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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
3c95ef22 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
2c18d164 | 5 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
706457b7 DMSP |
14 | #include "../ssl_local.h" |
15 | #include "statem_local.h" | |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
d7e498ac | 20 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
49b26f54 | 22 | #include <openssl/trace.h> |
3c95ef22 | 23 | #include <openssl/encoder.h> |
d02b48c6 | 24 | |
c6d38183 RS |
25 | /* |
26 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
27 | */ | |
28 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
29 | int x509err; | |
30 | int alert; | |
31 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
32 | ||
597c51bc MC |
33 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
34 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
35 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
36 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
37 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
38 | }; | |
39 | ||
d03fe5de MC |
40 | int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL *s, |
41 | ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb, | |
42 | ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb, | |
43 | void *mutatearg) | |
44 | { | |
45 | SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
46 | ||
47 | if (sc == NULL) | |
48 | return 0; | |
49 | ||
50 | sc->statem.mutate_handshake_cb = mutate_handshake_cb; | |
51 | sc->statem.mutatearg = mutatearg; | |
52 | sc->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb = finish_mutate_handshake_cb; | |
53 | ||
54 | return 1; | |
55 | } | |
56 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
57 | /* |
58 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
59 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
60 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 61 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
62 | { |
63 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 64 | size_t written = 0; |
38b051a1 | 65 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
0f113f3e | 66 | |
d03fe5de MC |
67 | /* |
68 | * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message | |
69 | * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation. | |
70 | */ | |
71 | if (s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb != NULL | |
72 | && !s->statem.write_in_progress | |
73 | && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
74 | && s->init_num >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
75 | unsigned char *msg; | |
76 | size_t msglen; | |
77 | ||
78 | if (!s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
79 | s->init_num, | |
80 | &msg, &msglen, | |
81 | s->statem.mutatearg)) | |
82 | return -1; | |
83 | if (msglen < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH | |
84 | || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, msglen)) | |
85 | return -1; | |
86 | memcpy(s->init_buf->data, msg, msglen); | |
87 | s->init_num = msglen; | |
88 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
89 | s->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s->statem.mutatearg); | |
90 | s->statem.write_in_progress = 1; | |
91 | } | |
92 | ||
38b051a1 | 93 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], |
7ee8627f | 94 | s->init_num, &written); |
404fb996 | 95 | if (ret <= 0) |
26a7d938 | 96 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
97 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
98 | /* | |
99 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
100 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 101 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 102 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
103 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
104 | || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET | |
9d75dce3 TS |
105 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE |
106 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
107 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
108 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
109 | written)) | |
110 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 111 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
d03fe5de | 112 | s->statem.write_in_progress = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
113 | if (s->msg_callback) |
114 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
38b051a1 | 115 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ssl, |
0f113f3e | 116 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
208fb891 | 117 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 118 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
119 | s->init_off += written; |
120 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 121 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 122 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 123 | |
38b051a1 | 124 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
125 | { |
126 | size_t msglen; | |
127 | ||
4a01c59f | 128 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 129 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 130 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
131 | return 0; |
132 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
133 | s->init_off = 0; | |
134 | ||
135 | return 1; | |
136 | } | |
137 | ||
38b051a1 | 138 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
1f5b44e9 | 139 | { |
8e32ea63 | 140 | int ver_min, ver_max, ok; |
38b051a1 TM |
141 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
142 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); | |
8e32ea63 | 143 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
144 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
145 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 146 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 147 | } |
c7f47786 | 148 | |
b186a592 MC |
149 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
150 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
151 | ||
8e32ea63 | 152 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 153 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); |
8e32ea63 MC |
154 | return 0; |
155 | } | |
156 | ||
157 | /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ | |
38b051a1 | 158 | if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { |
8e32ea63 MC |
159 | int md5sha1_needed = 0; |
160 | ||
161 | /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ | |
38b051a1 | 162 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8e32ea63 MC |
163 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, DTLS1_VERSION)) |
164 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
165 | } else { | |
166 | if (ver_max <= TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
167 | md5sha1_needed = 1; | |
168 | } | |
169 | if (md5sha1_needed) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
170 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
171 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, | |
172 | "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" | |
173 | " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" | |
174 | " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" | |
175 | " above, or load different providers"); | |
8e32ea63 MC |
176 | return 0; |
177 | } | |
178 | ||
179 | ok = 1; | |
180 | /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ | |
38b051a1 | 181 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8e32ea63 | 182 | if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(ver_min, DTLS1_2_VERSION)) |
38b051a1 | 183 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, DTLS1_2_VERSION); |
8e32ea63 MC |
184 | } else { |
185 | if (ver_min < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
38b051a1 | 186 | ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION); |
8e32ea63 MC |
187 | } |
188 | if (!ok) { | |
189 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
c48ffbcc | 190 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8e32ea63 MC |
191 | return 0; |
192 | } | |
193 | } | |
194 | ||
195 | ok = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 196 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 | 197 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
8e32ea63 | 198 | int i; |
38a73150 MC |
199 | |
200 | /* | |
201 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
202 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
203 | * ClientHello. | |
204 | */ | |
38a73150 MC |
205 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
206 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
207 | ||
38b051a1 | 208 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
38a73150 MC |
209 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && |
210 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
211 | ok = 1; | |
212 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
213 | ok = 1; | |
214 | } | |
215 | if (ok) | |
216 | break; | |
217 | } | |
218 | if (!ok) { | |
c48ffbcc RL |
219 | SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
220 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, | |
221 | "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
222 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
223 | return 0; |
224 | } | |
c7f47786 | 225 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc | 226 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
acce0557 | 227 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); |
c7f47786 | 228 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 229 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
38b051a1 | 230 | ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); |
c7f47786 | 231 | |
555cbb32 | 232 | s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; |
c7f47786 MC |
233 | } |
234 | } else { | |
235 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
acce0557 | 236 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); |
c7f47786 | 237 | else |
acce0557 P |
238 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
239 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); | |
c7f47786 MC |
240 | |
241 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
555cbb32 | 242 | memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); |
c7f47786 MC |
243 | s->hit = 0; |
244 | ||
555cbb32 | 245 | s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; |
c7f47786 | 246 | |
38b051a1 | 247 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 248 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
249 | } |
250 | ||
251 | return 1; | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
254 | /* |
255 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
256 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
257 | */ | |
258 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
259 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
260 | ||
38b051a1 | 261 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
262 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) |
263 | { | |
44e47328 TS |
264 | /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ |
265 | static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72" | |
266 | "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; | |
267 | /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ | |
268 | static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69" | |
269 | "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; | |
38b051a1 TM |
270 | |
271 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
272 | size_t hashlen; |
273 | ||
274 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
275 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
276 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
277 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
278 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
279 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
280 | else | |
281 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
282 | ||
283 | /* | |
284 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
285 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
286 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
287 | */ | |
288 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
289 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
290 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
291 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
292 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
293 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
294 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 295 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
296 | return 0; |
297 | } | |
298 | ||
299 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
300 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
301 | } else { | |
302 | size_t retlen; | |
60690b5b | 303 | long retlen_l; |
2c5dfdc3 | 304 | |
555cbb32 | 305 | retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); |
60690b5b | 306 | if (retlen_l <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 307 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2c5dfdc3 | 308 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 309 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
310 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
311 | } | |
312 | ||
313 | return 1; | |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
67ec6d2b | 316 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
d8bc1399 | 317 | { |
ad4dd362 DSH |
318 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
319 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 320 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
321 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
322 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
323 | void *hdata; |
324 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 325 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
555cbb32 | 326 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; |
38b051a1 | 327 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
2c5dfdc3 | 328 | |
555cbb32 | 329 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 330 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
331 | goto err; |
332 | } | |
555cbb32 | 333 | pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; |
ad4dd362 | 334 | |
38b051a1 | 335 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 336 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
ad4dd362 DSH |
337 | goto err; |
338 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
339 | |
340 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
341 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 342 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
343 | goto err; |
344 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 345 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
346 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
347 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 348 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
349 | goto err; |
350 | } | |
351 | ||
ad4dd362 | 352 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
c48ffbcc | 353 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
354 | goto err; |
355 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 356 | |
ed576acd TM |
357 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
358 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), | |
38b051a1 | 359 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 360 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 361 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
362 | goto err; |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
ad4dd362 | 365 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 366 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
367 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
368 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 369 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
370 | goto err; |
371 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
372 | } |
373 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
bddbfae1 MC |
374 | /* |
375 | * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
376 | * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. | |
377 | */ | |
caf2b6b5 | 378 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 |
83b4a243 SL |
379 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
380 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
381 | s->session->master_key) <= 0 | |
bddbfae1 | 382 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { |
caf2b6b5 | 383 | |
c48ffbcc | 384 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f9b64a2 MC |
385 | goto err; |
386 | } | |
bddbfae1 MC |
387 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); |
388 | if (sig == NULL | |
389 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 390 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
391 | goto err; |
392 | } | |
393 | } else { | |
394 | /* | |
395 | * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not | |
396 | * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal | |
397 | */ | |
398 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 399 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
400 | goto err; |
401 | } | |
402 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
403 | if (sig == NULL | |
404 | || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 405 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
bddbfae1 MC |
406 | goto err; |
407 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 408 | } |
5f9b64a2 | 409 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
410 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
411 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
412 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
413 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
414 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
415 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
416 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 417 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
418 | } |
419 | #endif | |
420 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 421 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
c48ffbcc | 422 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
423 | goto err; |
424 | } | |
425 | ||
426 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
427 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
428 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 429 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 430 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
431 | |
432 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
433 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
67ec6d2b | 434 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
d8bc1399 MC |
435 | err: |
436 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
437 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
67ec6d2b | 438 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
d8bc1399 MC |
439 | } |
440 | ||
38b051a1 | 441 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
d8bc1399 MC |
442 | { |
443 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 444 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
445 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
446 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
447 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 448 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 449 | int j; |
d8bc1399 | 450 | unsigned int len; |
d8bc1399 | 451 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 | 452 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 453 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 454 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 455 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 456 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 457 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
d8bc1399 MC |
458 | |
459 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 460 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 461 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
462 | } |
463 | ||
3c95ef22 | 464 | pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); |
f63a17d6 | 465 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 466 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 MC |
467 | goto err; |
468 | } | |
83b4049a | 469 | |
ee58915c | 470 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, sctx) == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 471 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
f63a17d6 MC |
472 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
473 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
474 | } |
475 | ||
f464f9c0 | 476 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
477 | unsigned int sigalg; |
478 | ||
479 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 480 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); |
f63a17d6 | 481 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 | 482 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
483 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
484 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
485 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 486 | } |
f464f9c0 | 487 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
97b8db1a TM |
488 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
489 | SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); | |
f63a17d6 | 490 | goto err; |
f464f9c0 PD |
491 | } |
492 | ||
38b051a1 | 493 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
c48ffbcc | 494 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 495 | goto err; |
168067b6 | 496 | } |
f464f9c0 | 497 | |
572fa024 | 498 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
49b26f54 | 499 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
ed576acd | 500 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
572fa024 | 501 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
502 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
503 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
504 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
505 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
506 | */ |
507 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
508 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
509 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
ed576acd TM |
510 | && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
511 | || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
f464f9c0 | 512 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 |
ed576acd | 513 | && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { |
f464f9c0 | 514 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
d8bc1399 MC |
515 | } else |
516 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 517 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 519 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 | 520 | } |
f464f9c0 | 521 | |
d8bc1399 | 522 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 523 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 524 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
525 | } |
526 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 527 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
528 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
529 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
530 | } |
531 | ||
49b26f54 | 532 | OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", |
ed576acd | 533 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); |
49b26f54 | 534 | |
d8652be0 | 535 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, |
ed576acd | 536 | md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
38b051a1 | 537 | sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, |
d38b6ae9 | 538 | NULL) <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 539 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 540 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
541 | } |
542 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
543 | { | |
ed576acd | 544 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
545 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
546 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
547 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
e077455e | 548 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) |
f63a17d6 | 549 | goto err; |
d8bc1399 MC |
550 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); |
551 | data = gost_data; | |
552 | } | |
553 | } | |
554 | #endif | |
555 | ||
5554facb | 556 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 557 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
558 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
559 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 560 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 561 | goto err; |
5f9b64a2 | 562 | } |
d8bc1399 | 563 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
564 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
565 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
83b4a243 SL |
566 | || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
567 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
568 | s->session->master_key) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 569 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 570 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
571 | } |
572 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 573 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 574 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
575 | } |
576 | } else { | |
577 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 578 | if (j <= 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 579 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
f63a17d6 | 580 | goto err; |
caf2b6b5 | 581 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
582 | } |
583 | ||
e4562014 MC |
584 | /* |
585 | * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client | |
586 | * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the | |
587 | * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest | |
588 | * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We | |
8c2bfd25 | 589 | * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual |
e4562014 MC |
590 | * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. |
591 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 592 | if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) |
e4562014 MC |
593 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
594 | else | |
595 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
f63a17d6 | 596 | err: |
555cbb32 TS |
597 | BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); |
598 | s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
599 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); |
600 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
601 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
602 | #endif | |
603 | return ret; | |
604 | } | |
605 | ||
67ec6d2b | 606 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 607 | { |
12472b45 | 608 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 609 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 610 | size_t slen; |
38b051a1 | 611 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
229185e6 | 612 | |
f7e393be | 613 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 614 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
615 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
616 | ||
617 | /* | |
84a14925 MC |
618 | * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode |
619 | * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible | |
620 | * moment. If we didn't already do this when we sent the client certificate | |
621 | * then we need to do it now. | |
f7e393be | 622 | */ |
38b051a1 | 623 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
f7e393be | 624 | && !s->server |
84a14925 MC |
625 | && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE |
626 | || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) | |
555cbb32 | 627 | && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 |
38b051a1 | 628 | && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
629 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
630 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
67ec6d2b | 631 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
f7e393be MC |
632 | } |
633 | ||
229185e6 | 634 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 TM |
635 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
636 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
229185e6 | 637 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
638 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
639 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
229185e6 | 640 | } |
0f113f3e | 641 | |
38b051a1 TM |
642 | finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
643 | sender, slen, | |
644 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md); | |
12472b45 | 645 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 646 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 647 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4f89bfbf MC |
648 | } |
649 | ||
555cbb32 | 650 | s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 651 | |
555cbb32 | 652 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
c48ffbcc | 653 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 654 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
4f89bfbf | 655 | } |
0f113f3e | 656 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
657 | /* |
658 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
659 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
660 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
661 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
662 | && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, | |
663 | s->session->master_key_length)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 664 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ec6d2b | 665 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
380a522f | 666 | } |
2faa1b48 | 667 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
668 | /* |
669 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
670 | */ | |
380a522f | 671 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 672 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 673 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
380a522f | 674 | } |
23a635c0 | 675 | if (!s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 676 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 677 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 678 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 679 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 680 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, |
12472b45 | 681 | finish_md_len); |
555cbb32 | 682 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 683 | } |
0f113f3e | 684 | |
67ec6d2b | 685 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
0f113f3e | 686 | } |
d02b48c6 | 687 | |
67ec6d2b | 688 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
44c04a2e MC |
689 | { |
690 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 691 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 692 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
44c04a2e MC |
693 | } |
694 | ||
9412b3ad | 695 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
67ec6d2b | 696 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
44c04a2e MC |
697 | } |
698 | ||
38b051a1 | 699 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e1c3de44 MC |
700 | { |
701 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
702 | ||
524420d8 MC |
703 | /* |
704 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
705 | * be on a record boundary. | |
706 | */ | |
707 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 708 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 709 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
710 | } |
711 | ||
e1c3de44 | 712 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 713 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 714 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 715 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 MC |
716 | } |
717 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
718 | /* |
719 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
720 | * didn't recognise. | |
721 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
722 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
723 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
c48ffbcc | 724 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
f63a17d6 | 725 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2d871227 MC |
726 | } |
727 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
728 | /* |
729 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
730 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
feb9e31c | 731 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). |
5bf47933 | 732 | */ |
feb9e31c | 733 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) |
5bf47933 MC |
734 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; |
735 | ||
57389a32 | 736 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
737 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
738 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
739 | } |
740 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
741 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
744 | /* |
745 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
746 | * to far. | |
747 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 748 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
749 | { |
750 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 751 | size_t slen; |
38b051a1 | 752 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
5d671101 | 753 | |
49ae7423 | 754 | if (!s->server) { |
38b051a1 TM |
755 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
756 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
0f113f3e | 757 | } else { |
38b051a1 TM |
758 | sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
759 | slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
760 | } |
761 | ||
555cbb32 | 762 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
38b051a1 TM |
763 | ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, |
764 | s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
5d671101 | 765 | |
555cbb32 | 766 | if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { |
5d671101 MC |
767 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
768 | return 0; | |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
771 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 772 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 773 | |
38b051a1 TM |
774 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
775 | PACKET *pkt) | |
b9908bf9 | 776 | { |
348240c6 | 777 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 778 | |
73999b62 | 779 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
780 | /* |
781 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
782 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
783 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 784 | */ |
38b051a1 | 785 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 786 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
787 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
788 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
789 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 790 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 791 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf MC |
792 | } |
793 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 794 | if (remain != 0) { |
c48ffbcc | 795 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
f63a17d6 | 796 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
c69f2adf | 797 | } |
657da85e MC |
798 | } |
799 | ||
800 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
555cbb32 | 801 | if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
c48ffbcc | 802 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
f63a17d6 | 803 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
804 | } |
805 | ||
555cbb32 | 806 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; |
657da85e | 807 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 808 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 809 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
810 | } |
811 | ||
38b051a1 | 812 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
b92fc4ae | 813 | dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ); |
c69f2adf MC |
814 | |
815 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
816 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
817 | ||
818 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
819 | /* | |
820 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
821 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
822 | * SCTP is used | |
823 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
824 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), |
825 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
c69f2adf MC |
826 | #endif |
827 | } | |
828 | ||
b9908bf9 | 829 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
830 | } |
831 | ||
38b051a1 | 832 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 833 | { |
12472b45 | 834 | size_t md_len; |
38b051a1 | 835 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1853d20a | 836 | int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s); |
2b9e2afc | 837 | int ok; |
b9908bf9 | 838 | |
d781d247 MC |
839 | |
840 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 | 841 | if (s->server) { |
de9e884b MC |
842 | /* |
843 | * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We | |
1853d20a MC |
844 | * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than |
845 | * TLSv1.3 | |
de9e884b | 846 | */ |
cffafb5f MC |
847 | if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL) |
848 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); | |
9d75dce3 TS |
849 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
850 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
38b051a1 TM |
851 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
852 | && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
853 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
854 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
855 | } | |
856 | } | |
d781d247 | 857 | |
524420d8 MC |
858 | /* |
859 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
860 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
861 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
862 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
863 | && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 864 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); |
f63a17d6 | 865 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
524420d8 MC |
866 | } |
867 | ||
0f113f3e | 868 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
38b051a1 | 869 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { |
c48ffbcc | 870 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
f63a17d6 | 871 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 872 | } |
555cbb32 | 873 | s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; |
0f113f3e | 874 | |
555cbb32 | 875 | md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 876 | |
12472b45 | 877 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 878 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
f63a17d6 | 879 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
880 | } |
881 | ||
2b9e2afc PA |
882 | ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
883 | md_len); | |
884 | #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION | |
885 | if (ok != 0) { | |
1dbfd7fe | 886 | if ((PACKET_data(pkt)[0] ^ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md[0]) != 0xFF) { |
2b9e2afc PA |
887 | ok = 0; |
888 | } | |
889 | } | |
890 | #endif | |
891 | if (ok != 0) { | |
c48ffbcc | 892 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
f63a17d6 | 893 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
894 | } |
895 | ||
896 | /* | |
897 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
898 | */ | |
380a522f | 899 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
c48ffbcc | 900 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
f63a17d6 | 901 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
380a522f | 902 | } |
23a635c0 | 903 | if (s->server) { |
555cbb32 | 904 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 905 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 906 | s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e | 907 | } else { |
555cbb32 | 908 | memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, |
12472b45 | 909 | md_len); |
555cbb32 | 910 | s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; |
0f113f3e MC |
911 | } |
912 | ||
7776a36c MC |
913 | /* |
914 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
915 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
916 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 917 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
92760c21 | 918 | if (s->server) { |
9d75dce3 | 919 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
38b051a1 TM |
920 | !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
921 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
922 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
923 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
924 | } |
925 | } else { | |
d74014c4 BK |
926 | /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ |
927 | size_t dummy; | |
38b051a1 | 928 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
ec15acb6 | 929 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
d74014c4 | 930 | &dummy)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
931 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
932 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 | 933 | } |
38b051a1 | 934 | if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
92760c21 | 935 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
936 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
937 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
938 | } | |
939 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
940 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
941 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
942 | } |
943 | } | |
944 | } | |
945 | ||
1853d20a MC |
946 | if (was_first |
947 | && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) | |
cffafb5f MC |
948 | && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) |
949 | s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); | |
1853d20a | 950 | |
e6575156 | 951 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 952 | } |
d02b48c6 | 953 | |
67ec6d2b | 954 | CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 955 | { |
7cea05dc | 956 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
c48ffbcc | 957 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
67ec6d2b | 958 | return CON_FUNC_ERROR; |
85a7a5e6 | 959 | } |
b9908bf9 | 960 | |
67ec6d2b | 961 | return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
b9908bf9 MC |
962 | } |
963 | ||
e96e0f8e | 964 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
38b051a1 | 965 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
72620ac7 | 966 | X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp) |
0f113f3e | 967 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
968 | int len; |
969 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
72620ac7 TS |
970 | int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE; |
971 | ||
972 | if (for_comp) | |
973 | context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
974 | |
975 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
976 | if (len < 0) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
977 | if (!for_comp) |
978 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
979 | return 0; |
980 | } | |
981 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
982 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
983 | if (!for_comp) |
984 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
985 | return 0; |
986 | } | |
987 | ||
72620ac7 TS |
988 | if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp) |
989 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 990 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e96e0f8e | 991 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 992 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
993 | |
994 | return 1; | |
995 | } | |
996 | ||
997 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
72620ac7 | 998 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) |
e96e0f8e MC |
999 | { |
1000 | int i, chain_count; | |
1001 | X509 *x; | |
1002 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
1003 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
1004 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
38b051a1 | 1005 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
e96e0f8e MC |
1006 | |
1007 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
1008 | return 1; | |
1009 | ||
1010 | x = cpk->x509; | |
1011 | ||
1012 | /* | |
1013 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
1014 | */ | |
d805a57b | 1015 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
1016 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
1017 | else | |
38b051a1 | 1018 | extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1019 | |
1020 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
1021 | chain_store = NULL; | |
1022 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
1023 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
1024 | else | |
38b051a1 | 1025 | chain_store = sctx->cert_store; |
e96e0f8e | 1026 | |
d805a57b | 1027 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
38b051a1 TM |
1028 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, |
1029 | sctx->propq); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1030 | |
1031 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
1032 | if (!for_comp) |
1033 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
f63a17d6 | 1034 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1035 | } |
1036 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
1037 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
72620ac7 TS |
1038 | if (!for_comp) |
1039 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
f63a17d6 | 1040 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1041 | } |
1042 | /* | |
1043 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
1044 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
1045 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
1046 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
1047 | */ | |
1048 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
1049 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
1050 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
1051 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
1052 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
1053 | if (i != 1) { | |
1054 | #if 0 | |
1055 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
6849b73c RL |
1056 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); |
1057 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
1058 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1059 | #endif |
1060 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
72620ac7 TS |
1061 | if (!for_comp) |
1062 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); | |
f63a17d6 | 1063 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1064 | } |
1065 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
1066 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
1067 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1068 | ||
72620ac7 | 1069 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1070 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e96e0f8e | 1071 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 1072 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
1073 | } |
1074 | } | |
1075 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
1076 | } else { | |
1077 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
1078 | if (i != 1) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
1079 | if (!for_comp) |
1080 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1081 | return 0; |
1082 | } | |
72620ac7 | 1083 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1084 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1085 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 1086 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1087 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
1088 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
72620ac7 | 1089 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1090 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1091 | return 0; | |
1092 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1093 | } |
1094 | } | |
1095 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1096 | } |
1097 | ||
3c95ef22 TS |
1098 | EVP_PKEY* tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc) |
1099 | { | |
1100 | if (sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL) | |
1101 | return sc->session->peer_rpk; | |
1102 | if (sc->session->peer != NULL) | |
1103 | return X509_get0_pubkey(sc->session->peer); | |
1104 | return NULL; | |
1105 | } | |
1106 | ||
1107 | int tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **peer_rpk) | |
1108 | { | |
1109 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1110 | int ret = 0; | |
1111 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
1112 | PACKET extensions; | |
1113 | PACKET context; | |
1114 | unsigned long cert_len = 0, spki_len = 0; | |
1115 | const unsigned char *spki, *spkistart; | |
1116 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc); | |
1117 | ||
1118 | /*- | |
1119 | * ---------------------------- | |
1120 | * TLS 1.3 Certificate message: | |
1121 | * ---------------------------- | |
1122 | * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2 | |
1123 | * | |
1124 | * enum { | |
1125 | * X509(0), | |
1126 | * RawPublicKey(2), | |
1127 | * (255) | |
1128 | * } CertificateType; | |
1129 | * | |
1130 | * struct { | |
1131 | * select (certificate_type) { | |
1132 | * case RawPublicKey: | |
1133 | * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo | |
1134 | * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; | |
1135 | * | |
1136 | * case X509: | |
1137 | * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; | |
1138 | * }; | |
1139 | * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; | |
1140 | * } CertificateEntry; | |
1141 | * | |
1142 | * struct { | |
1143 | * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; | |
1144 | * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; | |
1145 | * } Certificate; | |
1146 | * | |
1147 | * The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server | |
1148 | * has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message | |
1149 | * (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no | |
1150 | * suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate | |
1151 | * message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list" | |
1152 | * field having length 0). | |
1153 | * | |
1154 | * ---------------------------- | |
1155 | * TLS 1.2 Certificate message: | |
1156 | * ---------------------------- | |
1157 | * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-3 | |
1158 | * | |
1159 | * opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>; | |
1160 | * | |
1161 | * struct { | |
1162 | * select(certificate_type){ | |
1163 | * | |
1164 | * // certificate type defined in this document. | |
1165 | * case RawPublicKey: | |
1166 | * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; | |
1167 | * | |
1168 | * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246 | |
1169 | * case X.509: | |
1170 | * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; | |
1171 | * | |
1172 | * // Additional certificate type based on | |
1173 | * // "TLS Certificate Types" subregistry | |
1174 | * }; | |
1175 | * } Certificate; | |
1176 | * | |
1177 | * ------------- | |
1178 | * Consequently: | |
1179 | * ------------- | |
1180 | * After the (TLS 1.3 only) context octet string (1 byte length + data) the | |
1181 | * Certificate message has a 3-byte length that is zero in the client to | |
1182 | * server message when the client has no RPK to send. In that case, there | |
1183 | * are no (TLS 1.3 only) per-certificate extensions either, because the | |
1184 | * [CertificateEntry] list is empty. | |
1185 | * | |
1186 | * In the server to client direction, or when the client had an RPK to send, | |
1187 | * the TLS 1.3 message just prepends the length of the RPK+extensions, | |
1188 | * while TLS <= 1.2 sends just the RPK (octet-string). | |
1189 | * | |
1190 | * The context must be zero-length in the server to client direction, and | |
1191 | * must match the value recorded in the certificate request in the client | |
1192 | * to server direction. | |
1193 | */ | |
1194 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
1195 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) { | |
1196 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); | |
1197 | goto err; | |
1198 | } | |
1199 | if (sc->server) { | |
1200 | if (sc->pha_context == NULL) { | |
1201 | if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) { | |
1202 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); | |
1203 | goto err; | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | } else { | |
1206 | if (!PACKET_equal(&context, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) { | |
1207 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); | |
1208 | goto err; | |
1209 | } | |
1210 | } | |
1211 | } else { | |
1212 | if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) { | |
1213 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); | |
1214 | goto err; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | } | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | ||
1219 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) | |
1220 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_len) { | |
1221 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1222 | goto err; | |
1223 | } | |
1224 | ||
1225 | /* | |
1226 | * The list length may be zero when there is no RPK. In the case of TLS | |
1227 | * 1.2 this is actually the RPK length, which cannot be zero as specified, | |
1228 | * but that breaks the ability of the client to decline client auth. We | |
1229 | * overload the 0 RPK length to mean "no RPK". This interpretation is | |
1230 | * also used some other (reference?) implementations, but is not supported | |
1231 | * by the verbatim RFC7250 text. | |
1232 | */ | |
1233 | if (cert_len == 0) | |
1234 | return 1; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
1237 | /* | |
1238 | * With TLS 1.3, a non-empty explicit-length RPK octet-string followed | |
1239 | * by a possibly empty extension block. | |
1240 | */ | |
1241 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &spki_len)) { | |
1242 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1243 | goto err; | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | if (spki_len == 0) { | |
1246 | /* empty RPK */ | |
1247 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EMPTY_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1248 | goto err; | |
1249 | } | |
1250 | } else { | |
1251 | spki_len = cert_len; | |
1252 | } | |
1253 | ||
1254 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &spki, spki_len)) { | |
1255 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1256 | goto err; | |
1257 | } | |
1258 | spkistart = spki; | |
1259 | if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL, &spki, spki_len, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq)) == NULL | |
1260 | || spki != (spkistart + spki_len)) { | |
1261 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1262 | goto err; | |
1263 | } | |
1264 | if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { | |
1265 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1266 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); | |
1267 | goto err; | |
1268 | } | |
1269 | ||
1270 | /* Process the Extensions block */ | |
1271 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
1272 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != (cert_len - 3 - spki_len)) { | |
1273 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1274 | goto err; | |
1275 | } | |
1276 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) | |
1277 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
1278 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1279 | goto err; | |
1280 | } | |
1281 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(sc, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, | |
1282 | &rawexts, NULL, 1)) { | |
1283 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
1284 | goto err; | |
1285 | } | |
1286 | /* chain index is always zero and fin always 1 for RPK */ | |
1287 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(sc, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, | |
1288 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { | |
1289 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
1290 | goto err; | |
1291 | } | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | ret = 1; | |
1294 | if (peer_rpk != NULL) { | |
1295 | *peer_rpk = pkey; | |
1296 | pkey = NULL; | |
1297 | } | |
1298 | ||
1299 | err: | |
1300 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
1301 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1302 | return ret; | |
1303 | } | |
1304 | ||
1305 | unsigned long tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) | |
1306 | { | |
1307 | int pdata_len = 0; | |
1308 | unsigned char *pdata = NULL; | |
1309 | X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL; | |
1310 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
1311 | X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
1312 | ||
1313 | if (cpk != NULL && cpk->x509 != NULL) { | |
1314 | x509 = cpk->x509; | |
1315 | /* Get the RPK from the certificate */ | |
1316 | xpk = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cpk->x509); | |
1317 | if (xpk == NULL) { | |
1318 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1319 | goto err; | |
1320 | } | |
1321 | pdata_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, &pdata); | |
1322 | } else if (cpk != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { | |
1323 | /* Get the RPK from the private key */ | |
1324 | pdata_len = i2d_PUBKEY(cpk->privatekey, &pdata); | |
1325 | } else { | |
1326 | /* The server RPK is not optional */ | |
1327 | if (sc->server) { | |
1328 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1329 | goto err; | |
1330 | } | |
1331 | /* The client can send a zero length certificate list */ | |
1332 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) { | |
1333 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1334 | goto err; | |
1335 | } | |
1336 | return 1; | |
1337 | } | |
1338 | ||
1339 | if (pdata_len <= 0) { | |
1340 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1341 | goto err; | |
1342 | } | |
1343 | ||
1344 | /* | |
1345 | * TLSv1.2 is _just_ the raw public key | |
1346 | * TLSv1.3 includes extensions, so there's a length wrapper | |
1347 | */ | |
1348 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
1349 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { | |
1350 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1351 | goto err; | |
1352 | } | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | ||
1355 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) { | |
1356 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1357 | goto err; | |
1358 | } | |
1359 | ||
1360 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
1361 | /* | |
eb4129e1 | 1362 | * Only send extensions relevant to raw public keys. Until such |
3c95ef22 TS |
1363 | * extensions are defined, this will be an empty set of extensions. |
1364 | * |x509| may be NULL, which raw public-key extensions need to handle. | |
1365 | */ | |
1366 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(sc, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, | |
1367 | x509, 0)) { | |
1368 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1369 | goto err; | |
1370 | } | |
1371 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1372 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1373 | goto err; | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | } | |
1376 | ||
1377 | ret = 1; | |
1378 | err: | |
1379 | OPENSSL_free(pdata); | |
1380 | return ret; | |
1381 | } | |
1382 | ||
38b051a1 | 1383 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
72620ac7 | 1384 | CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) |
e96e0f8e | 1385 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1386 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
72620ac7 TS |
1387 | if (!for_comp) |
1388 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1389 | return 0; |
1390 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 1391 | |
72620ac7 | 1392 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp)) |
f63a17d6 MC |
1393 | return 0; |
1394 | ||
1395 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
72620ac7 TS |
1396 | if (!for_comp) |
1397 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1398 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1399 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1400 | |
c49e1912 | 1401 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1402 | } |
1403 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1404 | /* |
1405 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1406 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1407 | * freed up as well. | |
1408 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1409 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, |
a7e6a3d8 | 1410 | int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e MC |
1411 | { |
1412 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
4af5836b | 1413 | int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; |
38b051a1 TM |
1414 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
1415 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); | |
8723588e | 1416 | |
30f05b19 | 1417 | if (clearbufs) { |
38b051a1 | 1418 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
e7c27a6c | 1419 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
30f05b19 | 1420 | /* |
e7c27a6c N |
1421 | * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS |
1422 | * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions | |
1423 | * MUST NOT be used. | |
1424 | * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. | |
1425 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1426 | || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) |
e7c27a6c N |
1427 | #endif |
1428 | ) { | |
1429 | /* | |
1430 | * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf | |
30f05b19 MC |
1431 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits |
1432 | */ | |
1433 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1434 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1435 | } | |
e7c27a6c | 1436 | |
a2c2e000 | 1437 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
c48ffbcc | 1438 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b77f3ed1 | 1439 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1440 | } |
30f05b19 | 1441 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1442 | } |
8723588e | 1443 | |
38b051a1 | 1444 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
9d75dce3 TS |
1445 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
1446 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1447 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1448 | /* |
1449 | * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 | |
1450 | * post handshake exchange | |
1451 | */ | |
4af5836b | 1452 | if (cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1453 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1454 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1455 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1456 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
c0638ade | 1457 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
8723588e | 1458 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1459 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1460 | ||
8723588e | 1461 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1462 | /* |
1463 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1464 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1465 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1466 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) |
16ff1342 | 1467 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
8723588e | 1468 | |
0e6161bc | 1469 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
38b051a1 | 1470 | ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good); |
fe3a3291 | 1471 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1472 | } else { |
38b051a1 | 1473 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
4cb00457 MC |
1474 | /* |
1475 | * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, | |
1476 | * so we remove this one from the cache. | |
1477 | */ | |
1478 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode | |
1479 | & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) | |
1480 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1481 | } else { | |
1482 | /* | |
1483 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1484 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1485 | */ | |
5d61491c | 1486 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
4cb00457 | 1487 | } |
8723588e | 1488 | if (s->hit) |
acce0557 P |
1489 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1490 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); | |
8723588e | 1491 | |
fe3a3291 | 1492 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
acce0557 P |
1493 | ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
1494 | &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); | |
8723588e MC |
1495 | } |
1496 | ||
38b051a1 | 1497 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
8723588e MC |
1498 | /* done with handshaking */ |
1499 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1500 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1501 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1502 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1503 | } |
1504 | } | |
1505 | ||
c2c1d8a4 MC |
1506 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
1507 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
38b051a1 TM |
1508 | else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL) |
1509 | cb = sctx->info_callback; | |
c2c1d8a4 | 1510 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1511 | /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ |
1512 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
1513 | ||
4af5836b MC |
1514 | if (cb != NULL) { |
1515 | if (cleanuphand | |
38b051a1 | 1516 | || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
4af5836b | 1517 | || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
38b051a1 | 1518 | cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
4af5836b | 1519 | } |
c2c1d8a4 | 1520 | |
4ce787b9 MC |
1521 | if (!stop) { |
1522 | /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ | |
1523 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
30f05b19 | 1524 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
4ce787b9 | 1525 | } |
30f05b19 | 1526 | |
8723588e MC |
1527 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1528 | } | |
1529 | ||
38b051a1 | 1530 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt) |
9ab930b2 MC |
1531 | { |
1532 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1533 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1534 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1535 | size_t l, readbytes; |
38b051a1 | 1536 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1537 | |
1538 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1539 | ||
1540 | do { | |
1541 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
38b051a1 TM |
1542 | i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, |
1543 | &p[s->init_num], | |
1544 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
1545 | 0, &readbytes); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1546 | if (i <= 0) { |
1547 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1548 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1549 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1550 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1551 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1552 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1553 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1554 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1555 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 | 1556 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1557 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
1558 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1559 | } |
e9359719 | 1560 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
555cbb32 | 1561 | && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { |
e9359719 MC |
1562 | /* |
1563 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1564 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1565 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1566 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1567 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1568 | */ | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | } | |
555cbb32 | 1571 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1572 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1573 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
555cbb32 | 1574 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1575 | return 1; |
1576 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1577 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1578 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
1579 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1580 | } |
54105ddd | 1581 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1582 | } |
1583 | ||
1584 | skip_message = 0; | |
1585 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1586 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1587 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1588 | /* |
1589 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1590 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1591 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1592 | * MAC. | |
1593 | */ | |
1594 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1595 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1596 | skip_message = 1; | |
1597 | ||
1598 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1599 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
38b051a1 | 1600 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, |
9ab930b2 MC |
1601 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
1602 | } | |
1603 | } while (skip_message); | |
1604 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1605 | ||
1606 | *mt = *p; | |
555cbb32 | 1607 | s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
32ec4153 | 1608 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1609 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1610 | /* |
1611 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1612 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1613 | * |
1614 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1615 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1616 | */ |
4030869d | 1617 | l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
555cbb32 | 1618 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1619 | |
1620 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1621 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1622 | } else { | |
1623 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1624 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1625 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 1626 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1627 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
1628 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1629 | } |
555cbb32 | 1630 | s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1631 | |
1632 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1633 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | ||
1636 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1637 | } |
1638 | ||
38b051a1 | 1639 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1640 | { |
54105ddd | 1641 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1642 | unsigned char *p; |
1643 | int i; | |
38b051a1 | 1644 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
9ab930b2 | 1645 | |
555cbb32 | 1646 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1647 | /* We've already read everything in */ |
1648 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1649 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1650 | } |
1651 | ||
0f113f3e | 1652 | p = s->init_msg; |
555cbb32 | 1653 | n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
0f113f3e | 1654 | while (n > 0) { |
38b051a1 TM |
1655 | i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
1656 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1657 | if (i <= 0) { |
1658 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1659 | *len = 0; |
1660 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1661 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1662 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1663 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1664 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1665 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1666 | /* |
1667 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1668 | * Finished verification. | |
1669 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1670 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1671 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1672 | *len = 0; | |
1673 | return 0; | |
1674 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1675 | |
0f113f3e | 1676 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1677 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1678 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1679 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1680 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1681 | *len = 0; |
1682 | return 0; | |
1683 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1684 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1685 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
38b051a1 | 1686 | (size_t)s->init_num, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg); |
32ec4153 | 1687 | } else { |
11c67eea MC |
1688 | /* |
1689 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1690 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1691 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1692 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1693 | */ |
597c51bc | 1694 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 | 1695 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
38b051a1 TM |
1696 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) |
1697 | || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET | |
1698 | && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
555cbb32 | 1699 | if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO |
9d75dce3 TS |
1700 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1701 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1702 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1703 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1704 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1705 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1706 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1707 | *len = 0; | |
1708 | return 0; | |
1709 | } | |
597c51bc | 1710 | } |
d166ed8c | 1711 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1712 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1713 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
38b051a1 | 1714 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl, |
32ec4153 MC |
1715 | s->msg_callback_arg); |
1716 | } | |
1717 | ||
eda75751 | 1718 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1719 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1720 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1721 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1722 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1723 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1724 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
cccf532f | 1725 | {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
c6d38183 RS |
1726 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, |
1727 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1728 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1729 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1730 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1731 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1732 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1733 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1734 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1735 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1736 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1737 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1738 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1739 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1740 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1741 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1742 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1743 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1744 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1745 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1746 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1747 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1748 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1749 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1750 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1751 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1752 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1753 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1754 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1755 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1756 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1757 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1758 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1759 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1760 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1761 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1762 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1763 | ||
1764 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1765 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1766 | }; | |
1767 | ||
1768 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1769 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1770 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1771 | ||
1772 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1773 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1774 | break; | |
1775 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1776 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1777 | |
38b051a1 | 1778 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1779 | { |
1780 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1781 | return 0; | |
1782 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1783 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1784 | |
38b051a1 | 1785 | static int version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 | 1786 | { |
38b051a1 | 1787 | int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s); |
4fa52141 VD |
1788 | |
1789 | if (a == b) | |
1790 | return 0; | |
1791 | if (!dtls) | |
1792 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1793 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1794 | } | |
1795 | ||
1796 | typedef struct { | |
1797 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1798 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1799 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1800 | } version_info; |
1801 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1802 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION |
582a17d6 | 1803 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. |
4fa52141 VD |
1804 | #endif |
1805 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1806 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1807 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1808 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1809 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1810 | #else | |
1811 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1812 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1813 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1814 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1815 | #else |
a230b26e | 1816 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1817 | #endif |
1818 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1819 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1820 | #else |
a230b26e | 1821 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1822 | #endif |
1823 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1824 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1825 | #else |
a230b26e | 1826 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1827 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1828 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1829 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1830 | #else |
a230b26e | 1831 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1832 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1833 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1834 | }; |
1835 | ||
5c587fb6 | 1836 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION |
4fa52141 VD |
1837 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. |
1838 | #endif | |
1839 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1840 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1841 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1842 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1843 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1844 | #else |
a230b26e | 1845 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1846 | #endif |
1847 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1848 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1849 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1850 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1851 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1852 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1853 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1854 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1855 | }; |
1856 | ||
1857 | /* | |
1858 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1859 | * | |
1860 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1861 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1862 | * | |
1863 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1864 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1865 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1866 | { |
1867 | int version = method->version; | |
1868 | ||
1869 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1870 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1871 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1872 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1873 | ||
1874 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1875 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1876 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1877 | ||
1878 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1879 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1880 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1881 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1882 | |
1883 | return 0; | |
1884 | } | |
1885 | ||
baa45c3e MC |
1886 | /* |
1887 | * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable | |
ebda646d MC |
1888 | * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has |
1889 | * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. | |
baa45c3e | 1890 | */ |
38b051a1 | 1891 | static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
baa45c3e | 1892 | { |
ee58915c | 1893 | size_t i; |
65d2c16c | 1894 | int curve; |
38b051a1 | 1895 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); |
baa45c3e | 1896 | |
38b051a1 | 1897 | if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) |
ebda646d MC |
1898 | return 0; |
1899 | ||
1900 | /* | |
1901 | * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername | |
1902 | * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok | |
1903 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1904 | if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL |
ebda646d MC |
1905 | || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) |
1906 | return 1; | |
1907 | ||
d162340d MC |
1908 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
1909 | if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) | |
1910 | return 1; | |
1911 | #endif | |
1912 | ||
cd3b53b8 | 1913 | if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) |
baa45c3e MC |
1914 | return 1; |
1915 | ||
ee58915c MB |
1916 | /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */ |
1917 | for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1918 | /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ |
1919 | switch (i) { | |
1920 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
1921 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
1922 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
1923 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
1924 | continue; | |
1925 | default: | |
1926 | break; | |
1927 | } | |
de4dc598 MC |
1928 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) |
1929 | continue; | |
1930 | if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) | |
1931 | return 1; | |
1932 | /* | |
1933 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is | |
1934 | * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this | |
1935 | * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. | |
1936 | */ | |
d8975dec | 1937 | curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); |
de4dc598 | 1938 | if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) |
baa45c3e MC |
1939 | return 1; |
1940 | } | |
1941 | ||
1942 | return 0; | |
1943 | } | |
1944 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1945 | /* |
1946 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1947 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1948 | * | |
1949 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1950 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1951 | * | |
1952 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1953 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
1954 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, |
1955 | const SSL_METHOD **meth) | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1956 | { |
1957 | const version_info *vent; | |
1958 | const version_info *table; | |
1959 | ||
38b051a1 | 1960 | switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) { |
ccae4a15 FI |
1961 | default: |
1962 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1963 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1964 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1965 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1966 | break; | |
1967 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1968 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1969 | break; | |
1970 | } | |
1971 | ||
1972 | for (vent = table; | |
1973 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1974 | ++vent) { | |
baa45c3e MC |
1975 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL |
1976 | && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 | |
1977 | && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 | |
1978 | && (!s->server | |
1979 | || version != TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1980 | || is_tls13_capable(s))) { | |
4fd12788 MC |
1981 | if (meth != NULL) |
1982 | *meth = vent->cmeth(); | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1983 | return 1; |
1984 | } | |
1985 | } | |
1986 | return 0; | |
1987 | } | |
1988 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1989 | /* |
1990 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1991 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1992 | * supported protocol version. | |
1993 | * | |
1994 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1995 | * | |
1996 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1997 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 1998 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
4fa52141 VD |
1999 | { |
2000 | const version_info *vent; | |
2001 | const version_info *table; | |
a7f41885 | 2002 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 VD |
2003 | |
2004 | /* | |
2005 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
a7f41885 | 2006 | * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed |
4fa52141 VD |
2007 | * s->method). |
2008 | */ | |
a7f41885 | 2009 | if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version) |
4fa52141 VD |
2010 | return 1; |
2011 | ||
2012 | /* | |
2013 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
2014 | * highest protocol version). | |
2015 | */ | |
a7f41885 | 2016 | if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version) |
4fa52141 | 2017 | table = tls_version_table; |
a7f41885 | 2018 | else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version) |
4fa52141 VD |
2019 | table = dtls_version_table; |
2020 | else { | |
2021 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
2022 | return 0; | |
2023 | } | |
2024 | ||
2025 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 2026 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
2027 | return s->version == vent->version; |
2028 | } | |
2029 | return 0; | |
2030 | } | |
2031 | ||
2032 | /* | |
2033 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
2034 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
2035 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
2036 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
2037 | * | |
2038 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
2039 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
2040 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
2041 | * | |
2042 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
2043 | */ | |
2044 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
2045 | { | |
77174598 VD |
2046 | int valid_tls; |
2047 | int valid_dtls; | |
2048 | ||
869e978c KR |
2049 | if (version == 0) { |
2050 | *bound = version; | |
2051 | return 1; | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | ||
77174598 VD |
2054 | valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; |
2055 | valid_dtls = | |
861cd896 MC |
2056 | /* We support client side pre-standardisation version of DTLS */ |
2057 | (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
2058 | || (DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) | |
2059 | && DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_VERSION)); | |
77174598 VD |
2060 | |
2061 | if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) | |
2062 | return 0; | |
2063 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2064 | /*- |
2065 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
2066 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
2067 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
2068 | * | |
2069 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
2070 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
2071 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
2072 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
2073 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
77174598 VD |
2074 | * |
2075 | * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, | |
2076 | * returning success. | |
4fa52141 VD |
2077 | */ |
2078 | switch (method_version) { | |
2079 | default: | |
77174598 | 2080 | break; |
4fa52141 VD |
2081 | |
2082 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
2083 | if (valid_tls) |
2084 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2085 | break; |
2086 | ||
2087 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
77174598 VD |
2088 | if (valid_dtls) |
2089 | *bound = version; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2090 | break; |
2091 | } | |
4fa52141 VD |
2092 | return 1; |
2093 | } | |
2094 | ||
38b051a1 | 2095 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
f7f2a01d MC |
2096 | { |
2097 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
4fd12788 | 2098 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { |
f7f2a01d | 2099 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; |
38b051a1 | 2100 | } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
5627f9f2 MC |
2101 | && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION |
2102 | /* | |
2103 | * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 | |
2104 | * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still | |
2105 | * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and | |
2106 | * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is | |
2107 | * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. | |
2108 | */ | |
2109 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { | |
f7f2a01d MC |
2110 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; |
2111 | } else { | |
2112 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
2113 | } | |
2114 | } | |
2115 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2116 | /* |
2117 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
2118 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
2119 | * the version specific method. | |
2120 | * | |
2121 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
2122 | * | |
2123 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2124 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2125 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, |
2126 | DOWNGRADE *dgrd) | |
4fa52141 VD |
2127 | { |
2128 | /*- | |
2129 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
2130 | * | |
2131 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
5c587fb6 | 2132 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. |
4fa52141 VD |
2133 | * |
2134 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
2135 | * handle version. | |
2136 | */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2137 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
2138 | int server_version = ssl->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 2139 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2140 | const version_info *vent; |
2141 | const version_info *table; | |
2142 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 2143 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 2144 | |
1ab3836b MC |
2145 | s->client_version = client_version; |
2146 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2147 | switch (server_version) { |
2148 | default: | |
38b051a1 | 2149 | if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
7d061fce MC |
2150 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) |
2151 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 2152 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
2153 | /* |
2154 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2155 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2156 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2157 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2158 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2159 | */ | |
2160 | return 0; | |
2161 | } | |
d2f42576 | 2162 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
2163 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
2164 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 2165 | */ |
018fcbec | 2166 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
2167 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
2168 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2169 | break; | |
2170 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2171 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2172 | break; | |
2173 | } | |
2174 | ||
70af3d8e | 2175 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 2176 | |
6f40214f | 2177 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 2178 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
2179 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
2180 | ||
38b051a1 | 2181 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
2182 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
2183 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
2184 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
2185 | PACKET versionslist; | |
2186 | ||
6b473aca MC |
2187 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
2188 | ||
16bce0e0 | 2189 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
2190 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
2191 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
2192 | } | |
2193 | ||
d8434cf8 MC |
2194 | /* |
2195 | * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. | |
2196 | * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: | |
2197 | * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with | |
2198 | * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to | |
2199 | * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." | |
2200 | * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. | |
2201 | * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. | |
2202 | */ | |
2203 | if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) | |
2204 | return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; | |
2205 | ||
cd998837 | 2206 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { |
cd998837 MC |
2207 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
2208 | continue; | |
4fd12788 MC |
2209 | if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) |
2210 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
cd998837 MC |
2211 | } |
2212 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
2213 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
2214 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
2217 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 2218 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 2219 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
2220 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
2221 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
2222 | */ |
2223 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
2224 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
2225 | return 0; | |
2226 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 2227 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 | 2228 | s->version = best_vers; |
38b051a1 | 2229 | ssl->method = best_method; |
1d367677 | 2230 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers)) |
1853d20a MC |
2231 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2232 | ||
cd998837 MC |
2233 | return 0; |
2234 | } | |
2235 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
2236 | } | |
2237 | ||
2238 | /* | |
2239 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
2240 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
2241 | */ | |
2242 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
2243 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2244 | ||
2245 | /* | |
2246 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
2247 | * the ClientHello. | |
2248 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
2249 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2250 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
2251 | ||
2252 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
2253 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
2254 | continue; | |
2255 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
2256 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 2257 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 | 2258 | s->version = vent->version; |
38b051a1 | 2259 | ssl->method = method; |
1d367677 | 2260 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) |
1853d20a MC |
2261 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2262 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2263 | return 0; |
2264 | } | |
2265 | disabled = 1; | |
2266 | } | |
2267 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
2268 | } | |
2269 | ||
2270 | /* | |
2271 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
2272 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
2273 | * the version specific method. | |
2274 | * | |
2275 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2276 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 2277 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 2278 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 2279 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 2280 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
2281 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, |
2282 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) | |
4fa52141 VD |
2283 | { |
2284 | const version_info *vent; | |
2285 | const version_info *table; | |
b5b993b2 | 2286 | int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; |
38b051a1 | 2287 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 | 2288 | |
88050dd1 MC |
2289 | origv = s->version; |
2290 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 2291 | |
88050dd1 MC |
2292 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
2293 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
2294 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
2295 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
2296 | NULL, 0)) { | |
2297 | s->version = origv; | |
2298 | return 0; | |
2299 | } | |
2300 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
2301 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
2302 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 2303 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2304 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 2305 | return 0; |
c3043dcd MC |
2306 | } |
2307 | ||
38b051a1 | 2308 | switch (ssl->method->version) { |
4fa52141 | 2309 | default: |
38b051a1 | 2310 | if (s->version != ssl->method->version) { |
88050dd1 | 2311 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
29bfd5b7 | 2313 | return 0; |
c3043dcd | 2314 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
2315 | /* |
2316 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2317 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2318 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2319 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2320 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2321 | */ | |
1d367677 | 2322 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { |
1853d20a MC |
2323 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2324 | return 0; | |
2325 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 2326 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2327 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
2328 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2329 | break; | |
2330 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2331 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2332 | break; | |
2333 | } | |
2334 | ||
b5b993b2 MC |
2335 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); |
2336 | if (ret != 0) { | |
2337 | s->version = origv; | |
c48ffbcc | 2338 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); |
b5b993b2 MC |
2339 | return 0; |
2340 | } | |
38b051a1 TM |
2341 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) |
2342 | : s->version < ver_min) { | |
b5b993b2 | 2343 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2344 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 | 2345 | return 0; |
38b051a1 TM |
2346 | } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) |
2347 | : s->version > ver_max) { | |
b5b993b2 | 2348 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2349 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
b5b993b2 MC |
2350 | return 0; |
2351 | } | |
5df22060 | 2352 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2353 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) |
2354 | real_max = ver_max; | |
c3043dcd | 2355 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2356 | /* Check for downgrades */ |
2357 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { | |
2358 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 2359 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
2360 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), |
2361 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
2362 | s->version = origv; | |
2363 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2364 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
2365 | return 0; | |
2366 | } | |
38b051a1 | 2367 | } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) |
b5b993b2 MC |
2368 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION |
2369 | && real_max > s->version) { | |
2370 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
555cbb32 | 2371 | s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
b5b993b2 MC |
2372 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), |
2373 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
2374 | s->version = origv; | |
2375 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2376 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
2377 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 2378 | } |
b5b993b2 | 2379 | } |
c3043dcd | 2380 | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2381 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2382 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) | |
c3043dcd MC |
2383 | continue; |
2384 | ||
38b051a1 | 2385 | ssl->method = vent->cmeth(); |
1d367677 | 2386 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { |
1853d20a MC |
2387 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2388 | return 0; | |
2389 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 2390 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
2391 | } |
2392 | ||
88050dd1 | 2393 | s->version = origv; |
c48ffbcc | 2394 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); |
29bfd5b7 | 2395 | return 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2396 | } |
2397 | ||
068c358a | 2398 | /* |
38a73150 | 2399 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
2400 | * @s: The SSL connection |
2401 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
2402 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2403 | * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole |
2404 | * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled | |
2405 | * protocol. | |
068c358a KR |
2406 | * |
2407 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
2408 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
2409 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 2410 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 2411 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 2412 | * |
0485d540 | 2413 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
2414 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
2415 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
2416 | * | |
068c358a KR |
2417 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
2418 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 2419 | */ |
38b051a1 TM |
2420 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version, |
2421 | int *max_version, int *real_max) | |
4fa52141 | 2422 | { |
b5b993b2 | 2423 | int version, tmp_real_max; |
4fa52141 | 2424 | int hole; |
4fa52141 VD |
2425 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
2426 | const version_info *table; | |
2427 | const version_info *vent; | |
38b051a1 | 2428 | const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
4fa52141 | 2429 | |
38b051a1 | 2430 | switch (ssl->method->version) { |
4fa52141 VD |
2431 | default: |
2432 | /* | |
2433 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
2434 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
2435 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
2436 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
2437 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
2438 | */ | |
068c358a | 2439 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2440 | /* |
2441 | * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version | |
2442 | * flexible method. | |
2443 | */ | |
2444 | if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) | |
2445 | return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2446 | return 0; |
2447 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2448 | table = tls_version_table; | |
2449 | break; | |
2450 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
2451 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
2452 | break; | |
2453 | } | |
2454 | ||
2455 | /* | |
2456 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
2457 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
2458 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
2459 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
2460 | * | |
2461 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
2462 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
2463 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
2464 | * | |
2465 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
d561fe5a | 2466 | * the selected version. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. |
4fa52141 | 2467 | * |
d561fe5a | 2468 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, we support a contiguous |
2469 | * range of at least two methods. If we hit a disabled method, | |
2470 | * then hole becomes true again, but nothing else changes yet, | |
2471 | * because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
4fa52141 VD |
2472 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes |
2473 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
2474 | */ | |
068c358a | 2475 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 | 2476 | hole = 1; |
b5b993b2 MC |
2477 | if (real_max != NULL) |
2478 | *real_max = 0; | |
2479 | tmp_real_max = 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2480 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
2481 | /* | |
2482 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
2483 | * "version capability" vector. | |
2484 | */ | |
2485 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
2486 | hole = 1; | |
b5b993b2 | 2487 | tmp_real_max = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
2488 | continue; |
2489 | } | |
2490 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
b5b993b2 MC |
2491 | |
2492 | if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) | |
2493 | tmp_real_max = vent->version; | |
2494 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2495 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { |
2496 | hole = 1; | |
2497 | } else if (!hole) { | |
068c358a | 2498 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 | 2499 | } else { |
b5b993b2 MC |
2500 | if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) |
2501 | *real_max = tmp_real_max; | |
d561fe5a | 2502 | version = method->version; |
068c358a | 2503 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
2504 | hole = 0; |
2505 | } | |
2506 | } | |
2507 | ||
068c358a KR |
2508 | *max_version = version; |
2509 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
2510 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
2511 | if (version == 0) | |
2512 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
2513 | ||
068c358a KR |
2514 | return 0; |
2515 | } | |
2516 | ||
2517 | /* | |
2518 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 2519 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
2520 | * |
2521 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
2522 | * | |
2523 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
2524 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2525 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
068c358a | 2526 | { |
3eb2aff4 | 2527 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 2528 | |
447cc0ad MC |
2529 | /* |
2530 | * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent | |
2531 | * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. | |
2532 | */ | |
2533 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
2534 | return 0; | |
2535 | ||
b5b993b2 | 2536 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); |
068c358a KR |
2537 | |
2538 | if (ret != 0) | |
2539 | return ret; | |
2540 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2541 | s->version = ver_max; |
2542 | ||
222cf410 MC |
2543 | if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
2544 | if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2545 | /* | |
2546 | * Even though this is technically before version negotiation, | |
2547 | * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate | |
2548 | * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when | |
2549 | * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer | |
2550 | * about this immediately. | |
2551 | */ | |
1d367677 MC |
2552 | if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max)) |
2553 | return 0; | |
222cf410 MC |
2554 | } |
2555 | } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
2556 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
7acb8b64 | 2557 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; |
222cf410 | 2558 | } |
7acb8b64 MC |
2559 | |
2560 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2561 | return 0; |
2562 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2563 | |
2564 | /* | |
2565 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2566 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2567 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2568 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2569 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2570 | int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2571 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2572 | { | |
2573 | size_t i; | |
2574 | ||
2575 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2576 | return 0; | |
2577 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2578 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2579 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2580 | ||
2581 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2582 | && (!checkallow |
dbc6268f | 2583 | || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2584 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2585 | } |
2586 | } | |
2587 | ||
0acee504 | 2588 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2589 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2590 | |
2591 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
38b051a1 TM |
2592 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, |
2593 | const unsigned char *hashval, | |
43054d3d MC |
2594 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, |
2595 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2596 | { |
43054d3d | 2597 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2598 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2599 | ||
2600 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2601 | |
43054d3d MC |
2602 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2603 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2604 | hashlen = 0; | |
2605 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2606 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2607 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2608 | &hashlen)) { | |
2609 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2610 | return 0; | |
2611 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2612 | } |
2613 | ||
2614 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2615 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2616 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2617 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2618 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2619 | |
2620 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2621 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2622 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2623 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2624 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2625 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2626 | return 0; |
2627 | } | |
2628 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2629 | /* |
2630 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2631 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2632 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2633 | */ | |
2634 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2635 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2636 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
555cbb32 | 2637 | s->s3.tmp.message_size |
43054d3d MC |
2638 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { |
2639 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2640 | return 0; | |
2641 | } | |
2642 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2643 | return 1; |
2644 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2645 | |
2646 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2647 | { | |
2648 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2649 | } | |
2650 | ||
38b051a1 | 2651 | int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2652 | { |
2653 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2654 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2655 | PACKET cadns; | |
2656 | ||
2657 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
e077455e | 2658 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2659 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2660 | } |
2661 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2662 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2663 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2664 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2665 | } |
2666 | ||
2667 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2668 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2669 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2670 | ||
2671 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2672 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2673 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2674 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2675 | } |
2676 | ||
2677 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2678 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2679 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
f63a17d6 | 2680 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2681 | } |
2682 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2683 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
f63a17d6 | 2684 | goto err; |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2685 | } |
2686 | ||
2687 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
e077455e | 2688 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2689 | goto err; |
2690 | } | |
2691 | xn = NULL; | |
2692 | } | |
2693 | ||
555cbb32 TS |
2694 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2695 | s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2696 | |
2697 | return 1; | |
2698 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2699 | err: |
2700 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2701 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2702 | return 0; | |
2703 | } | |
2704 | ||
38b051a1 | 2705 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
5d6cca05 | 2706 | { |
1e331727 | 2707 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; |
38b051a1 | 2708 | SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); |
5d6cca05 | 2709 | |
98732979 | 2710 | if (s->server) { |
38b051a1 | 2711 | ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); |
98732979 MC |
2712 | if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) |
2713 | ca_sk = NULL; | |
2714 | } | |
2715 | ||
2716 | if (ca_sk == NULL) | |
38b051a1 | 2717 | ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl); |
98732979 MC |
2718 | |
2719 | return ca_sk; | |
2720 | } | |
2721 | ||
38b051a1 TM |
2722 | int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, |
2723 | WPACKET *pkt) | |
98732979 | 2724 | { |
5d6cca05 | 2725 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
f63a17d6 | 2726 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2727 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2728 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2729 | } |
5d6cca05 | 2730 | |
90fc2c26 | 2731 | if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2732 | int i; |
2733 | ||
2734 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2735 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2736 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2737 | int namelen; | |
2738 | ||
2739 | if (name == NULL | |
2740 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2741 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2742 | &namebytes) | |
2743 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2744 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2745 | return 0; |
2746 | } | |
2747 | } | |
2748 | } | |
2749 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2750 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2751 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
5d6cca05 | 2752 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2753 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2754 | |
2755 | return 1; | |
2756 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2757 | |
2758 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
38b051a1 | 2759 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2760 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2761 | { | |
2762 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2763 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2764 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2765 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
e077455e | 2766 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
72ceb6a6 | 2767 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2768 | } |
555cbb32 TS |
2769 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2770 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2771 | |
2772 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2773 | ||
2774 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2775 | return tbslen; | |
2776 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2777 | |
2778 | /* | |
2779 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2780 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2781 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2782 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
9d75dce3 TS |
2783 | { |
2784 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2785 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2786 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2787 | return 0; | |
2788 | ||
2789 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2790 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2791 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2792 | return 0; |
2793 | } | |
2794 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
555cbb32 | 2795 | s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2796 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
963eb12d | 2797 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); |
2798 | s->pha_dgst = NULL; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2799 | return 0; |
2800 | } | |
2801 | } | |
2802 | return 1; | |
2803 | } | |
2804 | ||
2805 | /* | |
2806 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2807 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2808 | */ | |
38b051a1 | 2809 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
9d75dce3 TS |
2810 | { |
2811 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
c48ffbcc | 2812 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2813 | return 0; |
2814 | } | |
555cbb32 | 2815 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, |
9d75dce3 | 2816 | s->pha_dgst)) { |
c48ffbcc | 2817 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9d75dce3 TS |
2818 | return 0; |
2819 | } | |
2820 | return 1; | |
2821 | } | |
b67cb09f TS |
2822 | |
2823 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG | |
2824 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
2825 | PACKET *pkt, | |
2826 | PACKET *tmppkt, | |
2827 | BUF_MEM *buf) | |
2828 | { | |
2829 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2830 | int comp_alg; | |
2831 | COMP_METHOD *method = NULL; | |
2832 | COMP_CTX *comp = NULL; | |
2833 | size_t expected_length; | |
2834 | size_t comp_length; | |
2835 | int i; | |
2836 | int found = 0; | |
2837 | ||
2838 | if (buf == NULL) { | |
2839 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2840 | goto err; | |
2841 | } | |
2842 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) { | |
2843 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2844 | goto err; | |
2845 | } | |
2846 | /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */ | |
2847 | if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) { | |
2848 | for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) { | |
2849 | if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) { | |
2850 | found = 1; | |
2851 | break; | |
2852 | } | |
2853 | } | |
2854 | if (!found) { | |
2855 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
2856 | goto err; | |
2857 | } | |
2858 | } | |
2859 | if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) { | |
2860 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
2861 | goto err; | |
2862 | } | |
2863 | switch (comp_alg) { | |
2864 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib: | |
3840271e | 2865 | method = COMP_zlib_oneshot(); |
b67cb09f TS |
2866 | break; |
2867 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli: | |
2868 | method = COMP_brotli_oneshot(); | |
2869 | break; | |
2870 | case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd: | |
2871 | method = COMP_zstd_oneshot(); | |
2872 | break; | |
2873 | default: | |
2874 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
2875 | goto err; | |
2876 | } | |
2877 | ||
7e3cacac TS |
2878 | if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL |
2879 | || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length) | |
b67cb09f TS |
2880 | || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length) |
2881 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length | |
2882 | || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length) | |
2883 | || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length) | |
b67cb09f TS |
2884 | || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length, |
2885 | (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) { | |
2886 | SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); | |
2887 | goto err; | |
2888 | } | |
2889 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
2890 | err: | |
2891 | COMP_CTX_free(comp); | |
2892 | return ret; | |
2893 | } | |
2894 | #endif |