2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * DH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
18 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "crypto/dh.h"
23 * Check that p and g are suitable enough
28 int DH_check_params_ex(const DH
*dh
)
32 if (!DH_check_params(dh
, &errflags
))
35 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
) != 0)
36 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
);
37 if ((errflags
& DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
) != 0)
38 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
);
39 if ((errflags
& DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
) != 0)
40 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
);
41 if ((errflags
& DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
) != 0)
42 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
48 int DH_check_params(const DH
*dh
, int *ret
)
54 * SP800-56A R3 Section 5.5.2 Assurances of Domain Parameter Validity
55 * (1a) The domain parameters correspond to any approved safe prime group.
57 nid
= DH_get_nid((DH
*)dh
);
62 * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
65 return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh
->libctx
, &dh
->params
,
66 FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH
, ret
, NULL
);
69 int DH_check_params(const DH
*dh
, int *ret
)
76 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(dh
->libctx
);
80 tmp
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
84 if (!BN_is_odd(dh
->params
.p
))
85 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
;
86 if (BN_is_negative(dh
->params
.g
)
87 || BN_is_zero(dh
->params
.g
)
88 || BN_is_one(dh
->params
.g
))
89 *ret
|= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
;
90 if (BN_copy(tmp
, dh
->params
.p
) == NULL
|| !BN_sub_word(tmp
, 1))
92 if (BN_cmp(dh
->params
.g
, tmp
) >= 0)
93 *ret
|= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
;
94 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS
)
95 *ret
|= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
;
96 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
)
97 *ret
|= DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
;
105 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
108 * Check that p is a safe prime and
109 * g is a suitable generator.
111 int DH_check_ex(const DH
*dh
)
115 if (!DH_check(dh
, &errflags
))
118 if ((errflags
& DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
) != 0)
119 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
);
120 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME
) != 0)
121 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME
);
122 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
) != 0)
123 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
);
124 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE
) != 0)
125 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE
);
126 if ((errflags
& DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR
) != 0)
127 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR
);
128 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
) != 0)
129 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
);
130 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME
) != 0)
131 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME
);
132 if ((errflags
& DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
) != 0)
133 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
);
134 if ((errflags
& DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
) != 0)
135 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
137 return errflags
== 0;
140 /* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
141 int DH_check(const DH
*dh
, int *ret
)
144 return DH_check_params(dh
, ret
);
146 int ok
= 0, r
, q_good
= 0;
148 BIGNUM
*t1
= NULL
, *t2
= NULL
;
149 int nid
= DH_get_nid((DH
*)dh
);
152 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
155 /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
156 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
) {
157 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
158 *ret
= DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
| DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
;
162 if (!DH_check_params(dh
, ret
))
165 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(dh
->libctx
);
169 t1
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
170 t2
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
174 if (dh
->params
.q
!= NULL
) {
175 if (BN_ucmp(dh
->params
.p
, dh
->params
.q
) > 0)
178 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
;
182 if (BN_cmp(dh
->params
.g
, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
183 *ret
|= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
;
184 else if (BN_cmp(dh
->params
.g
, dh
->params
.p
) >= 0)
185 *ret
|= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
;
187 /* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
188 if (!BN_mod_exp(t1
, dh
->params
.g
, dh
->params
.q
, dh
->params
.p
, ctx
))
191 *ret
|= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR
;
193 r
= BN_check_prime(dh
->params
.q
, ctx
, NULL
);
197 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME
;
198 /* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */
199 if (!BN_div(t1
, t2
, dh
->params
.p
, dh
->params
.q
, ctx
))
202 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
;
203 if (dh
->params
.j
!= NULL
204 && BN_cmp(dh
->params
.j
, t1
))
205 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE
;
208 r
= BN_check_prime(dh
->params
.p
, ctx
, NULL
);
212 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME
;
213 else if (dh
->params
.q
== NULL
) {
214 if (!BN_rshift1(t1
, dh
->params
.p
))
216 r
= BN_check_prime(t1
, ctx
, NULL
);
220 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME
;
227 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
230 int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH
*dh
, const BIGNUM
*pub_key
)
234 if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh
, pub_key
, &errflags
))
237 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL
) != 0)
238 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL
);
239 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE
) != 0)
240 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE
);
241 if ((errflags
& DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID
) != 0)
242 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID
);
244 return errflags
== 0;
248 * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Full public key validation.
250 int DH_check_pub_key(const DH
*dh
, const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, int *ret
)
252 /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
253 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
) {
254 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH
, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
255 *ret
= DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
| DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID
;
259 if (dh
->params
.q
!= NULL
&& BN_ucmp(dh
->params
.p
, dh
->params
.q
) < 0) {
260 *ret
|= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE
| DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID
;
264 return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh
->params
, pub_key
, ret
);
268 * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Partial public key validation.
269 * To only be used with ephemeral FFC public keys generated using the approved
272 int ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH
*dh
, const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, int *ret
)
274 return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dh
->params
, pub_key
, ret
)
278 int ossl_dh_check_priv_key(const DH
*dh
, const BIGNUM
*priv_key
, int *ret
)
281 BIGNUM
*two_powN
= NULL
, *upper
;
285 if (two_powN
== NULL
)
288 if (dh
->params
.q
!= NULL
) {
289 upper
= dh
->params
.q
;
291 } else if (dh
->params
.p
!= NULL
) {
293 * We do not have q so we just check the key is within some
294 * reasonable range, or the number of bits is equal to dh->length.
296 int length
= dh
->length
;
299 length
= BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) - 1;
300 if (BN_num_bits(priv_key
) <= length
301 && BN_num_bits(priv_key
) > 1)
303 } else if (BN_num_bits(priv_key
) == length
) {
312 /* Is it from an approved Safe prime group ?*/
313 if (DH_get_nid((DH
*)dh
) != NID_undef
&& dh
->length
!= 0) {
314 if (!BN_lshift(two_powN
, BN_value_one(), dh
->length
))
316 if (BN_cmp(two_powN
, dh
->params
.q
) < 0)
319 if (!ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(upper
, priv_key
, ret
))
329 * FFC pairwise check from SP800-56A R3.
330 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
332 int ossl_dh_check_pairwise(const DH
*dh
)
336 BIGNUM
*pub_key
= NULL
;
338 if (dh
->params
.p
== NULL
339 || dh
->params
.g
== NULL
340 || dh
->priv_key
== NULL
341 || dh
->pub_key
== NULL
)
344 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(dh
->libctx
);
351 /* recalculate the public key = (g ^ priv) mod p */
352 if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx
, dh
, dh
->priv_key
, pub_key
))
354 /* check it matches the existing public_key */
355 ret
= BN_cmp(pub_key
, dh
->pub_key
) == 0;