2 * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
14 #include "internal/refcount.h"
15 #include <openssl/err.h>
16 #include <openssl/engine.h>
19 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new(void)
21 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL
, NULL
);
25 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX
*ctx
)
27 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx
, NULL
);
30 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OPENSSL_CTX
*ctx
, int nid
)
32 EC_KEY
*ret
= EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx
);
35 ret
->group
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx
, nid
);
36 if (ret
->group
== NULL
) {
40 if (ret
->meth
->set_group
!= NULL
41 && ret
->meth
->set_group(ret
, ret
->group
) == 0) {
49 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid
)
51 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL
, nid
);
55 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY
*r
)
62 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r
->references
, &i
, r
->lock
);
63 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r
);
66 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i
< 0);
68 if (r
->meth
!= NULL
&& r
->meth
->finish
!= NULL
)
71 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
72 ENGINE_finish(r
->engine
);
75 if (r
->group
&& r
->group
->meth
->keyfinish
)
76 r
->group
->meth
->keyfinish(r
);
79 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY
, r
, &r
->ex_data
);
81 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r
->lock
);
82 EC_GROUP_free(r
->group
);
83 EC_POINT_free(r
->pub_key
);
84 BN_clear_free(r
->priv_key
);
86 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r
, sizeof(EC_KEY
));
89 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY
*dest
, const EC_KEY
*src
)
91 if (dest
== NULL
|| src
== NULL
) {
92 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
95 if (src
->meth
!= dest
->meth
) {
96 if (dest
->meth
->finish
!= NULL
)
97 dest
->meth
->finish(dest
);
98 if (dest
->group
&& dest
->group
->meth
->keyfinish
)
99 dest
->group
->meth
->keyfinish(dest
);
100 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
101 if (ENGINE_finish(dest
->engine
) == 0)
106 dest
->libctx
= src
->libctx
;
107 /* copy the parameters */
108 if (src
->group
!= NULL
) {
109 const EC_METHOD
*meth
= EC_GROUP_method_of(src
->group
);
110 /* clear the old group */
111 EC_GROUP_free(dest
->group
);
112 dest
->group
= EC_GROUP_new_ex(src
->libctx
, meth
);
113 if (dest
->group
== NULL
)
115 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest
->group
, src
->group
))
118 /* copy the public key */
119 if (src
->pub_key
!= NULL
) {
120 EC_POINT_free(dest
->pub_key
);
121 dest
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(src
->group
);
122 if (dest
->pub_key
== NULL
)
124 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest
->pub_key
, src
->pub_key
))
127 /* copy the private key */
128 if (src
->priv_key
!= NULL
) {
129 if (dest
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
130 dest
->priv_key
= BN_new();
131 if (dest
->priv_key
== NULL
)
134 if (!BN_copy(dest
->priv_key
, src
->priv_key
))
136 if (src
->group
->meth
->keycopy
137 && src
->group
->meth
->keycopy(dest
, src
) == 0)
144 dest
->enc_flag
= src
->enc_flag
;
145 dest
->conv_form
= src
->conv_form
;
146 dest
->version
= src
->version
;
147 dest
->flags
= src
->flags
;
149 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY
,
150 &dest
->ex_data
, &src
->ex_data
))
154 if (src
->meth
!= dest
->meth
) {
155 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
156 if (src
->engine
!= NULL
&& ENGINE_init(src
->engine
) == 0)
158 dest
->engine
= src
->engine
;
160 dest
->meth
= src
->meth
;
163 if (src
->meth
->copy
!= NULL
&& src
->meth
->copy(dest
, src
) == 0)
169 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY
*ec_key
)
171 EC_KEY
*ret
= ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key
->libctx
, ec_key
->engine
);
176 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret
, ec_key
) == NULL
) {
183 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY
*r
)
187 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r
->references
, &i
, r
->lock
) <= 0)
190 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r
);
191 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i
< 2);
192 return ((i
> 1) ? 1 : 0);
195 ENGINE
*EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
197 return eckey
->engine
;
200 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
202 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
) {
203 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
206 if (eckey
->meth
->keygen
!= NULL
)
207 return eckey
->meth
->keygen(eckey
);
208 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY
, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
212 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
214 return eckey
->group
->meth
->keygen(eckey
);
218 * ECC Key generation.
219 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
222 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
223 * is stored in this object.
224 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
226 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
229 BIGNUM
*priv_key
= NULL
;
230 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
231 EC_POINT
*pub_key
= NULL
;
232 const EC_GROUP
*group
= eckey
->group
;
233 BN_CTX
*ctx
= BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey
->libctx
);
238 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
239 priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
240 if (priv_key
== NULL
)
243 priv_key
= eckey
->priv_key
;
246 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
247 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
248 * stated in the security policy.
251 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(group
);
256 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
257 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
258 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
259 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
260 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
261 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
264 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key
, order
, ctx
))
266 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key
)) ;
268 if (eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
269 pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(group
);
273 pub_key
= eckey
->pub_key
;
275 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
276 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group
, pub_key
, priv_key
, NULL
, NULL
, ctx
))
279 eckey
->priv_key
= priv_key
;
280 eckey
->pub_key
= pub_key
;
287 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
289 BN_clear(eckey
->priv_key
);
290 if (eckey
->pub_key
!= NULL
)
291 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group
, eckey
->pub_key
);
294 EC_POINT_free(pub_key
);
295 BN_clear_free(priv_key
);
300 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
303 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
304 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
306 return EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
, eckey
->priv_key
, NULL
,
310 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
312 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
313 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
317 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->keycheck
== NULL
) {
318 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
322 return eckey
->group
->meth
->keycheck(eckey
);
326 * Check the range of the EC public key.
327 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
329 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
330 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
331 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
332 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
334 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX
*ctx
, const EC_KEY
*key
)
345 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, x
, y
, ctx
))
348 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key
->group
->meth
) == NID_X9_62_prime_field
) {
349 if (BN_is_negative(x
)
350 || BN_cmp(x
, key
->group
->field
) >= 0
352 || BN_cmp(y
, key
->group
->field
) >= 0) {
356 int m
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(key
->group
);
357 if (BN_num_bits(x
) > m
|| BN_num_bits(y
) > m
) {
368 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
369 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
370 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
371 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
373 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
374 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
375 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
377 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
381 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
382 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
384 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
385 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
389 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
390 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
)) {
391 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY
);
395 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey
->libctx
)) == NULL
)
398 if ((point
= EC_POINT_new(eckey
->group
)) == NULL
)
401 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
402 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx
, eckey
)) {
403 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE
);
407 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
408 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
, ctx
) <= 0) {
409 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE
);
413 order
= eckey
->group
->order
;
414 if (BN_is_zero(order
)) {
415 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER
);
418 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
419 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, point
, NULL
, eckey
->pub_key
, order
, ctx
)) {
420 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
423 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey
->group
, point
)) {
424 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER
);
428 if (eckey
->priv_key
!= NULL
) {
430 * 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
431 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
433 if (BN_cmp(eckey
->priv_key
, BN_value_one()) < 0
434 || BN_cmp(eckey
->priv_key
, order
) >= 0) {
435 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER
);
439 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
440 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
442 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, point
, eckey
->priv_key
,
444 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
447 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey
->group
, point
, eckey
->pub_key
, ctx
) != 0) {
448 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY
, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY
);
455 EC_POINT_free(point
);
459 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY
*key
, BIGNUM
*x
,
464 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
467 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
|| x
== NULL
|| y
== NULL
) {
468 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES
,
469 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
472 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(key
->libctx
);
477 point
= EC_POINT_new(key
->group
);
482 tx
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
483 ty
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
487 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, point
, x
, y
, ctx
))
489 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, point
, tx
, ty
, ctx
))
493 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
494 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
496 if (BN_cmp(x
, tx
) || BN_cmp(y
, ty
)) {
497 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES
,
498 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE
);
502 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key
, point
))
505 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key
) == 0)
513 EC_POINT_free(point
);
518 const EC_GROUP
*EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY
*key
)
523 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY
*key
, const EC_GROUP
*group
)
525 if (key
->meth
->set_group
!= NULL
&& key
->meth
->set_group(key
, group
) == 0)
527 EC_GROUP_free(key
->group
);
528 key
->group
= EC_GROUP_dup(group
);
529 return (key
->group
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
532 const BIGNUM
*EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY
*key
)
534 return key
->priv_key
;
537 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY
*key
, const BIGNUM
*priv_key
)
539 if (key
->group
== NULL
|| key
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
541 if (key
->group
->meth
->set_private
!= NULL
542 && key
->group
->meth
->set_private(key
, priv_key
) == 0)
544 if (key
->meth
->set_private
!= NULL
545 && key
->meth
->set_private(key
, priv_key
) == 0)
547 BN_clear_free(key
->priv_key
);
548 key
->priv_key
= BN_dup(priv_key
);
549 return (key
->priv_key
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
552 const EC_POINT
*EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY
*key
)
557 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY
*key
, const EC_POINT
*pub_key
)
559 if (key
->meth
->set_public
!= NULL
560 && key
->meth
->set_public(key
, pub_key
) == 0)
562 EC_POINT_free(key
->pub_key
);
563 key
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_dup(pub_key
, key
->group
);
564 return (key
->pub_key
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
567 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY
*key
)
569 return key
->enc_flag
;
572 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, unsigned int flags
)
574 key
->enc_flag
= flags
;
577 point_conversion_form_t
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY
*key
)
579 return key
->conv_form
;
582 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY
*key
, point_conversion_form_t cform
)
584 key
->conv_form
= cform
;
585 if (key
->group
!= NULL
)
586 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key
->group
, cform
);
589 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY
*key
, int flag
)
591 if (key
->group
!= NULL
)
592 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key
->group
, flag
);
595 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY
*key
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
597 if (key
->group
== NULL
)
599 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key
->group
, ctx
);
602 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY
*key
)
607 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, int flags
)
612 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, int flags
)
614 key
->flags
&= ~flags
;
617 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY
*key
, point_conversion_form_t form
,
618 unsigned char **pbuf
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
620 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->pub_key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
)
622 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, form
, pbuf
, ctx
);
625 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY
*key
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
628 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
)
630 if (key
->pub_key
== NULL
)
631 key
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(key
->group
);
632 if (key
->pub_key
== NULL
)
634 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, buf
, len
, ctx
) == 0)
637 * Save the point conversion form.
638 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
639 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
640 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
641 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
643 if ((key
->group
->meth
->flags
& EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE
) == 0)
644 key
->conv_form
= (point_conversion_form_t
)(buf
[0] & ~0x01);
648 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY
*eckey
,
649 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
651 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
653 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->priv2oct
== NULL
) {
654 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
658 return eckey
->group
->meth
->priv2oct(eckey
, buf
, len
);
661 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY
*eckey
,
662 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
666 buf_len
= (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey
->group
) + 7) / 8;
667 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
)
671 else if (len
< buf_len
)
674 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
676 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey
->priv_key
, buf
, buf_len
) == -1) {
677 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT
, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
);
684 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY
*eckey
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
686 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
688 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->oct2priv
== NULL
) {
689 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
692 return eckey
->group
->meth
->oct2priv(eckey
, buf
, len
);
695 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY
*eckey
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
697 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
)
698 eckey
->priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
699 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
700 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
703 eckey
->priv_key
= BN_bin2bn(buf
, len
, eckey
->priv_key
);
704 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
705 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
711 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY
*eckey
, unsigned char **pbuf
)
716 len
= EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey
, NULL
, 0);
719 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
720 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
723 len
= EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey
, buf
, len
);
732 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
734 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
735 || (eckey
->group
->meth
->flags
& EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN
))