2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
14 #include <openssl/rand.h>
15 #include <openssl/sha.h>
17 typedef enum bnrand_flag_e
{
18 NORMAL
, TESTING
, PRIVATE
21 static int bnrand(BNRAND_FLAG flag
, BIGNUM
*rnd
, int bits
, int top
, int bottom
)
23 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
24 int b
, ret
= 0, bit
, bytes
, mask
;
27 if (top
!= BN_RAND_TOP_ANY
|| bottom
!= BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY
)
32 if (bits
< 0 || (bits
== 1 && top
> 0))
35 bytes
= (bits
+ 7) / 8;
37 mask
= 0xff << (bit
+ 1);
39 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(bytes
);
41 BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
45 /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */
46 b
= flag
== NORMAL
? RAND_bytes(buf
, bytes
) : RAND_priv_bytes(buf
, bytes
);
50 if (flag
== TESTING
) {
52 * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs
57 for (i
= 0; i
< bytes
; i
++) {
58 if (RAND_bytes(&c
, 1) <= 0)
60 if (c
>= 128 && i
> 0)
75 buf
[0] |= (3 << (bit
- 1));
82 if (bottom
) /* set bottom bit if requested */
84 if (!BN_bin2bn(buf
, bytes
, rnd
))
88 OPENSSL_clear_free(buf
, bytes
);
93 BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND
, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL
);
97 int BN_rand(BIGNUM
*rnd
, int bits
, int top
, int bottom
)
99 return bnrand(NORMAL
, rnd
, bits
, top
, bottom
);
102 int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM
*rnd
, int bits
, int top
, int bottom
)
104 return bnrand(TESTING
, rnd
, bits
, top
, bottom
);
107 int BN_priv_rand(BIGNUM
*rnd
, int bits
, int top
, int bottom
)
109 return bnrand(PRIVATE
, rnd
, bits
, top
, bottom
);
112 /* random number r: 0 <= r < range */
113 static int bnrand_range(BNRAND_FLAG flag
, BIGNUM
*r
, const BIGNUM
*range
)
118 if (range
->neg
|| BN_is_zero(range
)) {
119 BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE
, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE
);
123 n
= BN_num_bits(range
); /* n > 0 */
125 /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */
129 else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range
, n
- 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range
, n
- 3)) {
131 * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer
135 if (!bnrand(flag
, r
, n
+ 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY
, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY
))
139 * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r -
140 * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since
141 * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >=
144 if (BN_cmp(r
, range
) >= 0) {
145 if (!BN_sub(r
, r
, range
))
147 if (BN_cmp(r
, range
) >= 0)
148 if (!BN_sub(r
, r
, range
))
153 BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE
, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS
);
158 while (BN_cmp(r
, range
) >= 0);
161 /* range = 11..._2 or range = 101..._2 */
162 if (!bnrand(flag
, r
, n
, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY
, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY
))
166 BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE
, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS
);
170 while (BN_cmp(r
, range
) >= 0);
177 int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM
*r
, const BIGNUM
*range
)
179 return bnrand_range(NORMAL
, r
, range
);
182 int BN_priv_rand_range(BIGNUM
*r
, const BIGNUM
*range
)
184 return bnrand_range(PRIVATE
, r
, range
);
187 int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM
*rnd
, int bits
, int top
, int bottom
)
189 return BN_rand(rnd
, bits
, top
, bottom
);
192 int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM
*r
, const BIGNUM
*range
)
194 return BN_rand_range(r
, range
);
198 * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike
199 * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in
200 * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv|
201 * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG
202 * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is
205 int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM
*out
, const BIGNUM
*range
,
206 const BIGNUM
*priv
, const unsigned char *message
,
207 size_t message_len
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
211 * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at
212 * least |range| bits of randomness.
214 unsigned char random_bytes
[64];
215 unsigned char digest
[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
217 /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */
218 const unsigned num_k_bytes
= BN_num_bytes(range
) + 8;
219 unsigned char private_bytes
[96];
220 unsigned char *k_bytes
;
223 k_bytes
= OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes
);
227 /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */
228 todo
= sizeof(priv
->d
[0]) * priv
->top
;
229 if (todo
> sizeof(private_bytes
)) {
231 * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this
232 * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the
233 * length of the private key.
235 BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE
, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE
);
238 memcpy(private_bytes
, priv
->d
, todo
);
239 memset(private_bytes
+ todo
, 0, sizeof(private_bytes
) - todo
);
241 for (done
= 0; done
< num_k_bytes
;) {
242 if (RAND_bytes(random_bytes
, sizeof(random_bytes
)) != 1)
245 SHA512_Update(&sha
, &done
, sizeof(done
));
246 SHA512_Update(&sha
, private_bytes
, sizeof(private_bytes
));
247 SHA512_Update(&sha
, message
, message_len
);
248 SHA512_Update(&sha
, random_bytes
, sizeof(random_bytes
));
249 SHA512_Final(digest
, &sha
);
251 todo
= num_k_bytes
- done
;
252 if (todo
> SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
)
253 todo
= SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
254 memcpy(k_bytes
+ done
, digest
, todo
);
258 if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes
, num_k_bytes
, out
))
260 if (BN_mod(out
, out
, range
, ctx
) != 1)
265 OPENSSL_free(k_bytes
);
266 OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes
, sizeof(private_bytes
));