2 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
14 #include "cmp_local.h"
15 #include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
17 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
18 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
19 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
20 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include "crypto/x509.h"
26 * Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
27 * (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
29 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
31 static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX
*cmp_ctx
,
32 const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
, X509
*cert
)
34 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
35 CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part
;
36 int digest_nid
, pk_nid
;
37 const EVP_MD
*digest
= NULL
;
38 EVP_PKEY
*pubkey
= NULL
;
40 size_t prot_part_der_len
= 0;
41 unsigned char *prot_part_der
= NULL
;
42 BIO
*bio
= BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
45 if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx
!= NULL
&& msg
!= NULL
&& cert
!= NULL
))
48 /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
49 if (!cmp_ctx
->ignore_keyusage
50 && (X509_get_key_usage(cert
) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
) == 0) {
51 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE
);
55 pubkey
= X509_get_pubkey(cert
);
57 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY
);
61 /* create the DER representation of protected part */
62 prot_part
.header
= msg
->header
;
63 prot_part
.body
= msg
->body
;
65 len
= i2d_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part
, &prot_part_der
);
66 if (len
< 0 || prot_part_der
== NULL
)
68 prot_part_der_len
= (size_t) len
;
70 /* verify signature of protected part */
71 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg
->header
->protectionAlg
->algorithm
),
73 || digest_nid
== NID_undef
|| pk_nid
== NID_undef
74 || (digest
= EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid
)) == NULL
) {
75 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
79 /* check msg->header->protectionAlg is consistent with public key type */
80 if (EVP_PKEY_type(pk_nid
) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey
)) {
81 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID
);
84 if ((ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
86 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx
, NULL
, digest
, NULL
, pubkey
)
87 && EVP_DigestVerify(ctx
, msg
->protection
->data
,
88 msg
->protection
->length
,
89 prot_part_der
, prot_part_der_len
) == 1) {
95 res
= x509_print_ex_brief(bio
, cert
, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS
);
96 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION
);
98 ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio
);
102 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx
);
103 OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der
);
104 EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey
);
110 /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
111 static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
,
112 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*secret
)
114 ASN1_BIT_STRING
*protection
= NULL
;
117 /* generate expected protection for the message */
118 if ((protection
= ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg
, secret
, NULL
)) == NULL
)
119 return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
121 valid
= msg
->protection
!= NULL
&& msg
->protection
->length
>= 0
122 && msg
->protection
->type
== protection
->type
123 && msg
->protection
->length
== protection
->length
124 && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg
->protection
->data
, protection
->data
,
125 protection
->length
) == 0;
126 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection
);
128 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE
);
134 * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
135 * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
136 * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
138 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
140 int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*trusted_store
,
144 X509_STORE_CTX
*csc
= NULL
;
147 if (ctx
== NULL
|| cert
== NULL
) {
148 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT
);
152 if (trusted_store
== NULL
) {
153 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE
);
157 if ((csc
= X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL
158 || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc
, trusted_store
,
159 cert
, ctx
->untrusted_certs
))
162 valid
= X509_verify_cert(csc
) > 0;
164 /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
165 err
= ERR_peek_last_error();
166 if (!valid
&& ERR_GET_REASON(err
) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE
)
167 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE
);
170 X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc
);
174 /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
175 static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
,
176 const char *actual_desc
, const X509_NAME
*actual_name
,
177 const char *expect_desc
, const X509_NAME
*expect_name
)
181 if (expect_name
== NULL
)
182 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
184 /* make sure that a matching name is there */
185 if (actual_name
== NULL
) {
186 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN
, ctx
, "missing %s", actual_desc
);
189 if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name
, expect_name
) == 0)
192 if ((str
= X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name
, NULL
, 0)) != NULL
)
193 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO
, ctx
, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc
, str
);
195 if ((str
= X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name
, NULL
, 0)) != NULL
)
196 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO
, ctx
, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc
, str
);
201 /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
202 static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
,
203 X509
*cert
, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*skid
)
205 char *actual
, *expect
;
206 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*ckid
= X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert
);
209 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
211 /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
213 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
216 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid
, skid
) == 0)
219 if ((actual
= OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid
->data
, ckid
->length
)) != NULL
)
220 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO
, ctx
, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", actual
);
221 if ((expect
= OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid
->data
, skid
->length
)) != NULL
)
222 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO
, ctx
, " does not match senderKID = %s", expect
);
223 OPENSSL_free(expect
);
224 OPENSSL_free(actual
);
228 static int already_checked(X509
*cert
, const STACK_OF(X509
) *already_checked
)
232 for (i
= sk_X509_num(already_checked
/* may be NULL */); i
> 0; i
--)
233 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked
, i
- 1), cert
) == 0)
239 * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
240 * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
241 * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
242 * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
244 * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
246 static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
,
247 const char *desc1
, const char *desc2
, X509
*cert
,
248 const STACK_OF(X509
) *already_checked1
,
249 const STACK_OF(X509
) *already_checked2
,
250 const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
)
252 X509_STORE
*ts
= ctx
->trusted
;
254 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ts
!= NULL
? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts
) : NULL
;
257 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO
, ctx
, " considering %s %s with..", desc1
, desc2
);
258 if ((sub
= X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert
), NULL
, 0)) != NULL
)
259 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO
, ctx
, " subject = %s", sub
);
260 if ((iss
= X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert
), NULL
, 0)) != NULL
)
261 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO
, ctx
, " issuer = %s", iss
);
265 if (already_checked(cert
, already_checked1
)
266 || already_checked(cert
, already_checked2
)) {
267 ossl_cmp_info(ctx
, " cert has already been checked");
271 time_cmp
= X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm
, X509_get0_notBefore(cert
),
272 X509_get0_notAfter(cert
));
274 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, time_cmp
> 0 ? "cert has expired"
275 : "cert is not yet valid");
280 "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert
),
281 "sender field", msg
->header
->sender
->d
.directoryName
))
284 if (!check_kid(ctx
, cert
, msg
->header
->senderKID
))
286 /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
287 ossl_cmp_info(ctx
, " cert is acceptable");
291 static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
,
292 X509
*scrt
, const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
)
294 if (!verify_signature(ctx
, msg
, scrt
)) {
295 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, "msg signature verification failed");
298 if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx
, store
, scrt
)) {
299 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, "cert path validation failed");
306 * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
307 * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP and if the ctx
308 * option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates from extraCerts as
309 * trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
310 * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
312 static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*scrt
,
313 const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
)
316 X509_STORE
*store
= X509_STORE_new();
318 if (store
!= NULL
/* store does not include CRLs */
319 && ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store
, msg
->extraCerts
,
320 1 /* self-issued only */))
321 valid
= check_msg_valid_cert(ctx
, store
, scrt
, msg
);
324 * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which is assumed to have
325 * rid == 0) can also be validated with the same trusted store
327 EVP_PKEY
*privkey
= OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx
, 1);
328 OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE
*crep
=
329 ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg
->body
->value
.ip
, 0);
330 X509
*newcrt
= ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey
, crep
);
332 * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
335 valid
= OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx
, store
, newcrt
);
338 X509_STORE_free(store
);
343 * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
344 * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
346 static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
,
348 const STACK_OF(X509
) *already_checked1
,
349 const STACK_OF(X509
) *already_checked2
,
350 const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
, int mode_3gpp
)
352 int in_extraCerts
= already_checked1
== NULL
;
353 int n_acceptable_certs
= 0;
356 if (sk_X509_num(certs
) <= 0) {
357 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN
, ctx
, "no %s", desc
);
361 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) { /* certs may be NULL */
362 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
364 if (!ossl_assert(cert
!= NULL
))
366 if (!cert_acceptable(ctx
, "cert from", desc
, cert
,
367 already_checked1
, already_checked2
, msg
))
369 n_acceptable_certs
++;
370 if (mode_3gpp
? check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx
, cert
, msg
)
371 : check_msg_valid_cert(ctx
, ctx
->trusted
, cert
, msg
)) {
372 /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
373 if (!X509_up_ref(cert
))
375 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx
, cert
)) {
382 if (in_extraCerts
&& n_acceptable_certs
== 0)
383 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
388 * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
389 * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
391 static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
,
397 mode_3gpp
? "failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
398 : "trying first normal mode using trust store");
399 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx
, msg
->extraCerts
, "extraCerts",
400 NULL
, NULL
, msg
, mode_3gpp
))
402 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx
, ctx
->untrusted_certs
, "untrusted certs",
403 msg
->extraCerts
, NULL
, msg
, mode_3gpp
))
406 if (ctx
->trusted
== NULL
) {
407 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, mode_3gpp
? "no self-issued extraCerts"
408 : "no trusted store");
410 STACK_OF(X509
) *trusted
= X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx
->trusted
);
411 ret
= check_msg_with_certs(ctx
, trusted
,
412 mode_3gpp
? "self-issued extraCerts"
413 : "certs in trusted store",
414 msg
->extraCerts
, ctx
->untrusted_certs
,
416 sk_X509_pop_free(trusted
, X509_free
);
421 /* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
422 static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
)
424 X509
*scrt
= ctx
->validatedSrvCert
; /* previous successful sender cert */
425 GENERAL_NAME
*sender
= msg
->header
->sender
;
427 char *skid_str
= NULL
;
428 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*skid
= msg
->header
->senderKID
;
429 OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb
= ctx
->log_cb
;
432 if (sender
== NULL
|| msg
->body
== NULL
)
433 return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
434 if (sender
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
) {
435 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
440 * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
441 * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
443 (void)ERR_set_mark();
445 && cert_acceptable(ctx
, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt
,
447 && (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx
, ctx
->trusted
, scrt
, msg
)
448 || check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx
, scrt
, msg
))) {
449 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
452 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
454 /* release any cached sender cert that proved no more successfully usable */
455 (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx
, NULL
);
457 /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
458 (void)ERR_set_mark();
459 ctx
->log_cb
= NULL
; /* temporarily disable logging diagnostic info */
461 if (check_msg_all_certs(ctx
, msg
, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
462 || check_msg_all_certs(ctx
, msg
, 1 /* 3gpp */)) {
463 /* discard any diagnostic info on trying to use certs */
464 ctx
->log_cb
= backup_log_cb
; /* restore any logging */
465 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
469 /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
470 ctx
->log_cb
= backup_log_cb
; /* restore any logging */
471 (void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
473 sname
= X509_NAME_oneline(sender
->d
.directoryName
, NULL
, 0);
474 skid_str
= skid
== NULL
? NULL
475 : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid
->data
, skid
->length
);
476 if (ctx
->log_cb
!= NULL
) {
477 ossl_cmp_info(ctx
, "verifying msg signature with valid cert that..");
479 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO
, ctx
, "matches msg sender name = %s", sname
);
480 if (skid_str
!= NULL
)
481 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO
, ctx
, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str
);
483 ossl_cmp_info(ctx
, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
484 /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
485 check_msg_all_certs(ctx
, msg
, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
486 check_msg_all_certs(ctx
, msg
, 1 /* 3gpp */);
489 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT
);
491 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL
, "for msg sender name = ");
492 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL
, sname
);
494 if (skid_str
!= NULL
) {
495 ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
496 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL
, skid_str
);
501 OPENSSL_free(skid_str
);
506 * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
507 * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
508 * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
509 * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
510 * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
512 * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
513 * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
514 * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
515 * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
516 * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
518 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
520 int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
)
523 int nid
= NID_undef
, pk_nid
= NID_undef
;
524 const ASN1_OBJECT
*algorOID
= NULL
;
527 if (ctx
== NULL
|| msg
== NULL
528 || msg
->header
== NULL
|| msg
->body
== NULL
) {
529 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT
);
533 if ((alg
= msg
->header
->protectionAlg
) == NULL
/* unprotected message */
534 || msg
->protection
== NULL
|| msg
->protection
->data
== NULL
) {
535 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION
);
539 /* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
540 X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID
, NULL
, NULL
, alg
);
541 nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID
);
544 /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
545 case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC
:
546 if (verify_PBMAC(msg
, ctx
->secretValue
)) {
548 * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
549 * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
550 * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
551 * certificate by the initiator.'
553 switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg
)) {
556 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP
:
557 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP
:
558 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP
:
559 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP
:
560 if (ctx
->trusted
!= NULL
) {
561 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
= msg
->body
->value
.ip
->caPubs
;
562 /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
564 if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx
->trusted
, certs
, 0))
565 /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
577 * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
580 case NID_id_DHBasedMac
:
581 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC
);
588 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg
->algorithm
), NULL
, &pk_nid
)
589 || pk_nid
== NID_undef
) {
590 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID
);
593 /* validate sender name of received msg */
594 if (msg
->header
->sender
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
) {
595 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
596 break; /* FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
599 * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
600 * Expected name can be set explicitly or the subject of ctx->srvCert.
601 * Mitigates risk to accept misused certificate of an unauthorized
602 * entity of a trusted hierarchy.
604 if (!check_name(ctx
, "sender DN field",
605 msg
->header
->sender
->d
.directoryName
,
606 "expected sender", ctx
->expected_sender
))
608 /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
612 if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx
, msg
))
614 } else { /* use pinned sender cert */
615 /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
616 if (verify_signature(ctx
, msg
, scrt
))
618 /* call cert_acceptable() for adding diagnostic information */
619 (void)cert_acceptable(ctx
, "explicitly set", "sender cert", scrt
,
621 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx
, "msg signature verification failed");
622 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG
);
631 * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
632 * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
635 * it has a valid body type
636 * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
637 * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
638 * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
639 * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
641 * If everything is fine:
642 * learns the senderNonce from the received message,
643 * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
645 * returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
647 int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX
*ctx
, const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
,
648 ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb
, int cb_arg
)
652 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
!= NULL
&& msg
!= NULL
))
655 if (sk_X509_num(msg
->extraCerts
) > 10)
657 "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
659 /* validate message protection */
660 if (msg
->header
->protectionAlg
!= 0) {
661 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
662 if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx
, msg
)
663 && (cb
== NULL
|| (*cb
)(ctx
, msg
, 1, cb_arg
) <= 0)) {
664 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION
);
668 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
669 if (cb
== NULL
|| (*cb
)(ctx
, msg
, 0, cb_arg
) <= 0) {
670 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION
);
675 /* check CMP version number in header */
676 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg
)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO
) {
677 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO
);
681 if ((rcvd_type
= ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg
)) < 0) {
682 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR
);
686 /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
687 if (ctx
->transactionID
!= NULL
688 && (msg
->header
->transactionID
== NULL
689 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx
->transactionID
,
690 msg
->header
->transactionID
) != 0)) {
691 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED
);
695 /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
696 if (ctx
->senderNonce
!= NULL
697 && (msg
->header
->recipNonce
== NULL
698 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx
->senderNonce
,
699 msg
->header
->recipNonce
) != 0)) {
700 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED
);
705 * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
706 * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
707 * --> Store for setting in next message
709 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx
, msg
->header
->senderNonce
))
712 /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
713 if (ctx
->transactionID
== NULL
714 && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx
, msg
->header
->transactionID
))
718 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
719 * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
720 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
721 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
723 if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx
->untrusted_certs
, msg
->extraCerts
,
724 0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
725 1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
731 int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG
*msg
, int accept_RAVerified
)
733 if (!ossl_assert(msg
!= NULL
&& msg
->body
!= NULL
))
735 switch (msg
->body
->type
) {
736 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR
:
738 X509_REQ
*req
= msg
->body
->value
.p10cr
;
740 if (X509_REQ_verify(req
, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req
)) > 0)
742 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED
);
745 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR
:
746 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR
:
747 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR
:
748 return OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg
->body
->value
.ir
,
752 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR
);