1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
61 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
62 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
63 #include <openssl/objects.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509.h>
65 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
68 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
71 const X509_CINF
*ai
, *bi
;
75 i
= ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai
->serialNumber
, &bi
->serialNumber
);
78 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai
->issuer
, bi
->issuer
));
81 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
82 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509
*a
)
84 unsigned long ret
= 0;
85 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
91 f
= X509_NAME_oneline(a
->cert_info
.issuer
, NULL
, 0);
92 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_md5(), NULL
))
94 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx
, (unsigned char *)f
, strlen(f
)))
98 (ctx
, (unsigned char *)a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
.data
,
99 (unsigned long)a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
.length
))
101 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, &(md
[0]), NULL
))
103 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
104 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
107 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx
);
112 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
114 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a
->cert_info
.issuer
, b
->cert_info
.issuer
));
117 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
119 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a
->cert_info
.subject
, b
->cert_info
.subject
));
122 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL
*a
, const X509_CRL
*b
)
124 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a
->crl
.issuer
, b
->crl
.issuer
));
127 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL
*a
, const X509_CRL
*b
)
129 return memcmp(a
->sha1_hash
, b
->sha1_hash
, 20);
132 X509_NAME
*X509_get_issuer_name(X509
*a
)
134 return (a
->cert_info
.issuer
);
137 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509
*x
)
139 return (X509_NAME_hash(x
->cert_info
.issuer
));
142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
143 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509
*x
)
145 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x
->cert_info
.issuer
));
149 X509_NAME
*X509_get_subject_name(X509
*a
)
151 return (a
->cert_info
.subject
);
154 ASN1_INTEGER
*X509_get_serialNumber(X509
*a
)
156 return &a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
;
159 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509
*x
)
161 return (X509_NAME_hash(x
->cert_info
.subject
));
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
165 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509
*x
)
167 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x
->cert_info
.subject
));
172 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
173 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
174 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
175 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
176 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
177 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
179 int X509_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
182 /* ensure hash is valid */
183 X509_check_purpose((X509
*)a
, -1, 0);
184 X509_check_purpose((X509
*)b
, -1, 0);
186 rv
= memcmp(a
->sha1_hash
, b
->sha1_hash
, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
189 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
190 if (!a
->cert_info
.enc
.modified
&& !b
->cert_info
.enc
.modified
) {
191 rv
= (int)(a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
- b
->cert_info
.enc
.len
);
194 return memcmp(a
->cert_info
.enc
.enc
, b
->cert_info
.enc
.enc
,
195 a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
);
200 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME
*a
, const X509_NAME
*b
)
204 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
206 if (!a
->canon_enc
|| a
->modified
) {
207 ret
= i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME
*)a
, NULL
);
212 if (!b
->canon_enc
|| b
->modified
) {
213 ret
= i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME
*)b
, NULL
);
218 ret
= a
->canon_enclen
- b
->canon_enclen
;
223 return memcmp(a
->canon_enc
, b
->canon_enc
, a
->canon_enclen
);
227 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME
*x
)
229 unsigned long ret
= 0;
230 unsigned char md
[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
232 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
233 i2d_X509_NAME(x
, NULL
);
234 if (!EVP_Digest(x
->canon_enc
, x
->canon_enclen
, md
, NULL
, EVP_sha1(),
238 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
239 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
246 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
247 * this is reasonably efficient.
250 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME
*x
)
252 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
253 unsigned long ret
= 0;
254 unsigned char md
[16];
259 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
260 i2d_X509_NAME(x
, NULL
);
261 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
262 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx
, EVP_md5(), NULL
)
263 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx
, x
->bytes
->data
, x
->bytes
->length
)
264 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
))
265 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
266 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
268 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
274 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
275 X509
*X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509_NAME
*name
,
276 ASN1_INTEGER
*serial
)
279 X509 x
, *x509
= NULL
;
284 x
.cert_info
.serialNumber
= *serial
;
285 x
.cert_info
.issuer
= name
;
287 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
288 x509
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
289 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509
, &x
) == 0)
295 X509
*X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509_NAME
*name
)
300 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
301 x509
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
302 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509
), name
) == 0)
308 EVP_PKEY
*X509_get0_pubkey(X509
*x
)
312 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x
->cert_info
.key
);
315 EVP_PKEY
*X509_get_pubkey(X509
*x
)
319 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x
->cert_info
.key
);
322 ASN1_BIT_STRING
*X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509
*x
)
326 return x
->cert_info
.key
->public_key
;
329 int X509_check_private_key(X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*k
)
334 xk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
337 ret
= EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk
, k
);
345 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY
, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH
);
348 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY
, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH
);
351 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE
);
359 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
360 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
361 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
366 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, int sign_nid
, unsigned long *pflags
)
368 const EC_GROUP
*grp
= NULL
;
370 if (pkey
&& EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_EC
)
371 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
373 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM
;
374 curve_nid
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
375 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
376 if (curve_nid
== NID_secp384r1
) { /* P-384 */
378 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
380 if (sign_nid
!= -1 && sign_nid
!= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
)
381 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
382 if (!(*pflags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
))
383 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
;
384 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
385 *pflags
&= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
;
386 } else if (curve_nid
== NID_X9_62_prime256v1
) { /* P-256 */
387 if (sign_nid
!= -1 && sign_nid
!= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
388 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
389 if (!(*pflags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
))
390 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
;
392 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE
;
397 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth
, X509
*x
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
402 unsigned long tflags
;
403 if (!(flags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
))
406 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
408 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, 0);
413 if (X509_get_version(x
) != 2) {
414 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION
;
415 /* Correct error depth */
420 pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
421 /* Check EE key only */
422 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, -1, &tflags
);
423 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
424 /* Correct error depth */
428 for (; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
429 sign_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
430 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
431 if (X509_get_version(x
) != 2) {
432 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION
;
435 pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
436 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, sign_nid
, &tflags
);
441 /* Final check: root CA signature */
442 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, X509_get_signature_nid(x
), &tflags
);
444 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
445 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
446 if ((rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
447 || rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
) && i
)
450 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
451 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
453 if (rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
&& flags
!= tflags
)
454 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256
;
461 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL
*crl
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, unsigned long flags
)
464 if (!(flags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
))
466 sign_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(crl
->crl
.sig_alg
.algorithm
);
467 return check_suite_b(pk
, sign_nid
, &flags
);
471 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth
, X509
*x
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
477 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL
*crl
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, unsigned long flags
)
484 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
485 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
486 * each X509 structure.
488 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
492 ret
= sk_X509_dup(chain
);
493 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ret
); i
++) {
494 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ret
, i
);