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1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /*
11 * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
12 * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
13 * Geoff
14 */
15
16 #include <stdio.h>
17 #include <time.h>
18 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "rsa_local.h"
21
22 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
23 BN_GENCB *cb);
24
25 /*
26 * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
27 * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
28 * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
29 * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
30 * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
31 */
32 int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
33 {
34 if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL)
35 return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
36
37 return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM,
38 e_value, cb);
39 }
40
41 int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
42 BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
43 {
44 #ifndef FIPS_MODE
45 /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */
46 if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) {
47 return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes,
48 e_value, cb);
49 } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) {
50 /*
51 * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we
52 * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't
53 * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin
54 * subroutine...
55 */
56 if (primes == 2)
57 return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
58 else
59 return 0;
60 }
61 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
62 return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb);
63 }
64
65 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
66 BN_GENCB *cb)
67 {
68 #ifdef FIPS_MODE
69 if (primes != 2)
70 return 0;
71 return rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
72 #else
73 BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
74 int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
75 int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
76 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
77 STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
78 BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
79 BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
80 unsigned long error = 0;
81
82 if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
83 ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
84 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
85 goto err;
86 }
87
88 if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) {
89 ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
90 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
91 goto err;
92 }
93
94 ctx = BN_CTX_new();
95 if (ctx == NULL)
96 goto err;
97 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
98 r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
99 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
100 r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
101 if (r2 == NULL)
102 goto err;
103
104 /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */
105 quo = bits / primes;
106 rmd = bits % primes;
107
108 for (i = 0; i < primes; i++)
109 bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo;
110
111 /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
112 if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
113 goto err;
114 if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
115 goto err;
116 if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
117 goto err;
118 if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
119 goto err;
120 if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
121 goto err;
122 if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
123 goto err;
124 if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
125 goto err;
126 if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
127 goto err;
128
129 /* initialize multi-prime components */
130 if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
131 rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
132 prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2);
133 if (prime_infos == NULL)
134 goto err;
135 if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) {
136 /* could this happen? */
137 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
138 }
139 rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos;
140
141 /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */
142 for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
143 pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
144 if (pinfo == NULL)
145 goto err;
146 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
147 }
148 }
149
150 if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
151 goto err;
152
153 /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */
154 for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) {
155 adj = 0;
156 retries = 0;
157
158 if (i == 0) {
159 prime = rsa->p;
160 } else if (i == 1) {
161 prime = rsa->q;
162 } else {
163 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
164 prime = pinfo->r;
165 }
166 BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
167
168 for (;;) {
169 redo:
170 if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
171 goto err;
172 /*
173 * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3...
174 * (those primes prior to this one)
175 */
176 {
177 int j;
178
179 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
180 BIGNUM *prev_prime;
181
182 if (j == 0)
183 prev_prime = rsa->p;
184 else if (j == 1)
185 prev_prime = rsa->q;
186 else
187 prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos,
188 j - 2)->r;
189
190 if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) {
191 goto redo;
192 }
193 }
194 }
195 if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one()))
196 goto err;
197 ERR_set_mark();
198 BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
199 if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
200 /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
201 break;
202 }
203 error = ERR_peek_last_error();
204 if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
205 && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
206 /* GCD != 1 */
207 ERR_pop_to_mark();
208 } else {
209 goto err;
210 }
211 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
212 goto err;
213 }
214
215 bitse += bitsr[i];
216
217 /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */
218 if (i == 1) {
219 /* we get at least 2 primes */
220 if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
221 goto err;
222 } else if (i != 0) {
223 /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */
224 if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx))
225 goto err;
226 } else {
227 /* i == 0, do nothing */
228 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
229 goto err;
230 continue;
231 }
232 /*
233 * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
234 * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
235 * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime.
236 *
237 * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of
238 * the way factors are generated.
239 *
240 * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the
241 * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at
242 * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private
243 * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered
244 * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9.
245 */
246 if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4))
247 goto err;
248 bitst = BN_get_word(r2);
249
250 if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) {
251 /*
252 * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to
253 * meet length requirement.
254 *
255 * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length.
256 *
257 * This strategy has the following goals:
258 *
259 * 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
260 * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
261 */
262 bitse -= bitsr[i];
263 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
264 goto err;
265 if (primes > 4) {
266 if (bitst < 0x9)
267 adj++;
268 else
269 adj--;
270 } else if (retries == 4) {
271 /*
272 * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used
273 * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times
274 * is set to 4.
275 */
276 i = -1;
277 bitse = 0;
278 continue;
279 }
280 retries++;
281 goto redo;
282 }
283 /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */
284 if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL)
285 goto err;
286 if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL)
287 goto err;
288 if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
289 goto err;
290 }
291
292 if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
293 tmp = rsa->p;
294 rsa->p = rsa->q;
295 rsa->q = tmp;
296 }
297
298 /* calculate d */
299
300 /* p - 1 */
301 if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
302 goto err;
303 /* q - 1 */
304 if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
305 goto err;
306 /* (p - 1)(q - 1) */
307 if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
308 goto err;
309 /* multi-prime */
310 for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
311 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
312 /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */
313 if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one()))
314 goto err;
315 if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx))
316 goto err;
317 }
318
319 {
320 BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
321
322 if (pr0 == NULL)
323 goto err;
324
325 BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
326 if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
327 BN_free(pr0);
328 goto err; /* d */
329 }
330 /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
331 BN_free(pr0);
332 }
333
334 {
335 BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
336
337 if (d == NULL)
338 goto err;
339
340 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
341
342 /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
343 if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
344 || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
345 BN_free(d);
346 goto err;
347 }
348
349 /* calculate CRT exponents */
350 for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
351 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
352 /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
353 if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) {
354 BN_free(d);
355 goto err;
356 }
357 }
358
359 /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
360 BN_free(d);
361 }
362
363 {
364 BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
365
366 if (p == NULL)
367 goto err;
368 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
369
370 /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
371 if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
372 BN_free(p);
373 goto err;
374 }
375
376 /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
377 for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
378 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
379 BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
380 if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) {
381 BN_free(p);
382 goto err;
383 }
384 }
385
386 /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
387 BN_free(p);
388 }
389
390 ok = 1;
391 err:
392 if (ok == -1) {
393 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
394 ok = 0;
395 }
396 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
397 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
398 return ok;
399 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
400 }