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1 /*
2 * Copyright 2007-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include "cmp_local.h"
13
14 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
15 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
16 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
17 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
18 #include <openssl/err.h>
19 #include <openssl/x509.h>
20
21 /*
22 * This function is also used by the internal verify_PBMAC() in cmp_vfy.c.
23 *
24 * Calculate protection for given PKImessage according to
25 * the algorithm and parameters in the message header's protectionAlg
26 * using the credentials, library context, and property criteria in the ctx.
27 *
28 * returns ASN1_BIT_STRING representing the protection on success, else NULL
29 */
30 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
31 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
32 {
33 ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
34 OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
35 const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
36 const void *ppval = NULL;
37 int pptype = 0;
38
39 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
40 return NULL;
41
42 /* construct data to be signed */
43 prot_part.header = msg->header;
44 prot_part.body = msg->body;
45
46 if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
47 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
48 return NULL;
49 }
50 X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
51
52 if (OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
53 int len;
54 size_t prot_part_der_len;
55 unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
56 size_t sig_len;
57 unsigned char *protection = NULL;
58 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
59 ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
60 const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
61
62 if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
63 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET);
64 return NULL;
65 }
66 if (ppval == NULL) {
67 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
68 return NULL;
69 }
70
71 len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
72 if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
73 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
74 goto end;
75 }
76 prot_part_der_len = (size_t)len;
77
78 pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
79 pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
80 pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
81 if (pbm == NULL) {
82 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
83 goto end;
84 }
85
86 if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq,
87 pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
88 ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length,
89 &protection, &sig_len))
90 goto end;
91
92 if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
93 return NULL;
94 /* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
95 prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
96 prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
97 if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
98 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
99 prot = NULL;
100 }
101 end:
102 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
103 OPENSSL_free(protection);
104 OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
105 return prot;
106 } else {
107 int md_nid;
108 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
109
110 if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
111 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP,
112 CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
113 return NULL;
114 }
115 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_nid, NULL)
116 || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)) == NULL) {
117 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
118 return NULL;
119 }
120
121 if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
122 return NULL;
123 if (ASN1_item_sign_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), NULL,
124 NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL, ctx->pkey, md,
125 ctx->libctx, ctx->propq))
126 return prot;
127 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
128 return NULL;
129 }
130 }
131
132 int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
133 {
134 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
135 return 0;
136
137 /* Add first ctx->cert and its chain if using signature-based protection */
138 if (!ctx->unprotectedSend && ctx->secretValue == NULL
139 && ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
140 int prepend = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
141 | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS;
142
143 /* if not yet done try to build chain using available untrusted certs */
144 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
145 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
146 "trying to build chain for own CMP signer cert");
147 ctx->chain =
148 ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq, NULL,
149 ctx->untrusted, ctx->cert);
150 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
151 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
152 "success building chain for own CMP signer cert");
153 } else {
154 /* dump errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
155 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
156 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
157 "could not build chain for own CMP signer cert");
158 }
159 }
160 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
161 if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->chain, prepend))
162 return 0;
163 } else {
164 /* make sure that at least our own signer cert is included first */
165 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, prepend))
166 return 0;
167 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "fallback: adding just own CMP signer cert");
168 }
169 }
170
171 /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
172 if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut,
173 X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP))
174 return 0;
175
176 /* in case extraCerts are empty list avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
177 if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
178 sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
179 msg->extraCerts = NULL;
180 }
181 return 1;
182 }
183
184 /*
185 * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
186 * the pbm settings in the context
187 */
188 static int set_pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR **alg)
189 {
190 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
191 unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
192 int pbm_der_len;
193 ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
194
195 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
196 return 0;
197
198 pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->pbm_slen,
199 EVP_MD_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt,
200 ctx->pbm_mac);
201 pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
202 if (pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
203 goto err;
204
205 if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
206 goto err;
207
208 if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
209 goto err;
210 if (*alg == NULL && (*alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
211 goto err;
212 OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
213
214 X509_ALGOR_set0(*alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
215 V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
216 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
217 return 1;
218
219 err:
220 ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
221 OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
222 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
223 return 0;
224 }
225
226 static int set_sig_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR **alg)
227 {
228 int nid = 0;
229 ASN1_OBJECT *algo = NULL;
230
231 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&nid, EVP_MD_type(ctx->digest),
232 EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
233 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
234 return 0;
235 }
236 if ((algo = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL)
237 return 0;
238 if (*alg == NULL && (*alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
239 return 0;
240
241 if (X509_ALGOR_set0(*alg, algo, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL))
242 return 1;
243 ASN1_OBJECT_free(algo);
244 return 0;
245 }
246
247 static int set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
248 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id)
249 {
250 if (id == NULL)
251 id = ctx->referenceValue; /* standard for PBM, fallback for sig-based */
252 return id == NULL || ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, id);
253 }
254
255 int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
256 {
257 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
258 return 0;
259
260 /*
261 * For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
262 * TODO: Consider also removing any pre-existing extraCerts.
263 */
264 X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
265 msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
266 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
267 msg->protection = NULL;
268
269 if (ctx->unprotectedSend) {
270 if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
271 goto err;
272 } else if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
273 /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
274 if (!set_pbmac_algor(ctx, &msg->header->protectionAlg))
275 goto err;
276 if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
277 goto err;
278
279 /*
280 * will add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
281 * while not needed to validate the protection certificate,
282 * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases
283 */
284 } else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
285 /* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client cert and key given */
286
287 /* make sure that key and certificate match */
288 if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
289 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
290 goto err;
291 }
292
293 if (!set_sig_algor(ctx, &msg->header->protectionAlg))
294 goto err;
295 /* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the cert according to 5.1.1 */
296 if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert)))
297 goto err;
298
299 /*
300 * will add ctx->cert followed, if possible, by its chain built
301 * from ctx->untrusted, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
302 */
303 } else {
304 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP,
305 CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
306 goto err;
307 }
308 if (!ctx->unprotectedSend
309 && ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL))
310 goto err;
311
312 /*
313 * For signature-based protection add ctx->cert followed by its chain.
314 * Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
315 * even if not needed to validate the protection
316 * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
317 */
318 if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
319 goto err;
320
321 /*
322 * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
323 * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
324 * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
325 */
326 if (!(ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
327 && msg->header->senderKID == NULL))
328 return 1;
329 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
330
331 err:
332 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
333 return 0;
334 }