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1 /*
2 * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
3 * 2000.
4 */
5 /* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 *
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 *
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18 * distribution.
19 *
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
24 *
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
29 *
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
33 *
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
35 * acknowledgment:
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
38 *
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
52 *
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
56 *
57 */
58
59 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
60 #include "ocsp_lcl.h"
61 #include <openssl/err.h>
62 #include <string.h>
63
64 static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
65 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st,
66 unsigned long flags);
67 static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
68 static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
69 unsigned long flags);
70 static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
71 OCSP_CERTID **ret);
72 static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
73 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
74 static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
75 static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
76 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
77 X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
78
79 /* Verify a basic response message */
80
81 int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
82 X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
83 {
84 X509 *signer, *x;
85 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
86 STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
87 X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
88 int i, ret = 0;
89 ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
90 if (!ret) {
91 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
92 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
93 goto end;
94 }
95 if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
96 flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
97 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
98 EVP_PKEY *skey;
99 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
100 if (skey)
101 ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
102 if (!skey || ret <= 0) {
103 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
104 goto end;
105 }
106 }
107 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
108 int init_res;
109 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
110 untrusted = NULL;
111 } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
112 untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
113 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
114 if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
115 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
116 goto end;
117 }
118 }
119 } else {
120 untrusted = bs->certs;
121 }
122 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
123 if (!init_res) {
124 ret = -1;
125 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
126 goto end;
127 }
128
129 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
130 ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
131 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
132 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
133 if (ret <= 0) {
134 i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
135 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
136 OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
137 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
138 X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
139 goto end;
140 }
141 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
142 ret = 1;
143 goto end;
144 }
145 /*
146 * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
147 * against the OCSP issuer criteria.
148 */
149 ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
150
151 /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
152 if (ret != 0)
153 goto end;
154
155 /*
156 * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
157 * trust
158 */
159 if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
160 goto end;
161
162 x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
163 if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
164 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
165 goto end;
166 }
167 ret = 1;
168 }
169
170 end:
171 sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
172 if (bs->certs && certs)
173 sk_X509_free(untrusted);
174 return ret;
175 }
176
177 static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
178 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st,
179 unsigned long flags)
180 {
181 X509 *signer;
182 OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
183 if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
184 *psigner = signer;
185 return 2;
186 }
187 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
188 (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
189 *psigner = signer;
190 return 1;
191 }
192 /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
193
194 *psigner = NULL;
195 return 0;
196 }
197
198 static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
199 {
200 int i;
201 unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
202 X509 *x;
203
204 /* Easy if lookup by name */
205 if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
206 return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
207
208 /* Lookup by key hash */
209
210 /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
211 if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
212 return NULL;
213 keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
214 /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
215 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
216 x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
217 X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
218 if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
219 return x;
220 }
221 return NULL;
222 }
223
224 static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
225 unsigned long flags)
226 {
227 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
228 X509 *signer, *sca;
229 OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
230 int i;
231 sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
232
233 if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
234 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
235 return -1;
236 }
237
238 /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
239 i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
240
241 /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
242 if (i <= 0)
243 return i;
244
245 signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
246 /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
247 if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
248 sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
249 i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
250 if (i < 0)
251 return i;
252 if (i) {
253 /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
254 if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags))
255 return 1;
256 return 0;
257 }
258 }
259
260 /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
261 return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
262 }
263
264 /*
265 * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
266 * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
267 * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
268 * equality against one of them.
269 */
270
271 static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
272 {
273 OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
274 int i, idcount;
275
276 idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
277 if (idcount <= 0) {
278 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
279 OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
280 return -1;
281 }
282
283 cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
284
285 *ret = NULL;
286
287 for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
288 tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
289 /* Check to see if IDs match */
290 if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
291 /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
292 if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
293 cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
294 return 2;
295 /* Else mismatch */
296 return 0;
297 }
298 }
299
300 /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
301 *ret = cid;
302 return 1;
303 }
304
305 static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
306 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
307 {
308 /* If only one ID to match then do it */
309 if (cid) {
310 const EVP_MD *dgst;
311 X509_NAME *iname;
312 int mdlen;
313 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
314 if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
315 == NULL) {
316 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
317 OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
318 return -1;
319 }
320
321 mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
322 if (mdlen < 0)
323 return -1;
324 if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
325 (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
326 return 0;
327 iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
328 if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
329 return -1;
330 if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
331 return 0;
332 X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
333 if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
334 return 0;
335
336 return 1;
337
338 } else {
339 /* We have to match the whole lot */
340 int i, ret;
341 OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
342 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
343 tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
344 ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
345 if (ret <= 0)
346 return ret;
347 }
348 return 1;
349 }
350
351 }
352
353 static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
354 {
355 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
356 && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
357 return 1;
358 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
359 return 0;
360 }
361
362 /*
363 * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
364 * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
365 * trust value.
366 */
367
368 int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
369 X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
370 {
371 X509 *signer;
372 X509_NAME *nm;
373 GENERAL_NAME *gen;
374 int ret;
375 X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
376 if (!req->optionalSignature) {
377 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
378 return 0;
379 }
380 gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
381 if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
382 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
383 OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
384 return 0;
385 }
386 nm = gen->d.directoryName;
387 ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
388 if (ret <= 0) {
389 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
390 OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
391 return 0;
392 }
393 if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
394 flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
395 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
396 EVP_PKEY *skey;
397 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
398 ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
399 if (ret <= 0) {
400 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
401 return 0;
402 }
403 }
404 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
405 int init_res;
406 if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
407 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL);
408 else
409 init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
410 req->optionalSignature->certs);
411 if (!init_res) {
412 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
413 return 0;
414 }
415
416 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
417 X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
418 ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
419 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
420 if (ret <= 0) {
421 ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
422 OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
423 OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
424 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
425 X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
426 return 0;
427 }
428 }
429 return 1;
430 }
431
432 static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
433 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
434 X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
435 {
436 X509 *signer;
437 if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
438 signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
439 if (signer) {
440 *psigner = signer;
441 return 1;
442 }
443 }
444
445 signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
446 if (signer) {
447 *psigner = signer;
448 return 2;
449 }
450 return 0;
451 }