[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / tls13_enc.c

/*
 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>

#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN     246

/* Always filled with zeros */
static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

/*
 * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and a |hash| of the
 * handshake messages, derive a new secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in
 * the location pointed to be |out|. The |hash| value may be NULL. Returns 1 on
 * success  0 on failure.
 */
int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
                             const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
                             const unsigned char *hash,
                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
    const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
    int ret;
    size_t hkdflabellen;
    size_t hashlen;
    /*
     * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
     * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
     */
    unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
                            + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
                            + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    WPACKET pkt;

    if (pctx == NULL)
        return 0;

    hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);

    if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
            || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, outlen)
            || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
            || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1)
            || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
            || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, hash, (hash == NULL) ? 0 : hashlen)
            || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
            || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
        WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
        return 0;
    }

    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY)
               <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, secret, hashlen) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0;

    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);

    return ret == 0;
}

/*
 * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
 * success  0 on failure.
 */
int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
                     unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
    static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";

    return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
                             NULL, key, keylen);
}

/*
 * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
 * success  0 on failure.
 */
int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
                    unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
    static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";

    return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
                             NULL, iv, ivlen);
}

int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
                             const unsigned char *secret,
                             unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
{
    static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";

    return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
                             sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, fin, finlen);
}

/*
 * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
 * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
 * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success  0 on failure.
 */
int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
                          const unsigned char *prevsecret,
                          const unsigned char *insecret,
                          size_t insecretlen,
                          unsigned char *outsecret)
{
    size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen;
    int ret;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
    static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
    unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

    if (pctx == NULL)
        return 0;

    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);

    if (insecret == NULL) {
        insecret = default_zeros;
        insecretlen = mdlen;
    }
    if (prevsecret == NULL) {
        prevsecret = default_zeros;
        prevsecretlen = 0;
    } else {
        EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
        unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

        /* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
        if (mctx == NULL
                || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
                || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
            EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
            return 0;
        }
        EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);

        /* Generate the pre-extract secret */
        if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
                               (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
                               sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash,
                               preextractsec, mdlen)) {
            EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
            return 0;
        }

        prevsecret = preextractsec;
        prevsecretlen = mdlen;
    }

    ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
               <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, insecret, insecretlen) <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, prevsecret, prevsecretlen)
               <= 0
            || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, outsecret, &mdlen)
               <= 0;

    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
    if (prevsecret == preextractsec)
        OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen);
    return ret == 0;
}

/*
 * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
 * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
 * generated. Returns 1 on success  0 on failure.
 */
int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
                                size_t insecretlen)
{
    return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
                                 insecret, insecretlen,
                                 (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
}

/*
 * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
 * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success  0 on
 * failure.
 */
int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
                                 unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
                                 size_t *secret_size)
{
    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);

    *secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
    return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
}

/*
 * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
 * 0 on error.
 */
size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
                             unsigned char *out)
{
    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

    if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
        goto err;

    if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label)
        key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
                                   s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
    else
        key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
                                   s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);

    if (key == NULL
            || ctx == NULL
            || EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0)
        goto err;

    ret = hashlen;
 err:
    EVP_PKEY_free(key);
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
    return ret;
}

/*
 * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
 * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
 */
int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
    const EVP_CIPHER *c;
    const EVP_MD *hash;
    int mac_type = NID_undef;

    s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
    if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
        (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
        return 0;
    }

    s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
    s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;

    return 1;
}

static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
                                    const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
                                    const unsigned char *insecret,
                                    const unsigned char *hash,
                                    const unsigned char *label,
                                    size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
                                    unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
{
    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
    size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
    size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);

    if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, secret,
                           hashlen)) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
    if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
        uint32_t algenc;

        ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
        if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
            /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
            algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
        } else {
            algenc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
        }
        if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
            taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
         else
            taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
    } else {
        ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph);
        taglen = 0;
    }

    if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
            || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
        || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
        || (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
                                                taglen, NULL))
        || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    return 1;
 err:
    OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
    return 0;
}

int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
    static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
    static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
    static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
    static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
    static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
    static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
    unsigned char *iv;
    unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    unsigned char *hash = hashval;
    unsigned char *insecret;
    unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
    const char *log_label = NULL;
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
    size_t finsecretlen = 0;
    const unsigned char *label;
    size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
    int ret = 0;
    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
    const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;

    if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
        } else {
            s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
            if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
            }
        }
        ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
        iv = s->read_iv;

        RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
    } else {
        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
        } else {
            s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
            if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
            }
        }
        ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
        iv = s->write_iv;

        RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
    }

    if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
            || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
        if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
            EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
            long handlen;
            void *hdata;
            unsigned int hashlenui;
            const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);

            insecret = s->early_secret;
            label = client_early_traffic;
            labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
            log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;

            handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
            if (handlen <= 0) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
                       SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
                goto err;
            }
            if (sslcipher == NULL) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                goto err;
            }

            /*
             * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
             * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
             * use ssl_handshake_md().
             */
            mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
            if (mdctx == NULL) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
            }
            cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(sslcipher));
            md = ssl_md(sslcipher->algorithm2);
            if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
                    || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
                    || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
                goto err;
            }
            hashlen = hashlenui;
            EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
        } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
            insecret = s->handshake_secret;
            finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
            finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
            label = client_handshake_traffic;
            labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
            log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
            /*
             * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
             * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
             * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
             * processed early data then we delay changing the server
             * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
             * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
             * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
             */
            hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
        } else {
            insecret = s->master_secret;
            label = client_application_traffic;
            labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
            log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
            /*
             * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
             * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
             * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
             * previously saved value.
             */
            hash = s->server_finished_hash;
        }
    } else {
        /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
        if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
            insecret = s->handshake_secret;
            finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
            finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
            label = server_handshake_traffic;
            labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
            log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
        } else {
            insecret = s->master_secret;
            label = server_application_traffic;
            labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
            log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
        }
    }

    if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
        md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
        cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
                || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
    }

    /*
     * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
     * client application traffic secret
     */
    if (label == server_application_traffic)
        memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);

    if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
        memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);

    if (label == client_application_traffic) {
        /*
         * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
         * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
         */
        if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
                               resumption_master_secret,
                               sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
                               hashval, s->session->master_key, hashlen)) {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;
        }
        s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
    }

    if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
                                  insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, iv,
                                  ciph_ctx)) {
        goto err;
    }

    if (label == server_application_traffic)
        memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
    else if (label == client_application_traffic)
        memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);

    if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    if (finsecret != NULL
            && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
                                         finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    ret = 1;
 err:
    OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
    return ret;
}

int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
{
    static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
    const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
    size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
    unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
    unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
    int ret = 0;

    if (s->server == sending)
        insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
    else
        insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;

    if (sending) {
        iv = s->write_iv;
        ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
        RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
    } else {
        iv = s->read_iv;
        ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
        RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
    }

    if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
                                  s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
                                  application_traffic,
                                  sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, iv,
                                  ciph_ctx))
        goto err;

    memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);

    ret = 1;
 err:
    OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
    return ret;
}

int tls13_alert_code(int code)
{
    if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION)
        return code;

    return tls1_alert_code(code);
}
Commit	Line	Data
34574f19 MC	1	/*
	2	* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
	3	*
	4	* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
	5	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
	6	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
	7	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
	8	*/
	9
	10	#include <stdlib.h>
	11	#include "ssl_locl.h"
	12	#include <openssl/evp.h>
	13	#include <openssl/kdf.h>
	14
	15	#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 246
	16
	17	/* Always filled with zeros */
	18	static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	19
34574f19 MC	20	/*
	21	* Given a \|secret\|; a \|label\| of length \|labellen\|; and a \|hash\| of the
	22	* handshake messages, derive a new secret \|outlen\| bytes long and store it in
f5ca0b04 MC	23	* the location pointed to be \|out\|. The \|hash\| value may be NULL. Returns 1 on
f5ca0b04 MC	24	* success 0 on failure.
34574f19	25	*/
ec15acb6	26	int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
34574f19 MC	27	const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
	28	const unsigned char *hash,
	29	unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
	30	{
17aa119e	31	const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
34574f19 MC	32	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
	33	int ret;
	34	size_t hkdflabellen;
	35	size_t hashlen;
	36	/*
	37	* 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
	38	* prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
	39	*/
	40	unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
	41	+ sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
	42	+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	43	WPACKET pkt;
	44
	45	if (pctx == NULL)
	46	return 0;
	47
	48	hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
	49
	50	if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
	51	\|\| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, outlen)
	52	\|\| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
	53	\|\| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1)
	54	\|\| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
	55	\|\| !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
	56	\|\| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, hash, (hash == NULL) ? 0 : hashlen)
	57	\|\| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
	58	\|\| !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
d49e23ec	59	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
34574f19 MC	60	WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
	61	return 0;
	62	}
	63
	64	ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
	65	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY)
	66	<= 0
	67	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
	68	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, secret, hashlen) <= 0
	69	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen) <= 0
	70	\|\| EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen) <= 0;
	71
	72	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
	73
	74	return ret == 0;
	75	}
	76
34574f19	77	/*
f5ca0b04 MC	78	* Given a \|secret\| generate a \|key\| of length \|keylen\| bytes. Returns 1 on
f5ca0b04 MC	79	* success 0 on failure.
34574f19	80	*/
d49e23ec MC	81	int tls13_derive_key(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
d49e23ec MC	82	unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
34574f19	83	{
f5ca0b04 MC	84	static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
f5ca0b04 MC	85
d49e23ec MC	86	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
d49e23ec MC	87	NULL, key, keylen);
34574f19 MC	88	}
	89
	90	/*
f5ca0b04 MC	91	* Given a \|secret\| generate an \|iv\| of length \|ivlen\| bytes. Returns 1 on
f5ca0b04 MC	92	* success 0 on failure.
34574f19	93	*/
d49e23ec MC	94	int tls13_derive_iv(SSL s, const EVP_MD md, const unsigned char *secret,
d49e23ec MC	95	unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
34574f19	96	{
f5ca0b04 MC	97	static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
f5ca0b04 MC	98
d49e23ec MC	99	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
d49e23ec MC	100	NULL, iv, ivlen);
34574f19 MC	101	}
34574f19 MC	102
ec15acb6 MC	103	int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL s, const EVP_MD md,
	104	const unsigned char *secret,
	105	unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
6484776f	106	{
f5ca0b04 MC	107	static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
f5ca0b04 MC	108
ec15acb6	109	return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
6484776f MC	110	sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, fin, finlen);
	111	}
	112
34574f19 MC	113	/*
	114	* Given the previous secret \|prevsecret\| and a new input secret \|insecret\| of
	115	* length \|insecretlen\|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
f5ca0b04	116	* pointed to by \|outsecret\|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
34574f19	117	*/
ec15acb6 MC	118	int tls13_generate_secret(SSL s, const EVP_MD md,
	119	const unsigned char *prevsecret,
	120	const unsigned char *insecret,
	121	size_t insecretlen,
	122	unsigned char *outsecret)
34574f19	123	{
34574f19 MC	124	size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen;
	125	int ret;
	126	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
17aa119e	127	static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
3e0458fb	128	unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
34574f19 MC	129
	130	if (pctx == NULL)
	131	return 0;
	132
	133	mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
	134
	135	if (insecret == NULL) {
	136	insecret = default_zeros;
	137	insecretlen = mdlen;
	138	}
	139	if (prevsecret == NULL) {
	140	prevsecret = default_zeros;
	141	prevsecretlen = 0;
	142	} else {
3e0458fb MC	143	EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
	144	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	145
	146	/* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
	147	if (mctx == NULL
	148	\|\| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
	149	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
	150	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
71d8c138	151	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3e0458fb MC	152	return 0;
	153	}
	154	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
	155
	156	/* Generate the pre-extract secret */
	157	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
	158	(unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
	159	sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash,
71d8c138 BE	160	preextractsec, mdlen)) {
71d8c138 BE	161	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3e0458fb	162	return 0;
71d8c138	163	}
3e0458fb MC	164
3e0458fb MC	165	prevsecret = preextractsec;
34574f19 MC	166	prevsecretlen = mdlen;
	167	}
	168
	169	ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0
	170	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
	171	<= 0
	172	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, md) <= 0
	173	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, insecret, insecretlen) <= 0
	174	\|\| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, prevsecret, prevsecretlen)
	175	<= 0
	176	\|\| EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, outsecret, &mdlen)
	177	<= 0;
	178
	179	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3e0458fb MC	180	if (prevsecret == preextractsec)
3e0458fb MC	181	OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen);
34574f19 MC	182	return ret == 0;
	183	}
	184
34574f19 MC	185	/*
	186	* Given an input secret \|insecret\| of length \|insecretlen\| generate the
	187	* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
f5ca0b04	188	* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
34574f19 MC	189	*/
	190	int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL s, const unsigned char insecret,
	191	size_t insecretlen)
	192	{
ec15acb6 MC	193	return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
ec15acb6 MC	194	insecret, insecretlen,
34574f19 MC	195	(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
	196	}
	197
	198	/*
	199	* Given the handshake secret \|prev\| of length \|prevlen\| generate the master
f5ca0b04 MC	200	* secret and store its length in \|*secret_size\|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
f5ca0b04 MC	201	* failure.
34574f19 MC	202	*/
	203	int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL s, unsigned char out,
	204	unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
	205	size_t *secret_size)
	206	{
ec15acb6 MC	207	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
	208
	209	*secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
	210	return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
34574f19 MC	211	}
34574f19 MC	212
92760c21	213	/*
f5ca0b04 MC	214	* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
f5ca0b04 MC	215	* 0 on error.
92760c21 MC	216	*/
	217	size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL s, const char str, size_t slen,
	218	unsigned char *out)
	219	{
6484776f MC	220	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
	221	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	222	size_t hashlen, ret = 0;
	223	EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
	224	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
92760c21	225
6484776f MC	226	if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen))
	227	goto err;
	228
	229	if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label)
	230	key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
	231	s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
	232	else
	233	key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
	234	s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
	235
	236	if (key == NULL
	237	\|\| ctx == NULL
	238	\|\| EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0
	239	\|\| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0
	240	\|\| EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0)
	241	goto err;
92760c21	242
6484776f MC	243	ret = hashlen;
	244	err:
	245	EVP_PKEY_free(key);
	246	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
	247	return ret;
92760c21 MC	248	}
	249
	250	/*
	251	* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
f5ca0b04	252	* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
92760c21 MC	253	*/
	254	int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
	255	{
	256	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
	257	const EVP_MD *hash;
	258	int mac_type = NID_undef;
	259
	260	s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
	261	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
	262	(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
	263	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
	264	return 0;
	265	}
	266
	267	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
	268	s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
	269
	270	return 1;
	271	}
	272
d1186c30	273	static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL s, int sending, const EVP_MD md,
d49e23ec	274	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
57389a32 MC	275	const unsigned char *insecret,
	276	const unsigned char *hash,
	277	const unsigned char *label,
	278	size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
	279	unsigned char iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx)
	280	{
	281	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
	282	size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
57389a32	283	size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
57389a32 MC	284
	285	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, secret,
	286	hashlen)) {
	287	SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	288	goto err;
	289	}
	290
	291	/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
	292	keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
	293	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
c117af67 MC	294	uint32_t algenc;
c117af67 MC	295
57389a32	296	ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
c117af67 MC	297	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
	298	/* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
	299	algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
	300	} else {
	301	algenc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
	302	}
	303	if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 \| SSL_AES256CCM8))
57389a32 MC	304	taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
	305	else
	306	taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
	307	} else {
	308	ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph);
	309	taglen = 0;
	310	}
	311
d49e23ec MC	312	if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
d49e23ec MC	313	\|\| !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
57389a32 MC	314	SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	315	goto err;
	316	}
	317
d1186c30	318	if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
57389a32 MC	319	\|\| !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
	320	\|\| (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
	321	taglen, NULL))
	322	\|\| EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
	323	SSLerr(SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
	324	goto err;
	325	}
	326
57389a32 MC	327	return 1;
	328	err:
	329	OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
	330	return 0;
	331	}
	332
0d9824c1 MC	333	int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
0d9824c1 MC	334	{
17aa119e MC	335	static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
	336	static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
	337	static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
	338	static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
	339	static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
	340	static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
bebc0c7d	341	unsigned char *iv;
0d9824c1	342	unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
ace081c1 MC	343	unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
ace081c1 MC	344	unsigned char *hash = hashval;
0d9824c1	345	unsigned char *insecret;
6484776f	346	unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
2c7bd692	347	const char *log_label = NULL;
0d9824c1	348	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
57389a32	349	size_t finsecretlen = 0;
0d9824c1	350	const unsigned char *label;
ace081c1	351	size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
6530c490	352	int ret = 0;
42f50fdf MC	353	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
42f50fdf MC	354	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
0d9824c1 MC	355
	356	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
	357	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
	358	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
	359	} else {
	360	s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
	361	if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
	362	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
	363	goto err;
	364	}
	365	}
	366	ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
bebc0c7d	367	iv = s->read_iv;
0d9824c1 MC	368
	369	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
	370	} else {
	371	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
	372	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
	373	} else {
	374	s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
	375	if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
	376	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
	377	goto err;
	378	}
	379	}
	380	ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
bebc0c7d	381	iv = s->write_iv;
0d9824c1 MC	382
	383	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
	384	}
	385
	386	if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
	387	\|\| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
d49e23ec MC	388	if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
	389	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
	390	long handlen;
	391	void *hdata;
	392	unsigned int hashlenui;
	393	const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
	394
	395	insecret = s->early_secret;
	396	label = client_early_traffic;
	397	labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
	398	log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
	399
	400	handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
	401	if (handlen <= 0) {
	402	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
	403	SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
	404	goto err;
	405	}
	406	if (sslcipher == NULL) {
	407	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	408	goto err;
	409	}
	410
	411	/*
	412	* We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
	413	* the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
	414	* use ssl_handshake_md().
	415	*/
	416	mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
	417	if (mdctx == NULL) {
	418	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
	419	goto err;
	420	}
	421	cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(sslcipher));
	422	md = ssl_md(sslcipher->algorithm2);
	423	if (md == NULL \|\| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
	424	\|\| !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
	425	\|\| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
	426	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	427	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
	428	goto err;
	429	}
	430	hashlen = hashlenui;
	431	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
	432	} else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
0d9824c1	433	insecret = s->handshake_secret;
6484776f	434	finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
6612d87b	435	finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
0d9824c1 MC	436	label = client_handshake_traffic;
0d9824c1 MC	437	labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
2c7bd692	438	log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
fe5e20fd	439	/*
69687aa8	440	* The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
f7e393be MC	441	* traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
	442	* write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
	443	* processed early data then we delay changing the server
	444	* read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
	445	* hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
	446	* when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
fe5e20fd	447	*/
f7e393be	448	hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
0d9824c1	449	} else {
ec15acb6	450	insecret = s->master_secret;
0d9824c1 MC	451	label = client_application_traffic;
0d9824c1 MC	452	labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
2c7bd692	453	log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
ace081c1 MC	454	/*
	455	* For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
	456	* Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
	457	* what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
	458	* previously saved value.
	459	*/
	460	hash = s->server_finished_hash;
0d9824c1 MC	461	}
0d9824c1 MC	462	} else {
d49e23ec	463	/* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
0d9824c1 MC	464	if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
0d9824c1 MC	465	insecret = s->handshake_secret;
6484776f	466	finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
6612d87b	467	finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
0d9824c1 MC	468	label = server_handshake_traffic;
0d9824c1 MC	469	labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
2c7bd692	470	log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
0d9824c1	471	} else {
ec15acb6	472	insecret = s->master_secret;
0d9824c1 MC	473	label = server_application_traffic;
0d9824c1 MC	474	labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
2c7bd692	475	log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
0d9824c1 MC	476	}
	477	}
	478
d49e23ec MC	479	if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
	480	md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
	481	cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
	482	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
	483	\|\| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
	484	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	485	goto err;
	486	}
ace081c1 MC	487	}
ace081c1 MC	488
ec15acb6 MC	489	/*
	490	* Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
	491	* client application traffic secret
	492	*/
	493	if (label == server_application_traffic)
	494	memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
	495
f7e393be	496	if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
fe5e20fd MC	497	memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
fe5e20fd MC	498
ec15acb6 MC	499	if (label == client_application_traffic) {
	500	/*
	501	* We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
	502	* hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
	503	*/
	504	if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
	505	resumption_master_secret,
	506	sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
	507	hashval, s->session->master_key, hashlen)) {
	508	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	509	goto err;
	510	}
	511	s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
	512	}
	513
d49e23ec MC	514	if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
	515	insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, iv,
	516	ciph_ctx)) {
57389a32	517	goto err;
ec07b1d8	518	}
0d9824c1	519
57389a32 MC	520	if (label == server_application_traffic)
	521	memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
	522	else if (label == client_application_traffic)
	523	memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
	524
2c7bd692 CB	525	if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
	526	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	527	goto err;
	528	}
	529
57389a32 MC	530	if (finsecret != NULL
	531	&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
	532	finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
0d9824c1 MC	533	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	534	goto err;
	535	}
	536
57389a32 MC	537	ret = 1;
	538	err:
	539	OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
	540	return ret;
	541	}
0d9824c1	542
d1186c30	543	int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
57389a32	544	{
17aa119e	545	static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
57389a32 MC	546	const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
	547	size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
	548	unsigned char insecret, iv;
	549	unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	550	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
	551	int ret = 0;
0d9824c1	552
d1186c30	553	if (s->server == sending)
57389a32 MC	554	insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
	555	else
	556	insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
bebc0c7d	557
d1186c30	558	if (sending) {
57389a32 MC	559	iv = s->write_iv;
	560	ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
	561	RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
	562	} else {
	563	iv = s->read_iv;
	564	ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
	565	RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
0d9824c1	566	}
57389a32	567
d1186c30	568	if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
d49e23ec MC	569	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
d49e23ec MC	570	application_traffic,
57389a32 MC	571	sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, iv,
	572	ciph_ctx))
	573	goto err;
	574
	575	memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
0d9824c1	576
6530c490	577	ret = 1;
0d9824c1 MC	578	err:
0d9824c1 MC	579	OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
6530c490	580	return ret;
0d9824c1	581	}
04904312 MC	582
	583	int tls13_alert_code(int code)
	584	{
ef6c191b	585	if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION)
04904312 MC	586	return code;
	587
	588	return tls1_alert_code(code);
	589	}