1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
63 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include <internal/dane.h>
73 #include <internal/x509_int.h>
76 /* CRL score values */
78 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
88 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
115 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
118 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
119 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
120 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
122 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
123 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
124 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
125 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
126 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
127 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
128 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
130 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
131 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
132 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
133 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
134 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
135 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
136 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
137 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
139 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
140 unsigned int *preasons
);
141 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
142 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
143 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
144 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
146 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
148 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
157 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
158 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
159 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
161 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
162 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
168 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
170 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
172 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
175 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
176 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
179 /* Look for exact match */
180 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
181 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
182 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
185 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
189 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
193 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
199 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
200 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
202 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
203 (ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
)) == 0 ||
204 (ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0 ||
205 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
206 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
207 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
210 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
212 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
214 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
215 if ((ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
)) == 0)
219 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
220 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
225 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
226 if ((ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
228 if ((ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
232 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
233 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
234 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
238 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
240 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
242 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
243 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
247 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
249 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
250 * cannot do another one.
252 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
257 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
258 * the first entry is in place
260 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
261 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
262 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
265 X509_up_ref(ctx
->cert
);
266 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
269 * If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
270 * DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
271 * keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in
272 * the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
274 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
275 return dane_verify(ctx
);
276 return verify_chain(ctx
);
280 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
283 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
286 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;;
287 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
288 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
289 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
291 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, 1))
298 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
300 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
304 return cert_self_signed(x
);
305 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
306 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
309 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
310 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
312 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
313 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
314 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
315 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
321 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
323 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
324 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
328 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
329 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
330 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
333 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
335 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
337 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
339 X509_up_ref(*issuer
);
345 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_NAME
*nm
)
347 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
350 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
351 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
352 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
354 sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
355 if (sk
== NULL
|| sk_X509_push(sk
, x
) == 0) {
356 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
366 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
367 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
369 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
372 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
375 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
376 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
378 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
379 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
380 * ctx->param->purpose!
382 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
383 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
384 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
385 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
386 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
388 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
389 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
392 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
393 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
396 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
398 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
401 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
407 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
413 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
414 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
415 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
416 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
420 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
424 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
426 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
428 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
430 int allow_proxy_certs
;
431 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
434 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
435 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
436 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
437 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
438 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
439 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
440 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
444 /* CRL path validation */
446 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
447 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
450 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
452 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
455 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
456 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
457 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
460 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
462 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
463 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
464 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
465 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
466 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
467 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
468 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
471 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
472 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
473 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
474 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
475 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
478 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
479 switch (must_be_ca
) {
481 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
482 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
484 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
491 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
497 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
500 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
506 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
507 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
508 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
512 if (!check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
515 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
516 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
517 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
518 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
519 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
520 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
521 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
522 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
525 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
526 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
529 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
530 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
531 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
533 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
534 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
535 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
536 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
537 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
538 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
549 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
553 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
554 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
555 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
556 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
557 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
560 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
561 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
562 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
565 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
566 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
568 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
569 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
571 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
572 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
573 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
582 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
584 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
585 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
586 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
587 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
590 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
593 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
596 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
597 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
598 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
600 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
601 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
602 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
608 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
610 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
612 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
613 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
616 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
617 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
620 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
621 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
627 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
632 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
633 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
637 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
638 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
640 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
641 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
642 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
643 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
649 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
650 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
651 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
652 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
654 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
655 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
656 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
657 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
658 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
660 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
665 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
666 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
668 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
669 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
671 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
674 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
676 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
677 * for a direct trust store match.
680 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
681 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
683 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
686 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
687 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
689 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
690 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
695 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
696 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
698 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
703 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
704 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
706 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
709 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
710 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
711 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
712 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
714 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
715 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
718 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
719 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
721 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
722 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
723 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
724 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
725 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
728 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
730 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
731 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
733 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
734 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
736 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
741 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
742 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
743 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
750 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
752 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
754 int ok
= 0, cnum
= 0;
755 unsigned int last_reasons
= 0;
756 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
757 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
758 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
759 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
760 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
761 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
762 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
763 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
764 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
766 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
768 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
770 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
773 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
774 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
777 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
778 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
783 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
786 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
792 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
794 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
804 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
807 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
808 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
809 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
817 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
822 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
824 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
829 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
830 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
831 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
832 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
837 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
841 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
842 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
849 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
850 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
854 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
855 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
860 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
861 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
864 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
865 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
868 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
869 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
875 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
880 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
881 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
882 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
884 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
885 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
886 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
887 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
888 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
890 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
891 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
893 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
895 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
897 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
898 best_score
= crl_score
;
899 best_reasons
= reasons
;
904 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
906 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
907 *pscore
= best_score
;
908 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
909 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
910 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
912 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
915 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
922 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
923 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
926 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
928 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
930 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
932 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
933 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
935 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
939 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
943 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
945 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
955 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
961 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
963 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
965 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
966 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
968 /* Base must have a CRL number */
969 if (!base
->crl_number
)
971 /* Issuer names must match */
972 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
974 /* AKID and IDP must match */
975 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
977 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
979 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
980 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
982 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
983 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
989 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
990 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
993 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
994 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
998 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1000 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1002 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1003 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1004 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1005 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1006 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1007 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1016 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1017 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1018 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1019 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1020 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1023 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1024 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1028 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1030 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1032 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1033 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1035 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1036 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1037 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1039 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1040 /* If no new reasons reject */
1041 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1044 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1045 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1047 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1048 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1049 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1052 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1054 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1055 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1058 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1059 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1061 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1062 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1064 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1066 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1069 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1071 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1072 /* If no new reasons reject */
1073 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1075 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1076 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1079 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1085 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1086 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1088 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1089 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1090 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1093 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1096 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1098 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1099 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1100 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1101 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1106 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1107 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1108 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1110 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1111 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1112 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1117 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1119 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1123 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1124 * untrusted certificates.
1126 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1127 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1128 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1130 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1131 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1132 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1139 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1140 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1141 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1142 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1145 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1147 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1149 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1152 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1155 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1156 /* Copy verify params across */
1157 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1159 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1160 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1162 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1163 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1168 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1170 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1172 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1177 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1178 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1179 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1180 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1181 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1185 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1186 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1187 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1189 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1190 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1191 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1192 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1198 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1199 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1200 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1201 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1202 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1205 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1207 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1208 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1209 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1216 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1220 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1225 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1227 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1228 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1231 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1232 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1236 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1238 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1239 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1240 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1242 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1248 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1250 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1251 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1252 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1253 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1254 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1263 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1266 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1267 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1269 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1270 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1271 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1272 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1274 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1280 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1282 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1283 unsigned int *preasons
)
1286 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1288 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1289 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1292 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1295 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1296 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1297 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1298 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1299 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1300 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1305 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1306 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1312 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1313 * to find a delta CRL too
1316 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1317 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1320 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1322 unsigned int reasons
;
1323 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1324 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1325 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1326 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1327 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1328 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1333 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1335 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1337 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1341 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1343 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1347 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1349 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1350 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1351 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1360 /* Check CRL validity */
1361 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1363 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1364 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1365 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1366 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1367 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1368 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1369 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1370 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1373 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1374 * certificate in chain.
1376 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1377 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1379 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1380 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1381 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1382 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1383 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1391 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1393 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1394 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1395 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1396 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1397 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1398 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1403 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1404 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1405 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1410 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1411 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1412 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1413 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1419 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1420 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1421 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1428 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1429 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1434 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1435 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1438 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1439 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1444 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1445 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1447 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1451 /* Verify CRL signature */
1452 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1453 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1454 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1467 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1468 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1473 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1474 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1475 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1476 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1478 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1479 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1480 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1481 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1486 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1487 * is not removeFromCRL.
1489 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1490 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1492 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1493 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1501 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1508 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1509 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1510 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1511 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1512 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1513 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1514 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1515 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1516 * X509_policy_check() call.
1518 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1519 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1522 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1523 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1524 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1525 sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1527 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1528 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1531 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1532 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1534 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1538 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1539 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1540 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1542 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1543 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1544 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1549 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1550 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1551 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1552 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1554 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1555 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1559 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1560 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1561 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1562 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1569 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int quiet
)
1574 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1575 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1576 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1581 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1585 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1586 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1587 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1594 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1595 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1596 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1600 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1604 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1605 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1606 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1613 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1614 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1615 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1622 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1626 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1628 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1629 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1630 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1633 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1634 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1635 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1637 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1643 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1646 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1651 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1652 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1653 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1657 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1658 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1663 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1664 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1667 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1670 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1671 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1674 if (xs
!= xi
|| (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)) {
1675 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1676 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1677 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1678 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1681 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1682 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1683 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1684 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1691 ok
= x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, 0);
1695 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1696 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1697 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1698 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
1705 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1713 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1715 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1718 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1723 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1724 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1727 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1728 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1730 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1731 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1732 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1733 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1735 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1736 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1737 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1738 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1739 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1746 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1747 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1748 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1749 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1757 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1768 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1769 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1770 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1772 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1775 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1776 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1785 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1794 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1796 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1799 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1800 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1802 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1803 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1807 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1809 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1810 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1812 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1815 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1816 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1818 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1819 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1828 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1829 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1835 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1837 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1840 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1842 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1845 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1846 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1855 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1856 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1857 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1858 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1859 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1861 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1864 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1866 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1869 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1872 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1873 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1875 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1876 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1879 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1883 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1884 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1888 /* first, populate the other certs */
1889 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1890 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1891 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1895 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1899 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1901 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1902 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1904 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1906 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1907 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1908 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1909 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1912 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1913 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1914 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1917 /* Issuer names must match */
1918 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1919 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1922 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1923 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1924 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1927 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1928 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1931 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1932 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
1933 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
1936 /* CRLs must verify */
1937 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
1938 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
1939 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
1942 /* Create new CRL */
1943 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
1944 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
1946 /* Set issuer name */
1947 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
1950 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
1952 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
1955 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1957 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
1961 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1962 * number to correct value too.
1965 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
1966 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
1967 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
1968 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
1972 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1974 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
1976 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
1977 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
1978 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
1980 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1981 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1983 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
1984 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
1987 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
1988 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
1993 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
1995 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2001 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2006 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2008 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2011 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2013 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2016 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2021 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2026 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2028 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2031 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2033 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2036 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2041 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2045 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2048 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2050 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2053 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2055 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2058 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2063 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2068 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2070 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2073 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2078 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2081 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2082 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2083 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2085 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2088 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2091 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2092 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2094 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2098 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2099 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2100 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2101 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2102 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2103 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2104 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2108 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2109 int purpose
, int trust
)
2112 /* If purpose not set use default */
2114 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2115 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2118 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2120 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2121 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2124 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2125 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2126 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2128 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2129 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2130 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2133 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2134 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2137 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2139 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2141 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2144 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2146 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2147 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2152 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2153 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2154 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2155 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2159 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2161 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2164 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2170 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2174 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2178 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2179 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2184 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2186 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2188 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2189 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2193 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2194 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2195 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2196 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2197 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2198 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2199 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2203 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2204 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2205 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2208 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2209 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2210 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2214 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2215 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2217 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2219 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2220 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2222 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2224 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2225 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2227 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2229 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2230 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2232 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2234 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2235 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2237 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2239 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2240 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2242 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2244 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2245 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2247 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2249 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2250 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2252 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2254 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2255 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2257 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2259 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2260 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2262 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2264 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2266 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2267 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2268 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2273 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2276 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2278 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2281 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2282 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2285 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2290 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2291 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2293 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2294 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2295 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2298 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2301 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2304 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2308 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2309 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2311 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2316 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2317 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2320 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2322 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2323 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2324 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2327 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2330 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2331 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2332 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2333 * pointers below after they're freed!
2335 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2336 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2338 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2340 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2341 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2342 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2345 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2347 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2349 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2350 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2353 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2355 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2358 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2360 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2363 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2366 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2369 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2370 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2372 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2375 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2380 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2382 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2385 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2387 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2390 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2392 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2393 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2396 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2399 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2404 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2406 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2410 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, struct dane_st
*dane
)
2415 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2418 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2420 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2424 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2427 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2428 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2430 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2431 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2434 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2438 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2439 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2443 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2447 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2449 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2451 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2452 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2453 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2454 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2455 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2456 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2457 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2458 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2459 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2460 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2464 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2467 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2470 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2472 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2473 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2476 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2477 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2478 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2480 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2481 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2484 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2485 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2487 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2489 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2490 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2491 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2492 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2494 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2495 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2496 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2498 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2499 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2500 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2501 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2502 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2503 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2504 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2506 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2507 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2508 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2509 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2511 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2512 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2513 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2514 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2516 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2519 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2520 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2521 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2523 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2524 selector
= t
->selector
;
2526 /* Update per-selector state */
2527 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2528 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2532 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2533 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2534 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2535 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2539 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2541 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2542 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2543 * other than "Full".
2545 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2550 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2551 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2553 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2554 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2560 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2568 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2569 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2572 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2573 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2574 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2576 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2577 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2579 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2587 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2588 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2592 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2594 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2598 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2599 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2602 * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2603 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2604 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2606 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2607 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2608 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2610 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2611 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2614 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2617 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2619 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2621 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2622 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2623 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2626 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2627 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2628 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2629 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2630 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2631 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2634 /* Clear PKIX-?? matches that failed to panned out to a full chain */
2635 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2638 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2639 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2640 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2643 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2644 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2645 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2646 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2648 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2651 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2654 static void dane_reset(struct dane_st
*dane
)
2657 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2659 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2666 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2668 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2670 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
2672 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2673 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2675 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
2678 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2680 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2681 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2687 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2688 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2691 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2694 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2696 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2697 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2698 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2702 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2703 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2704 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2709 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2710 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2712 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2713 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2714 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
;
2715 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
2719 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2720 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2722 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2725 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2727 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2728 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2729 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2730 int ss
= cert_self_signed(cert
);
2731 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
2732 unsigned int search
;
2733 int may_trusted
= 0;
2734 int may_alternate
= 0;
2735 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2736 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2741 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2742 OPENSSL_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
);
2744 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2745 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2746 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2748 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2749 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2750 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2751 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2752 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2754 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
2755 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
2756 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
2757 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2758 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
2764 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2765 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2766 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2768 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
2769 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2773 /* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */
2774 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
2775 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(dane
->certs
); ++i
) {
2776 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp
, sk_X509_value(dane
->certs
, i
))) {
2777 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
2778 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2785 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2786 * might be reasonable.
2788 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
2789 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
2792 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2793 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2794 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2796 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
2798 while (search
!= 0) {
2803 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2804 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When
2805 * we exceed the depth limit, we simulate absence of a match.
2807 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
2808 STACK_OF(X509
) *hide
= ctx
->chain
;
2810 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2811 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
2813 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2814 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2815 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2816 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2817 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2818 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2819 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2820 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2821 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2822 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2824 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2825 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2829 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
2831 /* Suppress duplicate suppression */
2833 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
2837 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2844 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
2845 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
2846 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
2847 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
2848 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
2849 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
2850 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
2851 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
2853 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
2854 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
2855 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
2857 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
2858 OPENSSL_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && ss
== 0);
2859 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
2860 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
2861 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2862 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
2864 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
2865 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
2867 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2870 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
2871 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2876 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
2877 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
2880 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
2882 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2883 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2887 ss
= cert_self_signed(x
);
2888 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
2890 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
2891 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
2892 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
2893 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
2895 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
2896 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
2901 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
2902 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
2907 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
2908 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
2909 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
2910 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
2912 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
2913 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
2914 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
2915 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
2916 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
2917 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
2920 OPENSSL_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
);
2921 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
2922 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
2923 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
2924 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
2934 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
2935 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
2936 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
2937 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
2939 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
2940 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
2941 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
2943 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
2944 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
2945 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
2947 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
2948 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
2949 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
2955 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
2957 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
2958 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2959 OPENSSL_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
);
2960 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
2961 xtmp
= (depth
< num
) ? NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
2964 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
2965 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
2968 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
2970 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2974 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
2975 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2976 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2981 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2982 ss
= cert_self_signed(xtmp
);
2985 * Not strictly necessary, but saves cycles looking at the same
2986 * certificates over and over.
2988 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, x
);
2991 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
2993 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
2994 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
2995 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3001 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3004 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3005 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3007 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3009 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3010 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3011 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3012 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3016 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3018 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3020 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3022 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3023 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
3024 ctx
->error_depth
= num
-1;
3026 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
;
3027 else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3028 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0))
3029 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
;
3030 else if (ss
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
3031 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
3033 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
3034 else if (ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
)
3035 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
3037 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
3038 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
3040 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);