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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52
DSH		 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119#include <openssl/dh.h>
120#include <openssl/bn.h>
121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
42182852 124const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf
DSH		 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
161e0a61 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
58964a49
RE		 135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
e0af0405 146 tls1_export_keying_material,
173e72e6
DSH		 147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
161e0a61 153SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
173e72e6
DSH		 154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
161e0a61 172SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173e72e6
DSH		 173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
4221c0dd
DSH		 185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
173e72e6
DSH		 187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
58964a49
RE		 190 };
191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
58964a49
RE		 193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
6b691a5c 199int tls1_new(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
6b691a5c 206void tls1_free(SSL *s)
58964a49 207 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 208#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
58964a49
RE		 214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
6b691a5c 217void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
637f374a 220 s->version = s->method->version;
58964a49
RE		 221 }
222
525de5d3 223#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 224
b362ccab
DSH		 225typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
f756fb43 235static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
525de5d3 236 {
b362ccab
DSH		 237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
525de5d3 265 };
eda3766b 266
d0595f17
DSH		 267
268static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
eda3766b 269 {
d0595f17
DSH		 270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
c2c76a4d 280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
d0595f17
DSH		 281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
c2c76a4d 283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
d0595f17
DSH		 284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
c2c76a4d 287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
d0595f17
DSH		 288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
eda3766b
DSH		 305 };
306
2ea80354
DSH		 307static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
525de5d3
DSH		 313int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
bcb245a7 315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
1e26a8ba
GT		 316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
b362ccab 319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
525de5d3
DSH		 320 }
321
322int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
bcb245a7 324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
525de5d3
DSH		 325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
6699cb84
DSH		 377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
525de5d3
DSH		 383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
740580c2
EK		 387/*
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
389 * preferred list.
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
fd2b65ce 398 */
740580c2 399static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
fd2b65ce 400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
740580c2 401 size_t *num_curves)
fd2b65ce 402 {
740580c2 403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 404 if (sess)
405 {
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
740580c2 407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
fd2b65ce 408 }
740580c2 409 else
fd2b65ce 410 {
740580c2
EK		 411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
413 {
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
417 break;
2ea80354 418
740580c2
EK		 419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
421 pcurveslen = 2;
422 break;
b34aa49c 423
740580c2
EK		 424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
426 pcurveslen = 2;
427 break;
428 default:
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
431 }
432 if (!*pcurves)
433 {
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
436 }
fd2b65ce 437 }
740580c2
EK		 438
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
440 if (pcurveslen & 1)
441 {
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
443 *num_curves = 0;
444 return 0;
445 }
446 else
fd2b65ce 447 {
740580c2
EK		 448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
449 return 1;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 450 }
451 }
b362ccab
DSH		 452
453/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
455 {
f756fb43 456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
b362ccab
DSH		 457 if (curve[0])
458 return 1;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
461 return 0;
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
1a14b47e
DSH		 463#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
465 return 0;
466#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
468 }
469
d18b716d
DSH		 470/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
472 {
473 const unsigned char *curves;
740580c2 474 size_t num_curves, i;
2ea80354 475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
d18b716d
DSH		 476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
477 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
479 if (suiteb_flags)
480 {
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
482 if (p[1])
483 return 0;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
485 {
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
487 return 0;
488 }
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
490 {
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
492 return 0;
493 }
494 else /* Should never happen */
495 return 0;
496 }
740580c2
EK		 497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
498 return 0;
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
d18b716d
DSH		 500 {
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
b362ccab 502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
d18b716d
DSH		 503 }
504 return 0;
505 }
d0595f17 506
1d97c843 507/*-
376e2ca3
EK		 508 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
d0595f17 512 */
a4352630 513int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
d0595f17
DSH		 514 {
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
740580c2 516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
d0595f17 517 int k;
a4352630
DSH		 518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
519 if (s->server == 0)
520 return -1;
2ea80354
DSH		 521 if (nmatch == -2)
522 {
523 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
524 {
525 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
526 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
527 * checks.
528 */
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
535 return NID_undef;
536 }
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
538 nmatch = 0;
539 }
740580c2
EK		 540 /*
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
543 */
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
545 &supp, &num_supp))
376e2ca3
EK		 546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
740580c2
EK		 548 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
549 &pref, &num_pref))
376e2ca3 550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
d0595f17 551 k = 0;
740580c2 552 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
d0595f17
DSH		 553 {
554 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
740580c2 555 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
d0595f17
DSH		 556 {
557 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
558 {
b362ccab
DSH		 559 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
560 continue;
d0595f17 561 if (nmatch == k)
a4352630
DSH		 562 {
563 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
564 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
565 }
d0595f17
DSH		 566 k++;
567 }
568 }
569 }
d0595f17 570 if (nmatch == -1)
a4352630 571 return k;
376e2ca3
EK		 572 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
573 return NID_undef;
d0595f17
DSH		 574 }
575
576int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
578 {
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
580 size_t i;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
583 */
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
586 if (!clist)
587 return 0;
588 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
589 {
590 unsigned long idmask;
591 int id;
592 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
593 idmask = 1L << id;
594 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
595 {
596 OPENSSL_free(clist);
597 return 0;
598 }
599 dup_list |= idmask;
600 s2n(id, p);
601 }
602 if (*pext)
603 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
604 *pext = clist;
605 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
606 return 1;
607 }
608
f6dfbeed 609#define MAX_CURVELIST 28
d0595f17
DSH		 610
611typedef struct
612 {
613 size_t nidcnt;
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
615 } nid_cb_st;
616
617static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
618 {
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
620 size_t i;
621 int nid;
622 char etmp[20];
623 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
624 return 0;
625 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
626 return 0;
627 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
628 etmp[len] = 0;
629 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
630 if (nid == NID_undef)
631 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
635 return 0;
636 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
637 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
638 return 0;
639 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
640 return 1;
641 }
642/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
643int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
644 const char *str)
645 {
646 nid_cb_st ncb;
647 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
649 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 650 if (pext == NULL)
651 return 1;
d0595f17
DSH		 652 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
653 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 654/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
655static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
656 EC_KEY *ec)
657 {
658 int is_prime, id;
659 const EC_GROUP *grp;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 660 const EC_METHOD *meth;
661 if (!ec)
662 return 0;
663 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
664 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
29b490a4 665 if (!grp)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 666 return 0;
667 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
668 if (!meth)
669 return 0;
670 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
671 is_prime = 1;
672 else
673 is_prime = 0;
674 /* Determine curve ID */
675 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
676 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
677 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
678 if (id)
679 {
680 curve_id[0] = 0;
681 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
682 }
683 else
684 {
685 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
686 if (is_prime)
687 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
688 else
689 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
690 }
691 if (comp_id)
692 {
29b490a4
PS		 693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
694 return 0;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
696 {
697 if (is_prime)
698 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
699 else
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
701 }
702 else
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
704 }
705 return 1;
706 }
707/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
708static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
709 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
710 {
740580c2
EK		 711 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
712 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
a4352630 713 int j;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 714 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
715 * is supported (see RFC4492).
716 */
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
718 {
740580c2
EK		 719 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
fd2b65ce 722 {
740580c2 723 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 724 break;
725 }
740580c2 726 if (i == num_formats)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 727 return 0;
728 }
2ea80354
DSH		 729 if (!curve_id)
730 return 1;
a4352630
DSH		 731 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
732 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
fd2b65ce 733 {
740580c2
EK		 734 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
735 return 0;
736 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
fd2b65ce 737 {
740580c2
EK		 738 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
739 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
a4352630 740 break;
fd2b65ce 741 }
740580c2 742 if (i == num_curves)
a4352630 743 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 744 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
745 if (!s->server)
b362ccab 746 break;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 747 }
748 return 1;
749 }
d61ff83b 750
5087afa1 751static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
740580c2 752 size_t *num_formats)
5087afa1
DSH		 753 {
754 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
755 * use default */
756 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
757 {
758 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
740580c2 759 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
5087afa1
DSH		 760 }
761 else
762 {
763 *pformats = ecformats_default;
764 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
765 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
740580c2 766 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
5087afa1 767 else
740580c2 768 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
5087afa1
DSH		 769 }
770 }
771
d61ff83b
DSH		 772/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
773 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
774 */
2ea80354 775static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
fd2b65ce 776 {
fd2b65ce 777 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
d61ff83b
DSH		 778 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
779 int rv;
780 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 781 if (!pkey)
782 return 0;
d61ff83b
DSH		 783 /* If not EC nothing to do */
784 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
785 {
786 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
787 return 1;
788 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 789 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
790 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
791 if (!rv)
792 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 793 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
794 * supported curves extension.
795 */
796 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
797 if (!rv)
798 return 0;
799 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
800 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
801 */
802 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
803 {
804 int check_md;
805 size_t i;
806 CERT *c = s->cert;
807 if (curve_id[0])
808 return 0;
809 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
810 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
811 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
812 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
813 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
814 else
815 return 0; /* Should never happen */
816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
817 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
818 break;
819 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
820 return 0;
821 if (set_ee_md == 2)
822 {
823 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
825 else
826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
827 }
828 }
829 return rv;
fd2b65ce 830 }
af6e2d51 831#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
fd2b65ce 832/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 833int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 834 {
835 unsigned char curve_id[2];
836 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
ed83ba53
DSH		 837#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
838 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
ddd13d67 839 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 840 return 1;
841#endif
2ea80354
DSH		 842 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
843 * no other curves permitted.
844 */
845 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
846 {
847 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
849 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
850 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
851 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
852 else
853 return 0;
854 curve_id[0] = 0;
855 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
856 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
857 return 0;
858 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
860 return 1;
861 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
862 else
863 {
864 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
865 if (!ec)
866 return 0;
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
868 return 0;
869 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
870 return 1;
871 return 0;
872 }
873
874 }
a4352630
DSH		 875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
876 {
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
879 return 1;
880 else return 0;
881 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 882 if (!ec)
883 {
884 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
885 return 1;
886 else
887 return 0;
888 }
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
1e4cb467 890 return 0;
d18b716d
DSH		 891/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
892#if 0
893 return 1;
894#else
fd2b65ce 895 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
d18b716d 896#endif
fd2b65ce 897 }
af6e2d51 898#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
d0595f17 899
14536c8c
DSH		 900#else
901
902static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
903 {
904 return 1;
905 }
906
525de5d3 907#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 908
ed3883d2 909#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88
DSH		 910
911/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
912 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
913 */
914
915#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
916#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
917#else
918#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
919#endif
920
921#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
922#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
923#else
924#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
925#endif
926
927#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
928#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
929#else
654ac273 930#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
fc101f88
DSH		 931#endif
932
933#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
934 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
937
938static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
939#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
942#endif
943#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
945 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
946#endif
947#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
949#endif
fc101f88 950};
14536c8c 951#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2ea80354
DSH		 952static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
953 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
954 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
955};
14536c8c 956#endif
b7bfe69b 957size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
f37f20ff 958 {
2ea80354
DSH		 959 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
960 * preferences.
961 */
14536c8c 962#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 963 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
964 {
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
968
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
971 return 2;
972
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
975 return 2;
976 }
14536c8c 977#endif
3dbc46df
DSH		 978 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
979 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
980 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 981 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df
DSH		 983 }
984 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
985 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 986 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
987 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 988 }
4453cd8c 989 else
0f229cce 990 {
b7bfe69b 991 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
45473632 992 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 993 }
b7bfe69b 994 }
ec4a50b3
DSH		 995/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
997 */
998int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
999 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1000 {
1001 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1002 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1003 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1004 /* Should never happen */
1005 if (sigalg == -1)
1006 return -1;
1007 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1008 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1009 {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1011 return 0;
1012 }
14536c8c 1013#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 1014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1015 {
1016 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1017 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1018 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1019 return 0;
1020 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
ed83ba53
DSH		 1021 {
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2ea80354 1023 return 0;
ed83ba53 1024 }
2ea80354
DSH		 1025 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1026 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1027 {
1028 if (curve_id[0])
1029 return 0;
1030 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1031 {
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1033 {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1035 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1036 return 0;
1037 }
1038 }
1039 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1040 {
1041 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1042 {
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1044 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1045 return 0;
1046 }
1047 }
1048 else
1049 return 0;
1050 }
1051 }
1052 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1053 return 0;
14536c8c 1054#endif
2ea80354 1055
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1056 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1057 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1059 {
1060 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1061 break;
1062 }
1063 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
2ea80354 1064 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1065 {
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1067 return 0;
1068 }
1069 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1070 if (*pmd == NULL)
1071 {
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1073 return 0;
1074 }
b362ccab
DSH		 1075 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1076 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1077 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1078 (void *)sig))
1079 {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1081 return 0;
1082 }
319354eb
DSH		 1083 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1084 * wish.
1085 */
1086 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1087 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1088 return 1;
1089 }
b362ccab 1090
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1091/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1092 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1093 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1094 * session and not global settings.
1095 *
1096 */
1097void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1098 {
1099 CERT *c = s->cert;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1100 c->mask_a = 0;
1101 c->mask_k = 0;
4221c0dd 1102 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1e2d4cb0 1103 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1104 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1105 else
1106 c->mask_ssl = 0;
b362ccab
DSH		 1107 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1108 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1109 * signature algorithms.
1110 */
b362ccab 1111 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
b7bfe69b 1112 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
b362ccab 1113 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
b7bfe69b 1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
b362ccab 1115 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
b7bfe69b 1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1117#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1118 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1119 {
1120 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1121 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1122 }
1123#endif
1124#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1125 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1126 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1127 {
1128 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1129 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1130 }
1131#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
80bd7b41
DSH		 1132#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1133 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1134 {
1135 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1136 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1137 }
1138#endif
b7bfe69b 1139 c->valid = 1;
f37f20ff 1140 }
fc101f88 1141
b362ccab 1142int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1143 {
1144 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1146 return 1;
b362ccab
DSH		 1147 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1148 }
1149
1150static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1151 {
1152 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1153 return 0;
1154 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1155 }
1156
22a10c89 1157unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1158 {
ed3883d2 1159 int extdatalen=0;
22a10c89
BL		 1160 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1161 unsigned char *ret = buf;
d0595f17
DSH		 1162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1164 int using_ecc = 0;
874a18cf 1165 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
d0595f17
DSH		 1166 {
1167 int i;
1168 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1170
1171 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1172 {
1173 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1174
1175 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1176 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1177 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
d0595f17
DSH		 1178 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1179 {
1180 using_ecc = 1;
1181 break;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 }
1185#endif
ed3883d2
BM		 1186
1187 ret+=2;
1188
1189 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
6434abbf 1190
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if (s->renegotiate)
1193 {
1194 int el;
1195
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1197 {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 return NULL;
1200 }
1201
1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1203
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1205 s2n(el,ret);
1206
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1208 {
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 return NULL;
1211 }
1212
1213 ret += el;
1214 }
1215 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1217 goto done;
1218
a70183bc 1219 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1220 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1221 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1222 unsigned long size_str;
1223 long lenmax;
1224
1d97c843
TH		 1225 /*-
1226 * check for enough space.
1227 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1228 * 2 for servernamelist length
1229 * 1 for the hostname type
1230 * 2 for hostname length
1231 * + hostname length
1232 */
52b8dad8 1233
761772d7
BM		 1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1235 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
a70183bc
BM		 1236 return NULL;
1237
1238 /* extension type and length */
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1240 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
f1fd4544 1241
a70183bc 1242 /* length of servername list */
ed3883d2 1243 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
a70183bc
BM		 1244
1245 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
f1fd4544 1246 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
ed3883d2 1247 s2n(size_str,ret);
ed3883d2
BM		 1248 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1249 ret+=size_str;
f1fd4544 1250 }
761772d7 1251
edc032b5 1252#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1df80b65 1253 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
edc032b5 1254 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1df80b65 1255 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
edc032b5 1256
1df80b65
DSH		 1257 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1258 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
edc032b5
BL		 1259 {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 return NULL;
1df80b65
DSH		 1262 }
1263
1d97c843
TH		 1264 /*-
1265 * check for enough space.
1266 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1267 * 1 for the srp user identity
1268 * + srp user identity length
1269 */
1df80b65
DSH		 1270 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1271
1272 /* fill in the extension */
edc032b5
BL		 1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1274 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1df80b65
DSH		 1275 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1276 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
edc032b5
BL		 1277 ret+=login_len;
1278 }
1279#endif
1280
36ca4ba6 1281#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0595f17 1282 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1283 {
1284 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1285 long lenmax;
740580c2
EK		 1286 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1287 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
b362ccab
DSH		 1288 size_t i;
1289 unsigned char *etmp;
5087afa1 1290
740580c2 1291 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
36ca4ba6 1292
761772d7 1293 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
740580c2
EK		 1294 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1295 if (num_formats > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1296 {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 return NULL;
1299 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1300
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
740580c2
EK		 1302 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1303 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1304 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1305 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1306 ret+=num_formats;
d0595f17 1307
33273721 1308 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
740580c2
EK		 1309 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1310 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1311 return NULL;
33273721 1312
761772d7 1313 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
740580c2
EK		 1314 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1315 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
33273721
BM		 1316 {
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1318 return NULL;
1319 }
b362ccab 1320
33273721
BM		 1321
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1323 etmp = ret + 4;
1324 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
740580c2 1325 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
b362ccab 1326 {
740580c2 1327 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
b362ccab 1328 {
740580c2
EK		 1329 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1330 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
b362ccab
DSH		 1331 }
1332 }
1333
740580c2 1334 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
a4974de9 1335
740580c2
EK		 1336 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1338 ret += curves_list_len;
33273721 1339 }
36ca4ba6 1340#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d3442bc7 1341
b362ccab 1342 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf
DSH		 1343 {
1344 int ticklen;
7ba3838a 1345 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
6434abbf 1346 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1347 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1349 {
1350 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1351 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1352 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1353 return NULL;
1354 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1356 ticklen);
1357 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1358 }
6434abbf
DSH		 1359 else
1360 ticklen = 0;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1361 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1362 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1363 goto skip_ext;
6434abbf
DSH		 1364 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1365 * rest for ticket
1366 */
761772d7 1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1369 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1370 if (ticklen)
1371 {
1372 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1373 ret += ticklen;
1374 }
1375 }
12bf56c0 1376 skip_ext:
6434abbf 1377
cbd64894 1378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
a2f9200f 1379 {
0f229cce 1380 size_t salglen;
b7bfe69b 1381 const unsigned char *salg;
b362ccab 1382 unsigned char *etmp;
b7bfe69b 1383 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
0f229cce 1384 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
a2f9200f
DSH		 1385 return NULL;
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1387 etmp = ret;
1388 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1389 ret += 4;
deffd89a 1390 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
b362ccab
DSH		 1391 /* Fill in lengths */
1392 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1393 s2n(salglen, etmp);
0f229cce 1394 ret += salglen;
a2f9200f
DSH		 1395 }
1396
761772d7 1397#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1398 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1399 {
1400 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1401
487dac87 1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
761772d7
BM		 1403 return NULL;
1404 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1405 return NULL;
1406
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1408 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1409 s2n(col, ret);
1410 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1411 ret += col;
1412 }
1413#endif
1414
874a18cf 1415 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1416 {
1417 int i;
1418 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1419 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1420
1421 idlen = 0;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1423 {
1424 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1425 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1426 if (itmp <= 0)
1427 return NULL;
1428 idlen += itmp + 2;
1429 }
1430
1431 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1432 {
1433 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1434 if (extlen < 0)
1435 return NULL;
1436 }
1437 else
1438 extlen = 0;
1439
1440 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1442 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1443 return NULL;
1444 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1445 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1446 s2n(idlen, ret);
1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1448 {
1449 /* save position of id len */
1450 unsigned char *q = ret;
1451 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1452 /* skip over id len */
1453 ret += 2;
1454 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1455 /* write id len */
1456 s2n(itmp, q);
1457 }
1458 s2n(extlen, ret);
1459 if (extlen > 0)
1460 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1461 }
1462
4817504d
DSH		 1463#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1464 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
c7f26739
DB		 1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1466 return NULL;
4817504d
DSH		 1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1468 s2n(1,ret);
1d97c843
TH		 1469 /*-
1470 * Set mode:
4817504d
DSH		 1471 * 1: peer may send requests
1472 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1473 */
1474 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1475 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1476 else
1477 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1478#endif
1479
bf48836c 1480#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1482 {
1483 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1484 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1485 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1486 return NULL;
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1488 s2n(0,ret);
1489 }
1490#endif
1491
6f017a8f
AL		 1492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1493 {
1494 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1495 return NULL;
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1497 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1498 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1499 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1500 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1501 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1502 }
1503
e659eff2 1504 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
333f926d
BL		 1505 {
1506 int el;
1507
1508 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1509
22a10c89 1510 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333f926d
BL		 1511
1512 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1513 s2n(el,ret);
1514
1515 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1516 {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 return NULL;
1519 }
1520 ret += el;
1521 }
28ea0a0c 1522 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
a398f821 1523 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
ecf4d660
DSH		 1524 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1525 return NULL;
5e3ff62c 1526#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 1527 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1528 s2n(0,ret);
5e3ff62c 1529#endif
01f2f18f 1530
4fcdd66f 1531 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
cd6bd5ff 1532 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
4fcdd66f
DSH		 1533 *
1534 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1535 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
0467ea68 1536 */
01f2f18f 1537 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
0467ea68 1538 {
01f2f18f
DSH		 1539 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1540 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1541 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1542 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1543 */
1544 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1545 hlen -= 5;
1546 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1547 {
1548 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1549 if (hlen >= 4)
1550 hlen -= 4;
1551 else
1552 hlen = 0;
4fcdd66f 1553
01f2f18f
DSH		 1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1555 s2n(hlen, ret);
1556 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1557 ret += hlen;
1558 }
0467ea68 1559 }
a398f821 1560
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 1561 done:
1562
22a10c89
BL		 1563 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1564 return orig;
ed3883d2 1565
22a10c89 1566 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
ed3883d2 1567 return ret;
52b8dad8 1568 }
ed3883d2 1569
22a10c89 1570unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1571 {
ed3883d2 1572 int extdatalen=0;
22a10c89
BL		 1573 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1574 unsigned char *ret = buf;
bf48836c
BL		 1575#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1576 int next_proto_neg_seen;
ee2ffc27 1577#endif
14536c8c 1578#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
5087afa1
DSH		 1579 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1580 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1581 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
5087afa1 1582 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
14536c8c 1583#endif
5f8f94a6 1584
a13c20f6 1585 ret+=2;
ed3883d2
BM		 1586 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1587
8025e251 1588 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
860c3dd1
DSH		 1589 {
1590 int el;
1591
1592 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1593 {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 return NULL;
1596 }
1597
22a10c89 1598 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1599
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1601 s2n(el,ret);
1602
1603 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1604 {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 return NULL;
1607 }
1608
1609 ret += el;
1610 }
1611
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 1612 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1613 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1614 goto done;
1615
1616 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1617 {
1618 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1619
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1621 s2n(0,ret);
1622 }
1623
36ca4ba6 1624#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 1625 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6 1626 {
5087afa1
DSH		 1627 const unsigned char *plist;
1628 size_t plistlen;
36ca4ba6
BM		 1629 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1630 long lenmax;
1631
5087afa1
DSH		 1632 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1633
761772d7 1634 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
5087afa1
DSH		 1635 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1636 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1637 {
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 return NULL;
1640 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1641
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
5087afa1
DSH		 1643 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1644 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1645 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1646 ret+=plistlen;
a70183bc 1647
36ca4ba6 1648 }
33273721 1649 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
36ca4ba6 1650#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
67c8e7f4 1651
b362ccab 1652 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf 1653 {
761772d7 1654 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1656 s2n(0,ret);
1657 }
761772d7 1658
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1659 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1660 {
1661 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1663 s2n(0,ret);
1664 }
1665
761772d7 1666#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1667 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1668 {
1669 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
6434abbf 1670
761772d7
BM		 1671 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1672 return NULL;
1673 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1674 return NULL;
1675
1676 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1677 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1678 s2n(sol, ret);
1679 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1680 ret += sol;
1681 }
1682#endif
333f926d 1683
e659eff2 1684 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
333f926d
BL		 1685 {
1686 int el;
1687
1688 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1689
22a10c89 1690 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333f926d
BL		 1691
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1693 s2n(el,ret);
1694
1695 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1696 {
7a236261 1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333f926d
BL		 1698 return NULL;
1699 }
1700 ret+=el;
1701 }
1702
0e1dba93
DSH		 1703 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1704 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1705 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1706 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1707 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1708 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1709 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1710 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1711 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1712 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1713 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1714 ret+=36;
1715
1716 }
761772d7 1717
4817504d 1718#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
5733919d
DSH		 1719 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1720 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1721 {
c7f26739
DB		 1722 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1723 return NULL;
5733919d
DSH		 1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1725 s2n(1,ret);
1d97c843
TH		 1726 /*-
1727 * Set mode:
5733919d
DSH		 1728 * 1: peer may send requests
1729 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1730 */
1731 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1732 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1733 else
1734 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
192540b5 1735
5733919d 1736 }
4817504d
DSH		 1737#endif
1738
bf48836c 1739#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1740 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1741 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1742 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1743 {
1744 const unsigned char *npa;
1745 unsigned int npalen;
1746 int r;
1747
1748 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1749 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1750 {
1751 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1752 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1753 s2n(npalen,ret);
1754 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1755 ret += npalen;
1756 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1757 }
1758 }
1759#endif
ecf4d660
DSH		 1760 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1761 return NULL;
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1762#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1763 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1764 {
5a3d8eeb 1765 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
f3014206 1766 * might want to disable for other cases too.
5e3ff62c 1767 */
f3014206 1768 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
5a3d8eeb 1769 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1770 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1771 else
1772 {
1773 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1774 s2n(0,ret);
1775 }
1776 }
1777#endif
a398f821 1778
6f017a8f
AL		 1779 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1780 {
1781 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1782 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1783
1784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1785 return NULL;
1786 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1787 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1788 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1789 *ret++ = len;
1790 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1791 ret += len;
1792 }
1793
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 1794 done:
1795
22a10c89
BL		 1796 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1797 return orig;
ed3883d2 1798
22a10c89 1799 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
ed3883d2 1800 return ret;
52b8dad8 1801 }
ed3883d2 1802
6f017a8f
AL		 1803/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1804 * ClientHello.
1805 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1806 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1807 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1808 * return.
1809 *
1810 * returns: 0 on success. */
1811static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1812 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1813 {
1814 unsigned i;
1815 unsigned proto_len;
1816 const unsigned char *selected;
1817 unsigned char selected_len;
1818 int r;
1819
1820 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1821 return 0;
1822
1823 if (data_len < 2)
1824 goto parse_error;
1825
1826 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1827 * length-prefixed strings. */
1828 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1829 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1830 data_len -= 2;
1831 data += 2;
1832 if (data_len != i)
1833 goto parse_error;
1834
1835 if (data_len < 2)
1836 goto parse_error;
1837
1838 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1839 {
1840 proto_len = data[i];
1841 i++;
1842
1843 if (proto_len == 0)
1844 goto parse_error;
1845
1846 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1847 goto parse_error;
1848
1849 i += proto_len;
1850 }
1851
1852 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1853 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1854 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1855 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1856 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1857 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1858 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1859 {
1860 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1861 return -1;
1862 }
1863 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1864 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1865 }
1866 return 0;
1867
1868parse_error:
1869 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1870 return -1;
1871 }
1872
dece3209 1873#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1d97c843
TH		 1874/*-
1875 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
dece3209
RS		 1876 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1877 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1878 * SNI,
1879 * elliptic_curves
1880 * ec_point_formats
1881 *
1882 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1883 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1884 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1885 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1886 */
1887static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1888 unsigned short type, size;
1889 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1890 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1891 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1892 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1893 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1894 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1895 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1896
1897 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1898 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1899 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1900 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1901 };
1902
1903 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1904 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1905 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1906 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1907 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1908 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1909 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1910 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1911 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1912 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1913 };
1914
1915 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1916 return;
1917 data += 2;
1918
1919 if (data > (d+n-4))
1920 return;
1921 n2s(data,type);
1922 n2s(data,size);
1923
1924 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1925 return;
1926
1927 if (data+size > d+n)
1928 return;
1929 data += size;
1930
378341e1 1931 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
dece3209
RS		 1932 {
1933 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1934 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1935
1936 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1937 return;
1938 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1939 return;
1940 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1941 return;
1942 }
1943 else
1944 {
1945 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1946
1947 if (data + len != d+n)
1948 return;
1949 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1950 return;
1951 }
1952
1953 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1954}
cbf81235 1955#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1956
ecf4d660 1957
b2284ed3
DSH		 1958static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1959 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1960 unsigned short type;
1961 unsigned short size;
1962 unsigned short len;
f1fd4544 1963 unsigned char *data = *p;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1964 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1965
a13c20f6 1966 s->servername_done = 0;
67c8e7f4 1967 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
6f31dd72
BM		 1968#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1969 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1970#endif
ed3883d2 1971
6f017a8f
AL		 1972 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1973 {
1974 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1975 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1976 }
1977
4817504d
DSH		 1978#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1979 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1980 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1981#endif
dece3209
RS		 1982
1983#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1984 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1985 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
cbf81235 1986#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1987
4453cd8c
DSH		 1988 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1989 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1990 {
1991 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1992 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1993 }
4817504d 1994
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1995#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1996 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1997#endif
1998
ed3883d2 1999 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2000 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2
BM		 2001 n2s(data,len);
2002
52b8dad8 2003 if (data > (d+n-len))
c27c9cb4 2004 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2005
f1fd4544
BM		 2006 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2007 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2008 n2s(data,type);
2009 n2s(data,size);
2010
2011 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2012 goto ri_check;
8e3b2dbb 2013#if 0
0e1dba93 2014 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
8e3b2dbb 2015#endif
6434abbf
DSH		 2016 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2017 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2018 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 2019 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2020 {
2021 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2022 return 0;
2023 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2024 }
2025 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2026 {}
1d97c843
TH		 2027/*-
2028 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2029 *
2030 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2031 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2032 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2033 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2034 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2035 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2036 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2037 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2038 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2039 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2040 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2041 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2042 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2043 * the value of the Host: field.
2044 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2045 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2046 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2047 * extension.
2048 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2049 *
2050 */
a13c20f6 2051
5a3d8eeb 2052 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
f1fd4544 2053 {
a70183bc 2054 unsigned char *sdata;
ed3883d2 2055 int servname_type;
a70183bc
BM		 2056 int dsize;
2057
2058 if (size < 2)
2059 {
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2061 return 0;
2062 }
2063 n2s(data,dsize);
52b8dad8 2064 size -= 2;
a70183bc 2065 if (dsize > size )
f1fd4544 2066 {
a70183bc
BM		 2067 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 return 0;
2069 }
2070
2071 sdata = data;
2072 while (dsize > 3)
2073 {
2074 servname_type = *(sdata++);
ed3883d2 2075 n2s(sdata,len);
a70183bc
BM		 2076 dsize -= 3;
2077
2078 if (len > dsize)
f1fd4544
BM		 2079 {
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 return 0;
2082 }
a70183bc 2083 if (s->servername_done == 0)
f1fd4544
BM		 2084 switch (servname_type)
2085 {
2086 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
732d31be 2087 if (!s->hit)
f1fd4544 2088 {
732d31be
DSH		 2089 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2090 {
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 return 0;
2093 }
2094 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
f1fd4544
BM		 2095 {
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2097 return 0;
2098 }
732d31be
DSH		 2099 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2100 {
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 return 0;
2103 }
ed3883d2 2104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
a13c20f6
BM		 2105 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2106 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2107 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
40a70628 2108 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
a13c20f6
BM		 2109 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2110 return 0;
f1fd4544 2111 }
a13c20f6
BM		 2112 s->servername_done = 1;
2113
a13c20f6
BM		 2114 }
2115 else
732d31be
DSH		 2116 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2117 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
6b9e941e 2118 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
a13c20f6 2119
ed3883d2 2120 break;
f1fd4544 2121
ed3883d2
BM		 2122 default:
2123 break;
f1fd4544 2124 }
52b8dad8 2125
a70183bc 2126 dsize -= len;
f1fd4544 2127 }
a70183bc
BM		 2128 if (dsize != 0)
2129 {
2130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 return 0;
2132 }
2133
ed3883d2 2134 }
edc032b5
BL		 2135#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2136 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2137 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2138 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2139 {
2140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 return 0;
2142 }
2143 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
edc032b5 2144 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2149 return -1;
2150 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2151 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2152
2153 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2154 {
2155 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 return 0;
edc032b5
BL		 2157 }
2158 }
2159#endif
ed3883d2 2160
36ca4ba6 2161#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2162 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2163 {
2164 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2165 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6 2166
e83aefb3
DSH		 2167 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2168 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2169 {
2170 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 return 0;
2172 }
732d31be 2173 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2174 {
732d31be
DSH		 2175 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2176 {
7d5686d3
DSH		 2177 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2178 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
732d31be
DSH		 2179 }
2180 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2181 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2182 {
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2184 return 0;
2185 }
2186 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2187 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2188 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2189#if 0
2190 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2191 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2192 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2193 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2194 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
33273721
BM		 2195#endif
2196 }
874a18cf 2197 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
33273721
BM		 2198 {
2199 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2200 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2201 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2202
e83aefb3 2203 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
33d5ba86
EK		 2204 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2205 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2206 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
33273721
BM		 2207 {
2208 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 return 0;
2210 }
732d31be 2211 if (!s->hit)
33273721 2212 {
732d31be
DSH		 2213 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2214 {
2215 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 return 0;
2217 }
2218 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2219 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2220 {
2221 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2222 return 0;
2223 }
2224 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2225 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
33273721 2226 }
33273721
BM		 2227#if 0
2228 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2229 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2230 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2231 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2232 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
36ca4ba6
BM		 2233#endif
2234 }
c6a27f01 2235#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
761772d7 2236#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2238 {
2239 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2240
2241 if (size < 2)
2242 {
2243 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2244 return 0;
2245 }
2246 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2247 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2248 {
2249 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 return 0;
2251 }
2252
2253 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2254 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2255 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2256 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2257 else
2258 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2259 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2260 {
2261 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 return 0;
2263 }
2264 }
2265#endif
12bf56c0
DSH		 2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2267 {
2268 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2269 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2270 {
2271 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 return 0;
2273 }
2274 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2276 {
2277 int dsize;
4453cd8c 2278 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
6b7be581
DSH		 2279 {
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 return 0;
2282 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2283 n2s(data,dsize);
2284 size -= 2;
4453cd8c 2285 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
6b7be581
DSH		 2286 {
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 return 0;
2289 }
c800c27a 2290 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
6b7be581
DSH		 2291 {
2292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 return 0;
2294 }
2295 }
d0b039d4 2296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2297 {
2298
2299 if (size < 5)
2300 {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2302 return 0;
2303 }
2304
2305 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2306 size--;
2307 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2308 {
2309 const unsigned char *sdata;
2310 int dsize;
2311 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2312 n2s(data,dsize);
2313 size -= 2;
2314 if (dsize > size )
2315 {
2316 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2317 return 0;
2318 }
2319 while (dsize > 0)
2320 {
2321 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2322 int idsize;
2323 if (dsize < 4)
2324 {
2325 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 return 0;
2327 }
2328 n2s(data, idsize);
2329 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
9770924f 2330 size -= 2 + idsize;
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2331 if (dsize < 0)
2332 {
2333 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 return 0;
2335 }
2336 sdata = data;
2337 data += idsize;
2338 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2339 &sdata, idsize);
2340 if (!id)
2341 {
2342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 return 0;
2344 }
2345 if (data != sdata)
2346 {
2347 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2348 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 return 0;
2350 }
2351 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2352 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2353 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2354 {
2355 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2356 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2357 return 0;
2358 }
2359 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2360 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2361 {
2362 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2363 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2364 return 0;
2365 }
2366 }
2367
2368 /* Read in request_extensions */
9770924f
BM		 2369 if (size < 2)
2370 {
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 return 0;
2373 }
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2374 n2s(data,dsize);
2375 size -= 2;
9770924f 2376 if (dsize != size)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2377 {
2378 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2379 return 0;
2380 }
2381 sdata = data;
2382 if (dsize > 0)
2383 {
25536ea6
DSH		 2384 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2385 {
2386 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2387 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2388 }
2389
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2390 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2391 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2392 &sdata, dsize);
2393 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2394 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2395 {
2396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 return 0;
2398 }
2399 }
2400 }
2401 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2402 * so ignore it.
2403 */
2404 else
2405 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2406 }
4817504d
DSH		 2407#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2408 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2409 {
2410 switch(data[0])
2411 {
2412 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2413 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2414 break;
2415 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2416 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2417 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2418 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2419 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2420 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2421 }
2422 }
2423#endif
bf48836c 2424#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27 2425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
6f017a8f
AL		 2426 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2427 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
ee2ffc27 2428 {
1d97c843
TH		 2429 /*-
2430 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
ee2ffc27
BL		 2431 * renegotiation.
2432 *
2433 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2434 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2435 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2436 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2437 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2438 * anything like that, but this might change).
1d97c843 2439 *
ee2ffc27
BL		 2440 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2441 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2442 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2443 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1d97c843
TH		 2444 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2445 */
ee2ffc27
BL		 2446 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2447 }
2448#endif
761772d7 2449
6f017a8f
AL		 2450 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2451 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2452 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2453 {
2454 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2455 return 0;
2911575c 2456#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f017a8f
AL		 2457 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2458 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2911575c 2459#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2460 }
2461
6434abbf 2462 /* session ticket processed earlier */
e659eff2
MC		 2463 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2464 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
333f926d
BL		 2465 {
2466 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2467 al))
2468 return 0;
2469 }
4b6dee2b
DSH		 2470#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2471 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
5a3d8eeb 2472 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
4b6dee2b 2473#endif
a398f821
T		 2474 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2475 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2476 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2477 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2478 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2479 */
ecf4d660 2480 else if (!s->hit)
a398f821 2481 {
33f653ad 2482 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
ecf4d660 2483 return 0;
a398f821
T		 2484 }
2485
6434abbf 2486 data+=size;
f1fd4544 2487 }
a9e1c50b 2488
f1fd4544 2489 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2490
2491 ri_check:
2492
2493 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2494
bdd53508 2495 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2496 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2497 {
fbed9f81 2498 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
aa09c2c6 2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2500 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2501 return 0;
2502 }
2503
f1fd4544 2504 return 1;
52b8dad8 2505 }
f1fd4544 2506
b2284ed3
DSH		 2507int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2508 {
2509 int al = -1;
28ea0a0c 2510 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2511 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2512 {
2513 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2514 return 0;
2515 }
2516
2daceb03 2517 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
b2284ed3 2518 {
aa09c2c6 2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2520 return 0;
2521 }
2522 return 1;
2523}
2524
bf48836c 2525#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 2526/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2527 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2528 * the length of the block. */
71fa4513 2529static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2530 {
2531 unsigned int off = 0;
2532
2533 while (off < len)
2534 {
2535 if (d[off] == 0)
2536 return 0;
2537 off += d[off];
2538 off++;
2539 }
2540
2541 return off == len;
2542 }
2543#endif
2544
09e4e4b9 2545static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
f1fd4544 2546 {
c8bbd98a 2547 unsigned short length;
ed3883d2
BM		 2548 unsigned short type;
2549 unsigned short size;
ed3883d2 2550 unsigned char *data = *p;
ed3883d2 2551 int tlsext_servername = 0;
860c3dd1 2552 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
ed3883d2 2553
6f31dd72
BM		 2554#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2555 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2556#endif
e94a6c0e 2557 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
6f31dd72 2558
6f017a8f
AL		 2559 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2560 {
2561 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2562 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2563 }
2564
4817504d
DSH		 2565#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2566 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2567 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2568#endif
2569
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2570#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2571 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2572#endif
2573
ed3883d2 2574 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2575 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2576
c8bbd98a
BL		 2577 n2s(data,length);
2578 if (data+length != d+n)
2579 {
2580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 return 0;
2582 }
ed3883d2 2583
f1fd4544
BM		 2584 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2585 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2586 n2s(data,type);
2587 n2s(data,size);
2588
2589 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2590 goto ri_check;
f1fd4544 2591
6434abbf
DSH		 2592 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2593 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2594 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2595
5a3d8eeb
DSH		 2596
2597 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2598 {
2599 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2600 return 0;
2601 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2602 }
2603 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2604 {}
2605 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
f1fd4544
BM		 2606 {
2607 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2608 {
2609 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2610 return 0;
2611 }
ed3883d2 2612 tlsext_servername = 1;
f1fd4544 2613 }
ed3883d2 2614
36ca4ba6 2615#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2617 {
2618 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2619 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2620
2621 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2622 {
2623 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2624 return 0;
2625 }
fb0bc2b2 2626 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2627 {
fb0bc2b2
GT		 2628 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2629 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2630 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2631 {
2632 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2633 return 0;
2634 }
2635 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2636 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2637 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2638#if 0
2639 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2640 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2641 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2642 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2643 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2644#endif
2645 }
c6a27f01 2646#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
6434abbf
DSH		 2647
2648 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2649 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 2650 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2651 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2652 {
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2654 return 0;
2655 }
b362ccab 2656 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
6434abbf
DSH		 2657 {
2658 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2659 return 0;
2660 }
2661 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2662 }
761772d7 2663#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2664 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2665 {
2666 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2667
2668 if (size < 2)
2669 {
2670 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2671 return 0;
2672 }
2673 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2674 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2675 {
2676 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2677 return 0;
2678 }
2679
2680 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2681 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2682 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2683 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2684 else
2685 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2686
2687 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2688 {
2689 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 return 0;
2691 }
2692 }
2693#endif
874a18cf 2694 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2695 {
2696 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2697 * a status request message.
2698 */
2699 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2700 {
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2702 return 0;
2703 }
2704 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2705 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2706 }
bf48836c 2707#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f31dd72
BM		 2708 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2709 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2710 {
2711 unsigned char *selected;
2712 unsigned char selected_len;
2713
2714 /* We must have requested it. */
eef69354 2715 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2716 {
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2718 return 0;
2719 }
2720 /* The data must be valid */
2721 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2722 {
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2724 return 0;
2725 }
2726 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2727 {
2728 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 return 0;
2730 }
2731 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2732 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2733 {
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2735 return 0;
2736 }
2737 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2738 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
6f31dd72 2739 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
ee2ffc27
BL		 2740 }
2741#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2742
2743 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2744 {
2745 unsigned len;
2746
2747 /* We must have requested it. */
2748 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2749 {
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2751 return 0;
2752 }
2753 if (size < 4)
2754 {
2755 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 return 0;
2757 }
1d97c843
TH		 2758 /*-
2759 * The extension data consists of:
6f017a8f
AL		 2760 * uint16 list_length
2761 * uint8 proto_length;
1d97c843
TH		 2762 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2763 */
6f017a8f
AL		 2764 len = data[0];
2765 len <<= 8;
2766 len |= data[1];
2767 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2768 {
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2770 return 0;
2771 }
2772 len = data[2];
2773 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2774 {
2775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2776 return 0;
2777 }
2778 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2779 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2780 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2781 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2782 {
2783 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 return 0;
2785 }
2786 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2787 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2788 }
4817504d
DSH		 2789#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2790 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2791 {
2792 switch(data[0])
2793 {
2794 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2795 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2796 break;
2797 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2798 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2799 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2800 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2801 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2802 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2803 }
2804 }
2805#endif
e659eff2 2806 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
333f926d
BL		 2807 {
2808 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2809 al))
2810 return 0;
2811 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2812#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2813 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2814 {
5a3d8eeb 2815 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
f3014206 2816 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
5a3d8eeb 2817 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2818 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2819 }
2820#endif
4b6dee2b
DSH		 2821 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2822 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2823 * callback */
2824 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2825 return 0;
a9e1c50b
BL		 2826
2827 data += size;
f1fd4544 2828 }
ed3883d2
BM		 2829
2830 if (data != d+n)
f1fd4544
BM		 2831 {
2832 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 return 0;
2834 }
ed3883d2 2835
f1fd4544
BM		 2836 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2837 {
2838 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2839 {
2840 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2841 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2842 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2843 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
f1fd4544
BM		 2844 {
2845 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2846 return 0;
2847 }
2848 }
2849 else
2850 {
2851 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2852 return 0;
2853 }
ed3883d2 2854 }
f1fd4544 2855 }
ed3883d2 2856
f1fd4544 2857 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2858
2859 ri_check:
2860
2861 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2862 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2863 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2864 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2865 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2866 * absence on initial connect only.
2867 */
c2c49969
DSH		 2868 if (!renegotiate_seen
2869 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
ef51b4b9 2870 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
c27c9cb4 2871 {
fbed9f81 2872 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
09e4e4b9 2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2874 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2875 return 0;
2876 }
2877
f1fd4544 2878 return 1;
52b8dad8 2879 }
ed3883d2 2880
b2172f4f 2881
36ca4ba6
BM		 2882int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2883 {
761772d7
BM		 2884
2885#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2886 {
2887 int r = 1;
2888
2889 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2890 {
2891 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2892 if (!r)
2893 return -1;
2894 }
2895
2896 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2897 {
2898 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2899 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2900
02c27b11
BM		 2901 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2902 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2903 else
2904 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2905 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2906 {
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2908 return -1;
2909 }
2910 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2911 }
2912
2913 if (r == 2)
2914 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2915 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2916 }
2917#endif
2918
36ca4ba6 2919 return 1;
52b8dad8 2920 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2921
2922int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2923 {
36ca4ba6 2924 return 1;
52b8dad8 2925 }
36ca4ba6 2926
2daceb03 2927static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
f1fd4544 2928 {
241520e6 2929 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2930 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2931
2932#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
33273721
BM		 2933 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2934 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2935 */
2936 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2937 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
36ca4ba6
BM		 2938 */
2939#endif
2940
2941 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2942 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2943 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2944 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2945
761772d7
BM		 2946#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2947 {
2948 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2949 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2daceb03
BL		 2950 * so this has to happen here in
2951 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
761772d7
BM		 2952
2953 int r = 1;
2954
2955 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2956 {
2957 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2958 if (!r)
2959 {
2960 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2961 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2962 goto err;
2963 }
2964 }
2965
2966 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2967 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2968 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2969
2970 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2971 {
2972 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2973 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2974 {
2975 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2976 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2977
02c27b11
BM		 2978 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2979 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2980 else
2981 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2982 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2983 {
2984 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2985 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 goto err;
2987 }
2988 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2989 }
2990 }
2991
2992 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2993 {
2994 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2995 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2996 * abort the handshake.
2997 */
2998 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2999 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3000 }
3001 }
761772d7
BM		 3002
3003 err:
2daceb03 3004#endif
52b8dad8
BM		 3005 switch (ret)
3006 {
36ca4ba6
BM		 3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3008 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3009 return -1;
3010
3011 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3012 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3013 return 1;
3014
3015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3016 s->servername_done=0;
3017 default:
3018 return 1;
52b8dad8 3019 }
36ca4ba6 3020 }
f1fd4544 3021
e469af8d
DSH		 3022int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3023 {
3024 int al;
3025 size_t i;
3026 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3027 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3028 {
3029 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3030 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3031 }
3032 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3033 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3034 {
3035 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3036 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3037 }
3038
3039 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3040 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3041 {
3042 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3043 {
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3045 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3046 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3047 goto err;
3048 }
3049 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3050 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3051 {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3053 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3054 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3055 goto err;
3056 }
3057 }
3058 else
3059 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3060 return 1;
3061 err:
3062 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3063 return 0;
3064 }
3065
2daceb03
BL		 3066int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3067 {
3068 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3069 int al;
3070
3071 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3072 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3073 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3074 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3075 */
3076 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3077 {
3078 int r;
e5db9c3b
DSH		 3079 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3080 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3081 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3082 if (certpkey == NULL)
3083 {
3084 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3085 return 1;
3086 }
3087 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3088 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3089 */
3090 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2daceb03
BL		 3091 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3092 switch (r)
3093 {
3094 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3097 break;
3098 /* status request response should be sent */
3099 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3100 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3102 else
3103 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3104 break;
3105 /* something bad happened */
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3107 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3109 goto err;
3110 }
3111 }
3112 else
3113 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3114
3115 err:
3116 switch (ret)
3117 {
3118 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3119 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3120 return -1;
3121
3122 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3124 return 1;
3125
3126 default:
3127 return 1;
3128 }
3129 }
3130
36ca4ba6
BM		 3131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3132 {
3133 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
58ece833 3134 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
241520e6 3135
36ca4ba6 3136#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0205686
DSH		 3137 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3138 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3139 * it must contain uncompressed.
36ca4ba6 3140 */
52b8dad8
BM		 3141 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3142 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
36ca4ba6 3143 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
d0205686 3144 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
4082fea8 3145 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
36ca4ba6
BM		 3146 {
3147 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
90bdfd97 3148 size_t i;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3149 unsigned char *list;
3150 int found_uncompressed = 0;
b9865f11 3151 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3152 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3153 {
3154 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3155 {
3156 found_uncompressed = 1;
3157 break;
3158 }
3159 }
3160 if (!found_uncompressed)
3161 {
a291745e 3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
36ca4ba6
BM		 3163 return -1;
3164 }
3165 }
3166 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3167#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3168
241520e6 3169 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3170 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3171 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3172 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3173
761772d7
BM		 3174#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3175 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3176 {
3177 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3178 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3179
3180 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3181 {
3182 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3183 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3184 }
3185
3186 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3187 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3188 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3189 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3190 {
3191 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3192 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3193 }
3194 }
3195#endif
3196
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3197 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3198 * tell the callback
3199 */
3200 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
121f9e74 3201 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3202 {
3203 int r;
3204 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3205 * there is no response.
3206 */
3207 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3208 {
3209 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3210 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3211 }
3212 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3213 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3214 if (r == 0)
3215 {
3216 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3217 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3218 }
3219 if (r < 0)
3220 {
3221 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3222 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3223 }
3224 }
3225
52b8dad8
BM		 3226 switch (ret)
3227 {
58ece833
BM		 3228 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3229 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3230 return -1;
3231
3232 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3233 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3234 return 1;
3235
3236 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3237 s->servername_done=0;
3238 default:
3239 return 1;
52b8dad8 3240 }
f1fd4544 3241 }
33273721 3242
09e4e4b9
DSH		 3243int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3244 {
3245 int al = -1;
3246 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3247 return 1;
3248 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3249 {
3250 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3251 return 0;
3252 }
3253
3254 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3255 {
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3257 return 0;
3258 }
3259 return 1;
3260}
3261
1d97c843
TH		 3262/*-
3263 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
c519e89f
BM		 3264 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3265 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3266 *
3267 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3268 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3269 * extension, if any.
3270 * len: the length of the session ID.
3271 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3272 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3273 * point to the resulting session.
3274 *
3275 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3276 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3277 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3278 *
3279 * Returns:
3280 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3281 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3282 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3283 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3284 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3285 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3286 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3287 *
3288 * Side effects:
3289 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3290 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3291 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3292 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3293 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3294 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 3295 */
6434abbf 3296int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
c519e89f 3297 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
6434abbf
DSH		 3298 {
3299 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3300 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3301 unsigned short i;
e8da6a1d 3302
c519e89f
BM		 3303 *ret = NULL;
3304 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3305
e8da6a1d 3306 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
c519e89f
BM		 3307 * to permit stateful resumption.
3308 */
b362ccab 3309 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
c519e89f 3310 return 0;
6434abbf 3311 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
c519e89f 3312 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3313 if (p >= limit)
3314 return -1;
07a9d1a2 3315 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
cbd64894 3316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
07a9d1a2
DSH		 3317 {
3318 i = *(p++);
3319 p+= i;
3320 if (p >= limit)
3321 return -1;
3322 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3323 /* Skip past cipher list */
3324 n2s(p, i);
3325 p+= i;
3326 if (p >= limit)
3327 return -1;
3328 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3329 i = *(p++);
3330 p += i;
3331 if (p > limit)
3332 return -1;
3333 /* Now at start of extensions */
3334 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
c519e89f 3335 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3336 n2s(p, i);
3337 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3338 {
3339 unsigned short type, size;
3340 n2s(p, type);
3341 n2s(p, size);
3342 if (p + size > limit)
c519e89f 3343 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3344 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3345 {
c519e89f 3346 int r;
6434abbf
DSH		 3347 if (size == 0)
3348 {
c519e89f
BM		 3349 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3350 * currently have one. */
6434abbf 3351 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
c519e89f 3352 return 1;
6434abbf 3353 }
12bf56c0
DSH		 3354 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3355 {
c519e89f
BM		 3356 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3357 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3358 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3359 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3360 * calculate the master secret later. */
3361 return 2;
3362 }
3363 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3364 switch (r)
3365 {
3366 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3367 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3368 return 2;
3369 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3370 return r;
3371 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3372 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3373 return 3;
3374 default: /* fatal error */
3375 return -1;
12bf56c0 3376 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3377 }
3378 p += size;
3379 }
c519e89f 3380 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3381 }
3382
1d97c843
TH		 3383/*-
3384 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
c519e89f
BM		 3385 *
3386 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3387 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3388 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3389 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3390 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3391 * point to the resulting session.
3392 *
3393 * Returns:
3394 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3395 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3396 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3397 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3398 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3399static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3400 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3401 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3402 {
3403 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3404 unsigned char *sdec;
3405 const unsigned char *p;
8a2062fe 3406 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3407 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3408 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
661dc143 3410 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3411 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3412 if (eticklen < 48)
c519e89f 3413 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3414 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3415 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
661dc143 3417 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
8a2062fe
DSH		 3418 {
3419 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
661dc143 3420 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3421 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3422 if (rv < 0)
3423 return -1;
3424 if (rv == 0)
c519e89f 3425 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3426 if (rv == 2)
3427 renew_ticket = 1;
3428 }
3429 else
3430 {
3431 /* Check key name matches */
661dc143 3432 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
c519e89f 3433 return 2;
661dc143 3434 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3435 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3436 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
661dc143 3437 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
8a2062fe 3438 }
6434abbf 3439 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
c519e89f
BM		 3440 * integrity checks on ticket.
3441 */
8a2062fe 3442 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
0eab41fb
BL		 3443 if (mlen < 0)
3444 {
3445 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3446 return -1;
3447 }
6434abbf 3448 eticklen -= mlen;
6434abbf 3449 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
6434abbf
DSH		 3450 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3451 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3452 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
7c770d57 3453 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
74827055
DSH		 3454 {
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
c519e89f 3456 return 2;
74827055 3457 }
6434abbf 3458 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
6434abbf 3459 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
8a2062fe
DSH		 3460 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3461 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
6434abbf
DSH		 3462 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3463 if (!sdec)
3464 {
3465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3466 return -1;
3467 }
3468 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3469 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
44724bee
DSH		 3470 {
3471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3472 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
c519e89f 3473 return 2;
44724bee 3474 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3475 slen += mlen;
3476 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3477 p = sdec;
c519e89f 3478
6434abbf
DSH		 3479 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3480 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3481 if (sess)
3482 {
c519e89f
BM		 3483 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3484 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3485 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3486 * as required by standard.
3487 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3488 if (sesslen)
3489 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3490 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3491 *psess = sess;
c519e89f
BM		 3492 if (renew_ticket)
3493 return 4;
3494 else
3495 return 3;
6434abbf 3496 }
c519e89f
BM		 3497 ERR_clear_error();
3498 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3499 * ticket. */
3500 return 2;
6434abbf 3501 }
6434abbf 3502
6b7be581
DSH		 3503/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3504
3505typedef struct
3506 {
3507 int nid;
3508 int id;
3509 } tls12_lookup;
3510
3511static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
6b7be581 3512 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
6b7be581 3513 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
6b7be581
DSH		 3514 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3515 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
6b7be581
DSH		 3516 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3517 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3518};
3519
3520static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
6b7be581 3521 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
6b7be581 3522 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
6b7be581 3523 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3524};
3525
3526static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3527 {
3528 size_t i;
3529 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3530 {
3531 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3532 return table[i].id;
3533 }
3534 return -1;
3535 }
e7f8ff43 3536
6b7be581
DSH		 3537static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3538 {
3539 size_t i;
3540 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3541 {
e7f8ff43 3542 if ((table[i].id) == id)
6b7be581
DSH		 3543 return table[i].nid;
3544 }
e7f8ff43 3545 return NID_undef;
6b7be581 3546 }
a2f9200f
DSH		 3547
3548int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
6b7be581
DSH		 3549 {
3550 int sig_id, md_id;
1db5f356
DSH		 3551 if (!md)
3552 return 0;
6b7be581
DSH		 3553 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3554 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3555 if (md_id == -1)
3556 return 0;
a2f9200f 3557 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
6b7be581
DSH		 3558 if (sig_id == -1)
3559 return 0;
3560 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3561 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3562 return 1;
3563 }
3564
a2f9200f
DSH		 3565int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3566 {
3567 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3568 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3569 }
3570
b362ccab 3571typedef struct
a2f9200f 3572 {
b362ccab
DSH		 3573 int nid;
3574 int secbits;
3575 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3576 } tls12_hash_info;
3577
3578static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3579#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3580 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3581#else
3582 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
ebc5e72f 3583#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3584#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3585 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3586#else
3587 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
a2f9200f 3588#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3589#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3590 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3591 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3592#else
3593 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3594 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
a2f9200f 3595#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3596#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3597 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3598 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3599#else
3600 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3601 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
a2f9200f 3602#endif
b362ccab 3603};
a2f9200f 3604
b362ccab
DSH		 3605static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3606 {
3607 if (hash_alg == 0)
3608 return NULL;
3609 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
a2f9200f 3610 return NULL;
b362ccab
DSH		 3611 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3612 }
a2f9200f 3613
b362ccab
DSH		 3614const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3615 {
3616 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
b362ccab
DSH		 3617 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3618 return NULL;
b362ccab
DSH		 3619 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3620 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3621 return NULL;
3622 return inf->mfunc();
a2f9200f
DSH		 3623 }
3624
4453cd8c
DSH		 3625static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3626 {
3627 switch(sig_alg)
3628 {
3629#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3630 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3631 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3632#endif
3633#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3634 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3635 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3636#endif
3637#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3638 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3639 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3640#endif
3641 }
3642 return -1;
3643 }
3644
3645/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3646static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3647 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3648 {
8e2a06bf 3649 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3650 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3651 return;
3652 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3653 {
3654 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3655 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3656 if (phash_nid)
3657 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3658 }
3659 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3660 {
3661 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3662 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3663 if (psign_nid)
3664 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3665 }
3666 if (psignhash_nid)
3667 {
3668 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3669 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3670 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3671 else
3672 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3673 }
3674 }
b362ccab
DSH		 3675/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3676static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3677 {
3678 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3679 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3680 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3681 return 0;
3682 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3683 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3684 return 0;
3685 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3686 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3687 }
3688
3689/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3690 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3691 * then RSA is disabled.
3692 */
3693
3694void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3695 {
3696 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3697 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3698 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3699 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3700 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3701 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3702 * if we have to.
3703 */
3704 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3705 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3706 {
3707 switch(sigalgs[1])
3708 {
3709#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3710 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3711 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3712 have_rsa = 1;
3713 break;
3714#endif
3715#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3716 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3717 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3718 have_dsa = 1;
3719 break;
3720#endif
3721#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3722 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3723 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3724 have_ecdsa = 1;
3725 break;
3726#endif
3727 }
3728 }
3729 if (!have_rsa)
3730 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3731 if (!have_dsa)
3732 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3733 if (!have_ecdsa)
3734 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3735 }
3736
3737size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3738 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3739 {
3740 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3741 size_t i;
3742 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3743 {
3744 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3745 {
3746 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3747 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3748 }
3749 }
3750 return tmpout - out;
3751 }
3752
4453cd8c 3753/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3754static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
4453cd8c
DSH		 3755 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3756 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3757 {
3758 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3759 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3760 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3761 {
3762 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
b362ccab 3763 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
4453cd8c
DSH		 3764 continue;
3765 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3766 {
3767 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3768 {
3769 nmatch++;
3770 if (shsig)
3771 {
3772 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3773 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3774 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3775 &shsig->sign_nid,
3776 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3777 ptmp);
3778 shsig++;
3779 }
3780 break;
3781 }
3782 }
3783 }
3784 return nmatch;
3785 }
3786
3787/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3788static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3789 {
3790 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3791 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3792 size_t nmatch;
3793 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3794 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354 3795 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
4563da1d
DSH		 3796 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3797 {
3798 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3799 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3800 }
3dbc46df 3801 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2ea80354 3802 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3803 {
3804 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3805 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3806 }
2ea80354 3807 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3808 {
3809 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
4453cd8c 3810 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 3811 }
4453cd8c 3812 else
2ea80354
DSH		 3813 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3814 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3815 {
3816 pref = conf;
3817 preflen = conflen;
3818 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3819 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3820 }
3821 else
3822 {
3823 allow = conf;
3824 allowlen = conflen;
3825 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3826 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3827 }
b362ccab 3828 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3829 if (!nmatch)
3830 return 1;
3831 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3832 if (!salgs)
3833 return 0;
b362ccab 3834 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3835 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3836 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3837 return 1;
3838 }
3839
3840
6b7be581
DSH		 3841/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3842
c800c27a 3843int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
6b7be581 3844 {
6b7be581 3845 CERT *c = s->cert;
cbd64894
DSH		 3846 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3847 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
6b7be581 3848 return 1;
8f829124
DSH		 3849 /* Should never happen */
3850 if (!c)
3851 return 0;
6b7be581 3852
4563da1d
DSH		 3853 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3854 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 3855 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
0f229cce 3856 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
e7f8ff43 3857 return 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3858 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3859 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
c800c27a
DSH		 3860 return 1;
3861 }
6b7be581 3862
c800c27a
DSH		 3863int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3864 {
3865 int idx;
3866 size_t i;
3867 const EVP_MD *md;
3868 CERT *c = s->cert;
3869 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3870 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3871 return 0;
6b7be581 3872
ed83ba53 3873#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
ddd13d67 3874 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 3875 {
3876 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3877 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3878 */
3879 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3880 if (s->server)
3881 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3882 else
3883 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3884 if (sigs)
3885 {
3886 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3887 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3888 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3889 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3890 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3891 {
3892 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3893 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3894 }
3895 }
3896 }
3897#endif
3898
4453cd8c
DSH		 3899 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3900 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3901 {
3902 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3903 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
6b7be581 3904 {
e7f8ff43 3905 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
4453cd8c 3906 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3907 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3908 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3909 {
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3911 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3912 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3913 }
3914
6b7be581 3915 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3916 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3917 * use the certificate for signing.
6b7be581 3918 */
2ea80354 3919 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
d61ff83b
DSH		 3920 {
3921 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3922 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3923 */
6b7be581 3924#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3925 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3926 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581
DSH		 3927#endif
3928#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3929 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3930 {
3931 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3932 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3933 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3934#endif
3935#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3936 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3937 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581 3938#endif
d61ff83b 3939 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3940 return 1;
3941 }
3942
4817504d 3943
e7f8ff43 3944int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4453cd8c 3945 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3946 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3947 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3948 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3949 if (psig == NULL)
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3950 return 0;
3951 if (idx >= 0)
3952 {
4453cd8c 3953 idx <<= 1;
0f229cce 3954 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
e7f8ff43 3955 return 0;
4453cd8c 3956 psig += idx;
e7f8ff43 3957 if (rhash)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3958 *rhash = psig[0];
3959 if (rsig)
3960 *rsig = psig[1];
3961 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
e7f8ff43 3962 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 3963 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3964 }
3965
3966int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3967 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3968 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3969 {
3970 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3971 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3972 return 0;
3973 shsigalgs += idx;
3974 if (phash)
3975 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3976 if (psign)
3977 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3978 if (psignhash)
3979 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3980 if (rsig)
3981 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3982 if (rhash)
3983 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3984 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3985 }
3986
3987
4817504d
DSH		 3988#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3989int
3990tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3991 {
3992 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3993 unsigned short hbtype;
3994 unsigned int payload;
3995 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3996
4817504d
DSH		 3997 if (s->msg_callback)
3998 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3999 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4000 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4001
731f4314
DSH		 4002 /* Read type and payload length first */
4003 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4004 return 0; /* silently discard */
4005 hbtype = *p++;
4006 n2s(p, payload);
4007 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4008 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4009 pl = p;
4010
4817504d
DSH		 4011 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4012 {
4013 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4014 int r;
4015
4016 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4017 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4018 * payload, plus padding
4019 */
4020 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
c27dc398
JM		 4021 if (buffer == NULL)
4022 {
4023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4024 return -1;
4025 }
4817504d
DSH		 4026 bp = buffer;
4027
4028 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4029 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4030 s2n(payload, bp);
4031 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
57cb030c
DSH		 4032 bp += payload;
4033 /* Random padding */
4034 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4035
4817504d
DSH		 4036 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4037
4038 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4039 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4040 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4041 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4042
4043 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4044
4045 if (r < 0)
4046 return r;
4047 }
4048 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4049 {
4050 unsigned int seq;
4051
4052 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4053 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4054 * sequence number */
4055 n2s(pl, seq);
4056
4057 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4058 {
4059 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
4060 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4061 }
4062 }
4063
4064 return 0;
4065 }
4066
4067int
4068tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4069 {
4070 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4071 int ret;
4072 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4073 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4074
4075 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4076 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4077 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4078 {
4079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4080 return -1;
4081 }
4082
4083 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4084 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4085 {
4086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4087 return -1;
4088 }
4089
4090 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4091 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4092 {
4093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4094 return -1;
4095 }
4096
4097 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4098 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4099 */
4100 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4101
1d97c843
TH		 4102 /*-
4103 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4817504d
DSH		 4104 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4105 * some random stuff.
4106 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4107 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4108 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4109 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4110 * - Padding
4111 */
4112 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
288b4e4f
JM		 4113 if (buf == NULL)
4114 {
4115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4116 return -1;
4117 }
4817504d
DSH		 4118 p = buf;
4119 /* Message Type */
4120 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4121 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4122 s2n(payload, p);
4123 /* Sequence number */
4124 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4125 /* 16 random bytes */
4126 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4127 p += 16;
4128 /* Random padding */
4129 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4130
4131 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4132 if (ret >= 0)
4133 {
4134 if (s->msg_callback)
4135 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4136 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4137 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4138
4139 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4140 }
4141
4142 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4143
4144 return ret;
4145 }
4146#endif
0f229cce 4147
4453cd8c 4148#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce
DSH		 4149
4150typedef struct
4151 {
4152 size_t sigalgcnt;
4153 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4154 } sig_cb_st;
4155
4156static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4157 {
4158 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4159 size_t i;
4160 char etmp[20], *p;
4161 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4162 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4163 return 0;
4164 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4165 return 0;
4166 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4167 etmp[len] = 0;
4168 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4169 if (!p)
4170 return 0;
4171 *p = 0;
4172 p++;
4173 if (!*p)
4174 return 0;
4175
4176 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4177 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4178 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4179 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4180 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4181 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4182 else return 0;
4183
4184 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4185 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4186 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4187 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4188 return 0;
4189
4190 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4191 {
4192 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4193 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4194 return 0;
4195 }
4196 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4197 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4198 return 1;
4199 }
4200
4201/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4202 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3dbc46df 4203int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f229cce
DSH		 4204 {
4205 sig_cb_st sig;
4206 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4207 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4208 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 4209 if (c == NULL)
4210 return 1;
3dbc46df 4211 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
0f229cce
DSH		 4212 }
4213
3dbc46df 4214int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f229cce 4215 {
4453cd8c 4216 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
0f229cce
DSH		 4217 int rhash, rsign;
4218 size_t i;
4219 if (salglen & 1)
4220 return 0;
4453cd8c 4221 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
0f229cce
DSH		 4222 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4223 return 0;
4453cd8c 4224 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
0f229cce 4225 {
4453cd8c 4226 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
0f229cce 4227 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4453cd8c 4228 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
0f229cce
DSH		 4229 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4230
4231 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4232 goto err;
4453cd8c
DSH		 4233 *sptr++ = rhash;
4234 *sptr++ = rsign;
0f229cce
DSH		 4235 }
4236
3dbc46df
DSH		 4237 if (client)
4238 {
4239 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4240 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4241 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4242 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4243 }
4244 else
4245 {
4246 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4247 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4248 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4249 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4250 }
0f229cce 4251
0f229cce
DSH		 4252 return 1;
4253
4254 err:
4255 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4256 return 0;
4257 }
4453cd8c 4258
d61ff83b
DSH		 4259static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4260 {
4261 int sig_nid;
4262 size_t i;
4263 if (default_nid == -1)
4264 return 1;
4265 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4266 if (default_nid)
4267 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4268 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4269 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4270 return 1;
4271 return 0;
4272 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4273/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4274static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4275 {
4276 X509_NAME *nm;
4277 int i;
4278 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4279 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4280 {
4281 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4282 return 1;
4283 }
4284 return 0;
4285 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4286
4287/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
6dbb6219
DSH		 4288 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4289 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4290 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 4291 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 4292
4293/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4294
4295#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4296 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4297/* Strict mode flags */
4298#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4299 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4300 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4301
d61ff83b
DSH		 4302int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4303 int idx)
4304 {
4305 int i;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4306 int rv = 0;
4307 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4308 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4309 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354
DSH		 4310 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4311 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
d61ff83b
DSH		 4312 if (idx != -1)
4313 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4314 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4315 if (idx == -2)
4316 {
4317 cpk = c->key;
4318 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4319 }
4320 else
4321 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4322 x = cpk->x509;
4323 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4324 chain = cpk->chain;
2ea80354 4325 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4326 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4327 if (!x || !pk)
4328 goto end;
ed83ba53
DSH		 4329#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4330 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
ddd13d67 4331 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 4332 {
4333 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4334 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4335 return rv;
4336 }
4337#endif
d61ff83b
DSH		 4338 }
4339 else
4340 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4341 if (!x || !pk)
4342 goto end;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4343 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4344 if (idx == -1)
4345 goto end;
6dbb6219 4346 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2ea80354 4347 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4348 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4349 else
4350 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4351 strict_mode = 1;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4352 }
4353
2ea80354
DSH		 4354 if (suiteb_flags)
4355 {
4356 int ok;
4357 if (check_flags)
4358 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4359 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
7255ca99
DSH		 4360 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4362 else if (!check_flags)
4363 goto end;
2ea80354 4364 }
6dbb6219 4365
d61ff83b
DSH		 4366 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4367 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4368 * and strict mode.
4369 */
6dbb6219 4370 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4371 {
4372 int default_nid;
4373 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4374 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4375 default_nid = 0;
4376 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4377 else
4378 {
4379 switch(idx)
4380 {
4381 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4382 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4383 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4384 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4385 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4386 break;
4387
4388 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4389 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4390 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4391 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4392 break;
4393
4394 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4395 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4396 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4397 break;
4398
4399 default:
4400 default_nid = -1;
4401 break;
4402 }
4403 }
4404 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4405 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4406 * sha1.
4407 */
15a70fe5 4408 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4409 {
4410 size_t j;
4411 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4412 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4413 {
4414 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4415 break;
4416 }
4417 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4418 {
4419 if (check_flags)
4420 goto skip_sigs;
4421 else
4422 goto end;
4423 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4424 }
4425 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4426 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4427 {
4428 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4429 }
4430 else
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4432 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4433 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4434 {
4435 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4436 default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4437 {
4438 if (check_flags)
4439 {
4440 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4441 break;
4442 }
4443 else
4444 goto end;
4445 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4446 }
4447 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4448 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4449 else if(check_flags)
4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4451 skip_sigs:
2ea80354
DSH		 4452 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4453 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4454 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4455 else if (!check_flags)
d61ff83b 4456 goto end;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4457 if (!s->server)
4458 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b 4459 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
6dbb6219 4460 else if (strict_mode)
d61ff83b 4461 {
6dbb6219 4462 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4463 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4464 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4465 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4466 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4467 {
4468 if (check_flags)
4469 {
4470 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4471 break;
4472 }
4473 else
4474 goto end;
4475 }
4476 }
4477 }
4478 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4479 {
4480 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4481 int check_type = 0;
4482 switch (pk->type)
4483 {
4484 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4485 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4486 break;
4487 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4488 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4489 break;
4490 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4491 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4492 break;
4493 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4494 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4495 {
4496 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4497 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4498 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4499 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4500 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4501 }
4502 }
4503 if (check_type)
4504 {
4505 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4506 int ctypelen;
4507 if (c->ctypes)
4508 {
4509 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4510 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4511 }
4512 else
4513 {
4514 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4515 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4516 }
4517 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4518 {
4519 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4520 {
4521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4522 break;
4523 }
4524 }
4525 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4526 goto end;
4527 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4528 else
4529 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4530
4531
4532 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4533
4534 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4536
4537 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4538 {
4539 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4540 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4541 }
4542 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4543 {
4544 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4545 {
4546 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4547 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4548 {
4549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4550 break;
4551 }
4552 }
4553 }
4554 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4555 goto end;
d61ff83b 4556 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4557 else
4558 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4559
4560 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4561 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4562
4563 end:
6dbb6219
DSH		 4564
4565 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
d61ff83b 4566 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4567 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4568 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4569 else if (cpk->digest)
d61ff83b 4570 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4571 }
4572 else
4573 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4574
4575 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4576 * if the chain is invalid.
4577 */
4578 if (!check_flags)
4579 {
4580 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4581 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4582 else
2ea80354
DSH		 4583 {
4584 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4585 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4586 return 0;
4587 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4588 }
4589 return rv;
4590 }
4591
4592/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4593void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4594 {
4595 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4596 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4597 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4598 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4599 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4600 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4601 }
18d71588
DSH		 4602/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4603int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4604 {
4605 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4606 }
d61ff83b 4607
4453cd8c 4608#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4609
4610#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4611DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4612 {
4613 int dh_secbits = 80;
4614 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4615 return DH_get_1024_160();
4616 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4617 {
4618 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4619 dh_secbits = 128;
4620 else
4621 dh_secbits = 80;
4622 }
4623 else
4624 {
4625 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4626 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4627 }
4628
4629 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4630 {
4631 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4632 if (!dhp)
4633 return NULL;
4634 dhp->g = BN_new();
4635 if (dhp->g)
4636 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4637 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4638 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4639 else
4640 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4641 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4642 {
4643 DH_free(dhp);
4644 return NULL;
4645 }
4646 return dhp;
4647 }
4648 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4649 return DH_get_2048_224();
4650 return DH_get_1024_160();
4651 }
4652#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4653
4654static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4655 {
4656 int secbits;
4657 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4658 if (pkey)
4659 {
4660 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4661 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4662 }
4663 else
4664 secbits = -1;
4665 if (s)
4666 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4667 else
4668 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4669 }
4670
4671static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4672 {
4673 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4674 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4675 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4676 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4677 {
4678 const EVP_MD *md;
4679 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4680 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4681 }
4682 if (s)
4683 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4684 else
4685 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4686 }
4687
4688int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4689 {
4690 if (vfy)
4691 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4692 if (is_ee)
4693 {
4694 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4695 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4696 }
4697 else
4698 {
4699 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4700 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4701 }
4702 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4703 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4704 return 1;
4705 }
4706
4707/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4708 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4709 * not sending one to the peer.
4710 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4711 */
4712
4713int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4714 {
4715 int rv, start_idx, i;
4716 if (x == NULL)
4717 {
4718 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4719 start_idx = 1;
4720 }
4721 else
4722 start_idx = 0;
4723
4724 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4725 if (rv != 1)
4726 return rv;
4727
4728 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4729 {
4730 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4731 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4732 if (rv != 1)
4733 return rv;
4734 }
4735 return 1;
4736 }
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