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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
75 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
76 | { | |
c7f47786 MC |
77 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) |
78 | return 0; | |
79 | ||
b186a592 MC |
80 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
81 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
82 | ||
c7f47786 | 83 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
84 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
85 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
86 | ||
87 | /* | |
88 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
89 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
90 | * ClientHello. | |
91 | */ | |
92 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
93 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
94 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
95 | return 0; | |
96 | } | |
97 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
98 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
99 | ||
100 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
101 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
102 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
103 | ok = 1; | |
104 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
105 | ok = 1; | |
106 | } | |
107 | if (ok) | |
108 | break; | |
109 | } | |
110 | if (!ok) { | |
111 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
112 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
113 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
114 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
117 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
118 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; | |
db0f35dd TS |
119 | } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
120 | /* Renegotiation is disabled */ | |
121 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
122 | return 0; | |
c7f47786 MC |
123 | } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
124 | !(s->options & | |
125 | SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
126 | /* | |
127 | * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't | |
128 | * support secure renegotiation. | |
129 | */ | |
130 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, | |
131 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
132 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
133 | return 0; | |
134 | } else { | |
135 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; | |
136 | ||
137 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
138 | } | |
139 | } else { | |
140 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
141 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; | |
142 | else | |
143 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; | |
144 | ||
145 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
146 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
147 | s->hit = 0; | |
148 | ||
149 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
150 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 151 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 152 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
153 | } |
154 | ||
155 | return 1; | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
158 | /* |
159 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
160 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
161 | */ | |
162 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
163 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
164 | ||
165 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
166 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
167 | { | |
168 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
169 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
170 | ||
171 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
172 | size_t hashlen; | |
173 | ||
174 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
175 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
176 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
177 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
178 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
179 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
180 | else | |
181 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
182 | ||
183 | /* | |
184 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
185 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
186 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
187 | */ | |
188 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
189 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
190 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
191 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
192 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
193 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
194 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | } | |
197 | ||
198 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
199 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
200 | } else { | |
201 | size_t retlen; | |
202 | ||
203 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
204 | if (retlen <= 0) | |
205 | return 0; | |
206 | *hdatalen = retlen; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
209 | return 1; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
212 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
213 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
214 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
215 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 216 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
217 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
218 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
219 | void *hdata; |
220 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 221 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 222 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 223 | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
224 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
226 | goto err; | |
227 | } | |
228 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
229 | md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); | |
230 | ||
231 | if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { | |
232 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
233 | goto err; | |
234 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
235 | |
236 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
237 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
238 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
239 | goto err; | |
240 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 241 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
242 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
243 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
d8bc1399 MC |
244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
245 | goto err; | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
ad4dd362 | 248 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
249 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
250 | goto err; | |
251 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
252 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
253 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
254 | if (sig == NULL) { |
255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
256 | goto err; | |
257 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 258 | |
75394189 | 259 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
5f9b64a2 MC |
260 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
261 | goto err; | |
262 | } | |
263 | ||
ad4dd362 | 264 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 265 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
266 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
267 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
269 | goto err; | |
270 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
271 | } |
272 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
273 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
274 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
275 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
276 | s->session->master_key) | |
277 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
278 | ||
5f9b64a2 MC |
279 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
280 | goto err; | |
281 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 282 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
283 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
284 | goto err; | |
285 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 286 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
287 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
288 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
289 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
290 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
291 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
292 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
293 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 294 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
295 | } |
296 | #endif | |
297 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 298 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
299 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
300 | goto err; | |
301 | } | |
302 | ||
303 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
304 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
305 | goto err; | |
306 | ||
307 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
308 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
309 | return 1; | |
310 | err: | |
311 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
312 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
313 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | } | |
316 | ||
317 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
318 | { | |
319 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 320 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
321 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
322 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
323 | #endif | |
5f9b64a2 | 324 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dc8da7b1 | 325 | int type = 0, j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
326 | unsigned int len; |
327 | X509 *peer; | |
328 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 329 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 330 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 331 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 332 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 333 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
334 | |
335 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
336 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
337 | goto f_err; |
338 | } | |
339 | ||
340 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
341 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
fb34a0f4 | 342 | if (pkey == NULL) |
83b4049a | 343 | goto f_err; |
83b4049a | 344 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
345 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); |
346 | ||
347 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
348 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
349 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
350 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
351 | goto f_err; | |
352 | } | |
353 | ||
354 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ | |
355 | /* | |
356 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without | |
357 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) | |
358 | */ | |
359 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
360 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
361 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
362 | len = 64; | |
363 | } else | |
364 | #endif | |
365 | { | |
366 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
367 | int rv; | |
703bcee0 | 368 | unsigned int sigalg; |
d8bc1399 | 369 | |
703bcee0 | 370 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
371 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
372 | goto f_err; | |
373 | } | |
5554facb | 374 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); |
d8bc1399 | 375 | if (rv == -1) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
376 | goto f_err; |
377 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
378 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
379 | goto f_err; | |
380 | } | |
381 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
382 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
383 | #endif | |
f365a3e2 | 384 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
d8bc1399 MC |
385 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
386 | goto f_err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
387 | } |
388 | ||
f365a3e2 DSH |
389 | md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx); |
390 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
391 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
392 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
393 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
394 | goto f_err; | |
395 | } | |
396 | } | |
397 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
398 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
399 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
400 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
401 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
402 | goto f_err; | |
403 | } | |
404 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
405 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
406 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
407 | goto f_err; | |
408 | } | |
409 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 410 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
d8bc1399 | 411 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d8bc1399 MC |
412 | goto f_err; |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
415 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
416 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
417 | #endif | |
75394189 | 418 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d8bc1399 | 419 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
d8bc1399 MC |
420 | goto f_err; |
421 | } | |
422 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
423 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 424 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
425 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
426 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
427 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
428 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
429 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
430 | goto f_err; |
431 | } | |
432 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
433 | data = gost_data; | |
434 | } | |
435 | } | |
436 | #endif | |
437 | ||
5554facb | 438 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 439 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
440 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
441 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
442 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
443 | goto f_err; | |
444 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 445 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
446 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
447 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
448 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
449 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
450 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
451 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
452 | goto f_err; | |
453 | } | |
454 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
455 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
457 | goto f_err; | |
458 | } | |
459 | } else { | |
460 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
461 | if (j < 0) { | |
462 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
463 | goto f_err; | |
464 | } else if (j == 0) { | |
465 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
466 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
467 | goto f_err; | |
468 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
469 | } |
470 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 471 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
d8bc1399 MC |
472 | if (0) { |
473 | f_err: | |
474 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
475 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
476 | } | |
477 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
478 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
479 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
480 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
481 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
482 | #endif | |
483 | return ret; | |
484 | } | |
485 | ||
229185e6 | 486 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 487 | { |
12472b45 | 488 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 489 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 490 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 491 | |
f7e393be MC |
492 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
493 | if (!s->server) | |
494 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
495 | ||
496 | /* | |
497 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
498 | * client certificate | |
499 | */ | |
500 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
501 | && !s->server | |
502 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
503 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
504 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
505 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
506 | goto err; | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
229185e6 MC |
509 | if (s->server) { |
510 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
511 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
512 | } else { | |
513 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
514 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
515 | } | |
0f113f3e | 516 | |
12472b45 MC |
517 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
518 | sender, slen, | |
519 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
520 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
522 | goto err; | |
523 | } | |
524 | ||
12472b45 | 525 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 526 | |
12472b45 | 527 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
528 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
529 | goto err; | |
530 | } | |
0f113f3e | 531 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
532 | /* |
533 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
534 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
535 | */ | |
536 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
537 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f MC |
538 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
539 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
540 | goto err; | |
541 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 542 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
543 | /* |
544 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
545 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
546 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
547 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
548 | goto err; | |
549 | } | |
23a635c0 | 550 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
551 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
552 | finish_md_len); | |
553 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 554 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
555 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
556 | finish_md_len); | |
557 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 558 | } |
0f113f3e | 559 | |
b9908bf9 | 560 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 561 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
562 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
563 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 564 | } |
d02b48c6 | 565 | |
44c04a2e MC |
566 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
567 | { | |
568 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
569 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
570 | goto err; | |
571 | } | |
572 | ||
9412b3ad | 573 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 574 | return 1; |
f14afcaa | 575 | |
44c04a2e MC |
576 | err: |
577 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
578 | return 0; | |
579 | } | |
580 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
581 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
582 | { | |
57389a32 | 583 | int al; |
e1c3de44 MC |
584 | unsigned int updatetype; |
585 | ||
82f992cb MC |
586 | s->key_update_count++; |
587 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
588 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
589 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
590 | goto err; | |
591 | } | |
592 | ||
524420d8 MC |
593 | /* |
594 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
595 | * be on a record boundary. | |
596 | */ | |
597 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
598 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
599 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
600 | goto err; | |
601 | } | |
602 | ||
e1c3de44 | 603 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 604 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
57389a32 | 605 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e1c3de44 | 606 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); |
57389a32 | 607 | goto err; |
e1c3de44 MC |
608 | } |
609 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
610 | /* |
611 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
612 | * didn't recognise. | |
613 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
614 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
615 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
616 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
617 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
618 | goto err; | |
619 | } | |
620 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
621 | /* |
622 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
623 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
624 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
625 | */ | |
626 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
627 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
628 | ||
57389a32 MC |
629 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
630 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
631 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
632 | goto err; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
e1c3de44 | 635 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
57389a32 MC |
636 | err: |
637 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
638 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
639 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
640 | } |
641 | ||
bf48836c | 642 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
643 | /* |
644 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
645 | * to far. | |
646 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 647 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
648 | { |
649 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 650 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
651 | /* |
652 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
653 | * the appropriate error. | |
654 | */ | |
655 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
656 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 657 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
658 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
659 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
660 | } else { | |
661 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
662 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
663 | } | |
664 | ||
665 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
666 | sender, | |
667 | slen, | |
668 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
669 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
670 | #endif |
671 | ||
be3583fa | 672 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
673 | { |
674 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 675 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 676 | |
73999b62 | 677 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
678 | /* |
679 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
680 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
681 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 682 | */ |
c69f2adf | 683 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 684 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
685 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
686 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
687 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
fb34a0f4 | 688 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
a230b26e EK |
689 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
690 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
691 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
692 | } |
693 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 694 | if (remain != 0) { |
fb34a0f4 | 695 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
696 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
697 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
698 | goto f_err; |
699 | } | |
657da85e MC |
700 | } |
701 | ||
702 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
703 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
704 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 705 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
706 | goto f_err; |
707 | } | |
708 | ||
709 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
710 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
711 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 712 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
713 | goto f_err; |
714 | } | |
715 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
716 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
717 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
718 | ||
719 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
720 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
721 | ||
722 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
723 | /* | |
724 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
725 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
726 | * SCTP is used | |
727 | */ | |
728 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
729 | #endif | |
730 | } | |
731 | ||
b9908bf9 | 732 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
733 | f_err: |
734 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 735 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 736 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
737 | } |
738 | ||
be3583fa | 739 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 740 | { |
7776a36c | 741 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 742 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 743 | |
d781d247 MC |
744 | |
745 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
f7e393be MC |
746 | if (s->server) |
747 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
d781d247 | 748 | |
524420d8 MC |
749 | /* |
750 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
751 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
752 | */ | |
753 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
754 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
755 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
756 | goto f_err; | |
757 | } | |
758 | ||
0f113f3e | 759 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 760 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 761 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 762 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
763 | goto f_err; |
764 | } | |
765 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
766 | ||
12472b45 | 767 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 768 | |
12472b45 | 769 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 770 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 771 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
772 | goto f_err; |
773 | } | |
774 | ||
12472b45 MC |
775 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
776 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 777 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 778 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
779 | goto f_err; |
780 | } | |
781 | ||
782 | /* | |
783 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
784 | */ | |
380a522f MC |
785 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
786 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
787 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
788 | goto f_err; | |
789 | } | |
23a635c0 | 790 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
791 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
792 | md_len); | |
793 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 794 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
795 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
796 | md_len); | |
797 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
798 | } |
799 | ||
7776a36c MC |
800 | /* |
801 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
802 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
803 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
804 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
805 | if (s->server) { | |
806 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
807 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
808 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
809 | goto f_err; | |
810 | } | |
811 | } else { | |
812 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 813 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 814 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
92760c21 MC |
815 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
816 | goto f_err; | |
817 | } | |
818 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
819 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
820 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
821 | goto f_err; | |
822 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
823 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
824 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
825 | } |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
e6575156 | 828 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
829 | f_err: |
830 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 831 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 832 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 833 | } |
d02b48c6 | 834 | |
7cea05dc | 835 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 836 | { |
7cea05dc | 837 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 838 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
839 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
840 | return 0; | |
841 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 842 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
843 | return 1; |
844 | } | |
845 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
846 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
847 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
848 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 849 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
850 | int len; |
851 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
852 | ||
853 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
854 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 855 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
856 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
857 | return 0; | |
858 | } | |
859 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
860 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 861 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
862 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
863 | return 0; | |
864 | } | |
865 | ||
866 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 867 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
e96e0f8e MC |
868 | chain, al)) |
869 | return 0; | |
870 | ||
871 | return 1; | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
875 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
876 | { | |
877 | int i, chain_count; | |
878 | X509 *x; | |
879 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
880 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
881 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
882 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
883 | ||
884 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
885 | return 1; | |
886 | ||
887 | x = cpk->x509; | |
888 | ||
889 | /* | |
890 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
891 | */ | |
d805a57b | 892 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
893 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
894 | else | |
895 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
896 | ||
897 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
898 | chain_store = NULL; | |
899 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
900 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
901 | else | |
902 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
903 | ||
d805a57b | 904 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
905 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
906 | ||
907 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
908 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
909 | goto err; | |
910 | } | |
911 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
912 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
913 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
914 | goto err; | |
915 | } | |
916 | /* | |
917 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
918 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
919 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
920 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
921 | */ | |
922 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
923 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
924 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
925 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
926 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
927 | if (i != 1) { | |
928 | #if 0 | |
929 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
930 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
932 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
933 | #endif | |
934 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
935 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
936 | goto err; | |
937 | } | |
938 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
939 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
940 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
941 | ||
942 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
943 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
944 | goto err; | |
945 | } | |
946 | } | |
947 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
948 | } else { | |
949 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
950 | if (i != 1) { | |
951 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
952 | goto err; | |
953 | } | |
954 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
955 | goto err; | |
956 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
957 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
958 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
959 | goto err; | |
960 | } | |
961 | } | |
962 | return 1; | |
963 | ||
964 | err: | |
965 | *al = tmpal; | |
966 | return 0; | |
967 | } | |
968 | ||
969 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
970 | int *al) | |
971 | { | |
972 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
973 | ||
5923ad4b | 974 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 975 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 976 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 977 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 978 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 979 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 980 | } |
c49e1912 | 981 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
982 | } |
983 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
984 | /* |
985 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
986 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
987 | * freed up as well. | |
988 | */ | |
989 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) | |
8723588e MC |
990 | { |
991 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
992 | ||
993 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
994 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 995 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
996 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
997 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
998 | return ret; | |
999 | } | |
1000 | #endif | |
1001 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1002 | if (clearbufs) { |
1003 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1004 | /* | |
1005 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1006 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1007 | */ | |
1008 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1009 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1010 | } | |
b77f3ed1 MC |
1011 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) |
1012 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
30f05b19 | 1013 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1014 | } |
8723588e | 1015 | |
c7f47786 | 1016 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1017 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1018 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1019 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1020 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1021 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1022 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1023 | ||
8723588e | 1024 | if (s->server) { |
8723588e MC |
1025 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
1026 | ||
1027 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 1028 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
1029 | } else { |
1030 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
1031 | if (s->hit) | |
1032 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
1033 | ||
fe3a3291 | 1034 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
1035 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
1036 | } | |
1037 | ||
1038 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1039 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1040 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1041 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1042 | ||
1043 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1044 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1045 | ||
1046 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1047 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1048 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1049 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1050 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1051 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1052 | } |
1053 | } | |
1054 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1055 | /* |
1056 | * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, | |
1057 | * so continue. | |
1058 | */ | |
1059 | if (!clearbufs) | |
1060 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
1061 | ||
4004ce5f | 1062 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1063 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1064 | } | |
1065 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1066 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1067 | { | |
1068 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1069 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
1070 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 1071 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1072 | |
1073 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1074 | ||
1075 | do { | |
1076 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1077 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1078 | &p[s->init_num], |
1079 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1080 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1081 | if (i <= 0) { |
1082 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1083 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1084 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1085 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1086 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1087 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1088 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1089 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1090 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
1091 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
1092 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1093 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1094 | goto f_err; | |
1095 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1096 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1097 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1098 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1099 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1100 | return 1; |
1101 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1102 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
1103 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
1104 | goto f_err; |
1105 | } | |
54105ddd | 1106 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1107 | } |
1108 | ||
1109 | skip_message = 0; | |
1110 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1111 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1112 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1113 | /* |
1114 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1115 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1116 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1117 | * MAC. | |
1118 | */ | |
1119 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1120 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1121 | skip_message = 1; | |
1122 | ||
1123 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1124 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1125 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1126 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | } while (skip_message); | |
1129 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1130 | ||
1131 | *mt = *p; | |
1132 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1133 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1134 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1135 | /* |
1136 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1137 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1138 | * |
1139 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1140 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1141 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1142 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1143 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1144 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1145 | ||
1146 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1147 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1148 | } else { | |
1149 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1150 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1151 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1152 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1153 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1154 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 1155 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1156 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1157 | ||
1158 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1159 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1160 | } | |
1161 | ||
1162 | return 1; | |
1163 | f_err: | |
1164 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1165 | return 0; |
1166 | } | |
1167 | ||
eda75751 | 1168 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1169 | { |
54105ddd | 1170 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1171 | unsigned char *p; |
1172 | int i; | |
1173 | ||
1174 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1175 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1176 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1177 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1178 | } |
1179 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1180 | p = s->init_msg; |
1181 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1182 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1183 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1184 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1185 | if (i <= 0) { |
1186 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1187 | *len = 0; |
1188 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1189 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1190 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1191 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1192 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1193 | |
bf48836c | 1194 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
1195 | /* |
1196 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1197 | * Finished verification. | |
1198 | */ | |
1199 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
1200 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
1201 | #endif |
1202 | ||
0f113f3e | 1203 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1204 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1205 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1206 | s->init_num)) { | |
1207 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
1208 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1209 | *len = 0; | |
1210 | return 0; | |
1211 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1212 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1213 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1214 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1215 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1216 | /* |
1217 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1218 | * processing the message | |
1219 | */ | |
1220 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | |
1221 | && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1222 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d166ed8c DSH |
1223 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
1224 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1225 | *len = 0; | |
1226 | return 0; | |
1227 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
1228 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1229 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1230 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1231 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1232 | } | |
1233 | ||
eda75751 | 1234 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1235 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1236 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1237 | |
2e5ead83 | 1238 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 1239 | { |
a230b26e | 1240 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
1241 | return -1; |
1242 | ||
1243 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
1244 | default: | |
1245 | return -1; | |
1246 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
d0ff28f8 | 1247 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA; |
17a72388 VD |
1248 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
1249 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 1250 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
1251 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
1252 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 1253 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 1254 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
1255 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
1256 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
1257 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
1258 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
1259 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
1260 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 1261 | #endif |
82049c54 | 1262 | } |
0f113f3e | 1263 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1264 | |
6b691a5c | 1265 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
1266 | { |
1267 | int al; | |
1268 | ||
1269 | switch (type) { | |
1270 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
1271 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
1272 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
1273 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1274 | break; | |
1275 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
1276 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
1277 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
1278 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
1279 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
1280 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1281 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
1282 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1283 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
1284 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
1285 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
1286 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
1287 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
1288 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
1289 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
1290 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1291 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
1292 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1293 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
1294 | break; | |
1295 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1296 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
1297 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
1298 | break; | |
1299 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1300 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
1301 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
1302 | break; | |
1303 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
1304 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
1305 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 1306 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 1307 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
1308 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
1309 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
1310 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1311 | break; | |
1312 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
1313 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
1314 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
1315 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
1316 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
1317 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
1318 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
1319 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
1320 | break; | |
1321 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
1322 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1323 | break; | |
1324 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1325 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1326 | break; | |
1327 | default: | |
1328 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1329 | break; | |
1330 | } | |
1331 | return (al); | |
1332 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1333 | |
b362ccab | 1334 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1335 | { |
1336 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1337 | return 0; | |
1338 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1339 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1340 | |
068c358a | 1341 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1342 | { |
1343 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1344 | ||
1345 | if (a == b) | |
1346 | return 0; | |
1347 | if (!dtls) | |
1348 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1349 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1350 | } | |
1351 | ||
1352 | typedef struct { | |
1353 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1354 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1355 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1356 | } version_info; |
1357 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1358 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1359 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1360 | #endif |
1361 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1362 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1363 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1364 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1365 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1366 | #else | |
1367 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1368 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1369 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1370 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1371 | #else |
a230b26e | 1372 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1373 | #endif |
1374 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1375 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1376 | #else |
a230b26e | 1377 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1378 | #endif |
1379 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1380 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1381 | #else |
a230b26e | 1382 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1383 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1384 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1385 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1386 | #else |
a230b26e | 1387 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1388 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1389 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1390 | }; |
1391 | ||
1392 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1393 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1394 | #endif | |
1395 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1396 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1397 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1398 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1399 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1400 | #else |
a230b26e | 1401 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1402 | #endif |
1403 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1404 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1405 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1406 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1407 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1408 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1409 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1410 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1411 | }; |
1412 | ||
1413 | /* | |
1414 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1415 | * | |
1416 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1417 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1418 | * | |
1419 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1420 | */ | |
068c358a | 1421 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1422 | { |
1423 | int version = method->version; | |
1424 | ||
1425 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1426 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1427 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1428 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1429 | ||
1430 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1431 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1432 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1433 | ||
1434 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1435 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1436 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1437 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1438 | |
1439 | return 0; | |
1440 | } | |
1441 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1442 | /* |
1443 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1444 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1445 | * | |
1446 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1447 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1448 | * | |
1449 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1450 | */ | |
1451 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1452 | { | |
1453 | const version_info *vent; | |
1454 | const version_info *table; | |
1455 | ||
1456 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1457 | default: | |
1458 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1459 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1460 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1461 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1462 | break; | |
1463 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1464 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1465 | break; | |
1466 | } | |
1467 | ||
1468 | for (vent = table; | |
1469 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1470 | ++vent) { | |
1471 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1472 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1473 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1474 | return 1; | |
1475 | } | |
1476 | } | |
1477 | return 0; | |
1478 | } | |
1479 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1480 | /* |
1481 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1482 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1483 | * supported protocol version. | |
1484 | * | |
1485 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1486 | * | |
1487 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1488 | */ | |
1489 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1490 | { | |
1491 | const version_info *vent; | |
1492 | const version_info *table; | |
1493 | ||
1494 | /* | |
1495 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1496 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1497 | * s->method). | |
1498 | */ | |
1499 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1500 | return 1; | |
1501 | ||
1502 | /* | |
1503 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1504 | * highest protocol version). | |
1505 | */ | |
1506 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1507 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1508 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1509 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1510 | else { | |
1511 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1512 | return 0; | |
1513 | } | |
1514 | ||
1515 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1516 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1517 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1518 | } | |
1519 | return 0; | |
1520 | } | |
1521 | ||
1522 | /* | |
1523 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1524 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1525 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1526 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1527 | * | |
1528 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1529 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1530 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1531 | * | |
1532 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1533 | */ | |
1534 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1535 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1536 | if (version == 0) { |
1537 | *bound = version; | |
1538 | return 1; | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1541 | /*- |
1542 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1543 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1544 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1545 | * | |
1546 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1547 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1548 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1549 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1550 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1551 | */ | |
1552 | switch (method_version) { | |
1553 | default: | |
1554 | /* | |
1555 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1556 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1557 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1558 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1559 | * versions. | |
1560 | */ | |
1561 | return 0; | |
1562 | ||
1563 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1564 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1565 | return 0; | |
1566 | break; | |
1567 | ||
1568 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1569 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1570 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1571 | return 0; |
1572 | break; | |
1573 | } | |
1574 | ||
1575 | *bound = version; | |
1576 | return 1; | |
1577 | } | |
1578 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1579 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1580 | { | |
1581 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1582 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1583 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1584 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1585 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1586 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1587 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1588 | } else { | |
1589 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1590 | } | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1593 | /* |
1594 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1595 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1596 | * the version specific method. | |
1597 | * | |
1598 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1599 | * | |
1600 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1601 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1602 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1603 | { |
1604 | /*- | |
1605 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1606 | * | |
1607 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1608 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1609 | * | |
1610 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1611 | * handle version. | |
1612 | */ | |
1613 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1614 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1615 | const version_info *vent; |
1616 | const version_info *table; | |
1617 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1618 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1619 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1620 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1621 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1622 | switch (server_version) { |
1623 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1624 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1625 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1626 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1627 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1628 | /* |
1629 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1630 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1631 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1632 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1633 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1634 | */ | |
1635 | return 0; | |
1636 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1637 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1638 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1639 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1640 | */ |
018fcbec | 1641 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1642 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1643 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1644 | break; | |
1645 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1646 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1647 | break; | |
1648 | } | |
1649 | ||
70af3d8e | 1650 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1651 | |
70af3d8e | 1652 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1653 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1654 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1655 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1656 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1657 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1658 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1659 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1660 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1661 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1662 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1663 | } | |
1664 | ||
1665 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1666 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1667 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1668 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1669 | /* |
1670 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1671 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1672 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1673 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1674 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1675 | continue; | |
1676 | for (vent = table; | |
1677 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1678 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1679 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1680 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1681 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1682 | ||
1683 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1684 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1685 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1686 | best_method = method; | |
1687 | } | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | } | |
1690 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1691 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1692 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1693 | } | |
1694 | ||
1695 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
7d061fce MC |
1696 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1697 | /* | |
1698 | * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this | |
1699 | * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
1700 | */ | |
1701 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1702 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1703 | return 0; | |
1704 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1705 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1706 | s->version = best_vers; |
1707 | s->method = best_method; | |
1708 | return 0; | |
1709 | } | |
1710 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | ||
1713 | /* | |
1714 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1715 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1716 | */ | |
1717 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1718 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1719 | ||
1720 | /* | |
1721 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1722 | * the ClientHello. | |
1723 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1724 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1725 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1726 | ||
1727 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1728 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1729 | continue; | |
1730 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1731 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1732 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1733 | s->version = vent->version; |
1734 | s->method = method; | |
1735 | return 0; | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | disabled = 1; | |
1738 | } | |
1739 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1740 | } | |
1741 | ||
1742 | /* | |
1743 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1744 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1745 | * the version specific method. | |
1746 | * | |
1747 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1748 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
c3043dcd MC |
1749 | * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random |
1750 | * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated | |
4fa52141 VD |
1751 | * |
1752 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1753 | */ | |
c3043dcd | 1754 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) |
4fa52141 VD |
1755 | { |
1756 | const version_info *vent; | |
1757 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1758 | int highver = 0; |
4fa52141 | 1759 | |
b97667ce MC |
1760 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1761 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1762 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1763 | ||
c3043dcd MC |
1764 | if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1765 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1766 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1767 | } | |
1768 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1769 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1770 | default: | |
c3043dcd MC |
1771 | if (version != s->version) { |
1772 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
4fa52141 | 1773 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; |
c3043dcd | 1774 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1775 | /* |
1776 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1777 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1778 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1779 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1780 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1781 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1782 | return 0; |
1783 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1784 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1785 | break; | |
1786 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1787 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1788 | break; | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | ||
1791 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1792 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1793 | int err; | |
1794 | ||
4fa52141 | 1795 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1796 | continue; |
1797 | ||
1798 | if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) | |
1799 | continue; | |
3847d426 | 1800 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1801 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1802 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd MC |
1803 | if (err != 0) { |
1804 | if (version == vent->version) { | |
1805 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1806 | return err; | |
1807 | } | |
1808 | ||
1809 | continue; | |
1810 | } | |
1811 | if (highver == 0) | |
1812 | highver = vent->version; | |
1813 | ||
1814 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1815 | continue; | |
1816 | ||
1817 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1818 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
1819 | if (checkdgrd) { | |
1820 | if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { | |
1821 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1822 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1823 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1824 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1825 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1826 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1827 | } | |
1828 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1829 | && version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1830 | && highver > version) { | |
1831 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1832 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1833 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1834 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1835 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1836 | return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; | |
1837 | } | |
1838 | } | |
1839 | } | |
1840 | #endif | |
1841 | ||
4fa52141 | 1842 | s->method = method; |
ccae4a15 | 1843 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1844 | return 0; |
1845 | } | |
1846 | ||
c3043dcd | 1847 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
4fa52141 VD |
1848 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1849 | } | |
1850 | ||
068c358a | 1851 | /* |
38a73150 | 1852 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1853 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1854 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1855 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1856 | * | |
1857 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1858 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1859 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1860 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1861 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1862 | * |
0485d540 | 1863 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1864 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1865 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1866 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1867 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1868 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1869 | */ |
38a73150 | 1870 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1871 | { |
1872 | int version; | |
1873 | int hole; | |
1874 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1875 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1876 | const version_info *table; | |
1877 | const version_info *vent; | |
1878 | ||
1879 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1880 | default: | |
1881 | /* | |
1882 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1883 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1884 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1885 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1886 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1887 | */ | |
068c358a | 1888 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1889 | return 0; |
1890 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1891 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1892 | break; | |
1893 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1894 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1895 | break; | |
1896 | } | |
1897 | ||
1898 | /* | |
1899 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1900 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1901 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1902 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1903 | * | |
1904 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1905 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1906 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1907 | * | |
1908 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1909 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1910 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1911 | * | |
1912 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1913 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1914 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1915 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1916 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1917 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1918 | */ | |
068c358a | 1919 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1920 | hole = 1; |
1921 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1922 | /* | |
1923 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1924 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1925 | */ | |
1926 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1927 | hole = 1; | |
1928 | continue; | |
1929 | } | |
1930 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1931 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1932 | hole = 1; | |
1933 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1934 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1935 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1936 | } else { |
1937 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1938 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1939 | hole = 0; |
1940 | } | |
1941 | } | |
1942 | ||
068c358a KR |
1943 | *max_version = version; |
1944 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1945 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1946 | if (version == 0) | |
1947 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1948 | ||
068c358a KR |
1949 | return 0; |
1950 | } | |
1951 | ||
1952 | /* | |
1953 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1954 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1955 | * |
1956 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1957 | * | |
1958 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1959 | */ | |
1960 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1961 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1962 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1963 | |
38a73150 | 1964 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1965 | |
1966 | if (ret != 0) | |
1967 | return ret; | |
1968 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1969 | s->version = ver_max; |
1970 | ||
1971 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1972 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1973 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1974 | ||
1975 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1976 | return 0; |
1977 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
1978 | |
1979 | /* | |
1980 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
1981 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
1982 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
1983 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
1984 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 1985 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
aff9929b MC |
1986 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, |
1987 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) | |
1988 | { | |
1989 | size_t i; | |
1990 | ||
1991 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
1992 | return 0; | |
1993 | ||
1994 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
6af87546 | 1995 | if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0) |
aff9929b MC |
1996 | && (!checkallow |
1997 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { | |
0acee504 | 1998 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
1999 | } |
2000 | } | |
2001 | ||
0acee504 | 2002 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2003 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2004 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2005 | |
2006 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
2007 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) | |
2008 | { | |
2009 | unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2010 | size_t hashlen = 0; | |
635b7d3f MC |
2011 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2012 | ||
2013 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea MC |
2014 | |
2015 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2016 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2017 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { | |
2018 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2019 | return 0; | |
2020 | } | |
2021 | ||
2022 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
2023 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) | |
2024 | return 0; | |
2025 | ||
2026 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2027 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
11c67eea MC |
2028 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; |
2029 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) | |
2030 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
2031 | SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2032 | return 0; | |
2033 | } | |
2034 | ||
2035 | return 1; | |
2036 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2037 | |
2038 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2039 | { | |
2040 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2041 | } | |
2042 | ||
2043 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2044 | { | |
2045 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2046 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2047 | PACKET cadns; | |
2048 | ||
2049 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
2050 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2051 | goto decerr; | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2054 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
2055 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2056 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2057 | goto decerr; | |
2058 | } | |
2059 | ||
2060 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2061 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2062 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2063 | ||
2064 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2065 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
2066 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2067 | goto decerr; | |
2068 | } | |
2069 | ||
2070 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2071 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
2072 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2073 | goto decerr; | |
2074 | } | |
2075 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
2076 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2077 | goto decerr; | |
2078 | } | |
2079 | ||
2080 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
2081 | SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2082 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2083 | goto err; | |
2084 | } | |
2085 | xn = NULL; | |
2086 | } | |
2087 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2088 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2089 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2090 | |
2091 | return 1; | |
2092 | ||
2093 | decerr: | |
2094 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2095 | err: | |
2096 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2097 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2098 | return 0; | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | ||
2101 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2102 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2103 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2104 | |
2105 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
2106 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) | |
2107 | return 0; | |
2108 | ||
2109 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2110 | int i; | |
2111 | ||
2112 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2113 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2114 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2115 | int namelen; | |
2116 | ||
2117 | if (name == NULL | |
2118 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2119 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2120 | &namebytes) | |
2121 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2122 | return 0; | |
2123 | } | |
2124 | } | |
2125 | } | |
2126 | ||
2127 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) | |
2128 | return 0; | |
2129 | ||
2130 | return 1; | |
2131 | } |