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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
33388b44 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
c2041da8 | 17 | #include "internal/evp.h" |
ec577822 | 18 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
d02b48c6 | 23 | |
852c2ed2 RS |
24 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509) |
25 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) | |
26 | DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER) | |
27 | ||
c6d38183 RS |
28 | /* |
29 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
30 | */ | |
31 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
32 | int x509err; | |
33 | int alert; | |
34 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
35 | ||
597c51bc MC |
36 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
37 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
38 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
39 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
40 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
41 | }; | |
42 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
43 | /* |
44 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
45 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
46 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 47 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
48 | { |
49 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 50 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
51 | |
52 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 53 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 54 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 55 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
56 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
57 | /* | |
58 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
59 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 60 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 61 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
62 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
63 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
64 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
65 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
66 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
67 | written)) | |
68 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 69 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
70 | if (s->msg_callback) |
71 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
72 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
73 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 74 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 75 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
76 | s->init_off += written; |
77 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 78 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 79 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 80 | |
4a01c59f | 81 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
82 | { |
83 | size_t msglen; | |
84 | ||
4a01c59f | 85 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 86 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 87 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
88 | return 0; |
89 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
90 | s->init_off = 0; | |
91 | ||
92 | return 1; | |
93 | } | |
94 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
95 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
96 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
97 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
98 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 99 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 100 | } |
c7f47786 | 101 | |
b186a592 MC |
102 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
103 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
104 | ||
c7f47786 | 105 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
106 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
107 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
108 | ||
109 | /* | |
110 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
111 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
112 | * ClientHello. | |
113 | */ | |
b5b993b2 | 114 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
4752c5de MC |
115 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
116 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
117 | return 0; |
118 | } | |
119 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
120 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
121 | ||
122 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
123 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
124 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
125 | ok = 1; | |
126 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
127 | ok = 1; | |
128 | } | |
129 | if (ok) | |
130 | break; | |
131 | } | |
132 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
133 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
134 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
135 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
136 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
137 | return 0; |
138 | } | |
c7f47786 | 139 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 140 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
9ef9088c | 141 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 142 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 143 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 144 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 145 | |
555cbb32 | 146 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
147 | } |
148 | } else { | |
149 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
9ef9088c | 150 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 151 | else |
9ef9088c | 152 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 MC |
153 | |
154 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 155 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
156 | s->hit = 0; |
157 | ||
555cbb32 | 158 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 159 | |
1f5b44e9 | 160 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 161 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
162 | } |
163 | ||
164 | return 1; | |
165 | } | |
166 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
167 | /* |
168 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
169 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
170 | */ | |
171 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
172 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
173 | ||
174 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
175 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
176 | { | |
48102247 | 177 | #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC |
99435164 | 178 | static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 179 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
180 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
181 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
99435164 | 182 | static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, |
48102247 | 183 | 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, |
184 | 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, | |
185 | 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; | |
186 | #else | |
99435164 AV |
187 | static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; |
188 | static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
48102247 | 189 | #endif |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
190 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
191 | size_t hashlen; | |
192 | ||
193 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
194 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
195 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
196 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
197 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
198 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
199 | else | |
200 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
201 | ||
202 | /* | |
203 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
204 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
205 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
206 | */ | |
207 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
208 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
209 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
210 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
211 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
212 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
213 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 214 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
215 | return 0; |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
218 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
219 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
220 | } else { | |
221 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 222 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 223 | |
555cbb32 | 224 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 225 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
226 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, |
227 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 228 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 229 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
230 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | return 1; | |
234 | } | |
235 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
236 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
237 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
238 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
239 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 240 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
241 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
242 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
243 | void *hdata; |
244 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 245 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 246 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 247 | |
555cbb32 | 248 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
249 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
250 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
251 | goto err; |
252 | } | |
555cbb32 | 253 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 254 | |
c8f6c28a | 255 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
256 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
257 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
258 | goto err; |
259 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
260 | |
261 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
262 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
264 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
265 | goto err; |
266 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 267 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
268 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
269 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 270 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
271 | goto err; |
272 | } | |
273 | ||
ad4dd362 | 274 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
275 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
276 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
277 | goto err; |
278 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 279 | |
fc69f32c MC |
280 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
281 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md), | |
282 | s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
283 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
284 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
285 | goto err; |
286 | } | |
287 | ||
ad4dd362 | 288 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 289 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
290 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
291 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
292 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
293 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
294 | goto err; |
295 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
296 | } |
297 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
298 | /* |
299 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
300 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
301 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 302 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
303 | /* |
304 | * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated | |
305 | * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params() | |
306 | */ | |
307 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
308 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
309 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 310 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 311 | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
313 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
314 | goto err; |
315 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
316 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
317 | if (sig == NULL | |
318 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
319 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, | |
320 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
321 | goto err; | |
322 | } | |
323 | } else { | |
324 | /* | |
325 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
326 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
327 | */ | |
328 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
329 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, | |
330 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
331 | goto err; | |
332 | } | |
333 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
334 | if (sig == NULL | |
335 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
336 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, | |
337 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
338 | goto err; | |
339 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 340 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 341 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
342 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
343 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
344 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
345 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
346 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
347 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
348 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 349 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
350 | } |
351 | #endif | |
352 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 353 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
354 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
355 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
356 | goto err; |
357 | } | |
358 | ||
359 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
360 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
361 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 362 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 363 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
364 | |
365 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
366 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
367 | return 1; | |
368 | err: | |
369 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
370 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
371 | return 0; |
372 | } | |
373 | ||
374 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
375 | { | |
376 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 377 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
378 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
379 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
380 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 381 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 382 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
383 | unsigned int len; |
384 | X509 *peer; | |
385 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 386 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 387 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 388 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 389 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 390 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
391 | |
392 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
393 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
394 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
395 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
396 | } |
397 | ||
398 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
399 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
400 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
402 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
403 | goto err; | |
404 | } | |
83b4049a | 405 | |
dd24857b | 406 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
407 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
408 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
409 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
410 | } |
411 | ||
f464f9c0 | 412 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
413 | unsigned int sigalg; |
414 | ||
415 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
416 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
417 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
418 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 419 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
420 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
421 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
422 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 423 | } |
f464f9c0 | 424 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
425 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
426 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
427 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
428 | } |
429 | ||
c8f6c28a | 430 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
431 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
432 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
433 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 434 | } |
f464f9c0 | 435 | |
572fa024 | 436 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 RL |
437 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
438 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
572fa024 | 439 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
440 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
441 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
442 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
443 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
444 | */ |
445 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
446 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
447 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
448 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
449 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
450 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
451 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
452 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
453 | } else |
454 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 455 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
456 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
457 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
458 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 459 | } |
f464f9c0 | 460 | |
d8bc1399 | 461 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
462 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
463 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
464 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
465 | } |
466 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 467 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
468 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
469 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
470 | } |
471 | ||
49b26f54 RL |
472 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
473 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
474 | ||
fc69f32c MC |
475 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
476 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md), | |
477 | s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
478 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
479 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
480 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
481 | } |
482 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
483 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 484 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
485 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
486 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
487 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
488 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
489 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
490 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
491 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
492 | } |
493 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
494 | data = gost_data; | |
495 | } | |
496 | } | |
497 | #endif | |
498 | ||
5554facb | 499 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 500 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
501 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
502 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
503 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
504 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
505 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 506 | } |
d8bc1399 | 507 | } |
caf2b6b5 | 508 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
83b4a243 SL |
509 | /* |
510 | * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated | |
511 | * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params() | |
512 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 513 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
514 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
515 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
516 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
517 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
518 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
519 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
520 | } |
521 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
522 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
523 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
524 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
525 | } |
526 | } else { | |
527 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 528 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
529 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
530 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
531 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 532 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
533 | } |
534 | ||
e4562014 MC |
535 | /* |
536 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
537 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
538 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
539 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
540 | * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual | |
541 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. | |
542 | */ | |
555cbb32 | 543 | if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
544 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
545 | else | |
546 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 547 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
548 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
549 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
550 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
551 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
552 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
553 | #endif | |
554 | return ret; | |
555 | } | |
556 | ||
229185e6 | 557 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 558 | { |
12472b45 | 559 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 560 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 561 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 562 | |
f7e393be | 563 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 564 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
565 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
566 | ||
567 | /* | |
568 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
569 | * client certificate | |
570 | */ | |
571 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
572 | && !s->server | |
555cbb32 | 573 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
f7e393be | 574 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
575 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
576 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 577 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
578 | } |
579 | ||
229185e6 MC |
580 | if (s->server) { |
581 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
582 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
583 | } else { | |
584 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
585 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
586 | } | |
0f113f3e | 587 | |
12472b45 MC |
588 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
589 | sender, slen, | |
555cbb32 | 590 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); |
12472b45 | 591 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
592 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
593 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
594 | } |
595 | ||
555cbb32 | 596 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 597 | |
555cbb32 | 598 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
599 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
600 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
601 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 602 | } |
0f113f3e | 603 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
604 | /* |
605 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
606 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
607 | */ | |
608 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
609 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 610 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
611 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
612 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 613 | } |
2faa1b48 | 614 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
615 | /* |
616 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
617 | */ | |
380a522f | 618 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
619 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
620 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
621 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 622 | } |
23a635c0 | 623 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 624 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 625 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 626 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 627 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 628 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 629 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 630 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 631 | } |
0f113f3e | 632 | |
b9908bf9 | 633 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 634 | } |
d02b48c6 | 635 | |
44c04a2e MC |
636 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
637 | { | |
638 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
639 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
640 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
641 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
642 | } |
643 | ||
9412b3ad | 644 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 645 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
646 | } |
647 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
648 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
649 | { | |
650 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
651 | ||
524420d8 MC |
652 | /* |
653 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
654 | * be on a record boundary. | |
655 | */ | |
656 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
657 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
658 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
659 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
660 | } |
661 | ||
e1c3de44 | 662 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 663 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
664 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
665 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
666 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
667 | } |
668 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
669 | /* |
670 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
671 | * didn't recognise. | |
672 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
673 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
674 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
675 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
676 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
677 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
678 | } |
679 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
680 | /* |
681 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
682 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 683 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 684 | */ |
feb9e31c | 685 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
686 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
687 | ||
57389a32 | 688 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
689 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
690 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
691 | } |
692 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
693 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
696 | /* |
697 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
698 | * to far. | |
699 | */ | |
5d671101 | 700 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
701 | { |
702 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 703 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 704 | |
49ae7423 | 705 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
706 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
707 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
708 | } else { | |
709 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
710 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
555cbb32 | 713 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
5d671101 | 714 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
555cbb32 | 715 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); |
5d671101 | 716 | |
555cbb32 | 717 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
718 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
719 | return 0; | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
722 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 723 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 724 | |
be3583fa | 725 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 726 | { |
348240c6 | 727 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 728 | |
73999b62 | 729 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
730 | /* |
731 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
732 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
733 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 734 | */ |
c69f2adf | 735 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 736 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
737 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
738 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
739 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
740 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
741 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
742 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
743 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
744 | } |
745 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 746 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
747 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
748 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
749 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
750 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 751 | } |
657da85e MC |
752 | } |
753 | ||
754 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 755 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
756 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
757 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
758 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
759 | } |
760 | ||
555cbb32 | 761 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 762 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
763 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
764 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
765 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
766 | } |
767 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
768 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
769 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
770 | ||
771 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
772 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
773 | ||
774 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
775 | /* | |
776 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
777 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
778 | * SCTP is used | |
779 | */ | |
780 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
781 | #endif | |
782 | } | |
783 | ||
b9908bf9 | 784 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
785 | } |
786 | ||
be3583fa | 787 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 788 | { |
12472b45 | 789 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 790 | |
d781d247 MC |
791 | |
792 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 793 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
794 | /* |
795 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
796 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less | |
797 | * than TLSv1.3 | |
798 | */ | |
799 | s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
800 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
801 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
802 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
803 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
804 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
805 | } | |
806 | } | |
d781d247 | 807 | |
524420d8 MC |
808 | /* |
809 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
810 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
811 | */ | |
812 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
813 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
814 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
815 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
816 | } |
817 | ||
0f113f3e | 818 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
555cbb32 | 819 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
820 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
821 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
822 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e | 823 | } |
555cbb32 | 824 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 825 | |
555cbb32 | 826 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 827 | |
12472b45 | 828 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
829 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
830 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
831 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
832 | } |
833 | ||
555cbb32 | 834 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 835 | md_len) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
836 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
837 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
838 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
839 | } |
840 | ||
841 | /* | |
842 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
843 | */ | |
380a522f | 844 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
845 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
846 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
847 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 848 | } |
23a635c0 | 849 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 850 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 851 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 852 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 853 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 854 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 855 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 856 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
857 | } |
858 | ||
7776a36c MC |
859 | /* |
860 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
861 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
862 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
863 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
864 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
865 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
866 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 867 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
868 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
869 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
870 | } |
871 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
872 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
873 | size_t dummy; | |
92760c21 | 874 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 875 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 876 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
877 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
878 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
879 | } |
880 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
881 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
882 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
883 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
884 | } | |
885 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
886 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
887 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
888 | } |
889 | } | |
890 | } | |
891 | ||
e6575156 | 892 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 893 | } |
d02b48c6 | 894 | |
7cea05dc | 895 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 896 | { |
7cea05dc | 897 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
898 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
899 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
900 | return 0; |
901 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 902 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
903 | return 1; |
904 | } | |
905 | ||
e96e0f8e | 906 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 907 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 908 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
909 | int len; |
910 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
911 | ||
912 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
913 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
914 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
915 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
916 | return 0; |
917 | } | |
918 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
919 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
920 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
921 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
922 | return 0; |
923 | } | |
924 | ||
925 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 926 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
927 | chain)) { |
928 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 929 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 930 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
931 | |
932 | return 1; | |
933 | } | |
934 | ||
935 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 936 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
937 | { |
938 | int i, chain_count; | |
939 | X509 *x; | |
940 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
941 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
942 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
943 | |
944 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
945 | return 1; | |
946 | ||
947 | x = cpk->x509; | |
948 | ||
949 | /* | |
950 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
951 | */ | |
d805a57b | 952 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
953 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
954 | else | |
955 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
956 | ||
957 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
958 | chain_store = NULL; | |
959 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
960 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
961 | else | |
962 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
963 | ||
d805a57b | 964 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
a959b4fa MC |
965 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(s->ctx->libctx, |
966 | s->ctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
967 | |
968 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
969 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
970 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
971 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
972 | } |
973 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
974 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
975 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
976 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
977 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
978 | } |
979 | /* | |
980 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
981 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
982 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
983 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
984 | */ | |
985 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
986 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
987 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
988 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
989 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
990 | if (i != 1) { | |
991 | #if 0 | |
992 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
993 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
994 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
995 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
996 | #endif | |
997 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
998 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
999 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1000 | } |
1001 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
1002 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
1003 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1004 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
1005 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
1006 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 1007 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 1008 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1009 | } |
1010 | } | |
1011 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
1012 | } else { | |
1013 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
1014 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1015 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
1016 | return 0; | |
1017 | } | |
1018 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
1019 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1020 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1021 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1022 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1023 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1024 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
1025 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1026 | return 0; | |
1027 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1028 | } |
1029 | } | |
1030 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1031 | } |
1032 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1033 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 1034 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1035 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
1036 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1037 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1038 | return 0; | |
1039 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1040 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1041 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
1042 | return 0; | |
1043 | ||
1044 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1045 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
1046 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1047 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1048 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1049 | |
c49e1912 | 1050 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1051 | } |
1052 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1053 | /* |
1054 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1055 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1056 | * freed up as well. | |
1057 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 1058 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1059 | { |
1060 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1061 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
8723588e | 1062 | |
30f05b19 | 1063 | if (clearbufs) { |
e7c27a6c N |
1064 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1065 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
30f05b19 | 1066 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1067 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1068 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1069 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1070 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1071 | */ | |
1072 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1073 | #endif | |
1074 | ) { | |
1075 | /* | |
1076 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1077 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1078 | */ | |
1079 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1080 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1081 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1082 | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1083 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1084 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1085 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1086 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1087 | } |
30f05b19 | 1088 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1089 | } |
8723588e | 1090 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1091 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1092 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1093 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1094 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1095 | /* |
1096 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1097 | * post handshake exchange | |
1098 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1099 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1100 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1101 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1102 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1103 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1104 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1105 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1106 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1107 | ||
8723588e | 1108 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1109 | /* |
1110 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1111 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1112 | */ | |
1113 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1114 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1115 | |
0e6161bc | 1116 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
9ef9088c | 1117 | tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1118 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1119 | } else { |
4cb00457 MC |
1120 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1121 | /* | |
1122 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1123 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1124 | */ | |
1125 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1126 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1127 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1128 | } else { | |
1129 | /* | |
1130 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1131 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1132 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1133 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1134 | } |
8723588e | 1135 | if (s->hit) |
9ef9088c | 1136 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
8723588e | 1137 | |
fe3a3291 | 1138 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
9ef9088c | 1139 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); |
8723588e MC |
1140 | } |
1141 | ||
8723588e MC |
1142 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1143 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1144 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1145 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1146 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1147 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1148 | } |
1149 | } | |
1150 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1151 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1152 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1153 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1154 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1155 | ||
4ce787b9 MC |
1156 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1157 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1158 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1159 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1160 | if (cleanuphand | |
1161 | || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1162 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
1163 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1164 | } | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1165 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1166 | if (!stop) { |
1167 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1168 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1169 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1170 | } |
30f05b19 | 1171 | |
8723588e MC |
1172 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1173 | } | |
1174 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1175 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1176 | { | |
1177 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1178 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1179 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1180 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1181 | |
1182 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1183 | ||
1184 | do { | |
1185 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1186 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1187 | &p[s->init_num], |
1188 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1189 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1190 | if (i <= 0) { |
1191 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1192 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1193 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1194 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1195 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1196 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1197 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1198 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1199 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1200 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1201 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1202 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1203 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1204 | } |
e9359719 | 1205 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1206 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1207 | /* |
1208 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1209 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1210 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1211 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1212 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1213 | */ | |
1214 | return 0; | |
1215 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1216 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1217 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1218 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1219 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1220 | return 1; |
1221 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1222 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1223 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1224 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1225 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1226 | } |
54105ddd | 1227 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1228 | } |
1229 | ||
1230 | skip_message = 0; | |
1231 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1232 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1233 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1234 | /* |
1235 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1236 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1237 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1238 | * MAC. | |
1239 | */ | |
1240 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1241 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1242 | skip_message = 1; | |
1243 | ||
1244 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1245 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1246 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1247 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | } while (skip_message); | |
1250 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1251 | ||
1252 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1253 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1254 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1255 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1256 | /* |
1257 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1258 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1259 | * |
1260 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1261 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1262 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1263 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1264 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
555cbb32 | 1265 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1266 | |
1267 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1268 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1269 | } else { | |
1270 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1271 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1272 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1273 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1274 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1275 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1276 | } |
555cbb32 | 1277 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1278 | |
1279 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1280 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1281 | } | |
1282 | ||
1283 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1284 | } |
1285 | ||
eda75751 | 1286 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1287 | { |
54105ddd | 1288 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1289 | unsigned char *p; |
1290 | int i; | |
1291 | ||
555cbb32 | 1292 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1293 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1294 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1295 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1296 | } |
1297 | ||
0f113f3e | 1298 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1299 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1300 | while (n > 0) { |
657da85e | 1301 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1302 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1303 | if (i <= 0) { |
1304 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1305 | *len = 0; |
1306 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1307 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1308 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1309 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1310 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1311 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1312 | /* |
1313 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1314 | * Finished verification. | |
1315 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1316 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1317 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1318 | *len = 0; | |
1319 | return 0; | |
1320 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1321 | |
0f113f3e | 1322 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1323 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1324 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1325 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1326 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1327 | *len = 0; |
1328 | return 0; | |
1329 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1330 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1331 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1332 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1333 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1334 | /* |
1335 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1336 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1337 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1338 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1339 | */ |
597c51bc | 1340 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1341 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
555cbb32 TS |
1342 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET |
1343 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1344 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1345 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1346 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1347 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1348 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1349 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1350 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1351 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1352 | *len = 0; | |
1353 | return 0; | |
1354 | } | |
597c51bc | 1355 | } |
d166ed8c | 1356 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1357 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1358 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1359 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1360 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1361 | } | |
1362 | ||
eda75751 | 1363 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1364 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1365 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1366 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1367 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1368 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1369 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1370 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1371 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1372 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1373 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1374 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1375 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1376 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1377 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1378 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1379 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1380 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1381 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1382 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1383 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1384 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1385 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1386 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1387 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1388 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1389 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1390 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1391 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1392 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1393 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1394 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1395 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1396 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1397 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1398 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1399 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1400 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1401 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1402 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1403 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1404 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1405 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1406 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1407 | ||
1408 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1409 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1410 | }; | |
1411 | ||
1412 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1413 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1414 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1415 | ||
1416 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1417 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1418 | break; | |
1419 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1420 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1421 | |
b362ccab | 1422 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1423 | { |
1424 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1425 | return 0; | |
1426 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1427 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1428 | |
068c358a | 1429 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1430 | { |
1431 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1432 | ||
1433 | if (a == b) | |
1434 | return 0; | |
1435 | if (!dtls) | |
1436 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1437 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1438 | } | |
1439 | ||
1440 | typedef struct { | |
1441 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1442 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1443 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1444 | } version_info; |
1445 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1446 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1447 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1448 | #endif |
1449 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1450 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1451 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1452 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1453 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1454 | #else | |
1455 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1456 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1457 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1458 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1459 | #else |
a230b26e | 1460 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1461 | #endif |
1462 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1463 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1464 | #else |
a230b26e | 1465 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1466 | #endif |
1467 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1468 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1469 | #else |
a230b26e | 1470 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1471 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1472 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1473 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1474 | #else |
a230b26e | 1475 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1476 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1477 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1478 | }; |
1479 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1480 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1481 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1482 | #endif | |
1483 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1484 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1485 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1486 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1487 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1488 | #else |
a230b26e | 1489 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1490 | #endif |
1491 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1492 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1493 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1494 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1495 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1496 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1497 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1498 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1499 | }; |
1500 | ||
1501 | /* | |
1502 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1503 | * | |
1504 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1505 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1506 | * | |
1507 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1508 | */ | |
068c358a | 1509 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1510 | { |
1511 | int version = method->version; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1514 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1515 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1516 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1517 | ||
1518 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1519 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1520 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1521 | ||
1522 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1523 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1524 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1525 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1526 | |
1527 | return 0; | |
1528 | } | |
1529 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1530 | /* |
1531 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
cd3b53b8 MC |
1532 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise |
1533 | * returns 0. | |
baa45c3e MC |
1534 | */ |
1535 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) | |
1536 | { | |
65d2c16c MC |
1537 | int i; |
1538 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1539 | int curve; | |
65d2c16c | 1540 | #endif |
baa45c3e | 1541 | |
d162340d MC |
1542 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1543 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1544 | return 1; | |
1545 | #endif | |
1546 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1547 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1548 | return 1; |
1549 | ||
1550 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1551 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ | |
1552 | switch (i) { | |
1553 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1554 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1555 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1556 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1557 | continue; | |
1558 | default: | |
1559 | break; | |
1560 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1561 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1562 | continue; | |
65d2c16c | 1563 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
de4dc598 MC |
1564 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) |
1565 | return 1; | |
1566 | /* | |
1567 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1568 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1569 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1570 | */ | |
c2041da8 RL |
1571 | curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC] |
1572 | .privatekey); | |
de4dc598 | 1573 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e | 1574 | return 1; |
65d2c16c MC |
1575 | #else |
1576 | return 1; | |
1577 | #endif | |
baa45c3e MC |
1578 | } |
1579 | ||
1580 | return 0; | |
1581 | } | |
1582 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1583 | /* |
1584 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1585 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1586 | * | |
1587 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1588 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1589 | * | |
1590 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1591 | */ | |
4fd12788 | 1592 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) |
ccae4a15 FI |
1593 | { |
1594 | const version_info *vent; | |
1595 | const version_info *table; | |
1596 | ||
1597 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1598 | default: | |
1599 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1600 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1601 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1602 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1603 | break; | |
1604 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1605 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1606 | break; | |
1607 | } | |
1608 | ||
1609 | for (vent = table; | |
1610 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1611 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1612 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1613 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1614 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1615 | && (!s->server | |
1616 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1617 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1618 | if (meth != NULL) |
1619 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1620 | return 1; |
1621 | } | |
1622 | } | |
1623 | return 0; | |
1624 | } | |
1625 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1626 | /* |
1627 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1628 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1629 | * supported protocol version. | |
1630 | * | |
1631 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1632 | * | |
1633 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1634 | */ | |
1635 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1636 | { | |
1637 | const version_info *vent; | |
1638 | const version_info *table; | |
1639 | ||
1640 | /* | |
1641 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1642 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1643 | * s->method). | |
1644 | */ | |
1645 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1646 | return 1; | |
1647 | ||
1648 | /* | |
1649 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1650 | * highest protocol version). | |
1651 | */ | |
1652 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1653 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1654 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1655 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1656 | else { | |
1657 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1658 | return 0; | |
1659 | } | |
1660 | ||
1661 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1662 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1663 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1664 | } | |
1665 | return 0; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | ||
1668 | /* | |
1669 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1670 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1671 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1672 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1673 | * | |
1674 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1675 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1676 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1677 | * | |
1678 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1679 | */ | |
1680 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1681 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1682 | if (version == 0) { |
1683 | *bound = version; | |
1684 | return 1; | |
1685 | } | |
1686 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1687 | /*- |
1688 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1689 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1690 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1691 | * | |
1692 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1693 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1694 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1695 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1696 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1697 | */ | |
1698 | switch (method_version) { | |
1699 | default: | |
1700 | /* | |
1701 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1702 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1703 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1704 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1705 | * versions. | |
1706 | */ | |
1707 | return 0; | |
1708 | ||
1709 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
5c587fb6 | 1710 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) |
4fa52141 VD |
1711 | return 0; |
1712 | break; | |
1713 | ||
1714 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
5c587fb6 | 1715 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) || |
032924c4 | 1716 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1717 | return 0; |
1718 | break; | |
1719 | } | |
1720 | ||
1721 | *bound = version; | |
1722 | return 1; | |
1723 | } | |
1724 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1725 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1726 | { | |
1727 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 1728 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 1729 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
5627f9f2 MC |
1730 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) |
1731 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1732 | /* | |
1733 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
1734 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
1735 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
1736 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
1737 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
1738 | */ | |
1739 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
1740 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
1741 | } else { | |
1742 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1743 | } | |
1744 | } | |
1745 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1746 | /* |
1747 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1748 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1749 | * the version specific method. | |
1750 | * | |
1751 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1752 | * | |
1753 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1754 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1755 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1756 | { |
1757 | /*- | |
1758 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1759 | * | |
1760 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 1761 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
1762 | * |
1763 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1764 | * handle version. | |
1765 | */ | |
1766 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1767 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1768 | const version_info *vent; |
1769 | const version_info *table; | |
1770 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1771 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1772 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1773 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1774 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1775 | switch (server_version) { |
1776 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1777 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1778 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1779 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1780 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1781 | /* |
1782 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1783 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1784 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1785 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1786 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1787 | */ | |
1788 | return 0; | |
1789 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1790 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1791 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1792 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1793 | */ |
018fcbec | 1794 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1795 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1796 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1797 | break; | |
1798 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1799 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1800 | break; | |
1801 | } | |
1802 | ||
70af3d8e | 1803 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1804 | |
6f40214f | 1805 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1806 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1807 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1808 | ||
70af3d8e | 1809 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1810 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1811 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1812 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1813 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1814 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1815 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1816 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1817 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1818 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1819 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1820 | } | |
1821 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
1822 | /* |
1823 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1824 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
1825 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
1826 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
1827 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
1828 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
1829 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
1830 | */ | |
1831 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
1832 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
1833 | ||
cd998837 | 1834 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1835 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1836 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
1837 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
1838 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
1839 | } |
1840 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1841 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1842 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1843 | } | |
1844 | ||
1845 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1846 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1847 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1848 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1849 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1850 | */ |
1851 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1852 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1853 | return 0; | |
1854 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1855 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1856 | s->version = best_vers; |
1857 | s->method = best_method; | |
1858 | return 0; | |
1859 | } | |
1860 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1861 | } | |
1862 | ||
1863 | /* | |
1864 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1865 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1866 | */ | |
1867 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1868 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1869 | ||
1870 | /* | |
1871 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1872 | * the ClientHello. | |
1873 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1874 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1875 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1876 | ||
1877 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1878 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1879 | continue; | |
1880 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1881 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1882 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1883 | s->version = vent->version; |
1884 | s->method = method; | |
1885 | return 0; | |
1886 | } | |
1887 | disabled = 1; | |
1888 | } | |
1889 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1890 | } | |
1891 | ||
1892 | /* | |
1893 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1894 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1895 | * the version specific method. | |
1896 | * | |
1897 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1898 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1899 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1900 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1901 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1902 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1903 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1904 | { |
1905 | const version_info *vent; | |
1906 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 1907 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
4fa52141 | 1908 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1909 | origv = s->version; |
1910 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1911 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1912 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1913 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1914 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1915 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1916 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1917 | s->version = origv; | |
1918 | return 0; | |
1919 | } | |
1920 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1921 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1922 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1923 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1924 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1925 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1926 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1927 | } |
1928 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1929 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1930 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1931 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1932 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1933 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1934 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1935 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1936 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1937 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1938 | /* |
1939 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1940 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1941 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1942 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1943 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1944 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1945 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1946 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1947 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1948 | break; | |
1949 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1950 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1951 | break; | |
1952 | } | |
1953 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
1954 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
1955 | if (ret != 0) { | |
1956 | s->version = origv; | |
1957 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1958 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); | |
1959 | return 0; | |
1960 | } | |
1961 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) | |
1962 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
1963 | s->version = origv; | |
1964 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1965 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1966 | return 0; | |
1967 | } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) | |
1968 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
1969 | s->version = origv; | |
1970 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1971 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1972 | return 0; | |
1973 | } | |
5df22060 | 1974 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1975 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
1976 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 1977 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
1978 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
1979 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
1980 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1981 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1982 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
1983 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1984 | s->version = origv; | |
1985 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1986 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1987 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1988 | return 0; | |
1989 | } | |
1990 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1991 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1992 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
1993 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 1994 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
1995 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
1996 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1997 | s->version = origv; | |
1998 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1999 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
2000 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
2001 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 2002 | } |
b5b993b2 | 2003 | } |
c3043dcd | 2004 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2005 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2006 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
2007 | continue; |
2008 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2009 | s->method = vent->cmeth(); |
29bfd5b7 | 2010 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2011 | } |
2012 | ||
88050dd1 | 2013 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
2014 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
2015 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
2016 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2017 | } |
2018 | ||
068c358a | 2019 | /* |
38a73150 | 2020 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2021 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2022 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2023 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2024 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2025 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2026 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2027 | * |
2028 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2029 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2030 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2031 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2032 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2033 | * |
0485d540 | 2034 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2035 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2036 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2037 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2038 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2039 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2040 | */ |
b5b993b2 MC |
2041 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, |
2042 | int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2043 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2044 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
2045 | int hole; |
2046 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
2047 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2048 | const version_info *table; | |
2049 | const version_info *vent; | |
2050 | ||
2051 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
2052 | default: | |
2053 | /* | |
2054 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2055 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2056 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2057 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2058 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2059 | */ | |
068c358a | 2060 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2061 | /* |
2062 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2063 | * flexible method. | |
2064 | */ | |
2065 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2066 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2067 | return 0; |
2068 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2069 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2070 | break; | |
2071 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2072 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2073 | break; | |
2074 | } | |
2075 | ||
2076 | /* | |
2077 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2078 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2079 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2080 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2081 | * | |
2082 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2083 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2084 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2085 | * | |
2086 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
2087 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
2088 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
2089 | * | |
2090 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
2091 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
2092 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
2093 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
2094 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
2095 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2096 | */ | |
068c358a | 2097 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2098 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2099 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2100 | *real_max = 0; | |
2101 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2102 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2103 | /* | |
2104 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2105 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2106 | */ | |
2107 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2108 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2109 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2110 | continue; |
2111 | } | |
2112 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2113 | |
2114 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2115 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2116 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2117 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2118 | hole = 1; | |
2119 | } else if (!hole) { | |
2120 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 2121 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2122 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2123 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2124 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
4fa52141 | 2125 | version = (single = method)->version; |
068c358a | 2126 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2127 | hole = 0; |
2128 | } | |
2129 | } | |
2130 | ||
068c358a KR |
2131 | *max_version = version; |
2132 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2133 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2134 | if (version == 0) | |
2135 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2136 | ||
068c358a KR |
2137 | return 0; |
2138 | } | |
2139 | ||
2140 | /* | |
2141 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2142 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2143 | * |
2144 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2145 | * | |
2146 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2147 | */ | |
2148 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2149 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2150 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2151 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2152 | /* |
2153 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2154 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2155 | */ | |
2156 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2157 | return 0; | |
2158 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2159 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2160 | |
2161 | if (ret != 0) | |
2162 | return ret; | |
2163 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2164 | s->version = ver_max; |
2165 | ||
2166 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2167 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2168 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2169 | ||
2170 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2171 | return 0; |
2172 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2173 | |
2174 | /* | |
2175 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2176 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2177 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2178 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2179 | */ | |
9e84a42d | 2180 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2181 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2182 | { | |
2183 | size_t i; | |
2184 | ||
2185 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2186 | return 0; | |
2187 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2188 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2189 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2190 | ||
2191 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2192 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2193 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2194 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2195 | } |
2196 | } | |
2197 | ||
0acee504 | 2198 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2199 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2200 | |
2201 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2202 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2203 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2204 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2205 | { |
43054d3d | 2206 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2207 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2208 | ||
2209 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2210 | |
43054d3d MC |
2211 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2212 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2213 | hashlen = 0; | |
2214 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2215 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2216 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2217 | &hashlen)) { | |
2218 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2219 | return 0; | |
2220 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2221 | } |
2222 | ||
2223 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2224 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2225 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2226 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2227 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2228 | |
2229 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2230 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2231 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2232 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2233 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2234 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2235 | return 0; |
2236 | } | |
2237 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2238 | /* |
2239 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2240 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2241 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2242 | */ | |
2243 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2244 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2245 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2246 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2247 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2248 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2249 | return 0; | |
2250 | } | |
2251 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2252 | return 1; |
2253 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2254 | |
2255 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2256 | { | |
2257 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2260 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2261 | { |
2262 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2263 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2264 | PACKET cadns; | |
2265 | ||
2266 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2267 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2268 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2269 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2270 | } |
2271 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2272 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2273 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2274 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2275 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2276 | } |
2277 | ||
2278 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2279 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2280 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2281 | ||
2282 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2283 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2284 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2285 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2286 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2287 | } |
2288 | ||
2289 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2290 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2291 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2292 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2293 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2294 | } |
2295 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2296 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2297 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2298 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2299 | } |
2300 | ||
2301 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2303 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2304 | goto err; |
2305 | } | |
2306 | xn = NULL; | |
2307 | } | |
2308 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2309 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2310 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2311 | |
2312 | return 1; | |
2313 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2314 | err: |
2315 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2316 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2317 | return 0; | |
2318 | } | |
2319 | ||
98732979 | 2320 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2321 | { |
98732979 | 2322 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; |
5d6cca05 | 2323 | |
98732979 MC |
2324 | if (s->server) { |
2325 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
2326 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) | |
2327 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2328 | } | |
2329 | ||
2330 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
2331 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); | |
2332 | ||
2333 | return ca_sk; | |
2334 | } | |
2335 | ||
2336 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2337 | { | |
5d6cca05 | 2338 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2339 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2340 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2341 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2342 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2343 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2344 | |
2345 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2346 | int i; | |
2347 | ||
2348 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2349 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2350 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2351 | int namelen; | |
2352 | ||
2353 | if (name == NULL | |
2354 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2355 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2356 | &namebytes) | |
2357 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2359 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2360 | return 0; |
2361 | } | |
2362 | } | |
2363 | } | |
2364 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2365 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2366 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2367 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2368 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2369 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2370 | |
2371 | return 1; | |
2372 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2373 | |
2374 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2375 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2376 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2377 | { | |
2378 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2379 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2380 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2381 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2382 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2383 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2384 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2385 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2386 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2387 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2388 | |
2389 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2390 | ||
2391 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2392 | return tbslen; | |
2393 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2394 | |
2395 | /* | |
2396 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2397 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2398 | */ | |
2399 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2400 | { | |
2401 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2402 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2403 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2404 | return 0; | |
2405 | ||
2406 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2407 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2408 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2409 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2410 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2411 | return 0; | |
2412 | } | |
2413 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2414 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
9d75dce3 TS |
2415 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2416 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2417 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2418 | return 0; | |
2419 | } | |
2420 | } | |
2421 | return 1; | |
2422 | } | |
2423 | ||
2424 | /* | |
2425 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2426 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2427 | */ | |
2428 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2429 | { | |
2430 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2431 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2432 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2433 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2434 | return 0; | |
2435 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2436 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 TS |
2437 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
2438 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2439 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2440 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2441 | return 0; | |
2442 | } | |
2443 | return 1; | |
2444 | } |