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Commit | Line | Data |
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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
3813046d | 4 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
5 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
6 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
7 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
8 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
3813046d | 9 | */ |
846e33c7 | 10 | |
48948d53 | 11 | #include <limits.h> |
f2d9a32c | 12 | #include <string.h> |
d02b48c6 | 13 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 15 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
67dc995e | 16 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
ec577822 | 17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
ec577822 BM |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
d02b48c6 | 21 | |
c6d38183 RS |
22 | /* |
23 | * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. | |
24 | */ | |
25 | typedef struct x509err2alert_st { | |
26 | int x509err; | |
27 | int alert; | |
28 | } X509ERR2ALERT; | |
29 | ||
597c51bc MC |
30 | /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ |
31 | const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { | |
32 | 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, | |
33 | 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, | |
34 | 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c | |
35 | }; | |
36 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
37 | /* |
38 | * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
39 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) | |
40 | */ | |
e7ecc7d4 | 41 | int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
0f113f3e MC |
42 | { |
43 | int ret; | |
7ee8627f | 44 | size_t written = 0; |
0f113f3e MC |
45 | |
46 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
7ee8627f | 47 | s->init_num, &written); |
0f113f3e | 48 | if (ret < 0) |
26a7d938 | 49 | return -1; |
0f113f3e MC |
50 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
51 | /* | |
52 | * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll | |
53 | * ignore the result anyway | |
9d75dce3 | 54 | * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added |
0f113f3e | 55 | */ |
9d75dce3 TS |
56 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET |
57 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE | |
58 | && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) | |
59 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, | |
60 | (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], | |
61 | written)) | |
62 | return -1; | |
7ee8627f | 63 | if (written == s->init_num) { |
0f113f3e MC |
64 | if (s->msg_callback) |
65 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
66 | (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
67 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
208fb891 | 68 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 69 | } |
7ee8627f MC |
70 | s->init_off += written; |
71 | s->init_num -= written; | |
26a7d938 | 72 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 73 | } |
e7ecc7d4 | 74 | |
4a01c59f | 75 | int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
76 | { |
77 | size_t msglen; | |
78 | ||
4a01c59f | 79 | if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) |
f1ec23c0 | 80 | || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) |
7cea05dc | 81 | || msglen > INT_MAX) |
2c7b4dbc MC |
82 | return 0; |
83 | s->init_num = (int)msglen; | |
84 | s->init_off = 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | return 1; | |
87 | } | |
88 | ||
1f5b44e9 MC |
89 | int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) |
90 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
91 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
92 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
c7f47786 | 93 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 94 | } |
c7f47786 | 95 | |
b186a592 MC |
96 | /* Reset any extension flags */ |
97 | memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); | |
98 | ||
c7f47786 | 99 | if (s->server) { |
38a73150 MC |
100 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
101 | int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; | |
102 | ||
103 | /* | |
104 | * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers | |
105 | * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the | |
106 | * ClientHello. | |
107 | */ | |
108 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { | |
4752c5de MC |
109 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
110 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
38a73150 MC |
111 | return 0; |
112 | } | |
113 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
114 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
115 | ||
116 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
117 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && | |
118 | DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) | |
119 | ok = 1; | |
120 | } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { | |
121 | ok = 1; | |
122 | } | |
123 | if (ok) | |
124 | break; | |
125 | } | |
126 | if (!ok) { | |
4752c5de MC |
127 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, |
128 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
38a73150 MC |
129 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " |
130 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
38a73150 MC |
131 | return 0; |
132 | } | |
c7f47786 | 133 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
0e6161bc BK |
134 | /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ |
135 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, | |
136 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 137 | } else { |
0e6161bc | 138 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
139 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, |
140 | s->ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
141 | |
142 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
143 | } | |
144 | } else { | |
1fcb4e4d | 145 | int discard; |
c7f47786 | 146 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
0e6161bc BK |
147 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, |
148 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 | 149 | else |
0e6161bc BK |
150 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, |
151 | 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
c7f47786 MC |
152 | |
153 | /* mark client_random uninitialized */ | |
154 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); | |
155 | s->hit = 0; | |
156 | ||
157 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
158 | ||
1f5b44e9 | 159 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
c7f47786 | 160 | s->statem.use_timer = 1; |
c7f47786 MC |
161 | } |
162 | ||
163 | return 1; | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
2c5dfdc3 MC |
166 | /* |
167 | * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: | |
168 | * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator | |
169 | */ | |
170 | #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 | |
171 | #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) | |
172 | ||
173 | static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, | |
174 | void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) | |
175 | { | |
176 | static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; | |
177 | static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; | |
178 | ||
179 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
180 | size_t hashlen; | |
181 | ||
182 | /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ | |
183 | memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); | |
184 | /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ | |
185 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
186 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) | |
187 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); | |
188 | else | |
189 | strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); | |
190 | ||
191 | /* | |
192 | * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake | |
193 | * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because | |
194 | * that includes the CertVerify itself. | |
195 | */ | |
196 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY | |
197 | || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { | |
198 | memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
199 | s->cert_verify_hash_len); | |
200 | hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; | |
201 | } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, | |
202 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 203 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
204 | return 0; |
205 | } | |
206 | ||
207 | *hdata = tls13tbs; | |
208 | *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; | |
209 | } else { | |
210 | size_t retlen; | |
211 | ||
212 | retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
213 | if (retlen <= 0) { |
214 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, | |
215 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c5dfdc3 | 216 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 217 | } |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
218 | *hdatalen = retlen; |
219 | } | |
220 | ||
221 | return 1; | |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
224 | int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
225 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
226 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
227 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
d8bc1399 | 228 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; |
5f9b64a2 MC |
229 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
230 | size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
231 | void *hdata; |
232 | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 233 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
ad4dd362 | 234 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
2c5dfdc3 | 235 | |
ad4dd362 | 236 | if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
237 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
238 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
239 | goto err; |
240 | } | |
241 | pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; | |
ad4dd362 | 242 | |
168067b6 | 243 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
244 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
245 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
246 | goto err; |
247 | } | |
d8bc1399 MC |
248 | |
249 | mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
250 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
251 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
252 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
253 | goto err; |
254 | } | |
d8bc1399 | 255 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
256 | /* Get the data to be signed */ |
257 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 258 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d8bc1399 MC |
259 | goto err; |
260 | } | |
261 | ||
ad4dd362 | 262 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
264 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
265 | goto err; |
266 | } | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
267 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
268 | sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); | |
d8bc1399 | 269 | if (sig == NULL) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
270 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
271 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
272 | goto err; |
273 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 274 | |
75394189 | 275 | if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
276 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
277 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
278 | goto err; |
279 | } | |
280 | ||
ad4dd362 | 281 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { |
5f9b64a2 | 282 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
283 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
284 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
285 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
286 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
287 | goto err; |
288 | } | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
289 | } |
290 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
291 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
292 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
293 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
294 | s->session->master_key) | |
295 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { | |
296 | ||
d4d2f3a4 MC |
297 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
298 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
5f9b64a2 MC |
299 | goto err; |
300 | } | |
caf2b6b5 | 301 | } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
302 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
303 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
304 | goto err; |
305 | } | |
5f9b64a2 | 306 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
307 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
308 | { | |
ad4dd362 DSH |
309 | int pktype = lu->sig; |
310 | ||
d8bc1399 MC |
311 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
312 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
313 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) | |
5f9b64a2 | 314 | BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); |
d8bc1399 MC |
315 | } |
316 | #endif | |
317 | ||
5f9b64a2 | 318 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
319 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, |
320 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
321 | goto err; |
322 | } | |
323 | ||
324 | /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
325 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
326 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
d8bc1399 | 327 | goto err; |
d4d2f3a4 | 328 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
329 | |
330 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
331 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
332 | return 1; | |
333 | err: | |
334 | OPENSSL_free(sig); | |
335 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
336 | return 0; |
337 | } | |
338 | ||
339 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
340 | { | |
341 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
703bcee0 | 342 | const unsigned char *data; |
d8bc1399 MC |
343 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST |
344 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; | |
345 | #endif | |
eb5fd03b | 346 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
dd24857b | 347 | int j; |
d8bc1399 MC |
348 | unsigned int len; |
349 | X509 *peer; | |
350 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2c5dfdc3 | 351 | size_t hdatalen = 0; |
d8bc1399 | 352 | void *hdata; |
2c5dfdc3 | 353 | unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
d8bc1399 | 354 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
5f9b64a2 | 355 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
d8bc1399 MC |
356 | |
357 | if (mctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
359 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
360 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
361 | } |
362 | ||
363 | peer = s->session->peer; | |
364 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
365 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
366 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, | |
367 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
368 | goto err; | |
369 | } | |
83b4049a | 370 | |
dd24857b | 371 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
372 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
373 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); | |
374 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
375 | } |
376 | ||
f464f9c0 | 377 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
f464f9c0 PD |
378 | unsigned int sigalg; |
379 | ||
380 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
382 | SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); | |
383 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 | 384 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
385 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { |
386 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
387 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
388 | } |
389 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
390 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
391 | #endif | |
392 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
393 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
394 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
395 | goto err; | |
f464f9c0 PD |
396 | } |
397 | ||
168067b6 | 398 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
399 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
400 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
401 | goto err; | |
168067b6 | 402 | } |
f464f9c0 | 403 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
404 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
405 | /* | |
f464f9c0 PD |
406 | * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without |
407 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) | |
d8bc1399 MC |
408 | */ |
409 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
f464f9c0 PD |
410 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) |
411 | && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 | |
412 | && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 | |
413 | || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
414 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 | |
415 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { | |
416 | len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
d8bc1399 MC |
417 | } else |
418 | #endif | |
f464f9c0 | 419 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
420 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
421 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
422 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 | 423 | } |
f464f9c0 | 424 | |
d8bc1399 MC |
425 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
426 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) | |
427 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
428 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
429 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); | |
430 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
431 | } |
432 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
433 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
434 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
435 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
436 | } |
437 | ||
2c5dfdc3 | 438 | if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
439 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
440 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
441 | } |
442 | ||
443 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
444 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
445 | #endif | |
75394189 | 446 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
447 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
448 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
449 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
450 | } |
451 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
452 | { | |
dc8da7b1 | 453 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); |
d8bc1399 MC |
454 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 |
455 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
456 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { | |
457 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
458 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
459 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
460 | goto err; | |
d8bc1399 MC |
461 | } |
462 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); | |
463 | data = gost_data; | |
464 | } | |
465 | } | |
466 | #endif | |
467 | ||
5554facb | 468 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
5f9b64a2 | 469 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
968ae5b3 DSH |
470 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
471 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
473 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
474 | goto err; | |
5f9b64a2 | 475 | } |
d8bc1399 | 476 | } |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
477 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { |
478 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 | |
479 | || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, | |
480 | (int)s->session->master_key_length, | |
481 | s->session->master_key)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
482 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
483 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
484 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
485 | } |
486 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
487 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
488 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
489 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 DSH |
490 | } |
491 | } else { | |
492 | j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); | |
25ffeb11 | 493 | if (j <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
494 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, |
495 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
496 | goto err; | |
caf2b6b5 | 497 | } |
d8bc1399 MC |
498 | } |
499 | ||
bd79bcb4 | 500 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 501 | err: |
d8bc1399 MC |
502 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); |
503 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; | |
504 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | |
505 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
506 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data); | |
507 | #endif | |
508 | return ret; | |
509 | } | |
510 | ||
229185e6 | 511 | int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 512 | { |
12472b45 | 513 | size_t finish_md_len; |
229185e6 | 514 | const char *sender; |
8b0e934a | 515 | size_t slen; |
229185e6 | 516 | |
f7e393be | 517 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ |
9d75dce3 | 518 | if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
f7e393be MC |
519 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; |
520 | ||
521 | /* | |
522 | * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the | |
523 | * client certificate | |
524 | */ | |
525 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
526 | && !s->server | |
527 | && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 | |
528 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
529 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; |
530 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b43c3765 | 531 | return 0; |
f7e393be MC |
532 | } |
533 | ||
229185e6 MC |
534 | if (s->server) { |
535 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; | |
536 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
537 | } else { | |
538 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
539 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
540 | } | |
0f113f3e | 541 | |
12472b45 MC |
542 | finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
543 | sender, slen, | |
544 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md); | |
545 | if (finish_md_len == 0) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
546 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
547 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf MC |
548 | } |
549 | ||
12472b45 | 550 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; |
4f89bfbf | 551 | |
12472b45 | 552 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
553 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
554 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
555 | return 0; | |
4f89bfbf | 556 | } |
0f113f3e | 557 | |
2c7bd692 CB |
558 | /* |
559 | * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for | |
560 | * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. | |
561 | */ | |
562 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, | |
563 | s->session->master_key, | |
380a522f | 564 | s->session->master_key_length)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
565 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
566 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 567 | } |
2faa1b48 | 568 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
569 | /* |
570 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
571 | */ | |
380a522f | 572 | if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
573 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, |
574 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
575 | return 0; | |
380a522f | 576 | } |
23a635c0 | 577 | if (!s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
578 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
579 | finish_md_len); | |
580 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 581 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
582 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, |
583 | finish_md_len); | |
584 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; | |
b9908bf9 | 585 | } |
0f113f3e | 586 | |
b9908bf9 | 587 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 588 | } |
d02b48c6 | 589 | |
44c04a2e MC |
590 | int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
591 | { | |
592 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
593 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, |
594 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
595 | return 0; | |
44c04a2e MC |
596 | } |
597 | ||
9412b3ad | 598 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; |
44c04a2e | 599 | return 1; |
44c04a2e MC |
600 | } |
601 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
602 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
603 | { | |
604 | unsigned int updatetype; | |
605 | ||
82f992cb MC |
606 | s->key_update_count++; |
607 | if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
608 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
609 | SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); | |
610 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
82f992cb MC |
611 | } |
612 | ||
524420d8 MC |
613 | /* |
614 | * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must | |
615 | * be on a record boundary. | |
616 | */ | |
617 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
618 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
619 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
620 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
621 | } |
622 | ||
e1c3de44 | 623 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) |
2d871227 | 624 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
625 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
626 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
627 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
628 | } |
629 | ||
9010b7bc MC |
630 | /* |
631 | * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we | |
632 | * didn't recognise. | |
633 | */ | |
2d871227 MC |
634 | if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED |
635 | && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
636 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, |
637 | SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); | |
638 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2d871227 MC |
639 | } |
640 | ||
5bf47933 MC |
641 | /* |
642 | * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need | |
643 | * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should | |
644 | * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). | |
645 | */ | |
646 | if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) | |
647 | s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | |
648 | ||
57389a32 | 649 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
650 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
651 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
57389a32 MC |
652 | } |
653 | ||
e1c3de44 MC |
654 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
655 | } | |
656 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
657 | /* |
658 | * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen | |
659 | * to far. | |
660 | */ | |
5d671101 | 661 | int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
662 | { |
663 | const char *sender; | |
8b0e934a | 664 | size_t slen; |
5d671101 | 665 | |
49ae7423 | 666 | if (!s->server) { |
0f113f3e MC |
667 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
668 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; | |
669 | } else { | |
670 | sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; | |
671 | slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; | |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
5d671101 MC |
674 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = |
675 | s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, | |
676 | s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); | |
677 | ||
678 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { | |
679 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
680 | return 0; | |
681 | } | |
682 | ||
683 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 684 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 685 | |
be3583fa | 686 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 687 | { |
348240c6 | 688 | size_t remain; |
4fa52141 | 689 | |
73999b62 | 690 | remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
657da85e MC |
691 | /* |
692 | * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have | |
c69f2adf MC |
693 | * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, |
694 | * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes | |
657da85e | 695 | */ |
c69f2adf | 696 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 697 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER |
a230b26e EK |
698 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) |
699 | || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
700 | && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
701 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
702 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
703 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
704 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf MC |
705 | } |
706 | } else { | |
73999b62 | 707 | if (remain != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
708 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
709 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, | |
710 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
711 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c69f2adf | 712 | } |
657da85e MC |
713 | } |
714 | ||
715 | /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
716 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
717 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
718 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
719 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
720 | } |
721 | ||
722 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
723 | if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
724 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
725 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
726 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
657da85e MC |
727 | } |
728 | ||
c69f2adf MC |
729 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
730 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); | |
731 | ||
732 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
733 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
734 | ||
735 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
736 | /* | |
737 | * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of | |
738 | * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no | |
739 | * SCTP is used | |
740 | */ | |
741 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); | |
742 | #endif | |
743 | } | |
744 | ||
b9908bf9 | 745 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
657da85e MC |
746 | } |
747 | ||
be3583fa | 748 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 749 | { |
12472b45 | 750 | size_t md_len; |
b9908bf9 | 751 | |
d781d247 MC |
752 | |
753 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
9d75dce3 TS |
754 | if (s->server) { |
755 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
756 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
757 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
758 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
759 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
760 | } | |
761 | } | |
d781d247 | 762 | |
524420d8 MC |
763 | /* |
764 | * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the | |
765 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
766 | */ | |
767 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
768 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
769 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
770 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
524420d8 MC |
771 | } |
772 | ||
0f113f3e | 773 | /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ |
92760c21 | 774 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
775 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
776 | SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); | |
777 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
778 | } |
779 | s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; | |
780 | ||
12472b45 | 781 | md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
0f113f3e | 782 | |
12472b45 | 783 | if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
784 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
785 | SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
786 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
787 | } |
788 | ||
12472b45 MC |
789 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
790 | md_len) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
791 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
792 | SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); | |
793 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
0f113f3e MC |
794 | } |
795 | ||
796 | /* | |
797 | * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks | |
798 | */ | |
380a522f | 799 | if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
800 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, |
801 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
802 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
380a522f | 803 | } |
23a635c0 | 804 | if (s->server) { |
12472b45 MC |
805 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
806 | md_len); | |
807 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e | 808 | } else { |
12472b45 MC |
809 | memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, |
810 | md_len); | |
811 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; | |
0f113f3e MC |
812 | } |
813 | ||
7776a36c MC |
814 | /* |
815 | * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing | |
816 | * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) | |
817 | */ | |
92760c21 MC |
818 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
819 | if (s->server) { | |
9d75dce3 TS |
820 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && |
821 | !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 822 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
823 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
824 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
825 | } |
826 | } else { | |
827 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 828 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 | 829 | &s->session->master_key_length)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
830 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
831 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
832 | } |
833 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
834 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
835 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
836 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
837 | } | |
838 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
839 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
840 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
92760c21 MC |
841 | } |
842 | } | |
843 | } | |
844 | ||
e6575156 | 845 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 846 | } |
d02b48c6 | 847 | |
7cea05dc | 848 | int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 849 | { |
7cea05dc | 850 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
851 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
852 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
85a7a5e6 MC |
853 | return 0; |
854 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 855 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
856 | return 1; |
857 | } | |
858 | ||
e96e0f8e | 859 | /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ |
f63a17d6 | 860 | static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) |
0f113f3e | 861 | { |
e96e0f8e MC |
862 | int len; |
863 | unsigned char *outbytes; | |
864 | ||
865 | len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); | |
866 | if (len < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
867 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
868 | ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
869 | return 0; |
870 | } | |
871 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) | |
872 | || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
873 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, |
874 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
875 | return 0; |
876 | } | |
877 | ||
878 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
fe874d27 | 879 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, |
f63a17d6 MC |
880 | chain)) { |
881 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 882 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 883 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
884 | |
885 | return 1; | |
886 | } | |
887 | ||
888 | /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ | |
f63a17d6 | 889 | static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e MC |
890 | { |
891 | int i, chain_count; | |
892 | X509 *x; | |
893 | STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; | |
894 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; | |
895 | X509_STORE *chain_store; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
896 | |
897 | if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) | |
898 | return 1; | |
899 | ||
900 | x = cpk->x509; | |
901 | ||
902 | /* | |
903 | * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. | |
904 | */ | |
d805a57b | 905 | if (cpk->chain != NULL) |
e96e0f8e MC |
906 | extra_certs = cpk->chain; |
907 | else | |
908 | extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; | |
909 | ||
910 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) | |
911 | chain_store = NULL; | |
912 | else if (s->cert->chain_store) | |
913 | chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; | |
914 | else | |
915 | chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; | |
916 | ||
d805a57b | 917 | if (chain_store != NULL) { |
e96e0f8e MC |
918 | X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); |
919 | ||
920 | if (xs_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
921 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
922 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
923 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
924 | } |
925 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { | |
926 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
927 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, |
928 | ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
929 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
930 | } |
931 | /* | |
932 | * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we | |
933 | * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately | |
934 | * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying | |
935 | * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can | |
936 | */ | |
937 | (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); | |
938 | /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ | |
939 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
940 | chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); | |
941 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); | |
942 | if (i != 1) { | |
943 | #if 0 | |
944 | /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ | |
945 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
946 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
947 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); | |
948 | #endif | |
949 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
950 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
951 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
952 | } |
953 | chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
954 | for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { | |
955 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
956 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
957 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { |
958 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e96e0f8e | 959 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); |
f63a17d6 | 960 | return 0; |
e96e0f8e MC |
961 | } |
962 | } | |
963 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); | |
964 | } else { | |
965 | i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); | |
966 | if (i != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
967 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); |
968 | return 0; | |
969 | } | |
970 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { | |
971 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
972 | return 0; | |
e96e0f8e | 973 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
974 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { |
975 | x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
976 | if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { |
977 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
978 | return 0; | |
979 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
980 | } |
981 | } | |
982 | return 1; | |
e96e0f8e MC |
983 | } |
984 | ||
f63a17d6 | 985 | unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) |
e96e0f8e | 986 | { |
f63a17d6 MC |
987 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { |
988 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
989 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
990 | return 0; | |
991 | } | |
e96e0f8e | 992 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
993 | if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) |
994 | return 0; | |
995 | ||
996 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
997 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, | |
998 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 999 | return 0; |
77d514c5 | 1000 | } |
f63a17d6 | 1001 | |
c49e1912 | 1002 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
1003 | } |
1004 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1005 | /* |
1006 | * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result | |
1007 | * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is | |
1008 | * freed up as well. | |
1009 | */ | |
2a8db717 | 1010 | WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) |
8723588e | 1011 | { |
1fcb4e4d | 1012 | int discard; |
8723588e MC |
1013 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
1014 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
1015 | if (clearbufs) { |
1016 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1017 | /* | |
1018 | * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf | |
1019 | * in case there are any unexpected retransmits | |
1020 | */ | |
1021 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
1022 | s->init_buf = NULL; | |
1023 | } | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1024 | if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { |
1025 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, | |
1026 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b77f3ed1 | 1027 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 1028 | } |
30f05b19 | 1029 | s->init_num = 0; |
473483d4 | 1030 | } |
8723588e | 1031 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1032 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server |
1033 | && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
1034 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; | |
1035 | ||
c7f47786 | 1036 | if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { |
8723588e MC |
1037 | /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
1038 | s->renegotiate = 0; | |
1039 | s->new_session = 0; | |
c7f47786 | 1040 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; |
8723588e | 1041 | |
30f05b19 MC |
1042 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
1043 | ||
8723588e | 1044 | if (s->server) { |
16ff1342 MC |
1045 | /* |
1046 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the | |
1047 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1048 | */ | |
1049 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1050 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); | |
8723588e | 1051 | |
0e6161bc | 1052 | /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ |
1fcb4e4d BK |
1053 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, |
1054 | s->ctx->lock); | |
fe3a3291 | 1055 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; |
8723588e | 1056 | } else { |
5d61491c MC |
1057 | /* |
1058 | * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the | |
1059 | * NewSessionTicket | |
1060 | */ | |
1061 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1062 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
8723588e | 1063 | if (s->hit) |
0e6161bc BK |
1064 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, |
1065 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e | 1066 | |
fe3a3291 | 1067 | s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; |
0e6161bc BK |
1068 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, |
1069 | &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); | |
8723588e MC |
1070 | } |
1071 | ||
1072 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1073 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1074 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1075 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | if (cb != NULL) | |
1078 | cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
1079 | ||
1080 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1081 | /* done with handshaking */ | |
1082 | s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
1083 | s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
1084 | s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
f5c7f5df | 1085 | dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
8723588e MC |
1086 | } |
1087 | } | |
1088 | ||
2a8db717 | 1089 | if (!stop) |
30f05b19 MC |
1090 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
1091 | ||
4004ce5f | 1092 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
8723588e MC |
1093 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
1094 | } | |
1095 | ||
9ab930b2 MC |
1096 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) |
1097 | { | |
1098 | /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1099 | int skip_message, i, recvd_type; |
9ab930b2 | 1100 | unsigned char *p; |
54105ddd | 1101 | size_t l, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1102 | |
1103 | p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
1104 | ||
1105 | do { | |
1106 | while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
1107 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, | |
a230b26e EK |
1108 | &p[s->init_num], |
1109 | SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, | |
54105ddd | 1110 | 0, &readbytes); |
9ab930b2 MC |
1111 | if (i <= 0) { |
1112 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1113 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1114 | } |
9ab930b2 | 1115 | if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
1257adec | 1116 | /* |
a230b26e EK |
1117 | * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur |
1118 | * in the middle of a handshake message. | |
1119 | */ | |
54105ddd | 1120 | if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1121 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1122 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1123 | SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
1124 | return 0; | |
1257adec | 1125 | } |
e9359719 MC |
1126 | if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE |
1127 | && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { | |
1128 | /* | |
1129 | * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is | |
1130 | * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. | |
1131 | * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do | |
1132 | * not return success until we see the second ClientHello | |
1133 | * with a valid cookie. | |
1134 | */ | |
1135 | return 0; | |
1136 | } | |
9ab930b2 | 1137 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
54105ddd | 1138 | s->init_num = readbytes - 1; |
c4377574 | 1139 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; |
54105ddd | 1140 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1141 | return 1; |
1142 | } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1143 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1144 | SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, | |
1145 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1146 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1147 | } |
54105ddd | 1148 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1149 | } |
1150 | ||
1151 | skip_message = 0; | |
1152 | if (!s->server) | |
c7f47786 MC |
1153 | if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK |
1154 | && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1155 | /* |
1156 | * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- | |
1157 | * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if | |
1158 | * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' | |
1159 | * MAC. | |
1160 | */ | |
1161 | if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { | |
1162 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1163 | skip_message = 1; | |
1164 | ||
1165 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1166 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
1167 | p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1168 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1169 | } | |
1170 | } while (skip_message); | |
1171 | /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
1172 | ||
1173 | *mt = *p; | |
1174 | s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); | |
32ec4153 | 1175 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1176 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
9ab930b2 MC |
1177 | /* |
1178 | * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible | |
1179 | * ClientHello | |
e8aa8b6c F |
1180 | * |
1181 | * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read | |
1182 | * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read | |
9ab930b2 | 1183 | */ |
9ab930b2 MC |
1184 | l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) |
1185 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1186 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1187 | ||
1188 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; | |
1189 | s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1190 | } else { | |
1191 | n2l3(p, l); | |
1192 | /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ | |
1193 | if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 MC |
1194 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, |
1195 | SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
1196 | return 0; | |
32ec4153 | 1197 | } |
9ab930b2 MC |
1198 | s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
1199 | ||
1200 | s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1201 | s->init_num = 0; | |
1202 | } | |
1203 | ||
1204 | return 1; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1205 | } |
1206 | ||
eda75751 | 1207 | int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) |
9ab930b2 | 1208 | { |
54105ddd | 1209 | size_t n, readbytes; |
9ab930b2 MC |
1210 | unsigned char *p; |
1211 | int i; | |
1212 | ||
1213 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1214 | /* We've already read everything in */ | |
1215 | *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; | |
1216 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1217 | } |
1218 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1219 | p = s->init_msg; |
1220 | n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; | |
1221 | while (n > 0) { | |
657da85e | 1222 | i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, |
54105ddd | 1223 | &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); |
0f113f3e MC |
1224 | if (i <= 0) { |
1225 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
9ab930b2 MC |
1226 | *len = 0; |
1227 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 1228 | } |
54105ddd MC |
1229 | s->init_num += readbytes; |
1230 | n -= readbytes; | |
0f113f3e | 1231 | } |
ee2ffc27 | 1232 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1233 | /* |
1234 | * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for | |
1235 | * Finished verification. | |
1236 | */ | |
5d671101 MC |
1237 | if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { |
1238 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1239 | *len = 0; | |
1240 | return 0; | |
1241 | } | |
ee2ffc27 | 1242 | |
0f113f3e | 1243 | /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
e8aa8b6c | 1244 | if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { |
d166ed8c DSH |
1245 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, |
1246 | s->init_num)) { | |
d4d2f3a4 | 1247 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
d166ed8c DSH |
1248 | *len = 0; |
1249 | return 0; | |
1250 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1251 | if (s->msg_callback) |
a230b26e | 1252 | s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, |
32ec4153 MC |
1253 | (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
1254 | } else { | |
11c67eea MC |
1255 | /* |
1256 | * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of | |
1257 | * processing the message | |
9d75dce3 TS |
1258 | * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished |
1259 | * message. | |
11c67eea | 1260 | */ |
597c51bc | 1261 | #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) |
9d75dce3 TS |
1262 | /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ |
1263 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET | |
1264 | && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { | |
1265 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO | |
1266 | || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1267 | || memcmp(hrrrandom, | |
1268 | s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, | |
1269 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { | |
1270 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1271 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1272 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1273 | *len = 0; | |
1274 | return 0; | |
1275 | } | |
597c51bc | 1276 | } |
d166ed8c | 1277 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1278 | if (s->msg_callback) |
1279 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
1280 | (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1281 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1282 | } | |
1283 | ||
eda75751 | 1284 | *len = s->init_num; |
9ab930b2 | 1285 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1286 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1287 | |
c6d38183 RS |
1288 | static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { |
1289 | {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, | |
1290 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1291 | {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1292 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1293 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1294 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1295 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1296 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, | |
1297 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1298 | {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1299 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, | |
1300 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1301 | {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, | |
1302 | {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1303 | {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1304 | {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1305 | {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1306 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1307 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1308 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1309 | {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1310 | {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1311 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1312 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1313 | {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1314 | {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1315 | {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1316 | {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1317 | {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1318 | {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1319 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1320 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1321 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, | |
1322 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1323 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1324 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1325 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1326 | {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, | |
1327 | {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, | |
1328 | ||
1329 | /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ | |
1330 | {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} | |
1331 | }; | |
1332 | ||
1333 | int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) | |
0f113f3e | 1334 | { |
c6d38183 RS |
1335 | const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; |
1336 | ||
1337 | for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) | |
1338 | if (tp->x509err == x509err) | |
1339 | break; | |
1340 | return tp->alert; | |
0f113f3e | 1341 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1342 | |
b362ccab | 1343 | int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e MC |
1344 | { |
1345 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) | |
1346 | return 0; | |
1347 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1348 | } | |
4fa52141 | 1349 | |
068c358a | 1350 | static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) |
4fa52141 VD |
1351 | { |
1352 | int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); | |
1353 | ||
1354 | if (a == b) | |
1355 | return 0; | |
1356 | if (!dtls) | |
1357 | return a < b ? -1 : 1; | |
1358 | return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; | |
1359 | } | |
1360 | ||
1361 | typedef struct { | |
1362 | int version; | |
a230b26e EK |
1363 | const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); |
1364 | const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); | |
4fa52141 VD |
1365 | } version_info; |
1366 | ||
582a17d6 MC |
1367 | #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION |
1368 | # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. | |
4fa52141 VD |
1369 | #endif |
1370 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1371 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1372 | static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { |
582a17d6 MC |
1373 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
1374 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, | |
1375 | #else | |
1376 | {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, | |
1377 | #endif | |
6b01bed2 | 1378 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1379 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1380 | #else |
a230b26e | 1381 | {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1382 | #endif |
1383 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
a230b26e | 1384 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1385 | #else |
a230b26e | 1386 | {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1387 | #endif |
1388 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
a230b26e | 1389 | {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1390 | #else |
a230b26e | 1391 | {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 | 1392 | #endif |
4fa52141 | 1393 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 |
a230b26e | 1394 | {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1395 | #else |
a230b26e | 1396 | {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 | 1397 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1398 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1399 | }; |
1400 | ||
1401 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
1402 | # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. | |
1403 | #endif | |
1404 | ||
f7f2a01d | 1405 | /* Must be in order high to low */ |
4fa52141 | 1406 | static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { |
6b01bed2 | 1407 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 |
a230b26e | 1408 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, |
6b01bed2 | 1409 | #else |
a230b26e | 1410 | {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
6b01bed2 VD |
1411 | #endif |
1412 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
a230b26e EK |
1413 | {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, |
1414 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1415 | #else |
a230b26e EK |
1416 | {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, |
1417 | {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, | |
6b01bed2 | 1418 | #endif |
a230b26e | 1419 | {0, NULL, NULL}, |
4fa52141 VD |
1420 | }; |
1421 | ||
1422 | /* | |
1423 | * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. | |
1424 | * | |
1425 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1426 | * @method: the intended method. | |
1427 | * | |
1428 | * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. | |
1429 | */ | |
068c358a | 1430 | static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) |
4fa52141 VD |
1431 | { |
1432 | int version = method->version; | |
1433 | ||
1434 | if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && | |
1435 | version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || | |
1436 | ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) | |
1437 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1438 | ||
1439 | if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && | |
a230b26e | 1440 | version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1441 | return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; |
1442 | ||
1443 | if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) | |
1444 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1445 | if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
1446 | return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1447 | |
1448 | return 0; | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
ccae4a15 FI |
1451 | /* |
1452 | * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by | |
1453 | * `SSL *` instance | |
1454 | * | |
1455 | * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method | |
1456 | * @version: Protocol version to test against | |
1457 | * | |
1458 | * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 | |
1459 | */ | |
1460 | int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) | |
1461 | { | |
1462 | const version_info *vent; | |
1463 | const version_info *table; | |
1464 | ||
1465 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1466 | default: | |
1467 | /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ | |
1468 | return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; | |
1469 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1470 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1471 | break; | |
1472 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1473 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1474 | break; | |
1475 | } | |
1476 | ||
1477 | for (vent = table; | |
1478 | vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; | |
1479 | ++vent) { | |
1480 | if (vent->cmeth != NULL && | |
1481 | version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && | |
1482 | ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { | |
1483 | return 1; | |
1484 | } | |
1485 | } | |
1486 | return 0; | |
1487 | } | |
1488 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1489 | /* |
1490 | * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version | |
1491 | * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest | |
1492 | * supported protocol version. | |
1493 | * | |
1494 | * @s server SSL handle. | |
1495 | * | |
1496 | * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. | |
1497 | */ | |
1498 | int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) | |
1499 | { | |
1500 | const version_info *vent; | |
1501 | const version_info *table; | |
1502 | ||
1503 | /* | |
1504 | * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version | |
1505 | * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed | |
1506 | * s->method). | |
1507 | */ | |
1508 | if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) | |
1509 | return 1; | |
1510 | ||
1511 | /* | |
1512 | * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its | |
1513 | * highest protocol version). | |
1514 | */ | |
1515 | if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) | |
1516 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1517 | else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) | |
1518 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1519 | else { | |
1520 | /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ | |
1521 | return 0; | |
1522 | } | |
1523 | ||
1524 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
a230b26e | 1525 | if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) |
4fa52141 VD |
1526 | return s->version == vent->version; |
1527 | } | |
1528 | return 0; | |
1529 | } | |
1530 | ||
1531 | /* | |
1532 | * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS | |
1533 | * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This | |
1534 | * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is | |
1535 | * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. | |
1536 | * | |
1537 | * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. | |
1538 | * @version: the intended limit. | |
1539 | * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. | |
1540 | * | |
1541 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
1542 | */ | |
1543 | int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) | |
1544 | { | |
869e978c KR |
1545 | if (version == 0) { |
1546 | *bound = version; | |
1547 | return 1; | |
1548 | } | |
1549 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1550 | /*- |
1551 | * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. | |
1552 | * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. | |
1553 | * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. | |
1554 | * | |
1555 | * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not | |
1556 | * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user | |
1557 | * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's | |
1558 | * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the | |
1559 | * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. | |
1560 | */ | |
1561 | switch (method_version) { | |
1562 | default: | |
1563 | /* | |
1564 | * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any | |
1565 | * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and | |
1566 | * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version | |
1567 | * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol | |
1568 | * versions. | |
1569 | */ | |
1570 | return 0; | |
1571 | ||
1572 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1573 | if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) | |
1574 | return 0; | |
1575 | break; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1578 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || | |
032924c4 | 1579 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
4fa52141 VD |
1580 | return 0; |
1581 | break; | |
1582 | } | |
1583 | ||
1584 | *bound = version; | |
1585 | return 1; | |
1586 | } | |
1587 | ||
f7f2a01d MC |
1588 | static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
1589 | { | |
1590 | if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1591 | && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1592 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; | |
1593 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1594 | && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
1595 | || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { | |
1596 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; | |
1597 | } else { | |
1598 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; | |
1599 | } | |
1600 | } | |
1601 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1602 | /* |
1603 | * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1604 | * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and | |
1605 | * the version specific method. | |
1606 | * | |
1607 | * @s: server SSL handle. | |
1608 | * | |
1609 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1610 | */ | |
f7f2a01d | 1611 | int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) |
4fa52141 VD |
1612 | { |
1613 | /*- | |
1614 | * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: | |
1615 | * | |
1616 | * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, | |
1617 | * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. | |
1618 | * | |
1619 | * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the | |
1620 | * handle version. | |
1621 | */ | |
1622 | int server_version = s->method->version; | |
df7ce507 | 1623 | int client_version = hello->legacy_version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1624 | const version_info *vent; |
1625 | const version_info *table; | |
1626 | int disabled = 0; | |
cd998837 | 1627 | RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; |
4fa52141 | 1628 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1629 | s->client_version = client_version; |
1630 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1631 | switch (server_version) { |
1632 | default: | |
7d061fce MC |
1633 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1634 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) | |
1635 | return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; | |
f7f2a01d | 1636 | *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
7d061fce MC |
1637 | /* |
1638 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1639 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1640 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1641 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1642 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1643 | */ | |
1644 | return 0; | |
1645 | } | |
d2f42576 | 1646 | /* |
7d061fce MC |
1647 | * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after |
1648 | * a HelloRetryRequest | |
4fa52141 | 1649 | */ |
018fcbec | 1650 | /* fall thru */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1651 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1652 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1653 | break; | |
1654 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1655 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1656 | break; | |
1657 | } | |
1658 | ||
70af3d8e | 1659 | suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; |
cd998837 | 1660 | |
6f40214f | 1661 | /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ |
fc7129dc | 1662 | if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) |
6f40214f MC |
1663 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; |
1664 | ||
70af3d8e | 1665 | if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1666 | unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; |
1667 | unsigned int best_vers = 0; | |
1668 | const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; | |
1669 | PACKET versionslist; | |
1670 | ||
6b473aca MC |
1671 | suppversions->parsed = 1; |
1672 | ||
16bce0e0 | 1673 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { |
cd998837 MC |
1674 | /* Trailing or invalid data? */ |
1675 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | ||
1678 | while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { | |
1679 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ | |
1680 | if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
1681 | candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
f2342b7a MC |
1682 | /* |
1683 | * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about | |
1ee4b98e | 1684 | * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the |
f2342b7a MC |
1685 | * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later |
1686 | */ | |
cd998837 MC |
1687 | if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) |
1688 | continue; | |
1689 | for (vent = table; | |
1690 | vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; | |
16bce0e0 | 1691 | ++vent) |
bf0ba5e7 | 1692 | continue; |
bf85ef1b | 1693 | if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { |
cd998837 MC |
1694 | const SSL_METHOD *method; |
1695 | ||
1696 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1697 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
1698 | best_vers = candidate_vers; | |
1699 | best_method = method; | |
1700 | } | |
1701 | } | |
1702 | } | |
1703 | if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { | |
1704 | /* Trailing data? */ | |
1705 | return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; | |
1706 | } | |
1707 | ||
1708 | if (best_vers > 0) { | |
fc7129dc | 1709 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { |
7d061fce | 1710 | /* |
6f40214f MC |
1711 | * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we |
1712 | * negotiated TLSv1.3 | |
7d061fce MC |
1713 | */ |
1714 | if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1715 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1716 | return 0; | |
1717 | } | |
f7f2a01d | 1718 | check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); |
cd998837 MC |
1719 | s->version = best_vers; |
1720 | s->method = best_method; | |
1721 | return 0; | |
1722 | } | |
1723 | return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; | |
1724 | } | |
1725 | ||
1726 | /* | |
1727 | * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest | |
1728 | * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 | |
1729 | */ | |
1730 | if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) | |
1731 | client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
1732 | ||
1733 | /* | |
1734 | * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in | |
1735 | * the ClientHello. | |
1736 | */ | |
4fa52141 VD |
1737 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { |
1738 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1739 | ||
1740 | if (vent->smeth == NULL || | |
1741 | version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) | |
1742 | continue; | |
1743 | method = vent->smeth(); | |
1744 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1745 | check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); |
4fa52141 VD |
1746 | s->version = vent->version; |
1747 | s->method = method; | |
1748 | return 0; | |
1749 | } | |
1750 | disabled = 1; | |
1751 | } | |
1752 | return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; | |
1753 | } | |
1754 | ||
1755 | /* | |
1756 | * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the | |
1757 | * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and | |
1758 | * the version specific method. | |
1759 | * | |
1760 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1761 | * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. | |
88050dd1 | 1762 | * @extensions: The extensions received |
4fa52141 | 1763 | * |
29bfd5b7 | 1764 | * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. |
4fa52141 | 1765 | */ |
88050dd1 | 1766 | int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) |
4fa52141 VD |
1767 | { |
1768 | const version_info *vent; | |
1769 | const version_info *table; | |
c3043dcd | 1770 | int highver = 0; |
88050dd1 | 1771 | int origv; |
4fa52141 | 1772 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1773 | origv = s->version; |
1774 | s->version = version; | |
b97667ce | 1775 | |
88050dd1 MC |
1776 | /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ |
1777 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, | |
1778 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1779 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, | |
1780 | NULL, 0)) { | |
1781 | s->version = origv; | |
1782 | return 0; | |
1783 | } | |
1784 | ||
fc7129dc MC |
1785 | if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE |
1786 | && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
88050dd1 | 1787 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1788 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1789 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1790 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1791 | } |
1792 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1793 | switch (s->method->version) { |
1794 | default: | |
88050dd1 MC |
1795 | if (s->version != s->method->version) { |
1796 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1797 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1798 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1799 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1800 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd | 1801 | } |
4fa52141 VD |
1802 | /* |
1803 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1804 | * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1805 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1806 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1807 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1808 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 | 1809 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1810 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: |
1811 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1812 | break; | |
1813 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1814 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1815 | break; | |
1816 | } | |
1817 | ||
1818 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1819 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1820 | int err; | |
1821 | ||
4fa52141 | 1822 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) |
c3043dcd MC |
1823 | continue; |
1824 | ||
88050dd1 | 1825 | if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd | 1826 | continue; |
3847d426 | 1827 | |
4fa52141 VD |
1828 | method = vent->cmeth(); |
1829 | err = ssl_method_error(s, method); | |
c3043dcd | 1830 | if (err != 0) { |
88050dd1 MC |
1831 | if (s->version == vent->version) { |
1832 | s->version = origv; | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1833 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1834 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err); | |
1835 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1836 | } |
1837 | ||
1838 | continue; | |
1839 | } | |
1840 | if (highver == 0) | |
1841 | highver = vent->version; | |
1842 | ||
88050dd1 | 1843 | if (s->version != vent->version) |
c3043dcd MC |
1844 | continue; |
1845 | ||
1846 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE | |
1847 | /* Check for downgrades */ | |
88050dd1 MC |
1848 | if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) { |
1849 | if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, | |
1850 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1851 | - sizeof(tls12downgrade), | |
1852 | sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1853 | s->version = origv; | |
1854 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1855 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1856 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1857 | return 0; | |
1858 | } | |
1859 | } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1860 | && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1861 | && highver > s->version) { | |
1862 | if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, | |
1863 | s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1864 | - sizeof(tls11downgrade), | |
1865 | sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { | |
1866 | s->version = origv; | |
1867 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1868 | SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, | |
1869 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
1870 | return 0; | |
c3043dcd MC |
1871 | } |
1872 | } | |
1873 | #endif | |
1874 | ||
4fa52141 | 1875 | s->method = method; |
29bfd5b7 | 1876 | return 1; |
4fa52141 VD |
1877 | } |
1878 | ||
88050dd1 | 1879 | s->version = origv; |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1880 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, |
1881 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
1882 | return 0; | |
4fa52141 VD |
1883 | } |
1884 | ||
068c358a | 1885 | /* |
38a73150 | 1886 | * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version |
068c358a KR |
1887 | * @s: The SSL connection |
1888 | * @min_version: The minimum supported version | |
1889 | * @max_version: The maximum supported version | |
1890 | * | |
1891 | * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the | |
1892 | * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx | |
1893 | * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B | |
b53338cb | 1894 | * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, |
068c358a | 1895 | * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. |
4fa52141 | 1896 | * |
0485d540 | 1897 | * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, |
4fa52141 VD |
1898 | * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol |
1899 | * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. | |
1900 | * | |
068c358a KR |
1901 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure |
1902 | * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. | |
4fa52141 | 1903 | */ |
38a73150 | 1904 | int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) |
4fa52141 VD |
1905 | { |
1906 | int version; | |
1907 | int hole; | |
1908 | const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; | |
1909 | const SSL_METHOD *method; | |
1910 | const version_info *table; | |
1911 | const version_info *vent; | |
1912 | ||
1913 | switch (s->method->version) { | |
1914 | default: | |
1915 | /* | |
1916 | * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't | |
1917 | * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope | |
1918 | * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol | |
1919 | * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return | |
1920 | * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) | |
1921 | */ | |
068c358a | 1922 | *min_version = *max_version = s->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1923 | return 0; |
1924 | case TLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1925 | table = tls_version_table; | |
1926 | break; | |
1927 | case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: | |
1928 | table = dtls_version_table; | |
1929 | break; | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | ||
1932 | /* | |
1933 | * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols | |
1934 | * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version | |
1935 | * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method | |
1936 | * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". | |
1937 | * | |
1938 | * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above | |
1939 | * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above | |
1940 | * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. | |
1941 | * | |
1942 | * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes | |
1943 | * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" | |
1944 | * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. | |
1945 | * | |
1946 | * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, | |
1947 | * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit | |
1948 | * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else | |
1949 | * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. | |
1950 | * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes | |
1951 | * selected, as we start from scratch. | |
1952 | */ | |
068c358a | 1953 | *min_version = version = 0; |
4fa52141 VD |
1954 | hole = 1; |
1955 | for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { | |
1956 | /* | |
1957 | * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the | |
1958 | * "version capability" vector. | |
1959 | */ | |
1960 | if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { | |
1961 | hole = 1; | |
1962 | continue; | |
1963 | } | |
1964 | method = vent->cmeth(); | |
1965 | if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { | |
1966 | hole = 1; | |
1967 | } else if (!hole) { | |
1968 | single = NULL; | |
068c358a | 1969 | *min_version = method->version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1970 | } else { |
1971 | version = (single = method)->version; | |
068c358a | 1972 | *min_version = version; |
4fa52141 VD |
1973 | hole = 0; |
1974 | } | |
1975 | } | |
1976 | ||
068c358a KR |
1977 | *max_version = version; |
1978 | ||
4fa52141 VD |
1979 | /* Fail if everything is disabled */ |
1980 | if (version == 0) | |
1981 | return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; | |
1982 | ||
068c358a KR |
1983 | return 0; |
1984 | } | |
1985 | ||
1986 | /* | |
1987 | * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for | |
7acb8b64 | 1988 | * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. |
068c358a KR |
1989 | * |
1990 | * @s: client SSL handle. | |
1991 | * | |
1992 | * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. | |
1993 | */ | |
1994 | int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) | |
1995 | { | |
3eb2aff4 | 1996 | int ver_min, ver_max, ret; |
068c358a | 1997 | |
38a73150 | 1998 | ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); |
068c358a KR |
1999 | |
2000 | if (ret != 0) | |
2001 | return ret; | |
2002 | ||
7acb8b64 MC |
2003 | s->version = ver_max; |
2004 | ||
2005 | /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ | |
2006 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2007 | ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
2008 | ||
2009 | s->client_version = ver_max; | |
4fa52141 VD |
2010 | return 0; |
2011 | } | |
aff9929b MC |
2012 | |
2013 | /* | |
2014 | * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is | |
2015 | * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be | |
2016 | * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is | |
2017 | * 1) or 0 otherwise. | |
2018 | */ | |
deb2d5e7 | 2019 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
9e84a42d | 2020 | int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, |
aff9929b MC |
2021 | size_t num_groups, int checkallow) |
2022 | { | |
2023 | size_t i; | |
2024 | ||
2025 | if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) | |
2026 | return 0; | |
2027 | ||
9e84a42d DSH |
2028 | for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
2029 | uint16_t group = groups[i]; | |
2030 | ||
2031 | if (group_id == group | |
aff9929b | 2032 | && (!checkallow |
9e84a42d | 2033 | || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { |
0acee504 | 2034 | return 1; |
aff9929b MC |
2035 | } |
2036 | } | |
2037 | ||
0acee504 | 2038 | return 0; |
aff9929b | 2039 | } |
deb2d5e7 | 2040 | #endif |
11c67eea MC |
2041 | |
2042 | /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ | |
43054d3d MC |
2043 | int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, |
2044 | size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, | |
2045 | size_t hrrlen) | |
11c67eea | 2046 | { |
43054d3d | 2047 | unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
635b7d3f MC |
2048 | unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
2049 | ||
2050 | memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); | |
11c67eea | 2051 | |
43054d3d MC |
2052 | if (hashval == NULL) { |
2053 | hashval = hashvaltmp; | |
2054 | hashlen = 0; | |
2055 | /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ | |
2056 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) | |
2057 | || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), | |
2058 | &hashlen)) { | |
2059 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2060 | return 0; | |
2061 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
2062 | } |
2063 | ||
2064 | /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2065 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
2066 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
11c67eea | 2067 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2068 | } |
11c67eea MC |
2069 | |
2070 | /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ | |
635b7d3f | 2071 | msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; |
3a63c0ed | 2072 | msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; |
11c67eea MC |
2073 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
2074 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2075 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
11c67eea MC |
2076 | return 0; |
2077 | } | |
2078 | ||
43054d3d MC |
2079 | /* |
2080 | * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted | |
2081 | * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after | |
2082 | * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. | |
2083 | */ | |
2084 | if (hrr != NULL | |
2085 | && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) | |
2086 | || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
2087 | s->s3->tmp.message_size | |
2088 | + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { | |
2089 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2090 | return 0; | |
2091 | } | |
2092 | ||
11c67eea MC |
2093 | return 1; |
2094 | } | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2095 | |
2096 | static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) | |
2097 | { | |
2098 | return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2101 | int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2102 | { |
2103 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
2104 | X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
2105 | PACKET cadns; | |
2106 | ||
2107 | if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2108 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2109 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2110 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2111 | } |
2112 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2113 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2114 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2115 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2116 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2117 | } |
2118 | ||
2119 | while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { | |
2120 | const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; | |
2121 | unsigned int name_len; | |
2122 | ||
2123 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) | |
2124 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2125 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2126 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2127 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2128 | } |
2129 | ||
2130 | namestart = namebytes; | |
2131 | if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2132 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2133 | ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
2134 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2135 | } |
2136 | if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2137 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2138 | SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2139 | goto err; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2140 | } |
2141 | ||
2142 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2143 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, |
2144 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2145 | goto err; |
2146 | } | |
2147 | xn = NULL; | |
2148 | } | |
2149 | ||
fa7c2637 DSH |
2150 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); |
2151 | s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2152 | |
2153 | return 1; | |
2154 | ||
5d6cca05 DSH |
2155 | err: |
2156 | sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
2157 | X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
2158 | return 0; | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | ||
2161 | int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2162 | { | |
9784ec04 | 2163 | const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2164 | |
2165 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2166 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
2167 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2168 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2169 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2170 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2171 | |
2172 | if (ca_sk != NULL) { | |
2173 | int i; | |
2174 | ||
2175 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { | |
2176 | unsigned char *namebytes; | |
2177 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); | |
2178 | int namelen; | |
2179 | ||
2180 | if (name == NULL | |
2181 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
2182 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, | |
2183 | &namebytes) | |
2184 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2185 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, |
2186 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2187 | return 0; |
2188 | } | |
2189 | } | |
2190 | } | |
2191 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2192 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
2193 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, | |
2194 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5d6cca05 | 2195 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2196 | } |
5d6cca05 DSH |
2197 | |
2198 | return 1; | |
2199 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2200 | |
2201 | /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2202 | size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2203 | const void *param, size_t paramlen) |
2204 | { | |
2205 | size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; | |
2206 | unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); | |
2207 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2208 | if (tbs == NULL) { |
2209 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, | |
2210 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
72ceb6a6 | 2211 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 2212 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2213 | memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
2214 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
2215 | ||
2216 | memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); | |
2217 | ||
2218 | *ptbs = tbs; | |
2219 | return tbslen; | |
2220 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2221 | |
2222 | /* | |
2223 | * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, | |
2224 | * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once | |
2225 | */ | |
2226 | int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2227 | { | |
2228 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2229 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) | |
2230 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2231 | return 0; | |
2232 | ||
2233 | s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2234 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2235 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2236 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2237 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2238 | return 0; | |
2239 | } | |
2240 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, | |
2241 | s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { | |
2242 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2243 | SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2244 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2245 | return 0; | |
2246 | } | |
2247 | } | |
2248 | return 1; | |
2249 | } | |
2250 | ||
2251 | /* | |
2252 | * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest | |
2253 | * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request | |
2254 | */ | |
2255 | int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) | |
2256 | { | |
2257 | if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { | |
2258 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2259 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2260 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2261 | return 0; | |
2262 | } | |
2263 | if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, | |
2264 | s->pha_dgst)) { | |
2265 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2266 | SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, | |
2267 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2268 | return 0; | |
2269 | } | |
2270 | return 1; | |
2271 | } |