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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
229185e6 | 75 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 76 | { |
12472b45 | 77 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 78 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 79 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 MC |
80 | |
81 | if (s->server) { | |
82 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
83 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
84 | } else { | |
85 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
86 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
87 | } | |
0f113f3e | 88 | |
12472b45 MC |
89 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
90 | sender, slen, | |
91 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
92 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
93 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
94 | goto err; | |
95 | } | |
96 | ||
12472b45 | 97 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 98 | |
12472b45 | 99 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
100 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
101 | goto err; | |
102 | } | |
0f113f3e | 103 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
104 | /* |
105 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
106 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 107 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
108 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
109 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
110 | finish_md_len); | |
111 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 112 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
113 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
114 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
115 | finish_md_len); | |
116 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 117 | } |
0f113f3e | 118 | |
b9908bf9 | 119 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 120 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
121 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
122 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 123 | } |
d02b48c6 | 124 | |
bf48836c | 125 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
126 | /* |
127 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
128 | * to far. | |
129 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 130 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
131 | { |
132 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 133 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
134 | /* |
135 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
136 | * the appropriate error. | |
137 | */ | |
138 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
139 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 140 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
141 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
142 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
143 | } else { | |
144 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
145 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
149 | sender, | |
150 | slen, | |
151 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
152 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
153 | #endif |
154 | ||
be3583fa | 155 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
156 | { |
157 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 158 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 159 | |
73999b62 | 160 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
161 | /* |
162 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
163 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
164 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 165 | */ |
c69f2adf | 166 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 167 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
168 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
169 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
170 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
171 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
172 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
173 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
174 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
175 | } |
176 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 177 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 178 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
179 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
180 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
181 | goto f_err; |
182 | } | |
657da85e MC |
183 | } |
184 | ||
185 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
186 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
187 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 188 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
189 | goto f_err; |
190 | } | |
191 | ||
192 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
193 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
194 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 195 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
196 | goto f_err; |
197 | } | |
198 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
199 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
200 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
201 | ||
202 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
203 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
204 | ||
205 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
206 | /* | |
207 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
208 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
209 | * SCTP is used | |
210 | */ | |
211 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
212 | #endif | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
b9908bf9 | 215 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
216 | f_err: |
217 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 218 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 219 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
220 | } |
221 | ||
be3583fa | 222 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 223 | { |
12472b45 MC |
224 | int al; |
225 | size_t md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 226 | |
0f113f3e MC |
227 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
228 | if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { | |
229 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 230 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
231 | goto f_err; |
232 | } | |
233 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
234 | ||
12472b45 | 235 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 236 | |
12472b45 | 237 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 238 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 239 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
240 | goto f_err; |
241 | } | |
242 | ||
12472b45 MC |
243 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
244 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 245 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 246 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
247 | goto f_err; |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
250 | /* | |
251 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
252 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 253 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
254 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
255 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
256 | md_len); | |
257 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 258 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
259 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
260 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
261 | md_len); | |
262 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
263 | } |
264 | ||
e6575156 | 265 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
266 | f_err: |
267 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 268 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 269 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 270 | } |
d02b48c6 | 271 | |
7cea05dc | 272 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 273 | { |
7cea05dc | 274 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 275 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
276 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
277 | return 0; | |
278 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 279 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
280 | return 1; |
281 | } | |
282 | ||
7cea05dc | 283 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
0f113f3e | 284 | { |
5923ad4b | 285 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
7cea05dc | 286 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk) |
5923ad4b | 287 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 288 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
7cea05dc | 289 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 290 | } |
c49e1912 | 291 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
292 | } |
293 | ||
be3583fa | 294 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
295 | { |
296 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
297 | ||
298 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
299 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 300 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
301 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
302 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
303 | return ret; | |
304 | } | |
305 | #endif | |
306 | ||
307 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
308 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
309 | |
310 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
311 | /* | |
312 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
313 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
314 | */ | |
315 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
316 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
317 | } | |
8723588e MC |
318 | |
319 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
320 | ||
321 | s->init_num = 0; | |
322 | ||
323 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
324 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
325 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
326 | s->new_session = 0; | |
327 | ||
328 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
329 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
330 | ||
331 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 332 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
333 | } else { |
334 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
335 | if (s->hit) | |
336 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
337 | ||
fe3a3291 | 338 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
339 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
340 | } | |
341 | ||
342 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
343 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
344 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
345 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
346 | ||
347 | if (cb != NULL) | |
348 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
349 | ||
350 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
351 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
352 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
353 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
354 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 355 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
356 | } |
357 | } | |
358 | ||
359 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
360 | } | |
361 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
362 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
363 | { | |
364 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
365 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
366 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 367 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
368 | |
369 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
370 | ||
371 | do { | |
372 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
373 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
374 | &p[s->init_num], |
375 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 376 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
377 | if (i <= 0) { |
378 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
379 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 380 | } |
9ab930b2 | 381 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 382 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
383 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
384 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
385 | */ | |
54105ddd | 386 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
387 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
388 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
389 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
390 | goto f_err; | |
391 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 392 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd MC |
393 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
394 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
395 | return 1; |
396 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
397 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
398 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
399 | goto f_err; |
400 | } | |
54105ddd | 401 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
402 | } |
403 | ||
404 | skip_message = 0; | |
405 | if (!s->server) | |
406 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
407 | /* | |
408 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
409 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
410 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
411 | * MAC. | |
412 | */ | |
413 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
414 | s->init_num = 0; | |
415 | skip_message = 1; | |
416 | ||
417 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
418 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
419 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
420 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
421 | } | |
422 | } while (skip_message); | |
423 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
424 | ||
425 | *mt = *p; | |
426 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 427 | |
e8aa8b6c | 428 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
429 | /* |
430 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
431 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
432 | * |
433 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
434 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 435 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
436 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
437 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
438 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
439 | ||
440 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
441 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
442 | } else { | |
443 | n2l3(p, l); | |
444 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
445 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
446 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
447 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
448 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 449 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
450 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
451 | ||
452 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
453 | s->init_num = 0; | |
454 | } | |
455 | ||
456 | return 1; | |
457 | f_err: | |
458 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
459 | return 0; |
460 | } | |
461 | ||
eda75751 | 462 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 463 | { |
54105ddd | 464 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
465 | unsigned char *p; |
466 | int i; | |
467 | ||
468 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
469 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
470 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
471 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
472 | } |
473 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
474 | p = s->init_msg; |
475 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
476 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 477 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 478 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
479 | if (i <= 0) { |
480 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
481 | *len = 0; |
482 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 483 | } |
54105ddd MC |
484 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
485 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 486 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 487 | |
bf48836c | 488 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
489 | /* |
490 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
491 | * Finished verification. | |
492 | */ | |
493 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
494 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
495 | #endif |
496 | ||
0f113f3e | 497 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 498 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
499 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
500 | s->init_num)) { | |
501 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
502 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
503 | *len = 0; | |
504 | return 0; | |
505 | } | |
32ec4153 | 506 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 507 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
508 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
509 | } else { | |
d166ed8c | 510 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
a230b26e | 511 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
512 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
513 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
514 | *len = 0; | |
515 | return 0; | |
516 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
517 | if (s->msg_callback) |
518 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
519 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
520 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
521 | } | |
522 | ||
eda75751 | 523 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 524 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 525 | } |
d02b48c6 | 526 | |
2e5ead83 | 527 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 528 | { |
a230b26e | 529 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
530 | return -1; |
531 | ||
532 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
533 | default: | |
534 | return -1; | |
535 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
536 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
537 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
538 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 539 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
540 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
541 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 542 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 543 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
544 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
545 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
546 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
547 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
548 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
549 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 550 | #endif |
82049c54 | 551 | } |
0f113f3e | 552 | } |
d02b48c6 | 553 | |
6b691a5c | 554 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
555 | { |
556 | int al; | |
557 | ||
558 | switch (type) { | |
559 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
560 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
561 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
562 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
563 | break; | |
564 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
565 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
566 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
567 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
568 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
569 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
570 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
571 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
572 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
573 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
574 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
575 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
576 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
577 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
578 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
579 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
580 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
581 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
582 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
583 | break; | |
584 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
585 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
586 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
587 | break; | |
588 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
589 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
590 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
591 | break; | |
592 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
593 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
594 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 595 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 596 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
597 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
598 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
599 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
600 | break; | |
601 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
602 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
603 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
604 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
605 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
606 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
607 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
608 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
609 | break; | |
610 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
611 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
612 | break; | |
613 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
614 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
615 | break; | |
616 | default: | |
617 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
618 | break; | |
619 | } | |
620 | return (al); | |
621 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 622 | |
b362ccab | 623 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
624 | { |
625 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
626 | return 0; | |
627 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
628 | } | |
4fa52141 | 629 | |
068c358a | 630 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
631 | { |
632 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
633 | ||
634 | if (a == b) | |
635 | return 0; | |
636 | if (!dtls) | |
637 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
638 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
639 | } | |
640 | ||
641 | typedef struct { | |
642 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
643 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
644 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
645 | } version_info; |
646 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
647 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
648 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
649 | #endif |
650 | ||
651 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
582a17d6 MC |
652 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
653 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
654 | #else | |
655 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
656 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 657 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 658 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 659 | #else |
a230b26e | 660 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
661 | #endif |
662 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 663 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 664 | #else |
a230b26e | 665 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
666 | #endif |
667 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 668 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 669 | #else |
a230b26e | 670 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 671 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 672 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 673 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 674 | #else |
a230b26e | 675 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 676 | #endif |
a230b26e | 677 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
678 | }; |
679 | ||
680 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
681 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
682 | #endif | |
683 | ||
684 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 685 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 686 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 687 | #else |
a230b26e | 688 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
689 | #endif |
690 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
691 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
692 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 693 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
694 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
695 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 696 | #endif |
a230b26e | 697 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
698 | }; |
699 | ||
700 | /* | |
701 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
702 | * | |
703 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
704 | * @method: the intended method. | |
705 | * | |
706 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
707 | */ | |
068c358a | 708 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
709 | { |
710 | int version = method->version; | |
711 | ||
712 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
713 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
714 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
715 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
716 | ||
717 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 718 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
719 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
720 | ||
721 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
722 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
723 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
724 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
725 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
726 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
727 | ||
728 | return 0; | |
729 | } | |
730 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
731 | /* |
732 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
733 | * `SSL *` instance | |
734 | * | |
735 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
736 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
737 | * | |
738 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
739 | */ | |
740 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
741 | { | |
742 | const version_info *vent; | |
743 | const version_info *table; | |
744 | ||
745 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
746 | default: | |
747 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
748 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
749 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
750 | table = tls_version_table; | |
751 | break; | |
752 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
753 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
754 | break; | |
755 | } | |
756 | ||
757 | for (vent = table; | |
758 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
759 | ++vent) { | |
760 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
761 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
762 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
763 | return 1; | |
764 | } | |
765 | } | |
766 | return 0; | |
767 | } | |
768 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
769 | /* |
770 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
771 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
772 | * supported protocol version. | |
773 | * | |
774 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
775 | * | |
776 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
777 | */ | |
778 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
779 | { | |
780 | const version_info *vent; | |
781 | const version_info *table; | |
782 | ||
783 | /* | |
784 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
785 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
786 | * s->method). | |
787 | */ | |
788 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
789 | return 1; | |
790 | ||
791 | /* | |
792 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
793 | * highest protocol version). | |
794 | */ | |
795 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
796 | table = tls_version_table; | |
797 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
798 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
799 | else { | |
800 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
801 | return 0; | |
802 | } | |
803 | ||
804 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 805 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
806 | return s->version == vent->version; |
807 | } | |
808 | return 0; | |
809 | } | |
810 | ||
811 | /* | |
812 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
813 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
814 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
815 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
816 | * | |
817 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
818 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
819 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
820 | * | |
821 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
822 | */ | |
823 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
824 | { | |
869e978c KR |
825 | if (version == 0) { |
826 | *bound = version; | |
827 | return 1; | |
828 | } | |
829 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
830 | /*- |
831 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
832 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
833 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
834 | * | |
835 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
836 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
837 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
838 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
839 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
840 | */ | |
841 | switch (method_version) { | |
842 | default: | |
843 | /* | |
844 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
845 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
846 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
847 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
848 | * versions. | |
849 | */ | |
850 | return 0; | |
851 | ||
852 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
853 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
854 | return 0; | |
855 | break; | |
856 | ||
857 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
858 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 859 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
860 | return 0; |
861 | break; | |
862 | } | |
863 | ||
864 | *bound = version; | |
865 | return 1; | |
866 | } | |
867 | ||
868 | /* | |
869 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
870 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
871 | * the version specific method. | |
872 | * | |
873 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
874 | * | |
875 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
876 | */ | |
877 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) | |
878 | { | |
879 | /*- | |
880 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
881 | * | |
882 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
883 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
884 | * | |
885 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
886 | * handle version. | |
887 | */ | |
888 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
889 | int client_version = s->client_version; | |
890 | const version_info *vent; | |
891 | const version_info *table; | |
892 | int disabled = 0; | |
893 | ||
894 | switch (server_version) { | |
895 | default: | |
896 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
897 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
898 | /* | |
899 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
900 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
901 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
902 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
903 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
904 | */ | |
905 | return 0; | |
906 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
907 | table = tls_version_table; | |
908 | break; | |
909 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
910 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
911 | break; | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
915 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
916 | ||
917 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
918 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
919 | continue; | |
920 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
921 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
922 | s->version = vent->version; | |
923 | s->method = method; | |
924 | return 0; | |
925 | } | |
926 | disabled = 1; | |
927 | } | |
928 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
929 | } | |
930 | ||
931 | /* | |
932 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
933 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
934 | * the version specific method. | |
935 | * | |
936 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
937 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
938 | * | |
939 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
940 | */ | |
941 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
942 | { | |
943 | const version_info *vent; | |
944 | const version_info *table; | |
945 | ||
946 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
947 | default: | |
948 | if (version != s->version) | |
949 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
950 | /* | |
951 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
952 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
953 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
954 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
955 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
956 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
957 | return 0; |
958 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
959 | table = tls_version_table; | |
960 | break; | |
961 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
962 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
963 | break; | |
964 | } | |
965 | ||
966 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
967 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
968 | int err; | |
969 | ||
970 | if (version != vent->version) | |
971 | continue; | |
972 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
973 | break; | |
974 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
975 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
976 | if (err != 0) | |
977 | return err; | |
978 | s->method = method; | |
ccae4a15 | 979 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
980 | return 0; |
981 | } | |
982 | ||
983 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
984 | } | |
985 | ||
068c358a KR |
986 | /* |
987 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
988 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
989 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
990 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
991 | * | |
992 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
993 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
994 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
995 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
996 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 | 997 | * |
0485d540 | 998 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
999 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1000 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1001 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1002 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1003 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1004 | */ |
a230b26e EK |
1005 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, |
1006 | int *max_version) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1007 | { |
1008 | int version; | |
1009 | int hole; | |
1010 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1011 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1012 | const version_info *table; | |
1013 | const version_info *vent; | |
1014 | ||
1015 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1016 | default: | |
1017 | /* | |
1018 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1019 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1020 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1021 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1022 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1023 | */ | |
068c358a | 1024 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1025 | return 0; |
1026 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1027 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1028 | break; | |
1029 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1030 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1031 | break; | |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
1034 | /* | |
1035 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1036 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1037 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1038 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1039 | * | |
1040 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1041 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1042 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1043 | * | |
1044 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1045 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1046 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1047 | * | |
1048 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1049 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1050 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1051 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1052 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1053 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1054 | */ | |
068c358a | 1055 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1056 | hole = 1; |
1057 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1058 | /* | |
1059 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1060 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1061 | */ | |
1062 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1063 | hole = 1; | |
1064 | continue; | |
1065 | } | |
1066 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1067 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1068 | hole = 1; | |
1069 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1070 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1071 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1072 | } else { |
1073 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1074 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1075 | hole = 0; |
1076 | } | |
1077 | } | |
1078 | ||
068c358a KR |
1079 | *max_version = version; |
1080 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1081 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1082 | if (version == 0) | |
1083 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1084 | ||
068c358a KR |
1085 | return 0; |
1086 | } | |
1087 | ||
1088 | /* | |
1089 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
1090 | * the initial ClientHello. | |
1091 | * | |
1092 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1093 | * | |
1094 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1095 | */ | |
1096 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1097 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1098 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1099 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1100 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1101 | |
1102 | if (ret != 0) | |
1103 | return ret; | |
1104 | ||
3eb2aff4 | 1105 | s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; |
4fa52141 VD |
1106 | return 0; |
1107 | } |