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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3813046d | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
0f113f3e | 12 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
ea262260 BM |
13 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
14 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 15 | |
48948d53 | 16 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 17 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 18 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 19 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 20 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
22 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 25 | |
0f113f3e MC |
26 | /* |
27 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
28 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
29 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 30 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
31 | { |
32 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 33 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
34 | |
35 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 36 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e MC |
37 | if (ret < 0) |
38 | return (-1); | |
39 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) | |
40 | /* | |
41 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
42 | * ignore the result anyway | |
43 | */ | |
d166ed8c DSH |
44 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, |
45 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 46 | written)) |
d166ed8c | 47 | return -1; |
0f113f3e | 48 | |
7ee8627f | 49 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (s->msg_callback) |
51 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
52 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
53 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
54 | return (1); | |
55 | } | |
7ee8627f MC |
56 | s->init_off += written; |
57 | s->init_num -= written; | |
0f113f3e MC |
58 | return (0); |
59 | } | |
e7ecc7d4 | 60 | |
4a01c59f | 61 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
62 | { |
63 | size_t msglen; | |
64 | ||
4a01c59f | 65 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 66 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 67 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
68 | return 0; |
69 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
70 | s->init_off = 0; | |
71 | ||
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
75 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
76 | { | |
77 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
78 | const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; | |
79 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; | |
80 | unsigned u = 0; | |
81 | long hdatalen = 0; | |
82 | void *hdata; | |
83 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
84 | ||
85 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
86 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
87 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
88 | goto err; | |
89 | } | |
90 | pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; | |
91 | ||
92 | hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); | |
93 | if (hdatalen <= 0) { | |
94 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
95 | goto err; | |
96 | } | |
97 | ||
98 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) { | |
99 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
100 | goto err; | |
101 | } | |
102 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
103 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
104 | #endif | |
105 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)); | |
106 | if (sig == NULL) { | |
107 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
108 | goto err; | |
109 | } | |
110 | if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) | |
111 | || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) | |
112 | || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION | |
113 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
114 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
115 | s->session->master_key)) | |
116 | || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) { | |
117 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
118 | goto err; | |
119 | } | |
120 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
121 | { | |
122 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
123 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
124 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
125 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
126 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u); | |
127 | } | |
128 | #endif | |
129 | ||
130 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) { | |
131 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
132 | goto err; | |
133 | } | |
134 | ||
135 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
136 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) | |
137 | goto err; | |
138 | ||
139 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
140 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
141 | return 1; | |
142 | err: | |
143 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
144 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
145 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
146 | return 0; | |
147 | } | |
148 | ||
149 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
150 | { | |
151 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
152 | const unsigned char *sig, *data; | |
153 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
154 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
155 | #endif | |
156 | int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
157 | int type = 0, j; | |
158 | unsigned int len; | |
159 | X509 *peer; | |
160 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
161 | long hdatalen = 0; | |
162 | void *hdata; | |
163 | ||
164 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
165 | ||
166 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
167 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
168 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
169 | goto f_err; | |
170 | } | |
171 | ||
172 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
173 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
174 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); | |
175 | ||
176 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { | |
177 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
178 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
179 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
180 | goto f_err; | |
181 | } | |
182 | ||
183 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ | |
184 | /* | |
185 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without | |
186 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) | |
187 | */ | |
188 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
189 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
190 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
191 | len = 64; | |
192 | } else | |
193 | #endif | |
194 | { | |
195 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
196 | int rv; | |
197 | ||
198 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { | |
199 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
200 | goto f_err; | |
201 | } | |
202 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); | |
203 | if (rv == -1) { | |
204 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
205 | goto f_err; | |
206 | } else if (rv == 0) { | |
207 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
208 | goto f_err; | |
209 | } | |
210 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
211 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
212 | #endif | |
213 | } else { | |
214 | /* Use default digest for this key type */ | |
215 | int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); | |
216 | if (idx >= 0) | |
217 | md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; | |
218 | if (md == NULL) { | |
219 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
220 | goto f_err; | |
221 | } | |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
224 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { | |
225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
226 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
227 | goto f_err; | |
228 | } | |
229 | } | |
230 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
231 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
232 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
233 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
234 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
235 | goto f_err; | |
236 | } | |
237 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
238 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
239 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
240 | goto f_err; | |
241 | } | |
242 | ||
243 | hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); | |
244 | if (hdatalen <= 0) { | |
245 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
246 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
247 | goto f_err; | |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
250 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
251 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
252 | #endif | |
253 | if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) | |
254 | || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { | |
255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
256 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
257 | goto f_err; | |
258 | } | |
259 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
260 | { | |
261 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
262 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
263 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
264 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
265 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
266 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
267 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
268 | goto f_err; | |
269 | } | |
270 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
271 | data = gost_data; | |
272 | } | |
273 | } | |
274 | #endif | |
275 | ||
276 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION | |
277 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
278 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
279 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
280 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
281 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
282 | goto f_err; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
285 | if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { | |
286 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
287 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
288 | goto f_err; | |
289 | } | |
290 | ||
291 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
292 | if (0) { | |
293 | f_err: | |
294 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
295 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
296 | } | |
297 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); | |
298 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
299 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
300 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
301 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
302 | #endif | |
303 | return ret; | |
304 | } | |
305 | ||
229185e6 | 306 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 307 | { |
12472b45 | 308 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 309 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 310 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 MC |
311 | |
312 | if (s->server) { | |
313 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
314 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
315 | } else { | |
316 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
317 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
318 | } | |
0f113f3e | 319 | |
12472b45 MC |
320 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
321 | sender, slen, | |
322 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
323 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
4f89bfbf MC |
324 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
325 | goto err; | |
326 | } | |
327 | ||
12472b45 | 328 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 329 | |
12472b45 | 330 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
4f89bfbf MC |
331 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
332 | goto err; | |
333 | } | |
0f113f3e | 334 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
335 | /* |
336 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
337 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 338 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
339 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
340 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
341 | finish_md_len); | |
342 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 343 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
344 | OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
345 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, | |
346 | finish_md_len); | |
347 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 348 | } |
0f113f3e | 349 | |
b9908bf9 | 350 | return 1; |
4f89bfbf | 351 | err: |
4f89bfbf MC |
352 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
353 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 354 | } |
d02b48c6 | 355 | |
bf48836c | 356 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
357 | /* |
358 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
359 | * to far. | |
360 | */ | |
ee2ffc27 | 361 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
362 | { |
363 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 364 | size_t slen; |
0f113f3e MC |
365 | /* |
366 | * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set | |
367 | * the appropriate error. | |
368 | */ | |
369 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) | |
370 | return; | |
49ae7423 | 371 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
372 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
373 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
374 | } else { | |
375 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
376 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
377 | } | |
378 | ||
379 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, | |
380 | sender, | |
381 | slen, | |
382 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
383 | } | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
384 | #endif |
385 | ||
be3583fa | 386 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 MC |
387 | { |
388 | int al; | |
348240c6 | 389 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 390 | |
73999b62 | 391 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
392 | /* |
393 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
394 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
395 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 396 | */ |
c69f2adf | 397 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 398 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
399 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
400 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
401 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
402 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
403 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
404 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
405 | goto f_err; | |
c69f2adf MC |
406 | } |
407 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 408 | if (remain != 0) { |
c69f2adf | 409 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
b9908bf9 MC |
410 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
411 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
c69f2adf MC |
412 | goto f_err; |
413 | } | |
657da85e MC |
414 | } |
415 | ||
416 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
417 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
418 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
b9908bf9 | 419 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
657da85e MC |
420 | goto f_err; |
421 | } | |
422 | ||
423 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
424 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
425 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
b9908bf9 | 426 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
657da85e MC |
427 | goto f_err; |
428 | } | |
429 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
430 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
431 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
432 | ||
433 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
434 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
435 | ||
436 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
437 | /* | |
438 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
439 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
440 | * SCTP is used | |
441 | */ | |
442 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
443 | #endif | |
444 | } | |
445 | ||
b9908bf9 | 446 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
447 | f_err: |
448 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 449 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 450 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
657da85e MC |
451 | } |
452 | ||
be3583fa | 453 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 454 | { |
7776a36c | 455 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
12472b45 | 456 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 457 | |
0f113f3e | 458 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 459 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
0f113f3e | 460 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
b9908bf9 | 461 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
0f113f3e MC |
462 | goto f_err; |
463 | } | |
464 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
465 | ||
12472b45 | 466 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 467 | |
12472b45 | 468 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
0f113f3e | 469 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 470 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
0f113f3e MC |
471 | goto f_err; |
472 | } | |
473 | ||
12472b45 MC |
474 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
475 | md_len) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 476 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 | 477 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
0f113f3e MC |
478 | goto f_err; |
479 | } | |
480 | ||
481 | /* | |
482 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
483 | */ | |
23a635c0 | 484 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
485 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
486 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
487 | md_len); | |
488 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 489 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
490 | OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
491 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, | |
492 | md_len); | |
493 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
494 | } |
495 | ||
7776a36c MC |
496 | /* |
497 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
498 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
499 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
500 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
501 | if (s->server) { | |
502 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
503 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
504 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
505 | goto f_err; | |
506 | } | |
507 | } else { | |
508 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
509 | s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0, | |
510 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
511 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
512 | goto f_err; | |
513 | } | |
514 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
515 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
92760c21 MC |
516 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
517 | goto f_err; | |
518 | } | |
7776a36c MC |
519 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) |
520 | goto f_err; | |
92760c21 MC |
521 | } |
522 | } | |
523 | ||
e6575156 | 524 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e MC |
525 | f_err: |
526 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
fe3a3291 | 527 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b9908bf9 | 528 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 529 | } |
d02b48c6 | 530 | |
7cea05dc | 531 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 532 | { |
7cea05dc | 533 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
3c106325 | 534 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
85a7a5e6 MC |
535 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
536 | return 0; | |
537 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 538 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
539 | return 1; |
540 | } | |
541 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
542 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
543 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, | |
544 | int *al) | |
0f113f3e | 545 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
546 | int len; |
547 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
548 | ||
549 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
550 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63e4288 | 551 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
e96e0f8e MC |
552 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
553 | return 0; | |
554 | } | |
555 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
556 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63e4288 | 557 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e MC |
558 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
559 | return 0; | |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
562 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
563 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, | |
564 | chain, al)) | |
565 | return 0; | |
566 | ||
567 | return 1; | |
568 | } | |
569 | ||
570 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
571 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) | |
572 | { | |
573 | int i, chain_count; | |
574 | X509 *x; | |
575 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
576 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
577 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
578 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
579 | ||
580 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
581 | return 1; | |
582 | ||
583 | x = cpk->x509; | |
584 | ||
585 | /* | |
586 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
587 | */ | |
d805a57b | 588 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
589 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
590 | else | |
591 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
592 | ||
593 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
594 | chain_store = NULL; | |
595 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
596 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
597 | else | |
598 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
599 | ||
d805a57b | 600 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
601 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
602 | ||
603 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
604 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
605 | goto err; | |
606 | } | |
607 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
608 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
609 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
610 | goto err; | |
611 | } | |
612 | /* | |
613 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
614 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
615 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
616 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
617 | */ | |
618 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
619 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
620 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
621 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
622 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
623 | if (i != 1) { | |
624 | #if 0 | |
625 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
626 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
627 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
628 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
629 | #endif | |
630 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
631 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
632 | goto err; | |
633 | } | |
634 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
635 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
636 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
637 | ||
638 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { | |
639 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
640 | goto err; | |
641 | } | |
642 | } | |
643 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
644 | } else { | |
645 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
646 | if (i != 1) { | |
647 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); | |
648 | goto err; | |
649 | } | |
650 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) | |
651 | goto err; | |
652 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { | |
653 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
654 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) | |
655 | goto err; | |
656 | } | |
657 | } | |
658 | return 1; | |
659 | ||
660 | err: | |
661 | *al = tmpal; | |
662 | return 0; | |
663 | } | |
664 | ||
665 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, | |
666 | int *al) | |
667 | { | |
668 | int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
669 | ||
5923ad4b | 670 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) |
e96e0f8e | 671 | || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) |
5923ad4b | 672 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
c49e1912 | 673 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 674 | *al = tmpal; |
7cea05dc | 675 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 676 | } |
c49e1912 | 677 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
678 | } |
679 | ||
be3583fa | 680 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
8723588e MC |
681 | { |
682 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
683 | ||
684 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
685 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
be3583fa | 686 | WORK_STATE ret; |
8723588e MC |
687 | ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
688 | if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) | |
689 | return ret; | |
690 | } | |
691 | #endif | |
692 | ||
693 | /* clean a few things up */ | |
694 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
473483d4 MC |
695 | |
696 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
697 | /* | |
698 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
699 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
700 | */ | |
701 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
702 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
703 | } | |
8723588e MC |
704 | |
705 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
706 | ||
707 | s->init_num = 0; | |
708 | ||
709 | if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { | |
710 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ | |
711 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
712 | s->new_session = 0; | |
713 | ||
714 | if (s->server) { | |
8723588e MC |
715 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
716 | ||
717 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; | |
fe3a3291 | 718 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e MC |
719 | } else { |
720 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
721 | if (s->hit) | |
722 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | |
723 | ||
fe3a3291 | 724 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
8723588e MC |
725 | s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
728 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
729 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
730 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
731 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
732 | ||
733 | if (cb != NULL) | |
734 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
735 | ||
736 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
737 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
738 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
739 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
740 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 741 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
742 | } |
743 | } | |
744 | ||
745 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
746 | } | |
747 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
748 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
749 | { | |
750 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
751 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; | |
752 | unsigned char *p; | |
54105ddd | 753 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
754 | |
755 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
756 | ||
757 | do { | |
758 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
759 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
760 | &p[s->init_num], |
761 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 762 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
763 | if (i <= 0) { |
764 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
765 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 766 | } |
9ab930b2 | 767 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 768 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
769 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
770 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
771 | */ | |
54105ddd | 772 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
1257adec DB |
773 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
774 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
775 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
776 | goto f_err; | |
777 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 778 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 779 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 780 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 781 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
782 | return 1; |
783 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
784 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
785 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
32ec4153 MC |
786 | goto f_err; |
787 | } | |
54105ddd | 788 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
789 | } |
790 | ||
791 | skip_message = 0; | |
792 | if (!s->server) | |
793 | if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
794 | /* | |
795 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
796 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
797 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
798 | * MAC. | |
799 | */ | |
800 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
801 | s->init_num = 0; | |
802 | skip_message = 1; | |
803 | ||
804 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
805 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
806 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
807 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
808 | } | |
809 | } while (skip_message); | |
810 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
811 | ||
812 | *mt = *p; | |
813 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 814 | |
e8aa8b6c | 815 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
816 | /* |
817 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
818 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
819 | * |
820 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
821 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 822 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
823 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
824 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
825 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
826 | ||
827 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
828 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
829 | } else { | |
830 | n2l3(p, l); | |
831 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
832 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
833 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
834 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
835 | goto f_err; | |
32ec4153 | 836 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
837 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
838 | ||
839 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
840 | s->init_num = 0; | |
841 | } | |
842 | ||
843 | return 1; | |
844 | f_err: | |
845 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
9ab930b2 MC |
846 | return 0; |
847 | } | |
848 | ||
eda75751 | 849 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 850 | { |
54105ddd | 851 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
852 | unsigned char *p; |
853 | int i; | |
854 | ||
855 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
856 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
857 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
858 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
859 | } |
860 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
861 | p = s->init_msg; |
862 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
863 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 864 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 865 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
866 | if (i <= 0) { |
867 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
868 | *len = 0; |
869 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 870 | } |
54105ddd MC |
871 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
872 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 873 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 874 | |
bf48836c | 875 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
0f113f3e MC |
876 | /* |
877 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
878 | * Finished verification. | |
879 | */ | |
880 | if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) | |
881 | ssl3_take_mac(s); | |
ee2ffc27 BL |
882 | #endif |
883 | ||
0f113f3e | 884 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 885 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
886 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
887 | s->init_num)) { | |
888 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
889 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
890 | *len = 0; | |
891 | return 0; | |
892 | } | |
32ec4153 | 893 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 894 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
895 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
896 | } else { | |
d166ed8c | 897 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
a230b26e | 898 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
899 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
900 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
901 | *len = 0; | |
902 | return 0; | |
903 | } | |
32ec4153 MC |
904 | if (s->msg_callback) |
905 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
906 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
907 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
908 | } | |
909 | ||
eda75751 | 910 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 911 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 912 | } |
d02b48c6 | 913 | |
2e5ead83 | 914 | int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
0f113f3e | 915 | { |
a230b26e | 916 | if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) |
17a72388 VD |
917 | return -1; |
918 | ||
919 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
920 | default: | |
921 | return -1; | |
922 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
923 | return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; | |
924 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
925 | return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
ea262260 | 926 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
17a72388 VD |
927 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
928 | return SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
ea262260 | 929 | #endif |
2a9b9654 | 930 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
17a72388 VD |
931 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: |
932 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
933 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: | |
934 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; | |
935 | case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: | |
936 | return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; | |
2a9b9654 | 937 | #endif |
82049c54 | 938 | } |
0f113f3e | 939 | } |
d02b48c6 | 940 | |
6b691a5c | 941 | int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) |
0f113f3e MC |
942 | { |
943 | int al; | |
944 | ||
945 | switch (type) { | |
946 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: | |
947 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: | |
948 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: | |
949 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
950 | break; | |
951 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: | |
952 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: | |
953 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: | |
954 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: | |
955 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: | |
956 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
957 | case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: | |
958 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
959 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: | |
960 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: | |
961 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: | |
f3e235ed VD |
962 | case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: |
963 | case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: | |
964 | case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: | |
965 | case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: | |
966 | case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
967 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: | |
968 | case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: | |
0f113f3e MC |
969 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
970 | break; | |
971 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
972 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: | |
973 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
974 | break; | |
975 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
976 | case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: | |
977 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; | |
978 | break; | |
979 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: | |
980 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; | |
981 | break; | |
f3e235ed | 982 | case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: |
0f113f3e | 983 | case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
f3e235ed VD |
984 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: |
985 | case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: | |
0f113f3e MC |
986 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
987 | break; | |
988 | case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: | |
989 | case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: | |
990 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: | |
991 | case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: | |
992 | case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: | |
993 | case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: | |
994 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: | |
995 | al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; | |
996 | break; | |
997 | case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: | |
998 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
999 | break; | |
1000 | case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: | |
1001 | al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; | |
1002 | break; | |
1003 | default: | |
1004 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; | |
1005 | break; | |
1006 | } | |
1007 | return (al); | |
1008 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 1009 | |
b362ccab | 1010 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1011 | { |
1012 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1013 | return 0; | |
1014 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1015 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1016 | |
068c358a | 1017 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1018 | { |
1019 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1020 | ||
1021 | if (a == b) | |
1022 | return 0; | |
1023 | if (!dtls) | |
1024 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1025 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1026 | } | |
1027 | ||
1028 | typedef struct { | |
1029 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1030 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1031 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1032 | } version_info; |
1033 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1034 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1035 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1036 | #endif |
1037 | ||
1038 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { | |
582a17d6 MC |
1039 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1040 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1041 | #else | |
1042 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1043 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1044 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1045 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1046 | #else |
a230b26e | 1047 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1048 | #endif |
1049 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1050 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1051 | #else |
a230b26e | 1052 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1053 | #endif |
1054 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1055 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1056 | #else |
a230b26e | 1057 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1058 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1059 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1060 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1061 | #else |
a230b26e | 1062 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1063 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1064 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1065 | }; |
1066 | ||
1067 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1068 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1069 | #endif | |
1070 | ||
1071 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { | |
6b01bed2 | 1072 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1073 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1074 | #else |
a230b26e | 1075 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1076 | #endif |
1077 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1078 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1079 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1080 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1081 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1082 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1083 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1084 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1085 | }; |
1086 | ||
1087 | /* | |
1088 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1089 | * | |
1090 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1091 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1092 | * | |
1093 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1094 | */ | |
068c358a | 1095 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1096 | { |
1097 | int version = method->version; | |
1098 | ||
1099 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1100 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1101 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1102 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1103 | ||
1104 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1105 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1106 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1107 | ||
1108 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1109 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1110 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1111 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
1112 | else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) | |
1113 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; | |
1114 | ||
1115 | return 0; | |
1116 | } | |
1117 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1118 | /* |
1119 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1120 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1121 | * | |
1122 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1123 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1124 | * | |
1125 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1126 | */ | |
1127 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1128 | { | |
1129 | const version_info *vent; | |
1130 | const version_info *table; | |
1131 | ||
1132 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1133 | default: | |
1134 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1135 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1136 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1137 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1138 | break; | |
1139 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1140 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1141 | break; | |
1142 | } | |
1143 | ||
1144 | for (vent = table; | |
1145 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1146 | ++vent) { | |
1147 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1148 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1149 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1150 | return 1; | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | } | |
1153 | return 0; | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1156 | /* |
1157 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1158 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1159 | * supported protocol version. | |
1160 | * | |
1161 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1162 | * | |
1163 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1164 | */ | |
1165 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1166 | { | |
1167 | const version_info *vent; | |
1168 | const version_info *table; | |
1169 | ||
1170 | /* | |
1171 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1172 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1173 | * s->method). | |
1174 | */ | |
1175 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1176 | return 1; | |
1177 | ||
1178 | /* | |
1179 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1180 | * highest protocol version). | |
1181 | */ | |
1182 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1183 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1184 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1185 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1186 | else { | |
1187 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1188 | return 0; | |
1189 | } | |
1190 | ||
1191 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1192 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1193 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1194 | } | |
1195 | return 0; | |
1196 | } | |
1197 | ||
1198 | /* | |
1199 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1200 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1201 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1202 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1203 | * | |
1204 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1205 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1206 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1207 | * | |
1208 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1209 | */ | |
1210 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1211 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1212 | if (version == 0) { |
1213 | *bound = version; | |
1214 | return 1; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1217 | /*- |
1218 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1219 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1220 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1221 | * | |
1222 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1223 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1224 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1225 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1226 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1227 | */ | |
1228 | switch (method_version) { | |
1229 | default: | |
1230 | /* | |
1231 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1232 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1233 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1234 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1235 | * versions. | |
1236 | */ | |
1237 | return 0; | |
1238 | ||
1239 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1240 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1241 | return 0; | |
1242 | break; | |
1243 | ||
1244 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1245 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1246 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1247 | return 0; |
1248 | break; | |
1249 | } | |
1250 | ||
1251 | *bound = version; | |
1252 | return 1; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
1255 | /* | |
1256 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1257 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1258 | * the version specific method. | |
1259 | * | |
1260 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1261 | * | |
1262 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1263 | */ | |
1ab3836b | 1264 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) |
4fa52141 VD |
1265 | { |
1266 | /*- | |
1267 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1268 | * | |
1269 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1270 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1271 | * | |
1272 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1273 | * handle version. | |
1274 | */ | |
1275 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1276 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1277 | const version_info *vent; |
1278 | const version_info *table; | |
1279 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1280 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1281 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1282 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1283 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1284 | switch (server_version) { |
1285 | default: | |
d2f42576 MC |
1286 | /* |
1287 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do | |
1288 | * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable | |
1289 | * renegotiation for TLS1.3 | |
1290 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1291 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) |
1292 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1293 | /* | |
1294 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1295 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1296 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1297 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1298 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1299 | */ | |
1300 | return 0; | |
1301 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1302 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1303 | break; | |
1304 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1305 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1306 | break; | |
1307 | } | |
1308 | ||
70af3d8e | 1309 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1310 | |
70af3d8e | 1311 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1312 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1313 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1314 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1315 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1316 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1317 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1318 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1319 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1320 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1321 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1322 | } | |
1323 | ||
1324 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1325 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1326 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1327 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1328 | /* |
1329 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1330 | * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the | |
1331 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later | |
1332 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1333 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1334 | continue; | |
1335 | for (vent = table; | |
1336 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1337 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1338 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1339 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1340 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1341 | ||
1342 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1343 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1344 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1345 | best_method = method; | |
1346 | } | |
1347 | } | |
1348 | } | |
1349 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1350 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1351 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1352 | } | |
1353 | ||
1354 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
1355 | s->version = best_vers; | |
1356 | s->method = best_method; | |
1357 | return 0; | |
1358 | } | |
1359 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1360 | } | |
1361 | ||
1362 | /* | |
1363 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1364 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1365 | */ | |
1366 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1367 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1368 | ||
1369 | /* | |
1370 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1371 | * the ClientHello. | |
1372 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1373 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1374 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1375 | ||
1376 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1377 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1378 | continue; | |
1379 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1380 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1381 | s->version = vent->version; | |
1382 | s->method = method; | |
1383 | return 0; | |
1384 | } | |
1385 | disabled = 1; | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1388 | } | |
1389 | ||
1390 | /* | |
1391 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1392 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1393 | * the version specific method. | |
1394 | * | |
1395 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1396 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
1397 | * | |
1398 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1399 | */ | |
1400 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) | |
1401 | { | |
1402 | const version_info *vent; | |
1403 | const version_info *table; | |
1404 | ||
b97667ce MC |
1405 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ |
1406 | if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1407 | version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
1408 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1409 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1410 | default: | |
1411 | if (version != s->version) | |
1412 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
1413 | /* | |
1414 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1415 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1416 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1417 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1418 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1419 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1420 | return 0; |
1421 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1422 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1423 | break; | |
1424 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1425 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1426 | break; | |
1427 | } | |
1428 | ||
1429 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1430 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1431 | int err; | |
1432 | ||
1433 | if (version != vent->version) | |
1434 | continue; | |
1435 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) | |
1436 | break; | |
1437 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1438 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
1439 | if (err != 0) | |
1440 | return err; | |
1441 | s->method = method; | |
ccae4a15 | 1442 | s->version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1443 | return 0; |
1444 | } | |
1445 | ||
1446 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | ||
068c358a KR |
1449 | /* |
1450 | * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version | |
1451 | * @s: The SSL connection | |
1452 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1453 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1454 | * | |
1455 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1456 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1457 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
1458 | * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, | |
1459 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. | |
4fa52141 | 1460 | * |
0485d540 | 1461 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1462 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1463 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1464 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1465 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1466 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1467 | */ |
a230b26e EK |
1468 | int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, |
1469 | int *max_version) | |
4fa52141 VD |
1470 | { |
1471 | int version; | |
1472 | int hole; | |
1473 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1474 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1475 | const version_info *table; | |
1476 | const version_info *vent; | |
1477 | ||
1478 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1479 | default: | |
1480 | /* | |
1481 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1482 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1483 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1484 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1485 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1486 | */ | |
068c358a | 1487 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1488 | return 0; |
1489 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1490 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1491 | break; | |
1492 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1493 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1494 | break; | |
1495 | } | |
1496 | ||
1497 | /* | |
1498 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1499 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1500 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1501 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1502 | * | |
1503 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1504 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1505 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1506 | * | |
1507 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1508 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1509 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1510 | * | |
1511 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1512 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1513 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1514 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1515 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1516 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1517 | */ | |
068c358a | 1518 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1519 | hole = 1; |
1520 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1521 | /* | |
1522 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1523 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1524 | */ | |
1525 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1526 | hole = 1; | |
1527 | continue; | |
1528 | } | |
1529 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1530 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1531 | hole = 1; | |
1532 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1533 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1534 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1535 | } else { |
1536 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1537 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1538 | hole = 0; |
1539 | } | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
068c358a KR |
1542 | *max_version = version; |
1543 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1544 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1545 | if (version == 0) | |
1546 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1547 | ||
068c358a KR |
1548 | return 0; |
1549 | } | |
1550 | ||
1551 | /* | |
1552 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1553 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1554 | * |
1555 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1556 | * | |
1557 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1558 | */ | |
1559 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1560 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1561 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1562 | |
3eb2aff4 | 1563 | ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1564 | |
1565 | if (ret != 0) | |
1566 | return ret; | |
1567 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
1568 | s->version = ver_max; |
1569 | ||
1570 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
1571 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1572 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1573 | ||
1574 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1575 | return 0; |
1576 | } |