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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
75 | /* |
76 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
77 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
78 | */ | |
79 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
80 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
81 | ||
82 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
83 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
84 | { | |
85 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
86 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
87 | ||
88 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
89 | size_t hashlen; | |
90 | ||
91 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
92 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
93 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
94 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
95 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
96 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
97 | else | |
98 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
99 | ||
100 | /* | |
101 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
102 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
103 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
104 | */ | |
105 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
106 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
107 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
108 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
109 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
110 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
111 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
112 | return 0; | |
113 | } | |
114 | ||
115 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
116 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
117 | } else { | |
118 | size_t retlen; | |
119 | ||
120 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
121 | if (retlen <= 0) | |
122 | return 0; | |
123 | *hdatalen = retlen; | |
124 | } | |
125 | ||
126 | return 1; | |
127 | } | |
128 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
129 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
130 | { | |
131 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 132 | const EVP_MD *md; |
d8bc1399 MC |
133 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
134 | unsigned u = 0; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 135 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 MC |
136 | void *hdata; |
137 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
138 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
139 | ||
140 | if (s->server) { | |
141 | /* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */ | |
142 | /* | |
143 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This needs to change. We should not get this from the | |
144 | * cipher. However, for now, we have not done the work to separate the | |
145 | * certificate type from the ciphersuite | |
146 | */ | |
147 | pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md); | |
148 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
149 | goto err; | |
150 | } else { | |
151 | md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; | |
152 | pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; | |
153 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
154 | |
155 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
156 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
157 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
158 | goto err; | |
159 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 160 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
161 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
162 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
163 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
164 | goto err; | |
165 | } | |
166 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 167 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
168 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
169 | goto err; | |
170 | } | |
171 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
172 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
173 | #endif | |
174 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)); | |
175 | if (sig == NULL) { | |
176 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
177 | goto err; | |
178 | } | |
179 | if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) | |
180 | || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) | |
181 | || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION | |
182 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
183 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
184 | s->session->master_key)) | |
185 | || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) { | |
186 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
187 | goto err; | |
188 | } | |
189 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
190 | { | |
191 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
192 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
193 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
194 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
195 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u); | |
196 | } | |
197 | #endif | |
198 | ||
199 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) { | |
200 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
201 | goto err; | |
202 | } | |
203 | ||
204 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
205 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
206 | goto err; | |
207 | ||
208 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
209 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
210 | return 1; | |
211 | err: | |
212 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
213 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
214 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
215 | return 0; | |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
218 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
219 | { | |
220 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
221 | const unsigned char *sig, *data; | |
222 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
223 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
224 | #endif | |
225 | int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
226 | int type = 0, j; | |
227 | unsigned int len; | |
228 | X509 *peer; | |
229 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 230 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 231 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 232 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 MC |
233 | |
234 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
235 | ||
236 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
237 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
238 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
239 | goto f_err; | |
240 | } | |
241 | ||
242 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
243 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
244 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); | |
245 | ||
246 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
247 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
248 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
249 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
250 | goto f_err; | |
251 | } | |
252 | ||
253 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ | |
254 | /* | |
255 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without | |
256 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) | |
257 | */ | |
258 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
259 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
260 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
261 | len = 64; | |
262 | } else | |
263 | #endif | |
264 | { | |
265 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
266 | int rv; | |
267 | ||
268 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { | |
269 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
270 | goto f_err; | |
271 | } | |
272 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); | |
273 | if (rv == -1) { | |
274 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
275 | goto f_err; | |
276 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
277 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
278 | goto f_err; | |
279 | } | |
280 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
281 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
282 | #endif | |
283 | } else { | |
284 | /* Use default digest for this key type */ | |
285 | int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); | |
286 | if (idx >= 0) | |
287 | md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; | |
288 | if (md == NULL) { | |
289 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
290 | goto f_err; | |
291 | } | |
292 | } | |
293 | ||
294 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { | |
295 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
296 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
297 | goto f_err; | |
298 | } | |
299 | } | |
300 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
301 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
302 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
303 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
304 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
305 | goto f_err; | |
306 | } | |
307 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
308 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
309 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
310 | goto f_err; | |
311 | } | |
312 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 313 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
314 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
315 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
316 | goto f_err; | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
320 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
321 | #endif | |
322 | if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) | |
323 | || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { | |
324 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
325 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
326 | goto f_err; | |
327 | } | |
328 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
329 | { | |
330 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
331 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
332 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
333 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
334 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
335 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
336 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
337 | goto f_err; | |
338 | } | |
339 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
340 | data = gost_data; | |
341 | } | |
342 | } | |
343 | #endif | |
344 | ||
345 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION | |
346 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
347 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
348 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
349 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
350 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
351 | goto f_err; | |
352 | } | |
353 | ||
354 | if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { | |
355 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
356 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
357 | goto f_err; | |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
360 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
361 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
362 | else | |
363 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
364 | if (0) { |
365 | f_err: | |
366 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
367 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
368 | } | |
369 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
370 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
371 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
372 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
373 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
374 | #endif | |
375 | return ret; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
229185e6 | 378 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 379 | { |
12472b45 | 380 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 381 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 382 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 MC |
383 | |
384 | if (s->server) { | |
385 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
386 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
387 | } else { | |
388 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
389 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
390 | } | |
0f113f3e | 391 | |
12472b45 MC |
392 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
393 | sender, slen, | |
394 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
395 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
397 | goto err; | |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
12472b45 | 400 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 401 | |
12472b45 | 402 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
403 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
404 | goto err; | |
405 | } | |
0f113f3e | 406 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
407 | /* |
408 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
409 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 410 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
411 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
412 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
413 | finish_md_len); | |
414 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 415 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
416 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
417 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
418 | finish_md_len); | |
419 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 420 | } |
0f113f3e | 421 | |
b9908bf9 | 422 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 423 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
424 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
425 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 426 | } |
d02b48c6 | 427 | |
bf48836c | 428 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
429 | /* |
430 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
431 | * to far. | |
432 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 433 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
434 | { |
435 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 436 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
437 | /* |
438 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
439 | * the appropriate error. | |
440 | */ | |
441 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
442 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 443 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
444 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
445 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
446 | } else { | |
447 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
448 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
449 | } | |
450 | ||
451 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
452 | sender, | |
453 | slen, | |
454 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
455 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
456 | #endif |
457 | ||
be3583fa | 458 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
459 | { |
460 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 461 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 462 | |
73999b62 | 463 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
464 | /* |
465 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
466 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
467 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 468 | */ |
c69f2adf | 469 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 470 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
471 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
472 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
473 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
474 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
475 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
476 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
477 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
478 | } |
479 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 480 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 481 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
482 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
483 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
484 | goto f_err; |
485 | } | |
657da85e MC |
486 | } |
487 | ||
488 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
489 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
490 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 491 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
492 | goto f_err; |
493 | } | |
494 | ||
495 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
496 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
497 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 498 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
499 | goto f_err; |
500 | } | |
501 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
502 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
503 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
504 | ||
505 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
506 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
507 | ||
508 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
509 | /* | |
510 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
511 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
512 | * SCTP is used | |
513 | */ | |
514 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
515 | #endif | |
516 | } | |
517 | ||
b9908bf9 | 518 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
519 | f_err: |
520 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 521 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 522 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
523 | } |
524 | ||
be3583fa | 525 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 526 | { |
7776a36c | 527 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 528 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 529 | |
0f113f3e | 530 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 531 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 532 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 533 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
534 | goto f_err; |
535 | } | |
536 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
537 | ||
12472b45 | 538 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 539 | |
12472b45 | 540 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 541 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 542 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
543 | goto f_err; |
544 | } | |
545 | ||
12472b45 MC |
546 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
547 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 548 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 549 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
550 | goto f_err; |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
553 | /* | |
554 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
555 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 556 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
557 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
558 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
559 | md_len); | |
560 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 561 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
562 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
563 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
564 | md_len); | |
565 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
566 | } |
567 | ||
7776a36c MC |
568 | /* |
569 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
570 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
571 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
572 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
573 | if (s->server) { | |
574 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
575 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
576 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
577 | goto f_err; | |
578 | } | |
579 | } else { | |
580 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
581 | s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0, | |
582 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
583 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
584 | goto f_err; | |
585 | } | |
586 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
587 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
588 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
589 | goto f_err; | |
590 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
591 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
592 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
593 | } |
594 | } | |
595 | ||
e6575156 | 596 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
597 | f_err: |
598 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 599 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 600 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 601 | } |
d02b48c6 | 602 | |
7cea05dc | 603 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 604 | { |
7cea05dc | 605 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 606 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
607 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
608 | return 0; | |
609 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 610 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
611 | return 1; |
612 | } | |
613 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
614 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
615 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
616 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 617 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
618 | int len; |
619 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
620 | ||
621 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
622 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 623 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
624 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
625 | return 0; | |
626 | } | |
627 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
628 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 629 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
630 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
631 | return 0; | |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
634 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
635 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, | |
636 | chain, al)) | |
637 | return 0; | |
638 | ||
639 | return 1; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
642 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
643 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
644 | { | |
645 | int i, chain_count; | |
646 | X509 *x; | |
647 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
648 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
649 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
650 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
651 | ||
652 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
653 | return 1; | |
654 | ||
655 | x = cpk->x509; | |
656 | ||
657 | /* | |
658 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
659 | */ | |
d805a57b | 660 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
661 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
662 | else | |
663 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
664 | ||
665 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
666 | chain_store = NULL; | |
667 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
668 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
669 | else | |
670 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
671 | ||
d805a57b | 672 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
673 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
674 | ||
675 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
676 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
677 | goto err; | |
678 | } | |
679 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
680 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
681 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
682 | goto err; | |
683 | } | |
684 | /* | |
685 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
686 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
687 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
688 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
689 | */ | |
690 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
691 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
692 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
693 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
694 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
695 | if (i != 1) { | |
696 | #if 0 | |
697 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
698 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
699 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
700 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
701 | #endif | |
702 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
703 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
704 | goto err; | |
705 | } | |
706 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
707 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
708 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
709 | ||
710 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
711 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
712 | goto err; | |
713 | } | |
714 | } | |
715 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
716 | } else { | |
717 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
718 | if (i != 1) { | |
719 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
720 | goto err; | |
721 | } | |
722 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
723 | goto err; | |
724 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
725 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
726 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
727 | goto err; | |
728 | } | |
729 | } | |
730 | return 1; | |
731 | ||
732 | err: | |
733 | *al = tmpal; | |
734 | return 0; | |
735 | } | |
736 | ||
737 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
738 | int *al) | |
739 | { | |
740 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
741 | ||
5923ad4b | 742 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 743 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 744 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 745 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 746 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 747 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 748 | } |
c49e1912 | 749 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
750 | } |
751 | ||
be3583fa | 752 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
753 | { |
754 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
755 | ||
756 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
757 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 758 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
759 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
760 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
761 | return ret; | |
762 | } | |
763 | #endif | |
764 | ||
765 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
766 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
767 | |
768 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
769 | /* | |
770 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
771 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
772 | */ | |
773 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
774 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
775 | } | |
8723588e MC |
776 | |
777 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
778 | ||
779 | s->init_num = 0; | |
780 | ||
781 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
782 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
783 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
784 | s->new_session = 0; | |
785 | ||
786 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
787 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
788 | ||
789 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 790 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
791 | } else { |
792 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
793 | if (s->hit) | |
794 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
795 | ||
fe3a3291 | 796 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
797 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
798 | } | |
799 | ||
800 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
801 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
802 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
803 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
804 | ||
805 | if (cb != NULL) | |
806 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
807 | ||
808 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
809 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
810 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
811 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
812 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 813 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
814 | } |
815 | } | |
816 | ||
817 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
820 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
821 | { | |
822 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
823 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
824 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 825 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
826 | |
827 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
828 | ||
829 | do { | |
830 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
831 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
832 | &p[s->init_num], |
833 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 834 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
835 | if (i <= 0) { |
836 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
837 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 838 | } |
9ab930b2 | 839 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 840 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
841 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
842 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
843 | */ | |
54105ddd | 844 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
845 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
846 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
847 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
848 | goto f_err; | |
849 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 850 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 851 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 852 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 853 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
854 | return 1; |
855 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
856 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
857 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
858 | goto f_err; |
859 | } | |
54105ddd | 860 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
861 | } |
862 | ||
863 | skip_message = 0; | |
864 | if (!s->server) | |
865 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
866 | /* | |
867 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
868 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
869 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
870 | * MAC. | |
871 | */ | |
872 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
873 | s->init_num = 0; | |
874 | skip_message = 1; | |
875 | ||
876 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
877 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
878 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
879 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
880 | } | |
881 | } while (skip_message); | |
882 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
883 | ||
884 | *mt = *p; | |
885 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 886 | |
e8aa8b6c | 887 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
888 | /* |
889 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
890 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
891 | * |
892 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
893 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 894 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
895 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
896 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
897 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
898 | ||
899 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
900 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
901 | } else { | |
902 | n2l3(p, l); | |
903 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
904 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
905 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
906 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
907 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 908 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
909 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
910 | ||
911 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
912 | s->init_num = 0; | |
913 | } | |
914 | ||
915 | return 1; | |
916 | f_err: | |
917 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
918 | return 0; |
919 | } | |
920 | ||
eda75751 | 921 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 922 | { |
54105ddd | 923 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
924 | unsigned char *p; |
925 | int i; | |
926 | ||
927 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
928 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
929 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
930 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
931 | } |
932 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
933 | p = s->init_msg; |
934 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
935 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 936 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 937 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
938 | if (i <= 0) { |
939 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
940 | *len = 0; |
941 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 942 | } |
54105ddd MC |
943 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
944 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 945 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 946 | |
bf48836c | 947 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
948 | /* |
949 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
950 | * Finished verification. | |
951 | */ | |
952 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
953 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
954 | #endif |
955 | ||
0f113f3e | 956 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 957 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
958 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
959 | s->init_num)) { | |
960 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
961 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
962 | *len = 0; | |
963 | return 0; | |
964 | } | |
32ec4153 | 965 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 966 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
967 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
968 | } else { | |
d166ed8c | 969 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
a230b26e | 970 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
971 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
972 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
973 | *len = 0; | |
974 | return 0; | |
975 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
976 | if (s->msg_callback) |
977 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
978 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
979 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
980 | } | |
981 | ||
eda75751 | 982 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 983 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 984 | } |
d02b48c6 | 985 | |
2e5ead83 | 986 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 987 | { |
a230b26e | 988 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
989 | return -1; |
990 | ||
991 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
992 | default: | |
993 | return -1; | |
994 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
995 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
996 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
997 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 998 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
999 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
1000 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 1001 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 1002 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
1003 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
1004 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
1005 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
1006 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
1007 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
1008 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 1009 | #endif |
82049c54 | 1010 | } |
0f113f3e | 1011 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1012 | |
6b691a5c | 1013 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1014 | { |
1015 | int al; | |
1016 | ||
1017 | switch (type) { | |
1018 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1019 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1020 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1021 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1022 | break; | |
1023 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1024 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1025 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1026 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1027 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1028 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1029 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1030 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1031 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1032 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1033 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1034 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1035 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1036 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1037 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1038 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1039 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1040 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1041 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1042 | break; | |
1043 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1044 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1045 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1046 | break; | |
1047 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1048 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1049 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1050 | break; | |
1051 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1052 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1053 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1054 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1055 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1056 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1057 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1058 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1059 | break; | |
1060 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1061 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1062 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1063 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1064 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1065 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1066 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1067 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1068 | break; | |
1069 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1070 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1071 | break; | |
1072 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1073 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1074 | break; | |
1075 | default: | |
1076 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1077 | break; | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | return (al); | |
1080 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1081 | |
b362ccab | 1082 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1083 | { |
1084 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1085 | return 0; | |
1086 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1087 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1088 | |
068c358a | 1089 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1090 | { |
1091 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1092 | ||
1093 | if (a == b) | |
1094 | return 0; | |
1095 | if (!dtls) | |
1096 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1097 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1098 | } | |
1099 | ||
1100 | typedef struct { | |
1101 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1102 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1103 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1104 | } version_info; |
1105 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1106 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1107 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1108 | #endif |
1109 | ||
1110 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
582a17d6 MC |
1111 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1112 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1113 | #else | |
1114 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1115 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1116 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1117 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1118 | #else |
a230b26e | 1119 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1120 | #endif |
1121 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1122 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1123 | #else |
a230b26e | 1124 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1125 | #endif |
1126 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1127 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1128 | #else |
a230b26e | 1129 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1130 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1131 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1132 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1133 | #else |
a230b26e | 1134 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1135 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1136 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1137 | }; |
1138 | ||
1139 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1140 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1141 | #endif | |
1142 | ||
1143 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 1144 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1145 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1146 | #else |
a230b26e | 1147 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1148 | #endif |
1149 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1150 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1151 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1152 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1153 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1154 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1155 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1156 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1157 | }; |
1158 | ||
1159 | /* | |
1160 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1161 | * | |
1162 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1163 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1164 | * | |
1165 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1166 | */ | |
068c358a | 1167 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1168 | { |
1169 | int version = method->version; | |
1170 | ||
1171 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1172 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1173 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1174 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1175 | ||
1176 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1177 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1178 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1179 | ||
1180 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1181 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1182 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1183 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
1184 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
1185 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
1186 | ||
1187 | return 0; | |
1188 | } | |
1189 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1190 | /* |
1191 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1192 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1193 | * | |
1194 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1195 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1196 | * | |
1197 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1198 | */ | |
1199 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1200 | { | |
1201 | const version_info *vent; | |
1202 | const version_info *table; | |
1203 | ||
1204 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1205 | default: | |
1206 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1207 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1208 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1209 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1210 | break; | |
1211 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1212 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1213 | break; | |
1214 | } | |
1215 | ||
1216 | for (vent = table; | |
1217 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1218 | ++vent) { | |
1219 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1220 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1221 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1222 | return 1; | |
1223 | } | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | return 0; | |
1226 | } | |
1227 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1228 | /* |
1229 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1230 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1231 | * supported protocol version. | |
1232 | * | |
1233 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1234 | * | |
1235 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1236 | */ | |
1237 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1238 | { | |
1239 | const version_info *vent; | |
1240 | const version_info *table; | |
1241 | ||
1242 | /* | |
1243 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1244 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1245 | * s->method). | |
1246 | */ | |
1247 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1248 | return 1; | |
1249 | ||
1250 | /* | |
1251 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1252 | * highest protocol version). | |
1253 | */ | |
1254 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1255 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1256 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1257 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1258 | else { | |
1259 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1260 | return 0; | |
1261 | } | |
1262 | ||
1263 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1264 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1265 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1266 | } | |
1267 | return 0; | |
1268 | } | |
1269 | ||
1270 | /* | |
1271 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1272 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1273 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1274 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1275 | * | |
1276 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1277 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1278 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1279 | * | |
1280 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1281 | */ | |
1282 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1283 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1284 | if (version == 0) { |
1285 | *bound = version; | |
1286 | return 1; | |
1287 | } | |
1288 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1289 | /*- |
1290 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1291 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1292 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1293 | * | |
1294 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1295 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1296 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1297 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1298 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1299 | */ | |
1300 | switch (method_version) { | |
1301 | default: | |
1302 | /* | |
1303 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1304 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1305 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1306 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1307 | * versions. | |
1308 | */ | |
1309 | return 0; | |
1310 | ||
1311 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1312 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1313 | return 0; | |
1314 | break; | |
1315 | ||
1316 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1317 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1318 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1319 | return 0; |
1320 | break; | |
1321 | } | |
1322 | ||
1323 | *bound = version; | |
1324 | return 1; | |
1325 | } | |
1326 | ||
1327 | /* | |
1328 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1329 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1330 | * the version specific method. | |
1331 | * | |
1332 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1333 | * | |
1334 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1335 | */ | |
1ab3836b | 1336 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) |
4fa52141 VD |
1337 | { |
1338 | /*- | |
1339 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1340 | * | |
1341 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1342 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1343 | * | |
1344 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1345 | * handle version. | |
1346 | */ | |
1347 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1348 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1349 | const version_info *vent; |
1350 | const version_info *table; | |
1351 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1352 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1353 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1354 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1355 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1356 | switch (server_version) { |
1357 | default: | |
d2f42576 MC |
1358 | /* |
1359 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do | |
1360 | * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable | |
1361 | * renegotiation for TLS1.3 | |
1362 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1363 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) |
1364 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1365 | /* | |
1366 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1367 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1368 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1369 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1370 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1371 | */ | |
1372 | return 0; | |
1373 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1374 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1375 | break; | |
1376 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1377 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1378 | break; | |
1379 | } | |
1380 | ||
70af3d8e | 1381 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1382 | |
70af3d8e | 1383 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1384 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1385 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1386 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1387 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1388 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1389 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1390 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1391 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1392 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1393 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | ||
1396 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1397 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1398 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1399 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1400 | /* |
1401 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1402 | * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the | |
1403 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later | |
1404 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1405 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1406 | continue; | |
1407 | for (vent = table; | |
1408 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1409 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1410 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1411 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1412 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1413 | ||
1414 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1415 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1416 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1417 | best_method = method; | |
1418 | } | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | } | |
1421 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1422 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1423 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | ||
1426 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
1427 | s->version = best_vers; | |
1428 | s->method = best_method; | |
1429 | return 0; | |
1430 | } | |
1431 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | ||
1434 | /* | |
1435 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1436 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1437 | */ | |
1438 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1439 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1440 | ||
1441 | /* | |
1442 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1443 | * the ClientHello. | |
1444 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1445 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1446 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1447 | ||
1448 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1449 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1450 | continue; | |
1451 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1452 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1453 | s->version = vent->version; | |
1454 | s->method = method; | |
1455 | return 0; | |
1456 | } | |
1457 | disabled = 1; | |
1458 | } | |
1459 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1460 | } | |
1461 | ||
1462 | /* | |
1463 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1464 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1465 | * the version specific method. | |
1466 | * | |
1467 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1468 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
1469 | * | |
1470 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1471 | */ | |
1472 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
1473 | { | |
1474 | const version_info *vent; | |
1475 | const version_info *table; | |
1476 | ||
b97667ce MC |
1477 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1478 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1479 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1480 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1481 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1482 | default: | |
1483 | if (version != s->version) | |
1484 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1485 | /* | |
1486 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1487 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1488 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1489 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1490 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1491 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1492 | return 0; |
1493 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1494 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1495 | break; | |
1496 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1497 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1498 | break; | |
1499 | } | |
1500 | ||
1501 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1502 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1503 | int err; | |
1504 | ||
1505 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1506 | continue; | |
1507 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
1508 | break; | |
1509 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1510 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
1511 | if (err != 0) | |
1512 | return err; | |
1513 | s->method = method; | |
ccae4a15 | 1514 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1515 | return 0; |
1516 | } | |
1517 | ||
1518 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1519 | } | |
1520 | ||
068c358a KR |
1521 | /* |
1522 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
1523 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
1524 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1525 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1526 | * | |
1527 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1528 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1529 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
1530 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
1531 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 | 1532 | * |
0485d540 | 1533 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1534 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1535 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1536 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1537 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1538 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1539 | */ |
a230b26e EK |
1540 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, |
1541 | int *max_version) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1542 | { |
1543 | int version; | |
1544 | int hole; | |
1545 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1546 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1547 | const version_info *table; | |
1548 | const version_info *vent; | |
1549 | ||
1550 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1551 | default: | |
1552 | /* | |
1553 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1554 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1555 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1556 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1557 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1558 | */ | |
068c358a | 1559 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1560 | return 0; |
1561 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1562 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1563 | break; | |
1564 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1565 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1566 | break; | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | ||
1569 | /* | |
1570 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1571 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1572 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1573 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1574 | * | |
1575 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1576 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1577 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1578 | * | |
1579 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1580 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1581 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1582 | * | |
1583 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1584 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1585 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1586 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1587 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1588 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1589 | */ | |
068c358a | 1590 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1591 | hole = 1; |
1592 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1593 | /* | |
1594 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1595 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1596 | */ | |
1597 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1598 | hole = 1; | |
1599 | continue; | |
1600 | } | |
1601 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1602 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1603 | hole = 1; | |
1604 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1605 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1606 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1607 | } else { |
1608 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1609 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1610 | hole = 0; |
1611 | } | |
1612 | } | |
1613 | ||
068c358a KR |
1614 | *max_version = version; |
1615 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1616 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1617 | if (version == 0) | |
1618 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1619 | ||
068c358a KR |
1620 | return 0; |
1621 | } | |
1622 | ||
1623 | /* | |
1624 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1625 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1626 | * |
1627 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1628 | * | |
1629 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1630 | */ | |
1631 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1632 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1633 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1634 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1635 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1636 | |
1637 | if (ret != 0) | |
1638 | return ret; | |
1639 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1640 | s->version = ver_max; |
1641 | ||
1642 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1643 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1644 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1645 | ||
1646 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1647 | return 0; |
1648 | } |