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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
597c51bc MC |
22 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
23 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
24 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
25 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
26 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
27 | }; | |
28 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
29 | /* |
30 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
31 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
32 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 33 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | { |
35 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 36 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | |
38 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 39 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 40 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 41 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
42 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
43 | /* | |
44 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
45 | * ignore the result anyway | |
46 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
47 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
48 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 49 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 50 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 51 | |
7ee8627f | 52 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
53 | if (s->msg_callback) |
54 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
55 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
56 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 57 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 58 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
59 | s->init_off += written; |
60 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 61 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 62 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 63 | |
4a01c59f | 64 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
65 | { |
66 | size_t msglen; | |
67 | ||
4a01c59f | 68 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 69 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 70 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
71 | return 0; |
72 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
73 | s->init_off = 0; | |
74 | ||
75 | return 1; | |
76 | } | |
77 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
78 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
79 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
80 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
81 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 82 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 83 | } |
c7f47786 | 84 | |
b186a592 MC |
85 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
86 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
87 | ||
c7f47786 | 88 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
89 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
90 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
91 | ||
92 | /* | |
93 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
94 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
95 | * ClientHello. | |
96 | */ | |
97 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
4752c5de MC |
98 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
99 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
100 | return 0; |
101 | } | |
102 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
103 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
104 | ||
105 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
106 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
107 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
108 | ok = 1; | |
109 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
110 | ok = 1; | |
111 | } | |
112 | if (ok) | |
113 | break; | |
114 | } | |
115 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
116 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
117 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
118 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
119 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
120 | return 0; |
121 | } | |
c7f47786 | 122 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc BK |
123 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
124 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, | |
125 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
db0f35dd TS |
126 | } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
127 | /* Renegotiation is disabled */ | |
128 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
129 | return 0; | |
c7f47786 MC |
130 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
131 | !(s->options & | |
132 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
133 | /* | |
134 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
135 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
136 | */ | |
4752c5de MC |
137 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
138 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
c7f47786 MC |
139 | return 0; |
140 | } else { | |
0e6161bc | 141 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
142 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, |
143 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
144 | |
145 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
146 | } | |
147 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d | 148 | int discard; |
c7f47786 | 149 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
0e6161bc BK |
150 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, |
151 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 152 | else |
0e6161bc BK |
153 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, |
154 | 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
155 | |
156 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
157 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
158 | s->hit = 0; | |
159 | ||
160 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
161 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 162 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 163 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
164 | } |
165 | ||
166 | return 1; | |
167 | } | |
168 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
169 | /* |
170 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
171 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
172 | */ | |
173 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
174 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
175 | ||
176 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
177 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
178 | { | |
179 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
180 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
181 | ||
182 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
183 | size_t hashlen; | |
184 | ||
185 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
186 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
187 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
188 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
189 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
190 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
191 | else | |
192 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
193 | ||
194 | /* | |
195 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
196 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
197 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
198 | */ | |
199 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
200 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
201 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
202 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
203 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
204 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
205 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 206 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
207 | return 0; |
208 | } | |
209 | ||
210 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
211 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
212 | } else { | |
213 | size_t retlen; | |
214 | ||
215 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
216 | if (retlen <= 0) { |
217 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, | |
218 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 219 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 220 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
221 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
224 | return 1; | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
227 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
228 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
229 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
230 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 231 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
232 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
233 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
234 | void *hdata; |
235 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 236 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 237 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 238 | |
ad4dd362 | 239 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
240 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
241 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
242 | goto err; |
243 | } | |
244 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 245 | |
168067b6 | 246 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
248 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
249 | goto err; |
250 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
251 | |
252 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
253 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
254 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
255 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
256 | goto err; |
257 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 258 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
259 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
260 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 261 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
262 | goto err; |
263 | } | |
264 | ||
ad4dd362 | 265 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
267 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
268 | goto err; |
269 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
270 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
271 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 | 272 | if (sig == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
273 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
274 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
275 | goto err; |
276 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 277 | |
75394189 | 278 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
279 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
280 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
281 | goto err; |
282 | } | |
283 | ||
ad4dd362 | 284 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 285 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
286 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
287 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
288 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
289 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
290 | goto err; |
291 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
292 | } |
293 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
294 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
295 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
296 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
297 | s->session->master_key) | |
298 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
299 | ||
d4d2f3a4 MC |
300 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
301 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
302 | goto err; |
303 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 304 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
305 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
306 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
307 | goto err; |
308 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 309 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
310 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
311 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
312 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
313 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
314 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
315 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
316 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 317 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
318 | } |
319 | #endif | |
320 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 321 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
322 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
323 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
324 | goto err; |
325 | } | |
326 | ||
327 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
328 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
329 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 330 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 331 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
332 | |
333 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
334 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
335 | return 1; | |
336 | err: | |
337 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
338 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
339 | return 0; |
340 | } | |
341 | ||
342 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
343 | { | |
344 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 345 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
346 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
347 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
348 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 349 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 350 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
351 | unsigned int len; |
352 | X509 *peer; | |
353 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 354 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 355 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 356 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 357 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 358 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
359 | |
360 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
361 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
362 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
363 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
364 | } |
365 | ||
366 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
367 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
368 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
369 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
370 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
371 | goto err; | |
372 | } | |
83b4049a | 373 | |
dd24857b | 374 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
375 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
376 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
377 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
378 | } |
379 | ||
f464f9c0 | 380 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
381 | unsigned int sigalg; |
382 | ||
383 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
384 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
385 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
386 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 387 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
388 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
389 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
390 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
391 | } |
392 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
393 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
394 | #endif | |
395 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
396 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
397 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
398 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
399 | } |
400 | ||
168067b6 | 401 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
402 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
403 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
404 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 405 | } |
f464f9c0 | 406 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
407 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
408 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
409 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
410 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
411 | */ |
412 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
413 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
414 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
415 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
416 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
417 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
418 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
419 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
420 | } else |
421 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 422 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
423 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
424 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
425 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 426 | } |
f464f9c0 | 427 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
428 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
429 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
430 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
431 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
432 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
433 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
434 | } |
435 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
436 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
437 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
438 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
439 | } |
440 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 441 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
442 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
443 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
444 | } |
445 | ||
446 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
447 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
448 | #endif | |
75394189 | 449 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
450 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
451 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
452 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
453 | } |
454 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
455 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 456 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
457 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
458 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
459 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
460 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
462 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
463 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
464 | } |
465 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
466 | data = gost_data; | |
467 | } | |
468 | } | |
469 | #endif | |
470 | ||
5554facb | 471 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 472 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
473 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
474 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
475 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
476 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
477 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 478 | } |
d8bc1399 | 479 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
480 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
481 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
482 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
483 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
484 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
485 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
486 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
487 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
488 | } |
489 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
490 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
491 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
492 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
493 | } |
494 | } else { | |
495 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 496 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
497 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
498 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
499 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 500 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
501 | } |
502 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 503 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 504 | err: |
d8bc1399 MC |
505 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); |
506 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
507 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
508 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
509 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
510 | #endif | |
511 | return ret; | |
512 | } | |
513 | ||
229185e6 | 514 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 515 | { |
12472b45 | 516 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 517 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 518 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 519 | |
f7e393be MC |
520 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
521 | if (!s->server) | |
522 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
523 | ||
524 | /* | |
525 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
526 | * client certificate | |
527 | */ | |
528 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
529 | && !s->server | |
530 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
531 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
532 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
533 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 534 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
535 | } |
536 | ||
229185e6 MC |
537 | if (s->server) { |
538 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
539 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
540 | } else { | |
541 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
542 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
543 | } | |
0f113f3e | 544 | |
12472b45 MC |
545 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
546 | sender, slen, | |
547 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
548 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
549 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
550 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
551 | } |
552 | ||
12472b45 | 553 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 554 | |
12472b45 | 555 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
556 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
557 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
558 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 559 | } |
0f113f3e | 560 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
561 | /* |
562 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
563 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
564 | */ | |
565 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
566 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 567 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
568 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
569 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 570 | } |
2faa1b48 | 571 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
572 | /* |
573 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
574 | */ | |
380a522f | 575 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
576 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
577 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
578 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 579 | } |
23a635c0 | 580 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
581 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
582 | finish_md_len); | |
583 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 584 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
585 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
586 | finish_md_len); | |
587 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 588 | } |
0f113f3e | 589 | |
b9908bf9 | 590 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 591 | } |
d02b48c6 | 592 | |
44c04a2e MC |
593 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
594 | { | |
595 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
596 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
597 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
598 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
599 | } |
600 | ||
9412b3ad | 601 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 602 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
603 | } |
604 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
605 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
606 | { | |
607 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
608 | ||
82f992cb MC |
609 | s->key_update_count++; |
610 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
611 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
612 | SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
613 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
82f992cb MC |
614 | } |
615 | ||
524420d8 MC |
616 | /* |
617 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
618 | * be on a record boundary. | |
619 | */ | |
620 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
621 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
622 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
623 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
624 | } |
625 | ||
e1c3de44 | 626 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 627 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
628 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
629 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
630 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
631 | } |
632 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
633 | /* |
634 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
635 | * didn't recognise. | |
636 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
637 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
638 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
639 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
640 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
641 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
642 | } |
643 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
644 | /* |
645 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
646 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
647 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
648 | */ | |
649 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
650 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
651 | ||
57389a32 | 652 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
653 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
654 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
655 | } |
656 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
657 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
658 | } | |
659 | ||
bf48836c | 660 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
661 | /* |
662 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
663 | * to far. | |
664 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 665 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
666 | { |
667 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 668 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
669 | /* |
670 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
671 | * the appropriate error. | |
672 | */ | |
673 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
674 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 675 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
676 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
677 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
678 | } else { | |
679 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
680 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
681 | } | |
682 | ||
683 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
684 | sender, | |
685 | slen, | |
686 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
687 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
688 | #endif |
689 | ||
be3583fa | 690 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 691 | { |
348240c6 | 692 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 693 | |
73999b62 | 694 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
695 | /* |
696 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
697 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
698 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 699 | */ |
c69f2adf | 700 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 701 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
702 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
703 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
704 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
705 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
706 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
707 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
708 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
709 | } |
710 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 711 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
712 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
713 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
714 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
715 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 716 | } |
657da85e MC |
717 | } |
718 | ||
719 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
720 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
721 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
722 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
723 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
724 | } |
725 | ||
726 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
727 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
728 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
729 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
730 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
731 | } |
732 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
733 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
734 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
735 | ||
736 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
737 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
738 | ||
739 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
740 | /* | |
741 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
742 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
743 | * SCTP is used | |
744 | */ | |
745 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
746 | #endif | |
747 | } | |
748 | ||
b9908bf9 | 749 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
750 | } |
751 | ||
be3583fa | 752 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 753 | { |
12472b45 | 754 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 755 | |
d781d247 MC |
756 | |
757 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
758 | if (s->server) |
759 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 760 | |
524420d8 MC |
761 | /* |
762 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
763 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
764 | */ | |
765 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
766 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
767 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
768 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
769 | } |
770 | ||
0f113f3e | 771 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 772 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
773 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
774 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
775 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
776 | } |
777 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
778 | ||
12472b45 | 779 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 780 | |
12472b45 | 781 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
782 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
783 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
784 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
785 | } |
786 | ||
12472b45 MC |
787 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
788 | md_len) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
789 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
790 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
791 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
792 | } |
793 | ||
794 | /* | |
795 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
796 | */ | |
380a522f | 797 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
798 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
799 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
800 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 801 | } |
23a635c0 | 802 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
803 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
804 | md_len); | |
805 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 806 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
807 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
808 | md_len); | |
809 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
810 | } |
811 | ||
7776a36c MC |
812 | /* |
813 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
814 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
815 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
816 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
817 | if (s->server) { | |
818 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
819 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
820 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
821 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
822 | } |
823 | } else { | |
824 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 825 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 826 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
827 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
828 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
829 | } |
830 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
831 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
832 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
833 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
834 | } | |
835 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
836 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
837 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
838 | } |
839 | } | |
840 | } | |
841 | ||
e6575156 | 842 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 843 | } |
d02b48c6 | 844 | |
7cea05dc | 845 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 846 | { |
7cea05dc | 847 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
848 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
849 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
850 | return 0; |
851 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 852 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
853 | return 1; |
854 | } | |
855 | ||
e96e0f8e | 856 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 857 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 858 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
859 | int len; |
860 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
861 | ||
862 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
863 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
864 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
865 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
866 | return 0; |
867 | } | |
868 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
869 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
870 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
871 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
872 | return 0; |
873 | } | |
874 | ||
875 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 876 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
877 | chain)) { |
878 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 879 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 880 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
881 | |
882 | return 1; | |
883 | } | |
884 | ||
885 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 886 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
887 | { |
888 | int i, chain_count; | |
889 | X509 *x; | |
890 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
891 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
892 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
893 | |
894 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
895 | return 1; | |
896 | ||
897 | x = cpk->x509; | |
898 | ||
899 | /* | |
900 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
901 | */ | |
d805a57b | 902 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
903 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
904 | else | |
905 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
906 | ||
907 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
908 | chain_store = NULL; | |
909 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
910 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
911 | else | |
912 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
913 | ||
d805a57b | 914 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
915 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
916 | ||
917 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
918 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
919 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
920 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
921 | } |
922 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
923 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
924 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
925 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
926 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
927 | } |
928 | /* | |
929 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
930 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
931 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
932 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
933 | */ | |
934 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
935 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
936 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
937 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
938 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
939 | if (i != 1) { | |
940 | #if 0 | |
941 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
942 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
943 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
944 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
945 | #endif | |
946 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
947 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
948 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
949 | } |
950 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
951 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
952 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
953 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
954 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
955 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 956 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 957 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
958 | } |
959 | } | |
960 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
961 | } else { | |
962 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
963 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
964 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
965 | return 0; | |
966 | } | |
967 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
968 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
969 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 970 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
971 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
972 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
973 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
974 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
975 | return 0; | |
976 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
977 | } |
978 | } | |
979 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
980 | } |
981 | ||
f63a17d6 | 982 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 983 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
984 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
985 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
986 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
987 | return 0; | |
988 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 989 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
990 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
991 | return 0; | |
992 | ||
993 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
994 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
995 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 996 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 997 | } |
f63a17d6 | 998 | |
c49e1912 | 999 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1000 | } |
1001 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1002 | /* |
1003 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1004 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1005 | * freed up as well. | |
1006 | */ | |
1007 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) | |
8723588e | 1008 | { |
1fcb4e4d | 1009 | int discard; |
8723588e MC |
1010 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
1011 | ||
1012 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1013 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 1014 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
1015 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
1016 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
1017 | return ret; | |
1018 | } | |
1019 | #endif | |
1020 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1021 | if (clearbufs) { |
1022 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1023 | /* | |
1024 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1025 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1026 | */ | |
1027 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1028 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1029 | } | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1030 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1031 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1032 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1033 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1034 | } |
30f05b19 | 1035 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1036 | } |
8723588e | 1037 | |
c7f47786 | 1038 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1039 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1040 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1041 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1042 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1043 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1044 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1045 | ||
8723588e | 1046 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1047 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1048 | ||
0e6161bc | 1049 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1050 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, |
1051 | s->ctx->lock); | |
fe3a3291 | 1052 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1053 | } else { |
5d61491c MC |
1054 | /* |
1055 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1056 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1057 | */ | |
1058 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1059 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
8723588e | 1060 | if (s->hit) |
0e6161bc BK |
1061 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, |
1062 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e | 1063 | |
fe3a3291 | 1064 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
0e6161bc BK |
1065 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, |
1066 | &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e MC |
1067 | } |
1068 | ||
1069 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1070 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1071 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1072 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1073 | ||
1074 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1075 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1076 | ||
1077 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1078 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1079 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1080 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1081 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1082 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1083 | } |
1084 | } | |
1085 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1086 | /* |
1087 | * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, | |
1088 | * so continue. | |
1089 | */ | |
1090 | if (!clearbufs) | |
1091 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1092 | ||
4004ce5f | 1093 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1094 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1095 | } | |
1096 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1097 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1098 | { | |
1099 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1100 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1101 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1102 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1103 | |
1104 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1105 | ||
1106 | do { | |
1107 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1108 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1109 | &p[s->init_num], |
1110 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1111 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1112 | if (i <= 0) { |
1113 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1114 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1115 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1116 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1117 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1118 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1119 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1120 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1121 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1122 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1123 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1124 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1125 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1126 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1127 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1128 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1129 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1130 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1131 | return 1; |
1132 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1133 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1134 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1135 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1136 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1137 | } |
54105ddd | 1138 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1139 | } |
1140 | ||
1141 | skip_message = 0; | |
1142 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1143 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1144 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1145 | /* |
1146 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1147 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1148 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1149 | * MAC. | |
1150 | */ | |
1151 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1152 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1153 | skip_message = 1; | |
1154 | ||
1155 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1156 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1157 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1158 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1159 | } | |
1160 | } while (skip_message); | |
1161 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1162 | ||
1163 | *mt = *p; | |
1164 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1165 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1166 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1167 | /* |
1168 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1169 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1170 | * |
1171 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1172 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1173 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1174 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1175 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1176 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1177 | ||
1178 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1179 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1180 | } else { | |
1181 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1182 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1183 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1184 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1185 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1186 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1187 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1188 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1189 | ||
1190 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1191 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1192 | } | |
1193 | ||
1194 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1195 | } |
1196 | ||
eda75751 | 1197 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1198 | { |
54105ddd | 1199 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1200 | unsigned char *p; |
1201 | int i; | |
1202 | ||
1203 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1204 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1205 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1206 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1207 | } |
1208 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1209 | p = s->init_msg; |
1210 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1211 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1212 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1213 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1214 | if (i <= 0) { |
1215 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1216 | *len = 0; |
1217 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1218 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1219 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1220 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1221 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1222 | |
bf48836c | 1223 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1224 | /* |
1225 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1226 | * Finished verification. | |
1227 | */ | |
1228 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1229 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1230 | #endif |
1231 | ||
0f113f3e | 1232 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1233 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1234 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1235 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1236 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1237 | *len = 0; |
1238 | return 0; | |
1239 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1240 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1241 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1242 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1243 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1244 | /* |
1245 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1246 | * processing the message | |
1247 | */ | |
597c51bc MC |
1248 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
1249 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
1250 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1251 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1252 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1253 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1254 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1255 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1256 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1257 | *len = 0; | |
1258 | return 0; | |
1259 | } | |
d166ed8c | 1260 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1261 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1262 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1263 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1264 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1265 | } | |
1266 | ||
eda75751 | 1267 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1268 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1269 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1270 | |
6b691a5c | 1271 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1272 | { |
1273 | int al; | |
1274 | ||
1275 | switch (type) { | |
1276 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1277 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1279 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1280 | break; | |
1281 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1282 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1283 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1284 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1285 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1286 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1287 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1289 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1290 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1291 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1292 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1293 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1294 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1295 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1296 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1297 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1298 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1299 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1300 | break; | |
1301 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1302 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1303 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1304 | break; | |
1305 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1306 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1307 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1308 | break; | |
1309 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1310 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1311 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1312 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1313 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1314 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1315 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1316 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1317 | break; | |
1318 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1319 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1320 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1321 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1322 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1323 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1324 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1325 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1326 | break; | |
1327 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1328 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1329 | break; | |
1330 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1331 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1332 | break; | |
1333 | default: | |
1334 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1335 | break; | |
1336 | } | |
26a7d938 | 1337 | return al; |
0f113f3e | 1338 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1339 | |
b362ccab | 1340 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1341 | { |
1342 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1343 | return 0; | |
1344 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1345 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1346 | |
068c358a | 1347 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1348 | { |
1349 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1350 | ||
1351 | if (a == b) | |
1352 | return 0; | |
1353 | if (!dtls) | |
1354 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1355 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1356 | } | |
1357 | ||
1358 | typedef struct { | |
1359 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1360 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1361 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1362 | } version_info; |
1363 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1364 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1365 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1366 | #endif |
1367 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1368 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1369 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1370 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1371 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1372 | #else | |
1373 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1374 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1375 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1376 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1377 | #else |
a230b26e | 1378 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1379 | #endif |
1380 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1381 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1382 | #else |
a230b26e | 1383 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1384 | #endif |
1385 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1386 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1387 | #else |
a230b26e | 1388 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1389 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1390 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1391 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1392 | #else |
a230b26e | 1393 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1394 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1395 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1396 | }; |
1397 | ||
1398 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1399 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1400 | #endif | |
1401 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1402 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1403 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1404 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1405 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1406 | #else |
a230b26e | 1407 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1408 | #endif |
1409 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1410 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1411 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1412 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1413 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1414 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1415 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1416 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1417 | }; |
1418 | ||
1419 | /* | |
1420 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1421 | * | |
1422 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1423 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1424 | * | |
1425 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1426 | */ | |
068c358a | 1427 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1428 | { |
1429 | int version = method->version; | |
1430 | ||
1431 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1432 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1433 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1434 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1435 | ||
1436 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1437 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1438 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1439 | ||
1440 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1441 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1442 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1443 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1444 | |
1445 | return 0; | |
1446 | } | |
1447 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1448 | /* |
1449 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1450 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1451 | * | |
1452 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1453 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1454 | * | |
1455 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1456 | */ | |
1457 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1458 | { | |
1459 | const version_info *vent; | |
1460 | const version_info *table; | |
1461 | ||
1462 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1463 | default: | |
1464 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1465 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1466 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1467 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1468 | break; | |
1469 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1470 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1471 | break; | |
1472 | } | |
1473 | ||
1474 | for (vent = table; | |
1475 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1476 | ++vent) { | |
1477 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1478 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1479 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1480 | return 1; | |
1481 | } | |
1482 | } | |
1483 | return 0; | |
1484 | } | |
1485 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1486 | /* |
1487 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1488 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1489 | * supported protocol version. | |
1490 | * | |
1491 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1492 | * | |
1493 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1494 | */ | |
1495 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1496 | { | |
1497 | const version_info *vent; | |
1498 | const version_info *table; | |
1499 | ||
1500 | /* | |
1501 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1502 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1503 | * s->method). | |
1504 | */ | |
1505 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1506 | return 1; | |
1507 | ||
1508 | /* | |
1509 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1510 | * highest protocol version). | |
1511 | */ | |
1512 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1513 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1514 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1515 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1516 | else { | |
1517 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1518 | return 0; | |
1519 | } | |
1520 | ||
1521 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1522 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1523 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1524 | } | |
1525 | return 0; | |
1526 | } | |
1527 | ||
1528 | /* | |
1529 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1530 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1531 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1532 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1533 | * | |
1534 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1535 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1536 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1537 | * | |
1538 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1539 | */ | |
1540 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1541 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1542 | if (version == 0) { |
1543 | *bound = version; | |
1544 | return 1; | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1547 | /*- |
1548 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1549 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1550 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1551 | * | |
1552 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1553 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1554 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1555 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1556 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1557 | */ | |
1558 | switch (method_version) { | |
1559 | default: | |
1560 | /* | |
1561 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1562 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1563 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1564 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1565 | * versions. | |
1566 | */ | |
1567 | return 0; | |
1568 | ||
1569 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1570 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1571 | return 0; | |
1572 | break; | |
1573 | ||
1574 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1575 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1576 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1577 | return 0; |
1578 | break; | |
1579 | } | |
1580 | ||
1581 | *bound = version; | |
1582 | return 1; | |
1583 | } | |
1584 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1585 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1586 | { | |
1587 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1588 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1589 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1590 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1591 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1592 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1593 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1594 | } else { | |
1595 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | } | |
1598 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1599 | /* |
1600 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1601 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1602 | * the version specific method. | |
1603 | * | |
1604 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1605 | * | |
1606 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1607 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1608 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1609 | { |
1610 | /*- | |
1611 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1612 | * | |
1613 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1614 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1615 | * | |
1616 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1617 | * handle version. | |
1618 | */ | |
1619 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1620 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1621 | const version_info *vent; |
1622 | const version_info *table; | |
1623 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1624 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1625 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1626 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1627 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1628 | switch (server_version) { |
1629 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1630 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1631 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1632 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1633 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1634 | /* |
1635 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1636 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1637 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1638 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1639 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1640 | */ | |
1641 | return 0; | |
1642 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1643 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1644 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1645 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1646 | */ |
018fcbec | 1647 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1648 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1649 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1650 | break; | |
1651 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1652 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1653 | break; | |
1654 | } | |
1655 | ||
70af3d8e | 1656 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1657 | |
70af3d8e | 1658 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1659 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1660 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1661 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1662 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1663 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1664 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1665 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1666 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1667 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1668 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1669 | } | |
1670 | ||
1671 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1672 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1673 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1674 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1675 | /* |
1676 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1677 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1678 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1679 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1680 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1681 | continue; | |
1682 | for (vent = table; | |
1683 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1684 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1685 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1686 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1687 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1688 | ||
1689 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1690 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1691 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1692 | best_method = method; | |
1693 | } | |
1694 | } | |
1695 | } | |
1696 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1697 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1698 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1699 | } | |
1700 | ||
1701 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
7d061fce MC |
1702 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1703 | /* | |
1704 | * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this | |
1705 | * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
1706 | */ | |
1707 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1708 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1709 | return 0; | |
1710 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1711 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1712 | s->version = best_vers; |
1713 | s->method = best_method; | |
1714 | return 0; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1717 | } | |
1718 | ||
1719 | /* | |
1720 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1721 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1722 | */ | |
1723 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1724 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1725 | ||
1726 | /* | |
1727 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1728 | * the ClientHello. | |
1729 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1730 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1731 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1732 | ||
1733 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1734 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1735 | continue; | |
1736 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1737 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1738 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1739 | s->version = vent->version; |
1740 | s->method = method; | |
1741 | return 0; | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | disabled = 1; | |
1744 | } | |
1745 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1746 | } | |
1747 | ||
1748 | /* | |
1749 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1750 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1751 | * the version specific method. | |
1752 | * | |
1753 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1754 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1755 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1756 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1757 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1758 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1759 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1760 | { |
1761 | const version_info *vent; | |
1762 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1763 | int highver = 0; |
88050dd1 | 1764 | int origv; |
4fa52141 | 1765 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1766 | origv = s->version; |
1767 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1768 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1769 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1770 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1771 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1772 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1773 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1774 | s->version = origv; | |
1775 | return 0; | |
1776 | } | |
1777 | ||
1778 | if (s->hello_retry_request && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
1779 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1780 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1781 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1782 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1783 | } |
1784 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1785 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1786 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1787 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1788 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1789 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1790 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1791 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1792 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1793 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1794 | /* |
1795 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1796 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1797 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1798 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1799 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1800 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1801 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1802 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1803 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1804 | break; | |
1805 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1806 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1807 | break; | |
1808 | } | |
1809 | ||
1810 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1811 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1812 | int err; | |
1813 | ||
4fa52141 | 1814 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1815 | continue; |
1816 | ||
88050dd1 | 1817 | if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd | 1818 | continue; |
3847d426 | 1819 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1820 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1821 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd | 1822 | if (err != 0) { |
88050dd1 MC |
1823 | if (s->version == vent->version) { |
1824 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1825 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1826 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err); | |
1827 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1828 | } |
1829 | ||
1830 | continue; | |
1831 | } | |
1832 | if (highver == 0) | |
1833 | highver = vent->version; | |
1834 | ||
88050dd1 | 1835 | if (s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd MC |
1836 | continue; |
1837 | ||
1838 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1839 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
88050dd1 MC |
1840 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) { |
1841 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1842 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1843 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1844 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1845 | s->version = origv; | |
1846 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1847 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1848 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1849 | return 0; | |
1850 | } | |
1851 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1852 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1853 | && highver > s->version) { | |
1854 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1855 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1856 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1857 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1858 | s->version = origv; | |
1859 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1860 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1861 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1862 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1863 | } |
1864 | } | |
1865 | #endif | |
1866 | ||
4fa52141 | 1867 | s->method = method; |
29bfd5b7 | 1868 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1869 | } |
1870 | ||
88050dd1 | 1871 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1872 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1873 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1874 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1875 | } |
1876 | ||
068c358a | 1877 | /* |
38a73150 | 1878 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1879 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1880 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1881 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1882 | * | |
1883 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1884 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1885 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1886 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1887 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1888 | * |
0485d540 | 1889 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1890 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1891 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1892 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1893 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1894 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1895 | */ |
38a73150 | 1896 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1897 | { |
1898 | int version; | |
1899 | int hole; | |
1900 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1901 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1902 | const version_info *table; | |
1903 | const version_info *vent; | |
1904 | ||
1905 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1906 | default: | |
1907 | /* | |
1908 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1909 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1910 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1911 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1912 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1913 | */ | |
068c358a | 1914 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1915 | return 0; |
1916 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1917 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1918 | break; | |
1919 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1920 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1921 | break; | |
1922 | } | |
1923 | ||
1924 | /* | |
1925 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1926 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1927 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1928 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1929 | * | |
1930 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1931 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1932 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1933 | * | |
1934 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1935 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1936 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1937 | * | |
1938 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1939 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1940 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1941 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1942 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1943 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1944 | */ | |
068c358a | 1945 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1946 | hole = 1; |
1947 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1948 | /* | |
1949 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1950 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1951 | */ | |
1952 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1953 | hole = 1; | |
1954 | continue; | |
1955 | } | |
1956 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1957 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1958 | hole = 1; | |
1959 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1960 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1961 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1962 | } else { |
1963 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1964 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1965 | hole = 0; |
1966 | } | |
1967 | } | |
1968 | ||
068c358a KR |
1969 | *max_version = version; |
1970 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1971 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1972 | if (version == 0) | |
1973 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1974 | ||
068c358a KR |
1975 | return 0; |
1976 | } | |
1977 | ||
1978 | /* | |
1979 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1980 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1981 | * |
1982 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1983 | * | |
1984 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1985 | */ | |
1986 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1987 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1988 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1989 | |
38a73150 | 1990 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1991 | |
1992 | if (ret != 0) | |
1993 | return ret; | |
1994 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1995 | s->version = ver_max; |
1996 | ||
1997 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1998 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1999 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2000 | ||
2001 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2002 | return 0; |
2003 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2004 | |
2005 | /* | |
2006 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2007 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2008 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2009 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2010 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 2011 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 2012 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2013 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2014 | { | |
2015 | size_t i; | |
2016 | ||
2017 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2018 | return 0; | |
2019 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2020 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2021 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2022 | ||
2023 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2024 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 2025 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2026 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2027 | } |
2028 | } | |
2029 | ||
0acee504 | 2030 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2031 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2032 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2033 | |
2034 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
2035 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) | |
2036 | { | |
2037 | unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2038 | size_t hashlen = 0; | |
635b7d3f MC |
2039 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2040 | ||
2041 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea MC |
2042 | |
2043 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2044 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2045 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2046 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2047 | return 0; |
2048 | } | |
2049 | ||
2050 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2051 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2052 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2053 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2054 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2055 | |
2056 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2057 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2058 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2059 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2060 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2061 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2062 | return 0; |
2063 | } | |
2064 | ||
2065 | return 1; | |
2066 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2067 | |
2068 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2069 | { | |
2070 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2071 | } | |
2072 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2073 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2074 | { |
2075 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2076 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2077 | PACKET cadns; | |
2078 | ||
2079 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2080 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2081 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2082 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2083 | } |
2084 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2085 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2086 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2087 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2088 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2089 | } |
2090 | ||
2091 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2092 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2093 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2094 | ||
2095 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2096 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2097 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2098 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2099 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2100 | } |
2101 | ||
2102 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2103 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2104 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2105 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2106 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2107 | } |
2108 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2109 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2110 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2111 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2112 | } |
2113 | ||
2114 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2115 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2116 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2117 | goto err; |
2118 | } | |
2119 | xn = NULL; | |
2120 | } | |
2121 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2122 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2123 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2124 | |
2125 | return 1; | |
2126 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2127 | err: |
2128 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2129 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2130 | return 0; | |
2131 | } | |
2132 | ||
2133 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2134 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2135 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2136 | |
2137 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2138 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2139 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2140 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2141 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2142 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2143 | |
2144 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2145 | int i; | |
2146 | ||
2147 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2148 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2149 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2150 | int namelen; | |
2151 | ||
2152 | if (name == NULL | |
2153 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2154 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2155 | &namebytes) | |
2156 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2157 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2158 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2159 | return 0; |
2160 | } | |
2161 | } | |
2162 | } | |
2163 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2164 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2165 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2166 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2167 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2168 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2169 | |
2170 | return 1; | |
2171 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2172 | |
2173 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2174 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2175 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2176 | { | |
2177 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2178 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2179 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2180 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2181 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2182 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2183 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2184 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2185 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2186 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2187 | ||
2188 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2189 | ||
2190 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2191 | return tbslen; | |
2192 | } |