2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
20 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
25 #include <sys/types.h>
26 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
27 # include <sys/stat.h>
35 # define fdopen _fdopen
37 # define fileno _fileno
42 * Following should not be needed, and we could have been stricter
43 * and demand S_IS*. But some systems just don't comply... Formally
44 * below macros are "anatomically incorrect", because normally they
45 * would look like ((m) & MASK == TYPE), but since MASK availability
46 * is as questionable, we settle for this poor-man fallback...
48 # if !defined(S_ISREG)
49 # define S_ISREG(m) ((m) & S_IFREG)
52 #define RAND_BUF_SIZE 1024
55 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
57 * __FILE_ptr32 is a type provided by DEC C headers (types.h specifically)
58 * to make sure the FILE* is a 32-bit pointer no matter what. We know that
59 * stdio functions return this type (a study of stdio.h proves it).
61 * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
62 * passing in sharing options being disabled by /STANDARD=ANSI89
64 static __FILE_ptr32 (*const vms_fopen
)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
65 (__FILE_ptr32 (*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen
;
66 # define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS \
67 "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
68 # define openssl_fopen(fname, mode) vms_fopen((fname), (mode), VMS_OPEN_ATTRS)
72 * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
73 * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c If |bytes| is
74 * -1 read the complete file; otherwise read the specified amount.
76 int RAND_load_file(const char *file
, long bytes
)
79 * The load buffer size exceeds the chunk size by the comfortable amount
80 * of 'RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH' bytes (not bits!). This is done on purpose
81 * to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such
82 * a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk
83 * (unless it's the only one).
85 #define RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE (RAND_BUF_SIZE + RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH)
86 unsigned char buf
[RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE
];
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
97 if ((in
= openssl_fopen(file
, "rb")) == NULL
) {
98 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE
, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE
);
99 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file
);
103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
104 if (fstat(fileno(in
), &sb
) < 0) {
105 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE
, RAND_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
106 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file
);
112 if (S_ISREG(sb
.st_mode
))
115 bytes
= RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH
;
119 * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation
120 * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here.
121 * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer
122 * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
126 # pragma environment save
127 # pragma message disable maylosedata2
130 * Don't buffer, because even if |file| is regular file, we have
131 * no control over the buffer, so why would we want a copy of its
132 * contents lying around?
135 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC)
136 # pragma environment restore
141 n
= (bytes
<= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE
) ? (int)bytes
: RAND_BUF_SIZE
;
143 n
= RAND_LOAD_BUF_SIZE
;
144 i
= fread(buf
, 1, n
, in
);
146 if (ferror(in
) && errno
== EINTR
){
155 RAND_add(buf
, i
, (double)i
);
158 /* If given a bytecount, and we did it, break. */
159 if (bytes
> 0 && (bytes
-= i
) <= 0)
163 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
, sizeof(buf
));
165 if (!RAND_status()) {
166 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_LOAD_FILE
, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR
);
167 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file
);
174 int RAND_write_file(const char *file
)
176 unsigned char buf
[RAND_BUF_SIZE
];
179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
182 if (stat(file
, &sb
) >= 0 && !S_ISREG(sb
.st_mode
)) {
183 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE
, RAND_R_NOT_A_REGULAR_FILE
);
184 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file
);
189 /* Collect enough random data. */
190 if (RAND_priv_bytes(buf
, (int)sizeof(buf
)) != 1)
193 #if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && \
194 !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
200 * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
201 * should be restrictive from the start
203 int fd
= open(file
, O_WRONLY
| O_CREAT
| O_BINARY
, 0600);
205 out
= fdopen(fd
, "wb");
209 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
211 * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
212 * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
213 * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
214 * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
215 * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
216 * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
217 * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
218 * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
219 * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
220 * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
221 * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
222 * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
223 * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
224 * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
225 * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
227 out
= openssl_fopen(file
, "rb+");
231 out
= openssl_fopen(file
, "wb");
233 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE
, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE
);
234 ERR_add_error_data(2, "Filename=", file
);
238 #if !defined(NO_CHMOD) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
240 * Yes it's late to do this (see above comment), but better than nothing.
245 ret
= fwrite(buf
, 1, RAND_BUF_SIZE
, out
);
247 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
, RAND_BUF_SIZE
);
251 const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf
, size_t size
)
255 int use_randfile
= 1;
257 #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
261 /* Look up various environment variables. */
262 if ((envlen
= GetEnvironmentVariableW(var
= L
"RANDFILE", NULL
, 0)) == 0) {
264 if ((envlen
= GetEnvironmentVariableW(var
= L
"HOME", NULL
, 0)) == 0
265 && (envlen
= GetEnvironmentVariableW(var
= L
"USERPROFILE",
267 envlen
= GetEnvironmentVariableW(var
= L
"SYSTEMROOT", NULL
, 0);
270 /* If we got a value, allocate space to hold it and then get it. */
273 WCHAR
*val
= _alloca(envlen
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
275 if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(var
, val
, envlen
) < envlen
276 && (sz
= WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8
, 0, val
, -1, NULL
, 0,
279 if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8
, 0, val
, -1, s
, sz
,
285 if ((s
= ossl_safe_getenv("RANDFILE")) == NULL
|| *s
== '\0') {
287 s
= ossl_safe_getenv("HOME");
292 if (!use_randfile
&& s
== NULL
)
295 if (s
== NULL
|| *s
== '\0')
304 if (len
+ 1 + strlen(RFILE
) + 1 >= size
)
307 #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS