654 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1655 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1656 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1657 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1658 | /* |
1659 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1660 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1661 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1662 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1663 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1664 | continue; | |
1665 | for (vent = table; | |
1666 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1667 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1668 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1669 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1670 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1671 | ||
1672 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1673 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1674 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1675 | best_method = method; | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | } | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1680 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1681 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | ||
1684 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
7d061fce MC |
1685 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1686 | /* | |
1687 | * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this | |
1688 | * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
1689 | */ | |
1690 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1691 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1692 | return 0; | |
1693 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1694 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1695 | s->version = best_vers; |
1696 | s->method = best_method; | |
1697 | return 0; | |
1698 | } | |
1699 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1700 | } | |
1701 | ||
1702 | /* | |
1703 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1704 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1705 | */ | |
1706 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1707 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1708 | ||
1709 | /* | |
1710 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1711 | * the ClientHello. | |
1712 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1713 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1714 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1715 | ||
1716 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1717 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1718 | continue; | |
1719 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1720 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1721 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1722 | s->version = vent->version; |
1723 | s->method = method; | |
1724 | return 0; | |
1725 | } | |
1726 | disabled = 1; | |
1727 | } | |
1728 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1729 | } | |
1730 | ||
1731 | /* | |
1732 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1733 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1734 | * the version specific method. | |
1735 | * | |
1736 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1737 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
c3043dcd MC |
1738 | * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random |
1739 | * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated | |
4fa52141 VD |
1740 | * |
1741 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1742 | */ | |
c3043dcd | 1743 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) |
4fa52141 VD |
1744 | { |
1745 | const version_info *vent; | |
1746 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1747 | int highver = 0; |
4fa52141 | 1748 | |
b97667ce MC |
1749 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1750 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1751 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1752 | ||
c3043dcd MC |
1753 | if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1754 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1755 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1756 | } | |
1757 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1758 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1759 | default: | |
c3043dcd MC |
1760 | if (version != s->version) { |
1761 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
4fa52141 | 1762 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; |
c3043dcd | 1763 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1764 | /* |
1765 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1766 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1767 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1768 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1769 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1770 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1771 | return 0; |
1772 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1773 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1774 | break; | |
1775 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1776 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1777 | break; | |
1778 | } | |
1779 | ||
1780 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1781 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1782 | int err; | |
1783 | ||
4fa52141 | 1784 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1785 | continue; |
1786 | ||
1787 | if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) | |
1788 | continue; | |
3847d426 | 1789 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1790 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1791 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd MC |
1792 | if (err != 0) { |
1793 | if (version == vent->version) { | |
1794 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1795 | return err; | |
1796 | } | |
1797 | ||
1798 | continue; | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | if (highver == 0) | |
1801 | highver = vent->version; | |
1802 | ||
1803 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1804 | continue; | |
1805 | ||
1806 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1807 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
1808 | if (checkdgrd) { | |
1809 | if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { | |
1810 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1811 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1812 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1813 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1814 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1815 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1816 | } | |
1817 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1818 | && version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1819 | && highver > version) { | |
1820 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1821 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1822 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1823 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1824 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1825 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1826 | } | |
1827 | } | |
1828 | } | |
1829 | #endif | |
1830 | ||
4fa52141 | 1831 | s->method = method; |
ccae4a15 | 1832 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1833 | return 0; |
1834 | } | |
1835 | ||
c3043dcd | 1836 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
4fa52141 VD |
1837 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1838 | } | |
1839 | ||
068c358a | 1840 | /* |
38a73150 | 1841 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1842 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1843 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1844 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1845 | * | |
1846 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1847 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1848 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1849 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1850 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1851 | * |
0485d540 | 1852 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1853 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1854 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1855 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1856 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1857 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1858 | */ |
38a73150 | 1859 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1860 | { |
1861 | int version; | |
1862 | int hole; | |
1863 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1864 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1865 | const version_info *table; | |
1866 | const version_info *vent; | |
1867 | ||
1868 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1869 | default: | |
1870 | /* | |
1871 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1872 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1873 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1874 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1875 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1876 | */ | |
068c358a | 1877 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1878 | return 0; |
1879 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1880 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1881 | break; | |
1882 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1883 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1884 | break; | |
1885 | } | |
1886 | ||
1887 | /* | |
1888 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1889 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1890 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1891 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1892 | * | |
1893 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1894 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1895 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1896 | * | |
1897 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1898 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1899 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1900 | * | |
1901 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1902 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1903 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1904 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1905 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1906 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1907 | */ | |
068c358a | 1908 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1909 | hole = 1; |
1910 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1911 | /* | |
1912 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1913 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1914 | */ | |
1915 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1916 | hole = 1; | |
1917 | continue; | |
1918 | } | |
1919 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1920 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1921 | hole = 1; | |
1922 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1923 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1924 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1925 | } else { |
1926 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1927 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1928 | hole = 0; |
1929 | } | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | ||
068c358a KR |
1932 | *max_version = version; |
1933 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1934 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1935 | if (version == 0) | |
1936 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1937 | ||
068c358a KR |
1938 | return 0; |
1939 | } | |
1940 | ||
1941 | /* | |
1942 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1943 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1944 | * |
1945 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1946 | * | |
1947 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1948 | */ | |
1949 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1950 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1951 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1952 | |
38a73150 | 1953 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1954 | |
1955 | if (ret != 0) | |
1956 | return ret; | |
1957 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1958 | s->version = ver_max; |
1959 | ||
1960 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1961 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1962 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1963 | ||
1964 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1965 | return 0; |
1966 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
1967 | |
1968 | /* | |
1969 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
1970 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
1971 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
1972 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
1973 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 1974 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 1975 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
1976 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
1977 | { | |
1978 | size_t i; | |
1979 | ||
1980 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
1981 | return 0; | |
1982 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
1983 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
1984 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
1985 | ||
1986 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 1987 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 1988 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 1989 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
1990 | } |
1991 | } | |
1992 | ||
0acee504 | 1993 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 1994 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 1995 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
1996 | |
1997 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
1998 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) | |
1999 | { | |
2000 | unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2001 | size_t hashlen = 0; | |
635b7d3f MC |
2002 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2003 | ||
2004 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea MC |
2005 | |
2006 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2007 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2008 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { | |
2009 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2010 | return 0; | |
2011 | } | |
2012 | ||
2013 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
2014 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) | |
2015 | return 0; | |
2016 | ||
2017 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2018 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
11c67eea MC |
2019 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; |
2020 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
2021 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
2022 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2023 | return 0; | |
2024 | } | |
2025 | ||
2026 | return 1; | |
2027 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2028 | |
2029 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2030 | { | |
2031 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2032 | } | |
2033 | ||
2034 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2035 | { | |
2036 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2037 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2038 | PACKET cadns; | |
2039 | ||
2040 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
2041 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2042 | goto decerr; | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2045 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
2046 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2047 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2048 | goto decerr; | |
2049 | } | |
2050 | ||
2051 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2052 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2053 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2054 | ||
2055 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2056 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
2057 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2058 | goto decerr; | |
2059 | } | |
2060 | ||
2061 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2062 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
2063 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2064 | goto decerr; | |
2065 | } | |
2066 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
2067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2068 | goto decerr; | |
2069 | } | |
2070 | ||
2071 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
2072 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2073 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2074 | goto err; | |
2075 | } | |
2076 | xn = NULL; | |
2077 | } | |
2078 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2079 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2080 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2081 | |
2082 | return 1; | |
2083 | ||
2084 | decerr: | |
2085 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2086 | err: | |
2087 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2088 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2089 | return 0; | |
2090 | } | |
2091 | ||
2092 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2093 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2094 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2095 | |
2096 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
2097 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) | |
2098 | return 0; | |
2099 | ||
2100 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2101 | int i; | |
2102 | ||
2103 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2104 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2105 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2106 | int namelen; | |
2107 | ||
2108 | if (name == NULL | |
2109 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2110 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2111 | &namebytes) | |
2112 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2113 | return 0; | |
2114 | } | |
2115 | } | |
2116 | } | |
2117 | ||
2118 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) | |
2119 | return 0; | |
2120 | ||
2121 | return 1; | |
2122 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2123 | |
2124 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
2125 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, | |
2126 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) | |
2127 | { | |
2128 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2129 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2130 | ||
2131 | if (tbs == NULL) | |
2132 | return 0; | |
2133 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2134 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2135 | ||
2136 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2137 | ||
2138 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2139 | return tbslen; | |
2140 | } |