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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
75 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
76 | { | |
c7f47786 MC |
77 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) |
78 | return 0; | |
79 | ||
b186a592 MC |
80 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
81 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
82 | ||
c7f47786 | 83 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
84 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
85 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
86 | ||
87 | /* | |
88 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
89 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
90 | * ClientHello. | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
93 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
94 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
95 | return 0; | |
96 | } | |
97 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
98 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
99 | ||
100 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
101 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
102 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
103 | ok = 1; | |
104 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
105 | ok = 1; | |
106 | } | |
107 | if (ok) | |
108 | break; | |
109 | } | |
110 | if (!ok) { | |
111 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
112 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
113 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
114 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
117 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
118 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; | |
119 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && | |
120 | !(s->options & | |
121 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
122 | /* | |
123 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
124 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
125 | */ | |
126 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, | |
127 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
128 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
129 | return 0; | |
130 | } else { | |
131 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; | |
132 | ||
133 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
134 | } | |
135 | } else { | |
136 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
137 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; | |
138 | else | |
139 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; | |
140 | ||
141 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
142 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
143 | s->hit = 0; | |
144 | ||
145 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
146 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 147 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 148 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
149 | } |
150 | ||
151 | return 1; | |
152 | } | |
153 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
154 | /* |
155 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
156 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
157 | */ | |
158 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
159 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
160 | ||
161 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
162 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
163 | { | |
164 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
165 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
166 | ||
167 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
168 | size_t hashlen; | |
169 | ||
170 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
171 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
172 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
173 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
174 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
175 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
176 | else | |
177 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
178 | ||
179 | /* | |
180 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
181 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
182 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
183 | */ | |
184 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
185 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
186 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
187 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
188 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
189 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
190 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
191 | return 0; | |
192 | } | |
193 | ||
194 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
195 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
196 | } else { | |
197 | size_t retlen; | |
198 | ||
199 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
200 | if (retlen <= 0) | |
201 | return 0; | |
202 | *hdatalen = retlen; | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
205 | return 1; | |
206 | } | |
207 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
208 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
209 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
210 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
211 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 212 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
213 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
214 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
215 | void *hdata; |
216 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 217 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 218 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 219 | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
220 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
221 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
222 | goto err; | |
223 | } | |
224 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
225 | md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); | |
226 | ||
227 | if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { | |
228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
229 | goto err; | |
230 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
231 | |
232 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
233 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
234 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
235 | goto err; | |
236 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 237 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
238 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
239 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
240 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
241 | goto err; | |
242 | } | |
243 | ||
ad4dd362 | 244 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
245 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
246 | goto err; | |
247 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
248 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
249 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
250 | if (sig == NULL) { |
251 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
252 | goto err; | |
253 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 254 | |
75394189 | 255 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
5f9b64a2 MC |
256 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
257 | goto err; | |
258 | } | |
259 | ||
ad4dd362 | 260 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 261 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
262 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
263 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
264 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
265 | goto err; | |
266 | } | |
267 | } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
268 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
269 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
270 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
271 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
272 | goto err; | |
273 | } | |
274 | } | |
275 | ||
75394189 | 276 | if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
277 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
278 | goto err; | |
279 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 280 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
281 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
282 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
283 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
284 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
285 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
286 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
287 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 288 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
289 | } |
290 | #endif | |
291 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 292 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
293 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
294 | goto err; | |
295 | } | |
296 | ||
297 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
298 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
299 | goto err; | |
300 | ||
301 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
302 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
303 | return 1; | |
304 | err: | |
305 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
306 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
307 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
308 | return 0; | |
309 | } | |
310 | ||
311 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
312 | { | |
313 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 314 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
315 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
316 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
317 | #endif | |
5f9b64a2 | 318 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dc8da7b1 | 319 | int type = 0, j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
320 | unsigned int len; |
321 | X509 *peer; | |
322 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 323 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 324 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 325 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 326 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 327 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
328 | |
329 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
330 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
331 | goto f_err; |
332 | } | |
333 | ||
334 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
335 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
fb34a0f4 | 336 | if (pkey == NULL) |
83b4049a | 337 | goto f_err; |
83b4049a | 338 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
339 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); |
340 | ||
341 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
342 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
343 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
344 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
345 | goto f_err; | |
346 | } | |
347 | ||
348 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ | |
349 | /* | |
350 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without | |
351 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) | |
352 | */ | |
353 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
354 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
355 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
356 | len = 64; | |
357 | } else | |
358 | #endif | |
359 | { | |
360 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
361 | int rv; | |
703bcee0 | 362 | unsigned int sigalg; |
d8bc1399 | 363 | |
703bcee0 | 364 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
365 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
366 | goto f_err; | |
367 | } | |
5554facb | 368 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); |
d8bc1399 | 369 | if (rv == -1) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
370 | goto f_err; |
371 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
372 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
373 | goto f_err; | |
374 | } | |
375 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
376 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
377 | #endif | |
f365a3e2 | 378 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
379 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
380 | goto f_err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
381 | } |
382 | ||
f365a3e2 DSH |
383 | md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx); |
384 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
385 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
386 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
387 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
388 | goto f_err; | |
389 | } | |
390 | } | |
391 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
392 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
393 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
394 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
395 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
396 | goto f_err; | |
397 | } | |
398 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
399 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
400 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
401 | goto f_err; | |
402 | } | |
403 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 404 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
d8bc1399 | 405 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
406 | goto f_err; |
407 | } | |
408 | ||
409 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
410 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
411 | #endif | |
75394189 | 412 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 | 413 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
414 | goto f_err; |
415 | } | |
416 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
417 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 418 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
419 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
420 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
421 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
422 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
423 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
424 | goto f_err; |
425 | } | |
426 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
427 | data = gost_data; | |
428 | } | |
429 | } | |
430 | #endif | |
431 | ||
5554facb | 432 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 433 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
434 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
435 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
436 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
437 | goto f_err; | |
438 | } | |
439 | } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION | |
d8bc1399 MC |
440 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, |
441 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
442 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
443 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
444 | goto f_err; |
445 | } | |
446 | ||
75394189 DSH |
447 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); |
448 | ||
449 | if (j < 0) { | |
450 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
451 | goto f_err; | |
452 | } else if (j == 0) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
453 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
454 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
455 | goto f_err; | |
456 | } | |
457 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 458 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
d8bc1399 MC |
459 | if (0) { |
460 | f_err: | |
461 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
462 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
463 | } | |
464 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
465 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
466 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
467 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
468 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
469 | #endif | |
470 | return ret; | |
471 | } | |
472 | ||
229185e6 | 473 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 474 | { |
12472b45 | 475 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 476 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 477 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 478 | |
f7e393be MC |
479 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
480 | if (!s->server) | |
481 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
482 | ||
483 | /* | |
484 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
485 | * client certificate | |
486 | */ | |
487 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
488 | && !s->server | |
489 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
490 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
491 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
492 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
493 | goto err; | |
494 | } | |
495 | ||
229185e6 MC |
496 | if (s->server) { |
497 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
498 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
499 | } else { | |
500 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
501 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
502 | } | |
0f113f3e | 503 | |
12472b45 MC |
504 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
505 | sender, slen, | |
506 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
507 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
508 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
509 | goto err; | |
510 | } | |
511 | ||
12472b45 | 512 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 513 | |
12472b45 | 514 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
516 | goto err; | |
517 | } | |
0f113f3e | 518 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
519 | /* |
520 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
521 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
522 | */ | |
523 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
524 | s->session->master_key, | |
525 | s->session->master_key_length)) | |
2faa1b48 CB |
526 | return 0; |
527 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
528 | /* |
529 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
530 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 531 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
532 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
533 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
534 | finish_md_len); | |
535 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 536 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
537 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
538 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
539 | finish_md_len); | |
540 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 541 | } |
0f113f3e | 542 | |
b9908bf9 | 543 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 544 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
545 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
546 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 547 | } |
d02b48c6 | 548 | |
44c04a2e MC |
549 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
550 | { | |
551 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
552 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
553 | goto err; | |
554 | } | |
555 | ||
9412b3ad | 556 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 557 | return 1; |
f14afcaa | 558 | |
44c04a2e MC |
559 | err: |
560 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
561 | return 0; | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
564 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
565 | { | |
57389a32 | 566 | int al; |
e1c3de44 MC |
567 | unsigned int updatetype; |
568 | ||
82f992cb MC |
569 | s->key_update_count++; |
570 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
571 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
572 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
573 | goto err; | |
574 | } | |
575 | ||
524420d8 MC |
576 | /* |
577 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
578 | * be on a record boundary. | |
579 | */ | |
580 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
581 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
582 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
583 | goto err; | |
584 | } | |
585 | ||
e1c3de44 | 586 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 587 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
57389a32 | 588 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 | 589 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
57389a32 | 590 | goto err; |
e1c3de44 MC |
591 | } |
592 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
593 | /* |
594 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
595 | * didn't recognise. | |
596 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
597 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
598 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
599 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
600 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
601 | goto err; | |
602 | } | |
603 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
604 | /* |
605 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
606 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
607 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
608 | */ | |
609 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
610 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
611 | ||
57389a32 MC |
612 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
613 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
614 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
615 | goto err; | |
616 | } | |
617 | ||
e1c3de44 | 618 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
57389a32 MC |
619 | err: |
620 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
621 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
622 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
623 | } |
624 | ||
bf48836c | 625 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
626 | /* |
627 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
628 | * to far. | |
629 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 630 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
631 | { |
632 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 633 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
634 | /* |
635 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
636 | * the appropriate error. | |
637 | */ | |
638 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
639 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 640 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
641 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
642 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
643 | } else { | |
644 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
645 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
646 | } | |
647 | ||
648 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
649 | sender, | |
650 | slen, | |
651 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
652 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
653 | #endif |
654 | ||
be3583fa | 655 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
656 | { |
657 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 658 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 659 | |
73999b62 | 660 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
661 | /* |
662 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
663 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
664 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 665 | */ |
c69f2adf | 666 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 667 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
668 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
669 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
670 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
fb34a0f4 | 671 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
a230b26e EK |
672 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
673 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
674 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
675 | } |
676 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 677 | if (remain != 0) { |
fb34a0f4 | 678 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
679 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
680 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
681 | goto f_err; |
682 | } | |
657da85e MC |
683 | } |
684 | ||
685 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
686 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
687 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 688 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
689 | goto f_err; |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
692 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
693 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
694 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 695 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
696 | goto f_err; |
697 | } | |
698 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
699 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
700 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
701 | ||
702 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
703 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
704 | ||
705 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
706 | /* | |
707 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
708 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
709 | * SCTP is used | |
710 | */ | |
711 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
712 | #endif | |
713 | } | |
714 | ||
b9908bf9 | 715 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
716 | f_err: |
717 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 718 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 719 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
720 | } |
721 | ||
be3583fa | 722 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 723 | { |
7776a36c | 724 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 725 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 726 | |
d781d247 MC |
727 | |
728 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
729 | if (s->server) |
730 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 731 | |
524420d8 MC |
732 | /* |
733 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
734 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
735 | */ | |
736 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
737 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
738 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
739 | goto f_err; | |
740 | } | |
741 | ||
0f113f3e | 742 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 743 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 744 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 745 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
746 | goto f_err; |
747 | } | |
748 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
749 | ||
12472b45 | 750 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 751 | |
12472b45 | 752 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 753 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 754 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
755 | goto f_err; |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
12472b45 MC |
758 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
759 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 760 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 761 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
762 | goto f_err; |
763 | } | |
764 | ||
765 | /* | |
766 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
767 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 768 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
769 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
770 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
771 | md_len); | |
772 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 773 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
774 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
775 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
776 | md_len); | |
777 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
778 | } |
779 | ||
7776a36c MC |
780 | /* |
781 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
782 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
783 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
784 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
785 | if (s->server) { | |
786 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
787 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
788 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
789 | goto f_err; | |
790 | } | |
791 | } else { | |
792 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 793 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 794 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
92760c21 MC |
795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
796 | goto f_err; | |
797 | } | |
798 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
799 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
800 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
801 | goto f_err; | |
802 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
803 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
804 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
805 | } |
806 | } | |
807 | ||
e6575156 | 808 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
809 | f_err: |
810 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 811 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 812 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 813 | } |
d02b48c6 | 814 | |
7cea05dc | 815 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 816 | { |
7cea05dc | 817 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 818 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
819 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
820 | return 0; | |
821 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 822 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
823 | return 1; |
824 | } | |
825 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
826 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
827 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
828 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 829 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
830 | int len; |
831 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
832 | ||
833 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
834 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 835 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
836 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
837 | return 0; | |
838 | } | |
839 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
840 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 841 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
842 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
843 | return 0; | |
844 | } | |
845 | ||
846 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 847 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
e96e0f8e MC |
848 | chain, al)) |
849 | return 0; | |
850 | ||
851 | return 1; | |
852 | } | |
853 | ||
854 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
855 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
856 | { | |
857 | int i, chain_count; | |
858 | X509 *x; | |
859 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
860 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
861 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
862 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
863 | ||
864 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
865 | return 1; | |
866 | ||
867 | x = cpk->x509; | |
868 | ||
869 | /* | |
870 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
871 | */ | |
d805a57b | 872 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
873 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
874 | else | |
875 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
876 | ||
877 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
878 | chain_store = NULL; | |
879 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
880 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
881 | else | |
882 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
883 | ||
d805a57b | 884 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
885 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
886 | ||
887 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
888 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
889 | goto err; | |
890 | } | |
891 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
892 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
893 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
894 | goto err; | |
895 | } | |
896 | /* | |
897 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
898 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
899 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
900 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
901 | */ | |
902 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
903 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
904 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
905 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
906 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
907 | if (i != 1) { | |
908 | #if 0 | |
909 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
910 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
911 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
912 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
913 | #endif | |
914 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
915 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
916 | goto err; | |
917 | } | |
918 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
919 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
920 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
921 | ||
922 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
923 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
924 | goto err; | |
925 | } | |
926 | } | |
927 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
928 | } else { | |
929 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
930 | if (i != 1) { | |
931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
932 | goto err; | |
933 | } | |
934 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
935 | goto err; | |
936 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
937 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
938 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
939 | goto err; | |
940 | } | |
941 | } | |
942 | return 1; | |
943 | ||
944 | err: | |
945 | *al = tmpal; | |
946 | return 0; | |
947 | } | |
948 | ||
949 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
950 | int *al) | |
951 | { | |
952 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
953 | ||
5923ad4b | 954 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 955 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 956 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 957 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 958 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 959 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 960 | } |
c49e1912 | 961 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
962 | } |
963 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
964 | /* |
965 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
966 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
967 | * freed up as well. | |
968 | */ | |
969 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) | |
8723588e MC |
970 | { |
971 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
972 | ||
973 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
974 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 975 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
976 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
977 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
978 | return ret; | |
979 | } | |
980 | #endif | |
981 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
982 | if (clearbufs) { |
983 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
984 | /* | |
985 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
986 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
987 | */ | |
988 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
989 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
990 | } | |
991 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
992 | s->init_num = 0; | |
473483d4 | 993 | } |
8723588e | 994 | |
c7f47786 | 995 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
996 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
997 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
998 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 999 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1000 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1001 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1002 | ||
8723588e | 1003 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1004 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1005 | ||
1006 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 1007 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
1008 | } else { |
1009 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
1010 | if (s->hit) | |
1011 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
1012 | ||
fe3a3291 | 1013 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
1014 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
1015 | } | |
1016 | ||
1017 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1018 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1019 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1020 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1021 | ||
1022 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1023 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1024 | ||
1025 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1026 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1027 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1028 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1029 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1030 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1031 | } |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1034 | /* |
1035 | * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, | |
1036 | * so continue. | |
1037 | */ | |
1038 | if (!clearbufs) | |
1039 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1040 | ||
4004ce5f | 1041 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1042 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1043 | } | |
1044 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1045 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1046 | { | |
1047 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1048 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
1049 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 1050 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1051 | |
1052 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1053 | ||
1054 | do { | |
1055 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1056 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1057 | &p[s->init_num], |
1058 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1059 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1060 | if (i <= 0) { |
1061 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1062 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1063 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1064 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1065 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1066 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1067 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1068 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1069 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
1070 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1071 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1072 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1073 | goto f_err; | |
1074 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1075 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1076 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1077 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1078 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1079 | return 1; |
1080 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1081 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1082 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
1083 | goto f_err; |
1084 | } | |
54105ddd | 1085 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1086 | } |
1087 | ||
1088 | skip_message = 0; | |
1089 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1090 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1091 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1092 | /* |
1093 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1094 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1095 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1096 | * MAC. | |
1097 | */ | |
1098 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1099 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1100 | skip_message = 1; | |
1101 | ||
1102 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1103 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1104 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1105 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1106 | } | |
1107 | } while (skip_message); | |
1108 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1109 | ||
1110 | *mt = *p; | |
1111 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1112 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1113 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1114 | /* |
1115 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1116 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1117 | * |
1118 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1119 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1120 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1121 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1122 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1123 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1124 | ||
1125 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1126 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1127 | } else { | |
1128 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1129 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1130 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1131 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1132 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1133 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 1134 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1135 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1136 | ||
1137 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1138 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | ||
1141 | return 1; | |
1142 | f_err: | |
1143 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1144 | return 0; |
1145 | } | |
1146 | ||
eda75751 | 1147 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1148 | { |
54105ddd | 1149 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1150 | unsigned char *p; |
1151 | int i; | |
1152 | ||
1153 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1154 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1155 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1156 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1157 | } |
1158 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1159 | p = s->init_msg; |
1160 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1161 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1162 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1163 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1164 | if (i <= 0) { |
1165 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1166 | *len = 0; |
1167 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1168 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1169 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1170 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1171 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1172 | |
bf48836c | 1173 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1174 | /* |
1175 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1176 | * Finished verification. | |
1177 | */ | |
1178 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1179 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1180 | #endif |
1181 | ||
0f113f3e | 1182 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1183 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1184 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1185 | s->init_num)) { | |
1186 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
1187 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1188 | *len = 0; | |
1189 | return 0; | |
1190 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1191 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1192 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1193 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1194 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1195 | /* |
1196 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1197 | * processing the message | |
1198 | */ | |
1199 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
1200 | && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1201 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d166ed8c DSH |
1202 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
1203 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1204 | *len = 0; | |
1205 | return 0; | |
1206 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
1207 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1208 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1209 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1210 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1211 | } | |
1212 | ||
eda75751 | 1213 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1214 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1215 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1216 | |
2e5ead83 | 1217 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 1218 | { |
a230b26e | 1219 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
1220 | return -1; |
1221 | ||
1222 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
1223 | default: | |
1224 | return -1; | |
1225 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
d0ff28f8 | 1226 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA; |
17a72388 VD |
1227 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
1228 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 1229 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
1230 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
1231 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 1232 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 1233 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
1234 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
1235 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
1236 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
1237 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
1238 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
1239 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 1240 | #endif |
82049c54 | 1241 | } |
0f113f3e | 1242 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1243 | |
6b691a5c | 1244 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1245 | { |
1246 | int al; | |
1247 | ||
1248 | switch (type) { | |
1249 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1250 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1251 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1252 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1253 | break; | |
1254 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1255 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1256 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1257 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1258 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1259 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1260 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1261 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1262 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1263 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1264 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1265 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1266 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1267 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1268 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1269 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1270 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1271 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1272 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1273 | break; | |
1274 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1275 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1276 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1277 | break; | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1279 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1280 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1281 | break; | |
1282 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1283 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1284 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1285 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1286 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1287 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1289 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1290 | break; | |
1291 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1292 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1293 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1294 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1295 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1296 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1297 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1298 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1299 | break; | |
1300 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1301 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1302 | break; | |
1303 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1304 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1305 | break; | |
1306 | default: | |
1307 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1308 | break; | |
1309 | } | |
1310 | return (al); | |
1311 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1312 | |
b362ccab | 1313 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1314 | { |
1315 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1316 | return 0; | |
1317 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1318 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1319 | |
068c358a | 1320 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1321 | { |
1322 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1323 | ||
1324 | if (a == b) | |
1325 | return 0; | |
1326 | if (!dtls) | |
1327 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1328 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1329 | } | |
1330 | ||
1331 | typedef struct { | |
1332 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1333 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1334 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1335 | } version_info; |
1336 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1337 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1338 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1339 | #endif |
1340 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1341 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1342 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1343 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1344 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1345 | #else | |
1346 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1347 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1348 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1349 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1350 | #else |
a230b26e | 1351 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1352 | #endif |
1353 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1354 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1355 | #else |
a230b26e | 1356 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1357 | #endif |
1358 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1359 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1360 | #else |
a230b26e | 1361 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1362 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1363 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1364 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1365 | #else |
a230b26e | 1366 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1367 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1368 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1369 | }; |
1370 | ||
1371 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1372 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1373 | #endif | |
1374 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1375 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1376 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1377 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1378 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1379 | #else |
a230b26e | 1380 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1381 | #endif |
1382 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1383 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1384 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1385 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1386 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1387 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1388 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1389 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1390 | }; |
1391 | ||
1392 | /* | |
1393 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1394 | * | |
1395 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1396 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1397 | * | |
1398 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1399 | */ | |
068c358a | 1400 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1401 | { |
1402 | int version = method->version; | |
1403 | ||
1404 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1405 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1406 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1407 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1408 | ||
1409 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1410 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1411 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1412 | ||
1413 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1414 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1415 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1416 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1417 | |
1418 | return 0; | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1421 | /* |
1422 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1423 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1424 | * | |
1425 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1426 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1427 | * | |
1428 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1429 | */ | |
1430 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1431 | { | |
1432 | const version_info *vent; | |
1433 | const version_info *table; | |
1434 | ||
1435 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1436 | default: | |
1437 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1438 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1439 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1440 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1441 | break; | |
1442 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1443 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1444 | break; | |
1445 | } | |
1446 | ||
1447 | for (vent = table; | |
1448 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1449 | ++vent) { | |
1450 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1451 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1452 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1453 | return 1; | |
1454 | } | |
1455 | } | |
1456 | return 0; | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1459 | /* |
1460 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1461 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1462 | * supported protocol version. | |
1463 | * | |
1464 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1465 | * | |
1466 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1467 | */ | |
1468 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1469 | { | |
1470 | const version_info *vent; | |
1471 | const version_info *table; | |
1472 | ||
1473 | /* | |
1474 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1475 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1476 | * s->method). | |
1477 | */ | |
1478 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1479 | return 1; | |
1480 | ||
1481 | /* | |
1482 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1483 | * highest protocol version). | |
1484 | */ | |
1485 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1486 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1487 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1488 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1489 | else { | |
1490 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1491 | return 0; | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
1494 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1495 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1496 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1497 | } | |
1498 | return 0; | |
1499 | } | |
1500 | ||
1501 | /* | |
1502 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1503 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1504 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1505 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1506 | * | |
1507 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1508 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1509 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1510 | * | |
1511 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1512 | */ | |
1513 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1514 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1515 | if (version == 0) { |
1516 | *bound = version; | |
1517 | return 1; | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1520 | /*- |
1521 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1522 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1523 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1524 | * | |
1525 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1526 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1527 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1528 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1529 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1530 | */ | |
1531 | switch (method_version) { | |
1532 | default: | |
1533 | /* | |
1534 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1535 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1536 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1537 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1538 | * versions. | |
1539 | */ | |
1540 | return 0; | |
1541 | ||
1542 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1543 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1544 | return 0; | |
1545 | break; | |
1546 | ||
1547 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1548 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1549 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1550 | return 0; |
1551 | break; | |
1552 | } | |
1553 | ||
1554 | *bound = version; | |
1555 | return 1; | |
1556 | } | |
1557 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1558 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1559 | { | |
1560 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1561 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1562 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1563 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1564 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1565 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1566 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1567 | } else { | |
1568 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1569 | } | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1572 | /* |
1573 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1574 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1575 | * the version specific method. | |
1576 | * | |
1577 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1578 | * | |
1579 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1580 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1581 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1582 | { |
1583 | /*- | |
1584 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1585 | * | |
1586 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1587 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1588 | * | |
1589 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1590 | * handle version. | |
1591 | */ | |
1592 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1593 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1594 | const version_info *vent; |
1595 | const version_info *table; | |
1596 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1597 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1598 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1599 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1600 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1601 | switch (server_version) { |
1602 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1603 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1604 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1605 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1606 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1607 | /* |
1608 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1609 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1610 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1611 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1612 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1613 | */ | |
1614 | return 0; | |
1615 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1616 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1617 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1618 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1619 | */ |
018fcbec | 1620 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1621 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1622 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1623 | break; | |
1624 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1625 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1626 | break; | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | ||
70af3d8e | 1629 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1630 | |
70af3d8e | 1631 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1632 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1633 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1634 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1635 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1636 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1637 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1638 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1639 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1640 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1641 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | ||
1644 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1645 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1646 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1647 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1648 | /* |
1649 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1650 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1651 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1652 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1653 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1654 | continue; | |
1655 | for (vent = table; | |
1656 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1657 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1658 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1659 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1660 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1661 | ||
1662 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1663 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1664 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1665 | best_method = method; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | } | |
1668 | } | |
1669 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1670 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1671 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1672 | } | |
1673 | ||
1674 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
7d061fce MC |
1675 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1676 | /* | |
1677 | * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this | |
1678 | * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
1679 | */ | |
1680 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1681 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1682 | return 0; | |
1683 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1684 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1685 | s->version = best_vers; |
1686 | s->method = best_method; | |
1687 | return 0; | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1690 | } | |
1691 | ||
1692 | /* | |
1693 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1694 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1695 | */ | |
1696 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1697 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1698 | ||
1699 | /* | |
1700 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1701 | * the ClientHello. | |
1702 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1703 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1704 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1705 | ||
1706 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1707 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1708 | continue; | |
1709 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1710 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1711 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1712 | s->version = vent->version; |
1713 | s->method = method; | |
1714 | return 0; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | disabled = 1; | |
1717 | } | |
1718 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1719 | } | |
1720 | ||
1721 | /* | |
1722 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1723 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1724 | * the version specific method. | |
1725 | * | |
1726 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1727 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
c3043dcd MC |
1728 | * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random |
1729 | * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated | |
4fa52141 VD |
1730 | * |
1731 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1732 | */ | |
c3043dcd | 1733 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) |
4fa52141 VD |
1734 | { |
1735 | const version_info *vent; | |
1736 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1737 | int highver = 0; |
4fa52141 | 1738 | |
b97667ce MC |
1739 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1740 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1741 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1742 | ||
c3043dcd MC |
1743 | if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1744 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1745 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1746 | } | |
1747 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1748 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1749 | default: | |
c3043dcd MC |
1750 | if (version != s->version) { |
1751 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
4fa52141 | 1752 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; |
c3043dcd | 1753 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1754 | /* |
1755 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1756 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1757 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1758 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1759 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1760 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1761 | return 0; |
1762 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1763 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1764 | break; | |
1765 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1766 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1767 | break; | |
1768 | } | |
1769 | ||
1770 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1771 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1772 | int err; | |
1773 | ||
4fa52141 | 1774 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1775 | continue; |
1776 | ||
1777 | if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) | |
1778 | continue; | |
3847d426 | 1779 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1780 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1781 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd MC |
1782 | if (err != 0) { |
1783 | if (version == vent->version) { | |
1784 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1785 | return err; | |
1786 | } | |
1787 | ||
1788 | continue; | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | if (highver == 0) | |
1791 | highver = vent->version; | |
1792 | ||
1793 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1794 | continue; | |
1795 | ||
1796 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1797 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
1798 | if (checkdgrd) { | |
1799 | if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { | |
1800 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1801 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1802 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1803 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1804 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1805 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1806 | } | |
1807 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1808 | && version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1809 | && highver > version) { | |
1810 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1811 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1812 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1813 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1814 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1815 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1816 | } | |
1817 | } | |
1818 | } | |
1819 | #endif | |
1820 | ||
4fa52141 | 1821 | s->method = method; |
ccae4a15 | 1822 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1823 | return 0; |
1824 | } | |
1825 | ||
c3043dcd | 1826 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
4fa52141 VD |
1827 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1828 | } | |
1829 | ||
068c358a | 1830 | /* |
38a73150 | 1831 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1832 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1833 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1834 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1835 | * | |
1836 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1837 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1838 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1839 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1840 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1841 | * |
0485d540 | 1842 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1843 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1844 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1845 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1846 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1847 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1848 | */ |
38a73150 | 1849 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1850 | { |
1851 | int version; | |
1852 | int hole; | |
1853 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1854 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1855 | const version_info *table; | |
1856 | const version_info *vent; | |
1857 | ||
1858 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1859 | default: | |
1860 | /* | |
1861 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1862 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1863 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1864 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1865 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1866 | */ | |
068c358a | 1867 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1868 | return 0; |
1869 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1870 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1871 | break; | |
1872 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1873 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1874 | break; | |
1875 | } | |
1876 | ||
1877 | /* | |
1878 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1879 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1880 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1881 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1882 | * | |
1883 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1884 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1885 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1886 | * | |
1887 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1888 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1889 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1890 | * | |
1891 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1892 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1893 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1894 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1895 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1896 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1897 | */ | |
068c358a | 1898 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1899 | hole = 1; |
1900 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1901 | /* | |
1902 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1903 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1904 | */ | |
1905 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1906 | hole = 1; | |
1907 | continue; | |
1908 | } | |
1909 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1910 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1911 | hole = 1; | |
1912 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1913 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1914 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1915 | } else { |
1916 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1917 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1918 | hole = 0; |
1919 | } | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | ||
068c358a KR |
1922 | *max_version = version; |
1923 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1924 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1925 | if (version == 0) | |
1926 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1927 | ||
068c358a KR |
1928 | return 0; |
1929 | } | |
1930 | ||
1931 | /* | |
1932 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1933 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1934 | * |
1935 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1936 | * | |
1937 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1938 | */ | |
1939 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1940 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1941 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1942 | |
38a73150 | 1943 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1944 | |
1945 | if (ret != 0) | |
1946 | return ret; | |
1947 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1948 | s->version = ver_max; |
1949 | ||
1950 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1951 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1952 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1953 | ||
1954 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1955 | return 0; |
1956 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
1957 | |
1958 | /* | |
1959 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
1960 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
1961 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
1962 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
1963 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 1964 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
aff9929b MC |
1965 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, |
1966 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) | |
1967 | { | |
1968 | size_t i; | |
1969 | ||
1970 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
1971 | return 0; | |
1972 | ||
1973 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
6af87546 | 1974 | if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0) |
aff9929b MC |
1975 | && (!checkallow |
1976 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { | |
0acee504 | 1977 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
1978 | } |
1979 | } | |
1980 | ||
0acee504 | 1981 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 1982 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 1983 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
1984 | |
1985 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
1986 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) | |
1987 | { | |
1988 | unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1989 | size_t hashlen = 0; | |
635b7d3f MC |
1990 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
1991 | ||
1992 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea MC |
1993 | |
1994 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
1995 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
1996 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { | |
1997 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1998 | return 0; | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | ||
2001 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
2002 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) | |
2003 | return 0; | |
2004 | ||
2005 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2006 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
11c67eea MC |
2007 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; |
2008 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
2009 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
2010 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2011 | return 0; | |
2012 | } | |
2013 | ||
2014 | return 1; | |
2015 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2016 | |
2017 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2018 | { | |
2019 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2020 | } | |
2021 | ||
2022 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2023 | { | |
2024 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2025 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2026 | PACKET cadns; | |
2027 | ||
2028 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
2029 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2030 | goto decerr; | |
2031 | } | |
2032 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2033 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
2034 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2035 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2036 | goto decerr; | |
2037 | } | |
2038 | ||
2039 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2040 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2041 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2042 | ||
2043 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2044 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
2045 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2046 | goto decerr; | |
2047 | } | |
2048 | ||
2049 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2050 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
2051 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2052 | goto decerr; | |
2053 | } | |
2054 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
2055 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2056 | goto decerr; | |
2057 | } | |
2058 | ||
2059 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
2060 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2061 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2062 | goto err; | |
2063 | } | |
2064 | xn = NULL; | |
2065 | } | |
2066 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2067 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2068 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2069 | |
2070 | return 1; | |
2071 | ||
2072 | decerr: | |
2073 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2074 | err: | |
2075 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2076 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2077 | return 0; | |
2078 | } | |
2079 | ||
2080 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2081 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2082 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2083 | |
2084 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
2085 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) | |
2086 | return 0; | |
2087 | ||
2088 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2089 | int i; | |
2090 | ||
2091 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2092 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2093 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2094 | int namelen; | |
2095 | ||
2096 | if (name == NULL | |
2097 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2098 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2099 | &namebytes) | |
2100 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2101 | return 0; | |
2102 | } | |
2103 | } | |
2104 | } | |
2105 | ||
2106 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) | |
2107 | return 0; | |
2108 | ||
2109 | return 1; | |
2110 | } |