2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include "internal/dane.h"
25 #include "crypto/x509.h"
26 #include "x509_local.h"
28 /* CRL score values */
30 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
32 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
34 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
40 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
42 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
44 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
46 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
54 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
58 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
62 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
66 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
67 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
68 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
69 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
70 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
71 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
72 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
73 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
74 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
75 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
76 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
77 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
78 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
79 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
80 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
81 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
82 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
84 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
85 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
86 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
87 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
88 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
89 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
91 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
93 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
94 unsigned int *preasons
);
95 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
96 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
97 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
98 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
100 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
102 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
107 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
115 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
116 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
122 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
124 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
126 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
135 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
139 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
158 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
159 ctx
->current_cert
= (x
!= NULL
) ? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
160 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
162 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
175 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
178 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
181 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
183 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
186 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
187 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 if (i
> 0 && !check_key_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
) == 0)
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 if (i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
) == 0)
207 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
217 (ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
)) == 0 ||
218 (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) == 0 ||
219 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
220 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
221 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
224 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
226 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
227 if ((ok
= verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
)) == 0)
231 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
232 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
236 if ((ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0)
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
240 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
241 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
243 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
247 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
248 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
249 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
253 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
255 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
258 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
259 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
260 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
264 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
266 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
267 * cannot do another one.
269 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
270 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
275 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
276 * the first entry is in place
278 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
279 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
280 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
281 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
284 X509_up_ref(ctx
->cert
);
285 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
287 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
288 if (!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
) &&
289 !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
))
292 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
293 ret
= dane_verify(ctx
);
295 ret
= verify_chain(ctx
);
298 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
299 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
300 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
302 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
303 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
308 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
310 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
313 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
315 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
316 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
317 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
319 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, -1))
326 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
328 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
332 return cert_self_signed(x
);
333 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
334 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
337 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
338 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
340 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
341 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
342 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
343 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
349 return (ret
== X509_V_OK
);
352 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
354 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
356 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
358 X509_up_ref(*issuer
);
364 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_NAME
*nm
)
366 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
370 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
371 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
372 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
374 sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
375 if (sk
== NULL
|| sk_X509_push(sk
, x
) == 0) {
376 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
377 X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
378 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
388 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
389 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
391 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
394 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
397 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
398 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
400 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
401 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
402 * ctx->param->purpose!
404 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
405 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
406 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
407 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
408 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
410 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
411 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
414 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
415 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
418 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
420 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
423 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
429 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
435 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
439 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
443 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
445 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
447 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
449 int allow_proxy_certs
;
450 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
453 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
454 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
455 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
456 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
457 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
458 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
459 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
463 /* CRL path validation */
465 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
466 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
469 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
470 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
473 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
475 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
476 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
477 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
478 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
479 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
))
482 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
483 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
484 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
))
487 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
488 switch (must_be_ca
) {
490 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
491 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
493 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
500 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
505 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
507 || ((i
+ 1 < num
|| ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
510 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
515 if (ret
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_OK
))
517 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
518 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
521 if ((i
> 1) && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
522 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
))) {
523 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
526 /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
527 if (i
> 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0)
530 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
531 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
532 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
534 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
536 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
537 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
538 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
539 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
541 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
542 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
543 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
544 * increment proxy_path_length.
546 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
547 if (proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
548 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
549 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
552 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
562 static int has_san_id(X509
*x
, int gtype
)
566 GENERAL_NAMES
*gs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, NULL
, NULL
);
571 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs
); i
++) {
572 GENERAL_NAME
*g
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs
, i
);
574 if (g
->type
== gtype
) {
579 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs
);
583 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
587 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
588 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
589 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
592 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
593 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
597 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
598 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
600 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
602 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
603 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
604 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
605 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
606 int last_object_nid
= 0;
608 int last_object_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
610 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
611 if (last_object_loc
< 1) {
612 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
613 goto proxy_name_done
;
617 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
618 * there is in issuer.
620 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
621 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
622 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
623 goto proxy_name_done
;
627 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
630 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
632 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
633 last_object_loc
- 1))) {
634 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
635 goto proxy_name_done
;
639 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
640 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
642 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
643 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
644 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
645 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
650 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_object_loc
);
652 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
654 if (last_object_nid
!= NID_commonName
655 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
656 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
659 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
660 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
664 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, err
))
669 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
670 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
671 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
674 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
675 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
678 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
680 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
681 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0
682 && (ctx
->param
->hostflags
683 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT
) == 0
684 && ((ctx
->param
->hostflags
685 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT
) != 0
686 || !has_san_id(x
, GEN_DNS
)))
687 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
692 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
695 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, rv
))
705 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
707 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
710 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
713 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
716 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
717 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
718 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
720 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
721 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
722 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
728 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
730 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
732 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
733 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
736 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
737 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
740 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
741 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
747 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
752 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
753 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
757 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
758 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
760 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
761 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
762 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
763 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
769 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
770 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
771 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
772 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
774 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
775 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
776 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
777 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
778 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
780 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
785 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
786 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
788 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
789 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
791 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
794 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
796 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
797 * for a direct trust store match.
800 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
801 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
803 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
806 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
807 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
809 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
810 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
815 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
816 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
818 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
823 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
824 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
826 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
829 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
))
830 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
831 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
834 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
835 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
837 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
838 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
839 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
840 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
841 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
844 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
846 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
847 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
849 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
850 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
852 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
857 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
858 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
859 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
866 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
868 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
870 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
871 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
873 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
874 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
875 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
876 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
878 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
881 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
882 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
884 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
886 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
888 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
890 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
893 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
896 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
897 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
902 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
905 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
911 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
913 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
923 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
926 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
927 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
935 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
939 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
941 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
947 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
948 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
949 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
950 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
955 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
959 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
966 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
970 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
971 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
976 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
979 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
980 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
983 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
989 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
994 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
995 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
996 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
998 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
999 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1000 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1001 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1002 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1004 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1005 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1006 reasons
= *preasons
;
1007 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1008 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
1010 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1011 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1013 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
1014 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
1017 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1020 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
1024 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1025 best_score
= crl_score
;
1026 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1030 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1032 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1033 *pscore
= best_score
;
1034 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1035 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1036 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1038 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1041 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1048 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1049 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1052 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1054 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1056 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1058 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1059 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1061 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1065 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1069 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1071 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1081 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1087 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1089 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1091 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1092 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1094 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1095 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1097 /* Issuer names must match */
1098 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1100 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1101 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1103 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1105 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1106 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1108 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1109 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1115 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1116 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1119 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1120 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1124 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1126 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1128 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1129 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1130 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1131 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1132 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1133 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1142 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1143 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1144 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1145 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1146 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1149 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1150 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1154 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1156 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1158 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1159 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1161 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1162 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1163 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1165 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1166 /* If no new reasons reject */
1167 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1170 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1171 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1173 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1174 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1175 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1178 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1180 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1181 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1184 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1185 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1187 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1188 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1190 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1192 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1195 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1197 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1198 /* If no new reasons reject */
1199 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1201 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1202 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1205 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1211 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1212 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1214 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1215 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1216 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1219 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1222 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1224 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1225 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1226 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1227 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1232 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1233 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1234 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1236 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1237 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1238 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1243 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1245 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1249 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1250 * untrusted certificates.
1252 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1253 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1254 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1256 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1257 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1258 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1265 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1266 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1267 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1268 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1271 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1273 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1276 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1279 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->store
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1282 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1283 /* Copy verify params across */
1284 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1286 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1287 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1289 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1290 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1294 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1295 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1297 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1302 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1303 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1304 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1305 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1306 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1310 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1311 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1312 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1314 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1315 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1316 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1317 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1323 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1324 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1325 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1326 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1327 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1330 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1332 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1333 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1334 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1341 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1345 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1350 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1352 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1353 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1356 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1357 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1361 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1363 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1364 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1365 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1367 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1373 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1375 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1376 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1377 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1378 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1379 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1388 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1391 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1392 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1394 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1395 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1396 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1397 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1399 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1405 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1407 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1408 unsigned int *preasons
)
1411 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1413 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1414 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1417 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1420 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1421 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1422 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1423 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1424 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1425 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1430 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1431 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1437 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1438 * to find a delta CRL too
1441 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1442 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1445 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1447 unsigned int reasons
;
1448 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1449 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1450 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1452 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1453 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1454 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1458 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1460 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1462 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1466 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1468 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1471 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1473 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1474 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1475 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1483 /* Check CRL validity */
1484 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1486 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1487 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1488 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1489 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1491 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1492 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1493 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1495 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1496 * certificate in chain.
1498 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1499 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1501 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1502 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1503 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1504 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1512 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1514 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1515 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1516 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1517 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) &&
1518 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1521 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) &&
1522 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1525 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) &&
1526 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1527 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1530 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) &&
1531 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1535 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) &&
1536 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1539 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1540 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1543 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1547 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1549 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1551 /* Verify CRL signature */
1552 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1553 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1559 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1560 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1565 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1566 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1567 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1568 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1570 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1571 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) &&
1572 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1575 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1576 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1578 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1579 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1581 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1588 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1595 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1596 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1597 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1598 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1599 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1600 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1601 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1602 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1603 * X509_policy_check() call.
1605 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1606 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1607 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1610 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1611 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1612 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1613 sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1615 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1616 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1617 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1620 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1621 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1624 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1625 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1626 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1628 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1630 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
1631 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
))
1636 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1637 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1638 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1639 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1641 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1642 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1646 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1647 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1649 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1650 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1651 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1652 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1654 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1662 * Check certificate validity times.
1663 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1664 * the validation status.
1666 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1668 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1673 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1674 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1675 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1680 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1681 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1683 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1684 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
))
1686 if (i
> 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1689 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1690 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1692 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1693 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
))
1695 if (i
< 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1700 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1702 int n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1703 X509
*xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1707 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1708 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1709 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1711 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1717 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1720 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1725 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, 0,
1726 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1728 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1729 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1733 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1734 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1740 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1741 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1742 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1743 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1745 if (xs
!= xi
|| (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)) {
1746 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1747 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, xi
!= xs
? n
+1 : n
,
1748 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1750 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1751 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xs
, n
,
1752 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1758 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1759 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1763 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1766 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1767 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1768 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1769 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1774 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1780 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1782 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1785 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1787 static const size_t utctime_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1788 static const size_t generalizedtime_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1789 ASN1_TIME
*asn1_cmp_time
= NULL
;
1790 int i
, day
, sec
, ret
= 0;
1791 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1792 const char upper_z
= 0x5A;
1794 const char upper_z
= 'Z';
1797 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1798 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1799 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1800 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1802 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1803 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1804 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1805 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1807 switch (ctm
->type
) {
1808 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME
:
1809 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(utctime_length
))
1812 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
:
1813 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(generalizedtime_length
))
1821 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1822 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1823 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1825 for (i
= 0; i
< ctm
->length
- 1; i
++) {
1826 if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm
->data
[i
]))
1829 if (ctm
->data
[ctm
->length
- 1] != upper_z
)
1833 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1834 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1835 * so we go through ASN.1
1837 asn1_cmp_time
= X509_time_adj(NULL
, 0, cmp_time
);
1838 if (asn1_cmp_time
== NULL
)
1840 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, ctm
, asn1_cmp_time
))
1844 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1845 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1847 ret
= (day
>= 0 && sec
>= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1850 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time
);
1854 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1856 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1859 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1861 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1864 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1865 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1874 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1875 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1876 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1877 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1878 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1880 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1883 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1885 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1888 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1891 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1892 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1894 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1895 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1898 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1902 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1903 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1907 /* first, populate the other certs */
1908 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1909 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1910 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1914 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1918 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1920 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1921 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1923 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1925 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1926 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1927 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1928 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1931 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1932 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1933 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1936 /* Issuer names must match */
1937 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1938 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1941 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1942 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1943 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1946 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1947 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1950 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1951 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
1955 /* CRLs must verify */
1956 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
1957 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
1958 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
1961 /* Create new CRL */
1962 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
1963 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
1965 /* Set issuer name */
1966 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
1969 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
)))
1971 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
)))
1974 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1976 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
1980 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1981 * number to correct value too.
1984 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
1985 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
1986 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
1987 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
1991 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1993 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
1995 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
1996 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
1997 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
1999 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2000 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2002 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2003 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2006 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2007 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2012 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2014 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2020 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2025 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2027 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2030 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2032 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2035 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2040 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2045 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2047 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2050 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2052 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2055 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2057 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2060 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2062 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2065 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2070 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2074 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2077 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2079 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2082 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2084 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2087 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2092 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2097 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2102 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2105 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2106 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2107 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2109 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2112 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2115 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2116 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2118 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2122 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2123 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2124 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2125 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2126 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2127 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2128 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2132 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2133 int purpose
, int trust
)
2136 /* If purpose not set use default */
2138 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2139 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2142 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2144 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2145 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2148 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2149 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2150 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2152 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2153 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2154 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2157 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2158 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2161 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2163 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2165 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2168 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2170 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2171 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2176 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2177 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2178 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2179 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2183 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2185 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2188 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2194 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2199 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2203 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2204 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2210 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2212 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2213 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2217 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2218 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2219 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2220 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2221 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2222 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2223 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2227 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2228 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2229 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2231 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2233 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2237 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2238 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2240 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2242 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2243 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2245 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2247 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2248 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2250 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2252 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2253 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2255 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2257 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2258 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2260 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2262 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2263 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2265 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2267 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2268 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2270 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2272 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2273 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2275 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2277 if (store
&& store
->check_policy
)
2278 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2280 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2282 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2283 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2285 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2287 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2288 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2290 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2292 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2293 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2294 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2299 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2302 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2304 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2307 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2308 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2311 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2316 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2317 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2319 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2320 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2321 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2324 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2327 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2330 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2334 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2335 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2337 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2342 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2343 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2345 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2347 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2348 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2349 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2352 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2355 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2356 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2357 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2358 * pointers below after they're freed!
2360 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2361 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2363 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2365 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2366 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2367 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2370 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2372 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2374 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2375 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2378 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2380 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2383 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2385 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2388 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2391 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2394 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2399 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2401 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2404 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2406 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2409 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2411 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2415 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2416 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2418 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2421 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2423 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2426 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2427 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2429 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2432 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2437 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2439 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2442 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2444 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2447 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2449 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2452 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2454 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2457 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2459 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2462 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2464 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2467 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2469 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2472 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2474 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2477 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2479 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2482 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2484 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2487 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2492 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2494 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2497 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2499 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2502 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2504 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2505 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2508 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2511 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2516 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2518 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2522 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2527 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2530 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2532 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2536 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2539 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2540 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2542 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2543 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2546 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2550 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2551 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2555 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2559 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2561 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2563 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2564 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2565 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2566 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2567 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2568 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2569 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2570 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2571 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2572 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2576 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2579 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2582 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2584 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2585 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2588 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2589 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2590 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2592 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2593 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2596 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2597 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2598 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2599 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2601 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2602 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2603 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2604 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2606 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2607 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2608 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2610 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2611 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2612 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2613 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2614 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2615 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2616 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2618 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2619 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2620 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2621 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2623 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2624 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2625 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2626 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2628 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2631 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2632 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2633 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2635 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2636 selector
= t
->selector
;
2638 /* Update per-selector state */
2639 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2640 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2644 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2645 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2646 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2647 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2651 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2653 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2654 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2655 * other than "Full".
2657 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2662 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2663 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2665 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2666 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2672 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2680 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2681 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2684 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2685 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2686 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2688 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2689 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2691 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2699 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2700 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2704 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2706 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2710 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2711 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2714 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2715 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2716 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2718 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2719 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2720 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2722 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2723 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2726 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2729 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2731 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2733 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2734 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2735 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2738 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2739 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2740 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2741 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2742 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2743 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2746 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2747 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2750 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2751 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2752 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2755 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2756 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2757 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2758 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2760 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2763 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2766 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2769 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2771 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2778 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2780 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2782 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
2784 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
2787 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2789 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2790 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2797 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2798 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2799 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2800 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2801 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2803 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2804 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2805 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2806 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2808 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2809 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2812 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2815 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2816 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2818 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2819 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
2822 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2823 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2824 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2825 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2829 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2830 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2831 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2836 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2837 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2839 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
2843 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2844 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2846 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2849 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2850 static int get_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2852 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
2856 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
2857 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
2862 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2864 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2865 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2866 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2867 int ss
= cert_self_signed(cert
);
2868 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
2869 unsigned int search
;
2870 int may_trusted
= 0;
2871 int may_alternate
= 0;
2872 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2873 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2878 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2879 if (!ossl_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
)) {
2880 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2881 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
2885 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2886 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2887 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2889 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2890 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2891 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2892 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2893 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2895 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
2896 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
2897 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
2898 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2899 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
2905 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2906 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2907 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2909 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
2910 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2911 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2916 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2917 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2918 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2919 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2920 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2921 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2922 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2925 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
2926 if (sktmp
== NULL
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
2927 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2928 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2931 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(dane
->certs
); ++i
) {
2932 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp
, sk_X509_value(dane
->certs
, i
))) {
2933 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
2934 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2935 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2942 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2943 * might be reasonable.
2945 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
2946 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
2949 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2950 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2951 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2953 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
2955 while (search
!= 0) {
2960 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2961 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2962 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2963 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2965 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2966 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2967 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2968 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2969 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2970 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2971 * would be a-priori too long.
2973 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
2974 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2975 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
2977 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2978 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2979 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2980 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2981 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2982 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2983 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2984 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2985 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2986 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2988 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2989 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2993 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
2995 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
2998 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2999 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3006 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3007 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3008 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3009 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3010 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3011 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3012 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3013 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3015 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3016 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3017 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3019 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3020 if (!ossl_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && ss
== 0)) {
3021 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3023 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3024 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3028 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3029 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3030 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3031 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3033 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3034 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3036 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3039 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3040 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3045 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3046 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3049 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
3051 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3052 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3053 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3057 ss
= cert_self_signed(x
);
3058 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3060 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3061 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3062 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3063 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3065 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
3066 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3071 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3072 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
3077 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3078 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3079 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3080 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3082 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3083 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3084 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3085 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3086 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3087 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3090 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
)) {
3091 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3092 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3093 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3097 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3098 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
3099 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3100 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3110 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3111 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3112 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3113 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3115 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3116 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3117 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3119 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3120 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3121 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3123 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3124 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3125 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3131 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3133 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3134 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3135 if (!ossl_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)) {
3136 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3137 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3138 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3142 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
3145 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3146 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3148 xtmp
= (ss
|| depth
< num
) ? NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
3150 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3152 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3156 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3157 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
3159 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
3160 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3161 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3162 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3167 X509_up_ref(x
= xtmp
);
3168 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3169 ss
= cert_self_signed(xtmp
);
3172 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3174 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
3175 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3176 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3182 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3185 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3186 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3188 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3190 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3191 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3192 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3193 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3197 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3199 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3200 /* Callback already issued */
3202 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3204 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3206 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3207 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3208 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3209 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0))
3210 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3211 if (ss
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
3212 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3213 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
);
3215 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3216 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3217 if (ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
)
3218 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3219 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
);
3220 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3221 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3225 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3226 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3229 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3232 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3234 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3236 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3237 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3240 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3241 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3242 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3248 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3252 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3253 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3255 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3259 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3260 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3261 * self-signed or otherwise).
3263 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3265 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3268 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3272 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3273 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3275 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert
, NULL
, NULL
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3278 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];