]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blame - ssl/t1_lib.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blame
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blob | blame (incremental) | history | HEAD
Fix seg fault in ASN1_generate_v3/ASN1_generate_nconf
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
0f113f3e 8 *
58964a49
RE		 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
0f113f3e 15 *
58964a49
RE		 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
0f113f3e 22 *
58964a49
RE		 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
0f113f3e 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
58964a49
RE		 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
0f113f3e 40 *
58964a49
RE		 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
0f113f3e 52 *
58964a49
RE		 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
0f113f3e 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
f1fd4544
BM		 67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e
MC		 119# include <openssl/dh.h>
120# include <openssl/bn.h>
09599b52 121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
0f113f3e 124const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
0f113f3e
MC		 128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
0f113f3e
MC		 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151};
152
153SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170};
171
172SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190};
58964a49 191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
0f113f3e
MC		 193{
194 /*
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
197 */
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
199}
58964a49 200
6b691a5c 201int tls1_new(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 202{
203 if (!ssl3_new(s))
204 return (0);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 return (1);
207}
58964a49 208
6b691a5c 209void tls1_free(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 210{
12bf56c0 211#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
214 }
215#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 ssl3_free(s);
217}
58964a49 218
6b691a5c 219void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 220{
221 ssl3_clear(s);
222 s->version = s->method->version;
223}
58964a49 224
525de5d3 225#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 226
0f113f3e
MC		 227typedef struct {
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231} tls_curve_info;
232
233# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235
236static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265};
266
267static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271};
272
273static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302};
303
304static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307};
2ea80354 308
525de5d3 309int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
0f113f3e
MC		 310{
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
314 return 0;
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
316}
525de5d3
DSH		 317
318int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 319{
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
321 switch (nid) {
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
323 return 1;
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 return 2;
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
327 return 3;
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
329 return 4;
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
331 return 5;
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
333 return 6;
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
335 return 7;
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
337 return 8;
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
339 return 9;
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
341 return 10;
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
343 return 11;
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
345 return 12;
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
347 return 13;
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
349 return 14;
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
351 return 15;
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
353 return 16;
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
355 return 17;
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
357 return 18;
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
359 return 19;
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
361 return 20;
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
363 return 21;
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
365 return 22;
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
367 return 23;
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
369 return 24;
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
371 return 25;
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
373 return 26;
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
375 return 27;
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
377 return 28;
378 default:
379 return 0;
380 }
381}
382
740580c2
EK		 383/*
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
385 * preferred list.
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
fd2b65ce 394 */
740580c2 395static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
0f113f3e
MC		 396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
397 size_t *num_curves)
398{
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
400 if (sess) {
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
403 } else {
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
409 break;
410
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 pcurveslen = 2;
414 break;
415
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 pcurveslen = 2;
419 break;
420 default:
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 }
424 if (!*pcurves) {
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
427 }
428 }
429
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 *num_curves = 0;
434 return 0;
435 } else {
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
437 return 1;
438 }
439}
b362ccab
DSH		 440
441/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 443{
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
445 if (curve[0])
446 return 1;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
449 return 0;
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
453 return 0;
454# endif
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
456}
b362ccab 457
d18b716d
DSH		 458/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
0f113f3e
MC		 460{
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
465 return 0;
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
467 if (suiteb_flags) {
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
469 if (p[1])
470 return 0;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
473 return 0;
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
476 return 0;
477 } else /* Should never happen */
478 return 0;
479 }
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
481 return 0;
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
485 }
486 return 0;
487}
d0595f17 488
1d97c843 489/*-
376e2ca3
EK		 490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
d0595f17 494 */
a4352630 495int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
0f113f3e
MC		 496{
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
499 int k;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
501 if (s->server == 0)
502 return -1;
503 if (nmatch == -2) {
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
505 /*
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
508 */
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
515 return NID_undef;
516 }
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
518 nmatch = 0;
519 }
520 /*
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
523 */
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
526 &num_supp))
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
531 &num_pref))
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
533 k = 0;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
539 continue;
540 if (nmatch == k) {
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
543 }
544 k++;
545 }
546 }
547 }
548 if (nmatch == -1)
549 return k;
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
551 return NID_undef;
552}
d0595f17
DSH		 553
554int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
0f113f3e
MC		 555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
556{
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
558 size_t i;
559 /*
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
561 * ids < 32
562 */
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
565 if (!clist)
566 return 0;
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
569 int id;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
571 idmask = 1L << id;
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
573 OPENSSL_free(clist);
574 return 0;
575 }
576 dup_list |= idmask;
577 s2n(id, p);
578 }
579 if (*pext)
580 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
581 *pext = clist;
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
583 return 1;
584}
585
586# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
587
588typedef struct {
589 size_t nidcnt;
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
591} nid_cb_st;
d0595f17
DSH		 592
593static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 594{
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
596 size_t i;
597 int nid;
598 char etmp[20];
2747d73c
KR		 599 if (elem == NULL)
600 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
602 return 0;
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
604 return 0;
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
606 etmp[len] = 0;
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
613 return 0;
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
616 return 0;
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
618 return 1;
619}
620
d0595f17 621/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
0f113f3e
MC		 622int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
623 const char *str)
624{
625 nid_cb_st ncb;
626 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
628 return 0;
629 if (pext == NULL)
630 return 1;
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
632}
633
fd2b65ce
DSH		 634/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
0f113f3e
MC		 636 EC_KEY *ec)
637{
638 int is_prime, id;
639 const EC_GROUP *grp;
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
641 if (!ec)
642 return 0;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
645 if (!grp)
646 return 0;
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
648 if (!meth)
649 return 0;
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
651 is_prime = 1;
652 else
653 is_prime = 0;
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
658 if (id) {
659 curve_id[0] = 0;
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
661 } else {
662 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
663 if (is_prime)
664 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
665 else
666 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
667 }
668 if (comp_id) {
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
670 return 0;
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
672 if (is_prime)
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
674 else
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
676 } else
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
678 }
679 return 1;
680}
681
fd2b65ce
DSH		 682/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
685{
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
688 int j;
689 /*
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
692 */
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
698 break;
699 }
700 if (i == num_formats)
701 return 0;
702 }
703 if (!curve_id)
704 return 1;
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
708 return 0;
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
711 break;
712 }
713 if (i == num_curves)
714 return 0;
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
716 if (!s->server)
717 break;
718 }
719 return 1;
720}
d61ff83b 721
5087afa1 722static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
0f113f3e
MC		 723 size_t *num_formats)
724{
725 /*
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
727 */
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
731 } else {
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
734 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
736 else
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
738 }
739}
740
741/*
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
d61ff83b 744 */
2ea80354 745static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 746{
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
748 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
749 int rv;
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
751 if (!pkey)
752 return 0;
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
755 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
756 return 1;
757 }
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
759 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
760 if (!rv)
761 return 0;
762 /*
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
764 * curves extension.
765 */
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
767 if (!rv)
768 return 0;
769 /*
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
772 */
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
774 int check_md;
775 size_t i;
776 CERT *c = s->cert;
777 if (curve_id[0])
778 return 0;
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
784 else
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
788 break;
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
790 return 0;
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
794 else
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
796 }
797 }
798 return rv;
799}
800
801# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
fd2b65ce 802/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 803int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
0f113f3e
MC		 804{
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
810 return 1;
811# endif
812 /*
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
814 * curves permitted.
815 */
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
822 else
823 return 0;
824 curve_id[0] = 0;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
827 return 0;
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
830 return 1;
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
832 else {
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
834 if (!ec)
835 return 0;
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
837 return 0;
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
839 return 1;
840 return 0;
841 }
842
843 }
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
847 return 1;
848 else
849 return 0;
850 }
851 if (!ec) {
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
853 return 1;
854 else
855 return 0;
856 }
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
858 return 0;
d18b716d 859/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
0f113f3e
MC		 860# if 0
861 return 1;
862# else
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
864# endif
865}
866# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
d0595f17 867
14536c8c
DSH		 868#else
869
870static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
0f113f3e
MC		 871{
872 return 1;
873}
14536c8c 874
0f113f3e 875#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 876
ed3883d2 877#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88 878
0f113f3e
MC		 879/*
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
fc101f88
DSH		 881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
882 */
883
0f113f3e
MC		 884# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
886# else
887# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
888# endif
889
890# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
892# else
893# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
894# endif
895
896# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
897# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
898 /* */
899# else
900# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
901# endif
902
903# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
906 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
fc101f88 907
d97ed219 908static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
0f113f3e
MC		 911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
0f113f3e 913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
fc101f88 914};
0f113f3e
MC		 915
916# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
d97ed219 917static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
2ea80354 920};
0f113f3e 921# endif
b7bfe69b 922size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
0f113f3e
MC		 923{
924 /*
925 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
926 * preferences.
927 */
928# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
929 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
930 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
931 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
933
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
936 return 2;
937
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
940 return 2;
941 }
942# endif
943 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
944 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
945 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
947 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
948 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
949 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 } else {
951 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
952 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
953 }
954}
955
956/*
957 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
ec4a50b3
DSH		 958 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
959 */
960int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
0f113f3e
MC		 961 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
962{
963 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
964 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
965 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
966 /* Should never happen */
967 if (sigalg == -1)
968 return -1;
969 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
970 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 return 0;
973 }
974# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
976 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
977 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
978 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 return 0;
980 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
982 return 0;
983 }
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
986 if (curve_id[0])
987 return 0;
988 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
989 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
991 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
992 return 0;
993 }
994 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 return 0;
999 }
1000 } else
1001 return 0;
1002 }
1003 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1004 return 0;
1005# endif
1006
1007 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1008 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1009 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1010 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1011 break;
1012 }
1013 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1014 if (i == sent_sigslen
1015 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1016 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1018 return 0;
1019 }
1020 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1021 if (*pmd == NULL) {
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1023 return 0;
1024 }
1025 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1026 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1027 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1028 (void *)sig)) {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1030 return 0;
1031 }
1032 /*
1033 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1034 */
1035 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1036 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1037 return 1;
1038}
2ea80354 1039
0f113f3e
MC		 1040/*
1041 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1042 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1043 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1044 * settings.
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1045 */
1046void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1047{
1048 CERT *c = s->cert;
1049 c->mask_a = 0;
1050 c->mask_k = 0;
1051 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1052 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1053 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1054 else
1055 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1056 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1057 /*
1058 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1059 * algorithms.
1060 */
1061 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1063 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1067# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1068 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1069 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1071 }
1072# endif
1073# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1074 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1075 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1076 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1077 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1078 }
1079# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1080# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1084 }
1085# endif
1086 c->valid = 1;
1087}
fc101f88 1088
b362ccab 1089int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 1090{
1091 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1092 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1093 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1094 return 1;
1095 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1096}
b362ccab
DSH		 1097
1098static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1099{
1100 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1101 return 0;
1102 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1103}
ed3883d2 1104
0f113f3e
MC		 1105unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1106 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1107{
1108 int extdatalen = 0;
1109 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1110 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1111# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1112 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1113 int using_ecc = 0;
1114 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1115 int i;
1116 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1117 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118
1119 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1121
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1126 using_ecc = 1;
1127 break;
1128 }
1129 }
1130 }
1131# endif
ed3883d2 1132
0f113f3e 1133 ret += 2;
6434abbf 1134
0f113f3e
MC		 1135 if (ret >= limit)
1136 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
5a3d8eeb 1137
0f113f3e
MC		 1138 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1139 if (s->renegotiate) {
1140 int el;
5a3d8eeb 1141
0f113f3e
MC		 1142 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 return NULL;
1145 }
5a3d8eeb 1146
0f113f3e
MC		 1147 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1148 return NULL;
5a3d8eeb 1149
0f113f3e
MC		 1150 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1151 s2n(el, ret);
5a3d8eeb 1152
0f113f3e
MC		 1153 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 return NULL;
5a3d8eeb 1156 }
edc032b5 1157
0f113f3e
MC		 1158 ret += el;
1159 }
1160 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1161 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1162 goto done;
1163
1164 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1165 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1166 unsigned long size_str;
1167 long lenmax;
1168
50e735f9
MC		 1169 /*-
1170 * check for enough space.
1171 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1172 * 2 for servernamelist length
1173 * 1 for the hostname type
1174 * 2 for hostname length
1175 * + hostname length
1176 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1177
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1179 || (size_str =
1180 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1181 return NULL;
1182
1183 /* extension type and length */
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1185 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1186
1187 /* length of servername list */
1188 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1189
1190 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1191 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1192 s2n(size_str, ret);
1193 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1194 ret += size_str;
1195 }
1196# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1199 * Client Hello message */
1200
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 return NULL;
1205 }
761772d7 1206
50e735f9
MC		 1207 /*-
1208 * check for enough space.
1209 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 * 1 for the srp user identity
1211 * + srp user identity length
1212 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1214 return NULL;
1215
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1218 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1221 ret += login_len;
1222 }
1223# endif
1224
1225# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 if (using_ecc) {
1227 /*
1228 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1229 */
1230 long lenmax;
1231 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1232 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1233 size_t i;
1234 unsigned char *etmp;
1235
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1237
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1239 return NULL;
1240 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1241 return NULL;
1242 if (num_formats > 255) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 return NULL;
1245 }
4817504d 1246
0f113f3e
MC		 1247 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1248 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1249 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1250 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1251 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1252 ret += num_formats;
1253
1254 /*
1255 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1256 */
1257 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1258 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1259 return NULL;
1260
1261 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1262 return NULL;
1263 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1264 return NULL;
1265 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 return NULL;
1268 }
ee2ffc27 1269
0f113f3e
MC		 1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1271 etmp = ret + 4;
1272 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1273 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1274 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1276 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1277 }
1278 }
01f2f18f 1279
0f113f3e
MC		 1280 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1281
1282 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1283 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1284 ret += curves_list_len;
1285 }
1286# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1287
1288 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1289 int ticklen;
1290 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1291 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1292 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1294 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1295 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1296 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1297 return NULL;
1298 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1300 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1301 } else
1302 ticklen = 0;
1303 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1304 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1305 goto skip_ext;
1306 /*
1307 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1308 * ticket
1309 */
1310 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1311 return NULL;
1312 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1313 s2n(ticklen, ret);
1314 if (ticklen) {
1315 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1316 ret += ticklen;
1317 }
1318 }
1319 skip_ext:
1320
1321 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1322 size_t salglen;
1323 const unsigned char *salg;
1324 unsigned char *etmp;
1325 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1326 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1327 return NULL;
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1329 etmp = ret;
1330 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1331 ret += 4;
1332 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1333 /* Fill in lengths */
1334 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1335 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1336 ret += salglen;
1337 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1338
1339 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1340 int i;
1341 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1342 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1343
1344 idlen = 0;
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1346 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1347 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1348 if (itmp <= 0)
1349 return NULL;
1350 idlen += itmp + 2;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1351 }
1352
0f113f3e
MC		 1353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1354 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1355 if (extlen < 0)
1356 return NULL;
1357 } else
1358 extlen = 0;
1359
1360 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1361 return NULL;
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1363 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1364 return NULL;
1365 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1366 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1367 s2n(idlen, ret);
1368 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1369 /* save position of id len */
1370 unsigned char *q = ret;
1371 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1372 /* skip over id len */
1373 ret += 2;
1374 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1375 /* write id len */
1376 s2n(itmp, q);
1377 }
1378 s2n(extlen, ret);
1379 if (extlen > 0)
1380 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 }
1382# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1385 return NULL;
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1387 s2n(1, ret);
50e735f9
MC		 1388 /*-
1389 * Set mode:
1390 * 1: peer may send requests
1391 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1392 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1393 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1395 else
1396 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1397# endif
1398
1399# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1401 /*
1402 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1403 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1404 */
1405 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1406 return NULL;
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1408 s2n(0, ret);
1409 }
1410# endif
1411
1412 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1413 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1414 return NULL;
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1416 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1418 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1419 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1420 }
1421# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1422 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1423 int el;
1424
1425 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1426
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1428 return NULL;
1429
1430 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1431 s2n(el, ret);
1432
1433 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1435 return NULL;
1436 }
1437 ret += el;
1438 }
1439# endif
1440 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1441 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1442 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1443 return NULL;
1444# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1446 s2n(0, ret);
1447# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1449 s2n(0, ret);
0f113f3e
MC		 1450
1451 /*
1452 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1453 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1454 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1455 * appear last.
1456 */
1457 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1458 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1459 /*
1460 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1461 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1462 * does not.
1463 */
1464 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1465 hlen -= 5;
1466 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1467 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1468 if (hlen >= 4)
1469 hlen -= 4;
1470 else
1471 hlen = 0;
1472
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1474 s2n(hlen, ret);
1475 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1476 ret += hlen;
1477 }
1478 }
5a3d8eeb 1479
0f113f3e 1480 done:
5a3d8eeb 1481
0f113f3e
MC		 1482 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1483 return orig;
5a3d8eeb 1484
0f113f3e
MC		 1485 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1486 return ret;
1487}
333f926d 1488
0f113f3e
MC		 1489unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1490 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1491{
1492 int extdatalen = 0;
1493 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1494 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1495# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1496 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1497# endif
1498# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1499 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1500 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1501 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1502 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1503 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1504# endif
1505
1506 ret += 2;
1507 if (ret >= limit)
1508 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1509
1510 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1511 int el;
1512
1513 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 return NULL;
1516 }
333f926d 1517
0f113f3e
MC		 1518 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1519 return NULL;
333f926d 1520
0f113f3e
MC		 1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1522 s2n(el, ret);
333f926d 1523
0f113f3e
MC		 1524 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 return NULL;
1527 }
333f926d 1528
0f113f3e
MC		 1529 ret += el;
1530 }
1531
1532 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1533 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1534 goto done;
1535
1536 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1537 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1539 return NULL;
1540
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1542 s2n(0, ret);
1543 }
1544# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1545 if (using_ecc) {
1546 const unsigned char *plist;
1547 size_t plistlen;
1548 /*
1549 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1550 */
1551 long lenmax;
1552
1553 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1554
1555 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1556 return NULL;
1557 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1558 return NULL;
1559 if (plistlen > 255) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 return NULL;
1562 }
4817504d 1563
0f113f3e
MC		 1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1565 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1566 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1567 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1568 ret += plistlen;
1569
1570 }
1571 /*
1572 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1573 * extension
1574 */
1575# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1576
1577 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1578 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1579 return NULL;
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1581 s2n(0, ret);
1582 }
1583
1584 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1586 return NULL;
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1588 s2n(0, ret);
1589 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1590
1591# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1593 int el;
1594
1595 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1596
1597 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1598 return NULL;
1599
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1601 s2n(el, ret);
1602
1603 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 return NULL;
1606 }
1607 ret += el;
1608 }
1609# endif
1610
1611 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1612 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1613 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1614 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1615 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1616 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1617 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1618 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1619 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1620 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1621 };
1622 if (limit - ret < 36)
1623 return NULL;
1624 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1625 ret += 36;
1626
1627 }
1628# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1629 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1631 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1632 return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1634 s2n(1, ret);
50e735f9
MC		 1635 /*-
1636 * Set mode:
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1639 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1642 else
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1644
1645 }
1646# endif
1647
1648# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1652 const unsigned char *npa;
1653 unsigned int npalen;
1654 int r;
1655
1656 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1657 s->
1658 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1659 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1660 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1661 return NULL;
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1663 s2n(npalen, ret);
1664 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1665 ret += npalen;
1666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1667 }
1668 }
1669# endif
1670 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1671 return NULL;
1672# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1673 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1674 /*
1675 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1676 * for other cases too.
1677 */
1678 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1679 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1680 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1681 else {
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1683 s2n(0, ret);
1684 }
1685 }
1686# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 1687 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1689 s2n(0, ret);
1690 }
0f113f3e
MC		 1691
1692 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1693 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1694 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1695
1696 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1697 return NULL;
1698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1699 s2n(3 + len, ret);
1700 s2n(1 + len, ret);
1701 *ret++ = len;
1702 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1703 ret += len;
1704 }
1705
1706 done:
1707
1708 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1709 return orig;
1710
1711 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1712 return ret;
1713}
a398f821 1714
0f113f3e
MC		 1715/*
1716 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1717 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1718 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1719 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1720 * success.
1721 */
6f017a8f 1722static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
0f113f3e
MC		 1723 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1724{
1725 unsigned i;
1726 unsigned proto_len;
1727 const unsigned char *selected;
1728 unsigned char selected_len;
1729 int r;
1730
1731 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1732 return 0;
1733
1734 if (data_len < 2)
1735 goto parse_error;
1736
1737 /*
1738 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1739 * length-prefixed strings.
1740 */
1741 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1742 data_len -= 2;
1743 data += 2;
1744 if (data_len != i)
1745 goto parse_error;
1746
1747 if (data_len < 2)
1748 goto parse_error;
1749
1750 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1751 proto_len = data[i];
1752 i++;
1753
1754 if (proto_len == 0)
1755 goto parse_error;
1756
1757 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1758 goto parse_error;
1759
1760 i += proto_len;
1761 }
1762
1763 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1764 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1765 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1766 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1768 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1769 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1771 return -1;
1772 }
1773 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1774 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1775 }
1776 return 0;
1777
1778 parse_error:
1779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1780 return -1;
1781}
6f017a8f 1782
0f113f3e 1783# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1d97c843
TH		 1784/*-
1785 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
dece3209
RS		 1786 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1787 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1788 * SNI,
1789 * elliptic_curves
1790 * ec_point_formats
1791 *
1792 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1793 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1794 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1795 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1796 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1797static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1798 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1799{
1800 unsigned short type, size;
1801 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1802 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1803 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1804 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1805 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1806 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1807 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1808
1809 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1810 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1811 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1812 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1813 };
1814
1815 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1816 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1817 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1818 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1819 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1820 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1821 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1822 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1823 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1824 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1825 };
1826
1827 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1828 return;
1829 data += 2;
1830
1831 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1832 return;
1833 n2s(data, type);
1834 n2s(data, size);
1835
1836 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1837 return;
1838
1839 if (data + size > d + n)
1840 return;
1841 data += size;
1842
1843 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1844 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1845 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1846
1847 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1848 return;
1849 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1850 return;
1851 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1852 return;
1853 } else {
1854 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1855
1856 if (data + len != d + n)
1857 return;
1858 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1859 return;
1860 }
1861
1862 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
dece3209 1863}
0f113f3e
MC		 1864# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1865
1866static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1867 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1868{
1869 unsigned short type;
1870 unsigned short size;
1871 unsigned short len;
1872 unsigned char *data = *p;
1873 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1874
1875 s->servername_done = 0;
1876 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1877# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1878 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1879# endif
1880
1881 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1883 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1884 }
1885# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1886 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1887 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1888# endif
1889
1890# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1891 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1892 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1893# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1894
1895 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1896 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1897 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1898 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1899 }
1900# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1901 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1902# endif
1903
1904# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1907 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1908 }
1909# endif
1910
1911 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1912
1913 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1914 goto ri_check;
1915 n2s(data, len);
1916
1917 if (data > (d + n - len))
1918 goto ri_check;
1919
1920 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1921 n2s(data, type);
1922 n2s(data, size);
1923
1924 if (data + size > (d + n))
1925 goto ri_check;
0f113f3e
MC		 1926 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1927 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1929 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1930 return 0;
1931 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1932 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1933 }
1d97c843
TH		 1934/*-
1935 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1936 *
1937 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1938 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1939 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1940 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1941 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
0f113f3e
MC		 1942 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1943 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1944 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1d97c843
TH		 1945 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1946 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1947 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1948 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1949 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
0f113f3e 1950 * the value of the Host: field.
1d97c843 1951 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
0f113f3e
MC		 1952 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1953 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1954 * extension.
1955 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1d97c843 1956 *
0f113f3e 1957 */
ed3883d2 1958
0f113f3e
MC		 1959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1960 unsigned char *sdata;
1961 int servname_type;
1962 int dsize;
1963
1964 if (size < 2) {
1965 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1966 return 0;
1967 }
1968 n2s(data, dsize);
1969 size -= 2;
1970 if (dsize > size) {
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1972 return 0;
1973 }
1974
1975 sdata = data;
1976 while (dsize > 3) {
1977 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1978 n2s(sdata, len);
1979 dsize -= 3;
1980
1981 if (len > dsize) {
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 return 0;
1984 }
1985 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1986 switch (servname_type) {
1987 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1988 if (!s->hit) {
1989 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 return 0;
1992 }
1993 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1994 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1995 return 0;
1996 }
1997 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1998 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 return 0;
2001 }
2002 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2003 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2004 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2005 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2006 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2007 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2008 return 0;
2009 }
2010 s->servername_done = 1;
761772d7 2011
0f113f3e
MC		 2012 } else
2013 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2014 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2015 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2016 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
b2284ed3 2017
0f113f3e 2018 break;
ee2ffc27 2019
0f113f3e
MC		 2020 default:
2021 break;
2022 }
6f31dd72 2023
0f113f3e
MC		 2024 dsize -= len;
2025 }
2026 if (dsize != 0) {
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 return 0;
2029 }
6f017a8f 2030
0f113f3e
MC		 2031 }
2032# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2033 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2034 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 return 0;
2037 }
2038 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 return 0;
2041 }
2042 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2043 return -1;
2044 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2045 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2046
2047 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 return 0;
2050 }
2051 }
2052# endif
2053
2054# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2055 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2056 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2057 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2058
2059 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2060 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2061 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 return 0;
2063 }
2064 if (!s->hit) {
2065 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2066 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2067 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2068 }
2069 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2070 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2071 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2072 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2076 ecpointformatlist_length;
2077 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2078 ecpointformatlist_length);
2079 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2080 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2081 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2082 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2083 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2084
2085 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2086 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2087 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2088 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2090 return 0;
2091 }
2092 if (!s->hit) {
2093 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2094 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 return 0;
2096 }
2097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2099 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2101 return 0;
2102 }
2103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2104 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2106 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2107 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2108 }
2109# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
0f113f3e
MC		 2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2111 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2112 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2113 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2114 {
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2116 return 0;
2117 }
2118 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2119 int dsize;
2120 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2121 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 return 0;
2123 }
2124 n2s(data, dsize);
2125 size -= 2;
2126 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 return 0;
2129 }
2130 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2131 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2132 return 0;
2133 }
2134 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2135
2136 if (size < 5) {
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2138 return 0;
2139 }
2140
2141 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2142 size--;
2143 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2144 const unsigned char *sdata;
2145 int dsize;
2146 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2147 n2s(data, dsize);
2148 size -= 2;
2149 if (dsize > size) {
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 return 0;
2152 }
2153 while (dsize > 0) {
2154 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2155 int idsize;
2156 if (dsize < 4) {
2157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 return 0;
2159 }
2160 n2s(data, idsize);
2161 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2162 size -= 2 + idsize;
2163 if (dsize < 0) {
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 return 0;
2166 }
2167 sdata = data;
2168 data += idsize;
2169 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2170 if (!id) {
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 return 0;
2173 }
2174 if (data != sdata) {
2175 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 return 0;
2178 }
2179 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2180 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2181 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2182 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2183 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2184 return 0;
2185 }
2186 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2187 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2188 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 return 0;
2190 }
2191 }
4817504d 2192
0f113f3e
MC		 2193 /* Read in request_extensions */
2194 if (size < 2) {
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 return 0;
2197 }
2198 n2s(data, dsize);
2199 size -= 2;
2200 if (dsize != size) {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 return 0;
2203 }
2204 sdata = data;
2205 if (dsize > 0) {
2206 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2207 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2208 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2209 }
2210
2211 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2212 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2213 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 return 0;
2216 }
2217 }
2218 }
2219 /*
2220 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2221 */
2222 else
2223 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2224 }
2225# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2227 switch (data[0]) {
2228 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2229 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2230 break;
2231 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2232 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2234 break;
2235 default:
2236 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2237 return 0;
2238 }
2239 }
2240# endif
2241# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2242 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2243 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2244 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
50e735f9
MC		 2245 /*-
2246 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2247 * renegotiation.
2248 *
2249 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2250 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2251 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2252 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2253 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2254 * anything like that, but this might change).
2255 *
2256 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2257 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2258 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2259 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2260 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2261 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2262 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2263 }
2264# endif
2265
2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2267 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2268 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2269 return 0;
2270# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2271 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2272 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2273# endif
2274 }
5e3ff62c 2275
0f113f3e
MC		 2276 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2277# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2278 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2279 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2280 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2281 return 0;
2282 }
2283# endif
2284# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2286 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2287# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 2288 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2289 if (!s->hit)
2290 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2291 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2292 /*
2293 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2294 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2295 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2296 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2297 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2298 */
2299 else if (!s->hit) {
2300 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2301 return 0;
2302 }
ed3883d2 2303
0f113f3e
MC		 2304 data += size;
2305 }
6f017a8f 2306
0f113f3e
MC		 2307 *p = data;
2308
2309 ri_check:
ed3883d2 2310
0f113f3e
MC		 2311 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2312
2313 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2315 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2317 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2318 return 0;
2319 }
2320
2321 return 1;
2322}
2323
2324int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2325 int n)
2326{
2327 int al = -1;
2328 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2329 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2330 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2331 return 0;
2332 }
2333
2334 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2336 return 0;
2337 }
2338 return 1;
2339}
2340
2341# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2342/*
2343 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2344 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2345 * fill the length of the block.
2346 */
2347static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2348{
2349 unsigned int off = 0;
2350
2351 while (off < len) {
2352 if (d[off] == 0)
2353 return 0;
2354 off += d[off];
2355 off++;
2356 }
2357
2358 return off == len;
2359}
2360# endif
2361
2362static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2363 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2364{
2365 unsigned short length;
2366 unsigned short type;
2367 unsigned short size;
2368 unsigned char *data = *p;
2369 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2370 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2371
2372# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2373 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2374# endif
2375 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2376
2377 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2378 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2379 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2380 }
2381# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2382 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2383 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2384# endif
2385
2386# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2387 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2388# endif
2389
2390 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2391 goto ri_check;
2392
2393 n2s(data, length);
2394 if (data + length != d + n) {
2395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2396 return 0;
2397 }
2398
2399 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2400 n2s(data, type);
2401 n2s(data, size);
2402
2403 if (data + size > (d + n))
2404 goto ri_check;
2405
2406 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2407 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2408
2409 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2410 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2411 return 0;
2412 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2413 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2414 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2415 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2417 return 0;
2418 }
2419 tlsext_servername = 1;
2420 }
2421# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2423 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2424 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2425
2426 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 return 0;
2429 }
2430 if (!s->hit) {
2431 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2432 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2433 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2434 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2435 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2437 return 0;
2438 }
2439 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2440 ecpointformatlist_length;
2441 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2442 ecpointformatlist_length);
2443 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2444 }
2445# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2446
2447 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2448 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2449 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2450 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2451 {
2452 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2453 return 0;
2454 }
2455 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2457 return 0;
2458 }
2459 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2460 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2461 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2462 /*
2463 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2464 * request message.
2465 */
2466 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2468 return 0;
2469 }
2470 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2471 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2472 }
2473# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2475 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2476 unsigned char *selected;
2477 unsigned char selected_len;
2478
2479 /* We must have requested it. */
2480 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2482 return 0;
2483 }
2484 /* The data must be valid */
2485 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2486 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2487 return 0;
2488 }
2489 if (s->
2490 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2491 size,
2492 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2493 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2495 return 0;
2496 }
2497 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2498 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2500 return 0;
2501 }
2502 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2503 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2504 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2505 }
2506# endif
2507
2508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2509 unsigned len;
2510
2511 /* We must have requested it. */
2512 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2514 return 0;
2515 }
2516 if (size < 4) {
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2518 return 0;
2519 }
50e735f9
MC		 2520 /*-
2521 * The extension data consists of:
2522 * uint16 list_length
2523 * uint8 proto_length;
2524 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2525 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2526 len = data[0];
2527 len <<= 8;
2528 len |= data[1];
2529 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 return 0;
2532 }
2533 len = data[2];
2534 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2535 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 return 0;
2537 }
2538 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2539 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2540 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2541 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2542 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2543 return 0;
2544 }
2545 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2546 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2547 }
2548# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2549 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2550 switch (data[0]) {
2551 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2553 break;
2554 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2555 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2556 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2557 break;
2558 default:
2559 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2560 return 0;
2561 }
2562 }
2563# endif
2564# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2565 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2566 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2567 return 0;
2568 }
2569# endif
2570# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2571 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2572 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2573 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2574 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2575 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2576 }
2577# endif
ddc06b35
DSH		 2578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2579 if (!s->hit)
2580 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2581 }
0f113f3e
MC		 2582 /*
2583 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2584 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2585 */
2586 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2587 return 0;
2588
2589 data += size;
2590 }
2591
2592 if (data != d + n) {
2593 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2594 return 0;
2595 }
2596
2597 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2598 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2599 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2600 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2601 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2602 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2603 return 0;
2604 }
2605 } else {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 return 0;
2608 }
2609 }
2610 }
2611
2612 *p = data;
2613
2614 ri_check:
2615
2616 /*
2617 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2618 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2619 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2620 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2621 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2622 * initial connect only.
2623 */
2624 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2625 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2626 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2628 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2629 return 0;
2630 }
2631
2632 return 1;
2633}
b2172f4f 2634
36ca4ba6 2635int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2636{
2637
0f113f3e
MC		 2638 return 1;
2639}
36ca4ba6
BM		 2640
2641int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2642{
2643 return 1;
2644}
36ca4ba6 2645
2daceb03 2646static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2647{
2648 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2649 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2650
2651# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2652 /*
2653 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2654 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2655 */
2656 /*
2657 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2658 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 */
2660# endif
2661
2662 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2663 ret =
2664 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2665 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2666 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2667 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2668 ret =
2669 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2670 s->
2671 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2672
0f113f3e
MC		 2673 switch (ret) {
2674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2675 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2676 return -1;
2677
2678 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2679 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2680 return 1;
2681
2682 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2683 s->servername_done = 0;
2684 default:
2685 return 1;
2686 }
2687}
f1fd4544 2688
e469af8d 2689int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2690{
2691 int al;
2692 size_t i;
2693 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2694 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2696 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2697 }
2698 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2699 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2700 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2701 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2702 }
2703
2704 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2705 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2706 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2708 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 goto err;
2710 }
2711 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2712 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2714 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2715 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2716 goto err;
2717 }
2718 } else
2719 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2720 return 1;
2721 err:
2722 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2723 return 0;
2724}
e469af8d 2725
2daceb03 2726int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2727{
2728 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2729 int al;
2730
2731 /*
2732 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2733 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2734 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2735 * influence which certificate is sent
2736 */
2737 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2738 int r;
2739 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2740 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2741 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2742 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2743 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2744 return 1;
2745 }
2746 /*
2747 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2748 * et al can pick it up.
2749 */
2750 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2751 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2752 switch (r) {
2753 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2755 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2756 break;
2757 /* status request response should be sent */
2758 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2759 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2760 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2761 else
2762 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2763 break;
2764 /* something bad happened */
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2766 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2767 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 goto err;
2769 }
2770 } else
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2daceb03
BL		 2772
2773 err:
0f113f3e
MC		 2774 switch (ret) {
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2777 return -1;
2778
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2780 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2781 return 1;
2782
2783 default:
2784 return 1;
2785 }
2786}
2daceb03 2787
36ca4ba6 2788int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2789{
2790 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2791 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2792
2793# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2794 /*
2795 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2796 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2797 * must contain uncompressed.
2798 */
2799 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2800 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2801 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2802 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2803 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2804 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2805 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2806 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2807 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2808 size_t i;
2809 unsigned char *list;
2810 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2811 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2812 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2813 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2814 found_uncompressed = 1;
2815 break;
2816 }
2817 }
2818 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2820 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2821 return -1;
2822 }
2823 }
2824 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2825# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2826
2827 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2828 ret =
2829 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2830 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2831 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2832 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2833 ret =
2834 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2835 s->
2836 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2837
0f113f3e
MC		 2838 /*
2839 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2840 * callback
2841 */
2842 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2843 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2844 int r;
2845 /*
2846 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2847 * response.
2848 */
2849 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2850 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2851 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2852 }
2853 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2854 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2855 if (r == 0) {
2856 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2857 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2858 }
2859 if (r < 0) {
2860 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2862 }
2863 }
2864
2865 switch (ret) {
2866 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2867 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2868 return -1;
2869
2870 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2872 return 1;
2873
2874 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2875 s->servername_done = 0;
2876 default:
2877 return 1;
2878 }
2879}
761772d7 2880
0f113f3e
MC		 2881int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2882 int n)
2883{
2884 int al = -1;
2885 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2886 return 1;
2887 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2888 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2889 return 0;
2890 }
2891
2892 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2894 return 0;
2895 }
2896 return 1;
09e4e4b9
DSH		 2897}
2898
1d97c843
TH		 2899/*-
2900 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
c519e89f
BM		 2901 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2902 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2903 *
2904 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2905 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2906 * extension, if any.
2907 * len: the length of the session ID.
2908 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2909 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2910 * point to the resulting session.
2911 *
2912 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2913 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2914 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2915 *
2916 * Returns:
2917 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2918 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2919 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2920 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2921 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2922 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2923 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2924 *
2925 * Side effects:
2926 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2927 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2928 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2929 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2930 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2931 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 2932 */
6434abbf 2933int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
0f113f3e
MC		 2934 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2935{
2936 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2937 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2938 unsigned short i;
2939
2940 *ret = NULL;
2941 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2942
2943 /*
2944 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2945 * resumption.
2946 */
2947 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2948 return 0;
2949 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2950 return 0;
2951 if (p >= limit)
2952 return -1;
2953 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2954 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2955 i = *(p++);
2956 p += i;
2957 if (p >= limit)
2958 return -1;
2959 }
2960 /* Skip past cipher list */
2961 n2s(p, i);
2962 p += i;
2963 if (p >= limit)
2964 return -1;
2965 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2966 i = *(p++);
2967 p += i;
2968 if (p > limit)
2969 return -1;
2970 /* Now at start of extensions */
2971 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2972 return 0;
2973 n2s(p, i);
2974 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2975 unsigned short type, size;
2976 n2s(p, type);
2977 n2s(p, size);
2978 if (p + size > limit)
2979 return 0;
2980 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2981 int r;
2982 if (size == 0) {
2983 /*
2984 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2985 * one.
2986 */
2987 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2988 return 1;
2989 }
2990 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2991 /*
2992 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2993 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2994 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2995 * calculate the master secret later.
2996 */
2997 return 2;
2998 }
2999 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3000 switch (r) {
3001 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3002 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3003 return 2;
3004 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3005 return r;
3006 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3007 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3008 return 3;
3009 default: /* fatal error */
3010 return -1;
3011 }
3012 }
3013 p += size;
3014 }
3015 return 0;
3016}
6434abbf 3017
1d97c843
TH		 3018/*-
3019 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
c519e89f
BM		 3020 *
3021 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3022 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3023 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3024 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3025 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3026 * point to the resulting session.
3027 *
3028 * Returns:
3029 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3030 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3031 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3032 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3033 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3034static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3035 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3036 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3037{
3038 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3039 unsigned char *sdec;
3040 const unsigned char *p;
3041 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3042 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3043 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3044 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3045 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3046 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3047 if (eticklen < 48)
3048 return 2;
3049 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3050 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3051 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3052 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3053 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3054 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3055 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3056 if (rv < 0)
3057 return -1;
3058 if (rv == 0)
3059 return 2;
3060 if (rv == 2)
3061 renew_ticket = 1;
3062 } else {
3063 /* Check key name matches */
3064 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3065 return 2;
3066 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
474e469b 3067 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
0f113f3e
MC		 3068 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3069 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3070 }
3071 /*
3072 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3073 * checks on ticket.
3074 */
3075 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3076 if (mlen < 0) {
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3078 return -1;
3079 }
3080 eticklen -= mlen;
3081 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3082 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3083 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3084 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3085 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3086 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3087 return 2;
3088 }
3089 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3090 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3091 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3092 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3093 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3094 if (!sdec) {
3095 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3096 return -1;
3097 }
3098 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3099 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3100 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3101 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3102 return 2;
3103 }
3104 slen += mlen;
3105 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3106 p = sdec;
3107
3108 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3109 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3110 if (sess) {
3111 /*
3112 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3113 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3114 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3115 * standard.
3116 */
3117 if (sesslen)
3118 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3119 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3120 *psess = sess;
3121 if (renew_ticket)
3122 return 4;
3123 else
3124 return 3;
3125 }
3126 ERR_clear_error();
3127 /*
3128 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3129 */
3130 return 2;
3131}
6434abbf 3132
6b7be581
DSH		 3133/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3134
0f113f3e
MC		 3135typedef struct {
3136 int nid;
3137 int id;
3138} tls12_lookup;
6b7be581 3139
d97ed219 3140static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3141 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3142 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3143 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3144 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3145 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3146 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3147};
3148
d97ed219 3149static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3150 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3151 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3152 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3153};
3154
d97ed219 3155static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3156{
3157 size_t i;
3158 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3159 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3160 return table[i].id;
3161 }
3162 return -1;
3163}
e7f8ff43 3164
d97ed219 3165static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
0f113f3e
MC		 3166{
3167 size_t i;
3168 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3169 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3170 return table[i].nid;
3171 }
3172 return NID_undef;
3173}
3174
3175int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3176 const EVP_MD *md)
3177{
3178 int sig_id, md_id;
3179 if (!md)
3180 return 0;
3181 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3182 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3183 if (md_id == -1)
3184 return 0;
3185 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3186 if (sig_id == -1)
3187 return 0;
3188 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3189 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3190 return 1;
3191}
6b7be581 3192
a2f9200f 3193int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
0f113f3e
MC		 3194{
3195 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3196 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3197}
3198
3199typedef struct {
3200 int nid;
3201 int secbits;
3202 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3203} tls12_hash_info;
b362ccab
DSH		 3204
3205static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
0f113f3e
MC		 3206# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3207 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3208# else
3209 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3210# endif
0f113f3e 3211 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
0f113f3e
MC		 3212 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3213 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
0f113f3e
MC		 3214 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3215 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
b362ccab 3216};
a2f9200f 3217
b362ccab 3218static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3219{
3220 if (hash_alg == 0)
3221 return NULL;
3222 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3223 return NULL;
3224 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3225}
a2f9200f 3226
b362ccab 3227const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3228{
3229 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3230 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3231 return NULL;
3232 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3233 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3234 return NULL;
3235 return inf->mfunc();
3236}
a2f9200f 3237
4453cd8c 3238static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3239{
3240 switch (sig_alg) {
3241# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3244# endif
3245# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3246 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3247 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3248# endif
3249# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3250 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3251 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3252# endif
3253 }
3254 return -1;
3255}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3256
3257/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3258static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
0f113f3e
MC		 3259 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3260{
3261 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3262 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3263 return;
3264 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3265 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3266 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3267 if (phash_nid)
3268 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3269 }
3270 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3271 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3272 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3273 if (psign_nid)
3274 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3275 }
3276 if (psignhash_nid) {
3277 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3278 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3279 else
3280 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3281 }
3282}
3283
b362ccab
DSH		 3284/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3285static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
0f113f3e
MC		 3286{
3287 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3288 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3289 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3290 return 0;
3291 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3292 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3293 return 0;
3294 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3295 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3296}
3297
3298/*
3299 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3300 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3301 * disabled.
b362ccab
DSH		 3302 */
3303
3304void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 3305{
3306 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3307 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3308 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3309 /*
3310 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3311 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3312 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3313 */
3314 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3315 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3316 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3317# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3319 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3320 have_rsa = 1;
3321 break;
3322# endif
3323# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3325 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3326 have_dsa = 1;
3327 break;
3328# endif
3329# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3331 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3332 have_ecdsa = 1;
3333 break;
3334# endif
3335 }
3336 }
3337 if (!have_rsa)
3338 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3339 if (!have_dsa)
3340 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3341 if (!have_ecdsa)
3342 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3343}
b362ccab
DSH		 3344
3345size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
0f113f3e
MC		 3346 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3347{
3348 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3349 size_t i;
3350 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3351 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3352 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3353 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3354 }
3355 }
3356 return tmpout - out;
3357}
b362ccab 3358
4453cd8c 3359/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3360static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
0f113f3e
MC		 3361 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3362 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3363{
3364 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3365 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3366 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3367 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3368 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3369 continue;
3370 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3371 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3372 nmatch++;
3373 if (shsig) {
3374 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3375 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3376 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3377 &shsig->sign_nid,
3378 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3379 shsig++;
3380 }
3381 break;
3382 }
3383 }
3384 }
3385 return nmatch;
3386}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3387
3388/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3389static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3390{
3391 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3392 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3393 size_t nmatch;
3394 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3395 CERT *c = s->cert;
3396 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3397 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3398 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3399 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3400 }
3401 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3402 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3403 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3404 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3405 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3406 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3407 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3408 } else
3409 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3410 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3411 pref = conf;
3412 preflen = conflen;
3413 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3414 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3415 } else {
3416 allow = conf;
3417 allowlen = conflen;
3418 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3419 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3420 }
3421 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3422 if (!nmatch)
3423 return 1;
3424 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3425 if (!salgs)
3426 return 0;
3427 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3428 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3429 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3430 return 1;
3431}
4453cd8c 3432
6b7be581
DSH		 3433/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3434
c800c27a 3435int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
0f113f3e
MC		 3436{
3437 CERT *c = s->cert;
3438 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3439 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3440 return 1;
3441 /* Should never happen */
3442 if (!c)
3443 return 0;
3444
3445 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3446 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3447 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3448 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3449 return 0;
3450 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3451 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3452 return 1;
3453}
6b7be581 3454
c800c27a 3455int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3456{
3457 int idx;
3458 size_t i;
3459 const EVP_MD *md;
3460 CERT *c = s->cert;
3461 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3462 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3463 return 0;
3464
3465# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3466 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3467 /*
3468 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3469 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3470 */
3471 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3472 if (s->server)
3473 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3474 else
3475 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3476 if (sigs) {
3477 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3478 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3479 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3480 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3481 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3482 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3483 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3484 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3485 }
3486 }
3487 }
3488# endif
3489
3490 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3491 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3492 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3493 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3494 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3495 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3496 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3497 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3498 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3499 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3500 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3501 }
3502 }
6b7be581 3503
0f113f3e
MC		 3504 }
3505 /*
3506 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3507 * the certificate for signing.
3508 */
3509 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3510 /*
3511 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3512 * supported it stays as NULL.
3513 */
3514# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3515 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3516 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3517# endif
3518# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3519 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3522 }
3523# endif
3524# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3525 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3526 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3527# endif
3528 }
3529 return 1;
3530}
4817504d 3531
e7f8ff43 3532int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3533 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3534 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3535{
3536 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3537 if (psig == NULL)
3538 return 0;
3539 if (idx >= 0) {
3540 idx <<= 1;
3541 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3542 return 0;
3543 psig += idx;
3544 if (rhash)
3545 *rhash = psig[0];
3546 if (rsig)
3547 *rsig = psig[1];
3548 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3549 }
3550 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3551}
4453cd8c
DSH		 3552
3553int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
0f113f3e
MC		 3554 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3555 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3556{
3557 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3558 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3559 return 0;
3560 shsigalgs += idx;
3561 if (phash)
3562 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3563 if (psign)
3564 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3565 if (psignhash)
3566 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3567 if (rsig)
3568 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3569 if (rhash)
3570 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3571 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3572}
3573
3574# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3575int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3576{
3577 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3578 unsigned short hbtype;
3579 unsigned int payload;
3580 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3581
3582 if (s->msg_callback)
3583 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3584 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3585 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3586
3587 /* Read type and payload length first */
3588 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3589 return 0; /* silently discard */
3590 hbtype = *p++;
3591 n2s(p, payload);
3592 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3593 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3594 pl = p;
3595
3596 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3597 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3598 int r;
3599
3600 /*
3601 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3602 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3603 */
3604 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3605 if (buffer == NULL) {
3606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3607 return -1;
3608 }
3609 bp = buffer;
3610
3611 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3612 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3613 s2n(payload, bp);
3614 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3615 bp += payload;
3616 /* Random padding */
3617 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3618
3619 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3620 3 + payload + padding);
3621
3622 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3623 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3624 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3625 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3626
3627 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3628
3629 if (r < 0)
3630 return r;
3631 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3632 unsigned int seq;
3633
3634 /*
3635 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3636 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3637 */
3638 n2s(pl, seq);
3639
3640 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3641 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3642 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3643 }
3644 }
3645
3646 return 0;
3647}
0f229cce 3648
0f113f3e
MC		 3649int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3650{
3651 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3652 int ret;
3653 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3654 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3655
3656 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3657 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3658 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3660 return -1;
3661 }
3662
3663 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3664 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3666 return -1;
3667 }
3668
3669 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3670 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3672 return -1;
3673 }
3674
3675 /*
3676 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3677 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3678 */
3679 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3680
50e735f9
MC		 3681 /*-
3682 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3683 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3684 * some random stuff.
3685 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3686 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3687 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3688 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3689 * - Padding
3690 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3691 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3692 if (buf == NULL) {
3693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3694 return -1;
3695 }
3696 p = buf;
3697 /* Message Type */
3698 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3699 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3700 s2n(payload, p);
3701 /* Sequence number */
3702 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3703 /* 16 random bytes */
3704 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3705 p += 16;
3706 /* Random padding */
3707 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3708
3709 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3710 if (ret >= 0) {
3711 if (s->msg_callback)
3712 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3713 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3714 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3715
3716 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3717 }
3718
3719 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3720
3721 return ret;
3722}
3723# endif
3724
3725# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce 3726
0f113f3e
MC		 3727typedef struct {
3728 size_t sigalgcnt;
3729 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3730} sig_cb_st;
0f229cce
DSH		 3731
3732static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
0f113f3e
MC		 3733{
3734 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3735 size_t i;
3736 char etmp[20], *p;
3737 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
2747d73c
KR		 3738 if (elem == NULL)
3739 return 0;
0f113f3e
MC		 3740 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3741 return 0;
3742 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3743 return 0;
3744 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3745 etmp[len] = 0;
3746 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3747 if (!p)
3748 return 0;
3749 *p = 0;
3750 p++;
3751 if (!*p)
3752 return 0;
3753
3754 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3755 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3756 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3757 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3758 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3759 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3760 else
3761 return 0;
3762
3763 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3764 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3765 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3766 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3767 return 0;
3768
3769 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3770 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3771 return 0;
3772 }
3773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3774 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3775 return 1;
3776}
3777
3778/*
3779 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3780 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3781 */
3dbc46df 3782int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f113f3e
MC		 3783{
3784 sig_cb_st sig;
3785 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3786 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3787 return 0;
3788 if (c == NULL)
3789 return 1;
3790 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3791}
3792
3793int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3794 int client)
3795{
3796 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3797 int rhash, rsign;
3798 size_t i;
3799 if (salglen & 1)
3800 return 0;
3801 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3802 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3803 return 0;
3804 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3805 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3806 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3807 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3808 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3809
3810 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3811 goto err;
3812 *sptr++ = rhash;
3813 *sptr++ = rsign;
3814 }
3815
3816 if (client) {
3817 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3818 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3819 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3820 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3821 } else {
3822 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3823 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3824 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3825 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3826 }
3827
3828 return 1;
3829
3830 err:
3831 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3832 return 0;
3833}
4453cd8c 3834
d61ff83b 3835static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
0f113f3e
MC		 3836{
3837 int sig_nid;
3838 size_t i;
3839 if (default_nid == -1)
3840 return 1;
3841 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3842 if (default_nid)
3843 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3844 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3845 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3846 return 1;
3847 return 0;
3848}
3849
6dbb6219
DSH		 3850/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3851static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
0f113f3e
MC		 3852{
3853 X509_NAME *nm;
3854 int i;
3855 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3856 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3857 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3858 return 1;
3859 }
3860 return 0;
3861}
3862
3863/*
3864 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3865 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3866 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3867 * attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 3868 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 3869
3870/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3871
0f113f3e
MC		 3872# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3873 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
6dbb6219 3874/* Strict mode flags */
0f113f3e
MC		 3875# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3876 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3877 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
6dbb6219 3878
d61ff83b 3879int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
0f113f3e
MC		 3880 int idx)
3881{
3882 int i;
3883 int rv = 0;
3884 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3885 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3886 CERT *c = s->cert;
3887 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3888 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3889 if (idx != -1) {
3890 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3891 if (idx == -2) {
3892 cpk = c->key;
3893 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3894 } else
3895 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3896 x = cpk->x509;
3897 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3898 chain = cpk->chain;
3899 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3900 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3901 if (!x || !pk)
3902 goto end;
3903# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3904 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3905 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3906 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3907 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3908 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3909 return rv;
3910 }
3911# endif
3912 } else {
3913 if (!x || !pk)
3914 goto end;
3915 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3916 if (idx == -1)
3917 goto end;
3918 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3919 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3920 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3921 else
3922 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3923 strict_mode = 1;
3924 }
3925
3926 if (suiteb_flags) {
3927 int ok;
3928 if (check_flags)
3929 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3930 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3931 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3932 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3933 else if (!check_flags)
3934 goto end;
3935 }
3936
3937 /*
3938 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3939 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3940 */
3941 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3942 int default_nid;
3943 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3944 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3945 default_nid = 0;
3946 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3947 else {
3948 switch (idx) {
3949 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3950 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3951 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3952 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3953 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3954 break;
3955
3956 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3957 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3958 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3959 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3960 break;
3961
3962 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
3963 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3964 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3965 break;
3966
3967 default:
3968 default_nid = -1;
3969 break;
3970 }
3971 }
3972 /*
3973 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3974 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3975 */
3976 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3977 size_t j;
3978 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3979 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3980 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3981 break;
3982 }
3983 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3984 if (check_flags)
3985 goto skip_sigs;
3986 else
3987 goto end;
3988 }
3989 }
3990 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3991 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3992 if (!check_flags)
3993 goto end;
3994 } else
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3997 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3998 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3999 if (check_flags) {
4000 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4001 break;
4002 } else
4003 goto end;
4004 }
4005 }
4006 }
4007 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4008 else if (check_flags)
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4010 skip_sigs:
4011 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4012 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4014 else if (!check_flags)
4015 goto end;
4016 if (!s->server)
4017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4018 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4019 else if (strict_mode) {
4020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4021 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4022 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4023 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4024 if (check_flags) {
4025 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4026 break;
4027 } else
4028 goto end;
4029 }
4030 }
4031 }
4032 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4033 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4034 int check_type = 0;
4035 switch (pk->type) {
4036 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4037 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4038 break;
4039 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4040 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4041 break;
4042 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4043 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4044 break;
4045 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4046 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4047 {
4048 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4049 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4050 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4051 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4052 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4053 }
4054 }
4055 if (check_type) {
4056 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4057 int ctypelen;
4058 if (c->ctypes) {
4059 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4060 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4061 } else {
4062 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4063 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4064 }
4065 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4066 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4068 break;
4069 }
4070 }
4071 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4072 goto end;
4073 } else
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4075
4076 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4077
4078 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4079 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4080
4081 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4082 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4083 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4084 }
4085 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4086 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4087 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4088 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4090 break;
4091 }
4092 }
4093 }
4094 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4095 goto end;
4096 } else
4097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4098
4099 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4100 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4101
4102 end:
4103
4104 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4105 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4107 else if (cpk->digest)
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4109 } else
4110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4111
4112 /*
4113 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4114 * chain is invalid.
4115 */
4116 if (!check_flags) {
4117 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4118 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4119 else {
4120 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4121 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4122 return 0;
4123 }
4124 }
4125 return rv;
4126}
d61ff83b
DSH		 4127
4128/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4129void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 4130{
4131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4137}
4138
18d71588
DSH		 4139/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4140int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
0f113f3e
MC		 4141{
4142 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4143}
d61ff83b 4144
4453cd8c 4145#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4146
4147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4148DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 4149{
4150 int dh_secbits = 80;
4151 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4152 return DH_get_1024_160();
4153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4154 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4155 dh_secbits = 128;
4156 else
4157 dh_secbits = 80;
4158 } else {
4159 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4160 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4161 }
4162
4163 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4164 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4165 if (!dhp)
4166 return NULL;
4167 dhp->g = BN_new();
4168 if (dhp->g)
4169 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4170 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4171 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4172 else
4173 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4174 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4175 DH_free(dhp);
4176 return NULL;
4177 }
4178 return dhp;
4179 }
4180 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4181 return DH_get_2048_224();
4182 return DH_get_1024_160();
4183}
09599b52 4184#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4185
4186static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4187{
4188 int secbits;
4189 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4190 if (pkey) {
4191 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4192 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4193 } else
4194 secbits = -1;
4195 if (s)
4196 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4197 else
4198 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4199}
b362ccab
DSH		 4200
4201static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
0f113f3e
MC		 4202{
4203 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4204 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4205 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4206 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4207 const EVP_MD *md;
4208 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4209 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4210 }
4211 if (s)
4212 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4213 else
4214 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4215}
b362ccab
DSH		 4216
4217int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
0f113f3e
MC		 4218{
4219 if (vfy)
4220 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4221 if (is_ee) {
4222 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4223 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4224 } else {
4225 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4226 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4227 }
4228 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4229 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4230 return 1;
4231}
4232
4233/*
4234 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4235 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4236 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
b362ccab
DSH		 4237 */
4238
4239int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
0f113f3e
MC		 4240{
4241 int rv, start_idx, i;
4242 if (x == NULL) {
4243 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4244 start_idx = 1;
4245 } else
4246 start_idx = 0;
4247
4248 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4249 if (rv != 1)
4250 return rv;
4251
4252 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4253 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4254 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4255 if (rv != 1)
4256 return rv;
4257 }
4258 return 1;
4259}
A mirror of the official openssl repository