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[PROV][KMGMT][KEXCH][EC] Implement EC keymgtm and ECDH
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / ec / ec_key.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 *
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
9 */
10
11 /*
12 * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
13 * internal use.
14 */
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
16
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
18 #include <string.h>
19 #include "ec_local.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/engine.h>
23
24 #ifndef FIPS_MODE
25 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
26 {
27 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL);
28 }
29 #endif
30
31 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
32 {
33 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx, NULL);
34 }
35
36 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int nid)
37 {
38 EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx);
39 if (ret == NULL)
40 return NULL;
41 ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx, nid);
42 if (ret->group == NULL) {
43 EC_KEY_free(ret);
44 return NULL;
45 }
46 if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
47 && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
48 EC_KEY_free(ret);
49 return NULL;
50 }
51 return ret;
52 }
53
54 #ifndef FIPS_MODE
55 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
56 {
57 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL, nid);
58 }
59 #endif
60
61 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
62 {
63 int i;
64
65 if (r == NULL)
66 return;
67
68 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
69 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
70 if (i > 0)
71 return;
72 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
73
74 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
75 r->meth->finish(r);
76
77 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
78 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
79 #endif
80
81 if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
82 r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
83
84 #ifndef FIPS_MODE
85 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
86 #endif
87 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
88 EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
89 EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
90 BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
91
92 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
93 }
94
95 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
96 {
97 if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
98 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
99 return NULL;
100 }
101 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
102 if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
103 dest->meth->finish(dest);
104 if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
105 dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
106 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
107 if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
108 return 0;
109 dest->engine = NULL;
110 #endif
111 }
112 dest->libctx = src->libctx;
113 /* copy the parameters */
114 if (src->group != NULL) {
115 const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
116 /* clear the old group */
117 EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
118 dest->group = EC_GROUP_new_ex(src->libctx, meth);
119 if (dest->group == NULL)
120 return NULL;
121 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
122 return NULL;
123
124 /* copy the public key */
125 if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
126 EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
127 dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
128 if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
129 return NULL;
130 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
131 return NULL;
132 }
133 /* copy the private key */
134 if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
135 if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
136 dest->priv_key = BN_new();
137 if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
138 return NULL;
139 }
140 if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
141 return NULL;
142 if (src->group->meth->keycopy
143 && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
144 return NULL;
145 }
146 }
147
148
149 /* copy the rest */
150 dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
151 dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
152 dest->version = src->version;
153 dest->flags = src->flags;
154 #ifndef FIPS_MODE
155 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
156 &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
157 return NULL;
158 #endif
159
160 if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
161 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
162 if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
163 return NULL;
164 dest->engine = src->engine;
165 #endif
166 dest->meth = src->meth;
167 }
168
169 if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
170 return NULL;
171
172 dest->dirty_cnt++;
173
174 return dest;
175 }
176
177 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
178 {
179 EC_KEY *ret = ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key->libctx, ec_key->engine);
180
181 if (ret == NULL)
182 return NULL;
183
184 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
185 EC_KEY_free(ret);
186 return NULL;
187 }
188 return ret;
189 }
190
191 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
192 {
193 int i;
194
195 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
196 return 0;
197
198 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
199 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
200 return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
201 }
202
203 ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
204 {
205 return eckey->engine;
206 }
207
208 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
209 {
210 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
211 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
212 return 0;
213 }
214 if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
215 int ret;
216
217 ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
218 if (ret == 1)
219 eckey->dirty_cnt++;
220
221 return ret;
222 }
223 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
224 return 0;
225 }
226
227 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
228 {
229 int ret;
230
231 ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
232
233 if (ret == 1)
234 eckey->dirty_cnt++;
235 return ret;
236 }
237
238 /*
239 * ECC Key generation.
240 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
241 *
242 * Params:
243 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
244 * is stored in this object.
245 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
246 */
247 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
248 {
249 int ok = 0;
250 BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
251 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
252 EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
253 const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
254 BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
255
256 if (ctx == NULL)
257 goto err;
258
259 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
260 priv_key = BN_secure_new();
261 if (priv_key == NULL)
262 goto err;
263 } else
264 priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
265
266 /*
267 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
268 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
269 * stated in the security policy.
270 */
271
272 order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
273 if (order == NULL)
274 goto err;
275
276 /*
277 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
278 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
279 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
280 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
281 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
282 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
283 */
284 do
285 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key, order, ctx))
286 goto err;
287 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
288
289 if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
290 pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
291 if (pub_key == NULL)
292 goto err;
293 } else
294 pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
295
296 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
297 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
298 goto err;
299
300 eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
301 eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
302 priv_key = NULL;
303 pub_key = NULL;
304
305 eckey->dirty_cnt++;
306
307 ok = 1;
308
309 err:
310 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
311 if (!ok) {
312 BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
313 if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
314 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
315 }
316
317 EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
318 BN_clear_free(priv_key);
319 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
320 return ok;
321 }
322
323 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
324 {
325 int ret;
326
327 /*
328 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
329 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
330 */
331 ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
332 NULL, NULL);
333
334 if (ret == 1)
335 eckey->dirty_cnt++;
336
337 return ret;
338 }
339
340 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
341 {
342 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
343 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
344 return 0;
345 }
346
347 if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
348 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
349 return 0;
350 }
351
352 return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
353 }
354
355 /*
356 * Check the range of the EC public key.
357 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
358 * i.e.
359 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
360 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
361 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
362 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
363 */
364 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
365 {
366 int ret = 0;
367 BIGNUM *x, *y;
368
369 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
370 x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
371 y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
372 if (y == NULL)
373 goto err;
374
375 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
376 goto err;
377
378 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
379 if (BN_is_negative(x)
380 || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
381 || BN_is_negative(y)
382 || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
383 goto err;
384 }
385 } else {
386 int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
387 if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
388 goto err;
389 }
390 }
391 ret = 1;
392 err:
393 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
394 return ret;
395 }
396
397 /*
398 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
399 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
400 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
401 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
402 * NOTES:
403 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
404 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
405 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
406 */
407 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
408 {
409 int ok = 0;
410 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
411 const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
412 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
413
414 if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
415 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
416 return 0;
417 }
418
419 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
420 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
421 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
422 goto err;
423 }
424
425 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
426 goto err;
427
428 if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
429 goto err;
430
431 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
432 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
433 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
434 goto err;
435 }
436
437 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
438 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
439 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
440 goto err;
441 }
442
443 order = eckey->group->order;
444 if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
445 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
446 goto err;
447 }
448 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
449 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
450 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
451 goto err;
452 }
453 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
454 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
455 goto err;
456 }
457
458 if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
459 /*
460 * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
461 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
462 */
463 if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
464 || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
465 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
466 goto err;
467 }
468 /*
469 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
470 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
471 */
472 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
473 NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
474 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
475 goto err;
476 }
477 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
478 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
479 goto err;
480 }
481 }
482 ok = 1;
483 err:
484 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
485 EC_POINT_free(point);
486 return ok;
487 }
488
489 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
490 BIGNUM *y)
491 {
492 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
493 BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
494 EC_POINT *point = NULL;
495 int ok = 0;
496
497 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
498 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
499 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
500 return 0;
501 }
502 ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(key->libctx);
503 if (ctx == NULL)
504 return 0;
505
506 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
507 point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
508
509 if (point == NULL)
510 goto err;
511
512 tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
513 ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
514 if (ty == NULL)
515 goto err;
516
517 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
518 goto err;
519 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
520 goto err;
521
522 /*
523 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
524 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
525 */
526 if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
527 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
528 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
529 goto err;
530 }
531
532 /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
533 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
534 goto err;
535
536 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
537 goto err;
538
539 ok = 1;
540
541 err:
542 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
543 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
544 EC_POINT_free(point);
545 return ok;
546
547 }
548
549 const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
550 {
551 return key->group;
552 }
553
554 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
555 {
556 if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
557 return 0;
558 EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
559 key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
560 key->dirty_cnt++;
561 return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
562 }
563
564 const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
565 {
566 return key->priv_key;
567 }
568
569 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
570 {
571 if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
572 return 0;
573 if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
574 && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
575 return 0;
576 if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
577 && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
578 return 0;
579 BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
580 key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
581 key->dirty_cnt++;
582 return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
583 }
584
585 const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
586 {
587 return key->pub_key;
588 }
589
590 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
591 {
592 if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
593 && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
594 return 0;
595 EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
596 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
597 key->dirty_cnt++;
598 return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
599 }
600
601 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
602 {
603 return key->enc_flag;
604 }
605
606 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
607 {
608 key->enc_flag = flags;
609 }
610
611 point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
612 {
613 return key->conv_form;
614 }
615
616 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
617 {
618 key->conv_form = cform;
619 if (key->group != NULL)
620 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
621 }
622
623 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
624 {
625 if (key->group != NULL)
626 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
627 }
628
629 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
630 {
631 if (key->group == NULL)
632 return 0;
633 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
634 }
635
636 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
637 {
638 return key->flags;
639 }
640
641 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
642 {
643 key->flags |= flags;
644 key->dirty_cnt++;
645 }
646
647 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
648 {
649 key->flags &= ~flags;
650 key->dirty_cnt++;
651 }
652
653 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
654 unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
655 {
656 if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
657 return 0;
658 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
659 }
660
661 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
662 BN_CTX *ctx)
663 {
664 if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
665 return 0;
666 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
667 key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
668 if (key->pub_key == NULL)
669 return 0;
670 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
671 return 0;
672 key->dirty_cnt++;
673 /*
674 * Save the point conversion form.
675 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
676 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
677 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
678 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
679 */
680 if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
681 key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
682 return 1;
683 }
684
685 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
686 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
687 {
688 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
689 return 0;
690 if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
691 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
692 return 0;
693 }
694
695 return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
696 }
697
698 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
699 unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
700 {
701 size_t buf_len;
702
703 buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
704 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
705 return 0;
706 if (buf == NULL)
707 return buf_len;
708 else if (len < buf_len)
709 return 0;
710
711 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
712
713 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
714 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
715 return 0;
716 }
717
718 return buf_len;
719 }
720
721 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
722 {
723 int ret;
724
725 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
726 return 0;
727 if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
728 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
729 return 0;
730 }
731 ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
732 if (ret == 1)
733 eckey->dirty_cnt++;
734 return ret;
735 }
736
737 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
738 {
739 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
740 eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
741 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
742 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
743 return 0;
744 }
745 eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key);
746 if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
747 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
748 return 0;
749 }
750 eckey->dirty_cnt++;
751 return 1;
752 }
753
754 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
755 {
756 size_t len;
757 unsigned char *buf;
758
759 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
760 if (len == 0)
761 return 0;
762 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
763 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
764 return 0;
765 }
766 len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
767 if (len == 0) {
768 OPENSSL_free(buf);
769 return 0;
770 }
771 *pbuf = buf;
772 return len;
773 }
774
775 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
776 {
777 if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
778 || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
779 return 0;
780 return 1;
781 }