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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
597c51bc MC |
22 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
23 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
24 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
25 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
26 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
27 | }; | |
28 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
29 | /* |
30 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
31 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
32 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 33 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | { |
35 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 36 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | |
38 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 39 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 40 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 41 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
42 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
43 | /* | |
44 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
45 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 46 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 47 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
48 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
49 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
50 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
51 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
52 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
53 | written)) | |
54 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 55 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
56 | if (s->msg_callback) |
57 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
58 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
59 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 60 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 61 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
62 | s->init_off += written; |
63 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 64 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 65 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 66 | |
4a01c59f | 67 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | { |
69 | size_t msglen; | |
70 | ||
4a01c59f | 71 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 72 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 73 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
74 | return 0; |
75 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
76 | s->init_off = 0; | |
77 | ||
78 | return 1; | |
79 | } | |
80 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
81 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
82 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
83 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
84 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 85 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 86 | } |
c7f47786 | 87 | |
b186a592 MC |
88 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
89 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
90 | ||
c7f47786 | 91 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
92 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
93 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
94 | ||
95 | /* | |
96 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
97 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
98 | * ClientHello. | |
99 | */ | |
100 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
4752c5de MC |
101 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
102 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
103 | return 0; |
104 | } | |
105 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
106 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
107 | ||
108 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
109 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
110 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
111 | ok = 1; | |
112 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
113 | ok = 1; | |
114 | } | |
115 | if (ok) | |
116 | break; | |
117 | } | |
118 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
119 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
120 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
121 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
122 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
123 | return 0; |
124 | } | |
c7f47786 | 125 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc BK |
126 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
127 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, | |
128 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 129 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 130 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
131 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, |
132 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
133 | |
134 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
135 | } | |
136 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d | 137 | int discard; |
c7f47786 | 138 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
0e6161bc BK |
139 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, |
140 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 141 | else |
0e6161bc BK |
142 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, |
143 | 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
144 | |
145 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
146 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
147 | s->hit = 0; | |
148 | ||
149 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
150 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 151 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 152 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
153 | } |
154 | ||
155 | return 1; | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
158 | /* |
159 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
160 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
161 | */ | |
162 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
163 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
164 | ||
165 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
166 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
167 | { | |
168 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
169 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
170 | ||
171 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
172 | size_t hashlen; | |
173 | ||
174 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
175 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
176 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
177 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
178 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
179 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
180 | else | |
181 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
182 | ||
183 | /* | |
184 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
185 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
186 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
187 | */ | |
188 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
189 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
190 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
191 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
192 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
193 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
194 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 195 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
196 | return 0; |
197 | } | |
198 | ||
199 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
200 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
201 | } else { | |
202 | size_t retlen; | |
203 | ||
204 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
205 | if (retlen <= 0) { |
206 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, | |
207 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 208 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 209 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
210 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
211 | } | |
212 | ||
213 | return 1; | |
214 | } | |
215 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
216 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
217 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
218 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
219 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 220 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
221 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
222 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
223 | void *hdata; |
224 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 225 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 226 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 227 | |
ad4dd362 | 228 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
229 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
230 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
231 | goto err; |
232 | } | |
233 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 234 | |
168067b6 | 235 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
236 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
237 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
238 | goto err; |
239 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
240 | |
241 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
242 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
243 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
244 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
245 | goto err; |
246 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 247 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
248 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
249 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 250 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
251 | goto err; |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
ad4dd362 | 254 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
255 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
256 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
257 | goto err; |
258 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
259 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
260 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 | 261 | if (sig == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
262 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
263 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
264 | goto err; |
265 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 266 | |
75394189 | 267 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
269 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
270 | goto err; |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
ad4dd362 | 273 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 274 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
275 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
276 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
277 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
278 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
279 | goto err; |
280 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
281 | } |
282 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
283 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
284 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
285 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
286 | s->session->master_key) | |
287 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
288 | ||
d4d2f3a4 MC |
289 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
290 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
291 | goto err; |
292 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 293 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
294 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
295 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
296 | goto err; |
297 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 298 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
299 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
300 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
301 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
302 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
303 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
304 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
305 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 306 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
307 | } |
308 | #endif | |
309 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 310 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
311 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
312 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
313 | goto err; |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
316 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
317 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
318 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 319 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 320 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
321 | |
322 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
323 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
324 | return 1; | |
325 | err: | |
326 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
327 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
328 | return 0; |
329 | } | |
330 | ||
331 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
332 | { | |
333 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 334 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
335 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
336 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
337 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 338 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 339 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
340 | unsigned int len; |
341 | X509 *peer; | |
342 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 343 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 344 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 345 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 346 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 347 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
348 | |
349 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
350 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
351 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
352 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
353 | } |
354 | ||
355 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
356 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
357 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
359 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
360 | goto err; | |
361 | } | |
83b4049a | 362 | |
dd24857b | 363 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
364 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
365 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
366 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
367 | } |
368 | ||
f464f9c0 | 369 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
370 | unsigned int sigalg; |
371 | ||
372 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
373 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
374 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
375 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 376 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
377 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
378 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
379 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
380 | } |
381 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
382 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
383 | #endif | |
384 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
385 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
386 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
387 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
388 | } |
389 | ||
168067b6 | 390 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
391 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
392 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
393 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 394 | } |
f464f9c0 | 395 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
396 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
397 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
398 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
399 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
400 | */ |
401 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
402 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
403 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
404 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
405 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
406 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
407 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
408 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
409 | } else |
410 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 411 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
412 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
413 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
414 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 415 | } |
f464f9c0 | 416 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
417 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
418 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
419 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
420 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
421 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
422 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
423 | } |
424 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
425 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
426 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
427 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
428 | } |
429 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 430 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
431 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
432 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
433 | } |
434 | ||
435 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
436 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
437 | #endif | |
75394189 | 438 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
439 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
440 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
441 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
442 | } |
443 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
444 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 445 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
446 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
447 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
448 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
449 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
450 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
451 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
452 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
453 | } |
454 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
455 | data = gost_data; | |
456 | } | |
457 | } | |
458 | #endif | |
459 | ||
5554facb | 460 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 461 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
462 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
463 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
464 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
465 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
466 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 467 | } |
d8bc1399 | 468 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
469 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
470 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
471 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
472 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
473 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
474 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
475 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
476 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
477 | } |
478 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
479 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
480 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
481 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
482 | } |
483 | } else { | |
484 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 485 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
486 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
487 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
488 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 489 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
490 | } |
491 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 492 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 493 | err: |
d8bc1399 MC |
494 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); |
495 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
496 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
497 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
498 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
499 | #endif | |
500 | return ret; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
229185e6 | 503 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 504 | { |
12472b45 | 505 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 506 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 507 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 508 | |
f7e393be | 509 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 510 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
511 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
512 | ||
513 | /* | |
514 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
515 | * client certificate | |
516 | */ | |
517 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
518 | && !s->server | |
519 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
520 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
521 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
522 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 523 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
524 | } |
525 | ||
229185e6 MC |
526 | if (s->server) { |
527 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
528 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
529 | } else { | |
530 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
531 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
532 | } | |
0f113f3e | 533 | |
12472b45 MC |
534 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
535 | sender, slen, | |
536 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
537 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
538 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
539 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
540 | } |
541 | ||
12472b45 | 542 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 543 | |
12472b45 | 544 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
545 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
546 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
547 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 548 | } |
0f113f3e | 549 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
550 | /* |
551 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
552 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
553 | */ | |
554 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
555 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 556 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
557 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
558 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 559 | } |
2faa1b48 | 560 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
561 | /* |
562 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
563 | */ | |
380a522f | 564 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
565 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
566 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
567 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 568 | } |
23a635c0 | 569 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
570 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
571 | finish_md_len); | |
572 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 573 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
574 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
575 | finish_md_len); | |
576 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 577 | } |
0f113f3e | 578 | |
b9908bf9 | 579 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 580 | } |
d02b48c6 | 581 | |
44c04a2e MC |
582 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
583 | { | |
584 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
585 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
586 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
587 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
588 | } |
589 | ||
9412b3ad | 590 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 591 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
592 | } |
593 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
594 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
595 | { | |
596 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
597 | ||
82f992cb MC |
598 | s->key_update_count++; |
599 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
600 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
601 | SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
602 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
82f992cb MC |
603 | } |
604 | ||
524420d8 MC |
605 | /* |
606 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
607 | * be on a record boundary. | |
608 | */ | |
609 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
610 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
611 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
612 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
613 | } |
614 | ||
e1c3de44 | 615 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 616 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
617 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
618 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
619 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
620 | } |
621 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
622 | /* |
623 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
624 | * didn't recognise. | |
625 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
626 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
627 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
628 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
629 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
630 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
631 | } |
632 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
633 | /* |
634 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
635 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
636 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
637 | */ | |
638 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
639 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
640 | ||
57389a32 | 641 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
642 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
643 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
644 | } |
645 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
646 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
647 | } | |
648 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
649 | /* |
650 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
651 | * to far. | |
652 | */ | |
5d671101 | 653 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
654 | { |
655 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 656 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 657 | |
49ae7423 | 658 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
659 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
660 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
661 | } else { | |
662 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
663 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
664 | } | |
665 | ||
5d671101 MC |
666 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
667 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, | |
668 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
669 | ||
670 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { | |
671 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
672 | return 0; | |
673 | } | |
674 | ||
675 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 676 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 677 | |
be3583fa | 678 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 679 | { |
348240c6 | 680 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 681 | |
73999b62 | 682 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
683 | /* |
684 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
685 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
686 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 687 | */ |
c69f2adf | 688 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 689 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
690 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
691 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
692 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
693 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
694 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
695 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
696 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
697 | } |
698 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 699 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
700 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
701 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
702 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
703 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 704 | } |
657da85e MC |
705 | } |
706 | ||
707 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
708 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
709 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
710 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
711 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
712 | } |
713 | ||
714 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
715 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
716 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
717 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
718 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
719 | } |
720 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
721 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
722 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
723 | ||
724 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
725 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
726 | ||
727 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
728 | /* | |
729 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
730 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
731 | * SCTP is used | |
732 | */ | |
733 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
734 | #endif | |
735 | } | |
736 | ||
b9908bf9 | 737 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
738 | } |
739 | ||
be3583fa | 740 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 741 | { |
12472b45 | 742 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 743 | |
d781d247 MC |
744 | |
745 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 TS |
746 | if (s->server) { |
747 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
748 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
749 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
750 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
751 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
752 | } | |
753 | } | |
d781d247 | 754 | |
524420d8 MC |
755 | /* |
756 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
757 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
758 | */ | |
759 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
760 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
761 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
762 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
763 | } |
764 | ||
0f113f3e | 765 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 766 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
767 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
768 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
769 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
770 | } |
771 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
772 | ||
12472b45 | 773 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 774 | |
12472b45 | 775 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
776 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
777 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
778 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
779 | } |
780 | ||
12472b45 MC |
781 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
782 | md_len) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
783 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
784 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
785 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
786 | } |
787 | ||
788 | /* | |
789 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
790 | */ | |
380a522f | 791 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
792 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
793 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
794 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 795 | } |
23a635c0 | 796 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
797 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
798 | md_len); | |
799 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 800 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
801 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
802 | md_len); | |
803 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
804 | } |
805 | ||
7776a36c MC |
806 | /* |
807 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
808 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
809 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
810 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
811 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
812 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
813 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 814 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
815 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
816 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
817 | } |
818 | } else { | |
819 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 820 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 821 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
822 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
823 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
824 | } |
825 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
826 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
827 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
828 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
829 | } | |
830 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
831 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
832 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
833 | } |
834 | } | |
835 | } | |
836 | ||
e6575156 | 837 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 838 | } |
d02b48c6 | 839 | |
7cea05dc | 840 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 841 | { |
7cea05dc | 842 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
843 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
844 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
845 | return 0; |
846 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 847 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
848 | return 1; |
849 | } | |
850 | ||
e96e0f8e | 851 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 852 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 853 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
854 | int len; |
855 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
856 | ||
857 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
858 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
859 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
860 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
861 | return 0; |
862 | } | |
863 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
864 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
865 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
866 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
867 | return 0; |
868 | } | |
869 | ||
870 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 871 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
872 | chain)) { |
873 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 874 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 875 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
876 | |
877 | return 1; | |
878 | } | |
879 | ||
880 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 881 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
882 | { |
883 | int i, chain_count; | |
884 | X509 *x; | |
885 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
886 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
887 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
888 | |
889 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
890 | return 1; | |
891 | ||
892 | x = cpk->x509; | |
893 | ||
894 | /* | |
895 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
896 | */ | |
d805a57b | 897 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
898 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
899 | else | |
900 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
901 | ||
902 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
903 | chain_store = NULL; | |
904 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
905 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
906 | else | |
907 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
908 | ||
d805a57b | 909 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
910 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
911 | ||
912 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
914 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
915 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
916 | } |
917 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
918 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
919 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
920 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
921 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
922 | } |
923 | /* | |
924 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
925 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
926 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
927 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
928 | */ | |
929 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
930 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
931 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
932 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
933 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
934 | if (i != 1) { | |
935 | #if 0 | |
936 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
937 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
938 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
939 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
940 | #endif | |
941 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
942 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
943 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
944 | } |
945 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
946 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
947 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
948 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
949 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
950 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 951 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 952 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
953 | } |
954 | } | |
955 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
956 | } else { | |
957 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
958 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
959 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
960 | return 0; | |
961 | } | |
962 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
963 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
964 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 965 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
966 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
967 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
968 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
969 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
970 | return 0; | |
971 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
972 | } |
973 | } | |
974 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
975 | } |
976 | ||
f63a17d6 | 977 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 978 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
979 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
980 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
981 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
982 | return 0; | |
983 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 984 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
985 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
986 | return 0; | |
987 | ||
988 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
989 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
990 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 991 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 992 | } |
f63a17d6 | 993 | |
c49e1912 | 994 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
995 | } |
996 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
997 | /* |
998 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
999 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1000 | * freed up as well. | |
1001 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 1002 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e | 1003 | { |
1fcb4e4d | 1004 | int discard; |
8723588e MC |
1005 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
1006 | ||
1007 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1008 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 1009 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
1010 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
1011 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
1012 | return ret; | |
1013 | } | |
1014 | #endif | |
1015 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1016 | if (clearbufs) { |
1017 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1018 | /* | |
1019 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1020 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1021 | */ | |
1022 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1023 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1024 | } | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1025 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1026 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1027 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1028 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1029 | } |
30f05b19 | 1030 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1031 | } |
8723588e | 1032 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1033 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1034 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1035 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1036 | ||
c7f47786 | 1037 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1038 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1039 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1040 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1041 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1042 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1043 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1044 | ||
8723588e | 1045 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1046 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1047 | ||
0e6161bc | 1048 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1049 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, |
1050 | s->ctx->lock); | |
fe3a3291 | 1051 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1052 | } else { |
5d61491c MC |
1053 | /* |
1054 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1055 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1056 | */ | |
1057 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1058 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
8723588e | 1059 | if (s->hit) |
0e6161bc BK |
1060 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, |
1061 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e | 1062 | |
fe3a3291 | 1063 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
0e6161bc BK |
1064 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, |
1065 | &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e MC |
1066 | } |
1067 | ||
1068 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1069 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1070 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1071 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1072 | ||
1073 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1074 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1075 | ||
1076 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1077 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1078 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1079 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1080 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1081 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1082 | } |
1083 | } | |
1084 | ||
2a8db717 | 1085 | if (!stop) |
30f05b19 MC |
1086 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
1087 | ||
4004ce5f | 1088 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1089 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1090 | } | |
1091 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1092 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1093 | { | |
1094 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1095 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1096 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1097 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1098 | |
1099 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1100 | ||
1101 | do { | |
1102 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1103 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1104 | &p[s->init_num], |
1105 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1106 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1107 | if (i <= 0) { |
1108 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1109 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1110 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1111 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1112 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1113 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1114 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1115 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1116 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1117 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1118 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1119 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1120 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1121 | } |
e9359719 MC |
1122 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
1123 | && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { | |
1124 | /* | |
1125 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1126 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1127 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1128 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1129 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1130 | */ | |
1131 | return 0; | |
1132 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1133 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1134 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1135 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1136 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1137 | return 1; |
1138 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1139 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1140 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1141 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1142 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1143 | } |
54105ddd | 1144 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1145 | } |
1146 | ||
1147 | skip_message = 0; | |
1148 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1149 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1150 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1151 | /* |
1152 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1153 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1154 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1155 | * MAC. | |
1156 | */ | |
1157 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1158 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1159 | skip_message = 1; | |
1160 | ||
1161 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1162 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1163 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1164 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1165 | } | |
1166 | } while (skip_message); | |
1167 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1168 | ||
1169 | *mt = *p; | |
1170 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1171 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1172 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1173 | /* |
1174 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1175 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1176 | * |
1177 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1178 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1179 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1180 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1181 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1182 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1183 | ||
1184 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1185 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1186 | } else { | |
1187 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1188 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1189 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1190 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1191 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1192 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1193 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1194 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1195 | ||
1196 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1197 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1198 | } | |
1199 | ||
1200 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1201 | } |
1202 | ||
eda75751 | 1203 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1204 | { |
54105ddd | 1205 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1206 | unsigned char *p; |
1207 | int i; | |
1208 | ||
1209 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1210 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1211 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1212 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1213 | } |
1214 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1215 | p = s->init_msg; |
1216 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1217 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1218 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1219 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1220 | if (i <= 0) { |
1221 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1222 | *len = 0; |
1223 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1224 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1225 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1226 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1227 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1228 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1229 | /* |
1230 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1231 | * Finished verification. | |
1232 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1233 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1234 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1235 | *len = 0; | |
1236 | return 0; | |
1237 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1238 | |
0f113f3e | 1239 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1240 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1241 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1242 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1243 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1244 | *len = 0; |
1245 | return 0; | |
1246 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1247 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1248 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1249 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1250 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1251 | /* |
1252 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1253 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1254 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1255 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1256 | */ |
597c51bc | 1257 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 TS |
1258 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
1259 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET | |
1260 | && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1261 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
1262 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1263 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1264 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1265 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1266 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1267 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1268 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1269 | *len = 0; | |
1270 | return 0; | |
1271 | } | |
597c51bc | 1272 | } |
d166ed8c | 1273 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1274 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1275 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1276 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1277 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
eda75751 | 1280 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1281 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1282 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1283 | |
6b691a5c | 1284 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1285 | { |
1286 | int al; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | switch (type) { | |
1289 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1290 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1291 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1292 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1293 | break; | |
1294 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1295 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1296 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1297 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1298 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1299 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1300 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1301 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1302 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1303 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1304 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1305 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1306 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1307 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1308 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1309 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1310 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1311 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1312 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1313 | break; | |
1314 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1315 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1316 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1317 | break; | |
1318 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1319 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1320 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1321 | break; | |
1322 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1323 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1324 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1325 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1326 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1327 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1328 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1329 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1330 | break; | |
1331 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1332 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1333 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1334 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1335 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1336 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1337 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1338 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1339 | break; | |
1340 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1341 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1342 | break; | |
1343 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1344 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1345 | break; | |
1346 | default: | |
1347 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1348 | break; | |
1349 | } | |
26a7d938 | 1350 | return al; |
0f113f3e | 1351 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1352 | |
b362ccab | 1353 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1354 | { |
1355 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1356 | return 0; | |
1357 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1358 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1359 | |
068c358a | 1360 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1361 | { |
1362 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1363 | ||
1364 | if (a == b) | |
1365 | return 0; | |
1366 | if (!dtls) | |
1367 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1368 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1369 | } | |
1370 | ||
1371 | typedef struct { | |
1372 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1373 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1374 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1375 | } version_info; |
1376 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1377 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1378 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1379 | #endif |
1380 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1381 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1382 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1383 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1384 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1385 | #else | |
1386 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1387 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1388 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1389 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1390 | #else |
a230b26e | 1391 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1392 | #endif |
1393 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1394 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1395 | #else |
a230b26e | 1396 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1397 | #endif |
1398 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1399 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1400 | #else |
a230b26e | 1401 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1402 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1403 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1404 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1405 | #else |
a230b26e | 1406 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1407 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1408 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1409 | }; |
1410 | ||
1411 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1412 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1413 | #endif | |
1414 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1415 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1416 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1417 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1418 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1419 | #else |
a230b26e | 1420 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1421 | #endif |
1422 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1423 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1424 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1425 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1426 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1427 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1428 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1429 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1430 | }; |
1431 | ||
1432 | /* | |
1433 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1434 | * | |
1435 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1436 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1437 | * | |
1438 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1439 | */ | |
068c358a | 1440 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1441 | { |
1442 | int version = method->version; | |
1443 | ||
1444 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1445 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1446 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1447 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1448 | ||
1449 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1450 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1451 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1452 | ||
1453 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1454 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1455 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1456 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1457 | |
1458 | return 0; | |
1459 | } | |
1460 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1461 | /* |
1462 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1463 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1464 | * | |
1465 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1466 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1467 | * | |
1468 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1469 | */ | |
1470 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1471 | { | |
1472 | const version_info *vent; | |
1473 | const version_info *table; | |
1474 | ||
1475 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1476 | default: | |
1477 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1478 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1479 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1480 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1481 | break; | |
1482 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1483 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1484 | break; | |
1485 | } | |
1486 | ||
1487 | for (vent = table; | |
1488 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1489 | ++vent) { | |
1490 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1491 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1492 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1493 | return 1; | |
1494 | } | |
1495 | } | |
1496 | return 0; | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1499 | /* |
1500 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1501 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1502 | * supported protocol version. | |
1503 | * | |
1504 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1505 | * | |
1506 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1507 | */ | |
1508 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1509 | { | |
1510 | const version_info *vent; | |
1511 | const version_info *table; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | /* | |
1514 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1515 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1516 | * s->method). | |
1517 | */ | |
1518 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1519 | return 1; | |
1520 | ||
1521 | /* | |
1522 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1523 | * highest protocol version). | |
1524 | */ | |
1525 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1526 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1527 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1528 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1529 | else { | |
1530 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1531 | return 0; | |
1532 | } | |
1533 | ||
1534 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1535 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1536 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1537 | } | |
1538 | return 0; | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | ||
1541 | /* | |
1542 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1543 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1544 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1545 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1546 | * | |
1547 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1548 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1549 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1550 | * | |
1551 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1552 | */ | |
1553 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1554 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1555 | if (version == 0) { |
1556 | *bound = version; | |
1557 | return 1; | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1560 | /*- |
1561 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1562 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1563 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1564 | * | |
1565 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1566 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1567 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1568 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1569 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1570 | */ | |
1571 | switch (method_version) { | |
1572 | default: | |
1573 | /* | |
1574 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1575 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1576 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1577 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1578 | * versions. | |
1579 | */ | |
1580 | return 0; | |
1581 | ||
1582 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1583 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1584 | return 0; | |
1585 | break; | |
1586 | ||
1587 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1588 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1589 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1590 | return 0; |
1591 | break; | |
1592 | } | |
1593 | ||
1594 | *bound = version; | |
1595 | return 1; | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1598 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1599 | { | |
1600 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1601 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1602 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1603 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1604 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1605 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1606 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1607 | } else { | |
1608 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1609 | } | |
1610 | } | |
1611 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1612 | /* |
1613 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1614 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1615 | * the version specific method. | |
1616 | * | |
1617 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1618 | * | |
1619 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1620 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1621 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1622 | { |
1623 | /*- | |
1624 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1625 | * | |
1626 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1627 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1628 | * | |
1629 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1630 | * handle version. | |
1631 | */ | |
1632 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1633 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1634 | const version_info *vent; |
1635 | const version_info *table; | |
1636 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1637 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1638 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1639 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1640 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1641 | switch (server_version) { |
1642 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1643 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1644 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1645 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1646 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1647 | /* |
1648 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1649 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1650 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1651 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1652 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1653 | */ | |
1654 | return 0; | |
1655 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1656 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1657 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1658 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1659 | */ |
018fcbec | 1660 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1661 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1662 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1663 | break; | |
1664 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1665 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1666 | break; | |
1667 | } | |
1668 | ||
70af3d8e | 1669 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1670 | |
6f40214f | 1671 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1672 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1673 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1674 | ||
70af3d8e | 1675 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1676 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1677 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1678 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1679 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1680 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1681 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1682 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1683 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1684 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1685 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1686 | } | |
1687 | ||
1688 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1689 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1690 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1691 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1692 | /* |
1693 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1694 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1695 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1696 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1697 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1698 | continue; | |
1699 | for (vent = table; | |
1700 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1701 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1702 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1703 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1704 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1705 | ||
1706 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1707 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1708 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1709 | best_method = method; | |
1710 | } | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1714 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1715 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1716 | } | |
1717 | ||
1718 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1719 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1720 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1721 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1722 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1723 | */ |
1724 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1725 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1726 | return 0; | |
1727 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1728 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1729 | s->version = best_vers; |
1730 | s->method = best_method; | |
1731 | return 0; | |
1732 | } | |
1733 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1734 | } | |
1735 | ||
1736 | /* | |
1737 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1738 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1739 | */ | |
1740 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1741 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1742 | ||
1743 | /* | |
1744 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1745 | * the ClientHello. | |
1746 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1747 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1748 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1749 | ||
1750 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1751 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1752 | continue; | |
1753 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1754 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1755 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1756 | s->version = vent->version; |
1757 | s->method = method; | |
1758 | return 0; | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | disabled = 1; | |
1761 | } | |
1762 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1763 | } | |
1764 | ||
1765 | /* | |
1766 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1767 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1768 | * the version specific method. | |
1769 | * | |
1770 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1771 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1772 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1773 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1774 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1775 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1776 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1777 | { |
1778 | const version_info *vent; | |
1779 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1780 | int highver = 0; |
88050dd1 | 1781 | int origv; |
4fa52141 | 1782 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1783 | origv = s->version; |
1784 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1785 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1786 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1787 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1788 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1789 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1790 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1791 | s->version = origv; | |
1792 | return 0; | |
1793 | } | |
1794 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1795 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1796 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1797 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1798 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1799 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1800 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1801 | } |
1802 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1803 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1804 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1805 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1806 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1807 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1808 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1809 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1810 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1811 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1812 | /* |
1813 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1814 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1815 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1816 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1817 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1818 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1819 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1820 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1821 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1822 | break; | |
1823 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1824 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1825 | break; | |
1826 | } | |
1827 | ||
1828 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1829 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1830 | int err; | |
1831 | ||
4fa52141 | 1832 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1833 | continue; |
1834 | ||
88050dd1 | 1835 | if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd | 1836 | continue; |
3847d426 | 1837 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1838 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1839 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd | 1840 | if (err != 0) { |
88050dd1 MC |
1841 | if (s->version == vent->version) { |
1842 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1843 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1844 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err); | |
1845 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1846 | } |
1847 | ||
1848 | continue; | |
1849 | } | |
1850 | if (highver == 0) | |
1851 | highver = vent->version; | |
1852 | ||
88050dd1 | 1853 | if (s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd MC |
1854 | continue; |
1855 | ||
1856 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1857 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
88050dd1 MC |
1858 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) { |
1859 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1860 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1861 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1862 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1863 | s->version = origv; | |
1864 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1865 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1866 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1867 | return 0; | |
1868 | } | |
1869 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1870 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1871 | && highver > s->version) { | |
1872 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1873 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1874 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1875 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1876 | s->version = origv; | |
1877 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1878 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1879 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1880 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1881 | } |
1882 | } | |
1883 | #endif | |
1884 | ||
4fa52141 | 1885 | s->method = method; |
29bfd5b7 | 1886 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1887 | } |
1888 | ||
88050dd1 | 1889 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1890 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1891 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1892 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1893 | } |
1894 | ||
068c358a | 1895 | /* |
38a73150 | 1896 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1897 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1898 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1899 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1900 | * | |
1901 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1902 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1903 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1904 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1905 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1906 | * |
0485d540 | 1907 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1908 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1909 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1910 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1911 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1912 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1913 | */ |
38a73150 | 1914 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1915 | { |
1916 | int version; | |
1917 | int hole; | |
1918 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1919 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1920 | const version_info *table; | |
1921 | const version_info *vent; | |
1922 | ||
1923 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1924 | default: | |
1925 | /* | |
1926 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1927 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1928 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1929 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1930 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1931 | */ | |
068c358a | 1932 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1933 | return 0; |
1934 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1935 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1936 | break; | |
1937 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1938 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1939 | break; | |
1940 | } | |
1941 | ||
1942 | /* | |
1943 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1944 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1945 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1946 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1947 | * | |
1948 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1949 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1950 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1951 | * | |
1952 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1953 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1954 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1955 | * | |
1956 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1957 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1958 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1959 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1960 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1961 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1962 | */ | |
068c358a | 1963 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1964 | hole = 1; |
1965 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1966 | /* | |
1967 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1968 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1969 | */ | |
1970 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1971 | hole = 1; | |
1972 | continue; | |
1973 | } | |
1974 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1975 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1976 | hole = 1; | |
1977 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1978 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1979 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1980 | } else { |
1981 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1982 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1983 | hole = 0; |
1984 | } | |
1985 | } | |
1986 | ||
068c358a KR |
1987 | *max_version = version; |
1988 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1989 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1990 | if (version == 0) | |
1991 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1992 | ||
068c358a KR |
1993 | return 0; |
1994 | } | |
1995 | ||
1996 | /* | |
1997 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1998 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1999 | * |
2000 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2001 | * | |
2002 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2003 | */ | |
2004 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
2005 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 2006 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2007 | |
38a73150 | 2008 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
2009 | |
2010 | if (ret != 0) | |
2011 | return ret; | |
2012 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2013 | s->version = ver_max; |
2014 | ||
2015 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2016 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2017 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2018 | ||
2019 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2020 | return 0; |
2021 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2022 | |
2023 | /* | |
2024 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2025 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2026 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2027 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2028 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 2029 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 2030 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2031 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2032 | { | |
2033 | size_t i; | |
2034 | ||
2035 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2036 | return 0; | |
2037 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2038 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2039 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2040 | ||
2041 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2042 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 2043 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2044 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2045 | } |
2046 | } | |
2047 | ||
0acee504 | 2048 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2049 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2050 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2051 | |
2052 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2053 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2054 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2055 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2056 | { |
43054d3d | 2057 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2058 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2059 | ||
2060 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2061 | |
43054d3d MC |
2062 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2063 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2064 | hashlen = 0; | |
2065 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2066 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2067 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2068 | &hashlen)) { | |
2069 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2070 | return 0; | |
2071 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2072 | } |
2073 | ||
2074 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2075 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2076 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2077 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2078 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2079 | |
2080 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2081 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2082 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2083 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2084 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2085 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2086 | return 0; |
2087 | } | |
2088 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2089 | /* |
2090 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2091 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2092 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2093 | */ | |
2094 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2095 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2096 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
2097 | s->s3->tmp.message_size | |
2098 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { | |
2099 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2100 | return 0; | |
2101 | } | |
2102 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2103 | return 1; |
2104 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2105 | |
2106 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2107 | { | |
2108 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2109 | } | |
2110 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2111 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2112 | { |
2113 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2114 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2115 | PACKET cadns; | |
2116 | ||
2117 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2118 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2119 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2120 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2121 | } |
2122 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2123 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2124 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2125 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2126 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2127 | } |
2128 | ||
2129 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2130 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2131 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2132 | ||
2133 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2134 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2135 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2136 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2137 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2138 | } |
2139 | ||
2140 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2141 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2142 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2143 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2144 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2145 | } |
2146 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2147 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2148 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2149 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2150 | } |
2151 | ||
2152 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2153 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2154 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2155 | goto err; |
2156 | } | |
2157 | xn = NULL; | |
2158 | } | |
2159 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2160 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2161 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2162 | |
2163 | return 1; | |
2164 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2165 | err: |
2166 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2167 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2168 | return 0; | |
2169 | } | |
2170 | ||
2171 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2172 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2173 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2174 | |
2175 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2176 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2177 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2178 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2179 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2180 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2181 | |
2182 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2183 | int i; | |
2184 | ||
2185 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2186 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2187 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2188 | int namelen; | |
2189 | ||
2190 | if (name == NULL | |
2191 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2192 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2193 | &namebytes) | |
2194 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2195 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2196 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2197 | return 0; |
2198 | } | |
2199 | } | |
2200 | } | |
2201 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2202 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2203 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2204 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2205 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2206 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2207 | |
2208 | return 1; | |
2209 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2210 | |
2211 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2212 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2213 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2214 | { | |
2215 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2216 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2217 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2218 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2219 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2220 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2221 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2222 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2223 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2224 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2225 | ||
2226 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2227 | ||
2228 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2229 | return tbslen; | |
2230 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2231 | |
2232 | /* | |
2233 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2234 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2235 | */ | |
2236 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2237 | { | |
2238 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2239 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2240 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2241 | return 0; | |
2242 | ||
2243 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2244 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2245 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2246 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2247 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2248 | return 0; | |
2249 | } | |
2250 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
2251 | s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { | |
2252 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2253 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2254 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2255 | return 0; | |
2256 | } | |
2257 | } | |
2258 | return 1; | |
2259 | } | |
2260 | ||
2261 | /* | |
2262 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2263 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2264 | */ | |
2265 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2266 | { | |
2267 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2269 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2270 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2271 | return 0; | |
2272 | } | |
2273 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, | |
2274 | s->pha_dgst)) { | |
2275 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2276 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2277 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2278 | return 0; | |
2279 | } | |
2280 | return 1; | |
2281 | } |