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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
597c51bc MC |
22 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
23 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
24 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
25 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
26 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
27 | }; | |
28 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
29 | /* |
30 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
31 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
32 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 33 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | { |
35 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 36 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | |
38 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 39 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 40 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 41 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
42 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
43 | /* | |
44 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
45 | * ignore the result anyway | |
46 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
47 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
48 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 49 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 50 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 51 | |
7ee8627f | 52 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
53 | if (s->msg_callback) |
54 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
55 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
56 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 57 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 58 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
59 | s->init_off += written; |
60 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 61 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 62 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 63 | |
4a01c59f | 64 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
65 | { |
66 | size_t msglen; | |
67 | ||
4a01c59f | 68 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 69 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 70 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
71 | return 0; |
72 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
73 | s->init_off = 0; | |
74 | ||
75 | return 1; | |
76 | } | |
77 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
78 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
79 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
80 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
81 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 82 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 83 | } |
c7f47786 | 84 | |
b186a592 MC |
85 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
86 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
87 | ||
c7f47786 | 88 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
89 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
90 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
91 | ||
92 | /* | |
93 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
94 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
95 | * ClientHello. | |
96 | */ | |
97 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
4752c5de MC |
98 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
99 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
100 | return 0; |
101 | } | |
102 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
103 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
104 | ||
105 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
106 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
107 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
108 | ok = 1; | |
109 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
110 | ok = 1; | |
111 | } | |
112 | if (ok) | |
113 | break; | |
114 | } | |
115 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
116 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
117 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
118 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
119 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
120 | return 0; |
121 | } | |
c7f47786 | 122 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc BK |
123 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
124 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, | |
125 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 126 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 127 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
128 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, |
129 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
130 | |
131 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
132 | } | |
133 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d | 134 | int discard; |
c7f47786 | 135 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
0e6161bc BK |
136 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, |
137 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 138 | else |
0e6161bc BK |
139 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, |
140 | 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
141 | |
142 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
143 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
144 | s->hit = 0; | |
145 | ||
146 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
147 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 148 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 149 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
150 | } |
151 | ||
152 | return 1; | |
153 | } | |
154 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
155 | /* |
156 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
157 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
158 | */ | |
159 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
160 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
161 | ||
162 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
163 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
164 | { | |
165 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
166 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
167 | ||
168 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
169 | size_t hashlen; | |
170 | ||
171 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
172 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
173 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
174 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
175 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
176 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
177 | else | |
178 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
179 | ||
180 | /* | |
181 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
182 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
183 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
184 | */ | |
185 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
186 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
187 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
188 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
189 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
190 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
191 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 192 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
193 | return 0; |
194 | } | |
195 | ||
196 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
197 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
198 | } else { | |
199 | size_t retlen; | |
200 | ||
201 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
202 | if (retlen <= 0) { |
203 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, | |
204 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 205 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 206 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
207 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
208 | } | |
209 | ||
210 | return 1; | |
211 | } | |
212 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
213 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
214 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
215 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
216 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 217 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
218 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
219 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
220 | void *hdata; |
221 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 222 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 223 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 224 | |
ad4dd362 | 225 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
226 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
227 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
228 | goto err; |
229 | } | |
230 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 231 | |
168067b6 | 232 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
233 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
234 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
235 | goto err; |
236 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
237 | |
238 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
239 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
240 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
241 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
242 | goto err; |
243 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 244 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
245 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
246 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 247 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
248 | goto err; |
249 | } | |
250 | ||
ad4dd362 | 251 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
252 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
253 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
254 | goto err; |
255 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
256 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
257 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 | 258 | if (sig == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
259 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
260 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
261 | goto err; |
262 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 263 | |
75394189 | 264 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
265 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
266 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
267 | goto err; |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
ad4dd362 | 270 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 271 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
272 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
273 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
274 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
275 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
276 | goto err; |
277 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
278 | } |
279 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
280 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
281 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
282 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
283 | s->session->master_key) | |
284 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
285 | ||
d4d2f3a4 MC |
286 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
287 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
288 | goto err; |
289 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 290 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
291 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
292 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
293 | goto err; |
294 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 295 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
296 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
297 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
298 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
299 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
300 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
301 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
302 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 303 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
304 | } |
305 | #endif | |
306 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 307 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
308 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
309 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
310 | goto err; |
311 | } | |
312 | ||
313 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
314 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
315 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 316 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 317 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
318 | |
319 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
320 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
321 | return 1; | |
322 | err: | |
323 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
324 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
325 | return 0; |
326 | } | |
327 | ||
328 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
329 | { | |
330 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 331 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
332 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
333 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
334 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 335 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 336 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
337 | unsigned int len; |
338 | X509 *peer; | |
339 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 340 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 341 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 342 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 343 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 344 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
345 | |
346 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
347 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
348 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
349 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
350 | } |
351 | ||
352 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
353 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
354 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
355 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
356 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
357 | goto err; | |
358 | } | |
83b4049a | 359 | |
dd24857b | 360 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
361 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
362 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
363 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
364 | } |
365 | ||
f464f9c0 | 366 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
367 | unsigned int sigalg; |
368 | ||
369 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
370 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
371 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
372 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 373 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
374 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
375 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
376 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
377 | } |
378 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
379 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
380 | #endif | |
381 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
382 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
383 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
384 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
385 | } |
386 | ||
168067b6 | 387 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
388 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
389 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
390 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 391 | } |
f464f9c0 | 392 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
393 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
394 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
395 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
396 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
397 | */ |
398 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
399 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
400 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
401 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
402 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
403 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
404 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
405 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
406 | } else |
407 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 408 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
409 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
410 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
411 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 412 | } |
f464f9c0 | 413 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
414 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
415 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
416 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
417 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
418 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
419 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
420 | } |
421 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
422 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
423 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
424 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
425 | } |
426 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 427 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
428 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
429 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
430 | } |
431 | ||
432 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
433 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
434 | #endif | |
75394189 | 435 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
436 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
437 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
438 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
439 | } |
440 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
441 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 442 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
443 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
444 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
445 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
446 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
447 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
448 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
449 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
450 | } |
451 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
452 | data = gost_data; | |
453 | } | |
454 | } | |
455 | #endif | |
456 | ||
5554facb | 457 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 458 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
459 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
460 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
462 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
463 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 464 | } |
d8bc1399 | 465 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
466 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
467 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
468 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
469 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
470 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
471 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
472 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
473 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
474 | } |
475 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
476 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
477 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
478 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
479 | } |
480 | } else { | |
481 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 482 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
483 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
484 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
485 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 486 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
487 | } |
488 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 489 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 490 | err: |
d8bc1399 MC |
491 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); |
492 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
493 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
494 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
495 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
496 | #endif | |
497 | return ret; | |
498 | } | |
499 | ||
229185e6 | 500 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 501 | { |
12472b45 | 502 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 503 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 504 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 505 | |
f7e393be MC |
506 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
507 | if (!s->server) | |
508 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
509 | ||
510 | /* | |
511 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
512 | * client certificate | |
513 | */ | |
514 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
515 | && !s->server | |
516 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
517 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
518 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
519 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 520 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
521 | } |
522 | ||
229185e6 MC |
523 | if (s->server) { |
524 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
525 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
526 | } else { | |
527 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
528 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
529 | } | |
0f113f3e | 530 | |
12472b45 MC |
531 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
532 | sender, slen, | |
533 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
534 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
535 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
536 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
537 | } |
538 | ||
12472b45 | 539 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 540 | |
12472b45 | 541 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
542 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
543 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
544 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 545 | } |
0f113f3e | 546 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
547 | /* |
548 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
549 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
550 | */ | |
551 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
552 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 553 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
554 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
555 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 556 | } |
2faa1b48 | 557 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
558 | /* |
559 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
560 | */ | |
380a522f | 561 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
562 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
563 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
564 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 565 | } |
23a635c0 | 566 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
567 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
568 | finish_md_len); | |
569 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 570 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
571 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
572 | finish_md_len); | |
573 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 574 | } |
0f113f3e | 575 | |
b9908bf9 | 576 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 577 | } |
d02b48c6 | 578 | |
44c04a2e MC |
579 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
580 | { | |
581 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
582 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
583 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
584 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
585 | } |
586 | ||
9412b3ad | 587 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 588 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
589 | } |
590 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
591 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
592 | { | |
593 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
594 | ||
82f992cb MC |
595 | s->key_update_count++; |
596 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
597 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
598 | SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
599 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
82f992cb MC |
600 | } |
601 | ||
524420d8 MC |
602 | /* |
603 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
604 | * be on a record boundary. | |
605 | */ | |
606 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
607 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
608 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
609 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
610 | } |
611 | ||
e1c3de44 | 612 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 613 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
614 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
615 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
616 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
617 | } |
618 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
619 | /* |
620 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
621 | * didn't recognise. | |
622 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
623 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
624 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
625 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
626 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
627 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
628 | } |
629 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
630 | /* |
631 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
632 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
633 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
634 | */ | |
635 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
636 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
637 | ||
57389a32 | 638 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
639 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
640 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
641 | } |
642 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
643 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
bf48836c | 646 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
647 | /* |
648 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
649 | * to far. | |
650 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 651 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
652 | { |
653 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 654 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
655 | /* |
656 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
657 | * the appropriate error. | |
658 | */ | |
659 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
660 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 661 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
662 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
663 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
664 | } else { | |
665 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
666 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
667 | } | |
668 | ||
669 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
670 | sender, | |
671 | slen, | |
672 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
673 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
674 | #endif |
675 | ||
be3583fa | 676 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 677 | { |
348240c6 | 678 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 679 | |
73999b62 | 680 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
681 | /* |
682 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
683 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
684 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 685 | */ |
c69f2adf | 686 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 687 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
688 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
689 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
690 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
691 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
692 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
693 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
694 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
695 | } |
696 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 697 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
698 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
699 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
700 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
701 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 702 | } |
657da85e MC |
703 | } |
704 | ||
705 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
706 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
707 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
708 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
709 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
710 | } |
711 | ||
712 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
713 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
714 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
715 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
716 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
717 | } |
718 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
719 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
720 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
721 | ||
722 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
723 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
724 | ||
725 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
726 | /* | |
727 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
728 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
729 | * SCTP is used | |
730 | */ | |
731 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
732 | #endif | |
733 | } | |
734 | ||
b9908bf9 | 735 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
736 | } |
737 | ||
be3583fa | 738 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 739 | { |
12472b45 | 740 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 741 | |
d781d247 MC |
742 | |
743 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
744 | if (s->server) |
745 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 746 | |
524420d8 MC |
747 | /* |
748 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
749 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
750 | */ | |
751 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
752 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
753 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
754 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
755 | } |
756 | ||
0f113f3e | 757 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 758 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
759 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
760 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
761 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
762 | } |
763 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
764 | ||
12472b45 | 765 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 766 | |
12472b45 | 767 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
768 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
769 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
770 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
771 | } |
772 | ||
12472b45 MC |
773 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
774 | md_len) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
775 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
776 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
777 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
778 | } |
779 | ||
780 | /* | |
781 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
782 | */ | |
380a522f | 783 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
784 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
785 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
786 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 787 | } |
23a635c0 | 788 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
789 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
790 | md_len); | |
791 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 792 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
793 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
794 | md_len); | |
795 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
796 | } |
797 | ||
7776a36c MC |
798 | /* |
799 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
800 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
801 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
802 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
803 | if (s->server) { | |
804 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
805 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
806 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
807 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
808 | } |
809 | } else { | |
810 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 811 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 812 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
813 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
814 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
815 | } |
816 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
817 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
818 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
819 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
820 | } | |
821 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
822 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
823 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
824 | } |
825 | } | |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
e6575156 | 828 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 829 | } |
d02b48c6 | 830 | |
7cea05dc | 831 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 832 | { |
7cea05dc | 833 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
834 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
835 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
836 | return 0; |
837 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 838 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
839 | return 1; |
840 | } | |
841 | ||
e96e0f8e | 842 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 843 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 844 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
845 | int len; |
846 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
847 | ||
848 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
849 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
850 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
851 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
852 | return 0; |
853 | } | |
854 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
855 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
856 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
857 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
858 | return 0; |
859 | } | |
860 | ||
861 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 862 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
863 | chain)) { |
864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 865 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 866 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
867 | |
868 | return 1; | |
869 | } | |
870 | ||
871 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 872 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
873 | { |
874 | int i, chain_count; | |
875 | X509 *x; | |
876 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
877 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
878 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
879 | |
880 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
881 | return 1; | |
882 | ||
883 | x = cpk->x509; | |
884 | ||
885 | /* | |
886 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
887 | */ | |
d805a57b | 888 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
889 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
890 | else | |
891 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
892 | ||
893 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
894 | chain_store = NULL; | |
895 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
896 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
897 | else | |
898 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
899 | ||
d805a57b | 900 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
901 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
902 | ||
903 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
904 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
905 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
906 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
907 | } |
908 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
909 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
910 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
911 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
912 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
913 | } |
914 | /* | |
915 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
916 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
917 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
918 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
919 | */ | |
920 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
921 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
922 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
923 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
924 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
925 | if (i != 1) { | |
926 | #if 0 | |
927 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
928 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
929 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
930 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
931 | #endif | |
932 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
933 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
934 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
935 | } |
936 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
937 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
938 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
939 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
940 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
941 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 942 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 943 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
944 | } |
945 | } | |
946 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
947 | } else { | |
948 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
949 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
950 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
951 | return 0; | |
952 | } | |
953 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
954 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
955 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 956 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
957 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
958 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
959 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
960 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
961 | return 0; | |
962 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
963 | } |
964 | } | |
965 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
966 | } |
967 | ||
f63a17d6 | 968 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 969 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
970 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
971 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
972 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
973 | return 0; | |
974 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 975 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
976 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
977 | return 0; | |
978 | ||
979 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
980 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
981 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 982 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 983 | } |
f63a17d6 | 984 | |
c49e1912 | 985 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
986 | } |
987 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
988 | /* |
989 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
990 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
991 | * freed up as well. | |
992 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 993 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e | 994 | { |
1fcb4e4d | 995 | int discard; |
8723588e MC |
996 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
997 | ||
998 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
999 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 1000 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
1001 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
1002 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
1003 | return ret; | |
1004 | } | |
1005 | #endif | |
1006 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1007 | if (clearbufs) { |
1008 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1009 | /* | |
1010 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1011 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1012 | */ | |
1013 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1014 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1015 | } | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1016 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1017 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1018 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1019 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1020 | } |
30f05b19 | 1021 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1022 | } |
8723588e | 1023 | |
c7f47786 | 1024 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1025 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1026 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1027 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1028 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1029 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1030 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1031 | ||
8723588e | 1032 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1033 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1034 | ||
0e6161bc | 1035 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1036 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, |
1037 | s->ctx->lock); | |
fe3a3291 | 1038 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1039 | } else { |
5d61491c MC |
1040 | /* |
1041 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1042 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1043 | */ | |
1044 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1045 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
8723588e | 1046 | if (s->hit) |
0e6161bc BK |
1047 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, |
1048 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e | 1049 | |
fe3a3291 | 1050 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
0e6161bc BK |
1051 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, |
1052 | &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e MC |
1053 | } |
1054 | ||
1055 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1056 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1057 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1058 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1059 | ||
1060 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1061 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1062 | ||
1063 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1064 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1065 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1066 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1067 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1068 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1069 | } |
1070 | } | |
1071 | ||
2a8db717 | 1072 | if (!stop) |
30f05b19 MC |
1073 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
1074 | ||
4004ce5f | 1075 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1076 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1077 | } | |
1078 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1079 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1080 | { | |
1081 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1082 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1083 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1084 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1085 | |
1086 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1087 | ||
1088 | do { | |
1089 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1090 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1091 | &p[s->init_num], |
1092 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1093 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1094 | if (i <= 0) { |
1095 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1096 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1097 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1098 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1099 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1100 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1101 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1102 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1103 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1104 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1105 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1106 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1107 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1108 | } |
e9359719 MC |
1109 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
1110 | && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { | |
1111 | /* | |
1112 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1113 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1114 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1115 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1116 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1117 | */ | |
1118 | return 0; | |
1119 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1120 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1121 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1122 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1123 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1124 | return 1; |
1125 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1126 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1127 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1128 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1129 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1130 | } |
54105ddd | 1131 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1132 | } |
1133 | ||
1134 | skip_message = 0; | |
1135 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1136 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1137 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1138 | /* |
1139 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1140 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1141 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1142 | * MAC. | |
1143 | */ | |
1144 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1145 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1146 | skip_message = 1; | |
1147 | ||
1148 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1149 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1150 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1151 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1152 | } | |
1153 | } while (skip_message); | |
1154 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1155 | ||
1156 | *mt = *p; | |
1157 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1158 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1159 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1160 | /* |
1161 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1162 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1163 | * |
1164 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1165 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1166 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1167 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1168 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1169 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1170 | ||
1171 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1172 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1173 | } else { | |
1174 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1175 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1176 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1177 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1178 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1179 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1180 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1181 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1182 | ||
1183 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1184 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1185 | } | |
1186 | ||
1187 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1188 | } |
1189 | ||
eda75751 | 1190 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1191 | { |
54105ddd | 1192 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1193 | unsigned char *p; |
1194 | int i; | |
1195 | ||
1196 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1197 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1198 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1199 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1200 | } |
1201 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1202 | p = s->init_msg; |
1203 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1204 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1205 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1206 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1207 | if (i <= 0) { |
1208 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1209 | *len = 0; |
1210 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1211 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1212 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1213 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1214 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1215 | |
bf48836c | 1216 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1217 | /* |
1218 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1219 | * Finished verification. | |
1220 | */ | |
1221 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1222 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1223 | #endif |
1224 | ||
0f113f3e | 1225 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1226 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1227 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1228 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1229 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1230 | *len = 0; |
1231 | return 0; | |
1232 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1233 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1234 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1235 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1236 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1237 | /* |
1238 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1239 | * processing the message | |
1240 | */ | |
597c51bc MC |
1241 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
1242 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
1243 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1244 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1245 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1246 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1247 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1248 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1249 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1250 | *len = 0; | |
1251 | return 0; | |
1252 | } | |
d166ed8c | 1253 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1254 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1255 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1256 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1257 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1258 | } | |
1259 | ||
eda75751 | 1260 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1261 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1262 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1263 | |
6b691a5c | 1264 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1265 | { |
1266 | int al; | |
1267 | ||
1268 | switch (type) { | |
1269 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1270 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1271 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1272 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1273 | break; | |
1274 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1275 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1276 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1277 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1279 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1280 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1281 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1282 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1283 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1284 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1285 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1286 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1287 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1289 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1290 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1291 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1292 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1293 | break; | |
1294 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1295 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1296 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1297 | break; | |
1298 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1299 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1300 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1301 | break; | |
1302 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1303 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1304 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1305 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1306 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1307 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1308 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1309 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1310 | break; | |
1311 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1312 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1313 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1314 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1315 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1316 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1317 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1318 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1319 | break; | |
1320 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1321 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1322 | break; | |
1323 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1324 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1325 | break; | |
1326 | default: | |
1327 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1328 | break; | |
1329 | } | |
26a7d938 | 1330 | return al; |
0f113f3e | 1331 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1332 | |
b362ccab | 1333 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1334 | { |
1335 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1336 | return 0; | |
1337 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1338 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1339 | |
068c358a | 1340 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1341 | { |
1342 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1343 | ||
1344 | if (a == b) | |
1345 | return 0; | |
1346 | if (!dtls) | |
1347 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1348 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1349 | } | |
1350 | ||
1351 | typedef struct { | |
1352 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1353 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1354 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1355 | } version_info; |
1356 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1357 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1358 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1359 | #endif |
1360 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1361 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1362 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1363 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1364 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1365 | #else | |
1366 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1367 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1368 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1369 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1370 | #else |
a230b26e | 1371 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1372 | #endif |
1373 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1374 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1375 | #else |
a230b26e | 1376 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1377 | #endif |
1378 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1379 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1380 | #else |
a230b26e | 1381 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1382 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1383 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1384 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1385 | #else |
a230b26e | 1386 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1387 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1388 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1389 | }; |
1390 | ||
1391 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1392 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1393 | #endif | |
1394 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1395 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1396 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1397 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1398 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1399 | #else |
a230b26e | 1400 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1401 | #endif |
1402 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1403 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1404 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1405 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1406 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1407 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1408 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1409 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1410 | }; |
1411 | ||
1412 | /* | |
1413 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1414 | * | |
1415 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1416 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1417 | * | |
1418 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1419 | */ | |
068c358a | 1420 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1421 | { |
1422 | int version = method->version; | |
1423 | ||
1424 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1425 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1426 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1427 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1428 | ||
1429 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1430 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1431 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1432 | ||
1433 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1434 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1435 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1436 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1437 | |
1438 | return 0; | |
1439 | } | |
1440 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1441 | /* |
1442 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1443 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1444 | * | |
1445 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1446 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1447 | * | |
1448 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1449 | */ | |
1450 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1451 | { | |
1452 | const version_info *vent; | |
1453 | const version_info *table; | |
1454 | ||
1455 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1456 | default: | |
1457 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1458 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1459 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1460 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1461 | break; | |
1462 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1463 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1464 | break; | |
1465 | } | |
1466 | ||
1467 | for (vent = table; | |
1468 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1469 | ++vent) { | |
1470 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1471 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1472 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1473 | return 1; | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | } | |
1476 | return 0; | |
1477 | } | |
1478 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1479 | /* |
1480 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1481 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1482 | * supported protocol version. | |
1483 | * | |
1484 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1485 | * | |
1486 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1487 | */ | |
1488 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1489 | { | |
1490 | const version_info *vent; | |
1491 | const version_info *table; | |
1492 | ||
1493 | /* | |
1494 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1495 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1496 | * s->method). | |
1497 | */ | |
1498 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1499 | return 1; | |
1500 | ||
1501 | /* | |
1502 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1503 | * highest protocol version). | |
1504 | */ | |
1505 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1506 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1507 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1508 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1509 | else { | |
1510 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1511 | return 0; | |
1512 | } | |
1513 | ||
1514 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1515 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1516 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1517 | } | |
1518 | return 0; | |
1519 | } | |
1520 | ||
1521 | /* | |
1522 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1523 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1524 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1525 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1526 | * | |
1527 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1528 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1529 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1530 | * | |
1531 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1532 | */ | |
1533 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1534 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1535 | if (version == 0) { |
1536 | *bound = version; | |
1537 | return 1; | |
1538 | } | |
1539 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1540 | /*- |
1541 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1542 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1543 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1544 | * | |
1545 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1546 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1547 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1548 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1549 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1550 | */ | |
1551 | switch (method_version) { | |
1552 | default: | |
1553 | /* | |
1554 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1555 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1556 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1557 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1558 | * versions. | |
1559 | */ | |
1560 | return 0; | |
1561 | ||
1562 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1563 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1564 | return 0; | |
1565 | break; | |
1566 | ||
1567 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1568 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1569 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1570 | return 0; |
1571 | break; | |
1572 | } | |
1573 | ||
1574 | *bound = version; | |
1575 | return 1; | |
1576 | } | |
1577 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1578 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1579 | { | |
1580 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1581 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1582 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1583 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1584 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1585 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1586 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1587 | } else { | |
1588 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | } | |
1591 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1592 | /* |
1593 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1594 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1595 | * the version specific method. | |
1596 | * | |
1597 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1598 | * | |
1599 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1600 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1601 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1602 | { |
1603 | /*- | |
1604 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1605 | * | |
1606 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1607 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1608 | * | |
1609 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1610 | * handle version. | |
1611 | */ | |
1612 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1613 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1614 | const version_info *vent; |
1615 | const version_info *table; | |
1616 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1617 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1618 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1619 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1620 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1621 | switch (server_version) { |
1622 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1623 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1624 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1625 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1626 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1627 | /* |
1628 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1629 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1630 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1631 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1632 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1633 | */ | |
1634 | return 0; | |
1635 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1636 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1637 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1638 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1639 | */ |
018fcbec | 1640 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1641 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1642 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1643 | break; | |
1644 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1645 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1646 | break; | |
1647 | } | |
1648 | ||
70af3d8e | 1649 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1650 | |
6f40214f | 1651 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1652 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1653 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1654 | ||
70af3d8e | 1655 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1656 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1657 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1658 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1659 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1660 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1661 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1662 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1663 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1664 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1665 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | ||
1668 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1669 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1670 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1671 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1672 | /* |
1673 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1674 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1675 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1676 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1677 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1678 | continue; | |
1679 | for (vent = table; | |
1680 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1681 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1682 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1683 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1684 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1685 | ||
1686 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1687 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1688 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1689 | best_method = method; | |
1690 | } | |
1691 | } | |
1692 | } | |
1693 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1694 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1695 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1696 | } | |
1697 | ||
1698 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1699 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1700 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1701 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1702 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1703 | */ |
1704 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1705 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1706 | return 0; | |
1707 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1708 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1709 | s->version = best_vers; |
1710 | s->method = best_method; | |
1711 | return 0; | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1714 | } | |
1715 | ||
1716 | /* | |
1717 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1718 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1719 | */ | |
1720 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1721 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1722 | ||
1723 | /* | |
1724 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1725 | * the ClientHello. | |
1726 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1727 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1728 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1729 | ||
1730 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1731 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1732 | continue; | |
1733 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1734 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1735 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1736 | s->version = vent->version; |
1737 | s->method = method; | |
1738 | return 0; | |
1739 | } | |
1740 | disabled = 1; | |
1741 | } | |
1742 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1743 | } | |
1744 | ||
1745 | /* | |
1746 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1747 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1748 | * the version specific method. | |
1749 | * | |
1750 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1751 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1752 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1753 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1754 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1755 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1756 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1757 | { |
1758 | const version_info *vent; | |
1759 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1760 | int highver = 0; |
88050dd1 | 1761 | int origv; |
4fa52141 | 1762 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1763 | origv = s->version; |
1764 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1765 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1766 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1767 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1768 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1769 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1770 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1771 | s->version = origv; | |
1772 | return 0; | |
1773 | } | |
1774 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1775 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1776 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1777 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1778 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1779 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1780 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1781 | } |
1782 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1783 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1784 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1785 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1786 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1787 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1788 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1789 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1790 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1791 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1792 | /* |
1793 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1794 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1795 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1796 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1797 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1798 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1799 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1800 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1801 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1802 | break; | |
1803 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1804 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1805 | break; | |
1806 | } | |
1807 | ||
1808 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1809 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1810 | int err; | |
1811 | ||
4fa52141 | 1812 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1813 | continue; |
1814 | ||
88050dd1 | 1815 | if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd | 1816 | continue; |
3847d426 | 1817 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1818 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1819 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd | 1820 | if (err != 0) { |
88050dd1 MC |
1821 | if (s->version == vent->version) { |
1822 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1823 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1824 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err); | |
1825 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1826 | } |
1827 | ||
1828 | continue; | |
1829 | } | |
1830 | if (highver == 0) | |
1831 | highver = vent->version; | |
1832 | ||
88050dd1 | 1833 | if (s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd MC |
1834 | continue; |
1835 | ||
1836 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1837 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
88050dd1 MC |
1838 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) { |
1839 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1840 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1841 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1842 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1843 | s->version = origv; | |
1844 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1845 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1846 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1847 | return 0; | |
1848 | } | |
1849 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1850 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1851 | && highver > s->version) { | |
1852 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1853 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1854 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1855 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1856 | s->version = origv; | |
1857 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1858 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1859 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1860 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1861 | } |
1862 | } | |
1863 | #endif | |
1864 | ||
4fa52141 | 1865 | s->method = method; |
29bfd5b7 | 1866 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1867 | } |
1868 | ||
88050dd1 | 1869 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1870 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1871 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1872 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1873 | } |
1874 | ||
068c358a | 1875 | /* |
38a73150 | 1876 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1877 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1878 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1879 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1880 | * | |
1881 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1882 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1883 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1884 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1885 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1886 | * |
0485d540 | 1887 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1888 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1889 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1890 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1891 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1892 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1893 | */ |
38a73150 | 1894 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1895 | { |
1896 | int version; | |
1897 | int hole; | |
1898 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1899 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1900 | const version_info *table; | |
1901 | const version_info *vent; | |
1902 | ||
1903 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1904 | default: | |
1905 | /* | |
1906 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1907 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1908 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1909 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1910 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1911 | */ | |
068c358a | 1912 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1913 | return 0; |
1914 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1915 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1916 | break; | |
1917 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1918 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1919 | break; | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | ||
1922 | /* | |
1923 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1924 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1925 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1926 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1927 | * | |
1928 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1929 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1930 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1931 | * | |
1932 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1933 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1934 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1935 | * | |
1936 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1937 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1938 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1939 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1940 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1941 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1942 | */ | |
068c358a | 1943 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1944 | hole = 1; |
1945 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1946 | /* | |
1947 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1948 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1949 | */ | |
1950 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1951 | hole = 1; | |
1952 | continue; | |
1953 | } | |
1954 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1955 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1956 | hole = 1; | |
1957 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1958 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1959 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1960 | } else { |
1961 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1962 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1963 | hole = 0; |
1964 | } | |
1965 | } | |
1966 | ||
068c358a KR |
1967 | *max_version = version; |
1968 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1969 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1970 | if (version == 0) | |
1971 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1972 | ||
068c358a KR |
1973 | return 0; |
1974 | } | |
1975 | ||
1976 | /* | |
1977 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1978 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1979 | * |
1980 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1981 | * | |
1982 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1983 | */ | |
1984 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1985 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1986 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1987 | |
38a73150 | 1988 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1989 | |
1990 | if (ret != 0) | |
1991 | return ret; | |
1992 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1993 | s->version = ver_max; |
1994 | ||
1995 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1996 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1997 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1998 | ||
1999 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2000 | return 0; |
2001 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2002 | |
2003 | /* | |
2004 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2005 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2006 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2007 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2008 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 2009 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 2010 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2011 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2012 | { | |
2013 | size_t i; | |
2014 | ||
2015 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2016 | return 0; | |
2017 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2018 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2019 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2020 | ||
2021 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2022 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 2023 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2024 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2025 | } |
2026 | } | |
2027 | ||
0acee504 | 2028 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2029 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2030 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2031 | |
2032 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2033 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2034 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2035 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2036 | { |
43054d3d | 2037 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2038 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2039 | ||
2040 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2041 | |
43054d3d MC |
2042 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2043 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2044 | hashlen = 0; | |
2045 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2046 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2047 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2048 | &hashlen)) { | |
2049 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2050 | return 0; | |
2051 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2052 | } |
2053 | ||
2054 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2055 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2056 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2057 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2058 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2059 | |
2060 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2061 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2062 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2063 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2064 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2065 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2066 | return 0; |
2067 | } | |
2068 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2069 | /* |
2070 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2071 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2072 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2073 | */ | |
2074 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2075 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2076 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
2077 | s->s3->tmp.message_size | |
2078 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { | |
2079 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2080 | return 0; | |
2081 | } | |
2082 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2083 | return 1; |
2084 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2085 | |
2086 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2087 | { | |
2088 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2089 | } | |
2090 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2091 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2092 | { |
2093 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2094 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2095 | PACKET cadns; | |
2096 | ||
2097 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2098 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2099 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2100 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2101 | } |
2102 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2103 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2104 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2105 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2106 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2107 | } |
2108 | ||
2109 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2110 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2111 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2114 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2115 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2116 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2117 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2118 | } |
2119 | ||
2120 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2121 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2122 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2123 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2124 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2125 | } |
2126 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2127 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2128 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2129 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2130 | } |
2131 | ||
2132 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2133 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2134 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2135 | goto err; |
2136 | } | |
2137 | xn = NULL; | |
2138 | } | |
2139 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2140 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2141 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2142 | |
2143 | return 1; | |
2144 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2145 | err: |
2146 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2147 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2148 | return 0; | |
2149 | } | |
2150 | ||
2151 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2152 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2153 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2154 | |
2155 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2156 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2157 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2158 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2159 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2160 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2161 | |
2162 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2163 | int i; | |
2164 | ||
2165 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2166 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2167 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2168 | int namelen; | |
2169 | ||
2170 | if (name == NULL | |
2171 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2172 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2173 | &namebytes) | |
2174 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2175 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2176 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2177 | return 0; |
2178 | } | |
2179 | } | |
2180 | } | |
2181 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2182 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2183 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2184 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2185 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2186 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2187 | |
2188 | return 1; | |
2189 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2190 | |
2191 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2192 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2193 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2194 | { | |
2195 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2196 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2197 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2198 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2199 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2200 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2201 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2202 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2203 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2204 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2205 | ||
2206 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2207 | ||
2208 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2209 | return tbslen; | |
2210 | } |