2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
12 * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
18 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "rsa_local.h"
22 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA
*rsa
, int bits
, int primes
, BIGNUM
*e_value
,
26 * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
27 * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
28 * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
29 * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
30 * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
32 int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA
*rsa
, int bits
, BIGNUM
*e_value
, BN_GENCB
*cb
)
34 if (rsa
->meth
->rsa_keygen
!= NULL
)
35 return rsa
->meth
->rsa_keygen(rsa
, bits
, e_value
, cb
);
37 return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa
, bits
, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM
,
41 int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA
*rsa
, int bits
, int primes
,
42 BIGNUM
*e_value
, BN_GENCB
*cb
)
45 /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */
46 if (rsa
->meth
->rsa_multi_prime_keygen
!= NULL
) {
47 return rsa
->meth
->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa
, bits
, primes
,
49 } else if (rsa
->meth
->rsa_keygen
!= NULL
) {
51 * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we
52 * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't
53 * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin
57 return rsa
->meth
->rsa_keygen(rsa
, bits
, e_value
, cb
);
61 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
62 return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa
, bits
, primes
, e_value
, cb
);
65 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA
*rsa
, int bits
, int primes
, BIGNUM
*e_value
,
71 return rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(rsa
, bits
, e_value
, cb
);
73 BIGNUM
*r0
= NULL
, *r1
= NULL
, *r2
= NULL
, *tmp
, *prime
;
74 int ok
= -1, n
= 0, bitsr
[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM
], bitse
= 0;
75 int i
= 0, quo
= 0, rmd
= 0, adj
= 0, retries
= 0;
76 RSA_PRIME_INFO
*pinfo
= NULL
;
77 STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO
) *prime_infos
= NULL
;
80 unsigned long error
= 0;
82 if (bits
< RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS
) {
83 ok
= 0; /* we set our own err */
84 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
88 if (primes
< RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM
|| primes
> rsa_multip_cap(bits
)) {
89 ok
= 0; /* we set our own err */
90 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN
, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID
);
100 r2
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
104 /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */
108 for (i
= 0; i
< primes
; i
++)
109 bitsr
[i
] = (i
< rmd
) ? quo
+ 1 : quo
;
111 /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
112 if (!rsa
->n
&& ((rsa
->n
= BN_new()) == NULL
))
114 if (!rsa
->d
&& ((rsa
->d
= BN_secure_new()) == NULL
))
116 if (!rsa
->e
&& ((rsa
->e
= BN_new()) == NULL
))
118 if (!rsa
->p
&& ((rsa
->p
= BN_secure_new()) == NULL
))
120 if (!rsa
->q
&& ((rsa
->q
= BN_secure_new()) == NULL
))
122 if (!rsa
->dmp1
&& ((rsa
->dmp1
= BN_secure_new()) == NULL
))
124 if (!rsa
->dmq1
&& ((rsa
->dmq1
= BN_secure_new()) == NULL
))
126 if (!rsa
->iqmp
&& ((rsa
->iqmp
= BN_secure_new()) == NULL
))
129 /* initialize multi-prime components */
130 if (primes
> RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM
) {
131 rsa
->version
= RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI
;
132 prime_infos
= sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL
, primes
- 2);
133 if (prime_infos
== NULL
)
135 if (rsa
->prime_infos
!= NULL
) {
136 /* could this happen? */
137 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa
->prime_infos
, rsa_multip_info_free
);
139 rsa
->prime_infos
= prime_infos
;
141 /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */
142 for (i
= 2; i
< primes
; i
++) {
143 pinfo
= rsa_multip_info_new();
146 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos
, pinfo
);
150 if (BN_copy(rsa
->e
, e_value
) == NULL
)
153 /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */
154 for (i
= 0; i
< primes
; i
++) {
163 pinfo
= sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos
, i
- 2);
166 BN_set_flags(prime
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
170 if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime
, bitsr
[i
] + adj
, 0, NULL
, NULL
, cb
))
173 * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3...
174 * (those primes prior to this one)
179 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
187 prev_prime
= sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos
,
190 if (!BN_cmp(prime
, prev_prime
)) {
195 if (!BN_sub(r2
, prime
, BN_value_one()))
198 BN_set_flags(r2
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
199 if (BN_mod_inverse(r1
, r2
, rsa
->e
, ctx
) != NULL
) {
200 /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
203 error
= ERR_peek_last_error();
204 if (ERR_GET_LIB(error
) == ERR_LIB_BN
205 && ERR_GET_REASON(error
) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE
) {
211 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb
, 2, n
++))
217 /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */
219 /* we get at least 2 primes */
220 if (!BN_mul(r1
, rsa
->p
, rsa
->q
, ctx
))
223 /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */
224 if (!BN_mul(r1
, rsa
->n
, prime
, ctx
))
227 /* i == 0, do nothing */
228 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb
, 3, i
))
233 * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
234 * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
235 * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime.
237 * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of
238 * the way factors are generated.
240 * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the
241 * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at
242 * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private
243 * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered
244 * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9.
246 if (!BN_rshift(r2
, r1
, bitse
- 4))
248 bitst
= BN_get_word(r2
);
250 if (bitst
< 0x9 || bitst
> 0xF) {
252 * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to
253 * meet length requirement.
255 * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length.
257 * This strategy has the following goals:
259 * 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
260 * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
263 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb
, 2, n
++))
270 } else if (retries
== 4) {
272 * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used
273 * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times
283 /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */
284 if (i
> 1 && BN_copy(pinfo
->pp
, rsa
->n
) == NULL
)
286 if (BN_copy(rsa
->n
, r1
) == NULL
)
288 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb
, 3, i
))
292 if (BN_cmp(rsa
->p
, rsa
->q
) < 0) {
301 if (!BN_sub(r1
, rsa
->p
, BN_value_one()))
304 if (!BN_sub(r2
, rsa
->q
, BN_value_one()))
307 if (!BN_mul(r0
, r1
, r2
, ctx
))
310 for (i
= 2; i
< primes
; i
++) {
311 pinfo
= sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos
, i
- 2);
312 /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */
313 if (!BN_sub(pinfo
->d
, pinfo
->r
, BN_value_one()))
315 if (!BN_mul(r0
, r0
, pinfo
->d
, ctx
))
320 BIGNUM
*pr0
= BN_new();
325 BN_with_flags(pr0
, r0
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
326 if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa
->d
, rsa
->e
, pr0
, ctx
)) {
330 /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
335 BIGNUM
*d
= BN_new();
340 BN_with_flags(d
, rsa
->d
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
342 /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
343 if (!BN_mod(rsa
->dmp1
, d
, r1
, ctx
)
344 || !BN_mod(rsa
->dmq1
, d
, r2
, ctx
)) {
349 /* calculate CRT exponents */
350 for (i
= 2; i
< primes
; i
++) {
351 pinfo
= sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos
, i
- 2);
352 /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
353 if (!BN_mod(pinfo
->d
, d
, pinfo
->d
, ctx
)) {
359 /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
364 BIGNUM
*p
= BN_new();
368 BN_with_flags(p
, rsa
->p
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
370 /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
371 if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa
->iqmp
, rsa
->q
, p
, ctx
)) {
376 /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
377 for (i
= 2; i
< primes
; i
++) {
378 pinfo
= sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos
, i
- 2);
379 BN_with_flags(p
, pinfo
->r
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
380 if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo
->t
, pinfo
->pp
, p
, ctx
)) {
386 /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
393 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN
, ERR_LIB_BN
);
399 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */