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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
0f113f3e MC |
22 | /* |
23 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
24 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
25 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 26 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
27 | { |
28 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 29 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
30 | |
31 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 32 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 33 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 34 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
35 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
36 | /* | |
37 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
38 | * ignore the result anyway | |
39 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
40 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
41 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 42 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 43 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 44 | |
7ee8627f | 45 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
46 | if (s->msg_callback) |
47 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
48 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
49 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 50 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 51 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
52 | s->init_off += written; |
53 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 54 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 55 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 56 | |
4a01c59f | 57 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
58 | { |
59 | size_t msglen; | |
60 | ||
4a01c59f | 61 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 62 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 63 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
64 | return 0; |
65 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
66 | s->init_off = 0; | |
67 | ||
68 | return 1; | |
69 | } | |
70 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
71 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
72 | { | |
c7f47786 MC |
73 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) |
74 | return 0; | |
75 | ||
b186a592 MC |
76 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
77 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
78 | ||
c7f47786 | 79 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
80 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
81 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
82 | ||
83 | /* | |
84 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
85 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
86 | * ClientHello. | |
87 | */ | |
88 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
89 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
90 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
91 | return 0; | |
92 | } | |
93 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
94 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
95 | ||
96 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
97 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
98 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
99 | ok = 1; | |
100 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
101 | ok = 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | if (ok) | |
104 | break; | |
105 | } | |
106 | if (!ok) { | |
107 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
108 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
109 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
110 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
111 | return 0; | |
112 | } | |
c7f47786 | 113 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc BK |
114 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
115 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, | |
116 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
db0f35dd TS |
117 | } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
118 | /* Renegotiation is disabled */ | |
119 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
120 | return 0; | |
c7f47786 MC |
121 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
122 | !(s->options & | |
123 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
124 | /* | |
125 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
126 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
127 | */ | |
128 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, | |
129 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
130 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
131 | return 0; | |
132 | } else { | |
0e6161bc | 133 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
134 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, |
135 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
136 | |
137 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
138 | } | |
139 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d | 140 | int discard; |
c7f47786 | 141 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
0e6161bc BK |
142 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, |
143 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 144 | else |
0e6161bc BK |
145 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, |
146 | 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
147 | |
148 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
149 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
150 | s->hit = 0; | |
151 | ||
152 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
153 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 154 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 155 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
156 | } |
157 | ||
158 | return 1; | |
159 | } | |
160 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
161 | /* |
162 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
163 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
164 | */ | |
165 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
166 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
167 | ||
168 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
169 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
170 | { | |
171 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
172 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
173 | ||
174 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
175 | size_t hashlen; | |
176 | ||
177 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
178 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
179 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
180 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
181 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
182 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
183 | else | |
184 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
185 | ||
186 | /* | |
187 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
188 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
189 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
190 | */ | |
191 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
192 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
193 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
194 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
195 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
196 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
197 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
198 | return 0; | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
201 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
202 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
203 | } else { | |
204 | size_t retlen; | |
205 | ||
206 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
207 | if (retlen <= 0) | |
208 | return 0; | |
209 | *hdatalen = retlen; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
212 | return 1; | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
215 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
216 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
217 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
218 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 219 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
220 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
221 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
222 | void *hdata; |
223 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 224 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 225 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 226 | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
227 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
229 | goto err; | |
230 | } | |
231 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 232 | |
168067b6 | 233 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
ad4dd362 DSH |
234 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
235 | goto err; | |
236 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
237 | |
238 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
239 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
240 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
241 | goto err; | |
242 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 243 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
244 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
245 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
246 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
247 | goto err; | |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
ad4dd362 | 250 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
252 | goto err; | |
253 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
254 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
255 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
256 | if (sig == NULL) { |
257 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
258 | goto err; | |
259 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 260 | |
75394189 | 261 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
5f9b64a2 MC |
262 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
263 | goto err; | |
264 | } | |
265 | ||
ad4dd362 | 266 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 267 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
268 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
269 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
270 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
271 | goto err; | |
272 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
273 | } |
274 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
275 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
276 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
277 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
278 | s->session->master_key) | |
279 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
280 | ||
5f9b64a2 MC |
281 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
282 | goto err; | |
283 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 284 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
285 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
286 | goto err; | |
287 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 288 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
289 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
290 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
291 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
292 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
293 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
294 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
295 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 296 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
297 | } |
298 | #endif | |
299 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 300 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
301 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
302 | goto err; | |
303 | } | |
304 | ||
305 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
306 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
307 | goto err; | |
308 | ||
309 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
310 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
311 | return 1; | |
312 | err: | |
313 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
314 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
315 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
316 | return 0; | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
320 | { | |
321 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 322 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
323 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
324 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
325 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b AP |
326 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
327 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
dd24857b | 328 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
329 | unsigned int len; |
330 | X509 *peer; | |
331 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 332 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 333 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 334 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 335 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 336 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
337 | |
338 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
339 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
340 | goto f_err; |
341 | } | |
342 | ||
343 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
344 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
fb34a0f4 | 345 | if (pkey == NULL) |
83b4049a | 346 | goto f_err; |
83b4049a | 347 | |
dd24857b | 348 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
349 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
350 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
351 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
352 | goto f_err; | |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
f464f9c0 PD |
355 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
356 | int rv; | |
357 | unsigned int sigalg; | |
358 | ||
359 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
360 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
361 | goto f_err; | |
362 | } | |
363 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); | |
364 | if (rv == -1) { | |
365 | goto f_err; | |
366 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
367 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
368 | goto f_err; | |
369 | } | |
370 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
371 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
372 | #endif | |
373 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
374 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
375 | goto f_err; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
168067b6 DSH |
378 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
379 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
380 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
381 | goto f_err; | |
382 | } | |
f464f9c0 | 383 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
384 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
385 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
386 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
387 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
388 | */ |
389 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
390 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
391 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
392 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
393 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
394 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
395 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
396 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
397 | } else |
398 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 PD |
399 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
400 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
401 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
402 | goto f_err; | |
d8bc1399 | 403 | } |
f464f9c0 | 404 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
405 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
406 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
407 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
408 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
409 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
410 | goto f_err; | |
411 | } | |
412 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
413 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
414 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
415 | goto f_err; | |
416 | } | |
417 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 418 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
d8bc1399 | 419 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
420 | goto f_err; |
421 | } | |
422 | ||
423 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
424 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
425 | #endif | |
75394189 | 426 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 | 427 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
428 | goto f_err; |
429 | } | |
430 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
431 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 432 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
433 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
434 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
435 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
436 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
437 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
438 | goto f_err; |
439 | } | |
440 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
441 | data = gost_data; | |
442 | } | |
443 | } | |
444 | #endif | |
445 | ||
5554facb | 446 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 447 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
448 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
449 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
450 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
451 | goto f_err; | |
452 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 453 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
454 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
455 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
456 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
457 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
458 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
459 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
460 | goto f_err; | |
461 | } | |
462 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
463 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
464 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
465 | goto f_err; | |
466 | } | |
467 | } else { | |
468 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 469 | if (j <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
470 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
471 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
472 | goto f_err; | |
473 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
474 | } |
475 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 476 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
d8bc1399 MC |
477 | if (0) { |
478 | f_err: | |
479 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
480 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
481 | } | |
482 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
483 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
484 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
485 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
486 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
487 | #endif | |
488 | return ret; | |
489 | } | |
490 | ||
229185e6 | 491 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 492 | { |
12472b45 | 493 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 494 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 495 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 496 | |
f7e393be MC |
497 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
498 | if (!s->server) | |
499 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
500 | ||
501 | /* | |
502 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
503 | * client certificate | |
504 | */ | |
505 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
506 | && !s->server | |
507 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
508 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
509 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
510 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
b43c3765 BE |
511 | /* |
512 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves | |
513 | * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state | |
514 | * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. | |
515 | */ | |
516 | return 0; | |
f7e393be MC |
517 | } |
518 | ||
229185e6 MC |
519 | if (s->server) { |
520 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
521 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
522 | } else { | |
523 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
524 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
525 | } | |
0f113f3e | 526 | |
12472b45 MC |
527 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
528 | sender, slen, | |
529 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
530 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
532 | goto err; | |
533 | } | |
534 | ||
12472b45 | 535 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 536 | |
12472b45 | 537 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
538 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
539 | goto err; | |
540 | } | |
0f113f3e | 541 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
542 | /* |
543 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
544 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
545 | */ | |
546 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
547 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f MC |
548 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
549 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
550 | goto err; | |
551 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 552 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
553 | /* |
554 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
555 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
556 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
557 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
558 | goto err; | |
559 | } | |
23a635c0 | 560 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
561 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
562 | finish_md_len); | |
563 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 564 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
565 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
566 | finish_md_len); | |
567 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 568 | } |
0f113f3e | 569 | |
b9908bf9 | 570 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 571 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
572 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
573 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 574 | } |
d02b48c6 | 575 | |
44c04a2e MC |
576 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
577 | { | |
578 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
579 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
580 | goto err; | |
581 | } | |
582 | ||
9412b3ad | 583 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 584 | return 1; |
f14afcaa | 585 | |
44c04a2e MC |
586 | err: |
587 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
588 | return 0; | |
589 | } | |
590 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
591 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
592 | { | |
57389a32 | 593 | int al; |
e1c3de44 MC |
594 | unsigned int updatetype; |
595 | ||
82f992cb MC |
596 | s->key_update_count++; |
597 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
598 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
599 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
600 | goto err; | |
601 | } | |
602 | ||
524420d8 MC |
603 | /* |
604 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
605 | * be on a record boundary. | |
606 | */ | |
607 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
608 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
609 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
610 | goto err; | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
e1c3de44 | 613 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 614 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
57389a32 | 615 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 | 616 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
57389a32 | 617 | goto err; |
e1c3de44 MC |
618 | } |
619 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
620 | /* |
621 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
622 | * didn't recognise. | |
623 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
624 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
625 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
626 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
627 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
628 | goto err; | |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
631 | /* |
632 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
633 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
634 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
635 | */ | |
636 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
637 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
638 | ||
57389a32 MC |
639 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
640 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
641 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642 | goto err; | |
643 | } | |
644 | ||
e1c3de44 | 645 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
57389a32 MC |
646 | err: |
647 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
648 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
649 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
650 | } |
651 | ||
bf48836c | 652 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
653 | /* |
654 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
655 | * to far. | |
656 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 657 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
658 | { |
659 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 660 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
661 | /* |
662 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
663 | * the appropriate error. | |
664 | */ | |
665 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
666 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 667 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
668 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
669 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
670 | } else { | |
671 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
672 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
673 | } | |
674 | ||
675 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
676 | sender, | |
677 | slen, | |
678 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
679 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
680 | #endif |
681 | ||
be3583fa | 682 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
683 | { |
684 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 685 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 686 | |
73999b62 | 687 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
688 | /* |
689 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
690 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
691 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 692 | */ |
c69f2adf | 693 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 694 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
695 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
696 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
697 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
fb34a0f4 | 698 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
a230b26e EK |
699 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
700 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
701 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
702 | } |
703 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 704 | if (remain != 0) { |
fb34a0f4 | 705 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
706 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
707 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
708 | goto f_err; |
709 | } | |
657da85e MC |
710 | } |
711 | ||
712 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
713 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
714 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 715 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
716 | goto f_err; |
717 | } | |
718 | ||
719 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
720 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
721 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 722 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
723 | goto f_err; |
724 | } | |
725 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
726 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
727 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
728 | ||
729 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
730 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
731 | ||
732 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
733 | /* | |
734 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
735 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
736 | * SCTP is used | |
737 | */ | |
738 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
739 | #endif | |
740 | } | |
741 | ||
b9908bf9 | 742 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
743 | f_err: |
744 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 745 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 746 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
747 | } |
748 | ||
be3583fa | 749 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 750 | { |
7776a36c | 751 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 752 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 753 | |
d781d247 MC |
754 | |
755 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
756 | if (s->server) |
757 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 758 | |
524420d8 MC |
759 | /* |
760 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
761 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
762 | */ | |
763 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
764 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
765 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
766 | goto f_err; | |
767 | } | |
768 | ||
0f113f3e | 769 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 770 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 771 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 772 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
773 | goto f_err; |
774 | } | |
775 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
776 | ||
12472b45 | 777 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 778 | |
12472b45 | 779 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 780 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 781 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
782 | goto f_err; |
783 | } | |
784 | ||
12472b45 MC |
785 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
786 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 787 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 788 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
789 | goto f_err; |
790 | } | |
791 | ||
792 | /* | |
793 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
794 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
795 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
796 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
797 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
798 | goto f_err; | |
799 | } | |
23a635c0 | 800 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
801 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
802 | md_len); | |
803 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 804 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
805 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
806 | md_len); | |
807 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
808 | } |
809 | ||
7776a36c MC |
810 | /* |
811 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
812 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
813 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
814 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
815 | if (s->server) { | |
816 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
817 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
818 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
819 | goto f_err; | |
820 | } | |
821 | } else { | |
822 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 823 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 824 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
92760c21 MC |
825 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
826 | goto f_err; | |
827 | } | |
828 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
829 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
830 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
831 | goto f_err; | |
832 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
833 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
834 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
835 | } |
836 | } | |
837 | ||
e6575156 | 838 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
839 | f_err: |
840 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 841 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 842 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 843 | } |
d02b48c6 | 844 | |
7cea05dc | 845 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 846 | { |
7cea05dc | 847 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 848 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
849 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
850 | return 0; | |
851 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 852 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
853 | return 1; |
854 | } | |
855 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
856 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
857 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
858 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 859 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
860 | int len; |
861 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
862 | ||
863 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
864 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 865 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
866 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
867 | return 0; | |
868 | } | |
869 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
870 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 871 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
872 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
873 | return 0; | |
874 | } | |
875 | ||
876 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 877 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
e96e0f8e MC |
878 | chain, al)) |
879 | return 0; | |
880 | ||
881 | return 1; | |
882 | } | |
883 | ||
884 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
885 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
886 | { | |
887 | int i, chain_count; | |
888 | X509 *x; | |
889 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
890 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
891 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
892 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
893 | ||
894 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
895 | return 1; | |
896 | ||
897 | x = cpk->x509; | |
898 | ||
899 | /* | |
900 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
901 | */ | |
d805a57b | 902 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
903 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
904 | else | |
905 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
906 | ||
907 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
908 | chain_store = NULL; | |
909 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
910 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
911 | else | |
912 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
913 | ||
d805a57b | 914 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
915 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
916 | ||
917 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
918 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
919 | goto err; | |
920 | } | |
921 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
922 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
923 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
924 | goto err; | |
925 | } | |
926 | /* | |
927 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
928 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
929 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
930 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
931 | */ | |
932 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
933 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
934 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
935 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
936 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
937 | if (i != 1) { | |
938 | #if 0 | |
939 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
940 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
941 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
942 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
943 | #endif | |
944 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
945 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
946 | goto err; | |
947 | } | |
948 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
949 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
950 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
951 | ||
952 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
953 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
954 | goto err; | |
955 | } | |
956 | } | |
957 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
958 | } else { | |
959 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
960 | if (i != 1) { | |
961 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
962 | goto err; | |
963 | } | |
964 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
965 | goto err; | |
966 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
967 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
968 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
969 | goto err; | |
970 | } | |
971 | } | |
972 | return 1; | |
973 | ||
974 | err: | |
975 | *al = tmpal; | |
976 | return 0; | |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
979 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
980 | int *al) | |
981 | { | |
982 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
983 | ||
5923ad4b | 984 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 985 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 986 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 987 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 988 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 989 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 990 | } |
c49e1912 | 991 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
992 | } |
993 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
994 | /* |
995 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
996 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
997 | * freed up as well. | |
998 | */ | |
999 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) | |
8723588e | 1000 | { |
1fcb4e4d | 1001 | int discard; |
8723588e MC |
1002 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
1003 | ||
1004 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1005 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 1006 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
1007 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
1008 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
1009 | return ret; | |
1010 | } | |
1011 | #endif | |
1012 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1013 | if (clearbufs) { |
1014 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1015 | /* | |
1016 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1017 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1018 | */ | |
1019 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1020 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1021 | } | |
b77f3ed1 MC |
1022 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) |
1023 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
30f05b19 | 1024 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1025 | } |
8723588e | 1026 | |
c7f47786 | 1027 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1028 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1029 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1030 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1031 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1032 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1033 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1034 | ||
8723588e | 1035 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1036 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1037 | ||
0e6161bc | 1038 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1039 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, |
1040 | s->ctx->lock); | |
fe3a3291 | 1041 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1042 | } else { |
5d61491c MC |
1043 | /* |
1044 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1045 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1046 | */ | |
1047 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1048 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
8723588e | 1049 | if (s->hit) |
0e6161bc BK |
1050 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, |
1051 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e | 1052 | |
fe3a3291 | 1053 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
0e6161bc BK |
1054 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, |
1055 | &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e MC |
1056 | } |
1057 | ||
1058 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1059 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1060 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1061 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1062 | ||
1063 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1064 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1065 | ||
1066 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1067 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1068 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1069 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1070 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1071 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1072 | } |
1073 | } | |
1074 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1075 | /* |
1076 | * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, | |
1077 | * so continue. | |
1078 | */ | |
1079 | if (!clearbufs) | |
1080 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1081 | ||
4004ce5f | 1082 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1083 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1084 | } | |
1085 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1086 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1087 | { | |
1088 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1089 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
1090 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 1091 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1092 | |
1093 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1094 | ||
1095 | do { | |
1096 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1097 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1098 | &p[s->init_num], |
1099 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1100 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1101 | if (i <= 0) { |
1102 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1103 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1104 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1105 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1106 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1107 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1108 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1109 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1110 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
1111 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1112 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1113 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1114 | goto f_err; | |
1115 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1116 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1117 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1118 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1119 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1120 | return 1; |
1121 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1122 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1123 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
1124 | goto f_err; |
1125 | } | |
54105ddd | 1126 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1127 | } |
1128 | ||
1129 | skip_message = 0; | |
1130 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1131 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1132 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1133 | /* |
1134 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1135 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1136 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1137 | * MAC. | |
1138 | */ | |
1139 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1140 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1141 | skip_message = 1; | |
1142 | ||
1143 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1144 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1145 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1146 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1147 | } | |
1148 | } while (skip_message); | |
1149 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1150 | ||
1151 | *mt = *p; | |
1152 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1153 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1154 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1155 | /* |
1156 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1157 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1158 | * |
1159 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1160 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1161 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1162 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1163 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1164 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1165 | ||
1166 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1167 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1168 | } else { | |
1169 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1170 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1171 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1172 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1173 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1174 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 1175 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1176 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1177 | ||
1178 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1179 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1180 | } | |
1181 | ||
1182 | return 1; | |
1183 | f_err: | |
1184 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1185 | return 0; |
1186 | } | |
1187 | ||
eda75751 | 1188 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1189 | { |
54105ddd | 1190 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1191 | unsigned char *p; |
1192 | int i; | |
1193 | ||
1194 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1195 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1196 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1197 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1198 | } |
1199 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1200 | p = s->init_msg; |
1201 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1202 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1203 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1204 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1205 | if (i <= 0) { |
1206 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1207 | *len = 0; |
1208 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1209 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1210 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1211 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1212 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1213 | |
bf48836c | 1214 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1215 | /* |
1216 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1217 | * Finished verification. | |
1218 | */ | |
1219 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1220 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1221 | #endif |
1222 | ||
0f113f3e | 1223 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1224 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1225 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1226 | s->init_num)) { | |
1227 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
1228 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1229 | *len = 0; | |
1230 | return 0; | |
1231 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1232 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1233 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1234 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1235 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1236 | /* |
1237 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1238 | * processing the message | |
1239 | */ | |
1240 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
1241 | && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1242 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d166ed8c DSH |
1243 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
1244 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1245 | *len = 0; | |
1246 | return 0; | |
1247 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
1248 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1249 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1250 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1251 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1252 | } | |
1253 | ||
eda75751 | 1254 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1255 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1256 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1257 | |
6b691a5c | 1258 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1259 | { |
1260 | int al; | |
1261 | ||
1262 | switch (type) { | |
1263 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1264 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1265 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1266 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1267 | break; | |
1268 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1269 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1270 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1271 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1272 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1273 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1274 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1275 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1276 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1277 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1279 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1280 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1281 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1282 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1283 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1284 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1285 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1286 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1287 | break; | |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1289 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1290 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1291 | break; | |
1292 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1293 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1294 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1295 | break; | |
1296 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1297 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1298 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1299 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1300 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1301 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1302 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1303 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1304 | break; | |
1305 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1306 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1307 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1308 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1309 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1310 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1311 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1312 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1313 | break; | |
1314 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1315 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1316 | break; | |
1317 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1318 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1319 | break; | |
1320 | default: | |
1321 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1322 | break; | |
1323 | } | |
26a7d938 | 1324 | return al; |
0f113f3e | 1325 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1326 | |
b362ccab | 1327 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1328 | { |
1329 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1330 | return 0; | |
1331 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1332 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1333 | |
068c358a | 1334 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1335 | { |
1336 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1337 | ||
1338 | if (a == b) | |
1339 | return 0; | |
1340 | if (!dtls) | |
1341 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1342 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | ||
1345 | typedef struct { | |
1346 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1347 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1348 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1349 | } version_info; |
1350 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1351 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1352 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1353 | #endif |
1354 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1355 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1356 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1357 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1358 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1359 | #else | |
1360 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1361 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1362 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1363 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1364 | #else |
a230b26e | 1365 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1366 | #endif |
1367 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1368 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1369 | #else |
a230b26e | 1370 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1371 | #endif |
1372 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1373 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1374 | #else |
a230b26e | 1375 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1376 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1377 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1378 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1379 | #else |
a230b26e | 1380 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1381 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1382 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1383 | }; |
1384 | ||
1385 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1386 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1387 | #endif | |
1388 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1389 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1390 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1391 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1392 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1393 | #else |
a230b26e | 1394 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1395 | #endif |
1396 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1397 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1398 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1399 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1400 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1401 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1402 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1403 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1404 | }; |
1405 | ||
1406 | /* | |
1407 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1408 | * | |
1409 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1410 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1411 | * | |
1412 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1413 | */ | |
068c358a | 1414 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1415 | { |
1416 | int version = method->version; | |
1417 | ||
1418 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1419 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1420 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1421 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1422 | ||
1423 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1424 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1425 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1426 | ||
1427 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1428 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1429 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1430 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1431 | |
1432 | return 0; | |
1433 | } | |
1434 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1435 | /* |
1436 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1437 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1438 | * | |
1439 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1440 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1441 | * | |
1442 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1443 | */ | |
1444 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1445 | { | |
1446 | const version_info *vent; | |
1447 | const version_info *table; | |
1448 | ||
1449 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1450 | default: | |
1451 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1452 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1453 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1454 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1455 | break; | |
1456 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1457 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1458 | break; | |
1459 | } | |
1460 | ||
1461 | for (vent = table; | |
1462 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1463 | ++vent) { | |
1464 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1465 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1466 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1467 | return 1; | |
1468 | } | |
1469 | } | |
1470 | return 0; | |
1471 | } | |
1472 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1473 | /* |
1474 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1475 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1476 | * supported protocol version. | |
1477 | * | |
1478 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1479 | * | |
1480 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1481 | */ | |
1482 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1483 | { | |
1484 | const version_info *vent; | |
1485 | const version_info *table; | |
1486 | ||
1487 | /* | |
1488 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1489 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1490 | * s->method). | |
1491 | */ | |
1492 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1493 | return 1; | |
1494 | ||
1495 | /* | |
1496 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1497 | * highest protocol version). | |
1498 | */ | |
1499 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1500 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1501 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1502 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1503 | else { | |
1504 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1505 | return 0; | |
1506 | } | |
1507 | ||
1508 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1509 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1510 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1511 | } | |
1512 | return 0; | |
1513 | } | |
1514 | ||
1515 | /* | |
1516 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1517 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1518 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1519 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1520 | * | |
1521 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1522 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1523 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1524 | * | |
1525 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1526 | */ | |
1527 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1528 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1529 | if (version == 0) { |
1530 | *bound = version; | |
1531 | return 1; | |
1532 | } | |
1533 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1534 | /*- |
1535 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1536 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1537 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1538 | * | |
1539 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1540 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1541 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1542 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1543 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1544 | */ | |
1545 | switch (method_version) { | |
1546 | default: | |
1547 | /* | |
1548 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1549 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1550 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1551 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1552 | * versions. | |
1553 | */ | |
1554 | return 0; | |
1555 | ||
1556 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1557 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1558 | return 0; | |
1559 | break; | |
1560 | ||
1561 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1562 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1563 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1564 | return 0; |
1565 | break; | |
1566 | } | |
1567 | ||
1568 | *bound = version; | |
1569 | return 1; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1572 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1573 | { | |
1574 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1575 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1576 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1577 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1578 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1579 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1580 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1581 | } else { | |
1582 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1583 | } | |
1584 | } | |
1585 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1586 | /* |
1587 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1588 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1589 | * the version specific method. | |
1590 | * | |
1591 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1592 | * | |
1593 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1594 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1595 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1596 | { |
1597 | /*- | |
1598 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1599 | * | |
1600 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1601 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1602 | * | |
1603 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1604 | * handle version. | |
1605 | */ | |
1606 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1607 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1608 | const version_info *vent; |
1609 | const version_info *table; | |
1610 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1611 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1612 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1613 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1614 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1615 | switch (server_version) { |
1616 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1617 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1618 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1619 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1620 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1621 | /* |
1622 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1623 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1624 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1625 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1626 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1627 | */ | |
1628 | return 0; | |
1629 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1630 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1631 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1632 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1633 | */ |
018fcbec | 1634 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1635 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1636 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1637 | break; | |
1638 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1639 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1640 | break; | |
1641 | } | |
1642 | ||
70af3d8e | 1643 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1644 | |
70af3d8e | 1645 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1646 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1647 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1648 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1649 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1650 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1651 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1652 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1653 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1654 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1655 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1656 | } | |
1657 | ||
1658 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1659 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1660 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1661 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1662 | /* |
1663 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1664 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1665 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1666 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1667 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1668 | continue; | |
1669 | for (vent = table; | |
1670 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1671 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1672 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1673 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1674 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1675 | ||
1676 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1677 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1678 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1679 | best_method = method; | |
1680 | } | |
1681 | } | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1684 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1685 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1686 | } | |
1687 | ||
1688 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
7d061fce MC |
1689 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1690 | /* | |
1691 | * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this | |
1692 | * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
1693 | */ | |
1694 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1695 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1696 | return 0; | |
1697 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1698 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1699 | s->version = best_vers; |
1700 | s->method = best_method; | |
1701 | return 0; | |
1702 | } | |
1703 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1704 | } | |
1705 | ||
1706 | /* | |
1707 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1708 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1709 | */ | |
1710 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1711 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1712 | ||
1713 | /* | |
1714 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1715 | * the ClientHello. | |
1716 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1717 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1718 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1719 | ||
1720 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1721 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1722 | continue; | |
1723 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1724 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1725 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1726 | s->version = vent->version; |
1727 | s->method = method; | |
1728 | return 0; | |
1729 | } | |
1730 | disabled = 1; | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1733 | } | |
1734 | ||
1735 | /* | |
1736 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1737 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1738 | * the version specific method. | |
1739 | * | |
1740 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1741 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
c3043dcd MC |
1742 | * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random |
1743 | * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated | |
4fa52141 VD |
1744 | * |
1745 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1746 | */ | |
c3043dcd | 1747 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) |
4fa52141 VD |
1748 | { |
1749 | const version_info *vent; | |
1750 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1751 | int highver = 0; |
4fa52141 | 1752 | |
b97667ce MC |
1753 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1754 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1755 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1756 | ||
c3043dcd MC |
1757 | if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1758 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1759 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1760 | } | |
1761 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1762 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1763 | default: | |
c3043dcd MC |
1764 | if (version != s->version) { |
1765 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
4fa52141 | 1766 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; |
c3043dcd | 1767 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1768 | /* |
1769 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1770 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1771 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1772 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1773 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1774 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1775 | return 0; |
1776 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1777 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1778 | break; | |
1779 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1780 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1781 | break; | |
1782 | } | |
1783 | ||
1784 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1785 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1786 | int err; | |
1787 | ||
4fa52141 | 1788 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1789 | continue; |
1790 | ||
1791 | if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) | |
1792 | continue; | |
3847d426 | 1793 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1794 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1795 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd MC |
1796 | if (err != 0) { |
1797 | if (version == vent->version) { | |
1798 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1799 | return err; | |
1800 | } | |
1801 | ||
1802 | continue; | |
1803 | } | |
1804 | if (highver == 0) | |
1805 | highver = vent->version; | |
1806 | ||
1807 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1808 | continue; | |
1809 | ||
1810 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1811 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
1812 | if (checkdgrd) { | |
1813 | if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { | |
1814 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1815 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1816 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1817 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1818 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1819 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1820 | } | |
1821 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1822 | && version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1823 | && highver > version) { | |
1824 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1825 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1826 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1827 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1828 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1829 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1830 | } | |
1831 | } | |
1832 | } | |
1833 | #endif | |
1834 | ||
4fa52141 | 1835 | s->method = method; |
ccae4a15 | 1836 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1837 | return 0; |
1838 | } | |
1839 | ||
c3043dcd | 1840 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
4fa52141 VD |
1841 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1842 | } | |
1843 | ||
068c358a | 1844 | /* |
38a73150 | 1845 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1846 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1847 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1848 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1849 | * | |
1850 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1851 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1852 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1853 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1854 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1855 | * |
0485d540 | 1856 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1857 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1858 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1859 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1860 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1861 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1862 | */ |
38a73150 | 1863 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1864 | { |
1865 | int version; | |
1866 | int hole; | |
1867 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1868 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1869 | const version_info *table; | |
1870 | const version_info *vent; | |
1871 | ||
1872 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1873 | default: | |
1874 | /* | |
1875 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1876 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1877 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1878 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1879 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1880 | */ | |
068c358a | 1881 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1882 | return 0; |
1883 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1884 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1885 | break; | |
1886 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1887 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1888 | break; | |
1889 | } | |
1890 | ||
1891 | /* | |
1892 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1893 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1894 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1895 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1896 | * | |
1897 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1898 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1899 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1900 | * | |
1901 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1902 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1903 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1904 | * | |
1905 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1906 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1907 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1908 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1909 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1910 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1911 | */ | |
068c358a | 1912 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1913 | hole = 1; |
1914 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1915 | /* | |
1916 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1917 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1918 | */ | |
1919 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1920 | hole = 1; | |
1921 | continue; | |
1922 | } | |
1923 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1924 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1925 | hole = 1; | |
1926 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1927 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1928 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1929 | } else { |
1930 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1931 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1932 | hole = 0; |
1933 | } | |
1934 | } | |
1935 | ||
068c358a KR |
1936 | *max_version = version; |
1937 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1938 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1939 | if (version == 0) | |
1940 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1941 | ||
068c358a KR |
1942 | return 0; |
1943 | } | |
1944 | ||
1945 | /* | |
1946 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1947 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1948 | * |
1949 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1950 | * | |
1951 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1952 | */ | |
1953 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1954 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1955 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1956 | |
38a73150 | 1957 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1958 | |
1959 | if (ret != 0) | |
1960 | return ret; | |
1961 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1962 | s->version = ver_max; |
1963 | ||
1964 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1965 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1966 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1967 | ||
1968 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1969 | return 0; |
1970 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
1971 | |
1972 | /* | |
1973 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
1974 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
1975 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
1976 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
1977 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 1978 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 1979 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
1980 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
1981 | { | |
1982 | size_t i; | |
1983 | ||
1984 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
1985 | return 0; | |
1986 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
1987 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
1988 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
1989 | ||
1990 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 1991 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 1992 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 1993 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
1994 | } |
1995 | } | |
1996 | ||
0acee504 | 1997 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 1998 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 1999 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2000 | |
2001 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
2002 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) | |
2003 | { | |
2004 | unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2005 | size_t hashlen = 0; | |
635b7d3f MC |
2006 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2007 | ||
2008 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea MC |
2009 | |
2010 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2011 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2012 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { | |
2013 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2014 | return 0; | |
2015 | } | |
2016 | ||
2017 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
2018 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) | |
2019 | return 0; | |
2020 | ||
2021 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2022 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
11c67eea MC |
2023 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; |
2024 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
2025 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
2026 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2027 | return 0; | |
2028 | } | |
2029 | ||
2030 | return 1; | |
2031 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2032 | |
2033 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2034 | { | |
2035 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2036 | } | |
2037 | ||
2038 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2039 | { | |
2040 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2041 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2042 | PACKET cadns; | |
2043 | ||
2044 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
2045 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2046 | goto decerr; | |
2047 | } | |
2048 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2049 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
2050 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2051 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2052 | goto decerr; | |
2053 | } | |
2054 | ||
2055 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2056 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2057 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2058 | ||
2059 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2060 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
2061 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2062 | goto decerr; | |
2063 | } | |
2064 | ||
2065 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2066 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
2067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2068 | goto decerr; | |
2069 | } | |
2070 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
2071 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2072 | goto decerr; | |
2073 | } | |
2074 | ||
2075 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
2076 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2077 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2078 | goto err; | |
2079 | } | |
2080 | xn = NULL; | |
2081 | } | |
2082 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2083 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2084 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2085 | |
2086 | return 1; | |
2087 | ||
2088 | decerr: | |
2089 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2090 | err: | |
2091 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2092 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2093 | return 0; | |
2094 | } | |
2095 | ||
2096 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2097 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2098 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2099 | |
2100 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
2101 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) | |
2102 | return 0; | |
2103 | ||
2104 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2105 | int i; | |
2106 | ||
2107 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2108 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2109 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2110 | int namelen; | |
2111 | ||
2112 | if (name == NULL | |
2113 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2114 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2115 | &namebytes) | |
2116 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2117 | return 0; | |
2118 | } | |
2119 | } | |
2120 | } | |
2121 | ||
2122 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) | |
2123 | return 0; | |
2124 | ||
2125 | return 1; | |
2126 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2127 | |
2128 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
2129 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, | |
2130 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) | |
2131 | { | |
2132 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2133 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2134 | ||
2135 | if (tbs == NULL) | |
2136 | return 0; | |
2137 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2138 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2139 | ||
2140 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2141 | ||
2142 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2143 | return tbslen; | |
2144 | } |