2 * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
12 #include <openssl/err.h>
13 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
18 * The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
20 * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
21 * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
22 * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
23 * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
24 * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
25 * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
29 * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
30 * Return -2 if the type is not supported, 1 on success and -1 on
33 int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
, int nid
, unsigned int flags
)
37 drbg
->state
= DRBG_UNINITIALISED
;
43 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET
, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE
);
46 /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
56 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET
, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG
);
61 * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
62 * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed.
64 RAND_DRBG
*RAND_DRBG_new(int type
, unsigned int flags
, RAND_DRBG
*parent
)
66 RAND_DRBG
*drbg
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg
));
69 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
72 drbg
->size
= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED
;
73 drbg
->fork_count
= rand_fork_count
;
74 drbg
->parent
= parent
;
75 if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg
, type
, flags
) < 0)
79 if (parent
->state
== DRBG_UNINITIALISED
80 && RAND_DRBG_instantiate(parent
, NULL
, 0) == 0)
82 if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg
, drbg_entropy_from_parent
,
86 * Add in our address. Note we are adding the pointer
87 * itself, not its contents!
89 || !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg
,
90 (unsigned char*)&drbg
, sizeof(drbg
)))
101 RAND_DRBG
*RAND_DRBG_get0_global(void)
107 * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
109 void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
)
111 /* The global DRBG is free'd by rand_cleanup_int() */
112 if (drbg
== NULL
|| drbg
== &rand_drbg
)
115 ctr_uninstantiate(drbg
);
116 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG
, drbg
, &drbg
->ex_data
);
117 OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg
, sizeof(*drbg
));
121 * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
122 * |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
124 int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
,
125 const unsigned char *pers
, size_t perslen
)
127 unsigned char *nonce
= NULL
, *entropy
= NULL
;
128 size_t noncelen
= 0, entlen
= 0;
130 if (perslen
> drbg
->max_pers
) {
131 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE
,
132 RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG
);
135 if (drbg
->state
!= DRBG_UNINITIALISED
) {
136 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE
,
137 drbg
->state
== DRBG_ERROR
? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
138 : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED
);
142 drbg
->state
= DRBG_ERROR
;
143 if (drbg
->get_entropy
!= NULL
)
144 entlen
= drbg
->get_entropy(drbg
, &entropy
, drbg
->strength
,
145 drbg
->min_entropy
, drbg
->max_entropy
);
146 if (entlen
< drbg
->min_entropy
|| entlen
> drbg
->max_entropy
) {
147 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE
, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY
);
151 if (drbg
->max_nonce
> 0 && drbg
->get_nonce
!= NULL
) {
152 noncelen
= drbg
->get_nonce(drbg
, &nonce
, drbg
->strength
/ 2,
153 drbg
->min_nonce
, drbg
->max_nonce
);
154 if (noncelen
< drbg
->min_nonce
|| noncelen
> drbg
->max_nonce
) {
155 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE
, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE
);
160 if (!ctr_instantiate(drbg
, entropy
, entlen
,
161 nonce
, noncelen
, pers
, perslen
)) {
162 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE
, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG
);
166 drbg
->state
= DRBG_READY
;
167 drbg
->reseed_counter
= 1;
170 if (entropy
!= NULL
&& drbg
->cleanup_entropy
!= NULL
)
171 drbg
->cleanup_entropy(drbg
, entropy
);
172 if (nonce
!= NULL
&& drbg
->cleanup_nonce
!= NULL
)
173 drbg
->cleanup_nonce(drbg
, nonce
);
174 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_READY
)
180 * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
182 int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
)
184 int ret
= ctr_uninstantiate(drbg
);
186 OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg
->ctr
, sizeof(drbg
->ctr
));
187 drbg
->state
= DRBG_UNINITIALISED
;
192 * Mix in the specified data to reseed |drbg|.
194 int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
,
195 const unsigned char *adin
, size_t adinlen
)
197 unsigned char *entropy
= NULL
;
200 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_ERROR
) {
201 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED
, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
);
204 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_UNINITIALISED
) {
205 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED
, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED
);
211 else if (adinlen
> drbg
->max_adin
) {
212 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED
, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG
);
216 drbg
->state
= DRBG_ERROR
;
217 if (drbg
->get_entropy
!= NULL
)
218 entlen
= drbg
->get_entropy(drbg
, &entropy
, drbg
->strength
,
219 drbg
->min_entropy
, drbg
->max_entropy
);
220 if (entlen
< drbg
->min_entropy
|| entlen
> drbg
->max_entropy
) {
221 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED
, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY
);
225 if (!ctr_reseed(drbg
, entropy
, entlen
, adin
, adinlen
))
227 drbg
->state
= DRBG_READY
;
228 drbg
->reseed_counter
= 1;
231 if (entropy
!= NULL
&& drbg
->cleanup_entropy
!= NULL
)
232 drbg
->cleanup_entropy(drbg
, entropy
);
233 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_READY
)
239 * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
240 * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
241 * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
243 int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
, unsigned char *out
, size_t outlen
,
244 int prediction_resistance
,
245 const unsigned char *adin
, size_t adinlen
)
247 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_ERROR
) {
248 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE
, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
);
251 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_UNINITIALISED
) {
252 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE
, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED
);
255 if (outlen
> drbg
->max_request
) {
256 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE
, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG
);
259 if (adinlen
> drbg
->max_adin
) {
260 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE
, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG
);
264 if (drbg
->fork_count
!= rand_fork_count
) {
265 drbg
->fork_count
= rand_fork_count
;
266 drbg
->state
= DRBG_RESEED
;
269 if (drbg
->reseed_counter
>= drbg
->reseed_interval
)
270 drbg
->state
= DRBG_RESEED
;
272 if (drbg
->state
== DRBG_RESEED
|| prediction_resistance
) {
273 if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg
, adin
, adinlen
)) {
274 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE
, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR
);
281 if (!ctr_generate(drbg
, out
, outlen
, adin
, adinlen
)) {
282 drbg
->state
= DRBG_ERROR
;
283 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE
, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR
);
287 if (drbg
->reseed_counter
>= drbg
->reseed_interval
)
288 drbg
->state
= DRBG_RESEED
;
290 drbg
->reseed_counter
++;
295 * Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. We currently don't use
296 * the nonce; that's mainly for the KATs
298 int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
,
299 RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn cb_get_entropy
,
300 RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cb_cleanup_entropy
,
301 RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn cb_get_nonce
,
302 RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cb_cleanup_nonce
)
304 if (drbg
->state
!= DRBG_UNINITIALISED
)
306 drbg
->get_entropy
= cb_get_entropy
;
307 drbg
->cleanup_entropy
= cb_cleanup_entropy
;
308 drbg
->get_nonce
= cb_get_nonce
;
309 drbg
->cleanup_nonce
= cb_cleanup_nonce
;
314 * Set the reseed interval.
316 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
, int interval
)
318 if (interval
< 0 || interval
> MAX_RESEED
)
320 drbg
->reseed_interval
= interval
;
325 * Get and set the EXDATA
327 int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG
*drbg
, int idx
, void *arg
)
329 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg
->ex_data
, idx
, arg
);
332 void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG
*drbg
, int idx
)
334 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg
->ex_data
, idx
);
339 * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
340 * global DRBG. They lock.
343 static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out
, int count
)
348 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg
.lock
);
349 if (rand_drbg
.state
== DRBG_UNINITIALISED
350 && RAND_DRBG_instantiate(&rand_drbg
, NULL
, 0) == 0)
353 for ( ; count
> 0; count
-= chunk
, out
+= chunk
) {
355 if (chunk
> rand_drbg
.max_request
)
356 chunk
= rand_drbg
.max_request
;
357 ret
= RAND_DRBG_generate(&rand_drbg
, out
, chunk
, 0, NULL
, 0);
364 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg
.lock
);
368 static int drbg_add(const void *buf
, int num
, double randomness
)
370 unsigned char *in
= (unsigned char *)buf
;
371 unsigned char *out
, *end
;
373 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes
.lock
);
374 out
= &rand_bytes
.buff
[rand_bytes
.curr
];
375 end
= &rand_bytes
.buff
[rand_bytes
.size
];
377 /* Copy whatever fits into the end of the buffer. */
378 for ( ; --num
>= 0 && out
< end
; rand_bytes
.curr
++)
381 /* XOR any the leftover. */
383 for (out
= rand_bytes
.buff
; --num
>= 0 && out
< end
; )
387 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes
.lock
);
391 static int drbg_seed(const void *buf
, int num
)
393 return drbg_add(buf
, num
, num
);
396 static int drbg_status(void)
400 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg
.lock
);
401 if (rand_drbg
.state
== DRBG_UNINITIALISED
)
402 RAND_DRBG_instantiate(&rand_drbg
, NULL
, 0);
403 ret
= rand_drbg
.state
== DRBG_READY
? 1 : 0;
404 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg
.lock
);
408 RAND_DRBG rand_drbg
; /* The default global DRBG. */
409 RAND_DRBG priv_drbg
; /* The global private-key DRBG. */
411 RAND_METHOD rand_meth
= {
420 RAND_METHOD
*RAND_OpenSSL(void)