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Move the rand_nonce_lock code into drbg_lib.c
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / rand / drbg_lib.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <string.h>
11 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
12 #include <openssl/err.h>
13 #include <openssl/rand.h>
14 #include "rand_lcl.h"
15 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
16 #include "internal/rand_int.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
18
19 /*
20 * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
21 *
22 * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview.
23 *
24 * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
25 * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
26 * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
27 * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
28 * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
29 * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
30 */
31
32
33 typedef struct drbg_global_st {
34 /*
35 * The three shared DRBG instances
36 *
37 * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
38 */
39
40 /*
41 * The <master> DRBG
42 *
43 * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
44 * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
45 * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
46 *
47 * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
48 * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
49 * DRBG instances during reseeding.
50 */
51 RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
52 /*
53 * The <public> DRBG
54 *
55 * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
56 *
57 * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
58 * thread.
59 */
60 CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
61 /*
62 * The <private> DRBG
63 *
64 * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
65 *
66 * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
67 * thread.
68 */
69 CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
70 } DRBG_GLOBAL;
71
72 typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st {
73 CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
74 int rand_nonce_count;
75 } DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL;
76
77 /* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
78 static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
79
80 #define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
81 RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
82
83 #define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER 0
84 #define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC 1
85 #define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE 2
86
87 /* Defaults */
88 static int rand_drbg_type[3] = {
89 RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Master */
90 RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Public */
91 RAND_DRBG_TYPE /* Private */
92 };
93 static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags[3] = {
94 RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER, /* Master */
95 RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC, /* Public */
96 RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE /* Private */
97 };
98
99 static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
100 static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
101
102 static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
103 static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
104
105 /* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */
106 static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
107 RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
108
109
110 static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
111
112 static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
113 int secure,
114 int type,
115 unsigned int flags,
116 RAND_DRBG *parent);
117
118 static int is_ctr(int type)
119 {
120 switch (type) {
121 case NID_aes_128_ctr:
122 case NID_aes_192_ctr:
123 case NID_aes_256_ctr:
124 return 1;
125 default:
126 return 0;
127 }
128 }
129
130 static int is_digest(int type)
131 {
132 switch (type) {
133 case NID_sha1:
134 case NID_sha224:
135 case NID_sha256:
136 case NID_sha384:
137 case NID_sha512:
138 case NID_sha512_224:
139 case NID_sha512_256:
140 case NID_sha3_224:
141 case NID_sha3_256:
142 case NID_sha3_384:
143 case NID_sha3_512:
144 return 1;
145 default:
146 return 0;
147 }
148 }
149
150 /*
151 * Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
152 * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
153 */
154 static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
155 {
156 DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
157
158 if (dgbl == NULL)
159 return NULL;
160
161 if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
162 goto err1;
163
164 if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
165 goto err2;
166
167 dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
168 if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
169 goto err3;
170
171 return dgbl;
172
173 err3:
174 CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
175 err2:
176 CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
177 err1:
178 OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
179 return NULL;
180 }
181
182 static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
183 {
184 DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
185
186 RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
187 CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
188 CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
189
190 OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
191 }
192
193 static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
194 drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
195 drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
196 };
197
198 /*
199 * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce()
200 * which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since
201 * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock
202 * to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an
203 * infinite recursion loop.
204 */
205 static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
206 {
207 DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl));
208
209 if (dngbl == NULL)
210 return NULL;
211
212 dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
213 if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) {
214 OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
215 return NULL;
216 }
217
218 return dngbl;
219 }
220
221 static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl)
222 {
223 DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl;
224
225 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
226
227 OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
228 }
229
230 static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = {
231 drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new,
232 drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free,
233 };
234
235 static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
236 {
237 return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
238 &drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
239 }
240
241 /* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */
242 size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
243 unsigned char **pout,
244 int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
245 {
246 size_t ret = 0;
247 RAND_POOL *pool;
248 DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
249 = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
250 &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
251 struct {
252 void *instance;
253 int count;
254 } data;
255
256 if (dngbl == NULL)
257 return 0;
258
259 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
260 pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
261 if (pool == NULL)
262 return 0;
263
264 if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
265 goto err;
266
267 data.instance = drbg;
268 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
269 dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
270
271 if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
272 goto err;
273
274 ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
275 *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
276
277 err:
278 rand_pool_free(pool);
279
280 return ret;
281 }
282
283 /*
284 * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
285 *
286 */
287 void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
288 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
289 {
290 OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
291 }
292
293 /*
294 * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
295 *
296 * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults
297 *
298 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
299 */
300 int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
301 {
302 int ret = 1;
303
304 if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
305 type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
306 flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
307 }
308
309 /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
310 if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
311 drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
312 rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
313 drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
314 }
315
316 drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
317 drbg->flags = flags;
318 drbg->type = type;
319
320 if (type == 0) {
321 /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
322 drbg->meth = NULL;
323 return 1;
324 } else if (is_ctr(type)) {
325 ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
326 } else if (is_digest(type)) {
327 if (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
328 ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg);
329 else
330 ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg);
331 } else {
332 drbg->type = 0;
333 drbg->flags = 0;
334 drbg->meth = NULL;
335 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
336 return 0;
337 }
338
339 if (ret == 0) {
340 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
341 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
342 }
343 return ret;
344 }
345
346 /*
347 * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
348 *
349 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
350 */
351 int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
352 {
353 int all;
354 if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) {
355 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) {
360 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS);
361 return 0;
362 }
363
364 all = ((flags & RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS) == 0);
365 if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) != 0) {
366 rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = type;
367 rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER;
368 }
369 if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) != 0) {
370 rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = type;
371 rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC;
372 }
373 if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) != 0) {
374 rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = type;
375 rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE;
376 }
377 return 1;
378 }
379
380
381 /*
382 * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
383 * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
384 * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
385 *
386 * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
387 */
388 static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
389 int secure,
390 int type,
391 unsigned int flags,
392 RAND_DRBG *parent)
393 {
394 RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
395 : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
396
397 if (drbg == NULL) {
398 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
399 return NULL;
400 }
401
402 drbg->libctx = ctx;
403 drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
404 drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
405 drbg->parent = parent;
406
407 if (parent == NULL) {
408 #ifdef FIPS_MODE
409 drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy;
410 drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy;
411 #else
412 drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
413 drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
414 #endif
415 #ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
416 drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
417 drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
418 #endif
419
420 drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
421 drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
422 } else {
423 drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
424 drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
425 /*
426 * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
427 * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
428 */
429
430 drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
431 drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
432 }
433
434 if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
435 goto err;
436
437 if (parent != NULL) {
438 rand_drbg_lock(parent);
439 if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
440 /*
441 * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
442 * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
443 */
444 rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
445 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
446 goto err;
447 }
448 rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
449 }
450
451 return drbg;
452
453 err:
454 RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
455
456 return NULL;
457 }
458
459 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
460 RAND_DRBG *parent)
461 {
462 return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent);
463 }
464
465 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
466 {
467 return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
468 }
469
470 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
471 unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
472 {
473 return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent);
474 }
475
476 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
477 {
478 return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
479 }
480 /*
481 * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
482 */
483 void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
484 {
485 if (drbg == NULL)
486 return;
487
488 if (drbg->meth != NULL)
489 drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
490 rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
491 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
492 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
493
494 if (drbg->secure)
495 OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
496 else
497 OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
498 }
499
500 /*
501 * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
502 * |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
503 *
504 * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
505 *
506 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
507 */
508 int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
509 const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
510 {
511 unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
512 size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
513 size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
514 size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
515 size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
516
517 if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
518 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
519 RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
520 goto end;
521 }
522
523 if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
524 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
525 RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
526 goto end;
527 }
528
529 if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
530 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
531 drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
532 : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
533 goto end;
534 }
535
536 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
537
538 /*
539 * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
540 * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
541 * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
542 * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
543 */
544 if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
545 min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
546 min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
547 max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
548 }
549
550 drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
551 if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
552 drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
553 if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
554 drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
555 }
556
557 if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
558 entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
559 min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
560 if (entropylen < min_entropylen
561 || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
562 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
563 goto end;
564 }
565
566 if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
567 noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
568 drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
569 if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
570 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
571 goto end;
572 }
573 }
574
575 if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
576 nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
577 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
578 goto end;
579 }
580
581 drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
582 drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
583 drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
584 tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
585
586 end:
587 if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
588 drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
589 if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
590 drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
591 if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
592 return 1;
593 return 0;
594 }
595
596 /*
597 * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
598 *
599 * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
600 *
601 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
602 */
603 int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
604 {
605 int index = -1, type, flags;
606 if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
607 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
608 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
609 RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
610 return 0;
611 }
612
613 /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
614 * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
615 * initial values.
616 */
617 drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
618
619 /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
620 if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
621 index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER;
622 else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
623 index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE;
624 else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
625 index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC;
626
627 if (index != -1) {
628 flags = rand_drbg_flags[index];
629 type = rand_drbg_type[index];
630 } else {
631 flags = drbg->flags;
632 type = drbg->type;
633 }
634 return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags);
635 }
636
637 /*
638 * Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data
639 *
640 * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
641 *
642 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
643 */
644 int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
645 const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
646 int prediction_resistance)
647 {
648 unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
649 size_t entropylen = 0;
650
651 if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
652 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
653 return 0;
654 }
655 if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
656 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
657 return 0;
658 }
659
660 if (adin == NULL) {
661 adinlen = 0;
662 } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
663 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
664 return 0;
665 }
666
667 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
668
669 drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
670 if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
671 drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
672 if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
673 drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
674 }
675
676 if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
677 entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
678 drbg->min_entropylen,
679 drbg->max_entropylen,
680 prediction_resistance);
681 if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
682 || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
683 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
684 goto end;
685 }
686
687 if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
688 goto end;
689
690 drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
691 drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
692 drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
693 tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
694
695 end:
696 if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
697 drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
698 if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
699 return 1;
700 return 0;
701 }
702
703 /*
704 * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
705 *
706 * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
707 * regardless of its current state.
708 *
709 * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
710 * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
711 *
712 * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
713 *
714 * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
715 *
716 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
717 *
718 * This function is used internally only.
719 */
720 int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
721 const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
722 {
723 int reseeded = 0;
724 const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
725 size_t adinlen = 0;
726
727 if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
728 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
729 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
730 rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
731 drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
732 return 0;
733 }
734
735 if (buffer != NULL) {
736 if (entropy > 0) {
737 if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
738 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
739 RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
740 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
741 return 0;
742 }
743
744 if (entropy > 8 * len) {
745 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
746 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
747 return 0;
748 }
749
750 /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
751 drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
752 if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
753 return 0;
754 } else {
755 if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
756 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
757 RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
758 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
759 return 0;
760 }
761 adin = buffer;
762 adinlen = len;
763 }
764 }
765
766 /* repair error state */
767 if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
768 RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
769
770 /* repair uninitialized state */
771 if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
772 /* reinstantiate drbg */
773 RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
774 (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
775 sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
776 /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
777 reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
778 }
779
780 /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
781 if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
782 if (adin != NULL) {
783 /*
784 * mix in additional input without reseeding
785 *
786 * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
787 * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
788 * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
789 * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
790 */
791 drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
792 } else if (reseeded == 0) {
793 /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
794 RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
795 }
796 }
797
798 rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
799 drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
800
801 return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
802 }
803
804 /*
805 * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
806 * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
807 * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
808 *
809 * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
810 *
811 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
812 *
813 */
814 int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
815 int prediction_resistance,
816 const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
817 {
818 int reseed_required = 0;
819
820 if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
821 /* try to recover from previous errors */
822 rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
823
824 if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
825 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
826 return 0;
827 }
828 if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
829 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
830 return 0;
831 }
832 }
833
834 if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
835 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
836 return 0;
837 }
838 if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
839 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
840 return 0;
841 }
842
843 if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
844 drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
845 reseed_required = 1;
846 }
847
848 if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
849 if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval)
850 reseed_required = 1;
851 }
852 if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
853 time_t now = time(NULL);
854 if (now < drbg->reseed_time
855 || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
856 reseed_required = 1;
857 }
858 if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
859 unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
860 if (reseed_counter > 0
861 && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
862 != reseed_counter)
863 reseed_required = 1;
864 }
865
866 if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
867 if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
868 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
869 return 0;
870 }
871 adin = NULL;
872 adinlen = 0;
873 }
874
875 if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
876 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
877 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
878 return 0;
879 }
880
881 drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
882
883 return 1;
884 }
885
886 /*
887 * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
888 * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
889 *
890 * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
891 *
892 * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
893 */
894 int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
895 {
896 unsigned char *additional = NULL;
897 size_t additional_len;
898 size_t chunk;
899 size_t ret = 0;
900
901 if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
902 if (drbg->type == 0)
903 goto err;
904 drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
905 if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
906 goto err;
907 }
908
909 additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
910 &additional);
911
912 for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
913 chunk = outlen;
914 if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
915 chunk = drbg->max_request;
916 ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
917 if (!ret)
918 goto err;
919 }
920 ret = 1;
921
922 err:
923 if (additional != NULL)
924 rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
925
926 return ret;
927 }
928
929 /*
930 * Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
931 *
932 * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been
933 * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
934 *
935 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
936 */
937 int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
938 RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
939 RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
940 RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
941 RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
942 {
943 if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
944 || drbg->parent != NULL)
945 return 0;
946 drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
947 drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
948 drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
949 drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
950 return 1;
951 }
952
953 /*
954 * Set the reseed interval.
955 *
956 * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the number of generate
957 * requests exceeds the given reseed interval. If the reseed interval
958 * is 0, then this feature is disabled.
959 *
960 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
961 */
962 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
963 {
964 if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
965 return 0;
966 drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
967 return 1;
968 }
969
970 /*
971 * Set the reseed time interval.
972 *
973 * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the time elapsed since
974 * the last reseeding exceeds the given reseed time interval. For safety,
975 * a reseeding will also occur if the clock has been reset to a smaller
976 * value.
977 *
978 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
979 */
980 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
981 {
982 if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
983 return 0;
984 drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
985 return 1;
986 }
987
988 /*
989 * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances
990 *
991 * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances
992 * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent).
993 *
994 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
995 */
996
997 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
998 unsigned int _master_reseed_interval,
999 unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval,
1000 time_t _master_reseed_time_interval,
1001 time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval
1002 )
1003 {
1004 if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL
1005 || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
1006 return 0;
1007
1008 if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL
1009 || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
1010 return 0;
1011
1012 master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval;
1013 slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval;
1014
1015 master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval;
1016 slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval;
1017
1018 return 1;
1019 }
1020
1021 /*
1022 * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking
1023 * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
1024 *
1025 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1026 */
1027 int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
1028 {
1029 if (drbg->lock != NULL)
1030 return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
1031
1032 return 1;
1033 }
1034
1035 /*
1036 * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking
1037 * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
1038 *
1039 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1040 */
1041 int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
1042 {
1043 if (drbg->lock != NULL)
1044 return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
1045
1046 return 1;
1047 }
1048
1049 /*
1050 * Enables locking for the given drbg
1051 *
1052 * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator
1053 * is in the uninitialized state.
1054 *
1055 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1056 */
1057 int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
1058 {
1059 if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
1060 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
1061 RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
1062 return 0;
1063 }
1064
1065 if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
1066 if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) {
1067 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
1068 RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
1069 return 0;
1070 }
1071
1072 drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
1073 if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
1074 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
1075 RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
1076 return 0;
1077 }
1078 }
1079
1080 return 1;
1081 }
1082
1083 /*
1084 * Get and set the EXDATA
1085 */
1086 int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
1087 {
1088 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
1089 }
1090
1091 void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
1092 {
1093 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
1094 }
1095
1096
1097 /*
1098 * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
1099 * global DRBG. They lock.
1100 */
1101
1102 /*
1103 * Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and
1104 * initializes it with default settings.
1105 *
1106 * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
1107 */
1108 static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
1109 {
1110 RAND_DRBG *drbg;
1111
1112 drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
1113 rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
1114 if (drbg == NULL)
1115 return NULL;
1116
1117 /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
1118 if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
1119 goto err;
1120
1121 /* enable seed propagation */
1122 tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
1123
1124 /*
1125 * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
1126 *
1127 * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
1128 * an automatic recovery is attempted.
1129 */
1130 (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
1131 (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
1132 sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
1133 return drbg;
1134
1135 err:
1136 RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
1137 return NULL;
1138 }
1139
1140 void drbg_delete_thread_state(void)
1141 {
1142 /* TODO(3.0): Other PRs will pass the ctx as a param to this function */
1143 OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1144 DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
1145 RAND_DRBG *drbg;
1146
1147 if (dgbl == NULL)
1148 return;
1149 drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
1150 CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
1151 RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
1152
1153 drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
1154 CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
1155 RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
1156 }
1157
1158 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
1159 static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
1160 {
1161 int ret;
1162 RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public();
1163
1164 if (drbg == NULL)
1165 return 0;
1166
1167 ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count);
1168
1169 return ret;
1170 }
1171
1172 /*
1173 * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
1174 * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
1175 * successfully.
1176 */
1177 size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
1178 {
1179 /*
1180 * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
1181 * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
1182 * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
1183 * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
1184 */
1185 size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
1186 size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
1187
1188 /*
1189 * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
1190 * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
1191 */
1192 if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
1193 min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
1194 min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
1195 }
1196
1197 /*
1198 * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
1199 * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
1200 * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
1201 */
1202 min_entropy >>= 3;
1203
1204 /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
1205 return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
1206 }
1207
1208 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
1209 static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
1210 {
1211 int ret = 0;
1212 RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
1213 size_t buflen;
1214 size_t seedlen;
1215
1216 if (drbg == NULL)
1217 return 0;
1218
1219 if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
1220 return 0;
1221
1222 rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
1223 seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
1224
1225 buflen = (size_t)num;
1226
1227 #ifdef FIPS_MODE
1228 /*
1229 * NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
1230 * by the consuming application. By setting the randomness to zero,
1231 * we ensure that the buffer contents will be added to the internal
1232 * state of the DRBG only as additional data.
1233 *
1234 * (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2)
1235 */
1236 randomness = 0.0;
1237 #endif
1238 if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
1239 #if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
1240 /*
1241 * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
1242 * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
1243 * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
1244 * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
1245 * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
1246 */
1247 unsigned char dummy[1];
1248
1249 ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
1250 rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
1251 return ret;
1252 #else
1253 /*
1254 * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
1255 * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
1256 * reseeding.
1257 */
1258 randomness = 0.0;
1259 #endif
1260 }
1261
1262 if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
1263 /*
1264 * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
1265 * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
1266 * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
1267 * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
1268 * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
1269 * security strength.
1270 */
1271 randomness = (double)seedlen;
1272 }
1273
1274 ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
1275 rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
1276
1277 return ret;
1278 }
1279
1280 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
1281 static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
1282 {
1283 return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
1284 }
1285
1286 /* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */
1287 static int drbg_status(void)
1288 {
1289 int ret;
1290 RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
1291
1292 if (drbg == NULL)
1293 return 0;
1294
1295 rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
1296 ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
1297 rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
1298 return ret;
1299 }
1300
1301 /*
1302 * Get the master DRBG.
1303 * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
1304 *
1305 */
1306 RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
1307 {
1308 DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
1309
1310 if (dgbl == NULL)
1311 return NULL;
1312
1313 return dgbl->master_drbg;
1314 }
1315
1316 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
1317 {
1318 return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
1319 }
1320
1321 /*
1322 * Get the public DRBG.
1323 * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
1324 */
1325 RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
1326 {
1327 DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
1328 RAND_DRBG *drbg;
1329
1330 if (dgbl == NULL)
1331 return NULL;
1332
1333 drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
1334 if (drbg == NULL) {
1335 if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
1336 return NULL;
1337 drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
1338 CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
1339 }
1340 return drbg;
1341 }
1342
1343 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
1344 {
1345 return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
1346 }
1347
1348 /*
1349 * Get the private DRBG.
1350 * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
1351 */
1352 RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
1353 {
1354 DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
1355 RAND_DRBG *drbg;
1356
1357 if (dgbl == NULL)
1358 return NULL;
1359
1360 drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
1361 if (drbg == NULL) {
1362 if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
1363 return NULL;
1364 drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
1365 CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
1366 }
1367 return drbg;
1368 }
1369
1370 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
1371 {
1372 return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
1373 }
1374
1375 RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
1376 drbg_seed,
1377 drbg_bytes,
1378 NULL,
1379 drbg_add,
1380 drbg_bytes,
1381 drbg_status
1382 };
1383
1384 RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
1385 {
1386 #ifndef FIPS_MODE
1387 return &rand_meth;
1388 #else
1389 return NULL;
1390 #endif
1391 }